Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Ontology and the Question of Living Well

Marc Warren Roberts

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Staffordshire University

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Abstract

This aim of this study is to investigate the manner in which Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work can be productively understood as being concerned with the question of living well, where it will be suggested that living well necessitates that we not only become aware of, but that we also explore, the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings. In particular, this study will make an original contribution to existing Deleuzian studies by arguing that what legitimises this conception of living well, and what can motivate us to engage in such a practice, is that a life that becomes aware of and explores the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment engenders is a life that reflects, or that is lived in accordance with, the challenging ontological account that can be discerned throughout Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work; a life lived in accordance with his open, dynamic and thoroughly temporal theory of Being or what I will suggest he came to refer to simply as ‘Life’. In addition, I will argue that in so far as each individual human being is to be understood as an ongoing and immanent expression of Life, an immediate expression of Life understood as a universal, impersonal and pre-individual dynamism, then a life that strives to explore the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings - a practice that I shall propose also necessitates that each individual strives to resist the diverse ways in which their present possibilities are continually hindered, thwarted and negated - is not only a life that strives to live in accordance with the temporal dynamism of Life, but is also a life lived in accordance with our own dynamic and thoroughly temporal being.
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Introduction

The aim of this study is to investigate the manner in which Gilles Deleuze’s individual work, and his collaborative work with Félix Guattari, can be productively understood as being concerned with the question of living well. In particular, I am going to argue that their work can be understood as suggesting that living well necessitates that we become aware of the manner in which each moment of our lives provides us with a plurality of forever renewed present possibilities, with an ‘open field’ of present possibilities for ‘living otherwise’. However, I am also going to argue that Deleuze’s work is profoundly concerned with the diverse ways in which our possibilities for living otherwise are continually hindered, thwarted and negated by the often restrictive, self-limiting modes of life that are part of the historical legacy that we have inherited and that continue to occlude an awareness of our present possibilities. In doing so, I shall propose that rather than seeking to simply make us aware of our present possibilities for living otherwise, the individual and collaborative work of Deleuze entails that living well is also concerned with exploring our present possibilities, a practice that necessitates that we continually attempt to resist the diverse ways in which those possibilities are hindered, thwarted and negated. However, in seeking to make us aware of, and in seeking to encourage us, to explore the possibilities for living otherwise that each moment engenders, Deleuze does not then move on to provide us with a fixed conception of what the content or the direction of our lives should be, he does not provide us with an organised, rigid plan for how our lives ought to be lived. This is to say that beyond seeking to make us aware of, and seeking to encourage us to explore, the forever renewed present possibilities for our lives, a practice that necessitates
that we also continually attempt to resist the diverse ways in which those possibilities are often occluded and constrained, Deleuze’s work does not address the question of living well by providing us with a fixed, overarching plan of how our life’s possibilities ought to be actualised. Rather, I am suggesting that his work seeks to raise and respond to the question of living well by sensitising us to the diverse ways in which our life’s possibilities are hindered, thwarted and negated such that, with this awareness, we are then better prepared to actively explore the possibilities for our lives and move beyond the often restrictive, self-limiting modes of life that we have inherited and that continue to occlude our present possibilities for living otherwise.

It is therefore possible to understand Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work as presenting a practical challenge to the manner in which we live our lives, a challenge that has its basis in a provocative accusation of the manner in which our lives are often, and have habitually been lived. This is to say that his work can be understood in terms of an accusation that all too often we do not live well, that all too often we are guilty of what Henry Miller called ‘the great crime’, ‘the great crime of not living life to the full’.¹ Understood as such, Deleuze’s work is not only an accusation that the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise are hindered, thwarted and negated, but also that we are all too often complicit in the circumscription of these possibilities, that we all too often fail to see, let alone explore and exploit the possibilities for living otherwise that each moment provides.² However, while Deleuze’s work can be understood as an accusation that we are often guilty of the crime of not living life to the full, it ought not to be understood as a resentful accusation, an accusation that is animated by recrimination and that seeks to engender within
us a sense of hopelessness, a sense that things cannot be otherwise. This is to say that his work ought not to be understood as an accusation that would seek to engender an overwhelming sense of guilt about how we have lived so far, a restrictive sense of shame at how our possibilities have been constrained or how we have unreflectively actualised our possibilities in accordance with what he proposes are the increasingly meagre and mundane modes of existence that characterise contemporary society. Rather, I am suggesting that Deleuze’s work can be understood as a provocative accusation, an accusation that seeks to challenge us to become aware of the manner in which the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment engenders have been constrained, and the manner in which we have been complicit in such constriction. This is to say that Deleuze’s work can be understood as seeking to sensitize us to the often restrictive, self-limiting modes of life that we have inherited in order to then challenge us to live well, to sensitize us to the diverse ways in which our present possibilities are circumscribed in order to then sting us into activity, to provoke us to begin to explore the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings.

But why should we take up this challenge, why should we concern ourselves with becoming aware of the present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings? What is the legitimacy or authority of the suggestion that living well necessitates becoming aware of and exploring our present possibilities, and what can motivate us to participate in such a practice, a practice that also necessitates that we become aware of, and continually attempt to resist, the ways in which those possibilities are occluded and constrained? The answer, I shall suggest, is that a life that strives to become aware of and
explore the open field of present possibilities that each moment brings, a life that strives to resist the ways in which life’s present possibilities are continually hindered, thwarted and negated, is nothing less then a life that reflects, or that strives to live in accordance with, what Deleuze came to refer to simply as ‘Life’. Before discussing this further, however, before discussing the relation between living well and Life, it is important to note that the term Life appears intermittently throughout Deleuze’s individual and collaborative texts, and when it does appear it is presented in a characteristically difficult, obscure and even quasi-mystical manner. For example, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, it is suggested that ‘not all Life is confined to the organic strata: rather, the organism is that which life sets against itself in order to limit itself, and there is a life all the more intense, all the more powerful for being anorganic’.\(^4\) In a similarly complex formulation in *Essays Critical and Clinical* - and in relation to the work of Samuel Beckett in particular - Deleuze proposes that: ‘Becoming imperceptible is Life, “without cessation or condition”…attaining to a cosmic and spiritual lapping’.\(^5\) However, Deleuze’s employment of the term Life receives its most explicit, although no less complex, treatment in *Immanence: a Life*, the last brief and difficult text that was published shortly before his death in 1995. In particular, Life is explicitly associated with the notion of immanence, with the notion of a ‘pure immanence’ or an ‘absolute immanence’, an immanence that is not immanent to something above and beyond it and which has therefore ‘purified’ itself of any notion of transcendence. For example, Deleuze writes that: ‘We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else. It is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing else is itself a life. A
life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is complete power, complete bliss’. 6

Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the manner in which Deleuze’s individual and collaborative works make reference to a variety of figures from across the life-sciences, the notion of Life, and Deleuze’s work more generally, has commonly been presented within that context. Therefore, prior to discussing how I propose to understand the notion of Life, I want to briefly highlight the manner in which Deleuze’s work has been employed in relation to the growing concern with open systems and complexity theory, along with recent developments in evolutionary theory and bio-philosophy, in so far as it provides the context from which I want to distinguish this study, and its concern with the relation between living well and Life. In order to first highlight the employment of Deleuze’s work in relation to open systems and complexity theory, it is important to note the suggestion that towards the end of the twentieth century there was, as it were, ‘a paradigm shift’ in the scientific study of biological life. 7

In particular, rather than attempting to understand, for example, a living organism in terms of its constituent parts, there was a focus on the organizing relations and processes between those parts, and therefore an understanding of the organism as a dynamic system. This is to say that it is insufficient to attempt to understand a living organism by solely attending to its DNA, proteins and other molecular structures, because one must also, as Capra has suggested, attend to ‘the ceaseless flow of energy and matter through a network of chemical reactions, which enables a living organism to continuously generate, repair and perpetuate itself’. 8 In addition, this systems view of organisms and natural phenomena more generally involves the awareness that, rather than being
conservative, ‘closed’ or, for all practical intents and purposes, isolated from their surroundings, most systems in nature are ‘open’ and therefore subject to continuous flows of matter and energy through them. One of the central factors that has accelerated this new systemic understanding of natural phenomena has been the advent of powerful digital computers that have made it possible to give a visual representation - or what is technically referred to as a ‘phase portrait’ - of the behaviour of a given system, and this has enabled the perception of an underlying order beneath the seemingly chaotic behaviour of systems. In particular, the creation of a phase portrait involves identifying a system’s relevant aspects or its ‘degrees of freedom’ - such as its velocity, position, pressure and temperature - and then condensing all that information into a single point such that, as the system changes, the point representing the system also changes and thereby traces or draws a given trajectory. While a given system may commence in a variety of ways it subsequently adopts a characteristic long-term behaviour or dynamic form such that the visual representation of that system’s trajectory forms a pattern, and this patterned visual representation is referred to as an ‘attractor’ because, metaphorically speaking, the system in question is attracted to this pattern whatever its starting point may have been.

While a variety of attractors have been discerned in natural systems, including the strangely tangled shapes that represent seemingly chaotic behaviour and that are therefore referred to as ‘strange’ or ‘chaotic’ attractors, one of the most startling features of attractors is their ability to spontaneously mutate into another attractor. This is to say that while a given natural system will display a characteristic long-term behaviour, and is thus guided by one attractor, any changes in the system’s degrees of freedom will subtly change the
existing attractor until, at a certain crucial point - what is technically referred to as a ‘bifurcation point’ - the attractor suddenly mutates into a different attractor and the system thereby adopts a different dynamic form. What is of central importance, however, for an understanding of the relation of Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work to open systems and complexity theory is the discovery that, rather than each physical system possessing its own specific attractor, there is only a limited number of attractors such that entirely different material systems can, as it were, ‘share’ the same attractor. Therefore, Manuel Delanda has suggested that attractors and bifurcations can be understood as ‘abstract’ or ‘virtual mechanisms’, as a form of ‘nonorganic life’ that is ‘incarnated’ in different physical systems, and yet are not analogous to Platonic Forms - if by this we mean that attractors have an independent existence in some supra-sensible, transcendent realm; as he makes clear, attractors and bifurcations ‘are intrinsic features of the dynamics of physical systems, and they have no independent existence outside of those physical systems’. However, DeLanda goes on to suggest that attractors are to be understood as a limited and ‘abstract reservoir of resources’ that are available for many different physical systems, and he identifies such an abstract reservoir with what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as ‘the machinic phylum’. Thus, he writes that:

I introduce the term “machinic phylum” to designate a single phylogenetic line cutting through all matter, “living” or “non-living,” a single source of spontaneous order for all of reality. More specifically, the attractors define the more of less stable and permanent features of this reality (its long term tendencies), and bifurcations constitute its source of creativity and variability. Or to put it more philosophically,
attractors are veritable “figures of destiny,” for they define the future of many systems.\textsuperscript{16}

In addition to its application to open systems and complexity theory, however, Deleuze’s work has also been situated within the tradition of modern biophilosophy which is said to run from Charles Darwin and August Weismann through to Henri Bergson and Sigmund Freud, while also incorporating the work of a diverse range of thinkers including Raymond Ruyer, Gilbert Simondon and Jacob von Uexkull.\textsuperscript{17} While the details of this complex work will not be discussed here, a productive way to illustrate the employment of Deleuze’s work in relation to this tradition is through the work of the contemporary zoologist Richard Dawkins and, in particular, his notion of the extended phenotype. Thus, Dawkins proposes that the current and prevailing orthodoxy in evolutionary theory is to think of genes as having a manifest effect - or what is technically referred to as a \textit{phenotypic expression} - that produces attributes or behaviours that are confined to, and that benefit, the individual organism in which those genes reside.\textsuperscript{18} For example, an organism can be said to possess a gene that finds phenotypic expression in that organism’s tail size, or another gene that finds phenotypic expression in the organism’s dam building behaviour. In addition to this, however, Dawkins suggests that the genes of an organism can extend beyond the organism in which they happen to reside, such that those genes find phenotypic expression in a second organism. For example, while the intended or definitive host of fluke parasites is birds, the flukes invade the horns of snails and manipulate their behaviour with regard to light, such that the snails engage in positive light seeking behaviour; in doing so, the snails venture up and out onto open sites where their horns, visibly pulsating with
fluke parasites, are eaten by birds - the flukes’ definitive hosts - who mistake the pulsating horns for insects. What is important to note here is that the genes of the fluke extend beyond the confines of its own body, they no longer merely have phenotypic expression with regard to its own attributes or behaviour, but influence the behaviour of the snail, such that the snail’s behaviour is to be understood as a phenotypic expression of fluke genes; as Dawkins notes: ‘The genes in one organism’s cells, then, can have extended phenotypic influence on the living body of another organism; in this case a parasite’s genes find phenotypic expression in the behaviour of its host’.20

Following this, Dawkins moves on to discuss ‘genetic action at a distance’ in which the genes of parasites can influence the behaviour of their hosts without physically living inside those hosts - such as the manner in which a cuckoo chick, through ‘supernormal stimuli’, manipulates the behaviour of an adult reed warbler such that the warbler feeds the cuckoo to the detriment of its own offspring. What is important to note about Dawkins’ notion of the extended phenotype, however, is not merely the extended phenotypic effects of genes, but the manner in which the phenotypic expression of genes is able to traverse species and genera such that, for example, the genes of a fluke are able to have phenotypic expression in a snail. As he makes clear: ‘From internal parasites we moved via cuckoos to action at a distance. In theory, genetic action at a distance could include almost all interactions between individuals of the same or different species. The living world can be seen as a network of interlocking fields of replicator power’.22 With striking similarity, Deleuze illustrates such ‘transversal communication’ between different species - as well as the symbiotic relationships between those species - with the example of the
manner in which some varieties of orchid, in order to ensure their own reproduction, manipulate the behaviour of wasps; in particular, he proposes that: ‘The wasp becomes part of the orchid’s reproductive apparatus at the same time as the orchid becomes the sexual organ of the wasp.’ The significance of such transversal communication between different species and genera is that it challenges the notion that evolution occurs exclusively in terms of filiation and descent in which the phenotypic expression of genes are confined to the organism in which they happen to be situated and are passed onto that species’ descendents. Indeed, when considering evolution - or what is referred to variously as ‘non-parallel evolution’, ‘nuptials’, ‘blocks of becoming’ or simply ‘involution’ - Deleuze makes it clear that ‘movement occurs not only, or not primarily, by filiative productions but also by transversal communications between heterogeneous populations’. Therefore, with respect to the productive connections between Deleuze’s work and modern evolutionary theory, Ansell-Pearson has suggested that the extended phenotype comes very close to what Deleuze and Guattari mean by transversal communication, ‘communication of matter and information across phyletic lineages without fidelity to relations of species and genus’. In particular, he proposes that: ‘The extended phenotype which communicates beyond the confines of the organism is a good way of capturing the significance of what Deleuze and Guattari call the machinic phylum in which evolution takes place via modes of symbiosis and contagion’.

The employment of Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work in relation to the life-sciences, as the foregoing brief overview begins to indicate, can therefore be understood as a challenging and stimulating area of research. However, there are also increasing examples of the manner in which Deleuze’s
notion of Life, rather than being situated within the context of the life-sciences, is being investigated in relation to more traditional, philosophical concerns. For example, Claire Colebrook has recently discussed the meaning of Deleuze’s employment of the term life by presenting it within the context of ‘the life of meaning’ and - by connecting Deleuze’s notion of life to his notion of sense - as the life of that sense that makes meaning possible. Thus, she proposes that Deleuze ‘gives the meaning of life as the life of meaning, the life that yields a sense that is grasped through meaning but which is irreducible to meaning’.

Moreover, rather than presenting life as the stable ground of sense, as that clearly demarcated horizon which would definitely explain sense, life is presented as an open, impersonal and dynamic power, as ‘the potentiality of sense’ such that ‘life is the giving of sense that can itself never be definitively said’. Similarly, the manner in which Deleuze’s immersion within the philosophical tradition, and his concern with ontology in particular, can be employed to investigate the traditional philosophical question of how one might live can be evidenced in Todd May’s Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction. In that work May argues that while both Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida approach the question of how one might live by rejecting ontology, Deleuze seeks to approach that question within the context of ontological inquiry. As May suggests:

For both Foucault and Derrida any approach to the question of being that goes by means of an account of an unchanging, pure nature or essence is misguided, for either historical or linguistic reasons. Misguided, and worse than misguided: harmful. To address the question of being by means of an account of what there is would seem to constrain human behavior to a narrow conformity. It would fail to keep alive the question
of how one might live. And that is the point at which they diverge from Deleuze, who approaches the question of how one might live not by abandoning ontology, but by embracing it.31

It is therefore within this context that I want to situate Deleuze’s notion of Life and the manner in which the question of living well can be understood in relation to it. This is to say that rather than investigating the notion of Life, and Deleuze’s work more generally, within the context of the life-sciences, I shall suggest that the concept of Life can be productively understood in ontological terms. Indeed, while Alain Badiou has produced one of the most provocative critiques of Deleuze’s philosophy32 - a critique that I shall argue Deleuze’s work is able to address - Badiou proposes that the name that Deleuze came to attribute to being, understood as an impersonal or neutral power, was Life.33 However, rather than simply being understood as an impersonal power, I shall argue that Life, understood in ontological terms, ought to be conceptualised in terms of an impersonal, temporal and thoroughly immanent power that is free from any remaining vestiges of transcendence.34 Indeed, in associating Life with an absolute immanence, with an immanence that excludes any notion of transcendence, Giorgio Agamben has noted the manner in which such immanence is to be understood in ontological terms and, in particular, in terms of an ontology of univocity. For example, he writes that: ‘The principle of immanence, therefore, is nothing other than a generalization of the ontology of univocity, which excludes any transcendence of Being’.35 However, in addition to arguing that Deleuze’s notion of Life can be understood in ontological terms as the impersonal, immanent and temporal nature of reality itself, I shall propose that Deleuze’s ontology, and his engagement with the philosophical tradition
more generally, also provides the conceptual tools by which to formulate a coherent account of the manner in which the living human being can be understood as an ongoing expression of Life. In particular, I shall suggest that the temporal character of each individual’s living present is to be understood as an ongoing expression of Life itself, an immediate or immanent expression of the universal, impersonal and thoroughly temporal nature of reality, such that a life that strives to become aware of and to explore the open field of present possibilities that each moment brings, a life that strives to resist the diverse ways in which those present possibilities are continually occluded and constrained, is not only a life that reflects, or that strives to live in accordance with Life, but is also a life lived in accordance with our own dynamic and thoroughly temporal being.

The intimate relation between Life and the living being, the manner in which each individual can be understood in terms of an expression of the universal temporality of Life itself, can perhaps begin to be evidenced most clearly in Deleuze’s *Immanence: a Life*. In particular, the notion of Life, or what he refers to as ‘a life’, and its relation to the living being, is explicated by means of a scene from Charles Dickens’ *Our Mutual Friend* in which a roguish, disreputable man, held in contempt by everyone, is discovered lying on the floor and on the verge of death. Suddenly, however, those watching over the dying man are said to ‘manifest an eagerness, respect, even love, for his slightest sign of life’ and, in doing so, they frantically try to save him and to save his life. As the dying man unexpectedly begins to recover, however, the people that moments before were trying to save his life, begin to turn colder towards him as once again he becomes for them the roguish, disreputable man that they had
held in contempt. Deleuze moves on to discuss the events surrounding the roguish man, and his relation to Life, by suggesting that:

Between his life and his death, there is a moment that is only that of a life playing with death. The life of the individual gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life…a “Homo tantum” with whom everyone empathizes and who attains a sort of beatitude…a life of pure immanence, neutral, beyond good and evil, for it was only the subject that incarnated it in the midst of things that made it good or bad.\(^{37}\)

In reading this, it perhaps becomes clearer to see why it has been suggested that, while representing Deleuze’s mature metaphysical reflections, the tenor of *Immanence: a Life* is, as it were, ‘almost spiritual’\(^{38}\). However, despite the seemingly obscure and spiritual tenor of this account of a life, it can provisionally be suggested that Deleuze is proposing that what the onlookers encounter when attending to the roguish man is Life understood as a universal, impersonal and immanent power. Indeed, it is precisely at that point when the rogue’s individual life begins to disperse that a life, Life understood as an impersonal power, becomes manifest and it is precisely this impersonal power, ‘neutral, beyond good and evil’, that the onlookers wish to save in so far as it is that universal and impersonal Life that their own specific lives ‘incarnate’ and with whom everyone is said to empathize.

Despite its brevity and its difficulty, what is therefore important to note about Deleuze’s presentation of a life in *Immanence: a Life* is that it can not only be understood as an attempt to elucidate the general characteristics of what I have referred to as the notion of Life, the manner in which it is to be understood as an impersonal, universal and immanent power, but there is also an
attempt to situate Life firmly within the context of the individual lives of human beings that are its incarnation or its ongoing and immanent expression. Indeed, while Dickens’ account is employed by Deleuze to suggest that a life can be encountered when an individual is on the point of death, it is suggested that a life can also be witnessed at birth, with babies and small children who are yet to fully develop the individual life and personal qualities that are present in older children and adults. As Deleuze makes clear, ‘very small children all resemble one another and have hardly any individuality…[and]…through all their sufferings and weaknesses, are infused with an immanent life that is pure power and even bliss’. Moreover, while a life is said to be witnessed most clearly at the birth of the individual - when the individual’s life and personal qualities are yet to develop - and also at the death of the individual - when the individual’s life is about to disperse - a life is presented in terms of an impersonal power that continually co-exists with every moment of an individual’s life. As Deleuze notes, ‘we shouldn’t enclose life in the single moment when individual life confronts universal death. A life is everywhere, in all the moments that a given living subject goes through’. Therefore, motivated by Deleuze’s concern in his last published work with the notion of a life and its place within the lives of human beings, this study will seek to make an original contribution to existing Deleuzian studies by formulating an account of the manner in which each individual, as an ongoing and immanent expression of the dynamic nature of Life, is presented with forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise.

In particular, I will suggest that living well necessitates that the individual becomes aware of and explores these present possibilities such that what legitimises this conception of living well is that it is a life that not only strives to
live in accordance with Life itself, but is also a life lived in accordance with our own dynamic, temporal being.

To clarify, the aim of this study is to investigate the manner in which Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work can be productively understood as being concerned with the question of living well, and the manner in which living well necessitates that we not only become aware of, but that we also explore, the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings. In particular, I am suggesting that what legitimises this conception of living well, and what can motivate us to engage in such a practice, is that a life that becomes aware of and explores the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings is a life that reflects Life itself, a life that is lived in accordance with the open, dynamic and thoroughly temporal nature of reality. Moreover, to the extent that each individual is to be understood as an ongoing and immanent expression of Life, then a life that strives to explore the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment engenders - a practice that also necessitates that each individual strives to resist the diverse ways in which their present possibilities are continually hindered, thwarted and negated - is not only a life lived in accordance with the dynamic nature of Life, but is also a life lived in accordance with our own dynamic, temporal being. Therefore, in so far as Deleuze and Guattari’s individual and collaborative work can be productively understood as being concerned with the question of living well, and in so far as living well is to be understood as living in accordance with Life, then the question of living well in Deleuze’s individual and collaborative works is intimately connected to the open and thoroughly temporal ontological account that is present throughout
those works. Before moving on to examine this in detail, however, it is important to note that in suggesting that a life that strives to explore our forever renewed present possibilities is a life that strives to live in accordance with Life itself then Deleuze’s work can be understood as possessing what might be referred to as ‘a Stoical orientation’. Indeed, it is productive to briefly clarify and distinguish what I am here referring to as Deleuze’s stoical orientation from the philosophical orientation of the Stoics in so far as it brings into relief important aspects of the relation between both Life and living well, and the human being and their present possibilities.

In order to do this, however, it is first necessary to clarify the meaning of the Stoic imperative to live in accordance with life, or what is sometimes referred to as living in accordance with nature, and to suggest that it should not be understood as advocating that we abandon the trappings of civilisation and return to nature, and still less does it mean that we should ‘throw off the shackles’ of civilisation and live as we see fit. As Staniforth has suggested, according to the Stoics the chief end of man is happiness and ‘happiness was attained by “living in accordance with Nature”’. This celebrated phrase is too easily misunderstood by the modern reader. It does not mean living the simple life, or the life of the natural man; still less does it mean living just as one likes. Rather, to live in accordance with nature is to live both in accordance with the nature of the universe, and to live in accordance with one’s own nature; in doing so, there is said to be no conflict between the two in so far as our natures are to be understood as being a part of the nature of the universe and also because we are by nature rational beings, the attribute that we share with and derive from the universe itself. What is important to note about this
relation, however, is that if the universe is said to possess a specific and
determinate nature, if the universe is said to be ‘rational, and alive and
intelligent’ and therefore governed by reason, a reason that we share with and
derive from the universe, then to live in accordance with nature would seem to
suggest that we ought to act in accordance with, and therefore actualise the
specific possibilities dictated to us by, the rational principle that organises
nature. Indeed, the manner in which living in accordance with nature appears
to suggest a fixed, overarching plan of how our life’s possibilities ought to be
actualised can be discerned in Diogenes Laertius’s suggestion that: ‘[T]he goal
becomes “to live consistently with nature”, i.e., according to one’s own nature
and that of the universe, doing nothing which is forbidden by the common law,
which is right reason, penetrating all things…So Diogenes says explicitly that
the goal is reasonable behaviour in the selection of things according to nature,
and Archedumus [says it is] to live carrying out all the appropriate acts.’

For Deleuze, however, living in accordance with Life does not entail a
fixed, overarching plan of how the possibilities for our lives ought to be
actualised. This is because Life, understood in ontological terms as a universal,
impersonal and thoroughly temporal power, does not possess some definite,
fixed determination that would dictate how our possibilities ought to be
actualised, but is instead to be understood as that which is continually becoming
different to what it is at any given moment, an irrepressible temporal power that
continually overcomes any present determination or identity in its interminable
drive to continually produce forever renewed present possibilities for being.

Indeed, in stressing the importance of the centrality of difference for Deleuze’s
work, and his ‘philosophy of life more generally’, Colebrook suggests that:
‘Deleuze’s philosophy of life is necessarily, avowedly and manifestly composed along a line of internal incoherence: philosophy must, if it is philosophical, think difference, even if difference is that which cannot be thought. Such an impossibility is not confined to philosophy and has to do with the very positivity of life’. 48 Therefore, while chapter one of this study will begin by providing an account of Life as an impersonal and expressive power through the employment of Deleuze’s ‘Spinozist concept of expressionism’,49 I shall move on to suggest that a formulation of the ‘positivity’, or thoroughly open and dynamic nature of Life can only be completed through the employment of Deleuze’s account of time, or what he refers to as ‘the passive synthesis of time’,50 that itself rests upon a challenging conception of the dynamic and ongoing return of difference. Moreover, while chapter three will formulate an account of the manner in which our forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise are continually hindered, thwarted and negated, and will seek to do so within the context of ‘nihilism’ - where nihilism must be understood as possessing a technical and specifically temporal sense - chapter four will formulate an account of how we might practically respond or ‘resist’ this circumscription of our present possibilities and, by doing so, not only become aware of, but also begin to explore, the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings.

Deleuze’s account of the passive syntheses of time, therefore, will be central to this study as whole, and while that account of time is not only complex and challenging but, as Deleuze himself acknowledges, profoundly paradoxical,51 then it will be given a detailed exposition in chapter two of this study. However, in order to highlight the thoroughly temporal nature of Life and
the manner in which living in accordance with Life does not, in contrast to the Stoics, suggest a fixed, overarching plan of how the possibilities for our lives ought to be actualised, it is here productive to note that there are three passive synthesis of time. Briefly stated, the first synthesis or what Deleuze refers to as ‘Habit’ is a retention, contraction and synthesis of all past moments into the present to create the present lived expectation of the future, while the second synthesis of time or ‘Memory’ is a contraction of the totality of the past into and co-existence with the present, a contraction and co-existence which ensures that the present passes. For example, in highlighting the names that he attributes to the first and second synthesis of time, along with the relation between those two syntheses, Deleuze writes that:

The passive synthesis of habit in turn refers to this more profound passive synthesis of memory: Habitus and Mnemosyne, the alliance of sky and ground. Habit is the originary synthesis of time, which constitutes the life of the passing present; Memory is the fundamental synthesis of time which constitutes the being of the past (that which causes the present to pass).52

While the first two syntheses of time draw heavily upon the work of Henri Bergson,53 I shall suggest that one of the central innovations of Deleuze’s work is the third synthesis of time. In particular, I shall argue that what is central about the third synthesis of time is that it not only creates and connects the past and the future either side of the present moment, but that it is also that which establishes the continual or ‘eternal return’54 of a new or different present moment that simultaneously cuts the past from the future, thereby providing each individual with an open field of present possibilities for living otherwise
and ensuring the continual overcoming of Life’s present identity or
determination.

What I have referred to as the Stoical orientation of Deleuze’s work, however, can not only be discerned in the suggestion that living well is living in accordance with Life. Rather, to the extent that I have suggested that each individual is to be understood as an ongoing and immanent expression of Life then Deleuze’s work can be understood as possessing a general Stoical orientation in the sense that the Stoics, as we have seen, proposed that human beings were an intimate part of nature, deriving their nature from the nature of the cosmos.\textsuperscript{55} Again, however, caution is needed with respect to what is meant here. In suggesting that the individual is a part of nature, a nature that is governed by a rational, organising principle, then the Stoics were suggesting that each individual derives their nature from nature at large, that human beings were ‘by nature’ rational beings.\textsuperscript{56} For example, in highlighting the centrality of rationality to human being, Marcus Aurelius concisely proposed that: ‘A little flesh, a little breath, and a Reason to rule all – that is myself’.\textsuperscript{57} However, if human beings are to be understood as possessing a specific and determinate nature, a nature that we share with and derive from the universe, then our natures would seem to suggest that we ought to act in accordance with, and therefore actualise the specific possibilities dictated to us, by the nature that we derive from the universe. Indeed, the manner in which the Stoics and, in particular, late Stoicism suggested that human beings were by nature rational beings, and the manner in which this determination of the nature of human being began to circumscribe the individual’s open field of present possibilities for living otherwise, can be understood as being highlighted by Foucault in his work
on the emergence and transformation of the *epimeleia heautou* or ‘the care of the self’ throughout classical and late antiquity. In particular, Foucault notes that in early Stoicism the care of the self was understood as being concerned with treating one’s life as a work of art, an ‘aesthetics of existence’, in which the central problem was one of personal choice, the choice of which of life’s possibilities to actualise in order to create and to live a beautiful life.\(^{58}\) In late Stoicism, however, he notes how the problem of choice, the personal choice of which possibilities of living to actualise, gives way to the imperative or the obligation to actualise the possibilities for one’s life in accordance with that dictated to it by reason, understood as the central characteristic of human being.

Thus, he makes it clear that: ‘In late Stoicism, when they start saying, “Well, you are obliged to do that because you are a human being,” something changes. It’s not a problem of choice; you have to do it because you are a rational being’.\(^{59}\)

Indeed, it is instructive to briefly examine Foucault’s suspicion of any formulation of the universal, natural or essential characteristics of human being, and of universal structures more generally, in so far as it brings into relief a central difference between Foucault and Deleuze regarding the possibilities for living that are available to human beings, and helps us understand the latter’s commitment to ontology more generally.\(^{60}\) Simply stated, Foucault’s works can be understood as being concerned with taking that which has been presented as universal, essential and necessary, such as the ‘ultimate nature of human being’ or the ‘ultimate nature of reality itself’, and exposing such universal postulates as historical and contingent.\(^{61}\) Indeed, in outlining his methodological approach, he makes it clear that our critical and practical philosophical question ought to
be: ‘In what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints?’ 62 In seeking to pursue this question, Foucault’s concern is to investigate the manner in which that which has been presented as universal and necessary has been employed to regulate human conduct and to establish and enforce, for example, certain sexual, psychological and emotional norms. This is to say that Foucault is concerned with the manner in which constraints and limits have been placed on the possibilities of living that are available to human beings in the name of the essential characteristics of human being, or the universal structures of reality. For example, if we suggest that the essential and universal characteristic of human being is rationality, a position that I have suggested Foucault sees late Stoicism moving towards, then those human beings that do not accord with the dominant conception of what rationality is, what rational human beings ought to do, say and think, risk being considered as irrational, abnormal or even as ‘not fully human’. 63 Indeed, it is in this sense that we can understand Foucault’s suggestion towards the end of his life that the primary objective of his work had been to give a history of the different ways in which ‘human beings are made subjects’. 64 This is to say that he was concerned with examining the manner in which human beings were ‘made subjects’ in so far as their subjective identity, who or what they understand themselves to be, is made or produced by being tied to a specific, historically contingent conception of what it is to be a human being, but also made subjects in the sense of being made subject to others by control and dependence on the basis of that conception of human being. 65
In seeking to expose candidates for universality as being historical contingencies, Foucault is not concerned with then establishing his own conception of what the essential characteristics of human being are, or what the fundamental structure of reality is. Rather, he is seeking to expose such candidates for universality as historical contingencies in order to then open up the field of present possibilities available to human beings, to combat the manner in which one’s possibilities for living have been constrained in the name of essential characteristics and universal postulates. For example, in stating the aim of his critical and practical critique, he makes it clear that:

[T]his critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think. It is not seeking to make possible a metaphysics that has finally become a science; it is seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.

For Foucault, therefore, that which is given to us as universal, any conception of the nature of being or of the nature of human being, is incompatible with an open field of present possibilities because such universalities entail that our possibilities for living give way to the obligation to actualise the possibilities for one’s life in accordance with that dictated to us by such universalities. Indeed, in characterising the manner in which the circumscription of our life’s possibilities are supposed to follow from that which is given to us as universal, May has suggested that if we accept that there are aspects of our world that are ‘immune from change’, then:
We must conform to the limits they place before us and order our world with those limits in mind. This is more deeply true, and more deeply constraining, when those limits are not merely placed upon us from the outside like barriers but are instead woven into the very fabric of human existence. To attempt to surpass such limits, to seek to live otherwise, would be futile. Far from being a sign of liberation, the project of living otherwise would be a symptom of abnormality.\textsuperscript{68}

It is therefore possible to discern an instructive, distinctive relationship between the work of Foucault and Deleuze in relation to what I have referred to as universal postulates, a relationship within which is woven the Stoics and the care of the self, and that brings into relief a central difference between the two philosophers regarding the commitment to ontology and the present possibilities for living otherwise that are available to human beings. As we have seen, Foucault is suspicious of any notion of the universal nature of being and the universal nature of human being in so far as such universalities seem, for him, to be incompatible with the care of the self - understood as an aesthetics of existence in which the central problem was one of personal choice, the choice of which possibilities of living to actualise in order to create our lives and to create ourselves. This is to say that any proposed ontological account, any account of the nature of being or of the nature of human being, and especially any imperative to come to know and live in accordance with these natures, would appear to be incompatible with the care of the self in so far as such universal postulates would then seem to determine what we ought to do, say or think. For example, Foucault makes it clear that ‘this idea that one must know oneself - that is, gain ontological knowledge of the soul’s mode of being - is independent
of what one would call an exercise of the self upon the self [i.e. the care of the self]. As we have seen, this opposition is made evident in his distinction between the early Stoics, in which the central problem was which of life’s possibilities to actualise in order to create and to live a beautiful life, and the manner in which the problem of choice involved in the care of the self gives way in late Stoicism to the obligation to actualise the possibilities for one’s life in accordance with that dictated to it by reason, understood as the essential characteristic of human being and, more generally, the rational, organising principle of reality. For Foucault, therefore, the way to open up a field of present possibilities for living otherwise is to critically examine, and expose as historically contingent, candidates for the universal being of nature and, in particular, the ultimate nature of human being so that we may begin to move beyond the limits placed on the possibilities for living available to us, limits that have been legitimised in the name of, and said to necessarily follow from, such universalities.

Deleuze, like Foucault, is also critical of that which has been, and continues to be given to us as universal, critical of the manner in which such universalities have been conceptualised and employed to enforce the actualisation of a specific set of possibilities for living. However, one of the central and profound innovations of Deleuze’s work is that he provides a candidate for universality that does not circumscribe the field of present possibilities for living otherwise that are available to human beings. This is to say that although Deleuze can be understood as presenting a universal account of the dynamic nature of human being, a nature that is shared with and derived from the universal nature of Life itself, neither entail that we ought to actualise a
specific set of possibilities for living, neither entail an organised, rigid plan for how our lives ought to be lived. This is because Deleuze’s account of the dynamic and thoroughly temporal nature of Life and of human being is not conceptualised in terms of a fixed, determinate nature, it is not conceptualised in terms of that which is immune from change and which would oblige us to actualise a given set of possibilities dictated to us by that nature. Rather, Deleuze’s dynamic and thoroughly temporal ontological account - what I am referring to as Life, Life as a universal and impersonal dynamic power - is to be understood as that which is continually becoming different to what it is at any given moment, an irrepressible temporal power that continually overcomes any present determination or identity in its interminable drive to continually produce forever renewed present possibilities. As Hardt suggests: ‘Being differs with itself immediately, internally. It does not look outside itself for an other or a force of mediation because its difference rises from its very core’. Therefore, while Foucault seeks to open up a field of present possibilities for living, and thereby enable us to creatively work upon ourselves and upon our lives, by exposing candidates for universality as historically contingent, Deleuze provides a candidate for universality that engenders an open field of present possibilities for living, an awareness of which enables us to creatively work upon ourselves and upon our lives. This is to say that Deleuze can be understood as formulating a universal account of the nature of Life and its relation to human being, but it is a thoroughly dynamic and temporal account, an awareness of which enlivens us to the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings, and which thereby enables us to begin to engage with the problem of
which of Life’s possibilities to actualise in order to creatively work upon ourselves and upon our lives.
Chapter One: Expression

I have suggested that Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work can be productively understood as being concerned with the question of living well, where living well necessitates that we not only become aware of, but that we also explore, the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings. In doing so, we not only live in accordance with the open, dynamic temporality of Life itself but, to the extent that we are to be understood as an ongoing and immanent expression of Life, then we also live in accordance with our own dynamic, thoroughly temporal being. My objective in this chapter, therefore, is to begin to formulate of an account of the manner in which each human being is to be understood as an ongoing and immanent expression of Life, the manner in which each human being participates in Life, and I shall do so within the context of what Deleuze, in relation to his work on Spinoza, refers to as the problem of participation. Before introducing the problem of participation, however, I would like to briefly discuss the reason for employing that problematic to discuss the relation between human beings and Life. In order to do this, however, it is important to recall that I have suggested that Life, understood in ontological terms as a universal, impersonal and dynamic power, does not possess some definite, fixed determination, but is to be understood as that which continually overcomes any present determination or identity in its interminable drive to continually produce forever renewed present possibilities. Moreover, in so far as I have also suggested that each human being is an ongoing and, in particular, an immanent expression of this dynamic power, then to live in accordance with Life does not entail that we live in accordance with a transcendent nature that would entail a fixed, overarching plan of how we ought
to actualise our present possibilities, but that we explore the open field of present possibilities that this dynamic power continually engenders. However, what the problem of participation, and the various historical responses to that problem, vividly illustrate is the manner in which the dynamic nature of Life, and the manner in which each human being is to be understood as an ongoing and immanent expression of Life, can be frustrated, thwarted and even negated. This is to say that the problem of participation, and the various historical responses to that problem, contain a number of interrelated and established ontological presuppositions that frustrate what I have suggested is the dynamic nature of Life and the manner in which it continually overcomes any present determination or identity, and also frustrate the manner in which each human being can be understood as an ongoing and immanent expression of Life that is continually provided with an open field of present possibilities for living otherwise.

I am therefore employing the problem of participation in order to formulate an account of the relation between human beings and Life because an account of the dynamic nature of Life, and the manner in which the human being is an immanent expression of this dynamism, will be required to address and overcome the ontological presuppositions associated with the historical responses to the problem of participation. This is to say that the ontological presuppositions associated with the responses to the problem of participation provide a valuable context in which to formulate an account of the dynamic relation between human beings and Life because that account will be required to address the challenge that those established ontological presuppositions pose. In particular, that which would frustrate, thwart and deny the dynamic nature of
Life and of human being concerns the important notion of transcendence, along with a number of ontological presuppositions that are intimately related to this notion; namely, the notions of equivocity, ontological hierarchy, the positing of an immutable foundation or fixed ground, the primacy of identity over difference and, ultimately, the subordination of difference to identity. In seeking to formulate an account of the relation between human beings and Life that addresses these presuppositions I shall employ Deleuze’s Spinozist concept of expression, developed most fully in Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, to argue that the relation between Life and human being ought to be understood as an expressive one. In being understood as such, I shall suggest that the notion of transcendence and the interrelated ontological presuppositions associated with the various historical responses to the problem of participation can begin to be addressed. In particular, the notion of expression will enable us to begin to think about how human beings can be understood as an ongoing and immediate expression of Life, a Life that remains immanent within all human beings in so far as they are its ongoing and immediate expression. In doing so, we shall begin to understand that rather than an ontological division and difference between the nature of Life and the nature of human beings, there is what Deleuze refers to as one ontologically univocal and ‘consistent plane of nature’ or ‘plane of immanence’, an immanent plane of Life upon which all human beings exist as Life’s ongoing and immediate expression and from which all human beings derive their ongoing, dynamic and temporal being.

In beginning to elucidate the problem of participation, it is perhaps best to understand that problematic in terms of ontological inquiry, in terms of that which, in its Aristotelian formulation, is to be understood as an investigation
into ‘the study of things that are, qua being’, an investigation into being *qua* being.\textsuperscript{76} In particular, the problem of participation can be understood as being concerned with how, or in what manner, the multitude of manifestly different beings, the many different things that exist and populate the world, despite those manifest differences, come to ‘possess’, or come to ‘participate in’, that singular characteristic of existing, that one attribute of being. As Aristotle makes clear: ‘There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, but all that ‘is’ is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to ‘be’ by a mere ambiguity’.\textsuperscript{77} As this formulation suggests, an important and traditional terminological distinction within ontological inquiry, a distinction that Deleuze himself will adopt in order to position himself against,\textsuperscript{78} is that between the ‘One and the many’, or between ‘Being and beings’ - the former term commonly capitalised to emphasise this distinction and, often, to confer priority on it over the latter term. However, in order to formulate an account of the relation between human beings and Life and to begin to understand how this relation challenges the traditional ontological distinction between the One and the many, or between Being and beings, it is first necessary to note that the problem of participation can best be understood by beginning with the work of Plato. Indeed, Deleuze refers to the problem of participation as ‘the Platonic problem of participation’ and suggests that everything may be traced back to it.\textsuperscript{79} In particular, in attempting to address the problem of participation Plato is said to have proposed various schemes of participation, in which ‘to participate was to be a part; or to imitate; or even to receive something from a demon…’\textsuperscript{80} However, his most celebrated answer to the problem of participation, his most celebrated answer to the question of how, or in what manner, the multitude of
manifestly different beings, the many different things that exist and populate the
world, despite those manifest differences, come to possess or participate in that
singular characteristic of existing, that one attribute of Being, is the so-called
‘theory of Forms’ or ‘doctrine of Ideas’.

As an attempt to address the problem of participation, the theory of
Forms is to be understood as proposing that for every group of particular beings,
for every class or set of things that exist and populate the world, there exists a
single, transcendent Form or Idea and it is by virtue of participating in that Form
that every particular member of a given group or set obtains its characteristic
being. For example, assuming his interlocutor’s knowledge of the theory of
Forms, Socrates suggests in the Republic that: ‘We are in the habit, I take it, of
posing a single idea or form in the case of the various multiplicities to which
we give the same name’. In particular, a given Form can be understood as an
ideal pattern or exemplary model for which the corresponding group of
particular beings are approximate instances, imitations or copies. Thus, in
defence of the Forms against Parmenides, Socrates makes it clear that ‘these
forms are as it were patterns fixed in the nature of things. The other things are
made in their image and are likenesses, and this participation they come to have
in forms is nothing but their being made in their image’. For example, the vast
group of particular couches that exist and populate the world participate, as
copies, in the single Form of Couch, an ideal Form that transcends or lies
beyond both the sensible world and all the particular couches that populate it.
Moreover, it is precisely by virtue of participating in the ideal, transcendent
Form of Couch, a Form that serves as the exemplary model of what a couch is,
that every particular couch that populates the world obtains its characteristic
being as a couch. Similarly, the group or set of particular just people that exist within the world are said to participate, as approximations, in the single Form of Justice, an ideal Form that transcends both the sensible world and all the particular just people that populate it; again, it is by virtue of participating in the ideal, transcendent Form of Justice, a Form that serves as the exemplary model of what it is to be just, that every particular just person that exists in the world obtains their characteristic being as just.

As a response to the problem of participation, therefore, Plato’s theory of Forms suggests that for every given group, class or set of particular things that exists, their also exists a single Form. In particular, a given Form is to be understood as an exemplary model that transcends those particular things, and it is by virtue of participating in the relevant Form that every particular thing that exists obtains its characteristic being. Now while Deleuze’s dynamic and thoroughly temporal theory of Being - or what I am suggesting he later came to refer to as Life - can be understood as challenging Plato’s answer to the problem of participation, it is important to note that Deleuze’s relation to Plato should not be understood in terms of a simple and outright opposition to Plato’s theory of Forms. For example, although he makes it clear that: ‘The task of modern philosophy has been defined: to overturn Platonism’, he also suggests that it is not only ‘inevitable’ but that it is also ‘desirable’ that this overturning should conserve many Platonic characteristics. In particular, by way of an examination of Plato’s own suggestion that some particular things that exist and populate the world are to be understood as bad or degraded copies of a given Form, Deleuze suggests that the status of those bad copies, phantasms or simulacra undermine Plato’s own account of the theory of Forms. Therefore,
Deleuze not only suggests that the overturning of Plato is to be discovered, as it were, within Platonism itself, a so-called ‘anti-Platonism at the heart of Platonism’, but he also suggests that at the end of the *Sophist* Plato himself discovers, ‘in the flash of an instant, that the simulacrum is not simply a false copy, but that it places in question the very notions of copy and model’. In order to formulate an account of the relation between human beings and Life, however, I shall not pursue an overturning of Platonism in terms of *simulacra*; rather, I shall propse that Plato’s theory of Forms, as a response to the problem of participation, ought to understood as containing a number of interrelated characteristics or ontological presuppositions that the relation between human beings and Life is required to address and overturn.

The first and most evident characteristic of Plato’s answer to the problem of participation - the most evident ontological presupposition that an account of the dynamic nature of Life, and the manner in which the human being is an ongoing and immanent expression of this dynamism, seeks to overturn - is the concept of transcendence. This is to say that in so far as Plato seeks to address the problem of participation by positing a super-sensible Form for every given group or set of sensible beings, Forms that reside over, above or beyond the sensible world and every particular thing that exists within it, then transcendence can be understood as an explicit ontological supposition within Plato’s theory of Forms. Moreover, while it has been suggested that Plato’s employment of transcendence can be variously attributed to the influence of Orphism, Pythagoras and Parmenides’ notion of the One, in order to gain a fuller understanding of the Platonic notion of transcendence, it is instructive to recall Aristotle’s analysis of Plato’s possible motivation for introducing
transcendent Forms. In particular, Aristotle suggests that Plato became acquainted in his youth with the ideas of the Heraclitean philosopher Cratylus and, deeply influenced by such ideas, retained into his later years the Heraclitean view that ‘all sensible things are ever in a state of flux’.\(^9^0\) This is to say that Plato held the view that the multitude of particular things that exist and populate the sensible world, the multitude of beings that can be accessed via the senses, are in a continual state of flux, change or becoming.\(^9^1\) However, if the sensible world and the multitude of different beings that populate it are in a continual state of flux, if all sensible things are continually changing and becoming something other than what they are, then the question arises as to how anything can come to possess ‘definite’ or ‘determinate’ being, how anything that is in a continual state of flux can be something definite or determinate. As such, Aristotle suggests that Plato - influenced by Socrates’ ethical pursuit of universal definitions, such as the definition of holiness or piety, of *sophrosyne* or temperance, and of courage\(^9^2\) - was led to posit, over and above the multitude of particular, mutable beings that populate the sensible world, a transcendent world of Forms, where transcendence designates that which exists over and above the sensible world of becoming, and therefore designates that which is invariant and immutable, an eternal world of definite and determinate Being that the mutable beings of the sensible world ‘participate’ in.\(^9^3\)

In addition to the notion of transcendence in Plato’s theory of Forms, and intimately connected to it, is the ontological presupposition of equivocity. This is to say that in so far as Plato seeks to address the problem of participation by positing a transcendent realm of Forms and a sensible realm of continual becoming then he posits two irreducibly different realms of existence, two
irremediably different kinds of Being. In particular, the transcendent realm of Forms is to be understood as a world of immutable, definite and determinate Being that is accessed by the intelligence, and is therefore said to be an object of knowledge, while the realm of particular, sensible things is to be understood as a world of mutable, indefinite and indeterminate beings that is accessed via the senses, and is therefore said to be merely an object of opinion.\textsuperscript{94} Importantly, however, in presenting an equivocal ontological account, Plato’s answer to the problem of participation does not merely posit two irreducibly different realms of existence, but also proposes that one realm is to be understood as ontologically superior to the other, thereby introducing the presupposition of ontological hierarchy. This is to say that in so far as Plato posits a transcendent Form for every set of particular sensible things, then the Forms are to be understood as ontologically superior to all sensible things. For example, he suggests that if we consider the activity of a craftsman who makes particular couches then what he produces is not the Form of the couch, which is to be understood as what a couch ‘really is’, but merely makes a particular couch by, as it were, ‘fixing his eyes’ on the Form of the couch.\textsuperscript{95} This is to say that the craftsman takes the Form of the couch as the exemplary model for the particular couches that he produces but, in doing so, what he makes is not what a couch really is but something which resembles what a couch really is, an imitation or a copy of the real couch. As Plato makes clear, the craftsman ‘could not be said to make real being but something that resembles real being but is not that’, so in making a particular couch, in merely copying the Form of the couch, we ought not to be surprised that what the craftsman makes is merely a ‘dim adumbration’ in comparison with what really is; namely, the Form of the couch.\textsuperscript{96}
In addition to the notions of transcendence, equivocity and ontological hierarchy, Plato’s answer to the problem of participation can also be understood as an ontological account that posits an immutable foundation or fixed ground. For example, while the set of particular just people participate in the Form of Justice as copies or approximations, the Form of Justice does not, in turn, participate in something other than itself, it does not obtain the quality of being just from somewhere else. Rather, the Form of Justice is its own foundation, a characteristic that Deleuze illustrates with his assertion that, within Plato’s theory of Forms, ‘Justice alone is just’. Moreover, in so far as a given Form is to be understood as its own foundation, then Plato’s answer to the problem of participation can also be seen to be characterised by the primacy of identity over difference and, ultimately, by the subordination of difference to identity. For Deleuze, the subordination of difference to identity has become so dominant within the Western philosophical tradition that it is embodied within the ‘cognitive schema’ or the specifically representational schema which has come to constitute the very image of what it means to think. However, while examined in detail in relation to the work of Aristotle, as well as Hegel and Leibniz, the subordination of difference to identity can be discerned in Plato’s answer to the problem of participation. In particular, it can be discerned in the manner in which a transcendent Form, as an exemplary model, does not participate in something other than itself, does not obtain its specific quality from elsewhere but is, as it were, identical to itself. As Deleuze suggests: ‘The model is supposed to enjoy an originary superior identity (the Idea alone is nothing other than what it is: only Courage is courageous, Piety pious)’. In contrast, a given set of particular sensible beings are different from their
respective transcendent Form, as well as being different from each other; however, the status of those sensible beings as different from the transcendent Form and different from each other is dependent upon those sensible beings possessing an internal resemblance to the Form, as possessing an imitative similitude, and therefore as being copies, of that which eternally remains the same. Indeed, in so far as the identity of the Form is primary, and the copies resemblance or similitude to the Form is secondary then Deleuze makes it clear that ‘it is in this sense that difference only comes in third place, behind identity and resemblance, and can be understood only in terms of these prior notions’.

In seeking to formulate an account of the relation between human beings and Life, in seeking to formulate an account of the dynamism of Life, and the manner in which the human being is an immanent and ongoing expression of this dynamism, I have suggested that a productive place to begin is with the Platonic problem of participation. In particular, I have suggested that as a response to that problem Plato’s theory of Forms contains a number of ontological presuppositions that an account of the relation between Life and human beings will be required to confront, a number of ontological presuppositions that the dynamic nature of Life, and the manner in which the human being is an immanent expression of this dynamism, will be required to address. In particular, I have suggested that what can frustrate, thwart and deny the dynamic relation between human beings and Life concerns the important notion of transcendence, along with a number of ontological presuppositions that are intimately related to this notion: equivocity, ontological hierarchy, the positing of an immutable foundation or fixed ground, the primacy of identity over difference and, ultimately, the subordination of difference to identity.
Indeed, by addressing the primacy of identity over difference, by overturning the superior identity of any transcendent Form, we shall also see that the demand for an internal resemblance to the identity of a transcendent Form is also undermined in so far as there is no longer a superior, transcendent identity for any being to bear an internal resemblance to. For now, however, it is important to note that an overturning of Platonism ought not to be understood as simply being directed at the work of Plato. Rather, an overturning of Platonism is to be understood as being directed at any response to the problem of participation that retains the foregoing ontological presuppositions, and therefore at any response that can be understood as ‘Platonic’ more generally. Therefore, in order to illustrate the manner in which the dynamic nature of Life, and the manner in which the human being is an immanent and ongoing expression of this dynamism, is required to not only address the ontological presuppositions contained in Plato’s theory of Forms, but will be required to address the challenge posed by Platonism more generally, I would now like to briefly examine two Post-Platonic responses to the problem of participation: the responses given by Neo-Platonism and Christianity.

As I shall discuss, while both Neo-Platonism and Christianity retain a number of Platonic ontological presuppositions, they also afford an important break with Plato’s theory of Forms by introducing a significant degree of movement, dynamism and productive genesis into their accounts. Although this dynamism will be seen to be inadequate to account for what I have suggested is the dynamic nature of Life, it is important to note that Neo-Platonism and Christianity are able to introduce a significant degree of movement, dynamism and productive genesis into their response to the problem of participation
because they re-conceptualise the manner in which that problem is to be addressed. This is to say that in seeking to address the problem of participation Plato’s theory of Forms begins with the multitude of sensible beings that exist and subsequently considers how it is that they can come to possess that singular characteristic of Being, how the multitude of particular couches, for example, can come to possess their characteristic being as couches. In contrast, in seeking to address the problem of participation, the significant post-Platonic innovation that led to the introduction of movement, dynamism and productive genesis was to invert the manner in which the problem of participation was to be addressed. This is to say that for Neo-Platonism and Christianity, the problem of participation was no longer a matter of determining how it is that the multitude of sensible beings participate in, or come to possesses, that singular attribute of existing, but rather a matter of determining how it is that the one attribute of Being, that which is participated in, manifests itself in the plurality of sensible beings, the multitude of manifestly different participants. As Deleuze makes clear: ‘The primary Postplatonic task was to invert the problem. A principle that would make participation possible was sought, but one that would make it possible from the side of the participated itself.’ Indeed, in discussing the manner in which Neo-Platonism in particular reformulated the problem of participation, Deleuze notes that: ‘Neoplatonists no longer start from the characteristics of what participates (as multiple, sensible and so on), asking by what violence participation becomes possible. They try rather to discover the internal principle and movement that grounds participation in the participated as such, from the side of the participated as such.’
In order to account for the manner in which that one attribute of Being, the participated, manifests itself in the plurality of sensible beings, the participants, the Neo-Platonic response to the problem of participation is to be understood in terms of *emanation*. In particular, the multitude of sensible beings that exist and populate the world are said to emanate from Being such that Being is understood to cause the manifest beings of the world to come into existence, conferring their existence upon them in the manner of a ‘gift’ or a ‘donation’. In the *Enneads*, for example, Plotinus illustrates the concept of emanation with a variety of images, suggesting that it is analogous to the manner in which heat is produced by fire, how scent diffuses from perfume and, perhaps most notably, how light radiates from the sun. Despite inverting the manner in which the problem of participation is to be considered, however, Neo-Platonism’s emanative response continues to retain the ontological presupposition of transcendence, for although the plurality of sensible beings are said to emanate from Being, Being continues to remain transcendent in relation to those beings. For example, in illustrating the manner in which sensible beings emanate from Being, and the manner in which those beings are in a continual state of flux while Being remains in a transcendent state of ‘repose’, a state of eternal invariance that is above and beyond that which it produces, Plotinus asks us to: ‘Think of a spring not having another source, giving itself to all the rivers, and not being used up in the rivers but remaining tranquil by itself’. Moreover, as Plotinus’ metaphor illustrates, the emanative answer to the problem of participation can also be understood as being characterised by equivocity. This is to say that in so far as the participated remains distinct from that which participates in it, in so far as Being remains transcendent in relation to the
sensible beings that emanate from it, then the Neo-Platonic answer to the problem of participation posits two irreducibly different realms of existence, two irremediably different kinds of being. Thus, illustrating the manner in which Neo-Platonism is characterised by equivocity by drawing on the Neo-Platonic tripartite distinction between the imparticipable, the particpated and the participants, Deleuze concisely notes that: ‘The giver is above its gifts as it is above its products, participable through what it gives, but imparticipable in itself or as itself, thereby grounding participation’.  

In presenting an equivocal ontological account, Neo-Platonism does not merely posit two irreducibly different realms of existence, but also introduces ontological hierarchy by suggesting that one realm is ontologically superior to the other. Indeed, for Plotinus, the direction of emanation is said to ‘proceed downward’ towards sensible beings such that, while dependent upon Being, they have a decreasing ‘intensity’ or ‘degree’ of Being. To illustrate this through Plotinus’ own examples, consider the manner in which heat diminishes by degrees as it moves further away from the source which produces it, the manner in which water becomes less powerful and less pure as it flows further from the spring or the manner in which the intensity of light diminishes as it radiates further from the sun. In addition, the Neo-Platonic answer to the problem of participation is also to be understood as being characterised by an immutable foundation in so far as Being does not, in turn, participate in anything other than itself but is the ‘first principle’ that gives the quality of Being to all sensible beings. Indeed, as an immutable foundation, the principle that gives the quality of Being to all sensible beings is itself said to be imparticipable such that: ‘There is no question of the principle that makes participation possible itself
being participated or participable. Everything emanates from this principle, it
gives forth everything. But it is not itself participated’. Moreover, in so far as
it does not participate in anything other than itself, but is the imparticipable
foundation upon which all beings depend, then emanative Being is also to be
understood as possessing an exemplary similitude to itself, as being ‘identical to
itself’, and thereby as possessing a ‘superior identity’. As such, Neo-Platonism
can also be understood as being characterised by the primacy of identity over
difference and, ultimately, by the subordination of difference to identity. This is
to say that the hierarchical differences between sensible beings are dependent
upon, and subordinated to, the superior identity, foundation or first principle that
is the emanative cause of those differences. Indeed, in illustrating the primacy of
identity over difference that characterises Neo-Platonism’s emanative response
to the problem of participation, Deleuze proposes that: ‘Emanation thus serves
as the principle of a universe rendered hierarchical; the difference of beings is in
general conceived as a hierarchical difference; each term is as it were the image
of the superior term that precedes it, and is defined by the degree of distance that
separates it from the first cause or first principle’.

As may be evident from the foregoing, the answer to the problem of
participation given by both Plato and by the Neo-Platonists can be understood as
possessing a significant degree of resonance with Christian metaphysics. Indeed, in his Confessions, Saint Augustine suggests that the books of the
Platonists, while employing a different conceptual vocabulary, expressed the
sense of the Christian teaching that it was through God that all things came into
being. In accordance with Neo-Platonism in particular, Christian metaphysics
can be understood as inverting the problem of participation by suggesting that it
is no longer a matter of determining how it is that the multitude of sensible beings participate in that singular characteristic of existing, but a matter of determining how it is that the one attribute of Being, that which is participated in, manifests itself in the plurality of sensible beings, the multitude of manifestly different participants. Rather than emanation, however, Christianity’s answer to the problem of participation is given in terms of *creation* in so far as the plurality of manifestly different sensible beings that exist and populate the world are said to have been created by God,¹¹⁸ to have had their existence conferred on them through an act of divine creation which, as McGrath has suggested, is ‘especially associated with the image of a potter working clay into a recognizably ordered structure’.¹¹⁹ However, while the notions of emanation and creation can both be understood, broadly speaking, as forms of production, as types of productive genesis, their difference lies in the precise character of that production. In emanation the attribute of Being that is conferred on the plurality of sensible beings is to be understood as emerging out of the very substance, as it were, of Being, analogous to the manner in which heat emerges from fire, how scent diffuses from perfume and how light radiates from the sun. In contrast, it has been suggested that in divine creation God is to be understood as willing sensible material into existence and moulding the plurality of beings out of that material; for example, in illustrating this distinction between divine creation and emanation, May graphically writes that:

Emanation is like creation in that there remains a distinction between the creator and the created. The difference is that what is created comes from the substance of the creator, emanates from it. If I were an artist who was able not only to mould the material before me but also
to will the very material to appear, I would be engaging in creation. If my art were instead torn from my flesh, I would be engaged in emanation.\textsuperscript{120}

As with Neo-Platonism’s emanative response, however, Christianity’s attempt to address the problem of participation in terms of creation continues to retain a number of Platonic ontological presuppositions. To illustrate this, consider the manner in which Saint Augustine, recounting his epiphany, proclaims that:

What I saw was something quite, quite different from any light we know on earth. It shone above my mind, but not in the way that oil floats above water or the sky hangs over the earth. It was above me because it was itself the Light that made me, and I was below because I was made by it. All who know the truth know this Light, and all who know this Light know eternity.\textsuperscript{121}

In doing so, Saint Augustine can be understood as disclosing the manner in which Christianity’s response to the problem of participation in terms of creation continues to retain the presuppositions of transcendence, equivocity, ontological hierarchy and an immutable foundation in so far as God is not only the transcendent, eternal source of all sensible beings - and therefore irremedially different in kind from anything that exists on earth - but is also to be understood as ontologically superior to all sensible beings in so far as all beings, being made by Him, are below him. Moreover, Christianity’s creationist response is also to be understood as being characterised by the primacy of identity over difference in so far as God, not dependent upon anything else for His Being, possesses an exemplary similitude to Himself, and is the superior identity that creates the plurality of sensible beings that populate the world.
Indeed, with evident similarities to Plato’s theory of Forms, the plurality of human beings that exist are said to be made in God’s image such that He is the exemplary model that all human beings bear an internal resemblance or likeness to. As a consequence of sin, however, all human beings are to be understood as degraded or fallen copies that have lost their internal resemblance or likeness to God, a degraded form of existence that entails that the life of all human beings, as Armstrong has proposed, is of a nature that: ‘Only the God who had created them from nothingness in the first place and kept them perpetually in being could assure their eternal salvation’. In so far as God is understood as the superior identity who has created the plurality of human beings, human beings who, as a consequence of sin, have lost their internal resemblance or likeness to God, then the concept of difference for Christianity can therefore also be understood as being subordinated to the notion of a superior identity and a resemblance to this identity.

In following Deleuze’s examination of the problem of participation, and in discussing the primary historical responses to that problem, I have sought to expose the ontological presuppositions associated with those responses, ontological presuppositions that would frustrate, thwart and deny what I have suggested is the dynamic nature of Life and its immanent relation to human beings. As I proposed at the beginning of this chapter, the ontological presuppositions associated with the various historical responses to the problem of participation provide a valuable context in which to formulate an account of the dynamic relation between human beings and Life because that account will be required to address the challenge that those ontological presuppositions pose. Therefore, in order to begin to formulate an account of the dynamism of Life
and its relation to human beings that does so, I shall now turn to the concept of
expression that Deleuze discerns in the work of Spinoza.\textsuperscript{125} This is to say that I
shall now turn to and employ Deleuze’s Spinozist concept of expression in order
to suggest that the relation between Life and the human being ought to be
understood as an expressive one, and that it is this concept of expression that can
enable us to begin to understand how the relation between Life and human
beings can be formulated in such a way that begins to address the ontological
presuppositions associated with Plato’s theory of Forms, along with Neo-
Platonism’s emanative and Christianity’s creationist response to the problem of
participation. This turn to Spinoza’s work, however, in order to discern and
employ a concept of expression should not be considered an uncontroversial one.
Indeed, not only has the validity of Deleuze’s discernment of the concept of
expression in Spinoza’s work been called into question,\textsuperscript{126} but Deleuze himself
acknowledges that discerning a concept of expression in Spinoza’s work is
particularly challenging. For example, he proposes that many of the most
respected commentators have taken little account of the notion of expression in
Spinoza’s work, and have rendered it at best ‘mystical’ and at worst
‘incomprehensible’.\textsuperscript{127} Similarly, he goes on to propose that for those that have
attempted to account for the concept of expression in Spinoza’s work, some
have given it ‘a certain indirect significance, seeing in it another name for some
deeper principle’ and, in particular, mistakenly identifying the concept of
expression with the Neo-Platonic concept of emanation.\textsuperscript{128}

Deleuze acknowledges, however, that this apparent difficulty with
discerning the concept of expression within Spinoza’s work and with explicating
that concept may be largely attributable to the manner in which it is dealt with
by Spinoza in the *Ethics*. In particular, the difficulty with discerning and explicating the concept of expression is attributable to the manner in which it can only be understood when one considers the nature of the relation between the principal conceptual terms in Spinoza’s *Ethics*, and not when those terms are considered in isolation or abstraction from one another. Thus, Deleuze proposes that ‘the idea of expression seems to emerge only as determining the relation into which attribute, substance and essence enter, once God for his part is defined as a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes…Expression does not relate to substance or attributes in general, in the abstract.’ In order to therefore understand the manner in which the concept of expression is present within Spinoza’s work, and the manner in which that concept can be employed to formulate an account of the dynamic relation between Life and human being that addresses the aforementioned Platonic ontological presuppositions, it is necessary to briefly elucidate the ontological apparatus that is introduced within the *Ethics*. Thus, at the beginning of the *Ethics* Spinoza identifies God, ‘a being absolutely infinite’, with what he refers to as ‘substance’, where substance consists of an infinity of ‘attributes’ which, in turn, are to be understood as that which expresses the infinite essence of substance. In doing so, however, the attributes that express the essence of substance are to be understood as doing so in their own particular way. This is to say, for example, that while Thought and Extension are to be understood as attributes of substance, while Thought and Extension express the essence of substance, they express that essence into determinate forms such that substance or God can be comprehended both under the attribute of Thought and under the attribute of Extension. Therefore, in contrast to Descartes, Thought and Extension, and thinking thing and extended
thing in particular, are not to be thought of as distinct substances that are only contingently bound.\textsuperscript{133} Rather, as the attributes of substance, Thought and Extension remain the expression of one substance that, in expressing itself, expresses that one substance into particular, determinate forms.\textsuperscript{134}

Attributes express the essence of substance and in doing so determine that essence into different forms. Once this first expression has taken place, however, the attributes are in their turn expressed, expressing themselves in what Spinoza refers to as ‘modes’ which are to be understood as the variations, modifications or ‘affections’ of the attributes.\textsuperscript{135} For example, while Thought and Extension are two attributes of substance, a mode of the attribute of Thought would be a singular thought and a mode of the attribute of Extension would be a specific body.\textsuperscript{136} Therefore, expression is to be understood as occurring on ‘two levels’ or to be understood in terms of a ‘double movement’: the first movement of expression is from substance to attribute, in which the essence of substance is determined into particular forms - such as Thought and Extension - while the second movement of expression, from attribute to modes, involves the production of particular things - such as singular thoughts and specific bodies.\textsuperscript{137} However, in order to understand Deleuze’s Spinozist concept of expression, and the manner in which it can enable us to begin to understand how the dynamic relation between Life and human being can be formulated in such a way that addresses the ontological presuppositions associated with Platonism, it is also necessary to understand the role of immanence in Spinoza’s thought. Indeed, it has been suggested that ‘Spinoza’s entire philosophy could be seen as an ontology of pure immanence’,\textsuperscript{138} and that this ontology of pure immanence is evidenced in Spinoza’s equation of God with the whole of
nature, epitomised in Spinoza’s formula *Deus sive Natura* (God, that is, Nature’). To understand this equation of God with nature and the manner in which it reveals both the presence of immanence and expression in Spinoza’s work, it is important to note that God, understood as substance, is both expressive agency and the expressed enactments or products of that agency.

This is to say that seen from one perspective God is unlimited productive force, what Spinoza refers to as *natura naturans*, or ‘naturing’ nature, an agency that expresses itself in various attributes; however, seen from another perspective substance is just as much the products of this agency, the particular and specific modes that are an expression of the attributes, or what Spinoza refers to as *natura naturata*, or ‘natured’ nature.

Spinoza’s conception of God, therefore, is not to be understood in terms of a transcendent deity that remains over and above nature, God does not exist in a transcendent state of repose beyond the manifestly different beings of the world. Rather, there is an equality of being between God and nature that attests to a thoroughgoing immanence in so far as there is only one substance seen, as it were, from two sides: *natura naturans* as the expressive agency of this substance, and *naturans naturata* as the expressed products of this agency. Indeed, Wasser proposes that Spinoza’s *Deus sive Natura*, Spinoza’s equation of God with nature, ‘is the assertion of immanence par excellence, the fundamental gambit of a philosophy that attempts to differentiate itself from schemas of transcendence’, where some category such as the Good in Plato, the One in Plotinus or God in the Christian tradition is thought to be beyond, prior to, or superior to the empirical world. Spinoza’s *Ethics* can therefore be understood as seeking to develop an ontological account characterised by a thoroughgoing
immanence that eliminates any notion of transcendence and can be understood as doing so through the notion of expression. This is to say that substance first expresses itself in its attributes but, in doing so, substance is not to be thought of as transcendent to those attributes but remains immanent within them. Substance then re-expresses itself on a second level which constitutes the movement from attributes to modes but, as modifications of the attributes, the modes are not to be thought of as separate from substance or God; as Deleuze suggests, ‘in the last instance it is always God who, but for the different level of expression, is designated by all things. Attributes designate God, but so also do modes, within the attribute on which they depend’. Therefore, in summarising the relevance of the *Ethics* for Deleuze, Beistegui has suggested that Spinoza’s ‘primordial proposition’ is that there is one substance that possesses all attributes and all beings or ‘creatures’, where the latter - being modes or ways of being of substance - are contained in turn in the attributes of that substance. Beistegui then goes on to suggest that the immediate consequence of this ‘is the levelling (or the ironing out) and the flattening - the *aplanisement* and *aplatissement* - of a vertical and hierarchical structure, of a sequence of concepts: there is no hierarchy, no sequence between the attributes, or between thought and extension, but a single fixed plane on which everything takes place. This is what Deleuze calls the plane of immanence’.

I am therefore suggesting that it is in its association with the principle of immanence that the concept of expression can be understood as enabling us to begin to understand how the relation between Life and human beings can be formulated in such a way that addresses the ontological presuppositions associated with the various historical responses to the problem of participation.
Indeed, more than a corollary or characteristic of the concept of expression, Deleuze is keen to stress that not only are immanence and expression not to be thought of as separate but neither is one notion to be thought of as having priority over the other; as he makes clear: ‘Immanence is revealed as expressive, and expression as immanent, in a system of logical relations within which the two notions are correlative’. However, despite the centrality of the Spinozist concept of expression in formulating an account of the relation between Life and human beings, there are dangers in adopting Spinoza’s tripartite distinction between substance, attributes and modes in order to develop that relation. Indeed, in highlighting this danger, Deleuze writes that ‘there still remains a difference between substance and the modes: Spinoza’s substance appears independent of the modes, while the modes are dependent on substance, but as though on something other than themselves’. This is to say that despite seeking to maintain that modes are an immanent expression of substance, as immanent an expression of substance as the attributes, Spinoza’s modes seem ‘at once removed’ from substance. Of course, as an expression of substance, modes are dependent on substance, but as a second level expression of substance, as a modification of the attributes, modes appear to be dependent on something that remains distanced, independent and even ontologically superior to them. As Piercey has suggested: ‘Spinoza, despite his preoccupation with immanence, seems at the end of the day to think that Being is not equally present in all entities. He seems to rank entities hierarchically, and to rank substance more highly than mode’. Thus, while the Spinozist concept of expression and, in particular, its correlative relation with imminence can be understood in terms of a systematic attempt to break from schemas of transcendence, the conception of
the relation between substance and modes and, in particular, the danger of understanding the former as being beyond, independent and even superior to the latter, threatens to reintroduce the various schemas of transcendence that Spinoza’s work seeks to overcome.153

In suggesting that the expressive relation between Being and the manifest beings of the world must be understood in terms of an even greater immediacy than that suggested by Spinoza’s tripartite division, an immediacy that resists the re-introduction of transcendence and its associated ontological presuppositions, Deleuze stresses that: ‘Substance must itself be said of the modes and only of the modes’.154 To understand this, to understand the immediate and thoroughly immanent nature of the expressive relation between substance and modes, between Being and beings or - to employ the terminology of the dynamic relation that I am seeking to formulate - between Life and human beings, it is productive to introduce two further notions that Deleuze highlights as being central to an understanding of the notion of expression: explication and involvement.155 To take the concept of explication first, this term entails that substance, Being or Life, in expressing itself, presses itself out into multiple modes, forms or beings such that: ‘Expression is on the one hand an explication, an unfolding of what expresses itself, the One manifesting itself in the many’.156 However, if expressive Being were simply characterised by explication, by a pressing out of multiple beings or modes from Being, then expressive Being would risk falling back into a process of emanation or creation. This is to say that to simply assert that expressive Being presses itself into multiple forms suggests that Being remains distinct from the beings that it produces, that those beings are either created by Being or emanate from Being and, in doing so,
remain inferior to the superior, transcendent cause that produces them. What distinguishes expressive Being from emanation and creation, however, is that Being does not stand behind or above beings as their superior, distinct and transcendent cause, but is ‘woven’ into, as it were, each being that it expresses. Therefore, while expressive Being is characterised by explication, an unfolding of itself into multiple forms: ‘Its multiple expression, on the other hand, involves Unity. The One remains involved in what expresses it, imprinted in what unfolds it, immanent in whatever manifests it: expression is in this respect an involvement’.157 This is to say that while expressive Being or the One expresses or explicates itself in terms of the multitude of beings that exist and populate the world, that multitude does not remain distinct from the One; rather, the One remains immanent within each of its expressions, involved or implicated within each of the many beings that are its expression.

Is it possible to better illustrate the immediate, immanent nature of this relation? Is there, for example, an image that can help capture the intimacy of the expressive relation between Being and beings, an image that illustrates the manner in which expressive Being, while explicating itself as a plurality of beings, resists the reintroduction of the ontological presuppositions associated with Platonism? In his introduction to Deleuze, May can be seen to employ an image that goes some way to illustrating the manner in which expressive Being, while expressing or explicating itself as a multitude of modes or a variety of forms, continues to remain immanent, involved or implicated within those forms. In particular, he gives the image of the Japanese art of origami, the folding and refolding of a piece of paper into recognisable figures, such as swans, turtles, people or trees.158 Using Spinoza’s terminology, May suggests that the paper can
be understood as substance, or what I have referred to as expressive Being, while the arrangements that the paper is folded and refolded into can be understood as the modes or beings that expressive Being explicates or manifests itself as. What is important to note about the example of origami is that it not only illustrates the manner in which we can begin to think about the productive relation between expressive Being and beings, and ultimately between Life and human beings, without recourse to the concept of transcendence, but it also illustrates the manner in which expressive Being or the One (i.e. the sheet of paper) explicates itself into multiple forms or the many (i.e. the folded figures), and yet continues to remain immanent, involved or implicated within those multiple forms. In contrast to the analogy with origami, however, Deleuze can be understood as providing his own image of the expressive relation between Being and beings that perhaps illustrates not only the immanent nature, but also the ongoing dynamism, of this relation to a greater degree. In particular, Deleuze draws an analogy between Being and a voice on several occasions throughout his work, and it is this analogy that I wish to briefly reflect upon and develop in order to begin to illustrate both the intimacy and the dynamism of the expressive relation between Being and beings and, ultimately, move closer to a formulation of the manner in which human beings can be understood as an ongoing and immanent expression of the dynamism of Life.

Consider, therefore, the manner in which a single human voice expresses itself as a multitude of manifestly different and diverse intonations, tones and modulations and yet, despite this vast differentiation, all those variations, all those different intonations, tones and modulations continue to be the expression of a single voice. In an analogous manner, consider Being or Life in terms of a
voice and consider the diverse, sensible beings of the world, including human beings, as the expressed intonations, modulations or modes of that voice. This is to say that the plurality of manifestly different beings, the multitude of different things that exist and populate the world, are to be understood as the expressed modes of Being or Life in a manner analogous to how the plurality and vast differentiation of vocal modulations are the expression of a single human voice. Indeed, it is in this sense that we can begin to comprehend Deleuze’s assertion that ‘there is a single ‘voice’ of Being which includes all its modes, including the most diverse, the most varied, the most differenced’.

What the employment of the image of a voice expressing itself illustrates is that in explicating a multitude of diverse modulations, that voice does not remain in a transcendent, immutable state of repose, somehow existing over, above or beyond the vocal modulations that it produces. Rather, that voice remains involved, implicated or immanent within each and every vocal modulation that it produces in so far as all of those manifestly different vocal modulations are the expression of a single voice. Similarly, expressive Being or Life is not to be thought of as remaining in a transcendent and immutable state of repose, as somehow existing over, above or beyond the multitude of beings that are its expression - to conceptualise expressive Being in this manner would be to once more understand Being in terms of emanation or in terms of creation. Rather, in so far as all of the manifestly different beings that exist and populate the world are to be understood as an ongoing expression or explication of Being, then expressive Being is to be understood as remaining immanent within every sensible being that it produces, an intimacy that is analogous to the manner in
which the human voice remains immanent within every vocal modulation that it produces.

This intimacy and immediacy that I am suggesting characterises the expressive relation between Being and beings, an intimacy that expresses a pure immanence that has eliminated any remaining vestiges of transcendence, entails that there are not two irredeemably different realms of Being such that one can take precedence over the other, but that there is instead a thoroughgoing equality of being. Indeed, Deleuze makes it clear that ‘pure immanence requires as a principle the equality of being, or the positing of equal Being: not only is being equal in itself, but it is seen to be equally present in all beings’. This is to say, for example, that analogous to the manner in which the voice that expresses a plurality of diverse modulations is not to be thought of as somehow superior to those modulations, expressive Being is not to be understood as ontologically superior to the manifestly different beings that are its expression. However, in order to understand the full implications of the manner in which expressive Being resists the reintroduction of ontological hierarchy, then expressive Being must not be understood as expressing the multitude of beings in a serial manner, as it were, one after the other, but ought to be understood as expressing that multitude simultaneously. In order to elucidate this, it is necessary to extend Deleuze’s analogy between Being and a voice somewhat and conceive of a single voice that, rather than producing one vocal modulation, concluding that expression and then moving onto another modulation, is able to express, and continue to express, a vast plurality of vocal modulations all at once, to express a multitude of modulations in a simultaneous fashion. The simultaneously expressed modulations of the voice of Being, therefore, are not ontologically
inferior in relation to that voice, and neither are some modulations further away from that voice, somehow possessing a diminished degree of vocal, and hence ontological, participation. Rather, the voice of Being remains equally present, equally immanent within, each and every one of the modulations that it produces, equally present in each and every one of the manifestly different beings that it simultaneously expresses. Against the Neo-Platonic emanative response and the Christian creationist response to the problem of participation, therefore, in which Being or God is to be understood as the ontologically superior and eminent cause of all that is, the pure immanence that characterises expressive Being must be understood as being ‘opposed to any eminence of the cause…any hierarchical conception of the world’.

To the extent that the immanent and equal nature of expressive Being denies that Being reposes in some transcendent realm, ontologically superior to the plurality of manifestly different beings or modes that it produces or explicates, then expressive Being must also be understood as being characterised by univocity. Indeed, an ontological position of univocity is so important for Deleuze that Badiou has suggested that it is ‘the very core of Deleuze’s work’ and that it is ‘entirely reasonable to maintain that the sole function of the immense pedagogy of cases’ that Deleuze engages with in his individual and collaborative works - such as the ‘cinema, the schizo, Foucault, Riemann, Capital, Spinoza, the nomad, and so on’ - is to ‘verify tirelessly’ the ontological proposition that Being is univocal. Against Plato’s theory of Forms, therefore, and against the Neo-Platonic and Christian responses to the problem of participation, the expressive relation between Being and beings entails that Being is univocal, that everything exists on one ontological level or single,
ontologically consistent and immanent plane such that the expressive relation between Being and beings must not be conceptualised in terms of two irreducibly different realms of existence, two irretrievably different kinds of Being. As Deleuze suggests, ‘expressive immanence cannot be sustained unless it is accompanied by a thoroughgoing conception of univocity, a thoroughgoing affirmation of univocal Being’. What is important to note about this conception of univocity, however, is that although everything exists on a single ontological level, on an ontologically consistent and immanent plane, this does not entail that the vast plurality of manifestly different beings that exist, the vast differentiation of expressive Being’s modalities, are somehow really, fundamentally or ultimately the same. In a central passage for an understanding of the particular nature of the univocity that characterises expressive Being, Deleuze proposes that:

In effect, the essential in univocity is not that Being is said in a single and same sense, but that it is said, in a single and same sense, of all its individuating differences or intrinsic modalities. Being is the same for all these modalities, but these modalities are not the same. It is ‘equal’ for all, but they themselves are not equal. It is said of all in a single sense, but they themselves do not have the same sense.

In seeking to elucidate this, and the nature of the univocity that it proposes, consider again the example of a single human voice. In particular, note the manner in which a single human voice, while expressing and explicating itself as a multitude of differentiated vocal modulations, does not negate the differences between those modulations such they ought to be considered as ‘really’, ‘fundamentally’ or ‘ultimately’ the same. Rather, those vocal
modulations maintain their differences despite being the expression of a single human voice. Similarly, while expressing and explicating itself as a multitude of differentiated beings, expressive Being does not negate the differences between those beings such they ought to be considered as somehow really, fundamentally or ultimately the same. As Deleuze concisely suggests: ‘Being is said in a single and same sense of everything of which it is said, but that of which it is said differs.’\textsuperscript{168} The conception of the univocal nature of expressive Being that is being presented here can therefore be understood in terms of a complex, subtle and challenging attempt to distinguish expressive Being from the plurality of beings that it expresses, without expressive Being thereby being distinct or separate from the plurality of manifestly different beings that are its expression. This is to say that the specific conception of univocity that Deleuze seeks to maintain necessitates that expressive Being is considered as the ground of the variegated beings that are its expression, that expressive Being is distinguishable from the multitude of beings that it produces or explicates; however, in so far as expressive Being remains involved, implicated or immanent within the multitude of beings that are its expression, then expressive Being must not be understood as distinct or separate from those beings. It is precisely this attempt to maintain an ontological position of univocity while holding that expressive Being is distinguishable from the multitude of manifestly different beings that are its expression that Badiou can be understood as suggesting that Deleuze is unable to sustain.\textsuperscript{169} This is to say that in seeking to maintain that expressive Being is the distinguishable ground of the variegated beings that it explicates, Badiou suggests that Deleuze ultimately separates expressive Being from the beings that are its expression and falls into a position of equivocality, with
expressive Being remaining distinct - either ‘above’ or ‘beneath’, but most certainly ‘beyond’ - and therefore transcendent to, the manifestly different beings that it produces.\textsuperscript{170}

Badiou can therefore be understood as arguably Deleuze’s main interlocutor, and worthy of discussion for this study, precisely because the former’s critique would reintroduce the Platonic, ontological presupposition of transcendence into the latter’s philosophy, thereby threatening to frustrate, thwart and negate the attempt to formulate an account of the universal and impersonal dynamism of Life, and the manner in which the human being is an immanent and ongoing expression of this dynamism. By reintroducing the concept of transcendence, along with the ontological presuppositions associated with that concept, then the thoroughgoing dynamic temporality of Life, the manner in which it continually overcomes any present determination or identity in its interminable drive to continually produce new present possibilities, forever renewed present possibilities for each individual to live otherwise, will be frustrated. This is to say that one’s present possibilities for living otherwise give way to the obligation to actualise the possibilities for one’s life in accordance with that dictated to it by the transcendence characteristic of Platonism. Therefore, in understanding the challenge that Badiou raises against Deleuze’s univocal account of expressive Being, it is important to note that Badiou correctly suggests that it is necessary for Deleuze to articulate his account of the univocity of Being from the point of view of Being and beings, from the side of expressive Being and also from the side of the multitude of different beings that are Being’s expression. Thus, Badiou writes that ‘Being needs to be said in a single sense both from the viewpoint of the unity of its power and from the
viewpoint of the multiplicity of the divergent simulacra [beings] that this power actualizes in itself.\textsuperscript{171} This is to say that in order to maintain the univocity of expressive Being, Deleuze not only needs to suggest, from the perspective of Being, that Being expresses itself in a multitude of manifestly different beings, but also how it is possible to conceive of univocity from the perspective of those manifestly different beings: how is it that Being expresses itself in a multiplicity of divergent beings, while those many different beings are simultaneously an ongoing expression of Being? In order to address this, Badiou suggests that Deleuze employs a variety of ‘binary distributions’ or ‘doublets’ throughout his work,\textsuperscript{172} but notes that the principal doublet and distinction that Deleuze maintains is that between the ‘virtual’ and the ‘actual’.\textsuperscript{173}

As I shall discuss in detail in the next chapter, the virtual/actual doublet is central for an understanding of the manner in which Deleuze’s work can be employed to address the ontological presuppositions associated with Platonism, and to thereby formulate an account of the dynamism of Life, and the manner in which the human being is to be understood as an immanent expression of this dynamism. However, in order to gain an initial orientation with regard to the meaning of the virtual/actual doublet then what Deleuze refers to as the actual can be understood in terms of the multitude of manifestly different modes or beings that we encounter everyday, the many different ‘bodies’ that exist and populate the world, such as actual books, tables and people, along with actual sights, sounds or situations. In contrast, the virtual is not to be understood in accordance with the common phrase ‘virtual reality’, where this is taken to refer to a computer generated simulation of a three dimensional environment or, more generally, as referring to that which is artificial or not real. As Sherman notes:
‘We mustn’t think the virtual in the way that our digital culture does, as a shadowy realm of fantasy, games, and escape’. Indeed, Deleuze himself makes it clear that: ‘The virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual’. In discussing and highlighting the importance of the virtual/actual doublet for Deleuze, Badiou notes that it is not only the doublet that appears most frequently across Deleuze’s own texts, but it is also the conceptual doublet that is most unequivocally employed to identify and distinguish expressive Being as the ground of the actual beings that are its expression. Moreover, Badiou also suggests that the virtual/actual doublet is that which Deleuze employs to illustrate the univocity that is supposed to characterise the nature of the expressive relation Being and beings; for example, Badiou writes that:

“Virtual” is without any doubt the principal name of being in Deleuze’s work. Or rather, the nominal pair virtual/actual exhausts the deployment of univocal Being. But we are now familiar with the Deleuzian logic of the One: two names are required for the One in order to test that the ontological univocity designated by the nominal pair proceeds from a single one of those names. We require the couple virtual/actual to test that an actual being univocally possesses its being as a function of its virtuality. In this sense, the virtual is the ground of the actual.

It is precisely the attempt to maintain this distinction, however, the attempt to distinguish the virtual from the actual while maintaining a position of univocity that Badiou suggests Deleuze is unable to maintain. This is to say that in seeking to maintain that the virtual, or expressive Being, is the distinguishable ground of the variegated actual beings that it explicates, Badiou suggests that Deleuze
ultimately separates the virtual from the actual beings that are its expression and thereby falls into a position of equivocity.\textsuperscript{178} As Badiou makes clear, however, in order to maintain a position of univocity then ‘the virtual must not be thought apart from the object itself…indeed, were we to separate the virtual from the actual object, univocity would be ruined, for Being would be said according to the division of the objective actual and the non-objective virtual’.\textsuperscript{179} Conversely, however, if the virtual is no longer distinguishable from the actual beings that are its supposed expression then Badiou suggests that the virtual collapses into the multitude of actual beings; this is to say that if expressive Being is no longer the distinguishable ground of the multitude of manifestly different beings that it supposedly explicates then the consequence of this, and the philosophical position that Badiou maintains, is that the conception of the virtual ground or expressive Being must be dismissed such that we are left with a multiplicity of actual beings. Thus, Badiou concludes that: ‘I must therefore return, as is the law in philosophy - that discipline of thought in which discussion is at once omnipresent and without any other effect than internal - to my own song: the One is not, there are only actual multiplicities, and the ground is void’.\textsuperscript{180} To summarise Badiou’s critique of Deleuze’s attempt to maintain a position of univocity within a schema of expressive Being, I am suggesting that Badiou proposes that we will be confronted with one of two choices. If we wish to maintain that expressive Being is the distinguishable ground of the multitude of variegated actual beings that it explicates then expressive Being must ultimately be understood as distinct or separate from those beings and we therefore establish ‘a renewed concept of the One’ that reinstates a position of equivocity and transcendence. However, if we want to maintain that expressive Being is not
distinct or separate from the multitude of actual beings that are its expression then Being, or the virtual ground, ultimately collapses into the multitude of actual beings such that there is only a multitude of actual beings and the notion of Being as the expressive ground of those beings is void.¹⁸¹

For Badiou, Deleuze’s attempt to establish his particular conception of the univocal nature of expressive Being is therefore ultimately a failure. In particular, the attempt to distinguish the virtual ground, or expressive Being, from the plurality of actual beings that it expresses, without expressive Being thereby being distinct or separate from the plurality of beings that are its expression, collapses into the traditional, opposing relation between the One and the many. This is to say that Deleuze’s attempt to maintain that the virtual, or expressive Being, is the distinguishable, and yet not distinct ground of the variegated actual beings that it explicates, leads to the collapse of expressive Being into an equivocal position of transcendent Being (i.e. ‘a renewed concept of the One’) above the multitude of actual beings, or the dissolution of expressive Being into the multitude of actual beings (i.e. the many).¹⁸² In doing so, however, Deleuze’s work becomes open to the charge of being a species of Platonism in so far as the opposing relation between the One and the many can be understood as precisely that which characterises the primary, historical responses to the problem of participation. This is to say that within Plato’s theory of Forms, the Neo-Platonic emanative response or the Christian creationist response to the problem of participation, that which is participated in - a transcendent Form, emanative Being or God - is to be understood as one, indeed as the One, in contrast to the many manifestly different beings of the world that either participate in their respective transcendent Form or emerge as a
consequence of an emanative process or a process of divine creation. In all three responses to the problem of participation, there is a clear distinction between Being and beings, between the One and the many, and this distinction is intimately connected to the ontological presuppositions of transcendence, equivocity, ontological hierarchy, an immutable foundation or fixed ground, the primacy of identity over difference and, ultimately, the subordination of difference to identity. What is important to note about Badiou’s critique, however, is that it suggests that on his own terms Deleuze fails to overcome the opposing relation between the One and the many that can be understood as characteristic of Platonism. This is to say that the virtual/actual doublet that Deleuze introduces to establish his particular conception of the univocal nature of expressive Being, and which is supposed to overcome the opposing relation between the One and many, and therefore the ontological presuppositions of Platonism, cannot be maintained.

Against Badiou, however, is it still possible to formulate an account of the univocal nature of expressive Being in terms of the virtual and the actual that overcomes the opposing relation between the One and many, and therefore the ontological presuppositions of Platonism? To a certain degree, Deleuze’s analogy between expressive Being and a voice perhaps goes some way to illustrate how we might begin to think of the univocal nature of expressive Being without falling into the opposing relation between the One and the many. For example, the single voice that expresses itself can be understood as the distinguishable ground of the multitude of vocal modulations that it expresses, but we are not led to concede that the voice is therefore separate or distinct from the multitude of vocal modulations that the voice explicates, we are not led to a
position of equivocity in which the voice is considered as distinct from - and somehow above, beneath or beyond - the multitude of modulations that it produces. Rather, distinguishable and yet not distinct, the voice remains involved, implicated or immanent within each and every vocal modulation that it produces in so far as all of those manifestly different vocal modulations are the expression of a single voice. Beyond such analogies, however, is it possible to formulate an account of the univocal nature of expressive Being, as it were, on Deleuze’s own terms through the employment of the notions of the virtual and the actual? This is to say that without recourse to analogy, is it possible to understand the virtual or expressive Being as a distinguishable ground that is nevertheless not distinct from the actual beings that are its ongoing expression, and that thereby overcomes the opposing relation between the One and many? In chapter two, I shall argue that this is possible but that it necessitates a thoroughgoing ‘temporalisation’ of expressive Being and, in particular, a reconceptualisation of expressive Being in terms of what Deleuze refers to as the passive synthesis of time. In doing so, I shall argue that it is ultimately this temporalisation of expressive Being that enables a formulation of Life as a universal, impersonal and thoroughly dynamic power, along with the manner in which the human being is an immanent and ongoing expression of this dynamism, and that it is an understanding of the relation between Life and the human being in terms of the three passive syntheses of time that overcomes the opposing relation between the One and the many and therefore addresses the ontological presuppositions associated with the historical responses to the problem of participation.
Chapter Two: Time

In the introduction to this study, I suggested that Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work can be productively understood as being concerned with the question of living well, where it was suggested that living well necessitates that we not only become aware of, but that we also explore, the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings, therefore moving beyond the often restrictive, self-limiting modes of life that are part of the historical legacy that we have inherited and that continue to occlude an awareness of our present possibilities. In particular, I proposed that what legitimises this conception of living well, and what can motivate us to engage in such a practice, is that a life that becomes aware of and explores the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings is a life that reflects or that is lived in accordance with the challenging ontological account that is present in Deleuze’s work, his open, dynamic and thoroughly temporal theory of Being or what I have suggested he later came to refer to simply as Life. To live in accordance with Life, however, does not entail a fixed, overarching plan of how the possibilities for our lives ought to be actualised in so far as Life is to be understood as that which is continually becoming different to what it is at any given moment, an irrepressible temporal power that continually overcomes any present determination or identity in its interminable drive to continually produce new present possibilities. Moreover, in so far as each individual is to be understood as an ongoing and immanent expression of Life, then a life that strives to explore the forever renewed present possibilities that each moment engenders, a practice that also necessitates that each individual strives to resist the diverse ways in which their present possibilities are
continually hindered, thwarted and negated, is not only a life that strives to live in accordance with the dynamism of Life, but is also a life lived in accordance with our own dynamic being. This is to say that Life is to be understood in terms of a universal, impersonal and thoroughly temporal dynamic power and, in particular, in terms of a complex temporal structure that Deleuze refers to as the passive syntheses of time, a temporal dynamism that I will argue constitutes the dynamic form or temporal character of each individual’s ‘living present’.  

In order to begin to explore the manner in which each human being is to be understood as an immediate and ongoing expression of Life, a continual and immanent expression of this thoroughly temporal power, chapter one began to do so within the context of the Platonic problem of participation. In particular I suggested that an account of the dynamism of Life, and the manner in which each individual is to be understood as an immanent expression of this dynamism, will be required to address and overcome the ontological presuppositions associated with the historical responses to the problem of participation; namely, the presupposition of transcendence, equivocity, ontological hierarchy, the positing of an immutable foundation or fixed ground, the primacy of identity over difference and, ultimately, the subordination of difference to identity. In seeking to formulate an account of the relation between human beings and Life that addresses, challenges and overcomes these Platonic presuppositions, presuppositions retained by both Neo-Platonism and Christianity, I also suggested that the immanent relation between Life and human beings ought to be understood in terms of the Spinozist concept of expression, an immanent expressionism that entails a challenging conception of ontological univocity. In particular, the conception of univocity that Deleuze seeks to maintain was
presented in terms of a complex, subtle and challenging attempt to distinguish an expressive ontological ground from the plurality of beings that it expresses, without that ground thereby being distinct or separate from the plurality of beings that are its expression. However, it is precisely this attempt to maintain an ontological position of univocity while holding that there is an expressive ontological ground that is distinguishable from the multitude of beings that are its expression that Badiou can be understood as suggesting that Deleuze is unable to sustain. For Badiou, Deleuze’s attempt to determine an expressive ontological ground as the distinguishable and virtual ground of the plurality of actual beings that it expresses, without that ontological ground thereby being distinct or separate from the plurality of beings that are its expression, collapses into the traditional, opposing relation between the One and the many, reintroducing the Platonic ontological presupposition of transcendence along with the remaining ontological presuppositions associated with the historical responses to the problem of participation.

To accept Badiou’s critique of Deleuze, therefore, would be to accept the introduction of the ontological presupposition of transcendence into the latter’s work, thereby threatening to frustrate this study’s attempt to formulate an account of the dynamism of Life, and the manner in which the human being is to be understood as an ongoing and immanent expression of that dynamism. By introducing the concept of transcendence into Deleuze’s work, along with the other Platonic ontological presuppositions associated with that concept, then the dynamism of Life, along with the legitimacy of the conception of living well that rests upon it, is threatened by a conception of Life in terms of a transcendent, immutable identity and the obligation to actualise one’s
possibilities in accordance with that dictated to it by that transcendent identity. My objective in this chapter, however, is to argue that it is possible to provide a coherent account of the expressive and univocal nature of Life, to understand Life in terms of a distinguishable ground that is nevertheless not distinct from the actual beings that are its ongoing expression, and that by doing so the opposing relation between the One and many can be addressed - along with the ontological presuppositions associated with the historical responses to the problem of participation. However, I also want to propose that this necessitates, as it were, a thoroughgoing temporalisation of Life, a conceptualisation of Life in terms of the three passive syntheses of time and, within the context of these syntheses, a reconsideration of Deleuze’s important distinction between the virtual and the actual. As a result, we shall be able to formulate an account of the manner in which each human being can be understood as an immediate and ongoing expression of Life, a continual and immanent expression of that which is continually becoming different to what it is at any given moment. In particular, I will argue that a reconceptualisation of Life in terms of the three passive syntheses of time will enable a formulation of the manner in which Life can be understood as a universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that constitutes the dynamic form or temporal character of each individual’s living present, as well as enabling us to understand how each moment of our lives provides us with the forever renewed present opportunity for moving beyond the often restrictive, self-limiting modes of life that we have inherited and that continue to occlude an awareness of our present possibilities.

In order to address these various concerns, I want to begin with the manner in which our living present is to be understood as being constituted by
the three passive syntheses of time, the manner in which our living present is an immanent and ongoing expression of Life. In order to do this, however, I want to begin with an examination of two, brief examples that Deleuze employs in *Difference and Repetition* and which begin to disclose the nature or the character of the living present. The first example is what Deleuze identifies as David Hume’s account of the repeated series of couples of events or instances: AB, AB, AB…in which whenever an instance of A occurs we expect B to follow - in our living present an example of this repeated series would be the ongoing ‘tick-tock’ of a clock. The second example that Deleuze identifies and employs is Henri Bergson’s account of a series of repeated instances: A, A, A…in which whenever A occurs we expect another A to follow - an example of this type of repeated series in the living present would be the repeated chimes of a clock. While these examples will be seen to be illustrative for various aspects of the living present, what I want to suggest here is that they illustrate the manner in which our present, lived experience - such as our present experience of the repeated tick-tock of a clock or the present experience of hearing the repeated chimes of a clock - is constituted by virtue of the relation or synthesis that independent elements or instants enter into. Indeed, in relation to Hume’s example of hearing the repeated tick-tock of a clock, Deleuze makes it clear that what is at work here is a synthesis that ‘contracts the successive independent instants into one another, thereby constituting the lived, or living, present.’ Through the employment of both Hume’s and Bergson’s examples to illustrate the temporal character of the living present we can therefore begin to suggest that underlying and constituting that living present, underlying and constituting the nature of our present, lived experience of, for example, hearing
the tick-tock of a clock or a clock’s repeated chimes, are independent instants that enter into a relation or synthesis that thereby constitutes that present experience.

In addition to the two, brief examples given by Deleuze, however - in addition to Hume’s example of the repeated series of couples of events or instances and Bergson’s example of a series of repeated instances - it is productive to employ an example that is well established when discussing philosophical accounts of time; namely, the experience of hearing a musical melody in the living present. In particular, I want to suggest that the example of hearing a melody not only further explicates the manner in which the living present is constituted by a synthesis of independent instants, but that it will also be illustrative for various other aspects of the manner in which the temporal character of each individual’s living present is to be understood as an ongoing expression of the passive syntheses of time. To begin to do so, consider the manner in which it is necessary, in order to hear the ongoing progression of a melody in the living present, that the notes that constitute that melody are heard as conjoined, and therefore experienced as an ongoing continuity. This is to say that in order to hear a melody in the living present then the multitude of independent notes from which it is composed must not be experientially independent, the multitude of independent notes which make up that melody must not be heard in isolation from one another, but must be experienced in the living present as conjoined, as an ongoing and progressive continuity. Therefore, while the multitude of independent notes from which that melody is composed are not experientially independent, while the multitude of notes that make up a melody are not heard in isolation from one another, they can be understood as
being independent from one another prior to our experience of them in the living present, as being, as it were, ‘logically independent’ or ‘logically isolated’ from one another. Indeed, in illustrating the logical independence of the instances that make up the lived experience of that which is not experientially independent and, in particular, the manner in which we hear four chimes of a clock in the living present as conjoined - thereby enabling us to determine that it is four o’clock - Deleuze makes it clear that ‘four o’clock strikes…each stroke, each disturbance or excitation, is logically independent of the other, mens momentanea’.188 This is to say that each instance, one tick or chime of the clock, or one note of a musical melody, is to be understood as being logically independent from every other in the sense that - prior to our experience of them in the living present - one instance, one chime of the clock, one note of the melody, does not appear unless the other has disappeared.189

In supplementing the examples given by Deleuze with the example of a musical melody, and by drawing a distinction between that which is logically independent but not experientially independent, my intention is to begin to illustrate the manner in which our lived, present experience is constituted by, or an expression of, a particular temporal dynamic or synthesis which Deleuze refers to as the first synthesis of time or simply as Habit.190 Each individual’s living present is an expression of a dynamic synthesis which ensures that all of the independent instants that have disappeared or that have passed continue to be retained, contracted and synthesised into the present. As Deleuze makes clear: ‘This synthesis contracts the successive independent instants into one another, thereby constituting the lived, or living present. It is in this present that time is deployed.’191 If we consider the example of the lived, present experience of
hearing a musical melody, then the first synthesis of time can be understood as ensuring that - rather than hearing the multitude of notes in isolation from one another - the previous notes of the melody are retained, contracted and synthesised into the experience of the present note, so that the present note is always experienced alongside or, as it were, against the background of the notes that have passed. As Hughes has suggested: ‘The first passive synthesis, undertaken by a spontaneous imagination, does nothing more than gather together sensibility’s passing presents. In doing so, it produces the temporal dimension of the ‘the present’’. As has been noted elsewhere, in characterising the first synthesis of time in terms of a retention, contraction and synthesis of the past into the present, Deleuze is here drawing upon and refining Bergson’s account of duree or duration in which our former conscious states are said to endure, coexist and meld into our present conscious state. Indeed, in discussing the manner in which the endurance of the past with the present that characterises duration presupposes the constituting activity of contraction, Deleuze makes it clear that: ‘Saying that the past is preserved in itself and that it is prolonged in the present is tantamount to saying that the subsequent moment appears without the disappearance of the previous moment. This presupposes a contraction, and it is contraction that defines duration’. In presenting his account of duration, at least in his earlier works, Bergson suggests that the ongoing endurance of the past with the present, an ongoing endurance that presupposes the contraction of the past into the present, is characteristic of the ongoing succession of our conscious states. For example, he makes it clear that: ‘Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live’,
conscious states ‘permeate one another, imperceptibly organize themselves into a whole, and bind the past to the present by this very process of connexion’.\(^{196}\)

All too often, however, it is suggested that we fail to notice the durational nature of our conscious states, all too often we fail to see the manner in which the past is retained, contracted and synthesised into the present, and we fail to do so to the extent that we commonly introduce an abstract and, in particular, a spatial conception of time into the lived, durational nature of our conscious states. As Bergson makes clear, ‘we set our states of consciousness side by side in such a way as to perceive them simultaneously, no longer in one another, but alongside one another; in a word we project time into space, we express duration in terms of extensity, and succession thus takes the form of a continuous line or a chain, the parts of which touch without penetrating one another’.\(^{197}\) As I shall discuss below, the ongoing contraction of the past with the present that characterises duration and which Deleuze adopts in order to develop his account of the passive synthesis of time ought not to be understood as being confined to, and an exclusive property of, the individual’s conscious states, a displacement of ‘psychological duration’ that Deleuze also discerns in Bergson’s later works. However, for now I want to suggest that rather than being solely understood as that which contracts all of the independent instants that have passed, the first synthesis of time also simultaneously establishes a further characteristic of the living present. This is to say that in addition to the ongoing contraction of all the particular independent instants into the present, Habit is to be understood as that which simultaneously ensures that each individual’s living present is also characterised by expectations of the future. As Deleuze makes clear, ‘the living present goes from the past to the future which it constitutes in time, which is to
say also from the particular to the general: from the particulars which it envelops by contraction to the general which it develops in the field of its expectation.\textsuperscript{198}

If we consider this additional aspect of the first synthesis of time within the context of the lived, present experience of hearing a musical melody, then this temporal dynamic does not simply ensure that the previous notes of the melody are contracted, retained and synthesised into the experience of the present note, so that the present note is always experienced against the background of the notes that have passed. Rather, the first synthesis of time also simultaneously creates an anticipation or expectation of the future, the anticipation or expectation that there are more notes of the musical melody to come. The ongoing contraction, retention and synthesis that characterises the first synthesis of time, therefore, must be understood as not only ensuring that each individual’s living present is characterised by an ongoing continuity with the past, but must also be understood as that which ensures that the living present is characterised by certain expectations of the future. As Deleuze suggests, both the past and the future must be understood as being deployed within, or belonging to, each individual’s living present, ‘the past in so far as the preceding instants are retained in the contraction; the future because its expectation is anticipated in this same contraction’.\textsuperscript{199} Therefore, in employing the example of a musical melody to illustrate the manner in which the living present is an expression of the first synthesis of time we can suggest that although the notes of a melody, prior to our experience of them in the living present, are instantaneous, discontinuous and logically independent from one another - in the sense that one note does not appear unless the other has disappeared - the first synthesis of time ensures that all of the notes that have
passed are contracted, retained and synthesised into the present. As a consequence of this ongoing contraction, however, the first synthesis of time simultaneously creates a general, ongoing anticipation or expectation of the arrival of future notes, an orientation towards the future that is possible ‘in so far as there is also a synthesis of the past within the living present’. It is this ongoing contraction, retention and synthesis of the past into the present which simultaneously creates an expectation of the future that can be understood as transforming the instantaneous, discontinuous, and therefore logically independent notes of a melody into the lived, present experience of its ongoing and dynamic continuity.

However, to conceptualise the temporal character of the living present as being constituted by, and an expression of, the first synthesis of time or Habit, and thereby understand both the past and the future as belonging to, or continuous with the present, challenges what we might refer to as the everyday conception of time or, following Heidegger, ‘the ordinary understanding of time’. In contrast to Deleuze’s account of the manner in which the first synthesis of time ensures that the living present is characterised in terms of an ongoing continuity with the past and the future, the ordinary understanding of time attempts to characterise the living present exclusively in terms of a series of successive and distinct present moments or ‘nows’ in which the previous ‘now’ is said to have gone, the future ‘now’ is yet to come and so only the present ‘now’ is said to exist. Of course, Deleuze’s account of the first synthesis of time is not the first to call into question, and provide an alternative to, this ordinary understanding of time as a series of successive ‘nows’. Husserl’s account of ‘internal time consciousness’ in which our lived experience of the
present is composed of ‘primal impressions’, ‘retentions’ and ‘protentions’, Bergson’s account of *duree* in which the succession of our conscious states are directly experienced or lived in such a way that our former conscious states endure, coexist and fuse into our present state, and Heidegger’s account of the ‘*ecstases*’ of temporality in which Dasein, at any given moment, simultaneously ‘stands’ in the past, present and future, all provide critiques of, and alternatives to, the ordinary understanding of time. Indeed, prior to Husserl, Bergson and Heidegger, Aristotle raised a series of concerns about understanding time in terms of the ‘now’. For example, how are we to resolve the apparent experiential fact that we are continually presented with a series of new ‘nows’, that each of our present experiences is continually changing and different, and yet our experience always seems to occur within the same, apparently unchanging form of ‘now’? As Durie has suggested: ‘It is not simply that the content, so to speak of each experience is different; it is, rather, that each now, while still being now, is also a new now’.

Despite the manner in which the ordinary understanding of time has been highlighted as problematic and contested, at least philosophically, since the work of Aristotle, it has been suggested that in our everyday thinking about time it continues to persist, albeit dressed in modern day metaphors. For example, Sokolowski has proposed that: ‘When we try to explain how we experience temporal objects, we are usually tempted to say that we have a series of “nows” presented to us, one after the other. We tend to say that temporal experience is very much like a film being run, with one exposure (one presence) quickly following another’. Indeed, in his recent study, *Consuming Life*, Zygmunt Bauman has proposed that within modern consumer society, not only is time
widely *conceptualised* in terms of a series of punctuated or discontinuous present moments, but that it increasingly becomes the primary mode in which time is ordinarily *lived*. This is to say that in so far as consumer society associates happiness with an ever rising volume and intensity of desires and the prompt use, and rapid replacement, of the commodities intended to satisfy those desires then the meaning of time is renegotiated. In particular, there is a greater emphasis on the present, on continually renewed present desires and their immediate gratification such that, increasingly, the members of ‘liquid modern society’ come to live and experience time in a ‘pointillist’ manner, as a series of discrete points, spots or ‘nows’. As Bauman proposes: ‘Pointillist time is more prominent for its inconsistency and lack of cohesion than for its elements of continuity and consistency; in this kind of time whatever continuity or causal logic may connect successive spots tends to be surmised and/or construed at the far end of the retrospective search for intelligibility and order, being as a rule conspicuously absent among the motives prompting the actors’ movement between points’. Whatever our assessment of Bauman’s thesis regarding the proliferation and intensification of pointillist time in modern consumer society, the continued persistence of an understanding of time as a successive series of ‘nows’, or independent instants, is important enough for Deleuze to stress the manner in which his account of the first synthesis of time ought to be distinguished from the ordinary understanding of time. For example, he asserts that: ‘A succession of independent instants does not constitute time any more than it causes it to disappear; it indicates only its constantly aborted moment of birth’.213
What is important for Deleuze about this ordinary understanding of time, however, is not merely the manner in which it prioritises the existence of an independent present ‘now’, but the manner in which the temporality, movement or passage of time is thought to occur by virtue of a passing series or succession of distinct presents. In the ordinary understanding of time, time understood as a series of successive ‘nows’, the present moment or ‘now’ is thought to become past when a new present moment arrives and reconstitutes the former present moment as past. Indeed, in illustrating and calling into question this ordinary conception of the passage of time, Deleuze makes it clear that: ‘We are too accustomed to thinking in terms of the “present.” We believe that a present is only past when it is replaced by another present’.\(^{214}\) One of the main difficulties with this conception of time, however, an account that prioritises the present ‘now’ and understands the passage of time in terms of a series of successive and distinct ‘nows’, is that it is unclear how one ‘now’ is to succeed another, how the arrival of a new present moment is supposed to constitute the former present moment as past. In highlighting the difficulties of this conception of the passage of time, Deleuze writes that: ‘In effect, we are unable to believe that the past is constituted after it has been present, or because a new present appears. If a new present were required for the past to be constituted as past, then the former present would never pass and the new one would never arrive’.\(^{215}\) In order to understand the problem that Deleuze highlights here, it is necessary to note that when time is understood in terms of a series of successive and distinct ‘nows’, then the present moment or ‘now’ is often understood in terms of a limit or a boundary that separates the past ‘now’ from the future ‘now’.\(^{216}\) However, if the independent present moment or ‘now’ is understood in terms of a boundary that
separates or divides the past ‘now’ from the future ‘now’, then the present ‘now’ would seem to be irremediably set adrift from the past and the future, both unable to traverse itself in order to become past and divorced from the possibility of being replaced by the arrival of a new ‘now’.

In order to account for the manner in which the living present is characterised by the movement or passage of time, therefore, then that living present is also to be understood as being constituted by, or being an expression of, a second synthesis of time, a synthesis of time that Deleuze refers to as Memory. However, if the first synthesis of time challenges the ordinary understanding of time, then the second synthesis of time, when compared to the understanding of time as a series of successive and distinct present moments or ‘nows’, must be understood as being profoundly paradoxical. In particular, the second synthesis of time entails that in order for the living present to be characterised by the passage of time, then every present moment must already possess, as it were, a past aspect to. This is to say that in order for the living present to be characterised by the movement of the present into the past then every present moment must be understood as already being past at the moment that it is present. Indeed, in highlighting this paradoxical character of the second synthesis of time, and yet its necessity for the passage of the present, Deleuze proposes that: ‘No present would ever pass were it not past ‘at the same time’ as it is present; no past would ever be constituted unless it was first constituted ‘at the same time’ as it was present’. Therefore, in order for the second synthesis of time to ensure that the present moment always has a past aspect to it, then the past must not be understood - as it is for the ordinary understanding of time - as a former present that is constituted after the arrival of a new present moment.
Rather, the second synthesis of time is to be understood in terms of an *a priori* past that always coexists with every present moment and that is the condition for the passage of every present, an *a priori* and contemporaneous past which ensures that each present moment has a past aspect to it and is therefore able to pass. In highlighting the *a priori* nature of the past constituted by the second synthesis of time, Deleuze writes that ‘we necessarily speak of a past which never *was* present, since it was not formed ‘after’. Its manner of being contemporaneous with itself as present is that of being posed as already there, presupposed by the passing present and causing it to pass’.

For each individual’s living present to be characterised by the passage of time, then it must also be understood as being an expression of a second synthesis of time or Memory, a profoundly paradoxical synthesis of time that, in establishing an *a priori* and contemporaneous past, ensures that each present moment is already past at the moment that it is present. As Turetzky notes: ‘For a present to pass it must be constituted as past, and it cannot be constituted as past unless it were so constituted when it was present’. In so far as the second synthesis of time constitutes ‘a past which never *was* present’, a past which was already there prior to every present moment, then this *a priori* past must not be understood in terms of, and as being constituted by, a series of former presents or ‘nows’. Rather, this *a priori* past is to be understood as ‘the past itself’ or a ‘general region’ into which each present moment passes, a coexistent ‘past in general’ in which particular former presents preserve themselves and from which it is possible to focus upon and actively represent those former presents to ourselves in the living present. As Deleuze suggests: ‘The past is not the former present itself but the element in which we focus upon the latter. Particularity,
therefore, now belongs to that on which we focus - in other words, to that which ‘has been’; whereas the past itself, the ‘was’, is by nature general. The past in general is the element in which each former present is focused upon in particular and as a particular.\textsuperscript{221} Therefore, as that which is already there prior to every present, the second synthesis time is not only to be understood as a coexistent a priori past that ensures that our living present is characterised by the passage of time, but it is also to be understood as the past in general into which particular presents pass and that, by virtue of its contemporaneity, serves as a necessary condition for the possibility of actively recollecting and representing those former presents to ourselves in the living present.\textsuperscript{222}

As the past in general into which particular presents pass, the coexistent a priori past that is established by the second synthesis of time, ought not to be understood as a general region into which some of our particular presents pass. Rather, the past in general is to be understood as that general region into which all of our former presents pass so that the whole of our past is contemporaneous with our living present, so that ‘all of the past coexists with the new present in relation to which it is now past’.\textsuperscript{223} As Williams suggests, the proposal that all of our former presents coexist with our living present, including those that have ‘sunk without a trace’, is ‘deeply counter-intuitive’ in so far as it is often supposed that without some physical record or some enduring memorial ‘trace’, without some enduring remembrance of a former present that we can call to mind, then those former presents are gone for good and forever lost to memory: ‘The enduring intuition is: no trace - no past; no remembering - no memory’.\textsuperscript{224} However, the ongoing coexistence of all of our former presents with our living present can be understood as the necessary condition for the phenomena of
involuntarily memory. It is because the whole of our past is contemporaneous with our living present that any one of the former presents that comprise that past - even those former presents that have sunk without a trace, those former presents for which there is no longer a physical record or enduring memorial trace - can be involuntarily summoned into the living present by, for example, the smell of perfume, the notes of a melody or, as famously depicted in Marcel Proust’s *In Search of Lost Time* the taste of a piece of madeleine dipped in lime-blossom tea. Indeed, in highlighting the extent to which such involuntarily memory can resurrect whole periods of lost time, rather than merely a limited number of recent former presents, Proust’s narrator proposes that the taste of madeleine dipped in lime-blossom tea involuntarily summons whole sections of his forgotten past into the present so that ‘the good people of the village and their little dwellings and the church and all of Combray and its surroundings, all of this which is assuming form and substance, emerged, town and gardens alike, from my cup of tea’.\textsuperscript{225}

In beginning with the living present, it has been suggested that the dynamic form or temporal character of our living present is to be understood as being an expression of, and thereby constituted by, two distinct syntheses of time. The first synthesis of time or Habit ensures that our lived present is characterised by an ongoing continuity in so far as this synthesis contracts and retains every present moment that has passed and synthesises all those past moments into the present, thereby creating an anticipation or certain expectation of the future. However, in order to ensure that the living present is characterised by the passage of time then the second synthesis of time or Memory constitutes an *a priori* past in general that not only ensures that every present moment
possess a past aspect to it, and is therefore able to pass, but is also the coexistent region into which every former present passes, ensuring that those former presents can be recollected, either voluntarily or involuntarily, in the present moment. If we consider the first and second synthesis of time within the context of the example of hearing a melody in the living present, then the first synthesis of time ensures that all the notes that have passed are contracted, retained and synthesised into the present, creating the expectation of future notes and the ongoing continuity of the melody. In contrast, the second synthesis of time is that synthesis which ensures that each note of the melody is able to pass and is also the condition for both the voluntary and involuntary recollection of the past notes and phrases of that melody. Therefore, in so far as the first synthesis of time is a contraction of all the present moments that have passed, while the second synthesis ensures that each present moment is able to pass, the former synthesis refers to, and must be understood as being grounded upon, the latter synthesis. Without the activity of the second synthesis of time no present would be able to pass and therefore the first synthesis of time would be unable to conduct its contraction of the presents that have passed. Highlighting the dependency of the first synthesis of time upon the passing present, and therefore upon the second syntheses of time, Deleuze makes it clear that: ‘The claim of the present is precisely that it passes. However, it is what causes the present to pass, that to which the present and habit belong, which must be considered the ground of time. It is memory that grounds time’.

But how is it that the living present is continually characterised by a new and distinguishable present moment upon which the first and second syntheses of time conduct their respective syntheses? While Habit contracts every present
moment that passes, and Memory ensures that every present moment is able to pass, how are we to account for the manner in which our living present is continually characterised by a new present moment, necessarily distinguishable from the past and the future, that Memory ensures passes and Habit continually contracts into the new present moment? The answer to this, I shall argue, is that the living present is not only constituted by, and therefore an expression of, the first and second synthesis of time, but it is also an expression of a third syntheses of time, a third synthesis of time that ensures that the living present is continually characterised by a distinguishable and new present moment without which the first and second syntheses would be unable to conduct their respective syntheses. Before discussing this further, however, it should be noted that any attempt to provide an exposition of the third synthesis of time demands a particularly close and critical reading of Deleuze’s work, not only because that synthesis possesses a particularly complex determination or character, but also because it is introduced in *Difference and Repetition* in a significantly contracted and abstruse manner. Indeed, in his assessment of the difficulty in coming to terms with the exposition of the third synthesis of time in *Difference and Repetition*, and the need for a critical reading in order to do so, Hughes has suggested that: ‘Deleuze’s comments on the third synthesis are among the most opaque of the entire book. His descriptions are extremely difficult to follow, and at times they seem incoherent and contradictory…one reason this particular moment is so difficult to follow is that Deleuze himself does not make enough distinctions and pushes too much information and too many elaborate allusions into too few lines’. 227 Indeed, Deleuze’s explicit exposition of the third synthesis of time in *Difference and Repetition* can be seen as being conducted over a mere
three or four pages, and does so by employing a number of oblique references to a variety of literary, fictional characters such as Oedipus and Hamlet. For example, Deleuze writes: ‘What does this mean: the empty form of time or third synthesis? The Northern Prince says ‘time is out of joint’. Can it be that the Northern philosopher says the same thing: that he should be Hamletian because he is Oedipal?’

Despite these difficulties, however, I shall suggest that the exposition of the third synthesis of time is best approached through a careful and critical reading of Deleuze’s brief allusion to the nineteenth century German poet Friedrich Hölderlin and, within the context of Hölderlin, Deleuze’s discussion of ‘the caesura’ in particular. Therefore, in order to provide an exposition of the third synthesis of time, and continue the formulation of the manner in which the temporal character of each individual’s living present is to be understood as an expression of all three syntheses of time, and ultimately the manner in which the living present is an ongoing and immanent expression of Life itself, it is to Deleuze’s employment of Hölderlin and his discussion of the caesura that I shall now turn. Deleuze can be understood as seeking to elucidate the complex character of the third synthesis of time with the suggestion that: ‘Hölderlin said that it no longer ‘rhymed’, because it was distributed unequally on both sides of a ‘caesura’, as a result of which beginning and end no longer coincided. We may define the order of time as this purely formal distribution of the unequal in the function of a caesura.’ Despite the complex and contracted manner of this passage, I want to argue that Deleuze can be understood as proposing that a productive way to begin to think about the third synthesis of time is in accordance with, and analogous to, the poetic device known as a caesura, where
a caesura is a cut or a break that occurs midway in a poetic line - more often than not, of iambic pentameter. For example, following his encounter with the ghost of his father, Hamlet famously declares that: ‘The time is out of joint: O cursed spite // That ever I was born to set it right!’ Here, a particularly sharp caesura occurs in the first line (indicated by the colon) which effectively cuts or breaks the line in two, enabling a clear distinction to be made between what comes before the caesura and what comes after it. This is to say that the caesura functions as a break or a pause that enables an audience to clearly distinguish Hamlet’s assessment of the current state of ‘the time’ (i.e. ‘the time is out of joint’), and his assessment of the role he has in relation to that time (i.e. ‘O cursed spite // That ever I was born to set it right’).

In an analogous fashion to the caesura in a poetic line, therefore, we can provisionally propose that the third synthesis of time can be understood in terms of a ‘temporal caesura’, a temporal caesura that functions as, or serves to introduce, a cut or a break. However, if we understand the caesura in temporal terms, then how are we to consider the nature of the cut or the break that it serves to introduce, and what is the ‘purely formal distribution of the unequal’ that Deleuze suggests is established by the function of the caesural cut or break? In a fashion analogous to the function of the poetic caesura, the temporal caesura that is to be identified with the third synthesis of time can be understood as enabling a temporal distinction to be made between what comes before the caesura and what comes after it. This is to say that in so far as the third synthesis of time is understood in terms of a temporal caesura then I am suggesting that it establishes a temporal cut or break that enables a distinction to be made between the past - or that which comes before the temporal caesura - and the future - or
that which comes after the temporal caesura. It is in this sense that we can understand the third synthesis of time as establishing ‘a distribution of the unequal’ on both sides of the caesura, a distribution of the past on one side or before the caesura, and a distribution of the future on the other side or after the caesura, such that the past and the future are unequal and therefore distinguishable distributions either side of the temporal cut that, to use the terminology that Deleuze attributes to Hölderlin, no longer ‘rhyme’. If the third synthesis of time is understood in terms of a temporal caesura that serves to introduce a cut that enables a distinction to be made between the past and the future, then the caesural cut itself can be further determined in temporal terms. This is to say that as a caesural cut that enables a temporal distinction to be made between what comes before the caesura and what comes after it, the third synthesis of time can be determined as the present moment such that the present moment, understood as a temporal caesural cut, is that which enables a distinction to be made between the past or that which comes before the present moment and the future or that which comes after the present moment.

Although the third synthesis of time is to be understood as a temporal caesura that is identified with the present moment and that enables a distinction to be made between the past and the future, that temporal caesura must not be understood exclusively as a cut or a break. This is to say that while the third synthesis of time functions as a temporal caesura, a cut that enables a temporal distinction to be made between the past and the future, it must not be understood as a caesural cut that definitively and irremediably breaks the past from the future. If we again consider the function of a poetic caesura, then the caesural cut does not simply break the line in two, irrevocably divorcing that which
comes before the caesura from that which comes after the caesura. Rather, the caesural cut must also be understood as gathering together that which comes before and after it precisely so that a distinction can be made between them. For example, the caesural cut highlighted in Shakespeare’s line from Hamlet does not irrevocably separate Hamlet’s assessment of the current state of the time from his assessment of the role that he has in relation to that time. Rather, the caesural cut gathers those two assessments together precisely so that the audience can make the distinction between them. In an analogous fashion, the temporal caesura that is the third synthesis of time and that is identified with the present moment is not a caesural cut that irrevocably divorces the past from the future, but is to be understood as a cut that simultaneously gathers together the past and the future either side of the present moment precisely so that a distinction can be made between that which comes before and that which comes after that temporal caesura. The third synthesis of time, therefore, possesses a double aspect such that, as a temporal cut that is to be identified with the present moment, it divides time into a distinguishable past and future, but in doing so it is also that which simultaneously creates and connects that past and future either side of the present moment so that they can be distinguished. Indeed, it is in this sense that we can understand Deleuze’s suggestion that the caesura ‘must be determined in the image of a unique and tremendous event, an act which is adequate to time as a whole’, in so far as the caesural cut that is the third synthesis of time is that dynamic action that simultaneously cuts, creates and connects the past and the future either side of the present moment. A ‘unique and tremendous event’ that thereby establishes the whole of time, the dimensions of past, present and future, and therefore that which Deleuze refers
to as the formal or ‘pure order of time’, the very manner in which each individual’s living present is always characterised by a present moment with a distinguishable past and future either side of that present.

As a unique and tremendous event that establishes the pure order of time, the action of the caesural cut that is to be identified with the third synthesis of time ought not to be understood in terms of that which establishes a particular distinguishable past and future either side of the present moment. Indeed, in discussing the ‘purely formal distribution’ of the unequal that is established by the caesural cut, Deleuze suggests that: ‘We can then distinguish a more or less extensive past and a future in inverse proportion, but the future and the past here are not empirical and dynamic determinations of time: they are formal and fixed characteristics which follow *a priori* from the order of time’.

This is to say that as a temporal cut that simultaneously cuts, creates and connects a distinguishable past and future either side of the present moment, the past and future that is thereby established is not to be understood in terms of our empirical pasts or futures, our particular and individual histories or our individual future expectations or aspirations. Similarly, the past constituted by the third synthesis of time ought not to be identified with the past in general, that past constituted by the second synthesis of time, into which, for example, the particular notes of a melody pass, and neither is it to be identified with the expectations of the future established by the first synthesis of time such as the expectation of the ongoing progression of a musical melody. Rather, while the third synthesis of time is analogous to the temporal caesura that is to be identified with a present moment - a present moment that, through the activity of the first and second synthesis of time, passes and is then contracted into the
present to create certain expectations of the future - the past and the future that is established by the third synthesis is not particular and dynamic. The past and future that is constituted by the third synthesis of time is to be understood in terms of the formal order of time or the pure order of time, the manner in which each individual’s living present possesses the formal characteristics of a distinguishable past and future either side of a present moment and is always structured in accordance with this fixed order.

In discussing the manner in which it establishes the pure order of the living present, the formal, fixed or, as it were, static characteristics of every living present, Deleuze sometimes refers to the third synthesis of time as a static synthesis, as ‘statique forcement’ or necessarily static. Despite this, however, the third synthesis of time must not be thought of as a synthesis that is not dynamic, as a temporal caesural cut that only occurs once and thereby establishes, one and for all, the distinguishable but non-particular past and future either side of the present moment. Indeed, in discussing the manner in which the third synthesis constitutes the fixed and formal characteristics of time, the manner in which time always has the order of a past and future either side of a present moment, Deleuze suggests that the third synthesis of time constitutes the past and present ‘as though it comprised a static synthesis of time’ (comme une synthese statique du temps). How then are we to understand the description of the third synthesis of time as a static synthesis of time, or as though it acted like a static synthesis of time? The answer to this can be discerned in Deleuze’s description of the third synthesis of time as ‘the most radical form of change, but the form of change does not change.’ This is to say that the third synthesis of time is the most radical synthesis of time because, in being understood as a
caesural cut that is identified with the present moment, it constitutes the fixed and formal characteristics of the whole of time, the manner in which our living present is always characterised by a past and future either side of a present moment, as opposed to the second and first syntheses of time which deal with the passage of particular presents and their contraction respectively. In doing so, however, the very form of change, the manner in which change occurs within the formal order of time established by the third synthesis does not change. Change occurs within a living present that is always characterised by a past and a future either side of a present moment, a necessarily static order of time that is established by the third synthesis such that this synthesis appears to be a static synthesis of time, a caesural cut that only occurs once and thereby establishes the order of time.

The third synthesis of time, however, is the most radical form of change, and it is the most radical form of change not merely because it establishes the fixed, formal or static characteristics of the whole of time, but because it continually establishes or reconstitutes these static characteristics. This is to say that as a caesural cut that is to be identified with the present moment, the third synthesis of time is not to be understood as a temporal cut that only occurs once, but is to be understood as an ongoing or recurring present moment that continually cuts, creates and connects the distinguishable but non-particular past and future either side of the present moment. Although the form of time is fixed or static, although each individual’s living present is always characterised by a past and a future either side of a present moment, this static form of time is continually reconstituted by the ongoing recurrence of the present moment, a present moment that continually cuts, creates and connects a past and a future
either side of that present moment such that the third synthesis of time, far from being a static synthesis, is to be understood as a thoroughly dynamic synthesis of time. In order to assist in the conceptualisation of this thoroughly dynamic character of the third synthesis of time, Deleuze therefore identifies it with an important concept from the philosophical tradition: Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal return or the eternal recurrence.\textsuperscript{239} Arguably more than any other figure from the philosophical tradition, Nietzsche’s work as a whole has lent itself to a variety of both creative readings and dangerous distortions, with the notion of the eternal return in particular being given a number of formulations\textsuperscript{240} - a state of affairs that can be illustrated by Grosz’s recent suggestion that: ‘In many ways, the eternal return can be seen as a curious amalgam and a bizarre, twisted reformulation of Darwinism, thermodynamics and Kantian ethics’.\textsuperscript{241} However, Deleuze is insistent that the eternal return ought to be understood in temporal terms and, in particular, in terms of the third synthesis of time; indeed, in a somewhat enigmatic fashion he suggests that: ‘Eternal return, in its esoteric truth, concerns - and can concern - only the third time of the series. Only there is it determined’.\textsuperscript{242}

The esoteric truth of the eternal return that Deleuze speaks of, however, involves a particular understanding or formulation of the eternal return, a formulation that, in turn, serves to further illustrate the thoroughgoing dynamism of the third synthesis of time and the manner in which it establishes the past and the future either side of a present moment. The esoteric truth of the eternal return is not, as one might be tempted to conclude, to be understood in terms of the continual return of the same thing or the eternal recurrence of the same state of affairs.\textsuperscript{243} Indeed, while acknowledging that Nietzsche himself
made statements that lent themselves to an understanding of the eternal return as the return of the same or the similar. Deleuze makes it clear in the preface to the English translation of *Nietzsche and Philosophy* that no one was more vigorous in their critique of identity than Nietzsche, no one was more systematic in the overturning of the prioritisation of the same and the similar. Indeed, he suggests that: ‘Every time we understand the eternal return as the return of a particular arrangement of things after all the other arrangements have been realised, every time we interpret the eternal return as the return of the identical or the same, we replace Nietzsche’s thought with childish hypotheses’. However, if the eternal return is not to be understood in terms of the continual return of a particular arrangement of things, if it is not to be understood as the eternal recurrence of the same or similar state of affairs, then the question arises as to how we are to understood the character or the esoteric truth of the eternal return, and what precisely is it that is continually returning in the eternal return? In his response to this, Deleuze is emphatic in his insistence that the eternal return, rather than being conceptualised in terms of the continual return of the identical, rather than being understood as the eternal recurrence of the same thing or the same state of affairs, is to be understood in terms of the ongoing and dynamic recurrence of that which is new or different. For example, he proposes that: ‘Eternal return affects only the new…However, it causes neither the condition nor the agent to return: on the contrary, it repudiates these and expels them with all its centrifugal force…It is itself the new, complete novelty’.

In order to assist in the conceptualisation of the thoroughly dynamic nature of the third synthesis of time, and to further illustrate the manner in which it establishes the past and the future either side of the present moment, Deleuze
therefore identifies the third synthesis with Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal return. In doing so, however, the eternal return is not to be understood in terms of the continual return of the same thing or the eternal recurrence of the same state of affairs, but is instead to be understood in terms of the dynamic recurrence of that which is new or different, and it is precisely in this understanding of the eternal return that we uncover its esoteric truth. Indeed, in highlighting this challenging and even radical understanding of the eternal return, Ansell-Pearson proposes that: ‘Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche goes further than any other reading in insisting that the eternal return does not speak of a return of the same but only of difference’.247 However, in so far as I have suggested that the function of the eternal return is to further illuminate the third synthesis of time then there would appear to be a conflict between an understanding of the eternal return as the eternal recurrence of the new or the different and the manner in which I have suggested that the third synthesis is to be understood as that which establishes the fixed, formal or static characteristics of the living present. If the eternal return is to be understood in terms of the continual return of the new or the different, then the question arises as to how it can be productively employed to further illustrate the character of the third synthesis of time when it has been suggested that the third synthesis is that synthesis which ensures that our living present possess a fixed identity, the manner in which our living present is always characterised by the same order of time: a distinguishable past and future either side of a present moment. In order to address this apparent conflict then it is necessary to be cautious when considering Deleuze’s more dramatic declarations concerning the manner in which the eternal return ‘expels’ the return of the same ‘with all its centrifugal
This is to say that it is necessary to understand the eternal return in a more refined manner and to thereby suggest that the eternal return is not simply that which expels the return of a particular arrangement of things, or the recurrence of the same state of affairs, but is to be understood as that which is able to ensure the return of the same or the recurrence of a given identity but only as a consequence of the eternal return of the new or the different.

In accordance with this more refined understanding of the eternal return, Deleuze proposes: ‘That identity not be first, that it exists as a principle but as a second principle, as a principle become; that it revolve around the Different…Nietzsche meant nothing more than this by eternal return’. But how are we then to understand the third synthesis of time in light of this more refined understanding of the eternal return, an understanding of the eternal return that incorporates the return of the same or the recurrence of a given identity but only as a consequence of the more profound recurrence of the different or the new? To address this question I want to suggest that within the context of the third synthesis of time, the eternal return entails that although the same form of time continually returns, although the living present is always structured into a distinguishable past and future either side of a present moment, this ongoing identity depends upon, or is a product of, the eternal recurrence of a new or different present moment that continually cuts, creates and connects the past and the future either side of that present moment. This is to say that while the third synthesis of time is to be understood as a temporal caesura that is identified with the present moment and that enables a distinction to be made between the past and the future, that caesural cut is not to be understood as only occurring once. Rather, the third synthesis of time is to be understood as a
thoroughly dynamic synthesis of time in so far as it is an ongoing caesural cutting that continually engenders a new or different present moment which, in its eternal recurrence, continually establishes the formal, fixed or static characteristics of the living present, the manner in which each individual’s living present is always characterized by a distinguishable past and future either side of a present moment. It is therefore in terms of the continual recurrence of a new or different present moment that the eternal return can serve to further illustrate the manner in which the third synthesis of time is a dynamic synthesis of time, a synthesis in which the very identity or order of time is continually established, but is established only as a consequence of the continual and more profound recurrence of the different or the new.

In introducing the third synthesis of time I proposed that, beyond the first and second syntheses, a further synthesis was necessary in order for the first and second syntheses of time to conduct their respective syntheses. While Habit contracts every present moment that passes, creating expectations of the future, and Memory ensures that every present moment is able to pass, retaining those particular former present moments so that they can be recollected, I suggested that the question arose as to how we are to account for the manner in which our living present is continually characterized by a new present moment, necessarily distinguishable from the past and the future, that Memory ensures passes and Habit continually contracts into the forever renewed present moment. We can now respond to this by suggesting that our living present is not only an expression of, and therefore constituted by, the first and second syntheses of time, but that it is also an expression of a thoroughly dynamic third synthesis of time, a third synthesis of time that is to be understood as an ongoing caesural
cutting that is to be identified with the present moment and, in particular, with
the continual or eternal return of a new or different present moment. The first
and second syntheses of time, therefore, must be understood as referring to, and
as being grounded upon, the third synthesis of time in so far as it is this latter
synthesis which ensures that our living present is continually characterised by a
new present moment, distinguishable from the past and the future. Without the
activity of the third synthesis of time there would be no present moment, no
continually renewed present moment that the second synthesis of time could
ensure passes and the first synthesis of time could continually contract into a
forever renewed present moment. Therefore, while we shall see that the
character of the ground or foundation that the third synthesis of time constitutes
challenges the traditional, Platonic conceptualisation of what it means to be a
ground, the third synthesis of time can be understood as the ground of time in so
far as it is the temporal synthesis that the first and second syntheses of time must
be understood as referring to, a temporal synthesis that engenders a continually
renewed present moment without which Habit and Memory would be unable to
conduct their respective syntheses.  

In illustrating the manner in which the temporal character or dynamic
form of an individual’s living present is an expression of the passive syntheses
of time, the foregoing should not simply be understood as providing an account
of the lived experience of hearing, for example, the ongoing continuity of
musical melodies or the ticking or chiming of clocks. Rather, the foregoing
exposition of the passive syntheses of time, and of the third synthesis of time in
particular, ought to be understood as that which enables us to begin to address a
number of the concerns of this study. At the beginning of this study, I suggested
that my aim would be to investigate the manner in which Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work could be productively understood as being concerned with the question of living well, where it was suggested that living well necessitates that we not only become aware of, but that we also explore, the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings, therefore moving beyond the often restrictive, self-limiting modes of life that are part of the historical legacy that we have inherited and that continue to occlude an awareness of our present possibilities. Following the exposition of the passive syntheses of time, it is now possible to see that it is the thoroughgoing dynamism of the third synthesis of time that ensures that we are continually given a new present moment, necessarily distinguishable from the past and the future, which provides us with the forever renewed opportunity to explore new possibilities for living otherwise. As Williams has noted: ‘The third synthesis of time is the condition for actions that drive towards the new’. This is to say that the manner in which each moment of our lives provides us with the possibility of new or novel actions, with a forever renewed present possibility for living otherwise, is to be understood as being established by the temporal caesura that is to be identified with the third synthesis of time, as being addressed by that temporal synthesis which constitutes the very ground of time in so far as it engenders a forever renewed present moment upon which the first two syntheses depend. It is therefore precisely the ongoing dynamism of the third synthesis of time which, in continually ensuring that our living present is characterised by a forever renewed present moment, ensures that we are given a continually open field of present possibilities for living otherwise, that we are given a continually or eternally recurring opportunity for exploring and moving
beyond the often restrictive, self-limiting modes of life that we have inherited and that continue to occlude an awareness of our present possibilities.

To strive to become aware of and to explore the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise should therefore not simply be understood as acting in accordance with the temporal character of our own individual living present. Rather, in so far as the living present of each human being is to be understood as being an expression of, and therefore constituted by, the passive syntheses of time, then to explore the possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings is to live in accordance with a temporality that, as it were, exceeds the living present of any individual human being. Indeed, we can begin to see the manner in which the passive syntheses of time are to be understood as that which exceeds the living present of any individual human being by considering Deleuze’s determination of the three syntheses of time as passive rather than active syntheses. For example, in discussing the character of the first synthesis of time or Habit, Deleuze writes that: ‘In any case, this synthesis must be given a name: passive synthesis. Although it is constitutive it is not, for all that, active’.\textsuperscript{252} Although the first synthesis of time contracts and synthesises the past into the present, thereby constituting certain expectations of the future, it is not a synthesis of time that is actively carried out by the individual, but is a synthesis in relation to which the individual remains passive, a synthesis of time that occurs prior to any active reflection, deliberation or prediction by the individual. We do not, for example, hear a melody in our living present by consciously or actively remembering, retaining and somehow synthesising all of the notes of the melody that have passed into the present, while simultaneously considering in a conscious or active manner which notes are yet to come. Of
course, ‘we are always able, in the present moment, to actively remember the past notes and phrases [of a melody] and consciously ‘predict’ or ‘expect’ the appearance of future ones, but this is not the primary mode in which we hear a melody’. Rather, the experience of hearing a melody in the living present as an ongoing and progressive continuity occurs prior to active reflection, deliberation and prediction, a pre-reflective experience of the ongoing continuity of the living present that is established by the passive constituting dynamism that is characteristic of the first synthesis of time.

The passivity characteristic of the first synthesis of time, a passivity that enables us to begin to see the manner in which that synthesis is an expression of a temporality that exceeds the living present of the human being, is also to be understood as being characteristic of the second and third syntheses of time. Neither the passage of the present that is established by the second synthesis of time, nor the ongoing recurrence of a forever renewed present moment that is established by the third synthesis of time, are to be understood as syntheses that the individual actively carries out. Instead, the manner in which the living present is always characterised by a forever renewed present moment, and the manner in which that present moment always passes, is to be understood as being established by the passive constituting dynamism that is characteristic of the second and third synthesis of time, syntheses of time that occur prior to any activity conducted by the individual in the living present. Indeed, the passivity of the three syntheses of time, and the manner in which they are to be understood in terms of a temporality that exceeds the living present of any individual, can be seen in Deleuze’s determination of those syntheses as a universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that is characteristic of the pre-
individual processes that occur at the most fundamental level of the human organism. For example, in illustrating this in relation to the first synthesis of time, he proposes that: ‘We are made of contracted water, earth, light and the air - not merely prior to the recognition or representation of these, but prior to their being sensed. Every organism, in its receptive and perceptual elements, but also in its viscera, is a sum of contractions, of retentions and of expectations.\textsuperscript{254} Indeed, in stressing the manner in which the passive syntheses of time are to be understood as occurring at the most fundamental level of the human organism, a universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that is constitutive of the organism and that ensures its ongoing survival, Deleuze proposes that the contraction, retention and synthesis of the past into the present is manifest in the form of cellular hereditary, while the orientation towards the future that this synthesis establishes is manifest in the form of need.\textsuperscript{255}

The passive syntheses of time, therefore, are not to be understood in terms of a temporality that is confined to the temporal character of the individual’s living present. For example, in discussing Deleuze’s development of a philosophical account of time, Ansell-Pearson makes it clear that: ‘The presentation of time he is developing is by no means restricted to human time’.\textsuperscript{256} Rather, the temporal character of each individual’s living present is an expression of, and therefore constituted by, the passive syntheses of time where the passive syntheses of time are to be understood as a universal and impersonal temporality that exceeds all individual human beings. Indeed, Deleuze’s displacement of an account of temporality that is confined to, and an exclusive property of, the temporal character of the individual’s lived experience - or what can be referred to as ‘psychological duration’ - and his development of an
account of time that exceeds, and yet is intimately connected to the temporal character of each individual’s living present - or what can be referred to as ‘ontological duration’ - can be traced back to his work on Bergson. For example, Deleuze writes that: ‘It is only to the extent that movement is grasped as belonging to things as much to consciousness that it ceases to be confused with psychological duration, whose point of application it will displace, thereby necessitating that things participate directly in duration itself…Psychological duration should be only a clearly determined case, an opening onto ontological duration’.257 As I have discussed earlier, in presenting his account of duration, at least in his earlier works, Bergson can be understood as proposing that the ongoing endurance of the past with the present, an ongoing endurance that presupposes the contraction and the melding of the past into the present, is an exclusive characteristic of the ongoing succession of our conscious states. For example, in Time and Free Will he suggests that ‘in consciousness we find states which succeed, without being distinguished from each other; and in space simultaneities which, without succeeding, are distinguished from one another, in the sense that one has ceased to exist when the other appears. Outside us, mutual externality without succession; within us, succession without mutual externality’.258

Bergson’s later work suggests, however, that duration is not to be understood as being confined to, and an exclusive property of, the temporal character of the individual’s lived experience, but that the durational nature of the individual’s conscious states ought to be understood as an opening onto a broader, more universal duration. As Deleuze makes clear, ‘Bergson evolved, in a certain sense, from the beginning to the end of his work…[in
particular]...Duration seemed to him to be less and less reducible to a psychological experience and became instead the variable essence of things, providing the theme of a complex ontology. This move from duration being reducible to a psychological experience and instead becoming ‘the variable essence of things’ can be discerned in Bergson’s *Creative Evolution* in which he proposes that: ‘The universe *endures*...The systems marked off by science *endure* only because they are bound up inseparably with the rest of the universe’. This is to say that duration is no longer to be understood as an exclusive characteristic of the ongoing succession of our conscious states, but is also a feature of the systems that science studies, such that both the duration of the individual’s conscious states and the systems that science commonly isolates and abstracts from the movement of the whole of reality, are in fact bound up with the duration of the universe itself. Thus, Bergson goes on to suggests that: ‘There is no reason, therefore, why a duration, and so a form of existence like our own, should not be attributed to the systems that science isolates, provided such systems are reintegrated into the Whole’. Deleuze’s displacement of an account of temporality that is confined to, and an exclusive property of, the temporal character of the individual’s lived experience can therefore be traced back to his work on Bergson, a displacement of temporality that, I am suggesting, entails that the temporal character of each individual’s living present is constituted by the passive syntheses of time where the passive syntheses of time are to be understood in terms of a temporality that exceeds all individual human beings, a universal, impersonal and pre-individual temporal dynamic or what I want to suggest is the time of Life itself. This is to say that the thoroughgoing temporalisation of Life that I proposed at the beginning of this
chapter necessitates a reconsideration of Life in terms of the passive syntheses of time such that Life is to be understood as a universal, impersonal and pre-individual temporality that, by virtue of its ongoing expression, constitutes the dynamic form or temporal character of each individual’s living present.

To the extent that the temporal character or dynamic form of each individual’s living present is an expression of, and therefore constituted by, the passive syntheses of time, where the passive syntheses of time are to be understood as a universal, pre-individual and impersonal temporal dynamic that exceeds the living present of every individual, then it is possible to highlight a difference between Deleuze’s work and that of Immanuel Kant’s, a difference that Deleuze himself highlights, and that can help to further clarify the distinctive character of his approach. It is important to note, however, that the relationship between Deleuze’s work and Kant’s is both complex and multifaceted, with it variously being suggested that Deleuze’s work stands in opposition to Kant’s,262 that Deleuze’s work aims to complete Kant’s work,263 or that Deleuze’s work is concerned with developing problems set by Kant.264 As such, my intention here is not to provide a detailed analysis of the relationship between Kant’s work and Deleuze’s, but rather to suggest that in so far as the passive synthesis of time is to be understood as the pre-individual conditions that dynamically or genetically constitute the temporal character of each individual’s living present, then it is possible to highlight an important distinction between the work of Deleuze and Kant that serves to further illustrate the character of the former. Therefore, in the Critique of Pure Reason, and in particular as that which he identifies with the revolution of the movement of celestial bodies instigated by Copernicus, Kant proposes that the mind, in
experiencing the world, necessarily apprehends it in terms of a certain structure; this is to say that we come to the world already armed with *a priori* concepts of the understanding, concepts that are prior to and independent of experience.\textsuperscript{265} In particular, Kant calls these *a priori* or ‘pure’ concepts of the understanding ‘categories’,\textsuperscript{266} categories such as causality or substance, that are presupposed by experience and are fundamental preconditions for our being able to experience the world at all.\textsuperscript{267} As such our ability to experience the world involves an interaction, fusion or union of the dispersed sensory presentations or intuitions that are received by our sensibility, and the concepts of the understanding or categories that order those intuitions and enable cognition; as Kant famously suggests: ‘Without sensibility no object would be given to us; and without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind…Only from their union can cognition arise.’\textsuperscript{268}

However, in order for the dispersed sensory presentations that are received by the sensibility to be brought under *a priori* concepts and thereby become an object of thought, in order to move ‘from an indeterminate object dispersed in diversity to the determinate object of cognition’,\textsuperscript{269} it is necessary that the dispersed sensory presentations that are received by the sensibility are subject to a process of combination, subject to what Kant refers to as ‘synthesis’.\textsuperscript{270} In particular, in the 1781 edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant proposes that there are three synthesis: the synthesis of ‘apprehension’, the synthesis of ‘reproduction’ and, finally, the synthesis of ‘recognition’; while the first two synthesises are said to be carried out by the ‘imagination’, it is the third synthesis, carried out by the ‘understanding’, that brings the dispersed sensory
presentations under *a priori* concepts or categories, such that those presentations become a unified and determinate object of cognition. As Burnham and Young suggest, it is the third synthesis, the synthesis of recognition as a function of the understanding, which ensures that ‘A and B have a conceptual relationship, such as being the same thing at different times, species of the same type, or being cause and effect. Without that recognition, B would always [be] new with respect to A, always be different and without unity’. Importantly, however, this unification of disparate sensory presentations under *a priori* concepts, a unification carried out by the synthesis of recognition as a function of the understanding, also necessitates the unity of consciousness as its necessary condition. As Deleuze suggests: ‘My representations [disparate sensory presentations brought under *a priori* concepts or categories] are mine in so far as they are linked in the unity of a consciousness, in such a way that the ‘I think’ accompanies them’. This is to say that the recognition that A and B have a conceptual relationship, that A and B are, for example, the same thing at different times, not only requires the employment of *a priori* concepts or categories, but it also requires an enduring and unified consciousness within which A and B can enter into a conceptual relationship, an original unity of consciousness or what Kant refers to as ‘pure’ or ‘transcendental apperception’, which ensures that the variety of sensory presentations that are received by the sensibility can be recognised as belonging to one unified and enduring consciousness. Therefore, Kant proposes that if we want to pursue the basis of the combination or synthesis of the dispersed sensory presentations or intuitions that are received by the sensibility, ‘and pursue it to the point at which the presentations must all converge in order that there they may first of all acquire
the unity of cognition needed for a possible experience, then we must start from pure apperception. All intuitions are nothing for us and are of no concern to us whatsoever if they cannot be taken up into consciousness...and solely through consciousness is cognition possible'.

Despite this brief overview, it is now possible to draw a distinction between Kant and Deleuze, a distinction that Deleuze himself draws attention to, and that serves to further illustrate the character of his approach. In particular, he suggests that although ‘the question of knowing how the transcendental field is to be determined is very complex. It seems impossible to endow it, in the Kantian manner, with the personal form of an I, or the synthetic unity of apperception’. This is to say that what Deleuze objects to in Kant’s work is the determination of the necessary or a priori conditions of experience, what Deleuze refers to as the ‘transcendental field’ or simply the ‘transcendental’, in the image of consciousness, and he objects to this precisely because it is said to involve a projection or, more appropriately, a retrojection of ‘the given’ back into the conditions that are supposed to account for the given. For example, despite proposing that Kant is ‘the analogue of a great explorer - not of another world, but of the upper or lower reaches of this one’, Deleuze suggests that in his formulation of the three syntheses in the 1781 edition of the Critique of Pure Reason ‘Kant traces the so-called transcendental structures from the empirical acts of a psychological consciousness...In order to hide this all too obvious procedure, Kant suppressed this text in the second edition. Although it is better hidden, the tracing method, with all its ‘psychologism’, nevertheless subsists’. More generally, Deleuze stresses that: ‘The error of all attempts to determine the transcendental as consciousness is that they think of the transcendental in the
image of, and in the resemblance to, that which it is supposed to ground’. For Deleuze, the central issue at stake in the retrojection of the empirical or the given back into the transcendental or the conditions that are supposed to account for the given - a manoeuvre that is exemplified by the determination of the transcendental field in the image of consciousness - is that it entails a paucity of dynamism, or genetic constitution, an inability, for example, to account for the manner in which the unity of consciousness itself may be dynamically or genetically constituted. Thus, Deleuze makes it clear that when we determine the conditions in the image of that which the conditions are supposed to ground, when we determine the transcendental field, after Kant, in terms of the unity of consciousness, then ‘in agreement we Kant, we give up genesis and constitution and we limit ourselves to a simple transcendental conditioning’. 279

We can therefore bring into sharper focus the character of Deleuze’s approach if we draw a distinction between his work and Kant’s, a distinction that Deleuze himself draws attention to, and which is concerned with the determination of the necessary or transcendental conditions of the given in terms of the unity of consciousness, and the manner in which this retrojection of the image of the given into its necessary conditions obscures genetic constitution for a simple conditioning of the given. In contrast to determining the necessary conditions of the given in terms of a unified consciousness and the simple conditioning that this is said to entail, Deleuze proposes to think of the conditions of the given in terms of impersonal or pre-individual processes that dynamically or genetically constitute the given. For example, he proposes to think in terms of ‘an impersonal transcendental field, not having the form of a synthetic personal consciousness or a subjective identity - with the subject, on
the contrary, being always constituted’. Therefore, to the extent that the conditions of the given are to be understood in terms of pre-individual or impersonal processes that dynamically or genetically constitute the given then Deleuze will seek to resist the retrojection of the given into its necessary conditions that he sees at work in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*, and that is exemplified by the determination of the transcendental field in the image of empirical consciousness. As Hughes has suggested: ‘In *Difference and Repetition*, the sole reason that ‘tracing the transcendental from the empirical’ was problematic...was that it obscured the point of view of genesis, or constitution’, whereas for Deleuze: ‘The constituted does not resemble its process of production, its constitution, in the same way a car does not resemble the production line which built it’. Therefore, the thoroughgoing temporalisation of Life, and its relation to the temporal character of each individual’s living present, that I have been developing throughout this chapter can begin to be understood as reflecting these Deleuzian characteristics of impersonal or pre-individual processes and dynamic or genetic constitution. This is to say that the manner in which the temporal character of each individual’s living present is an expression of, and therefore constituted by, the passive syntheses of time, where the passive syntheses of time, as the temporality of Life itself, are to be understood as a universal and impersonal temporality that exceeds all individual human beings, can be understood as seeking to account for the manner in which the temporal character of each individual’s living present is genetically constituted by impersonal, pre-individual and thoroughly dynamic processes.
While I shall continue to develop this shortly in relation to Deleuze’s important distinction between the virtual and the actual, I want to here further clarify the manner in which the living present is to be understood as an expression of an impersonal and dynamic temporality that exceeds and yet constitutes the living present. In particular, I want to do so with reference to Deleuze’s consideration of the commonplace suggestion that human beings ‘exist in time’, and his suggestion that this phrase is sometimes understood as implying that time is ‘interior’ to the human being, that time is confined to, and an exclusive property of, the temporal character of the individual’s lived experience.282 However, he notes that the suggestion that human beings exist within time must be understood as containing an important, albeit paradoxical, truth in so far as it ought to be taken to mean that: ‘Time is not the interior in us, but just the opposite, the interiority in which we are, in which we move, live and change’.283 This is to say that time ought not to be understood as belonging to the human being in the sense that time is an exclusive property of the individual’s lived experience. Rather, while the lived experience or interiority of the individual is characterized by time, while each individual’s living present possesses a dynamic form or temporal character, this is an interiority that is constituted by a universal, impersonal and pre-individual temporal dynamic, an interiority established by a temporality that exceeds all individual human beings and yet to which all individual’s belong. The displacement of an account of temporality that is confined to the temporal character of the individual’s lived experience has therefore led May to conclude that:

Deleuze’s philosophy is not humanistic. It does not seek to create an ontology centred on human perceptions or the human orientation
toward the world. This does not mean that humans do not figure in his ontology. Nor does it mean that we, as humans, do not figure in his approach to temporality. What it means is that we cannot occupy pride of place in that approach. We must conceive temporality in a way that both captures the human living of time and does not subordinate all of temporality to it.284

To understand each individual’s living present as being an ongoing expression of, and therefore constituted by, the passive syntheses of time, where the passive syntheses of time are understood in terms of a universal and impersonal temporality that exceeds all individual human beings, what I am suggesting is the very time of Life itself, can therefore enable us to begin to conceptualise the human living of time without subordinating all of temporality to it.

We can therefore begin to see that an important aspect of what I referred to in the introduction to this study as the stoical orientation of Deleuze’s work can be discerned in the manner in which all human beings are to be understood as deriving their dynamic, temporal being from Life. The temporal character or dynamic form of each individual’s living present, the manner in which every individual’s living present is characterised by a forever renewed present moment, a present moment that passes, and by expectations of the future, is an expression of, and therefore constituted by, the passive syntheses of time where the passive syntheses of time are to be understood as a universal, impersonal and pre-individual temporal dynamic that exceeds the living present of every individual. However, if Life is to be understood in terms of a temporality that exceeds the living present of every individual human being does this not once again raise the spectre of transcendence, along with threatening to resurrect the remaining Platonic presuppositions associated with the historical responses to
the problem of participation? If the temporal character of each individual’s living present is an expression of the passive syntheses of time, where the passive syntheses of time are to be understood in terms of the universal and impersonal temporality of Life itself, then is not the living present of each individual constituted by that which ‘lies beyond’, and remains transcendent, to each individual? In order to begin to address this concern, in order to understand the manner in which Life can be conceptualised as a universal and impersonal temporality that exceeds the living present of each individual, but is nevertheless not transcendent to the living present of those individuals, it is necessary to reconsider Deleuze’s important distinction between the virtual and the actual. This is to say that in order to understand the manner in which the temporal character or dynamic form of each individual’s living present is to be conceptualised as an ongoing expression of the temporality of Life and, in particular, as an immediate or immanent expression of this universal temporal dynamic, then it is necessary to provide a reconsideration of Deleuze’s distinction between the virtual and the actual that I introduced in the previous chapter, and to provide a reconsideration of this doublet within the context of the three passive syntheses of time.

In discussions of the virtual and the actual within the context of the passive syntheses of time, however, the virtual in particular is sometimes exclusively discussed in terms of the second syntheses of time, the *a priori* contemporaneous past that not only ensures that every present moment possesses a past aspect to it, and is therefore able to pass, but is also the coexistent region, past in general or pure past into which every former present passes and is retained. Turetzky, for example, writes that: ‘The living present
presupposes the past as already real, preserving itself as something without actual existence. Accordingly, the mode of being of the pure past is virtual’. Indeed, in *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze himself refers to the ‘virtual coexistence’ of the pure past within the context of his exposition of the second synthesis of time, and also speaks of a ‘mnemonic virtual’ in relation to the notion of the virtual coexistence of the past put forward by Bergson. An understanding of the notion of the virtual in terms of the second synthesis of time, the synthesis of time that establishes the coexistence of the past in general, would therefore appear to be justified in light of Deleuze’s references in *Difference and Repetition* to the virtuality of the coexistent past put forward by Bergson - along with the former’s work on the latter’s notion of the virtual elsewhere. However, while Deleuze makes reference to the virtual within the context of his discussion of the second synthesis of time, and discusses it in greater detail when discussing that which unites Bergson’s *Matter and Memory* with his *Creative Evolution*, we must be cautious in concluding that the *a priori* coexistent past in general that is established by the second synthesis of time exhaustively determines the notion of the virtual for Deleuze. In warning against a simple identification of Deleuze’s notion of the virtual with Bergson’s notion of the virtual, Hughes has proposed that: ‘Where the virtual is clearly the pure past for Bergson, it may not be for Deleuze…He may well adopt aspects of Bergson’s thought for his description of the second synthesis in *Difference and Repetition*, including the word itself [i.e. ‘virtual’], but it in no way follows from this that we have reached the properly Deleuzian notion of the virtual’.

Indeed, in the preface to the English edition of *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze can be understood as providing his own warning against a
simple identification of his work, and the terms that he employs within it, with the work of those that he makes reference to and employs. In particular, this warning can be discerned in the distinction that he draws between ‘writing history of philosophy’ and ‘writing philosophy’ where: ‘In the one case, we study the arrows or the tools of a great thinker, the trophies and the prey, the continents discovered. In the other case, we trim our own arrows, or gather those which seem to us the finest in order to try to send them in other directions, even if the distance is not astronomical but relatively small’. In so far as he proposes that *Difference and Repetition* was the first book in which tried to do the latter, to ‘do philosophy’, then we should not assume that the term ‘virtual’ for Deleuze is adopted from Bergson in order to establish a simple identification with the latter’s use of the term. In appropriating the term ‘virtual’ from Bergson, Deleuze can be understood to have gathered a tool or an arrow from another, and yet we should not suppose that his intention is to do the same work or cover the same ground with it, but that he is attempting to try and send that arrow in another direction. Therefore, rather than proposing that the notion of the virtual for Deleuze is to be identified with Bergson’s notion of the virtual, and thereby exhaustively understood in terms of the coexistence of the past in general that is established by the second synthesis of time, I want to argue that the first, second and third synthesis of time ought to determined as virtual, that all three syntheses comprise a dynamic and temporal virtual structure. In contrast, the temporal character or dynamic form of each individual’s living present - the manner in which it is characterised by a forever renewed present moment, a present moment that passes, and by particular expectations of the future - ought to be understood in terms of the actual such that the actual
character of the living present is an ongoing expression of, and therefore constituted by, the temporality of Life itself, a universal, impersonal and virtual temporal structure that is to be understood in terms of the three passive syntheses of time.

I have suggested that in so far as the temporal character of each individual’s living present is constituted by the passive syntheses of time then the living present is to be understood as an expression of a temporality that exceeds it. However, in proposing that the three passive syntheses of time comprise a virtual structure, this must not be understood as entailing that this virtual, universal and impersonal temporal dynamic is somehow artificial or not real or that it possesses an ideal and therefore transcendent character. As we have seen, Deleuze makes it clear that the notion of the virtual is to be understood as ‘fully real’ and is therefore not to be understood as being opposed to the real, as unreal or as ideal, but only as being opposed to the actual. We can illustrate the virtual character of the passive syntheses of time, and the manner in which it is to be understood as being fully real and yet being ‘opposed’ to the actual, if we once again consider the temporal character of each individual’s living present. The living present of each individual is to be understood as being characterised by a forever renewed present moment, a present moment that passes and by expectations of the future, and it is precisely these characteristics that I have suggested ought to be determined as actual. In contrast, that which establishes these actual characteristics of the individual’s living present, the dynamic activity of the three passive syntheses of time, are not actual in so far as they are the conditions for the actual temporal characteristics of the individual’s living present. If we consider, for example, the
dynamic activity of the first synthesis of time, the manner in which it contracts and retains all the particular presents that have passed and then synthesises those past particular presents into the new present, then we can see that this ongoing dynamic activity of the first synthesis of time is not encountered within our living present. Rather, what we encounter or experience in the living present is a series of actual expectations about the future that are established as a consequence of the dynamic activity of the first synthesis of time, as a consequence of the ongoing contraction and retention of the past into the present, a synthesis that therefore exceeds the actual character of the living present but, rather than being understood as unreal and ideal, is to be determined as virtual.

In determining the three passive syntheses of time as a virtual structure, therefore, it is not to be understood as a universal temporal dynamic that is artificial or transcendent, but is to be understood as the fully real condition for the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present. Indeed, in highlighting the manner in which the virtual is a structure that ought not to be understood as actual, and yet nevertheless possesses a full reality, Deleuze makes it clear that: ‘The reality of the virtual is structure. We must avoid giving the elements and relations which form a structure an actuality which they do not have, and withdrawing from them a reality which they have.’ In so far as the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present is to be understood as being constituted by a universal and virtual temporal structure - the three passive syntheses of time - then the living present is constituted by, and an expression of, that which exceeds the living present. However, while exceeding the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present, the virtual
structure that is the condition for it is to be understood as the universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that remains immanent, involved or implicated within those living presents. Each individual’s living present is an expression of a universal and virtual temporal structure, but precisely because that structure possesses a virtual character then it is not to be understood as unreal or ideal but ought to be determined as the fully real and immanent condition for the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present. Indeed, it is the reconsideration of the distinction between the virtual and the actual within the context of the three passive syntheses of time that enables us to begin to understand Life within the context of the specific conception of univocity that Deleuze sought to maintain. As I discussed in the previous chapter, Deleuze’s complex, subtle and challenging conception of univocity requires us to posit an expressive ontological ground that is the distinguishable ground of the variegated beings that are its expression; however, in so far as that expressive ground is to be understood as remaining involved, implicated or immanent within the multitude of beings that are its expression, then it must not be understood as being distinct or separate from those beings.

As I also discussed previously, it is precisely this attempt to maintain a position of univocity while holding that there is an expressive ontological ground that is distinguishable from the beings that are its expression that Badiou proposes Deleuze is unable to sustain. For Badiou, the attempt to determine an expressive ontological ground as the distinguishable and virtual ground of the plurality of actual beings that it expresses, without that ground thereby being distinct or separate from the plurality of beings that are its expression, collapses into the traditional, opposing relation between the One and the many,
reintroducing the Platonic ontological presupposition of transcendence along with the remaining ontological presuppositions associated with the historical responses to the problem of participation. However, if the virtual/actual doublet is reconceptualised within the context of the three passive syntheses of time and the temporal character of each individual’s living present, then we can begin to understand the manner in which the passive syntheses of time, as a universal and virtual temporal structure, can be understood as an expressive ground that, while distinguishable from the actual character of each individual’s living present, is nevertheless not distinct or separate from the plurality of living presents that are its ongoing expression. This to say that the virtual structure that is to be identified with the three passive syntheses of time, the universal and impersonal temporal dynamism of Life itself, can be distinguished from the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present in so far as the three passive syntheses of time are the conditions for the character of the living present. As I have suggested, the actual dynamic form or temporal character of each individual's living present, the manner in which it is characterised by a forever renewed present moment, a present moment that passes and by expectations of the future, is established as a consequence of the dynamic and distinguishable activity of the three syntheses of time. However, while distinguishable from the actual character of each individual’s living present, the dynamic activity of the three passive syntheses of time are not distinct or separate from those living presents. Precisely because the syntheses of time are determined as the virtual conditions for the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present, then that universal and impersonal temporal dynamism does not possess an ideal and therefore transcendent character, but is the fully real condition that exceeds,
and yet remains immanent within, the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present.

The actual temporal character of each individual’s living present is an expression of, and therefore constituted by, the distinguishable and dynamic activity of the first, second and third synthesis of time. However, precisely because it is a virtual structure, the passive syntheses of time are not to be understood as being distinct or separate from the plurality of living presents that are its expression. An understanding of the passive syntheses of time as the virtual, distinguishable and yet not distinct ground of the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present can therefore be understood as radically problematising the traditional, opposing relation between the One and the many that Badiou proposes continues to be present in Deleuze’s work. As a virtual ground, the passive syntheses of time are not to be understood in terms of a One that is above or transcendent to the many living presents that the virtual ground is the dynamic condition for. Rather, while the virtual can be understood as the distinguishable ground of the actual temporal character of the plurality of living presents that it constitutes, this distinction is made within the context of a thoroughgoing univocity. As Sherman notes, ‘Deleuze connects the virtual and the actual at the level of ontology so that the one never appears apart from its liaison with the other’.295 This is to say that there is no ontological division, no equivocity and no ontological hierarchy, between the virtual structure comprised of the passive syntheses of time and the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present that is an expression of that virtual structure, but solely one reality, a single and consistent plane of nature or plane of immanence, that is to be understood as possessing two sides or a double aspect to it. As
Deleuze suggests, that univocal reality, that ‘plane of immanence includes both
the virtual and its actualization simultaneously, without there being any
assignable limit between the two’. Therefore, while it is not actual, the virtual
is to be understood as fully real and so to determine the passive syntheses of
time as the distinguishable, virtual ground of the actual temporal character of
each individual’s living present is not to understand that ground as possessing a
distinct or separate reality, it is not to revert to the traditional, opposing relation
between the One and many where the former is the transcendent precondition
for the former. Rather, to distinguish the passive syntheses of time as the virtual
ground of each individual’s living present is to determine both the virtual
ground and the actual temporal character of the living present as ‘belonging’ to
the same thoroughly temporal, univocal reality, but it is to distinguish the former
as the virtual side or aspect of that univocal reality and the latter as the actual
side or aspect of that univocal reality. Accordingly, Smith warns that: ‘One must
not be led astray (as Alain Badiou seems to have been) by the prefix ‘uni’ in the
term ‘univocity’: a univocal ontology is by definition irreconcilable with a
philosophy of the One, which necessarily entails an equivocal concept of
being’.  

Despite determining the passive syntheses of time as the virtual,
distinguishable, and yet not distinct ground of the actual temporal character of
the living present, are we still not retaining something akin to the Platonic
ontological presupposition of an immutable foundation or fixed ground? Even if
the distinction between the virtual passive syntheses of time and the actual
character of the living present is made within the context of thoroughgoing
univocity, is not the former still the invariant precondition or fixed ground for
the latter? In order to respond to this concern, it is necessary to reconsider the character of the virtual structure that is comprised of the passive syntheses of time and, in particular, to recall the relation that holds between the first, second and third synthesis of time. In so far as the third synthesis of time is to be understood in terms of a temporal caesura, an ongoing temporal cutting that ensures that each individual’s living present is characterised by a forever renewed present moment, then the third synthesis is to be understood as the ground of time because it is that synthesis upon which the first and second synthesis of time depend. Without the activity of the third synthesis of time there would be no present moment, no continually renewed present moment that the second synthesis of time could ensure passes and the first synthesis of time could continually contract into a forever renewed present moment. However, in so far as the third synthesis of time is an ongoing caesural cutting that is to be identified with the eternal return - whose esoteric truth consists in being conceptualised as the dynamic recurrence of that which is new or different - then the ground that it constitutes challenges the traditional, Platonic conception of a ground as an immutable or fixed foundation. This is to say that in so far as the third synthesis of time is to be understood as the ground of time, and in so far as the third synthesis of time is to be identified with the continual or eternal return of the new or the different, then it must be understood as a thoroughly dynamic ground, a ground that never achieves a fixed form that could serve as an immutable foundation.

As the virtual ground of the actual temporal character or dynamic form of each individual’s living present, the passive syntheses of time therefore posses, at their foundation, a dynamic synthesis that never achieves a fixed form.
The actual temporal character of each individual’s living present is constituted by, or an expression of, the universal and impersonal temporal dynamism of Life itself whose first two syntheses depend upon a third synthesis of time that is characterised by the continual return of the new or the different. Indeed, to determine the third synthesis of time as the ground of time, and to identify that ground with the eternal return of the new or the different entails, as Deleuze makes clear, that any Platonic notion of a fixed ground or immutable foundation ‘has been superseded by a groundlessness, a universal ungrounding [effondement] which turns upon itself and causes only the yet-to-come to return’. The three syntheses of time comprise a virtual structure that possesses a complex formality: each synthesis is to be understood as a distinctive constituting dynamism that establishes a particular temporal characteristic of the living present, and the particular relation that holds between the three syntheses entails that while the first syntheses is grounded upon the second both the first and the second are grounded upon the third. However, it is precisely this particular relation between the three syntheses that engenders ‘the revelation of the formless in the eternal return’, such that ‘the extreme formality is there only for an excessive formlessness’. This is to say that while the three syntheses of time comprise a complex and formal virtual structure, at the foundation of that structural formality is the third synthesis of time, a synthesis that is characterised by the continual return of the new or the different such that the ‘extreme formality’ of that virtual structure reveals an ‘excessive formlessness’, a formless foundation or groundlessness that is to be identified with the eternal return of the new or the different. It is this conceptualisation of Life in terms of the three passive synthesis of time, a conceptualisation of Life in terms of a
universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that, at its foundation, is characterised by an excessive formlessness, by the eternal return of the new or different, that enables Life to be understood as that which is continually becoming different to what it is at any given moment, an irrepressible temporal power that continually overcomes any present determination or identity in its interminable drive to continually produce new present possibilities for being.

As a virtual structure that is comprised of the three passive syntheses of time and that, at its foundation, is characterised by the eternal return of the new or the different, the universal and impersonal temporal dynamism of Life itself has therefore overturned the Platonic primacy of identity over difference and, ultimately, the subordination of difference to identity. As the virtual condition for the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present, the passive syntheses of time do not possess a superior, fixed determination or identity such that the actual temporal character or dynamic form of each individual’s living present bears an internal resemblance or imitative similitude to that identity. At their foundation, the passive syntheses of time are characterised by an excessive formlessness or universal ungrounding that resists the establishment of a superior, fixed determination or identity that the individual’s living present could bear an internal resemblance or imitative similitude to. As we have seen, this does entail that we do not admit of identity or resemblance, of the same or the similar, but is instead to determine these as being established as a consequence of the continual and more profound recurrence of the different or the new. As Deleuze asserts: ‘In the reversal of Platonism, resemblance is said of internalised difference, and identity of the Different as primary power’. As an expression of the virtual, distinguishable, and yet not distinct dynamism of
Life, the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present is characterised by a forever renewed present moment, a present moment that passes, and by expectations of the future, such that each individual’s living present can be conceptualised in terms of a similitude or the same temporal character or dynamic form. However, the temporal character or dynamic form that characterises each individual’s living present is an expression of, and therefore constituted by, a universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that, at its foundation, is characterised by the eternal return of the new or the different as its primary power. It is this primary power, the ongoing caesural cutting that characterises the third synthesis of time and upon which the first two syntheses of time depend, that not only ensues that the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present is established as a consequence of the profound recurrence of the different or the new, but it is also that which ensures that we are continually given a new present moment, distinguishable from the past and the future, that provides us with forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise.
Chapter Three: Nihilism

In the previous chapter, I argued that the temporal character of each individual’s living present is an immediate an ongoing expression of the temporality of Life itself, a universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that is to be understood in terms of the three passive syntheses of time. Distinguishable and yet not distinct from the living present, the three syntheses of time comprise a virtual structure that is the fully real, universal and immanent condition for the actual dynamic form or temporal character of each individual’s living present, the manner in which each individual’s living present is characterised by a forever renewed present moment, a present moment that passes, and by expectations of the future. However, as the formless foundation of the passive syntheses of time, it is the third synthesis which ensures that the living present is characterised by a forever renewed present moment, distinguishable from both the past and the future, and which thereby provides each individual with continually renewed present possibilities for living otherwise. To strive to become aware of and to explore the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment engenders is therefore not simply to live in accordance with the actual temporal character of our own individual living present. Rather, in so far as the forever renewed present moment that characterises the living present is constituted by the third synthesis of time, then to strive to exploit the present possibilities for living otherwise is to strive to live in accordance with the formless foundation of the passive syntheses of time, to live in accordance with the universal ungrounding or excessive formlessness that characterises the temporality of Life itself. To live in accordance with Life, therefore, does not entail a fixed, overarching plan of how our present possibilities ought to be realised.
Understood in terms of the three passive syntheses of time - understood as a universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that, at its foundation, is characterised by the eternal return of the new or different - Life does not possess some definite, fixed determination that would oblige us to realise our possibilities in accordance with that determination. Rather, Life is to be understood as that which is continually becoming different to what it is at any given moment, an irrepressible temporal power that, at its formless foundation, continually resists the establishment of any fixed determination, continually overcoming the establishment of any fixed identity, in its interminable drive to produce new present possibilities.

In order to begin to address the aim of this study, therefore, the foregoing has formulated an account of the manner in which each individual’s living present is characterised by forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise, along with formulating an account of the manner in which a life that strives to explore that open field of present possibilities is a life that strives to live in accordance with the dynamic nature of Life itself, and therefore a life that address the question of living well that I suggested Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work could be productively understood as being concerned with. However, in addition to suggesting that I would formulate an account of the manner in which Deleuze’s work could be understood as being concerned with how it is that each moment of our lives provides us with a plurality of new possibilities, I also proposed that I would formulate an account of the manner in which Deleuze’s work can be understood as being profoundly concerned with how the present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment engenders are continually hindered, thwarted and negated. In particular, I suggested that
Deleuze’s work could be productively understood as being concerned with sensitising us to the manner in which our present possibilities for living otherwise are continually hindered, thwarted and negated such that, with this awareness, we are then better prepared to begin to actively explore the possibilities for our lives, better prepared to move beyond the often restrictive, self-limiting modes of life that are part of the historical legacy that we have inherited and that continue to occlude an awareness of our present possibilities. This is to say that Deleuze’s work is not simply concerned with the manner in which each moment of our lives provides us with a forever renewed present moment, a present moment that I have argued is constituted by the ongoing caesural cutting that characterises the third synthesis of time, where this is understood as the eternal return of the new or the different that characterises the dynamic, temporal and universal ungrounding of Life itself. Rather, Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work must also be understood as being profoundly concerned with sensitising us to the manner in which our life’s possibilities are continually constrained such that, with this awareness, we are then better prepared to resist such constriction and to begin to actively explore the possibilities for our lives, better prepared to begin to exploit the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings.

My objective in this chapter, therefore, is to formulate an account of the manner in which the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment engenders is often occluded, delimited and even negated. In particular, I shall argue that the circumscription of our present possibilities ought to be understood within the context of ‘nihilism’, where the term nihilism must be understood as possessing a technical and specifically temporal sense in
so far as it is to be determined as a reaction against the third synthesis of time, against the very foundation of the universal and impersonal temporal dynamism of Life itself. This is to say that against the thoroughly dynamic, temporal and ongoing return of the new or the different that characterises the third synthesis of time and which ensures that Life, at its foundation, is continually overcoming any fixed identity, nihilism is to be provisionally understood in terms of the establishment and perpetuation of an immutable foundation, and therefore fixed identity, in place of the temporal, formless foundation that characterises Life. However, while it shall be suggested that nihilism can be understood as having a substantial history that can be traced back to ancient Greek philosophy, I shall examine the manner in which nihilism, for Deleuze, can be understood as finding its exemplary expression with the advent of Christianity. In particular, I shall propose that the ‘perfection of nihilism’ that is said to characterise Christianity\textsuperscript{301} is to be discerned in the enlargement or intensification of its reaction against Life, a nihilism that is not merely limited to a reaction against the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that Life, at its foundation, is continually overcoming any fixed identity, but is also a reaction against the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that each individual’s living present is characterised by an open field of present possibilities for living otherwise. However, I will also argue that the persistence of the nihilistic reaction against Life within the lives of modern men and women is not to be understood merely in terms of the manner in which contemporary Western peoples may continue to explicitly adopt, for a variety of reasons, the Judeo-Christian world-view and may continue to adhere to its particular form of life. Rather, I shall suggest that the nihilistic reaction against Life of which
Christianity is said to be the exemplary expression can be understood as continuing to implicitly persist and exert an influence upon the lives of modern men and women such that a number of Christianity’s nihilistic presuppositions, concepts and themes manifest themselves in new guises and, as it were, transubstantiated forms beyond the ‘grand event’ that Nietzsche encapsulated in his now infamous proclamation that: ‘God is dead’. 302

To begin to formulate an account of the manner in which the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise are continually hindered, thwarted and negated, it is therefore necessary to begin by developing Deleuze’s notion of nihilism. In order to develop this Deleuzian notion of nihilism, however, then it is necessary to refer to Deleuze’s study of Nietzsche in Nietzsche and Philosophy in so far as it is in that work, as Williams has suggested, that we find Deleuze’s most sustained and comprehensive study of the concept of nihilism. 303 Indeed, in the preface to the English translation of Nietzsche and Philosophy Deleuze proposes that no one had analysed the concept of nihilism better than Nietzsche, 304 and it is within the context of his analysis of Nietzsche’s notion of nihilism that we can develop a Deleuzian understanding of that concept. This is not, of course, to suggest that Deleuze’s notion of nihilism can simply be identified with, and is therefore a reproduction of, Nietzsche’s notion of nihilism. As we have seen with respect to his discernment of a concept of expression in Spinoza’s work, his employment of Bergson’s notion of the virtual or Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal return, Deleuze’s employment of the work of others and the concepts within that work is not to be understood in terms of identification or reproduction, but in terms of a process of critical and creative transformation. I am therefore suggesting that it
is within the context of his sustained study of the concept of nihilism in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* that we can discern a Deleuzian notion of nihilism, but it is an understanding of nihilism that ought to be understood as emerging as a result of the creative interaction with, and transformative analysis of, Nietzsche’s notion of nihilism. Therefore, to begin to formulate an account of the manner in which our forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise are continually hindered, thwarted and negated, then it is necessary to formulate a Deleuzian notion of nihilism which, in turn, necessitates that we begin with Nietzsche’s understanding of that concept. However, as both Kaufmann\(^ {305} \) and Schacht\(^ {306} \) have indicated, in order to orientate oneself in relation to Nietzsche’s notion of nihilism then it is productive to understand that notion within the context of his infamous declaration that: ‘God is dead’.

As with many of Nietzsche’s ideas, his proclamation that God is dead has been subject to a variety of interpretations, a situation that is illustrated by Deleuze’s seemingly conflicting proposals that there are four senses of the death of God,\(^ {307} \) that ‘there are at least fifteen versions of the death of God’,\(^ {308} \) and that the death of God ‘has as many meanings as there are forces capable of seizing Christ and making him die’.\(^ {309} \) While I shall discuss the meaning and develop the implications of the death of God at a later point in this chapter, in order to determine an account of Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism within the context of the death of God then I want to provisionally suggest that by proclaiming that God is dead Nietzsche was proposing that Western culture in general, and the Judeo-Christian tradition in particular, had entered a profound ideological crisis, a crisis that would have profound existential implications for the lives of modern men and women, to the extent that there was a growing
sense that the belief in the existence of God was becoming untenable. Thus, in 1887, Nietzsche announced that: ‘The greatest recent event - that “God is dead,” that the belief in the Christian God has become unbelievable - is already beginning to cast its first shadows over Europe. For the few at least, whose eyes - the suspicion in whose eyes is strong and subtle enough for this spectacle, some sun seems to have set and some ancient and profound trust has been turned into doubt’. Although the recognition of the death of God, and certainly the full implications of this event, would initially remain ‘beyond the multitudes capacity for comprehension’, Nietzsche notes that its repercussions would begin to be felt by an increasing number of people. In particular, we would begin to experience a profound ‘instability’ and ‘disorientation’ and we would begin to do so because the belief in God, and the Judeo-Christian world view generally, had so greatly influenced the conception of ourselves and others, the values that we hold, the morality that we espouse, the meaning that we believe our lives to possess and the direction that we believe our lives ought to take. It was this Judeo-Christian world view that mitigated against uncertainty, distress and suffering ‘because it provided ready answers to the problem of how life ought to be lived and what its overall meaning and purpose was, and faith in the existence of God gave the reassurance that the validity of that form of life had, as it were, a ‘divine guarantee’.’

With the growing sense that the belief in the existence of God was becoming untenable, the two thousand year long form of life that was established upon that belief therefore comes to be seen as increasingly untenable. For Nietzsche: ‘The time has come when we have to pay for having been Christians for two thousand years: we are losing the center of gravity by virtue
of which we have lived; we are lost for a while’. In particular, the increasing incredulity towards the existence of God, the growing incredulity towards the Judeo-Christian interpretation of the world, and the loss of meaning and guidance that it gave to people’s lives, entails that the peoples of the West are confronted by that most profound of questions: ‘Has existence any meaning at all?’ According to Nietzsche, it will take time and courage for people to confront and ‘honestly’ attempt to tackle this question; indeed, he proposes that: ‘It will require a few centuries before this question can even be heard completely and in its full depth’. The initial response to it, however, would be one of despair, whereby people would rebound from the belief that ‘God is truth’ to the fanatical faith that: ‘All is false’. This is to say that the Judeo-Christian world view has so deeply influenced Western people’s lives that the loss of belief in God, the loss of belief in that which provided the Judeo-Christian world view and its form of life with a transcendent, immutable foundation, will engender the belief, the nihilistic belief, that everything is lost. Set to become the defining characteristic of our age, Nietzsche writes that nihilism is that condition wherein what were previously ‘the highest values devalue themselves’, a condition in which life lacks any aim, purpose or meaning, a condition in which ‘“why?” finds no answer’. Understood within the context of the death of God, the notion of nihilism for Nietzsche can therefore be understood in terms of a reaction that is instigated by the growing sense that a belief in the existence of God has become increasingly untenable. With the loss of belief in the existence of God, we lose the transcendent validation of the Judeo-Christian form of life that gave purpose, value and meaning to our existence, and we react against this loss by drawing the
conclusion, the specifically nihilistic conclusion, that existence has therefore become meaningless.

In determining Nietzsche’s notion of nihilism in terms of a reaction against the loss of belief in the existence of God, however, I am not suggesting that this determination exhausts the understanding of nihilism for Nietzsche. Indeed, in contrast to a reaction against the death of God, Nietzsche can be understood as proposing that the belief in the existence of God is itself a form of nihilism in so far as it depreciates ‘this world’ and the life of human beings within it to nothingness, to nil. As Kaufmann notes, Nietzsche was perhaps more concerned than any other with ‘the manner in which belief in God and a divine teleology may diminish the value and significance of man: how this world and life may be completely devaluated ad maiorem dei gloriam’.

Rather than exhausting the understanding of nihilism for Nietzsche, the determination of that concept as a reaction to the loss of belief in the existence of God ought to be understood as that which enables us to more easily understand the manner in which Deleuze’s notion of nihilism is developed within the context, and yet is a creative transformation, of Nietzsche’s understanding of that term. In particular, I want to argue that the notion of nihilism for Deleuze must also be understood in terms of a reaction but, unlike Nietzsche, it is no longer to be determined as a reaction to the loss of belief in God, and neither is it to be identified with the atheism that this loss of belief engenders. Indeed, Deleuze proposes that: ‘Atheism is not a problem for philosophers or the death of God…It is amazing that so many philosophers still take the death of God as tragic. Atheism is not a drama but the philosopher’s serenity and philosophy’s achievement’. Rather than a reaction to the loss of
belief in the existence of God, therefore, I want to provisionally propose that nihilism for Deleuze ought to be understood in terms of a deep-seated and profound reaction against Life. While I shall develop a Deleuzian notion of nihilism throughout this chapter, and while we shall see that nihilism for Deleuze can also be understood as incorporating the more general, broader understanding of nihilism as a devaluation of ‘this world’, a denigration of ‘this life’, I am suggesting that nihilism for Deleuze ought to primarily be understood in terms of a reaction against Life, where Life is to be understood as possessing the technical and specifically expressive, temporal sense that was developed over the course of the preceding two chapters.

The notion of nihilism for Deleuze is to be provisionally determined as a reaction against Life, where Life is to be understood in dynamic terms as that which is continually becoming different to what it is at any given moment, an irrepressible temporal power that, at its formless foundation, continually resists and overcomes the establishment of any fixed determination or identity. As a reaction against the manner in which Life is continually overcoming any fixed determination, therefore, nihilism is to be understood as a profound reaction against that which establishes this continual overcoming. As was discussed in the previous chapter, Life is to be understood as a universal and impersonal temporal dynamic and, in particular, as a virtual structure that is comprised of three passive syntheses of time with the third synthesis of time being the foundation of time upon which the first two syntheses conduct their respective constituting activity. However, in so far as the third synthesis of time is understood as an ongoing temporal caesural cutting that is characterised by the continual return of the new or the different, then the third synthesis is that
formless foundation or universal ungrounding that ensures that Life, at its foundation, continually resists and overcomes the establishment of any fixed determination or identity. To suggest that nihilism is to be determined as a deep-seated and profound reaction against Life is to suggest that nihilism is a reaction against the formless foundation of the passive synthesis of time, a reaction against the third synthesis of time and the manner in which it is characterised by the eternal return of the new or the different. Therefore, rather than a reaction against the loss of belief in the existence of God, and more than a devaluation of ‘this world’ and denigration of ‘this life’, the Deleuzian notion of nihilism that I am formulating here ought to be understood as possessing a technical and specifically temporal sense in so far as it is to be determined as a reaction against the third synthesis of time, against the very foundation of the universal and impersonal temporal dynamism of Life itself. Indeed, as Williams has noted, the notion of nihilism for Deleuze must be understood in terms of its ongoing antagonism towards the third synthesis of time, and the manner in which it is characterised by the eternal return of the new or the different, so that even though ‘Deleuze does not discuss nihilism at length in *Difference and Repetition*, it lurks in the background every time he develops the concept of the third synthesis of time and eternal return’. 323

But how are we to understand this nihilistic reaction against the third synthesis of time? By what means does nihilism establish and seek to perpetuate its antagonism towards the universal ungrounding that characterises the formless foundation of Life itself? We shall see that the nihilistic reaction against Life manifests itself in multifarious ways, and can even be understood in terms of an evolution or transformation from one manifestation to another, but I want to
provisionally propose that nihilism is to be understood as manifesting itself in the form of a fixed ground or immutable foundation. Against the thoroughly dynamic, temporal and ongoing return of the new or the different that characterises the third synthesis of time and which ensures that Life, at its foundation, is continually overcoming any fixed identity, nihilism is to be understood in terms of the establishment and perpetuation of an immutable foundation, and therefore fixed identity, in place of the temporal, formless foundation that characterises Life. As was discussed previously, as a universal, impersonal and specifically virtual structure that is comprised of the three passive syntheses of time, Life is to be understood as the fully real and immanent condition for the actual temporal character or dynamic form of each individual’s living present. This is to say that while Life is to be understood in terms of a temporality that exceeds the actual, and is therefore to be determined as distinguishable from it, as a virtual, fully real and immanent condition it is not to be determined as distinct or separate from the actual. Rather, the distinction between the virtual and actual is made with the context of a thoroughgoing univocity so that there is exclusively one reality, a single and consistent plane of nature or plane of immanence, which is to be understood as possessing two sides or a double aspect to it. In contrast, the nihilistic reaction against Life that I am suggesting is manifest in the positing of an immutable foundation also entails that this foundation exceeds the temporal character of the actual, but that it does so in an ideal and therefore transcendent manner. This is to say that the nihilistic positing of an immutable, fixed foundation is the positing of a transcendent foundation so that there is no longer a distinction within a univocal reality or single plane of immanence between the virtual and
the actual, with the former being the distinguishable and yet not distinct condition for the existence of the latter. Rather, we now have the distinction between the ideal and the real that inaugurates an equivocal account of reality, with the former being the distinguishable, distinct and transcendent precondition for the existence of the latter.

In so far as nihilism is to be provisionally understood in terms of the positing of an immutable, transcendent foundation that inaugurates an equivocal account of reality, then the responses to the Platonic problem of participation discussed in chapter one must be determined, for Deleuze, as manifestations of nihilism, as a nihilistic reaction against Life. As we saw, as a response to the problem of participation, Plato’s theory of Forms proposes that for every group of particular beings that exist there also exists a single, transcendent Form and it is by virtue of participating in that Form that every particular member of a given group obtains its characteristic being. Against the thoroughly temporal and formless foundation of Life, against the eternal return of the new or the different that characterises the third synthesis of time, the theory of Forms posits an immutable, transcendent foundation that possesses a fixed identity. Against the distinction between the virtual and the actual that is made within a univocal reality, with the former understood as the fully real and immanent condition of the latter, the theory of Forms establishes an equivocal distinction between the ideal and the real, with the former the transcendent and ontologically superior precondition for the being of the latter. Similarly, although Neo-Platonism and Christianity introduce a significant degree of movement, dynamism and productive genesis into their accounts they also continue to posit an immutable, transcendent foundation that possesses a fixed identity, and must therefore also
be determined for Deleuze as manifestations of nihilism. This is to say that while Neo-Platonism and Christianity invert the problem of participation - beginning from the side of the participated rather than the participants, and proposing that the latter have their existence conferred on them as a consequence of the emanative or creative dynamism of the former - both Neo-Platonism and Christianity maintain that the participated, the One and God respectively, is to be understood as an immutable, transcendent foundation that possesses a fixed identity. Therefore, while I shall propose that Deleuze’s concern is primarily with Christianity as a manifestation of nihilism, it is important to note that his antipathy towards religion more generally is not simply confined to Christianity or any other ‘established religions’. Rather, the term ‘religion’ for Deleuze is to be understood as designating that nihilistic reaction against Life that involves the positing of an immutable, transcendent foundation such that both Plato’s theory of Forms and the Neo-Platonic response to the problem of participation are to be understood as ‘religious’ responses. Indeed, rather than being confined to any particular established religion, Deleuze makes it clear that: ‘Wherever there is transcendence, vertical Being, imperial State in the sky or on earth, there is religion.’

Understood in terms of the positing of an immutable, transcendent foundation that opposes the thoroughly temporal and formless foundation of Life, the manifestation of nihilism is therefore to be understood as possessing a substantial history. Prior to Christianity, both Plato’s theory of Forms and the Neo-Platonic emanative response to the problem of participation are to be understood as nihilistic reactions against the dynamic, thoroughly temporal eternal return of the new or the different that characterises the third synthesis of
time and which ensures that Life, at its foundation, is continually overcoming any fixed determination or identity. Indeed, for Deleuze, nihilism can be understood as being manifest in the very beginnings of Western philosophy in so far as it can be discerned in the work of Anaximander and the manner in which he not only posits one original, immutable Being or Aperion that is the precondition for the mutability of the observable world, but also in the manner in which he seemingly denigrates the temporal state of the beings that Aperion produces. For example, considering Anaximander’s proposal that things ‘pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice in accordance with the ordering of time’, Deleuze suggests that Anaximander ought to be understood as putting forward the thesis that, as the product of Aperion, all beings fall into the inferior condition of temporality or becoming ‘the injustice of which it [Aperion] redeems eternally by destroying them’ and thereby releasing beings from their inferior, temporal condition. However, although nihilism is to be understood as being manifest prior to the advent of Christianity, of having a substantial history that can be traced back to ancient Greek philosophy and is variously manifest as the transcendent God of Christianity, the Neo-Platonic One, Platonic Forms, Anaximander’s Aperion and to which we could add, for example, Parmenides’ account of the unchanging and eternal nature of reality, it is Christianity that is to be understood as the exemplary manifestation of nihilism for Deleuze. For example, he declares that: ‘In comparison with Christianity the Greeks are children. Their way of depreciating existence, their “nihilism”, does not have the perfection of the Christian way.’ But how are we to understand this designation of Christianity as the exemplary or perfect expression of nihilism? If Anaximander, Plato, Neo-Platonicism and Christianity
all posit an immutable, transcendent foundation, and are therefore to be understood as expressing a nihilistic reaction against the formless foundation of Life, why is it that Christianity is any more complete an expression of nihilism than the Aperion of Anaximander, the Forms of Plato or the One of Neo-Platonism?

The answer to this, I shall argue, is that for Deleuze the advent of Christianity is characterised by the development of a new orientation, or at least an increased concern with an orientation that simultaneously enlarges and intensifies the nihilistic reaction against Life. This is to say that Christianity is not only concerned with the establishment of an ‘objective’, immutable and transcendent foundation that is the ideal precondition for the manifest beings of the world, but is also increasingly concerned with ‘subjectivity’ and with the ‘subjective’ aspects of human existence in particular. Indeed, in stressing the orientation to the subjective that characterises Christianity, a ‘turning’ that distinguishes Christianity from ‘ancient metaphysics’, and Plato’s theory of Forms in particular, Vattimo has proposed that: ‘Christianity announces the end of the Platonic ideal of objectivity. It cannot be the eternal word of forms outside ourselves that saves us, but only the eye directed toward the interior and the searching of the deep truth inside us all’. While I shall shortly discuss the manner in which Deleuze understands Christianity’s turning or increased concern with the subjective, I want to suggest here that it ought not to be understood as an orientation that diminishes a concern with its objective, immutable and transcendent foundation. We shall see that for Deleuze, Christianity is characterised by the interplay between the objective and the subjective such that the establishment of an immutable, transcendent foundation
has profound implications, specifically constraining and limiting implications, for the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that are available to human beings. Deleuze can therefore be understood as designating Christianity as the exemplary expression of nihilism because it does not merely manifest itself in the form of the establishment of an immutable, transcendent foundation that reacts against the formless foundation of Life, a foundation that is constituted by the third synthesis of time and is characterised by the eternal return of the new or the different. Rather, with its turning or increased concern with the subjective, Christianity develops an orientation that hinders, thwarts and even negates the open field of present possibilities that are available to human beings and, in doing so, is to be understood as a nihilistic reaction against the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that each individual’s living present is characterised by forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise.

To clarify, in designating Christianity as the exemplary manifestation of nihilism, I am proposing that rather than a reaction against the loss of belief in the existence of God, and more than a general devaluation of this ‘this world’ and denigration of ‘this life’, nihilism continues to possess a technical and temporal sense for Deleuze. This is to say that nihilism continues to be understood as a reaction against the third synthesis of time, against the very foundation of the universal and impersonal temporal dynamism of Life itself, but it is no longer simply manifest in the positing of an immutable, transcendent foundation that establishes an equivocal account of reality. As I discussed at length in the previous chapter, the actual dynamic form or temporal character of each individual’s living present - the manner in which each individual’s living
present is characterised by a forever renewed present moment, a present moment that passes, and by certain expectations of the future - is an immediate an ongoing expression of the temporality of Life itself, where Life is to be understood as a universal, impersonal and virtual temporal dynamic that is comprised of the three passive syntheses of time. However, as the formless foundation of the passive syntheses of time, it is the third synthesis which ensures that the living present is characterised by a forever renewed present moment, and which thereby provides each individual with the continually renewed present possibilities for living otherwise. In its turning towards the subjective, a turning to the supposedly ‘deep truth inside us all’, Christianity begins to delimit, occlude and even negate the open field of present possibilities that are available to each individual and, in doing so, must also be determined as that which reacts against the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that each individual is provided with forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise. The so-called perfection of nihilism that is said to characterise Christianity is therefore to be discerned in the enlargement or intensification of its reaction against Life, a nihilism that is not merely limited to a reaction against the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that Life, at its foundation, is continually overcoming any fixed identity, but is also a reaction against the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that each individual’s living present is characterised by an open field of present possibilities for living otherwise.

But how are we to respond to this designation of Christianity as the exemplary expression of nihilism? Is not the determination of Christianity as that which enlarges, intensifies and perfects the nihilistic reaction against Life
an unbalanced assessment and characterisation of Christianity, a characterisation that perhaps even risks becoming a caricature of Christianity? Consider, for example, the vociferous declaration that: ‘The will to destroy, the will to infiltrate every corner, the will to forever have the last word - a triple will that is unified and obstinate: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit’. Although I have proposed that Deleuze’s designation of Christianity as the perfect expression of nihilism ought to be understood as possessing a technical and temporal sense, are such pronouncements symptomatic of a failure to give due consideration to what might be of value in the teachings of Christ, such as compassion, charity and forgiveness? It is possible, however, to discern a distinction in Deleuze’s work between, on the one hand, the gospel and the historical figure of Jesus and, on the other hand, Christianity as an institutionalised set of beliefs - a distinction that is reminiscent of that which Nietzsche makes between Christ and Saint Paul. For example, while Deleuze writes that Christ invented ‘a religion of love (a practice, a way of living and not a belief)’, Christianity is to be understood as ‘a religion of Power - a belief, a terrible manner of judging’. In the main, however, when Deleuze’s work treats of Christianity it does so almost exclusively by focusing on what he perceives as its nihilistic character, rather than providing a consideration of what may be of value in the teachings’ of Christ. Indeed, it is in this context that we can understand Caputo’s suggestion that Deleuze’s antipathy towards Christianity meant that ‘for the most part, the New Testament remained for him a missed opportunity, and he allowed himself to be waylaid by the received institutional reading of the text and discouraged by the high wall of ecclesiastical power by which it is surrounded’. Despite this, however, I want to suggest that we can perhaps better understand the stridency
of Deleuze’s antipathy towards Christianity, and perhaps moderate its excesses, if we understand his pronouncements on Christianity as being deliberately provocative, as an intentional provocation whose aim is to elicit a practical response from contemporary men and women.

As I suggested in the introduction to this study, Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work can be understood in terms of a practical challenge to the manner in which we live our lives, a provocative accusation that all too often we do not live well, that all too often we are guilty, at one time or another, of the great crime of not living life to the full. As May has suggested, ‘we may take Deleuze as constructing, for his sake and ours, works which should be read as spiritual exercises, and wrestlings with and attempts to free us all from the grip of certain philosophical notions that prevent us from discovering and creating who we might be’. In particular, Deleuze’s work can be understood as a direct challenge to each that all too often we fail to see, let alone explore and exploit, the possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings because of the often restrictive, self-limiting modes of life - along with the philosophical notions inherent in those modes of life - that are part of the historical legacy that we have inherited and that continue to occlude an awareness of our present possibilities. In presenting Christianity as the perfect expression of nihilism, therefore, Deleuze can be understood as making a provocative accusation against that which has so profoundly shaped the culture of the West, an accusation that is designed to provoke us into developing a critical stance towards that which has so greatly influenced how we understand ourselves, the values that we hold, the morality that we maintain and the manner in which we believe our lives ought to be lived. Moreover, by conducting a provocative
accusation against that which is the cultural heritage of the West, Deleuze can be understood as not merely seeking to stimulate the development of a critical stance towards Christianity, but to develop a critical stance towards the past more generally, to provoke us to consider how our forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise may be hindered, thwarted and negated by the habitual, unreflective perpetuation of that which we have inherited. I shall develop an understanding of this critical stance towards the past in the following chapter, and I shall do so within the context of the first, second and third synthesis of time in particular, but what I want to suggest here is that instead of an outright resistance to the influence of the past upon the present, Deleuze’s work can be understood in terms of a creative transformation of the past that is designed to facilitate the exploration of the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise, and therefore as that which opens up the possibility for a more nuanced consideration of the value of Christianity for the present.

I want to now turn, however, to the manner in which the advent of Christianity for Deleuze can be understood in terms of the development of a new or more intensive orientation to the subjective that enlarges and intensifies the nihilistic reaction against Life and that leads to its designation as the exemplary expression of nihilism. In particular, I want to develop an account of the manner in which Christianity’s increased concern with the subjective aspects of human existence, in concert with the positing of an immutable, transcendent foundation, involves the development of technologies or systematic techniques that begin to occlude, constrain and constrict the open field of present possibilities that are available to human beings. To do so, however, it is necessary to recall that in positing an immutable, transcendent foundation as the precondition for the
manifest beings of the world, in responding to the problem of participation by maintaining that the manifest beings of the world are created by God, Christianity not only retains the Platonic ontological presupposition of equivocity, but also retains the presupposition of ontological hierarchy with God being understood as the ideal and ontologically superior precondition for the beings of the world. As Armstrong suggests, this is the view of the cosmos ‘as quintessentially frail and utterly dependent upon God for being and life…God had summoned every single being from an abysmal nothingness and at any moment he could withdraw his sustaining hand’.\textsuperscript{335} The increased concern with the subjective that is said to characterise Christianity, however, entails that this ontological hierarchy is not merely attributable to the manner in which the multitude of manifest beings are at once removed from the Creator, possessing a lesser degree of perfection than the ontological ideality of God. Rather, Christianity’s increased concern with the subjective aspects of human existence becomes manifest in the designation of existence as inferior, unjust and blameworthy because of the existence of pain, distress and suffering and, in particular, because of the existence of human pain, distress and suffering. This is to say that for Christianity, ‘the real’ is not inferior simply because it is at once removed from the ontological ideality of God, but must also be understood as being unjust and blameworthy because of the existence of human suffering. As Deleuze makes clear: ‘For Christianity the fact of suffering in life means primarily that life is not just, that it is even essentially unjust, that it pays for an essential injustice by suffering, it is blameworthy because it suffers’.\textsuperscript{336}

More than the designation of existence as unjust and blameworthy because of the existence of human suffering, the turning to the subjective that is
said to be characteristic of Christianity is concerned with who is responsible for this state of pain and distress. In order to begin to understand the manner in which Christianity’s turning to the subjective entails the enlargement or intensification of its nihilistic reaction against Life and, in particular, the manner in which that turning begins to circumscribe the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise that are available to human beings, it is necessary to note that it is human beings who are designated as being responsible for the existence of human suffering, that this suffering ought to be understood as a ‘condition of punishment’. In contrast with the manner in which the afflictions and tribulations of human existence and, in particular, the responsibility for those tribulations were, for the ancient Greeks, attributable to the various activities of gods, Deleuze writes that: ‘When existence is posited as blameworthy only one step is needed in order to make it responsible. All that is needed is a change of sex, Eve instead of the Titans’. This is to say that Christianity’s increased concern or turning to the subjective entails that it is human beings that are to be determined as being responsible for the existence of human suffering, that all human beings, as a consequence of Man’s original offence against God, are condemned to universal suffering, condemned to toil a soil strewn with thistles and thorns and thereafter condemned to exist in a state of profound privation. Encapsulated in Augustine’s notion of ‘original sin’, the original offence against God and the condition of punishment, privation and dispossession that it engenders does not merely designate the particular temptation succumbed to by the inhabitant’s of Eden and the condition to which they are condemned. Rather, it possesses a universal application that is to be understood as characterising the fundamental identity of all human beings such
that ‘the deep truth within us all’, the universal truth of the essence of human being, is to be understood in terms of an essential condition of dispossession, privation or lack so that the original, particular sin against God is to be understood, as Borg has suggested, as ‘a sinfulness that is transmitted to every individual in every generation’.341

However, while characterising the condition of human beings as one of universal privation, as being fallen and essential sinners who are responsible for the existence of human suffering, Christianity also offers the hope of salvation, a return to God’s heavenly kingdom in which human suffering will cease and we will be redeemed from our state of privation by a state of eternal bliss. Indeed, for Deleuze, there is an intimate relationship between the designation of existence as inferior, unjust and blameworthy because of the existence of human suffering, and the possibility of redemption from that condition of privation. For example, he writes that: ‘Existence seems to be given so much by being made a crime, an excess. It gains a double nature - an immense injustice and a justifying atonement’.342 This is to say that rather than engendering a condition of profound despair, Christianity can be understood as enabling the possibility of a meaning, purpose and direction for human existence that arises out of its designation of existence as inferior, unjust and blameworthy. Importantly, however, it is through the promise of the possibility of redemption from the essential human state of privation that we find the manner in which Christianity’s turning to the subjective can be seen to enlarge and intensify its nihilistic reaction against Life, the manner in which each individual’s forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise are hindered, thwarted and negated. This is to say that as an essential sinner, and therefore as the cause of
our own suffering, we can only obtain future salvation from our state of privation, and we can only be redeemed from our debt to God and avoid his future wrath, in so far as we continually strive to actualise our present possibilities in accordance with the dictates, prescriptions and strictures of Christianity. As McGrath suggests: ‘The believer’s present justified Christian existence is thus an anticipation of and advance participation in deliverance from the wrath to come, and an assurance in the present of the final eschatological verdict of acquittal’. 343 Rather than becoming aware of the manner in which every moment engenders an open field of present possibilities, rather than striving to explore the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings, each individual is concerned with the salvation of their soul and with actualising their possibilities in accordance with that form of life that will ensure it.

To understand the designation of Christianity as the perfect expression of nihilism is therefore to understand Christianity as the exemplary example of what Deleuze refers to as ‘a plan of organisation’. 344 This is to say that Christianity’s nihilistic reaction against Life is not merely manifest in the manner in which it reacts against the formless foundation of Life by positing a fixed, immutable foundation, by positing a transcendent God who, through the process of creation, organises reality into an equivocal distribution that is characterised by ontological hierarchy and the primacy of identity over difference. Rather, in addition to this concern with the objective character of reality, Christianity’s turning to the subjective manifests itself in the manner in which it seeks to organise how human beings live their lives, the manner in which it seeks to occlude the awareness and circumscribe the exploration of the
open field of present possibilities for living otherwise by promoting the actualisation of those possibilities in accordance with Christian dictates, prescriptions and strictures. As I indicated above, however, Christianity’s increased concern with the subjective aspects of human existence ought not to be understood as an orientation that diminishes a concern with the objective character of reality in so far as the imperative to actualise one’s present possibilities in accordance with Christianity’s strictures appeals to the objective character of reality in order to acquire its legitimacy and its power of adherence. This is to say that the dictates, prescriptions and strictures of Christianity are not to be understood as that which are open to question or subject to revision, they do not lay down what is contingently good and bad such that each individual is at liberty to decide which to follow, which to modify and which to dispose of. As Deleuze asserts, ‘moral law is an imperative, it has no other effect, no other finality than obedience’. 345 Christianity’s strictures are therefore to be understood as expressing eternal, transcendent values, as being the commands laid down by God Himself, as being the inerrant and infallible Word of God, such that they are that which constitutes what will be eternally good and bad for all human beings, as that which, to employ the moral terminology of Christianity, ought to be considered ‘Good’ and that which ought to considered ‘Evil’. 346

In order to determine God’s plan of organisation, in order to determine how we are to actualise our present possibilities in accordance with Christianity’s strictures and therefore obtain salvation, then the individual requires - particularly for Roman Catholicism - the mediation of the Church and its secular authorities. For example, in characterising this position, McGrath
writes that: ‘Salvation was only to be had through membership of the church. Christ may have made the hope of heaven possible; only the church could make it available. There was an ecclesiastical monopoly on the dispensation of redemption’. The secular authorities of the Church are therefore to be understood, for Deleuze, as those who profess to possess the knowledge and the authority to instruct human beings how to correctly actualise their present possibilities in accordance with the dictates of Christianity and, importantly, are those who profess to possess the knowledge and the authority to dispense judgement accordingly. For example, in characterising the psychology of the supposed authoritative intermediaries of the Church and, as it were, the passion to engage in the judgment of how others live their lives, Deleuze proposes that ‘the logic of judgement merges with the psychology of the priest, as the inventor of the most somber organisation: I want to judge, I have to judge…’ Moreover, while the mediation of the Church takes on less significance for the Christian tradition of Protestantism, the judgement and organisation of the individual’s life in accordance with the dictates, prescriptions and strictures of Christianity continues, but here it is the individual who takes the function of judgment upon themselves. This is to say that in so far as the individual comes to embrace and internalise Christianity’s plan of organisation - in so far as the individual comes to accept that plan’s account of the objective organisation of reality, the manner in which ‘the deep truth’ of their being ought to be conceptualised, and how they ought to actualise and organise their own present possibilities in accordance with the strictures of Christianity - then they accept and adopt the role of self-judge, a judgement of one’s own life that is in thrall to the all-pervasive judgement of God. Indeed, in characterising this adoption of
the role of self-judge that comes to characterise Christianity, Bogue makes it clear that: ‘The Christian’s only role is that of perpetual self-judge, and the sole form against which that role is measured is the infinite form of the deity, that form being one with an all-pervasive judgement’. 349

Deleuze’s determination of Christianity as the exemplary manifestation of nihilism ought to be understood, therefore, in terms of the manner in which it develops an increased concern with the subjective aspects of human existence, an orientation that makes reference to, and is supported by, the positing of an immutable, transcendent foundation and that, in its characterisation of reality, maintains the ontological presuppositions of Platonism. In particular, through the designation of human beings as responsible for the existence of pain, distress and suffering, Christianity is to be understood as promulgating an account of the essential identity of each human being, of uncovering the supposedly deep truth within us all, and of conceptualising that identity in terms of a condition of punishment, dispossession and profound privation. While existing upon earth in a current condition of privation, however, Christianity also offers the hope of salvation in the form of ascension to Heaven after death, a return to God’s transcendent kingdom in which human suffering will cease and each individual will be redeemed from their present condition of dispossession. Far from being assured, however, redemption is to be understood as being conditional upon the manner in which each individual conducts themselves in this life, conditional upon the manner in which each actualises their present possibilities and regulates their own conduct in accordance with the dictates, prescriptions and strictures of Christianity. The development of, and the increased concern with, the subjective aspects of human existence that is said to accompany the advent
of Christianity, and that leads Deleuze to designate Christianity as the exemplary expression of nihilism, can therefore be understood in terms of the manner in which it characterises the human condition as one of dispossession and privation, as providing hope of redemption from that condition after death and in making that redemption conditional upon the manner in which each actualises their present possibilities throughout life. This is to say that Christianity’s nihilistic reaction against Life is manifest in the manner in which it is to be understood as an exemplary instantiation of a plan of organisation that not only provides an account of the universal organisation of reality with reference to the notion of an immutable, transcendent foundation, but also in the manner in which it seeks to organise how each individual lives their life, thereby occluding, constricting and even negating an awareness of the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings.

Following the death of God, however, why is this concern with Christianity as the exemplary expression of nihilism relevant for contemporary human beings? If the growing disbelief in the existence of God entailed that the form of life that was established upon it also came to be seen as increasingly fragile, does not the incredulity towards a belief in a transcendent God entail an incredulity towards the status of Christianity’s dictates, prescriptions and strictures - understood as divine imperatives - as well a growing incredulity towards its notions of sin, privation and redemption more generally? Indeed, in highlighting the consequences of the growing disbelief in the existence of God and the authority of the dictates and prescriptions that were founded upon that belief, Deleuze proposes that: ‘The supersensible world and higher values are reacted against, their existence is denied, they are refused all validity…The
With the growing sense that the belief in the existence of God is becoming untenable, as well as the Judeo-Christian form of life that was established upon it, what contemporary significance can Christianity have with respect to the manner in which each individual’s forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise are hindered, thwarted and negated? In response to this we must remember Nietzsche’s suggestion that although it may be the greatest recent event, the full implications of the death of God would remain beyond the comprehension of many such that both the Judeo-Christian world view and its form of life would continue to exert considerable influence over the lives of modern men and women. Indeed, both Armstrong and Borg have suggested that, despite the secular tenor of much of contemporary Western society, Christianity and ‘the idea of God’ more generally continues to influence and affect the lives of millions of people throughout the world. Similarly, noting the enduring influence of Christianity within the lives of Western peoples, Vattimo has suggested that it may be understood variously as a response to a number of challenging socio-political issues confronting late-modern humanity, issues ranging from ‘genetic manipulation to ecology’, along with contemporary society’s perceived inability to address the more profound need for meaning, purpose and hope in the face of human finitude. For example, he writes that: ‘Death hovers over us as an ineluctable event, we escape from despair by turning to God and his promise to welcome us into his eternal kingdom.

I want to argue, however, that Deleuze’s concern with Christianity as the exemplary expression of nihilism is not to be understood merely in terms of
Christianity’s explicit manifestation in, and enduring influence upon, the lives of modern men and women, the manner in which contemporary Western peoples may continue to explicitly adopt, for a variety of reasons, the Judeo-Christian world-view and adhere to its form of life. Rather, his concern with Christianity is also to be understood in terms of the manner in which its nihilistic reaction against Life continues to implicitly persist and exert an influence upon the lives of modern men and women, the manner in which Christianity’s nihilistic technologies manifest themselves in ‘new guises’ and, as it were, ‘transubstantiated forms’ beyond the death of God. This is to say that despite the increasing incredulity towards Christianity as a plan of organisation, a growing disbelief that each individual ought to actualise their present possibilities in accordance with the strictures of Christianity, and a growing incredulity towards Christianity’s particular formulation of the notions of sin, privation and redemption, there is an attempt to preserve the transcendent, authoritative realm that has been vacated by God and to posit similarly authoritative prescriptions and compelling notions. For example, in noting this transition away from the explicit and specific content of Christianity as a plan of organisation, and yet a retention of a number of its ‘underlying formal characteristics’, Heidegger writes that ‘if God in the sense of the Christian god has disappeared from his authoritative position in the suprasensory world, then this authoritative place itself is still always preserved, even though as that which has become empty….What is more, the empty place demands to be occupied anew and to have the god now vanished from it replaced by something else. New ideals are set up.’ The death of God, therefore, entails a growing disbelief in the explicit content of Christianity as a plan of organisation, a growing incredulity towards
the existence of an immutable, transcendent God, a growing suspicion of Christianity’s formulation of the notions of original sin, privation and redemption and an increasing incredulity towards the promise of individual salvation through adherence to the strictures of Christianity. However, while the explicit content of Christianity as a plan of organisation comes to be seen as increasingly incredulous, its formal characteristics, its presuppositions, concepts and themes, implicitly persist in new and transmuted forms beyond the death of God, such that the nihilistic reaction against Life of which Christianity was, for Deleuze, an exemplary expression also persists beyond the death of God.

The persistence of the nihilistic reaction against Life that characterises Christianity’s plan of organisation becomes manifest in new plans of organisation that retain an account of the objective organisation of reality, as well as retaining a concern with the subjective aspects of human existence, such that they can be understood, to employ Nietzsche’s phrase, as forms of ‘latent Christianity.’ 357 Indeed, in highlighting the manner in which the death of God would be followed by an attempt to create new accounts of reality and forms of life that retained many elements of Christianity, and with what can be understood as an allusion to the enduring Platonic presuppositions that would continue to characterise these accounts, Nietzsche proposed that: ‘After Buddha was dead, his shadow was still shown for centuries in a cave - a tremendous, gruesome shadow. God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown.’ 358 As latent forms of Christianity, as tremendous, gruesome shadows of God, the new plans of organisation that emergence in the wake of the death of God can therefore be understood as continuing to maintain Christianity’s nihilistic reaction against the
manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that Life, at its foundation, is continually overcoming any fixed determination or identity, as well as maintaining Christianity’s reaction against the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that each individual’s living present is characterised by forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise. As such, Deleuze’s concern with Christianity can be understood as retaining its contemporary relevance not merely because of Christianity’s explicit manifestation in, and enduring influence upon, the lives of modern men and women, but also because the nihilistic reaction against Life that is characteristic of Christianity’s plan of organisation continues to implicitly persist in new plans of organisation, in latent forms of Christianity or shadows of God. In designating Christianity as the exemplary expression of nihilism, Deleuze can therefore be understood as illustrating the perfect example or paradigmatic instance of the nihilistic reaction against Life so that contemporary men and women are better able to locate the presence of these latent forms of Christianity in their lives, better able to trace and locate the transmutation of the nihilistic reaction against Life, and thereby better able to resist the manner in which the nihilism that these shadows of God perpetuate may occlude, delimit and even negate the individual’s forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise.

In order to illustrate the continuance of nihilism in the new plans of organisation that emerged in the wake of the death of God, I want to turn to the related philosophies of Hegel and Marx for the remainder of this chapter and to treat them as the exemplary instantiations of such new plans of organisation, as the exemplary expressions of latent Christianity. In particular, in order to illustrate the manner in which new plans of organisation emerged in the wake of
the death of God, I want to turn to Hegel’s ‘dialectics of Spirit’ and the ‘dialectical materialism’ of Marxism in order to discuss how they can be understood as shadows of God, as new plans of organisation that, while dispensing with the explicit and specific content of Christianity as a plan of organisation, retain a number of its underlying formal characteristics and, in significantly transmuted forms, perpetuate its nihilistic reaction against Life. But why turn to Hegel and Marx in order to illustrate the continuance of nihilism beyond the death of God when it is widely acknowledged that both Hegelian and Marxist historicism have themselves become the object of a sense of growing incredulity, with the latter in particular - following the collapse of communism - losing the influence that it once exerted over the lives of modern men and women? Indeed, in so far as the late twentieth and early twenty first century is commonly characterised as a new period of cultural history, as that which ought to be understood in terms of ‘the end of modernity’ and the emergence of a new ‘postmodern condition’, then it has been suggested that what has accompanied or even defined this period is an ‘incredulity’ towards those modern philosophies - those grand or ‘metanarratives’ of which Hegelianism and Marxism are characteristic examples - that emerged in the wake of the death of God. For example, Vattimo has suggested that: ‘The ‘end of modernity’, or in any case its crisis, has also been accompanied by the dissolution of the main philosophical theories that claimed to have done away with religion…Hegelian and then Marxist historicism’, while Young has proposed that: ‘Marxism, like Hegelianism…is, then, a myth. It does not merit serious belief; it deserves to ‘die’. And it has died, visibly and finally, with the fall of the Berlin Wall’.
As I shall discuss in the following chapter, even if we accept that there is a generalised cultural climate of incredulity towards those philosophies, specifically Hegelianism and Marxism, that emerged in the wake of the death of God, Deleuze can be understood as proposing that there are plans of organisation that persist within this climate. Even for those who seemingly no longer maintain an adherence to, or belief in, any overarching plan of organisation, the nihilistic reaction against Life can be understood as persisting in plans of organisation that adapt to this climate of disbelief, plans that, somewhat paradoxically, enable those ‘who no longer believe in anything to continue believing’. I shall return to this in the following chapter in relation to psychoanalysis, but for now I want to suggest that perhaps a greater degree of circumspection is required when considering the significance of the plans of organisation that emerged following the death of God. This is to say that while there may be a greater degree of incredulity towards both Hegelian and Marxist historicism, while the explicit content of those philosophies may no longer exert the influence that they once did over the lives of modern men and women, the potential for individual’s to be attracted to plans of organisation and, in particular, attracted to the manner in which they proffer meaning, purpose and hope in the face of a condition of seeming privation may continue to be powerful and enduring force. For example, in discussing the enduring attraction of ‘theodicy’, where this is not merely understood in terms of the vindication of God’s divine providence in the face of the existence of evil, but is understood more generally as an overarching and providential course of history, Levinas has suggested that: ‘It is impossible, in any case, to underestimate the temptation of theodicy, and to fail to recognise the profundity of the empire it exerts over
mankind’. The value in examining Hegelian and Marxist historicism can therefore be understood in terms of an attempt to gain a broader awareness of that empire, to understand the manner in which it is able to adopt new forms that continue to perpetuate the nihilistic reaction against Life beyond the death of God. In particular, Hegelian and Marxist historicism reveal how the ongoing concern with the objective organisation of reality continues to react against the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that Life is continually overcoming any fixed determination, as well as disclosing how the notions of sin, privation and redemption take on new forms that continue to react against the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that each individual is provided with an open field of present possibilities for living otherwise.

If we turn to the work of Hegel first in order to illustrate the manner in which new plans of organisation emerge in the wake of the death of God, and yet continue to perpetuate a nihilistic reaction against Life then, in contrast to the positing of a static, fixed foundation, Hegel is to be understood as characterising the nature of reality in terms of a historical, dynamic and developmental process. In particular, in the Phenomenology of Spirit he presents ‘ultimate reality’ or ‘the absolute’ as a person-like entity, subject or ‘I’, which can be understood as being indicated by the designation of the absolute as Geist, as Mind or Spirit. Rather than being a fixed, transcendent foundation, however, the absolute is to be understood as a process of developmental change, a process whose structure or pattern of change is dialectical - ‘the doubling which sets up opposition, and then again the negation of this indifferent diversity’ - and that can be discerned as manifesting itself in the everyday phenomena of the world such that ‘everything around us can be regarded an example of the dialectic’.
Importantly, each individual human being, existing in a state of estrangement or ‘alienation’ from every other individual,\textsuperscript{367} is to be understood as merely a part of that process, as merely that through which the absolute makes itself manifest, such that, as a person-like entity or subject, the absolute is to be understood as the only genuine subject.\textsuperscript{368} Moreover, the absolute does not undergo an infinite number of dialectical developments but has a telos or goal that Hegel refers to as ‘absolute knowing’,\textsuperscript{369} and which consists of the absolute coming to ‘know’ that it is the ultimate and only genuine subject, that it is all reality, and that everything is a part of itself.\textsuperscript{370} As Young has suggested, absolute knowing is said to have been achieved when all individual human beings recognise themselves and one another as a part of the absolute and, thereby, overcome their previous state of estrangement and alienation from each other.\textsuperscript{371} In order to begin to see the manner in which Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit can be understood as that which perpetuates a nihilistic reaction against Life and, in particular, comes to occlude and constrain the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings, it is important to note that although Hegel resists positing a higher transcendent realm within which the current state of human suffering, privation or alienation is expiated, he proposes that there will come a time when the dynamic, dialectical process will cease, a time of absolute knowing when historical development, becoming and thus time itself will be ‘annulled’.\textsuperscript{372}

That this is so can perhaps been seen more clearly within the dialectical materialism of Marxism that, drawing on the work of Hegel, conceptualises reality in terms of a historical, developmental and dialectical change, a process that is to be understood as teleological in so far as it unfolds towards a goal.
which will complete that dialectical process and therefore bring about its end.\textsuperscript{373}

However, whereas for Hegel that dialectical process is to be understood in terms of \textit{Geist} or Spirit, for Marx it is to be understood in terms of economic activity and class antagonisms, activity concerned with the means of production and the ownership of material wealth.\textsuperscript{374} In particular, this material or economic dialectic that characterises the dynamism of history suggests that history has progressed through a series of dialectical class struggles between ‘oppressor and oppressed’, a particular and ongoing societal organisation of power that has included the antagonisms between freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf and, in our epoch, bourgeoisie and proletariat.\textsuperscript{375} As a consequence of the various manifestations of this ongoing class antagonism, the historical condition of human beings is to be understood in terms of a universal estrangement or alienation from their essential or ‘species being’, an alienation from themselves, from the products of their labour and from fellow human beings.\textsuperscript{376} In so far as the origin of this alienation is private property then it will only be with the advent of communism and the abolition of private property that alienation will also disappear and the supposedly natural tendency to sociability and co-operation that is characteristic of human being will reassert itself.\textsuperscript{377} In a similar fashion to Hegel, therefore, Marx resists positing a fixed, transcendent realm within which the current state of alienation and human suffering is expiated, but he proposes that with the arrival of communism the dynamic, dialectical process of history will end along with the universal alienation and suffering of human beings. For example, in presenting this cessation of human estrangement and alienation that arrives with the advent of communism, Marx proposes that communism is to be understood ‘as the \textit{positive} transcendence of
private property, or human self-estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man; communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human) being...Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution’. 378

But how are we to understand this exposition of the historicism of Hegel and Marx as latent forms of Christianity, as tremendous and gruesome shadows of God that persist beyond the death of God? This is to say that to the extent that it has been suggested that Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit and the dialectical materialism of Marxism are to be understood as being characterised by dynamic, historical change, how are we to understand those philosophies in terms of the continuation, albeit in transmuted forms, of Christianity’s nihilistic reaction against the ongoing dynamism of the third synthesis of time? To understand the manner in which the philosophies of Hegel and Marx can be taken as perpetuating, in transmuted forms, the nihilistic reaction against the eternal return of the new or the different that characterises the formless foundation of Life then we must acknowledge that this reaction is not to be understood in terms of the positing of a what might be referred to as a ‘vertical transcendence’, such as the immutable, fixed transcendence that characterises the Platonic Forms, the neo-Platonic One or the God of Christianity. Indeed, Camus proposed that: ‘Hegel’s undeniable originality lies in his definitive destruction of all vertical transcendence’. 379 Rather, Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit and Marxism’s dialectical materialism can both be understood as reacting against the formless foundation of Life by directing what we might refer to as the ‘open’ dynamism of the third synthesis of time into a closed or fixed pattern of development towards a
specific goal, a fixed and teleological development such that - with the advent of absolute knowing or the arrival of communism - dynamism and historical change are annulled. This is to say that while the third synthesis of time is to be understood in terms of the ongoing or eternal return of the new or the different which ensures that Life, at its foundation, is characterised by a ongoing and excessive formlessness, an ongoing and universal ungrounding, it does not return the new or the different according to some transcendent, overarching pattern of development or predetermined, purposeful plan. In contrast, the Hegelian dialectics of Spirit and the dialectical materialism of Marxism can both be understood in terms of a reaction against the open dynamism of the eternal return of the new or the different that characterises the formless foundation of Life in so far as they provide an account of the objective organisation of reality in terms of a closed historical dynamic, a dynamic that is guided by a universal or overarching pattern of development that possesses a predetermined purpose.

In this respect, both Hegelian and Marxist historicism can be seen to display similarities with the eschatological concerns of Christianity, with that tradition of Christian thought that is concerned with the ‘last things’. This is to say that while Christianity has been primarily presented here in terms of the creationist response to the problem of participation, as the positing of an immutable and transcendent foundation that is the ideal and ontologically superior precondition for the beings of the world, there is also an eschatological current of thought within Christianity that is concerned with the final destiny of mankind and of the world. In particular, the New Testament foundations for eschatology can be discerned variously in Jesus’ preaching of the coming of the kingdom of God, the proclamation that ‘the kingdom of God is at hand’, and
in the writings of Saint Paul where there is a concern with the final coming of Christ, the execution of final judgement and, for those true believing Christians, redemption from sin and the fulfilment of the promise of eternal life. However, perhaps the clearest and most controversial foundations for the eschatological concerns of Christianity can be found in the book of Revelation, where John of Patmos recounts his visionary, apocalyptic experience of ‘the rapture’, ‘the final tribulation’, the battle of Armageddon, the second coming of the warrior Christ and ‘the last judgement’. As Borg has suggested, the ‘futurist’ reading of the book of Revelation stresses that the book tells us what will happen some time in the future, treating the book as that which unveils God’s transcendent and overarching plan for the destiny of the world and, in particular, does so in the form of ‘a cryptogram, a message encoded in symbols about the signs of the end that will precede the second coming of Christ’. With the futurist interpretation of the book of Revelation, therefore, Christianity can be understood as that which posits a closed historical dynamic, a dynamic that is guided by a universal or overarching pattern of development towards a predetermined end. Against the formless foundation of Life, against the eternal return of the new or the different that is characteristic of the open dynamism of the third synthesis of time, the eschatology of the New Testament posits a divine, fixed pattern of historical development towards a specific goal such that - with the second coming of Christ - dynamism, historical change and therefore time itself are annulled.

Previously I suggested that Deleuze’s employment of the term ‘religion’ is not to be understood as being confined to any particular established religion, but is to be understood as that which designates any nihilistic reaction against
Life that posits an immutable, transcendent foundation such as Plato’s theory of Forms, the Neo-Platonic emanative response, or Christianity’s creative response, to the problem of participation. However, in addition to these instances of vertical transcendence, Deleuze also suggests that the term religion, or what he refers to as a ‘theological plan’, is also to be understood as that which designates not only the eschatological concerns of Christianity but also those philosophies, such as Hegelianism and Marxism, whose dynamism and evolutionary change is guided by some universal, overarching or transcendent plan of development towards a predetermined end. For example, he writes that: ‘Any organisation that comes from above and refers to a transcendence, be it a hidden one, can be called a theological plan: a design in the mind of god, but also an evolution in the supposed depths of nature, or a society’s organisation of power’. Therefore, in contrast to the vertical transcendence that is manifest in the positing of an immutable, fixed foundation, with Hegelian and Marxist historicism we have what we might refer to as a ‘horizontal transcendence’ that is manifest in the positing of an overarching and fixed pattern of development, an evolutionary design within the depths of reality that guides history through a series of dialectical and purposeful progressions towards a predetermined goal or telos. In highlighting the manner in which Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit can be understood in terms of a horizontal, purposeful transcendence, and therefore as that which perpetuates the nihilistic reaction against Life but in a significantly transmuted form, Holland has noted that Hegel’s philosophy is characterised by ‘transcendental subjectivism’, in so far as ‘this historical agent, Absolute Spirit, is a subject that transcends any and all concrete subjects and indeed history itself’, and also by ‘teleologism’ to the extent that ‘the end of history is
guaranteed by the dialectical process of negation of the negation’.\footnote{384} As we have seen, as a person-like entity or subject, as Mind or Spirit, the absolute is to be understood as the dynamic principle of reality that transcends all individual human beings and history itself, as that universal and overarching plan of development that moves the whole of reality through a series of dialectical and purposeful developments towards the predetermined goal of absolute knowing wherein that dialectical process will cease and historical change, becoming and thus time itself will be annulled.

Similarly, the dialectical materialism of Marxism is also to be understood as being characterised by a horizontal transcendence in so far as it posits a fixed and purposeful pattern of development towards a predetermined end. However, in place of the dialectical and teleological development of Spirit towards absolute knowing we have a series of dialectical class struggles between oppressor and oppressed wherein society is moved through a series of dialectical transitions towards the predetermined goal of communism, whose advent will signal the end of historical and therefore societal development. As Holland has suggested:

\[\text{Much of what passes as “Marxist” philosophy of history - including some (though not all) of Marx’s own - merely translates or inverts Hegelian idealism into a “materialism” that nonetheless retains the transcendental subjectivism and the teleologism: classes act as transcendental subjects in the historical dialectic of class struggle, which will according to the necessary laws produce a classless society with the collapse of capitalism at the end of history.}\footnote{385} \]
With the philosophies of Hegelianism and Marxism, therefore, we have the perpetuation of the nihilistic reaction against Life of which Christianity is said to be the exemplary expression but, following the death of God, this nihilism manifests itself in a significantly transmuted form. With Hegel and Marx we continue to have an account of the objective, transcendent organisation of reality that can be understood as a reaction against the manner in which Life, at its formless foundation, is characterised by the open dynamism of the eternal return of the new or the different but, in contrast to the vertical transcendence that characterises Christianity’s creationist response to the problem of participation, we now have a horizontal, purposeful transcendence. This is to say that the third synthesis of time is no longer reacted against by positing an immutable, fixed foundation that is understood as being the ideal and ontologically superior precondition for the beings of the world. Rather, the nihilistic reaction against Life which characterises Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit and the dialectical materialism of Marxism is manifest in the form of an overarching and fixed pattern of development, a purposeful, dialectical and closed dynamic that is the ideal and ontologically superior precondition and guiding principle that directs the whole of reality, including all historical and societal developments, towards a predetermined end.

As with Christianity, however, the philosophies of Hegel and Marx are not simply concerned with formulating an account of the overall and objective organisation of reality, but also display a concern with the subjective aspects of human existence that enlarges and intensifies the manner in which they perpetuate the nihilistic reaction against Life. In particular, both Hegel and Marx can be understood as presenting an account of the fundamental identity of all
human beings, of the supposedly deep truth within us all, and of doing so in terms of an essential condition of dispossession, privation or lack in so far as each individual is conceptualised as existing in a current and profound condition of alienation. This is to say that while Christianity conceptualises the essential condition of human beings in terms of a condition of privation because of the existence and perpetuation of Man’s original offence against God, both Hegel and Marx suggest that the current condition of each individual is to be understood in terms of a loss of integration with every other individual, a profound condition of dispossession and privation in which mankind’s tendency to interpersonal cooperation has been replaced by a fracturing of society, a society of self-serving and ‘atomistic’ individuals engaged in interpersonal competition. However, while denying the possibility of ascension to Heaven after death, a return to God’s transcendent kingdom in which each individual will be redeemed from their present condition of privation, Hegel can be understood as providing hope of future ‘redemption’ from the current condition of alienation with the inevitable arrival of absolute knowing. As Young has made clear, ‘what Hegel offers is the promise - indeed, guarantee - that, as the inexorable laws of history unfold, alienation will one day be overcome and everyone will live in peace and harmony’.\(^{386}\) Similarly, while rejecting religion and the notion of heaven as that human creation designed to soporifically appease the reality of human suffering,\(^{387}\) Marx can be understood as providing each individual with the hope of a future ‘salvation’ from their current condition of alienation with the inevitable abolition of private property that is achieved with the advent of communism. Indeed, in highlighting the pseudo-religious, and specifically Christian, redemptive tenor of Marx and Engel’s work, Camus
noted that: ‘The final disappearance of political economy - the favourite theme of Marx and Engels - indicates the end of all suffering. Economics, in fact, coincide with pain and suffering in history, which disappear with the disappearance of history. We arrive at last in the Garden of Eden’. 388

Along with a concern to formulate an account of the objective organisation of reality, the new plans of organisation that emerge following the death of God, such as Hegelianism and Marxism, can therefore be understood as latent forms of Christianity to the extent that they also retain a concern with the subjective organisation of each individual’s reality, with the fundamental identity of all human beings and the ongoing organisation of the development and direction of their lives. This is to say that the new plans of organisation that emerge in the wake of the death of God are not to be understood as shadows of God simply because they posit a horizontal, purposeful transcendence, to the extent that they characterise the organisation of reality in terms of a fixed and purposeful pattern of development towards a predetermined end. Rather, these new plans of organisation are to be understood as latent forms of Christianity to the extent that they perpetuate Christianity’s concern with the subjective formation and organisation of the human being. Indeed, in stressing their concern with both the objective, developmental organisation of reality and the subjective formation of each individual’s identity, Deleuze makes it clear that a plan of this type ‘always involves forms and their developments, subjects and their formations. Development of forms and formation of subjects’. 389 Along with Christianity, therefore, both Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit and the dialectical materialism of Marxism can be understood as perpetuating, in a significantly transmuted form, the notions of dispossession and privation, along with the
notion of a redemption from that condition of privation, to the extent that they provide each individual with the hope of the future cessation of, and therefore redemption from, their current condition of alienation. The future redemption that characterises both Hegelian and Marxist historicism is no longer to be understood as being achieved after death in a super-sensible world, in God’s transcendent heavenly kingdom, but is instead to be found in the future of this world as reality follows its ineluctable course of dialectical developments towards its predetermined end. Indeed, in highlighting the manner in which new philosophies would arise in the wake of the death of God that would continue to perpetuate, in transmuted form, the redemptive ideal of Christianity, Nietzsche made it clear that the notion of the kingdom of God would be transferred to earth and, in particular, to the future condition of humanity so that while the redemptive ideal of Christianity would be ‘redressed’, as it were, in a new secular ‘garb’, those new philosophies would continue to hold fast ‘to the belief in the old ideal’.390

Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit and the dialectical materialism of Marxism can therefore both be understood as new plans of organisation that emerge in the wake of the death of God and, while dispensing with the explicit and specific content of Christianity as a plan of organisation, retain a number of its underlying formal characteristics and continue, in significantly transmuted forms, to perpetuate the nihilistic reaction against Life. In particular, both Hegelian and Marxist historicism can be understood as providing an account of the overall and objective organisation of reality that, in contrast to the vertical transcendence that characterises Christianity’s creationist response to the problem of participation, posit a horizontal, purposeful transcendence. This is to
say that both the philosophies of Hegel and Marx can be understood as reacting against the formless foundation of Life by directing the open dynamism of the third synthesis of time, the manner in which it is characterised by the eternal return of the new or the different, into a closed or fixed pattern of development towards a specific goal, a fixed and teleological development such that, with the advent of absolute knowing or the arrival of communism, dynamic and historical change are annulled. As with Christianity, however, the nihilism that characterises the philosophies of Hegel and Marx can also be discerned in the enlargement or intensification of their nihilistic reaction against Life, a nihilism that is not merely limited to a reaction against the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that Life, at its foundation, is continually overcoming any fixed identity, but is also a reaction against the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that each individual’s living present is characterised by an open field of present possibilities for living otherwise. This is to say that rather than becoming aware of the manner in which every moment engenders an open field of present possibilities, rather than striving to explore the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings, Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit and the dialectical materialism of Marxism shift the individual’s concern to the future of this world, expectant of the arrival of absolute knowing or the advent of communism as those future states that will ensure a redemption from the profound privation that is said to characterise the essential condition of humanity.
Chapter Four: Resistance

In addition to being concerned with how each moment of our lives provides us with forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise, the previous chapter suggested that Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work is concerned with the manner in which those possibilities are hindered, thwarted and even negated, a circumscription of present possibilities that I argued ought to be understood within the context of nihilism. However, rather than a reaction to the loss of belief in the existence of God, and the Judeo-Christian form of life that was established upon that belief, nihilism is to be understood as possessing a technical and specifically temporal sense in so far as it is to be determined as a reaction against the universal and impersonal temporal dynamism of Life itself. This is to say that nihilism is to be understood in terms of a reaction against the universal ungrounding or excessive formlessness that characterises the temporality of Life itself, a reaction against the third synthesis of time and the manner in which it ensures that Life, at its formless foundation, is continually becoming different to what it is at any given moment, continually resisting and overcoming the establishment of any fixed determination or identity. In particular, as a reaction against the formless foundation of Life, nihilism becomes manifest in the positing of an overarching account of the objective organisation of reality, accounts of reality that can be understood in terms of what Deleuze refers to as plans of organisation and that variously appeal to vertical transcendence - such as the Platonic Forms, the neo-Platonic One or the God of Christianity - or horizontal transcendence - as is evidenced in the eschatological concerns of Christianity, Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit or the dialectical materialism of Marxism. This is to say that the nihilism characteristic
of a plan of organisation manifests itself in accounts of the objective organisation of reality that react against the open dynamism that characterises the formless foundation of Life by appealing to a vertical transcendence, by positing an immutable, fixed foundation that is to be understood as the ideal and ontologically superior precondition for the beings of the world, or by appealing to a horizontal transcendence, by positing an overarching and fixed pattern of development that is the ideal and ontologically superior precondition and guiding principle that directs the whole of reality, including all historical and societal developments, towards a predetermined end.

The nihilistic reaction against Life that characterises a plan of organisation, however, is not merely manifest in the positing of an overarching account of the objective organisation of reality that appeals to a vertical and/or horizontal transcendence and, in doing so, reacts against the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that Life, at its foundation, is characterised by the eternal return of the new or the different. Rather, with the advent of Christianity, and for the new plans of organisation that follow in the wake of the death of God, there is also an increased concern with subjectivity, an increased concern with the subjective aspects of human existence, that enlarges and intensifies the nihilistic reaction against Life. As I discussed previously in relation to Christianity, and also in relation to both Hegelian and Marxist historicism, plans of organisation present an account of the fundamental identity of all human beings, an account of the supposedly deep truth within us all, and do so in terms of a universal and essential condition of dispossession, privation or lack. In concert with their specific account of the objective organisation of reality, plans of organisation occlude, constrain and constrict both the awareness
and exploration of the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings by means of the promise of salvation from a condition of privation, a redemption from an ostensible state of dispossession to the extent that the individual actualises their present possibilities in accordance with that form of life promulgated by the plan of organisation. Therefore, the nihilistic reaction against Life that is characteristic of Christianity as a plan of organisation, as well as those new plans of organisation that emerge in the wake of the death of God, is not merely manifest in the form of an account of the objective organisation of reality that reacts against the formless foundation of Life, a foundation that is constituted by the third synthesis of time and is characterised by the eternal return of the new or the different. Rather, with its turning or increased concern with the subjective aspects of human existence, those plans of organisation also circumscribe the open field of present possibilities that are available to human beings and, in doing so, are also to be understood as a nihilistic reaction against the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that each individual’s living present is characterised by a forever renewed present possibility for living otherwise.

But how are we to respond to the presence and the persistence of nihilism? At the beginning of this study, I suggested that Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work can be productively understood as being concerned with the question of living well, and the manner in which living well necessitates that we not only become aware of, but that we also explore, the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings. Over the course of the preceding chapters, I have sought to formulate an account of the manner in which, as an ongoing and immanent expression of Life, each
individual is continually granted a forever renewed present possibility for living otherwise, a present moment that is constituted by the ongoing caesural cutting that characterises the third synthesis of time and which is to be understood as the formless foundation of Life itself. However, I have also formulated an account of the manner in which our forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise are circumscribed by nihilism, hindered, thwarted and even negated by the nihilistic reaction against Life that finds its most systematic expression in plans of organisation. In response to the presence and the persistence of nihilism, therefore, my objective in this chapter is argue that living well, where this necessitates that we explore the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings, also necessitates that we strive to resist the diverse ways in which those present possibilities are often occluded and constrained. This is to say that in order to strive to become aware of and to explore our forever renewed present possibilities then the response to the presence and the persistence of nihilism ought to be understood in terms of resistance and, in particular, in terms of a resistance to the inheritance and perpetuation of the nihilism that is characteristic of plans of organisation. Although I shall formulate and develop the notion of resistance throughout this chapter, I want to begin by suggesting that, as with nihilism, the notion of resistance ought to be understood as possessing a technical and specifically temporal sense. This is to say that in order to explore the forever renewed present possibilities that each moment brings, then the resistance to nihilism that this necessitates must not only be understood within the context of the eternal return of the new or the different that characterises the third synthesis of time,
but must also be understood within the context of Habit, or the first synthesis of time, along with Memory, or the second synthesis of time.

In order to begin to formulate a notion of resistance within the context of the three syntheses of time, a resistance to the inheritance and perpetuation of the nihilism that finds its most systematic expression in plans of organisation, it is first necessary to recall the character of the virtual, temporal structure of Life along with its relationship to each individual’s actual living present. As I discussed in detail in chapter two, the temporal character of each individual’s living present is to be understood as an immediate an ongoing expression of the temporality of Life itself, a universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that is to be understood in terms of the three passive syntheses of time. Distinguishable and yet not distinct from the living present, the three syntheses of time comprise a virtual structure that is the fully real, universal and immanent condition for the actual dynamic form or temporal character of each individual’s living present, the manner in which each individual’s living present is characterised by a forever renewed present moment, a present moment that passes, and by certain expectations of the future. As the formless foundation of the passive syntheses of time, it is the third synthesis which ensures that the living present is characterised by a forever renewed present moment, distinguishable from both the past and the future, and which thereby provides each individual with an ongoing open field of present possibilities for living otherwise. In contrast, the first synthesis of time or Habit is that which ensures that our lived experience is characterised by an ongoing continuity in so far as this passive synthesis contracts and retains every present moment that has passed and synthesises all those past moments into the present, thereby creating certain expectations of the
future such as the expected repetition of the chimes of a clock or the expectation of the ongoing arrival of the notes of a musical melody. However, in order to ensure that the living present is characterised by the passage of time then the second synthesis or Memory is to be understood as an *a priori* past in general that not only ensures that every present moment possesses a past aspect to it, and is therefore able to pass, but is also the coexistent region into which every former present passes, ensuring that all of those former presents are contemporaneous with, and can therefore be either voluntarily or involuntarily recollected in, the present moment.

What the first and second syntheses of time therefore disclose is that the continued coexistence and perpetuation of the past with the present, and the expectations of the future that the contracted and coexistent past creates, is characteristic of, and inherent within, the temporality of Life itself. This is to say that as the virtual structure that is the fully real and immanent condition for the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present, Life is that universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that is comprised of three syntheses of time with the first two syntheses being characterised by the ongoing persistence of the past with the present and the continued projection of the past into the future to create a series of particular expectations. Memory is the coexistent region into which every former present moment passes and which ensures that the individual’s living present is characterised by the voluntary or involuntary recollection of the past in the present, while Habit is the ongoing contraction and retention of the past into the present which ensures that each individual’s living present is characterised by certain expectations of the future that arise as a consequence of the ongoing contraction of the past. The continued
coexistence and perpetuation of the past with the present that is characteristic of the constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory can therefore be understood as being profoundly productive in so far as it engenders a multiplicity of assumptions, judgments and expectations that what held in the past will continue to hold in the future, a plurality of unconscious expectations that enable us to carry out the full range of our everyday activities without conscious and therefore continued reflection. Indeed, as William Hazlitt suggested: ‘Without the aid of prejudice and custom, I should not be able to find my way across the room’.391 This is to say that without the plurality of pre-judgements about the future that are constituted by Habit and Memory - the expectation that the objects that populate the room will continue to cause us no harm, that the floor that bore our weight a moment ago will continue to do so, and that the way out of the room remains the same as it has always done - then the task of crossing and finding our way out of the room would become, for all practical intents and purposes, impossible.

However, the continued coexistence and perpetuation of the past with the present, and the expectations of the future that the contracted and coexistent past creates, can also be understood as being obstructive and inhibitory. For example, to the extent that Habit and Memory ensure the coexistence and perpetuation of a multitude of restrictive assumptions, judgements and expectations about who we are and what we are capable of then those expectations can occlude an awareness of the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings, thereby circumscribing and even negating the opportunities for growth, development and change that lie therein. As Miller suggested, when the past is contracted, perpetuated and coexists with the present
in such a manner then we are continually ‘weighted down’ with the past, continually dragging the past behind us as we attempt to move forward, a past that obstructs the present possibilities for living otherwise to such an extent that it becomes analogous to a ball and chain.\textsuperscript{392} Indeed, in his \textit{Proust}, Beckett dramatically proposed that: ‘Memory and Habit are attributes of the Time cancer’.\textsuperscript{393} This is to say that Memory and Habit, understood in terms of the pre-reflective persistence of the past with the present and its continued projection into the future, can come to dominate and ‘deaden’ time, seemingly squeezing, as it were, the very life or the very temporality out of time itself, ensuring that the continual recurrence of a renewed present moment is overshadowed by the retained past and the ongoing expectation that the future will continue to be the same or similar to that past. For Beckett, Habit and Memory are therefore to be understood as ‘ministers of dullness’ to the extent that they strive to ensure the continuation of a given state of affairs, an ongoing contraction of the past into the present that creates certain expectations of the future which entails that Habit and Memory are also to be understood as ‘agents of security’.\textsuperscript{394} This is to say that through the ongoing coexistence and perpetuation of the past with the present, and the expectations of the future that this contracted and coexistent past creates, Habit and Memory strive to maintain stability and security in the face of the unfamiliar and the unknown by bringing the continually renewed and irremediable uniqueness of the present moment under the power of past judgments, established concepts and historical assumptions, thereby appropriating and transforming the different, unfamiliar and unknown into the same, similar and familiar.\textsuperscript{395}
But what is the relation of nihilism to the coexistence and perpetuation of the past with the present that is characteristic of Habit and Memory, of the first and second synthesis of time? This is to say that in so far as I am seeking to formulate a notion of resistance within the context of the passive syntheses of time, a resistance to the inheritance and the perpetuation of the nihilism that finds its most systematic expression in plans of organisation, then how are we to understand the relation between nihilism and the perpetuation of the past that characterises the first and second synthesis of time? To address this question, we must recall that the continued coexistence and perpetuation of the past with the present, and the expectations of the future that the contracted and coexistent past creates, is not simply a feature of the dynamic form or temporal character of the individual’s living present. As I discussed in detail in chapter two, the first and second synthesis of time are part of that virtual, universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that - while being the universal and immanent condition for the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present - is to be understood as that which exceeds the actual living present of each individual. Importantly, as an expression of the universal and impersonal temporality of Life itself, characterized as it is by Habit and Memory, by the first and second synthesis of time, each individual’s actual living present is not merely characterized by the ongoing coexistence and persistence of their own individual past with the present, by the ongoing and exclusive persistence of that individual’s former presents. Rather, Deleuze’s work suggests that each individual’s past is to be understood as being ‘woven’ into, or ‘enfolded’ within, the pasts of others, and indeed woven into the whole of the past itself, such that all of those enfolded pasts comprise a vast historical legacy that is
contemporaneous with each individual’s living present. As May suggests: ‘It is not just the entirety of my past that exists within me; it is the entirety of the past itself. My own past, my sensations, desires, memories or joys, do not arise outside the historical context in which I live. They arise within a legacy that is planted in me by history, a legacy that I might perhaps change but cannot escape. To live is to navigate the world immersed in a historically given context that is not of one’s own making’.

The first and second synthesis of time, therefore, do not merely ensure that the individual’s specific past is contracted, retained and synthesised into their living present, but that the entirety of the past itself is contracted, retained and synthesised into the individual’s living present, such that Habit and Memory form what Deleuze refers to as a ‘gigantic memory’, a vast cultural past that coexists virtually with each individual’s actual living present. The moments and events that compose an individual’s life are therefore to be understood as enfolded within a gigantic memory or vast cultural past that continues to coexist virtually with the individual’s living present such that there can be what Deleuze refers to as ‘non-localisable connections, actions at a distance, systems of replay, resonance and echoes, objective chances, signs, signals and roles which transcend spatial locations and temporal successions’. This is to say that elements of the gigantic cultural past, such as socio-political and cultural events that happened many years ago, can ‘connect with and act upon’ the individual’s present moment, while the actions of the individual in the present moment may ‘resonate with and echo’ socio-political and cultural events that occurred in the distant past. Importantly, however, to the extent that Habit and Memory, the first and second synthesis of time, ensure that the entirety of the past itself is
contracted, retained and synthesised into the individual’s living present, then Habit and Memory also ensure that the nihilism that finds its most systematic expression in plans of organisation is also contracted, retained and synthesised into each individual’s living present. Habit and Memory not only ensure that all of the individual’s particular past moments are contracted and coexist with their living present, but that the entirety of the past itself is contracted and coexists with the individual’s living present, ensuring that the nihilism that has historically found its most systematic expression in a variety of plans of organisation is also contracted and coexists virtually with each individual’s actual living present. This is to say that Habit and Memory ensure that the various plans of organisation that have been examined in this study - such as Plato’s theory of Forms, Neo-Platonism, Christianity’s creationist and eschatological plans, along with the plans of organisation that arose in the wake of the death of God, such as Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit and the dialectical materialism of Marxism - are all continually contracted into, and continue to coexist with, every individual’s actual living present.

In order to begin to formulate a notion of resistance within the context of the three syntheses of time, a resistance to the inheritance and perpetuation of the nihilism that finds its most systematic expression in plans of organisation, then the notion of resistance must be understood in terms of a selective resistance to the constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory. This is to say that the notion of resistance that I am formulating here ought to be understood as possessing a technical, ontological and specifically temporal sense in so far as it entails that we resist the inheritance and perpetuation of the variety of nihilistic plans of organisation that have been examined here, a resistance to those plans...
of organisation that are part of the vast cultural past that each individual inherits and that, by virtue of the constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory, are contracted and coexist with each individual’s living present. In particular, this selective resistance to the plans of organisation that Habit and Memory ensures coexists with each individual’s living present ought to be understood as a resistance to the perpetuation of, and adherence to, any overarching account of the objective organisation of reality that reacts against the formless foundation of Life by appealing to a vertical transcendence - such as an immutable, fixed foundation that is the ideal and ontologically superior precondition for the beings of the world - or by appealing to a horizontal transcendence - such as an overarching and fixed pattern of development that directs the whole of reality towards a predetermined end. Moreover, this resistance must also be understood in terms of a resistance to the manner in which those plans of organisation promulgate an account of the fundamental identity of all human beings, an account of the supposedly deep truth within us all, and do so in terms of a universal and essential condition of dispossession, privation or lack from which we can be redeemed. This is to say that the selective resistance to Habit and Memory, to the first and second synthesis of time, ought to be understood as a resistance to the perpetuation of, and adherence to, the manner in which those plans of organisation provide the hope of salvation from an ostensible condition of privation, and seek to occlude and constrain an awareness of the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise by instructing the individual to actualise their present possibilities in accordance with that form of life promulgated by the plan of organisation.
The notion of resistance that I am formulating here, a resistance to the inheritance and the perpetuation of the nihilism that finds its most systematic expression in plans of organisation, ought to therefore be understood in terms of a resistance to the manner in which those plans of organisation may continue to act upon and influence the individual’s living present. This is to say that the resistance to those nihilistic plans of organisation that are part of the vast cultural past that each individual inherits and that, by virtue of the constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory, are contracted and coexist with each individual’s living present, necessitates a renouncement of the continued adherence to both the objective and the subjective aspects of a given plan of organisation, along with the variety of nihilistic notions of which a given plan of organisation is composed. However, as we discussed in the previous chapter and, in particular, in relation to the enduring influence of Christianity within the lives of Western peoples, a given plan of organisation is able to provide ready answers to a number of challenging socio-political issues confronting late-modern humanity, as well as ostensibly being able to address the more profound need for meaning, purpose and hope in the face of human finitude. In particular, by presenting an overarching account of the objective organisation of reality that appeals to a vertical and/or a horizontal transcendence, and an account of the supposedly deep truth within us all that delimits our place and role within that overarching account, then a plan of organisation provides ready answers to the problem of how life ought to be lived, and provides a transcendental validation for our adherence to the form of life promulgated by that plan of organisation. However, in so far as resistance to the inheritance and perpetuation of nihilism necessitates a renouncement of the continued adherence
to both the objective and the subjective aspects of a given plan of organisation then it also entails a renouncement of the ready answers that those plans offer, and an overcoming of the fear of losing the supposedly transcendent certitude and security that those plans provide. Indeed, in noting the difficulty in renouncing the continued adherence to a given plan of organisation and, in particular, the manner in which the ready answers and security that they provide entails that continued adherence, Deleuze proposes that: ‘We are always afraid of losing. Our security, the great molar organization that sustains us, the arborescences that we cling to, the binary machines that give us a well-defined status, the resonances we enter into to, the system of overcoding that dominates us - we desire all that’. 401

Resistance to the inheritance and the perpetuation of the nihilistic reaction against Life, a resistance that necessitates a renouncement of the continued adherence to both the objective and the subjective aspects of a given plan of organisation, ought to therefore be understood as particularly challenging. Indeed, rather than an image of Deleuze as the figure who is concerned with the rapid and almost careless renouncement of plans of organisation in order to enable the individual to begin to explore the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise,402 his work can be understood as displaying an acute awareness of the difficulties and the dangers in renouncing adherence to plans of organisation, along with the potential consequences of losing the transcendent certitude and security that they purport to provide. In particular, Deleuze notes that the loss of that security, the loss of those ready answers to questions concerning the meaning, purpose and direction that our lives ought to take, can potentially be so difficult for some individuals that it
may be preferable for some to continue to adhere to a given plan of organisation and the nihilistic notions or ‘strata’ of which it is composed. For example, he notes that ‘if you blow apart the strata without taking precautions, then instead of drawing the plane you will be killed, plunged into a black hole, or even dragged towards catastrophe. Staying stratified - organised, signified, subjected - is not the worst that can happen; the worst that can happen is if you throw the strata into demented or suicidal collapse.’\textsuperscript{403} This is to say that rather than a reckless renouncement of the adherence to a given plan of organisation, rather than a rapid rejection of the certitude and security that the plan of organisation may have afforded the individual, Deleuze can be understood as advocating a cautious consideration of the consequences of resisting and renouncing adherence to the plans of organisation that, by virtue of the constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory, are contracted and coexist with each individual’s living present. This is to say that the renouncement of the continued adherence to a plan of organisation must be undertaken with ‘great patience’ and with ‘great care’,\textsuperscript{404} an endeavour that requires that the individual not only considers what new present possibilities for living otherwise may be gained following the renouncement of a plan of organisation, but also what dangers and difficulties may be involved in such a renouncement, what ready answers, certitude and security might be lost, if the objective and subjective aspects of a given plan of organisation are renounced.\textsuperscript{405}

Resistance to nihilism is therefore to be understood as a resistance to, and cautious renouncement of, the continued adherence to both the objective and subjective aspects of a given plan of organisation and the variety of nihilistic notions of which a given plan of organisation is composed. Understood
within the context of the passive synthesis of time, resistance is to be understood as a resistance to those nihilistic plans of organisation that are part of the vast cultural past that each individual inherits and that, by virtue of the constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory, are contracted and coexist with each individual’s living present. In particular, resistance to nihilism is a resistance to, and renouncement of, those nihilistic notions of which a plan of organisation is composed, those nihilistic notions that ‘poison life’:\textsuperscript{406} the notion of an overarching account of reality that posits a transcendent, immutable foundation or a fixed pattern of development towards a predetermined end; a resistance to, and renouncement of, the associated Platonic ontological presuppositions of equivocity, ontological hierarchy, the primacy of identity over difference and, ultimately, the subordination of difference to identity; and a resistance to, and renouncement of, any notion of the supposedly deep truth within us all, particularly where this universal and essential identity is formulated in terms of a condition of dispossession, privation or lack from which we can be redeemed. This resistance to both the objective and subjective aspects of a given plan of organisation, and the variety of nihilistic notions of which a given plan of organisation is composed, is necessary in order to combat the manner in which nihilism reacts against the formless foundation of Life itself and, in particular, the manner in which it hinders, thwarts and even negates the continually renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment beings. It is this resistance to the manner in which a given plan of organisation may continue to act upon and influence the individual’s living present that enables the individual to become increasingly aware of, and to explore, the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise that is constituted by the third synthesis
of time, a resistance to both the objective and the subjective aspects of a given plan of organisation that enables the individual, as Deleuze concisely expresses it, to begin to participate in ‘the opposite of a morality of salvation, teaching the soul to live its life, not to save it’.  

But what is the contemporary relevance of this resistance to nihilism, a resistance that necessitates a cautious renouncement of the adherence to a given plan of organisation along with the nihilistic notions of which it is composed? As I noted in the previous chapter, in so far as the late twentieth and early twenty first century is commonly characterised as a new period of cultural history, then it has been suggested that what has accompanied or even defined this period is an incredulity towards, and therefore a renouncement of, not only Christianity as a plan of organisation, but also those forms of latent Christianity or shadows of God of which Hegelianism and Marxism were presented as characteristic examples. For example, with respect to our contemporary condition, Deleuze asks ‘how can belief continue after repudiation, how can we continue to be pious? We have repudiated and lost all our beliefs that proceeded by way of objective representations.’ This is to say that any overarching account of the objective organisation of reality that variously appeals to a vertical and/or horizontal transcendence and, on the basis of that transcendence, seeks to instruct human beings how they ought to organise those lives, has become an object of incredulity such that the death of God has come to designate not only an incredulity towards Christianity as a plan of organisation but an incredulity towards all forms of latent Christianity. As Ansell-Pearson has made clear, the death of God should be understood as denoting two things: ‘On the one hand, it names the death of the symbolic God - that is, the death of
the particular God of Christianity…On the other hand, it means that the God of theologians, philosophers and some scientists, that is, the God that serves as a guarantor that the universe is not devoid of structure, order and purpose, is also dead’. Therefore, it would appear as though there is little contemporary relevance for the need to resist nihilism - a resistance that necessitates a renouncement of Christianity as a plan of organisation along with all forms of latent Christianity - if the idea of an objective and transcendent organisation of reality, what Nietzsche referred to as the idea of a ‘true world’, has become discredited in our age, ‘an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating - an idea which has become useless and superfluous - consequently, a refuted idea.’

As I discussed in the previous chapter, however, perhaps a greater degree of circumspection is required when considering the enduring significance of plans of organisation within the lives of modern men and women. Although they may be regarded, philosophically, as an object of increasing incredulity we should not underestimate, as Levinas suggested, ‘the empire’ that such theological and pseudo-theological plans have exerted over humankind, and the manner in which modern men and women may continue to adhere to the forms of life that they propagate in order to seek the transcendent certitude, security and ready answers that those plans of organisation purport to provide. However, the contemporary relevance of the need for modern men and women to engage in a resistance to, and renouncement of, nihilistic plans of organisation should not simply be understood in terms of a resistance to those plans of organisation that are part of the vast cultural past that each individual inherits and that, by virtue of the constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory,
are contracted and coexist with each individual’s living present. Rather, the contemporary relevance of the need to resist the nihilistic reaction against Life should also be understood in terms of a resistance to the manner in which the plans of organisation that are part of our cultural and coexistent past, and the nihilistic notions of which those plans are composed, are able to adopt new forms and enter into new configurations that continue to hinder, thwart and negate the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment engenders. This is to say that even if we acknowledge that the contemporary condition of humankind is one of increased incredulity towards the idea of an objective and transcendent organisation of reality, an organisation that provides ready answers to the problem of how life ought to be lived, along with a transcendental validation for our adherence to the form of life promulgated by that plan of organisation, Deleuze’s work suggests that new plans of organisation emerge that are able to persist within this climate of increased incredulity. The need to resist and renounce nihilistic plans of organisation can therefore be understood as continuing to possess its contemporary relevance for modern men and women precisely because new nihilistic plans of organisation emerge that are able to persist within a climate of increased incredulity towards the plans of organisation that are part of our cultural and coexistent past, new plans of organisation that continue to occlude and constrain the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings.

In order to illustrate the manner in which Deleuze’s work can be understood as suggesting that new plans of organisation emerge that are able to persist within this climate of increased incredulity, and therefore the
contemporary relevance of resistance, it is instructive to do so within the context of Deleuze’s critique of psychoanalysis, and Freudian psychoanalysis in particular. It is important to note, however, that the critique of psychoanalysis, primarily carried out in *Anti-Oedipus*, is detailed, complex and challenging not least because of the manner in which a host of unfamiliar terms - such as ‘desiring-machines’, ‘desiring-production’ and ‘deterritorialization’ - are introduced and employed as though their meaning was unproblematic, while what we may consider to be unproblematic terms - such as ‘schizophrenia’, ‘paranoia’ and ‘fascism’ - are employed in new and unfamiliar ways. Therefore, to the extent that I have done so elsewhere, I do not here intend on providing a detailed exposition of the critique of psychoanalysis carried out in *Anti-Oedipus*, but shall instead draw upon Deleuze’s critique to illuminate this study’s ongoing concern with nihilism and to suggest that psychoanalysis can be understood as a new nihilistic plan of organisation that is able to persist within a climate of increased incredulity towards the plans of organisation that are part of our cultural and coexistent past, such as Christianity’s creationist and eschatological plans, and Hegelian and Marxist historicism. In order to understand how psychoanalysis perpetuates the nihilistic reaction against Life within this climate of increased incredulity, it is instructive to begin by considering Deleuze’s complex and enigmatic assertion that: ‘What acts in myth and tragedy at the level of objective elements is therefore reappropriated and raised to a higher level by psychoanalysis, but as an unconscious dimension of subjective representation’. To begin to understand this assertion, and the manner in which it can be understood as signalling a critique of psychoanalysis as a new nihilistic plan of organisation, it is important to note that the objective
and overarching accounts of reality that are characteristic of traditional plans of organisation, plans of organisation that also provide an account of the supposedly fundamental identity of all human beings, can be understood as ‘myths’ or ‘stories’ that possess a particular narrative structure. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the objective and subjective aspects of, for example, Christianity’s creationist and eschatological plans, Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit and the dialectical materialism of Marxism, are presented within a framework of redemption, a narrative or story of salvation that, with reference to a vertical and/or horizontal transcendence, present the current condition of human beings in terms of a universal condition of dispossession, but also tell of the journey of humankind towards redemption that is variously instigated with the kingdom of God, the arrival of absolute knowing or the advent of communism.

As with Christianity and Hegelian and Marxist historicism, however, Freudian psychoanalysis also possesses, and is presented in terms of, its own characteristic myth. In particular, the myth that is appropriated by psychoanalysis is the myth of Oedipus, a myth that no longer recounts the creation and development of the objective organisation of reality, but is instead employed by psychoanalysis to formulate the central ‘complex’ that is said to characterise the subjective organisation of the human psyche. Indeed, in stressing the centrality of the Oedipus complex for the theoretical and practical particularities of psychoanalysis, Rand suggests that:

Infantile psychosexual development and instinctual repression; fear of castration and the acceptance of moral precepts; the dynamic unconscious and the return of the repressed; the two principles of
mental functioning (the pleasure and reality principles); the mental apparatus stratified into the psychical agencies of ego, id, and superego; the remote origins of civilization in parricide, guilt, atonement, and the barrier against incest; the sublimation of sex drives in social interaction, art, and literature - all these theories and more coalesced around the distinctive and central idea of the Oedipus complex being the one and only formative, nuclear and universal psychosexual complex of humankind in health and disease.\textsuperscript{414}

In particular, the Oedipus complex, appropriated by Freud from Sophocles’ \textit{Oedipus Rex}, is to be understood as a composite of ideas and feelings that, developing in the individual’s childhood, are concerned with the desire to possess the parent of the opposite sex and eliminate the parent of the same sex. As Freud makes clear, ‘in the first years of infancy, the relation known as the \textit{Oedipus complex} becomes established: boys concentrate their sexual wishes upon their mother and develop hostile impulses against their father as being a rival, while girls adopt an analogous attitude’.\textsuperscript{415} However, in so far as the Oedipal complex remains unresolved then these repressed ideas and feelings persist into adulthood where they manifest themselves as a variety of neuroses, including acute or chronic anxiety, obsessive-compulsive behaviour or depression. By analysing the individual’s present behaviour in terms of this Oedipal drama, the therapeutic aim of the psychoanalyst is therefore to assist the individual to recognise the ‘true meaning’ of their current condition and achieve a release, catharsis and resolution of the emotional tension associated with such repression. Indeed, in highlighting the therapeutic centrality of recognising the truth of the Oedipus complex, Bowlby suggests that ‘in Freud’s common ‘tragedy’, every
human being is in the position of a dramatic character who must recognise their part in a long-buried past history of which they were previously unaware’.\footnote{416}

Despite seeking to present its theoretical foundations and practical activities in terms of a science, ‘the science of unconscious mental processes’,\footnote{417} psychoanalysis can be understood as appropriating, developing and therefore possessing its own characteristic myth. This is to say that although Freud sought to distance psychoanalysis from the myths that recount the creation and development of the objective organisation of reality - such as the redemptive narratives of Christianity, and religion more generally, and communism or Bolshevism in particular\footnote{418} - psychoanalysis possesses, and is presented in terms of, its own characteristic myth, appropriating the myth of Oedipus to account for the fundamental identity of all human beings. Indeed, in highlighting the manner in which the Oedipus complex is to be understood in terms of the deep truth within us all, the universal feature of the human subject that transcends any particular culture or historical epoch, Freud proposed that: ‘Every new arrival on this planet is faced by the task of mastering the Oedipus complex; anyone who fails to do so falls a victim to neurosis’.\footnote{419} With the advent of psychoanalysis, therefore, we no longer have a myth or story that recounts the creation and development of the objective organisation of reality with reference to a vertical transcendence and/or a horizontal transcendence, but we have instead a universal Oedipal drama that is said to characterise the subjective organisation of each human being. This is to say that while psychoanalysis presents itself as a science in order to distance itself from myth, it continues to perpetuate a particular myth, the myth of Oedipus, which is appropriated and employed by psychoanalysis to formulate an account of the transcendent identity of all human
beings, an account of the trans-historical and trans-cultural organisation of every individual’s psyche. Indeed, it is this rejection of the redemptive myths that sought to characterise the objective organisation and development of reality, and yet a retention of myth to formulate an account of the Oedipus complex as the universal truth of human subjectivity that leads Deleuze to note that psychoanalysis gives us a ‘double impression’ such that, on the one hand, ‘psychoanalysis is opposed to mythology no less than to mythologists, but at the same time extends myth and tragedy to the subjective universal’.

However, how can we begin to understand psychoanalysis as a new nihilistic plan of organisation that is able to persist within a climate of increased incredulity towards the plans of organisation that are part of our cultural and coexistent past, such as Christianity’s creationist and eschatological plans, and Hegelian and Marxist historicism? This is to say, how can psychoanalysis be understood in terms of a nihilistic reaction against the third synthesis of time and, in particular, as a nihilistic reaction against the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that each individual’s living present is characterised by an open field of present possibilities for living otherwise? In order to address this question, it is important to note that, as with Christianity and Hegelian and Marxist historicism, psychoanalysis presents an account of the fundamental identity of all human beings, of the supposedly deep truth within us all, and does so in terms of an essential condition of dispossession, privation or lack. As was highlighted above, for psychoanalysis the individual does not come into the world, as it were, in a state of ‘psychological harmony’, but inherits the psychological difficulties associated with the Oedipus complex and the challenge of mastering those difficulties. Indeed, in highlighting the manner in
which psychoanalysis transforms the uniqueness of the tragedy that befalls Sophocles’ Oedipus into the universal and common condition that each individual inherits, Bowlby proposes that: ‘Instead of being an exceptional perpetrator of incest and patricide, Oedipus was now seen as a kind of everyman, or everybody. He was not aberrant; rather, every single human being was destined to live through the beginnings of a comparable story in early life, and had no choice in it’. However, in promulgating the universal truth of the Oedipus complex, psychoanalysis does not merely present an account of the deep truth within us all in terms of an essential condition of dispossession, privation or lack but also offers the hope of a resolution of that drama for those who fail to do so themselves, a resolution that is conditional upon the individual adhering to the ‘therapeutic prescriptions’ of psychoanalysis. This is to say that the nihilistic force of the Oedipus complex does not merely manifest itself in the theoretical realm, in the conceptualisation of the ostensible organisation of each individual’s psychic reality, but also becomes apparent in the practical, therapeutic applications that a perceived failure to resolve the Oedipus complex entails. Indeed, stressing both the theoretical and practical interdependence and pervasiveness of the employment of the Oedipus complex by psychoanalysis, Deleuze makes it clear that: ‘Everything is made to begin with Oedipus, by means of explanation, with all the more certainty as one has reduced everything to Oedipus by means of application’. We can therefore understand the manner in which psychoanalysis can be taken as a new nihilistic plan of organisation to the extent that it promulgates its own particular conception of the fundamental identity of each human being in terms of a condition of privation, and offers the hope of a resolution of that state
that is conditional on the individual adhering to the therapeutic prescriptions of psychoanalysis. This is to say that rather than becoming aware of the manner in which each moment engenders an open field of present possibilities, rather than striving to explore the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings, psychoanalysis seeks to shift the individual’s concern to the Oedipus complex and the need for ongoing analysis to bring about its successful resolution. Indeed, in highlighting the manner in which psychoanalysis reacts against the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise by promulgating its own account of the subjective reality of each individual, along with the significant period of time that a person is required to be ‘in analysis’, Deleuze proposes that the individual is ‘eternally psychoanalyzed, going from one linear proceeding to another, perhaps even changing analysts, growing increasingly submissive to the normalisation of a dominant reality’.

Importantly, the therapeutic technique that is integral to the manner in which the individual becomes increasingly submissive to the subjective reality promulgated by psychoanalysis is interpretation, a technique that transforms everything that the individual does or says so that it is made to accord with the Oedipus complex. For example, discussing Freud’s famous analysis of the so-called ‘Wolf-Man’, and the manner in which the patient’s speech is continually ‘passed through the filter’, as it were, of the Oedipal drama, Deleuze suggests that: ‘The trap was set from the start: never will the Wolf-Man speak. Talk as he might about wolves, howl as he might like a wolf, Freud does not even listen; he glances at his dog and answers, “It’s daddy.” For as long as that lasts, Freud calls it neurosis; when it cracks, it’s psychosis.’

The nihilistic reaction against Life carried out by psychoanalysis, the manner in which it seeks
to circumscribe the individual’s open field of present possibilities for living otherwise, is therefore not only manifest in the manner in which it professes to reveal the transcendent truth of each individual’s psychic reality in terms of a condition of privation, and does so by appropriating and developing the myth of Oedipus, but it is also manifest in the manner in which it makes the resolution of that state conditional upon the acceptance of, and adherence to, the therapeutic interpretations and prescriptions of psychoanalysis.

However, as a new nihilistic plan of organisation, how is psychoanalysis able to persist within a climate of increased incredulity towards the plans of organisation that are part of our cultural and coexistent past? This is to say, how is psychoanalysis able to maintain belief in the Oedipal myth within a climate of increased incredulity towards the redemptive myths that characterise, for example, Christianity, Hegelianism and Marxism? In order to understand how psychoanalysis is able to do so, it is important to note the manner in which psychoanalysis proposes that the Oedipus complex is ‘held’ by the individual. This is to say that while psychoanalysis can be understood as seeking to distance itself from the redemptive myths of Christianity, Hegelianism and Marxism, thereby seeming to be in accordance with the contemporary climate of increased incredulity towards plans of organisation, it promulgates belief in its own particular myth by suggesting that the Oedipus complex is a feature of the individual’s unconscious mental processes. This is to say that in so far as the Oedipal drama is to be understood as a universal feature of the psychic reality of each human being, and which every human being must confront and seek to resolve, that psychic reality is not consciously acceded to and maintained by the individual, but is said to be *unconsciously* acceded to and maintained. In
highlighting the unconscious nature of the Oedipus complex, Goodchild makes it clear that ‘the child desires to be reunited sexually with its mother, but is prevented from realizing this unconscious phantasy (as opposed to conscious fantasy) by the real and forbidding presence of its father’.\textsuperscript{426} Therefore, by promulgating the Oedipus complex as an unconscious belief, psychoanalysis is able to propagate adherence to its particular mythology within a climate of increasing incredulity towards the redemptive myths that are characteristic of previous plans of organisation, promulgating a belief in a particular myth but, as Deleuze suggests, ‘only in order to raise it to the condition of a denial that preserves belief without believing in it’.\textsuperscript{427} This is to say that in so far as the late twentieth and early twenty first century has been characterised as a new period of cultural history, a period that has supposedly been accompanied by an incredulity towards the mythological narratives that characterised Christianity, and Hegelian and Marxist historicism, psychoanalysis seeks to promulgate belief in its particular myth by making it an unconscious and private belief, by suggesting that the beliefs and feelings that make up the Oedipus complex are a feature of the individual’s unconscious mental processes. As Deleuze makes clear, in a climate of increasing incredulity towards previous nihilistic plans of organisation, psychoanalysis ‘fills the following function: causing beliefs to survive even after repudiation; causing those who no longer believe in anything to continue believing; reconstituting a private territory for them, a private Urstaat, a private capital’.\textsuperscript{428}

Even if we acknowledge, therefore, that the contemporary condition of Western modernity is characterised by an increased incredulity towards the plans of organisation that are part of our cultural and coexistent past, I am
arguing that Deleuze’s work on psychoanalysis suggests that resistance to nihilism continues to retain its contemporary relevance within this climate of increased incredulity. This is to say that the need to resist and renounce nihilism continues to possess its contemporary relevance for modern men and women precisely because psychoanalysis is a new nihilistic plan of organisation that is able to persist within this climate of increased incredulity towards, for example, Christianity’s creationist and eschatological plans, Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit and the dialectical materialism of Marxism. While psychoanalysis no longer propagates an account of the objective and universal organisation of reality with reference to a vertical transcendence and/or a horizontal transcendence, it propagates an account of the universal organisation of every individual’s psychic reality, and does so in terms of an essential condition of dispossession, privation or lack. In particular, the subjective organisation of each individual’s psychic reality, and the universal challenge that each individual inherits, confronts and must seek to resolve, is to be understood in terms of the myth of Oedipus, a set of beliefs and feelings that are unconsciously held by the individual, but which the individual can gain insight into, and achieve a resolution of, to the extent that they accept the interpretations and prescriptions of psychoanalysis. Indeed, to the extent that the individual adopts, embraces and internalises the Oedipal interpretations and prescriptions that characterise psychoanalysis, in so far as the ‘analysand’ accepts that their unconscious psychic reality is organised in terms of the Oedipal drama, and in so far as they accept the psychoanalyst’s prescription of how to respond to that reality, then the direct guidance and judgement of the psychoanalyst can increasingly be dispensed with as the analysand takes such functions upon themselves. In
highlighting the manner in which the individual can progressively come to adopt the theoretical and therapeutic tenets of psychoanalysis and, by doing so, increasingly circumscribe their own present possibilities for living otherwise. Deleuze suggests that: ‘The psychoanalyst does not even have to speak anymore, the analysand assumes the burden of interpretation; as for the psychoanalyzed patient, the more he or she thinks about “his” or “her” next session, or the proceeding one, in segments, the better a subject he or she is.’

The Deleuzian notion of resistance that I am therefore formulating here, a notion of resistance that is formulated within the context of the three passive synthesizes of time, is to be understood in terms of a resistance to the multiple manifestations of nihilism that would occlude and circumscribe each individual’s open field of present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings. This is to say that the notion of resistance ought to be understood as possessing a technical, ontological and specifically temporal sense in so far as it entails a resistance to the enduring power of plans of organisation to act upon the individual’s living present, a resistance to the adherence and perpetuation of those nihilistic plans of organisation that are part of the vast cultural past that each individual inherits and that, by virtue of the constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory, are contracted and coexist with each individual’s living present. However, to the extent that it has been suggested that one of the salient features of contemporary, Western modernity is an increasing incredulity towards those nihilistic plans of organisation that are part of our cultural and coexistent past, such as Christianity, Hegelianism and Marxism, then resistance ought not to be understood exclusively in terms of a resistance to the perpetuation of, and adherence to, any overarching account of
the objective organisation of reality that reacts against the formless foundation of Life by appealing to a vertical transcendence and/or by appealing to a horizontal transcendence. Rather, I am arguing that the notion of resistance must also be understood in terms of both a sensitivity to, and vigilance against, the manner in which the nihilistic reaction against Life that characterises plans of organisation is able to adopt new forms and new configurations that continue to occlude and constrain the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings. This is to say that resistance must also be understood in terms of a sensitivity to, and vigilance against, the emergence of new plans of organisation, such as psychoanalysis, that seek to perpetuate the nihilistic reaction against Life within a climate of increased incredulity, and do so by promulgating an account of the deep truth within us all, a deep truth that is presented in terms of an essential condition of dispossession, privation or lack such that, by offering the hope of a resolution of this ostensible condition of privation, they continue to circumscribe the individual’s open field of present possibilities for living otherwise.

However, it is perhaps pertinent to once again raise the question regarding the extent to which resistance maintains its relevance in the face of contemporary suggestions that the influence of the Oedipus complex, and psychoanalysis more generally, is increasingly becoming an object of incredulity. Indeed, a year after the publication of *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze proposed that what made that work possible was the concurrent presence of ‘a particular mass of people (especially young people) who are fed up with psychoanalysis…fed up listening to themselves saying “daddy, mommy, Oedipus, castration, regression” and seeing themselves presented with a really
inane image of sexuality in general and of their own sexuality in particular.\(^{431}\)

However, even if we acknowledge that there is a growing incredulity towards psychoanalysis, Deleuze’s work entails that the contemporary relevance of resistance remains in so far as the nihilistic reaction against Life adopts *multiple* manifestations, new forms and new configurations that are no longer rigidly associated with the universal and overarching accounts of the objective and/or subjective organisation of reality that characterise Christianity, Hegelianism, Marxism and psychoanalysis. In particular, Deleuze’s collaborative work with Guattari can be understood as suggesting that nihilism also becomes manifest in a profusion of broad representational categories by which individual human beings come to be identified, a multiplicity of categories that often imply a condition of dispossession, privation or lack and, by doing so, continue to hinder, thwart and negate the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings. Indeed, that contemporary, Western peoples increasingly come to be identified, and come to identify themselves, in relation to a multiplicity of representational categories can be discerned in Deleuze’s seemingly enigmatic suggestion that: ‘Whether we are individuals or groups, we are made up of lines...all kinds of clearly defined segments, in all kinds of directions, which cut us up in all senses, packets of segmentarized lines’.\(^{432}\) I shall discuss Deleuze’s notion of ‘segmentarized lines’ or ‘segments’ shortly, but what it suggests is that even if we accept that psychoanalysis is becoming an object of incredulity the notion of resistance retains its contemporary relevance in so far as the nihilistic reaction against Life increasingly manifests itself in more mobile, fluid configurations that are no longer associated with the nihilistic plans of organisation examined above, no longer bound to the
universal and overarching accounts of the objective and/or subjective organisation of reality that characterise Christianity, Hegelianism, Marxism and psychoanalysis.

To illustrate the manner in which the nihilistic reaction against Life manifests itself in more mobile, fluid configurations that no longer appeal to a highly rigid and organised account of reality, the manner in which individual’s come to be identified, and come to identify themselves, in terms of a profusion of representational categories or segments, then it is necessary to introduce the notion of what Deleuze refers to as ‘binary machines’. In particular, it is important to note the relation between binary machines and segments that Deleuze draws when he asserts that: ‘Segments depend on binary machines which can be very varied if need be. Binary machines of social classes; of sexes, man-woman; of ages, child-adult; of races, black-white; of sectors, public-private; of subjectivations, ours-not ours. These binary machines are all the more complex for cutting across each other, or colliding against each other, and they cut us up in all sorts of directions’. 433 This is to say that within contemporary, Western society, modern individual’s increasingly come to be identified, and come to identify themselves, in terms of a composite of broad binary oppositions such that an individual is, for example, either male or female, and then either a child or an adult, and then either black or white, heterosexual or homosexual, rational or irrational, healthy or sick, able-bodied or disabled, neurotic or psychotic. However, in order to understand the manner in which those binary categories hinder, thwart and even negate the present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings then it is important to note that such categories or segments imply a host of established values, normative
standards and strictures, values, standards and strictures that entail the ongoing actualisation of certain possibilities and the perpetuation of a specific mode of existence. As Deleuze makes clear with reference to the work of Foucault, the binary categories or segments by which individuals are identified, or come to identify themselves, ‘also imply devices of power, which vary greatly among themselves, each fixing the code and the territory of the corresponding segment. These are the devices which have been analysed so profoundly by Foucault’.434 To the extent that I have discussed Foucault’s analyses of ‘devices of power’ elsewhere (with reference to ‘power-knowledge’, ‘panopticism’ and psychiatry in particular),435 I do not intend on providing a detailed exposition of them here. Rather, I want to suggest that in proposing that segments imply devices of power, Deleuze is suggesting that a given segment marks out a certain territory, such that the categories by which an individual is identified entail, variously, that they are expected or entitled to do or say certain things, and to refrain or be prohibited from doing or saying other things.436

However, in order to understand the manner in which the segments by which an individual is identified seek to validate the circumscription of that individual’s open field of present possibilities, it is important to note that the categories that constitute the variety of binary oppositions by which an individual is segmented do not possess an equivalent value. This is to say - in accordance with critiques of such binary oppositions presented by, for example, Jacques Derrida or Donna Haraway437 - one term of any given binary opposition has precedence over the other, and this precedence constitutes a dominant, evaluative standard or ‘molar’, ‘majoritarian model’ which Deleuze simply refers to as ‘man’; for example, he suggests that ‘man constitutes the majority,
or rather the standard upon which the majority is based: white, male, adult, “rational,” etc., in short, the average European’. In referring to ‘man’ as the majority it is important to stress that majority should not be understood in quantitative terms, but rather in qualitative terms as that which is considered as qualitatively superior, as the standard against which all else is judged. As Deleuze makes clear: ‘It is obvious that “man” holds the majority, even if he is less numerous than mosquitoes, children, women, blacks, peasants, homosexuals, etc.’ Therefore, as the dominant, evaluative standard, ‘man’ (understand as a composite of segments such as white, male, adult and rational) is to be understood as the ‘central point’ which ‘at every turn nourishes a certain distinctive opposition…male-(female), adult-(child), white-(black, yellow, or red); rational-(animal)’. Importantly, however, the latter term in such binary oppositions is not only defined as inferior, as an ‘outsystem’ or, regardless of number, as ‘minor’, as ‘minoritarian’, but is also characterised in terms of dispossession, privation or lack to the extent that it is defined as that which lacks what the major term possesses; as Deleuze proposes, ‘he [man] appears twice, once in the constant and again in the variable from which the constant is extracted’. For example, it has been suggested the segment ‘female’ or ‘the feminine’ has been defined in relation to the segment ‘male’ or ‘the masculine’ and, in particular, it has been formulated in negative terms as that which is not male, as that which lacks or is deprived of the characteristics of the male sex; indeed, in highlighting the manner in which the feminine is defined in terms of lack in relation to its ostensibly superior binary opposite, Luce Irigaray has asserted that: ‘The ‘feminine’ is always described in terms of a deficiency or
atrophy, as the other side of the sex that alone holds the monopoly on value: the male sex.  

The segments by which individuals come to be identified, and come to identify themselves, however, should not be understood in terms of static binary oppositions. Rather, Deleuze’s work suggests that contemporary, Western society is increasingly characterised by dynamic processes of segmentation which are increasingly adaptive, such that new categories can rapidly be constructed in order to identify an individual, and by which they can come to identify themselves, categories that rapidly develop their own normative standards, strictures and devices of power that circumscribe the individual’s present possibilities for living otherwise. As Deleuze proposes, ‘it is a particularity of modern societies, or rather State societies, to bring into their own duality machines that no longer function as such, and proceed simultaneously by biunivocal relationships and successively by binarized choices’. This is to say that even if an individual appears to elude a given binary opposition, even if that individual cannot, at present, be made to fit into either category of a dichotomous choice then, beginning with that binary opposition, successive categories can be constructed that imply devices of power, normative standards and strictures. So, for example, Deleuze suggests that:

[I]f you are neither a nor b, then you are c: dualism has shifted, and no longer relates to simultaneous elements to choose between, but successive choices; if you are neither black nor white, you are a half-breed; if you are neither man nor woman, you are a transvestite: each time the machine with binary elements will produce binary choices between elements that are not present at the first cutting-up.
I am therefore arguing that resistance to nihilism continues to retain its contemporary relevance in so far as the nihilistic reaction against Life manifests itself in increasingly mobile, fluid configurations, in a profusion of broad representational categories or segments that are no longer bound to the universal accounts of the objective and/or subjective organisation of reality that characterise Christianity, Hegelianism, Marxism and psychoanalysis. However, as with those nihilistic plans of organisation, the identity of the individual is commonly characterised in terms of dispossession, privation or lack, such that the segments by which the individual is identified imply an ostensible condition of inferiority, a condition of inferiority that is defined in relation to ‘man’ where ‘man’ is characterised as a standard of fulfilment and superiority. It is precisely on the basis of the ostensible inferiority of the increasingly mobile, fluid segments by which an individual is identified that the devices of power, normative standards and strictures obtain their validation, devices of power, normative standards and strictures that continue to hinder, thwart and negate the individual’s exploration of the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise.

In so far as I have suggested that the notion of resistance is to be understood within the context of the three synthses of time, however, I want to conclude this chapter by clarifying the relation of resistance to the continued contraction and coexistence of the past with the present that is constituted by the dynamic, constituting activity of the first and second synthesis of time. As I have suggested, the notion of resistance is to be understood as a resistance to those plans of organisation that are part of the vast cultural past that each individual inherits and that, by virtue of the constituting dynamism of Habit and
Memory, are contracted and coexist with each individual’s living present, along with a resistance to new nihilistic plans of organisation and increasingly mobile representational categories or segments by which people come to be identified, and come to identify themselves. However, Deleuze’s work entails that this resistance to these various manifestations of nihilism which, by virtue of the constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory, are contemporaneous with each individual’s living present, ought not to be understood as being synonymous with a broad, indiscriminate rejection of the contracted and coexistent past, a broad and indiscriminate negation of Habit and Memory. As I suggested previously, the continued coexistence and perpetuation of the past with the present that is constituted by Habit and Memory can be understood as being profoundly productive in so far as it engenders a multiplicity of assumptions, judgments and expectations that what held in the past will continue to hold in the future, a plurality of unconscious expectations that enable us to carry out the full range of our everyday activities without conscious and therefore continued reflection. More than this, however, I want to suggest that the contracted and coexistent past that is constituted by the first and second synthesis of time can also be understood in terms of a vast cultural and coexistent resource that can be actively employed by the individual to challenge that which circumscribes their present possibilities for living otherwise, a vast cultural and coexistent past that, more than just containing nihilistic plans of organisation, also contains resources that can be employed by the individual to facilitate the exploration of the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise.

In order to illustrate the manner in which the contracted and coexistent past that is constituted by Habit and Memory, more than just ‘containing’
nihilistic plans of organisation, is also to be understood as containing resources that can be employed by the individual to facilitate the exploration of the present possibilities for living otherwise, then it is productive to consider Deleuze’s brief comments on the resemblance between the French revolutionaries of 1789 and the Roman Republic, comments which echo those made by Marx in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*.\(^{447}\) In particular, Deleuze suggests that it ought not to be considered the case that it is exclusively the reflections of historians which determine a resemblance between the revolutionaries of 1789 and the Roman Republic, it ought not to be thought that the resemblance between the two was established from a historical perspective many years after the French revolution; rather, ‘it is in the first place for themselves that the revolutionaries are determined to lead their lives as ‘resuscitated Romans’, before becoming capable of the act which they have begun by repeating in the mode of a proper past, therefore under conditions such that they necessarily identify with a figure from the historical past’.\(^{448}\) This is to say that in order to inspire their own present activities, in order to resist the ongoing circumscription of their present possibilities for living otherwise, the French revolutionaries adopted the names, slogans and language of the past, and of the Roman Republic in particular. However, this identification with the past was not some form of ritual masquerade, an attempt to somehow repeat or faithfully reproduce past events in the present, and neither was it to be understood as an attempt to take flight from the reality of the struggles, difficulties and concerns that the present posed for the revolutionaries. Rather, their identification with the past, and with the names, slogans and language of the Roman Republic in particular, was an attempt to productively and creatively employ the vast cultural past for
their present purposes, an exploration and subsequent employment of the contracted and coexistent past that is constituted by Habit and Memory in order to assess what new perspectives the past could bring to bear on the revolutionaries’ present concerns, and how the past could assist in the exploration of their present possibilities for living otherwise. Indeed, it is in this sense that we can understand Marx’s suggestion that the particular employment of the past that was conducted by the French revolutionaries ‘served the purpose of glorifying the new struggles, not of parodying the old; of magnifying the given tasks in imagination, not of taking flight from their solution in reality, of finding once more the spirit of revolution, not of making its ghost walk again’. 449

Deleuze’s comments on the manner in which the French revolutionaries employed the past to inspire their own present struggles can therefore be understood as indicating how modern men and women, albeit in more modest terms, may productively employ the vast cultural and coexist past as a resource that facilitates the exploration of their forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise. This is to say that resistance to the manner in which the individual’s present possibilities are occluded and constrained is not simply to be understood in terms of a resistance to those plans of organisation that are part of the vast cultural past that each individual inherits and that, by virtue of the constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory, are contracted and coexist with each individual’s living present. Of course, to respond to the adherence to, and the perpetuation of, Christianity, Hegelianism, Marxism, psychoanalysis and the increasingly mobile representational categories by which people come to be identified with a decisive ‘no’ is an important feature of the notion of resistance
that has been formulated here, but to simply say no is, as Foucault made clear, ‘the minimum form of resistance’. This is to say that in order for the individual to become aware of and to explore the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings then it will be necessary for the individual to say no, to renounce the adherence to, and the perpetuation of, the objective and subjective aspects of ‘traditional’ plans of organisation, as well as saying no to the manner in which both psychoanalysis and the profusion of segments that circulate throughout contemporary society seek to account for the individual’s identity and circumscribe their present possibilities on the basis of that identity. Beyond this minimum form, however, I am suggesting that resistance to the nihilistic reaction against Life also entails that the individual employs the vast cultural and coexistent past as a resource, and does so in order to animate and inspire their present concerns, an exploration, discovery and creative employment of the strategies, techniques and practices that individuals and groups have employed in the past as they attempted to explore their present possibilities for living otherwise. As Grosz has suggested: ‘The resources of the previously oppressed - of women under patriarchy, of slaves under slavery, of minorities under racism, colonialism, or nationalism, of workers under capitalism, and so on - are not lost or wiped out...they are preserved somewhere, in the past itself, with effects and traces that can be animated in a number of different contexts and terms in the present’.

To illustrate how the notion of resistance that is being formulated here necessitates more that saying no, indeed to illustrate the limited nature of a form of resistance that is exclusively characterised by refusal, then it is productive to
do so in relation to the form of resistance that Deleuze discerns in Herman Melville’s short story *Bartleby*. At the beginning of Melville’s story, the narrator, an elderly lawyer who ‘in the tranquillity of a snug retreat’ is said to do ‘a snug business among rich men’s bonds, and mortgages, and title deeds,’ is given the title of a Master of Chancery. As a result of the increased work that this entails, and in addition to his two existing clerks, ‘Turkey’ and ‘Nipper’, the lawyer advertises for a scrivener or copyist and appoints Bartleby, a ‘motionless young man’, to the position. Although Bartleby initially carries out an extraordinary quantity of copying, ‘as if famishing for something to copy…copying by sunlight and candlelight,’ three days after being appointed to the position of scrivener, and in response to a request to assist in checking the accuracy of one of his own copies, Bartleby replies, in a singularly mild and yet firm voice, that: “I would prefer not to”. Throughout the course of the story, Bartleby continues to assert his preference not to do various tasks assigned to him, to continue to engage in what the lawyer refers to as ‘a passive resistance’, so that even if asked to go on the most trivial errand of any sort ‘it was generally understood that he would “prefer not to” - in other words, that he would refuse point blank.’ For Deleuze, a central aspect of the significance of Bartleby’s repeated response, the significance of the particular linguistic formula by which he asserts his resistance towards that which is asked of him (i.e. “I would prefer not to”), is that it challenges a variety of linguistic conventions and presuppositions, such as the presupposition that when asked by an employer to carry out what is determined as a ‘reasonable’ task, then an employee will agree to do it. As Deleuze makes clear, all of the lawyer’s continued attempts to ensure his requests are acceded to by Bartleby are frustrated ‘because they rest
on a *logic of presuppositions* according to which an employer “expects” to be
obeyed, or a kind friend listened to, whereas Bartleby has invented a new logic,
*a logic of preference*, which is enough to undermine the presuppositions of
language as a whole’. 457

Despite challenging such presuppositions, however, the limited nature of
Bartleby’s passive resistance, a form of resistance that is exclusively
classified by refusal, is vividly illustrated by Melville in recounting the
events that befall Bartleby. In particular, and in response to his preference not to
leave the lawyer’s office after being dismissed as a scrivener, and in response to
his preference not to leave the building after being carried out of the office,
Bartleby is taken to the Halls of Justice where, stating his preference not to
accept the dinners offered to him, Melville presents us with a final image of the
increasingly emaciated Bartleby facing the yard wall who, despite having his
eyes open, has fallen into a profound, motionless and silent sleep that will end in
his eventual demise.458 In highlighting the limited nature of a form of resistance
that is exclusively concerned with asserting no, Deleuze suggests that Bartleby
belongs to that group of Melville’s characters who are ‘creatures of innocence
and purity, stricken with a constitutive weakness but also with a strange beauty.
Petrified by nature they prefer…no will at all, a nothingness of the will rather
than a will to nothingness (hypochondriacal “negativism”’). 459 This is to say that
Bartleby’s ongoing refusal is not a form of resistance that arises in the service of
the will to pursue some other aim, it is not a form of resistance that emerges as a
consequence of the affirmation of some deeper objective, but is instead a form
of resistance that is riven with negation, an ongoing refusal that expresses a
profound passivity and nothingness of the will. Indeed, the linguistic
formulation that Deleuze employs to describe Bartleby’s continued resistance (i.e. ‘a nothingness of the will’), appears in Deleuze’s earlier work to describe what he refers to as a condition of ‘passive nihilism’, a condition in which one no longer reacts, refuses and resists the promulgation of higher or transcendent values in the service of some other aim or value, but is rather a condition of profound passivity in which one concludes that: ‘It is better to have no values at all than higher values, it is better to have no will at all, better to have a nothingness of the will than a will to nothingness. It is better to fade away passively’. Against this profound passivity, however, the notion of resistance to nihilism that I am formulating here is to be understood as a form of active resistance that says no in the service of opening up the individual’s field of present possibilities, a form of resistance that responds with a decisive no to the adherence to, and perpetuation of, Christianity, Hegelianism, Marxism, psychoanalysis and the increasingly mobile representational categories by which people come to be identified in order to become aware of and to actively explore the individual’s present possibilities for living otherwise.

As I have suggested, this active resistance to nihilism entails that the individual employs the vast cultural and coexistent past that is constituted by Habit and Memory as a resource, and does so in order to animate and inspire their present concerns, an exploration, discovery and creative employment of the strategies, techniques and practices that individuals and groups have employed in the past as they attempted to explore their present possibilities for living otherwise. However, Deleuze’s work also suggests that this employment of the past is not simply concerned with employing the vast cultural and coexistent past as a resource, but is also concerned with the manner in which the
individual’s own specific coexistent past can be employed to facilitate the exploration of their present possibilities for living otherwise. Importantly, this exploration and creative employment of the individual’s own specific past does not seek to ignore or deny those often contingent events that have befallen the individual and that, on the face of it, seem to restrict the individual’s possibilities for living otherwise, such as an event of suffering, illness or injury. This is to say that the employment of the contracted and coexistent past is not to be understood as simply being concerned with that which would appear to facilitate the individual’s exploration of their present possibilities for living otherwise, but is also to be understood in terms of a readiness to employ those past events that, as a consequence of the dynamic activity of Habit and Memory, continue to act upon the present and, to a greater or lesser extent, may be perceived as that which obstructs, diverts or prevents the individual from exploring their present possibilities for living otherwise. In doing so, I want to argue that the notion of resistance entails that the individual displays a readiness and a will to employ and creatively transform those seemingly negative and restrictive past events so that even they facilitate the individual’s exploration of the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise. To illustrate how Deleuze’s work entails a notion of resistance that not only calls for the employment of those seemingly positive past strategies, techniques and practices, but also calls for the employment of those seemingly restrictive and contingent events that befall the individual, it is instructive to situate this notion of resistance within Deleuze’s notion of ‘the event’ and, in particular, within the context of his imperative to ‘will the event’, to will ‘that which occurs insofar as it does occur’.

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Within the context of a notion of resistance that entails the employment of those events which seem to restrict the individual’s present possibilities, the imperative to will the event, to will that which occurs insofar as it does occur, can provisionally be taken to mean that given, for example, a past event of suffering, illness or injury that continues to obstruct, divert or prevent the individual from exploring their present possibilities for living otherwise, then the imperative to will the event entails, in its simplest terms, that the individual ought to accept, rather than reject, that which has occurred. In particular, the notion of resistance that I am formulating here suggests that the individual ought to resist the tendency to react to a seemingly negative and restrictive past event, an event that continues to act upon and restrict the individual’s present possibilities for living otherwise, by considering that event as unjust, unfair or unwarranted. Indeed, Deleuze suggests that: ‘To grasp whatever happens as unjust and unwarranted (it is always someone else’s fault) is, on the contrary, what renders our sores repugnant - veritable ressentiment, resentment of the event. There is no other ill will’. It is important to note, however, that although Deleuze presents the imperative to will the event within the context of Stoic ethics, and although I have suggested that willing the event involves an acceptance of that which occurs, rather than the resentful rejection of that which occurs, it would be a mistake to understand the imperative to will the event, as Stoicism is commonly characterised, in terms of a passive, resigned acceptance of that which occurs. As Williams has suggested, ‘to will the event could never simply be to accept a state of affairs…Resignation is therefore a form of replaying and indeed one that may be a poor way of responding to a given event’. This is to say that the imperative to will the event, where this is
understood as an acceptance of that which occurs, rather than the resentful rejection of that which has occurred, ought not to be understood in terms of Marcus Aurelius’s famous imperative to ‘withdraw into yourself’,\textsuperscript{465} if this is understood in terms of a resigned indifference to external events, or what Hegel characterised as the attempt ‘to maintain that lifeless indifference which steadfastly withdraws from the bustle of existence’\textsuperscript{466}.

Indeed, rather than a resentful rejection or resigned indifference to that which has occurred, such as an event of suffering, illness or injury, the imperative to will the event entails that the individual accepts that which occurs in order to then creatively engage with that which has occurred. As Williams puts it: ‘The challenge is always to conduct the intensity of these events and their significance, while resisting their necessary inner compulsion to confirm injuries, ideas and values as final and inevitable’.\textsuperscript{467} This is to say that the notion of resistance that is being presented here, a notion of resistance that is to be understood in terms of the imperative to will the event, entails that when a seemingly restrictive event befalls the individual, an event that seems to obstruct, divert or prevent the individual from exploring their present possibilities for living otherwise, then the challenge that the individual confronts is to resist the tendency to reject that event by considering it as unjust, unfair or unwarranted, resisting the inner and habitual compulsion to conclude that the seemingly restrictive event that has befallen the individual necessarily circumscribes their open field of present possibilities. Instead, I am arguing that Deleuze’s work challenges the individual to will the event where this is to be understood not only in terms of a non-resentful acceptance of that which occurs, but must also be understood in terms of an active engagement with, and creative
transformation of, that which occurs, such that the individual wills something in, or extracts something from, that which occurs which will facilitate the exploration of their present possibilities for living otherwise. As Deleuze proposes, in willing the event the individual is to will ‘not exactly what occurs, but something in that which occurs, something yet to come which would be consistent with what occurs’. This is to say that in willing the event the individual resists a resentful rejection of, or a resigned indifference to, the occurrence of, for example, an event of suffering, illness or injury, and is instead challenged to consider how that event can be employed to facilitate new present possibilities for living otherwise, to consider what new and enabling perspectives, values and ideas that event can afford the individual such that they are able to draw something significant from what, on the face of it, would appear to obstruct, divert or restrict the individual’s present possibilities.

The figure that Deleuze makes reference to across his works when discussing what it might mean, in practical terms, to will the event, what it might practically mean to creatively transform a seemingly restrictive event such that it facilitates the exploration of new present possibilities for living otherwise, is Joë Bousquet. Fighting near the Aisne battlelines in Vailly at the end of the First World War, Bousquet suffered a bullet wound that severed his spinal cord and left him paralysed and largely bedridden for the rest of his life. Within the context of the notion of resistance and the imperative to will the event that is being presented here, Bousquet can be understood as suffering an event that, by common assessments and evaluations, radically circumscribed the possibilities for living that were available to him. However, what is significant for an understanding of Deleuze’s imperative to will the event, and what it
might practically mean to creatively transform a seemingly restrictive event into one that facilitates the exploration of new present possibilities for living otherwise, is Bousquet’s reaction to this seemingly disastorous event, his reaction to a wounding and paralysis that seemed to irremediably hinder, thwart and negate his present possibilities for the remainder of his life. In particular, and in response to that which had befallen him, ‘Bousquet neither tries to deny his wound, nor blame it, nor ignore it. Instead he treats it as a fact or an event calling for a reinvention which will run parallel to the event and alter its sense’.470 This is to say that rather than a resentful rejection of, or resigned indifference to, that which had occurred, and rather than considering that event of wounding and paralysis as unjust, unfair or unwarranted, Bousquet responds to the seemingly restrictive event that had befallen him by actively engaging with, and creatively transforming, that which had occurred, extracting something enabling from the event of wounding and paralysis. In particular, the event of wounding and paralysis became for Bousquet the starting point for an extensive body of poetry and writing in which he returned to that which had occurred in artistic, and specifically surreal ways that enabled him to employ the seemingly disastorous event of wounding and paralysis in order to facilitate the exploration of new present possibilities for living otherwise. As Williams suggests, Bousquet’s event of wounding and paralysis ‘becomes an artistic event as well as a physical one and the life as an artist of acute sensibility and great passion rises out of, or hovers with, the curtailed life spent bedridden in deep pain’.471

Understood within the context of the imperative to will the event, therefore, Bousquet’s response to the event of wounding and paralysis illustrates
the manner in which the employment of the past is not simply concerned with that which would appear to facilitate the individual’s exploration of their present possibilities, but is also to be understood in terms of a readiness to employ those past events that, as a consequence of the dynamic activity of Habit and Memory, continue to coexist with the present and, to a greater or lesser extent, may be perceived as that which obstructs, diverts or prevents the individual from exploring their present possibilities for living otherwise. In particular, it illustrates the manner in which the individual is to strive to resist the tendency to react to a seemingly restrictive event with resentment or resigned indifference, and instead seeks to engage with, and creatively transform, such events so that they facilitate the exploration of new present possibilities for living otherwise. Indeed, it is in this sense that we can understand Deleuze’s seemingly enigmatic summation of the importance of willing the event in which he suggests that: ‘Nothing more can be said, and no more has ever been said: to become worthy of what happens to us, and thus to will and release the event, to become the offspring of one’s own events, and thereby to be reborn, to have one more birth, and to break with one’s carnal birth’.\footnote{472} This is to say that rather than considering an event of suffering, illness or injury as unjust, unfair or unwarranted, the individual is challenged ‘to become worthy’ of what has happened to them by transforming such an event into that which facilitates the exploration of new present possibilities. As Bogue notes: ‘To be worthy of what happens is to…thereby avoid \textit{ressentiment} and affirm the past events that have shaped one’s present’\footnote{473} In order to effect such a transformation, however, the individual may need to determine what attitudes, values and associations they must dispense with, what beliefs, feelings and relationships they may need to
retain, and what perspectives, skills and systems of support they may need to acquire, a thoroughgoing transformation that may entail a transformation of the individual’s current identity. Indeed, it is in this sense, that we can understand Deleuze’s somewhat enigmatic repetition of Bousquet’s assertion that: ‘My wound existed before me; I was born to embody it’. This is to say that the transformation of a wound, the transformation of an event of suffering, illness or injury, into that which facilitates the exploration of new present possibilities for living otherwise, may also necessitate the transformation of the individual’s conception of themselves such that a new self-identity, a new ‘I’, is born as a consequence of the event without which the individual would never have become who or what they currently are.

This transformation of the individual’s identity in response to the occurrence of an event of suffering, illness or injury ought not to be understood as entailing that the individual has finally discovered some deep truth within, that they have disclosed who or what their essential identity is. Rather, it suggests that the individual has had to engage in a process of personal transfiguration in order to transform a seemingly restrictive event into one that facilitates the exploration of new present possibilities, a transformation that may have necessitated a reassessment of their established values and beliefs, a disposal of their previous perspectives and attachments, and the development of new goals and more enabling relationships. This is to say that the transformation of the individual’s identity in response to a seemingly restrictive event is to be understood as a strategic manoeuvre, as that which may be necessary in order to transform an event which appears to obstruct, divert or restrict the individual’s present possibilities into a significant and meaningful ‘life-event’ that opens up
new present possibilities for living otherwise. In addition to being a strategic manoeuvre, however, the transformation of the individual’s identity in response to a seemingly restrictive event is also to be understood as a provisional manoeuvre. This is say that although the individual may have already transformed their identity in response to a previous event of suffering, illness or injury, with the arrival of a new event of suffering, illness or injury it may again be necessary for the individual to engage in a process of personal transfiguration in order to transform the new and seemingly restrictive event, to once again assess their established values and beliefs, dispose of previous perspectives and attachments, and develop new goals and more enabling relationships. Therefore, as an ongoing, episodic and creative process, the imperative to will the event does not seek to somehow provide a single, overarching response to all the seemingly restrictive and often contingent events that may befall the individual. Rather, the imperative to will the event entails the recognition that every event of suffering, illness or injury that befalls the individual, challenges that individual to will something in, or extract something from, that which has occurred which will facilitate the exploration of new present possibilities for living otherwise, and thereby express what Viktor Frankl suggested was ‘the uniquely human potential at its best, which is to transform a personal tragedy into a triumph, to turn one’s predicament into a human achievement’.475

Indeed, in Man’s Search for Meaning, Frankl draws upon his three year struggle for survival in Auschwitz, Dachau and other Nazi concentration camps in order to explore this ‘uniquely human potential’. In particular, he notes the manner in which many prisoners sought solace from the event of incarceration and their degraded, present existence by longing for a time prior to their pain,
suffering and distress, by succumbing to ‘the tendency to look into the past, to help make the present, with all its horrors, less real’. By responding to their present condition in this way, however, Frankl not only suggested that the prisoners sought to make their present existence, and the horrors that characterised it, increasingly unreal, but also proposed that their strategy for survival denied the present the possibility of acquiring worth or meaning; in particular, he noted that: ‘Instead of taking the camp’s difficulties as a test of their inner strength, they did not take their life seriously and despised it as something of no consequence. They preferred to close their eyes and to live in the past. Life for such people became meaningless.’ Understood within the context of the notion of resistance formulated here, a notion of resistance formulated within the context of the three passive syntheses of time, Frankl’s comments with respect to the attempt to retreat from the present into the past can be understood in terms of a resistance to the allure of the continued co-existence and perpetuation of the past with the present that is characteristic of the constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory, of the first synthesis of time and the second synthesis of time. As I discussed earlier in relation to the work of Beckett, Habit and Memory can be understood as agents of security in so far as the continued coexistence of the past with the present, and the expectations of the future that this contracted and coexistent past creates, strive to maintain stability and security in the face of the unfamiliar and the unknown by bringing the present moment under the power of past judgments, established concepts and historical assumptions. However, Habit and Memory can also be understood as agents of security to the extent that the contracted and co-existent past may provide a haven from the present, a haven wherein the individual is able to
retreat from the pain, suffering and distress of the present into the stability and security of former, ‘better’ times.

Confronted by their present and enduring horrors, Frankl respected the manner in which many prisoners sought refuge in the past, acknowledging his own attempts to make the present less real by doing so, although he stresses that such a strategy of survival possessed a certain danger. In particular, he suggested that it ‘robbed’ the present of ‘its reality’ to the extent that it obscured the possibilities that the present contained, that it led many ‘to overlook the opportunities to make something positive of camp life, opportunities which really did exist. Regarding our ‘provisional existence’ as unreal was in itself an important factor in causing the prisoners to lose their hold on life; everything in a way became pointless.

Frankl’s work can therefore enable us to understood a retreat into the past as a refusal of the constituting dynamism of the formless foundation of the passive syntheses of time, a refusal of the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that the living present is characterised by a forever renewed present moment, distinguishable from both the past and the future, and which thereby provides each individual with forever renewed present possibilities. Indeed, rather than retreating from the pain, suffering and distress that his incarceration in the concentration camps engendered, Frankl sought to survive, and noted the manner in which others sought to survive, by adopting a stance towards incarceration that can be understood in terms of the imperative to will the event that has been presented here. This is to say that in seeking to continually resist a resentful rejection or resigned indifference to the event of incarceration, Frankl sought to discern the opportunities for growth and development that the event provided, to consider what new and enabling
perspectives, values and ideas could be drawn from an event that seemingly destroyed his present possibilities. Even in a situation that appeared hopeless, he stressed the need to resist ‘closing one’s eyes’ and ‘living in the past’ and instead highlighted the manner in which each present moment - not only in spite of, but precisely because of, the enduring existence of pain, suffering and distress - provided an opportunity and a challenge, an opportunity and challenge ‘to grow beyond oneself’, even if this meant learning how to continue living when suffering appears to be one’s unalterable fate.480

Although Frankl’s response to the event of incarceration in the Nazi’s concentration camps, and Bousquet’s response to the event of wounding and paralysis in the First World War, are extraordinary examples of what it might mean, in practical terms, to will the event, they are nevertheless illustrative of the manner in which it is possible to actively engage with and creatively transform even the most horrific, disastrous and seemingly hopeless of events so that even they facilitate the exploration of new present possibilities for living otherwise. Therefore, understood as that which orientates the individual to the forever renewed present possibility for living otherwise in response to the most horrific and disastrous of events, understood as that which challenges the individual to actively engage with, and creatively transform, an event that seems to obstruct, divert or negate the individual’s exploration of their present possibilities for living otherwise, the imperative to will the event is to be understood as profoundly life-affirming, necessitating that the individual strives to become what Nietzsche referred to as a ‘Yes-sayer’.481 This is to say that the notion of resistance formulated here, a notion of resistance formulated within the context of the passive synthesis of time and the imperative to will the event,
necessitates that the individual responds to those plans of organisation that are
part of the vast coexistent and cultural past with a decisive ‘no’, resisting the
adherence to, and the perpetuation of Christianity, Hegelianism and Marxism,
along with psychoanalysis and the increasingly mobile segments by which
people come to be identified. However, I am arguing that the notion of
resistance also necessitates that the individual says ‘yes’, and not only says yes
to those strategies, techniques and practices in the cultural and coexistent past
that can facilitate the exploration of the individual’s present possibilities, but
also says yes to those often contingent events that befall the individual in the
course of their life and that engender pain, suffering and distress. This is to say
that the individual responds with a decisive yes to those events that would seem
to restrict their present possibilities, and in saying yes affirms those events
precisely as opportunities for exploring new present possibilities for living
otherwise, an affirmation and even ‘love’ of those events (comparable to what
Nietzsche termed amor fati or ‘love of fate’482 that strives to accept and even
embrace an event of suffering, illness or injury as an opportunity to explore new
present possibilities for living otherwise, as ‘an energetic stimulus for life, for
living more’483.

Understood as that which challenges the individual to say yes to an event
that seems to obstruct, divert or negate their present possibilities, to yes and
affirm an event of suffering, illness or injury as an opportunity to explore new
present possibilities for living otherwise, the imperative to will the event can be
understood as radically transfiguring the relation between illness and health
where those two notions are posited in diametric opposition. In order to clarify
this, it is productive to consider Deleuze’s brief comments on illness in
Nietzsche and Philosophy where he suggests that illness is to be understood as a restrictive and reactive force that circumscribes my present possibilities, a force that ‘separates me from what I can do…it narrows my possibilities and condemns me to a diminished milieu to which I can do no more than adapt myself’. However, while the event of illness can be understood as that which appears to obstruct, divert or restrict the individual’s present possibilities, Deleuze also suggests that illness ‘reveals to me a new capacity, it endows me with a new will that I can make my own, going to the limit of a strange power’. This is to say that the event of illness can also be understood as that which provides the individual with the opportunity to shift their perspective such that, from the position of illness, suffering and injury, they are able to consider, explore and move towards, as it were, a more ‘vital’ concept of health, a concept of health that is able to affirm and incorporate the event of illness, suffering and injury precisely as valuable conditions for the creation of new present possibilities for living otherwise. Indeed, in discussing Nietzsche’s self-proclaimed ability to achieve such a profound and vital form of health and, conversely, his loss of this health, Deleuze makes it clear that: ‘Nietzsche does not lose his health when he is sick, but when he can no longer affirm the distance, when he is no longer able, by means of his health, to establish sickness as a point of view on health’. This is to say that Nietzsche’s health, and the concept of health that the imperative to will the event can be understood as indicating, is not defined by the absence of illness, but is dependent upon the confidence and the capacity to be able, when an event of illness, suffering or injury befalls the individual, to resist the tendency to consider that event as unjust, unfair or unwarranted, and instead consider what new and enabling
perspectives, values and ideas that event can afford the individual such that the seemingly restrictive event of illness, suffering or injury can be employed to facilitate new present possibilities for living otherwise.

Such a profound form of health, what we might refer to, following Nietzsche, as ‘the great health,’
can be understood as being instantiated in Seneca’s image of the wrestler or athlete whose strength is tested and improved by the antagonists that he confronts and the adversity and pain that they bring, a strength or great health that is not only able to endure antagonists, adversity and pain, but is able to value and embrace them as a necessary element of that strength or health. Indeed, for Seneca, the individual’s strength or health is not only tested and developed by antagonists, adversity and pain, but would diminish without the ongoing threat and presence of those antagonists; as he makes clear: ‘Without an antagonist prowess fades away. Its true proportions and capacities come to light only when action proves its endurance’. It is in this sense that we can understand Georges Ganguilhem’s more recent suggestion that rather than health being defined in terms of the absence of disease, the absence of disease is, paradoxically, said to be the affliction or the ‘disease’ of ‘the normal man’; as he proposes: ‘By disease of the normal man we must understand the disturbance which arises in the course of time from the permanence of the normal state, from the incorruptible uniformity of the normal, the disease which arises from the deprivation of diseases, from an existence almost incompatible with disease.’ In contrast, and in accordance with Seneca’s image of the wrestler who embraces adversity in order to test and to strengthen his prowess, Canguilhem proposes that the presence of disease - or at least the threat, the ‘projected shadow’ of disease - is necessary for the
individual to possess an enduring confidence in their health,\textsuperscript{491} such that the healthy man ‘does not flee before the problems posed by sometimes sudden disruptions of his habits, even physiologically speaking; he measures his health in terms of his capacity to overcome organic crises in order to establish a new order’.\textsuperscript{492} This is to say that the threat or the presence of disease, the threat or the presence of a physiological disruption of the individual’s habits, is necessary in order for the individual to measure their health, in order for the individual to develop the confidence that their health is such that instead of perceiving the occurrence of disease, suffering and pain as unjust, unfair or unwarranted, they are able to affirm that event as an opportunity to explore new present possibilities for living otherwise, as an opportunity to establish a new order that has incorporated the event of disease, suffering and pain as a stimulus for a vital, profound form of health.

The notion of resistance that I have been developing throughout this chapter, a resistance to the presence and the persistence of nihilism that seeks to enable the individual to become aware of, and to explore, the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise, must therefore be understood as a multifaceted concept. In particular, I have argued that the notion of resistance ought to be understood within the context of the three syntheses of time such that an awareness and exploration of the individual’s present possibilities necessitates that they resist the inheritance and perpetuation of the nihilism that is characteristic of ‘traditional’ plans of organisation, such as Christianity’s creationist and eschatological plans, Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit and the dialectical materialism of Marxism. This is to say that the notion of resistance ought to be understood as possessing a technical, ontological and specifically
temporal sense in so far as it entails a resistance to the enduring power of plans of organisation to act upon the individual’s living present, a resistance to the adherence and perpetuation of those nihilistic plans of organisation that are part of the vast cultural past that each individual inherits and that, by virtue of the constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory, are contracted and coexist with each individual’s living present. However, to the extent that it has been suggested that one of the salient features of contemporary, Western modernity is an increasing incredulity towards those nihilistic plans of organisation that are part of our cultural and coexistent past, such as Christianity, Hegelianism and Marxism, then resistance ought not to be understood exclusively in terms of a resistance to the perpetuation of, and adherence to, any overarching account of the objective organisation of reality that appeals to a vertical and/or horizontal transcendence. Rather, the notion of resistance must also be understood in terms of both a sensitivity to, and vigilance against, the manner in which the nihilistic reaction against Life that characterises plans of organisation is able to adopt new forms and new configurations that continue to occlude and constrain the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings. This is to say that resistance to nihilism is also to be understood in terms of a resistance to the emergence, adherence and perpetuation of new nihilistic plans of organisation, such as psychoanalysis, that propagate an account of the subjective organisation of each individual’s psychic reality that is no longer bound to the overarching, objective organisation of reality, and the notions of vertical transcendence and/or horizontal transcendence that characterises ‘traditional’ plans of organisation. In addition, resistance to nihilism is also to be understood in terms of a resistance to the manner in which nihilism manifests
itself in increasingly mobile, fluid configurations, in a profusion of broad representational categories or segments that are no longer bound to the universal accounts of the objective and/or subjective organisation of reality that characterise Christianity, Hegelianism, Marxism and psychoanalysis.

To respond to the adherence to, and perpetuation of, Christianity, Hegelianism, Marxism, psychoanalysis and the increasingly mobile representational categories by which people come to be identified with a decisive ‘no’ is an important feature of the notion of resistance that has been formulated here, but to simply continue to say no, as was illustrated with Bartleby’s ‘passive resistance’, is to be understood as a minimum and limited form of resistance. Beyond this minimum form, however, and understood within the context of the three passive syntheses of time, resistance to the nihilistic reaction against Life also entails that the individual employs the vast cultural and coexistent past that is constituted by Habit and Memory as a resource, and does so in order to animate and inspire their present concerns, an exploration, discovery and creative employment of the strategies, techniques and practices that individuals and groups have employed in the past as they attempted to explore their present possibilities for living otherwise. This employment of the past, however, is not to be understood as simply being concerned with employing the vast cultural and coexistent past as a resource, but is also concerned with the manner in which the individual’s own specific coexistent past can be employed to facilitate the exploration of their present possibilities for living otherwise. Understood within the context of the imperative to will the event, the imperative to will that which occurs insofar as it does occur, I have argued that the employment of the individual’s own specific past does not seek
to ignore or deny those often contingent events that have befallen the individual and that, on the face of it, seem to restrict the individual’s present possibilities for living otherwise, such as an event of suffering, illness or injury. On the contrary, understood within the context of the imperative to will the event, the notion of resistance entails that when a seemingly restrictive event befalls the individual, an event that seems to obstruct, divert or prevent the individual from exploring their present possibilities for living otherwise, then the challenge that the individual confronts is to resist the tendency to reject that event by considering it as unjust, unfair or unwarranted, resisting the inner and habitual compulsion to conclude that the seemingly restrictive event that has befallen the individual necessarily circumscribes their open field of present possibilities. Instead, the notion of resistance that I have developed throughout this chapter entails that the individual is challenged to will the event, where this is to be understood not only in terms of a non-resentful acceptance of that which occurs, but must also be understood in terms of an active engagement with, and creative transformation of, that which occurs, a decisive ‘yes’ to those events that would seem to restrict the individual’s possibilities and, in saying yes, an affirmation of those events precisely as opportunities for exploring new present possibilities for living otherwise.
Conclusion

The aim of this study has been to investigate the manner in which Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work can be productively understood as being concerned with the question of living well, where it was suggested that living well necessitates that we not only become aware of, but that we also explore, the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings, therefore moving beyond the often restrictive, self-limiting modes of life that are part of the historical legacy that we have inherited and that continue to occlude an awareness of our present possibilities. In particular, I have sought to make an original contribution to existing Deleuzian studies by arguing that what legitimises this conception of living well, and what can motivate us to engage in such a practice, is that a life that becomes aware of and explores the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings is a life that reflects, or that is lived in accordance with, the challenging ontological account that is present in Deleuze’s work; a life lived in accordance with his open, dynamic and thoroughly temporal theory of Being or what I will suggest he later came to refer to simply as ‘Life’. To live in accordance with Life, however, does not entail a fixed, overarching plan of how the possibilities for our lives ought to be actualised in so far as Life is to be understood as that which is continually becoming different to what it is at any given moment, an irrepressible temporal power that continually overcomes any present determination or identity in its interminable drive to continually produce new present possibilities. Moreover, in so far as each individual is to be understood as an ongoing and immanent expression of Life, then a life that strives to explore the forever renewed present possibilities that each moment engenders, a practice that also necessitates that
each individual seeks to resist the diverse ways in which their present possibilities are continually hindered, thwarted and negated, is not only a life that strives to live in accordance with the dynamism of Life, but is also a life lived in accordance with our own dynamic and thoroughly temporal being. This is to say that Life is to be understood in terms of a universal, impersonal and thoroughly temporal dynamic power and, in particular, in terms of a complex temporal structure that Deleuze refers to as the passive syntheses of time, a temporal dynamism that constitutes the dynamic form or temporal character of each individual’s living present.

In developing and seeking to fulfil these interconnected claims, the objective of chapter one was to formulate an account of the manner in which each human being is to be understood as an immediate and ongoing expression of Life, a continual and immanent expression of this thoroughly temporal power. In particular, I suggested that a productive context in which to do so was the Platonic problem of participation in so far as an account of the thoroughly dynamic nature of Life, and the manner in which our living present is to be understood as an immanent expression of this dynamism, necessitated an overcoming of the ontological presuppositions associated with the historical responses to the problem of participation; namely, the presupposition of transcendence, equivocity, ontological hierarchy, the positing of an immutable foundation or fixed ground, the primacy of identity over difference and, ultimately, the subordination of difference to identity. In seeking to formulate an account of the relation between human beings and Life that addresses, challenges and overcomes these Platonic presuppositions - presuppositions retained by both Neo-Platonism’s emanative, and Christianity’s creationist,
response to the problem of participation - I argued that the immanent relation between Life and human beings ought to be understood in terms of the Spinozist concept of expression, an expressive relation that entails a challenging conception of ontological univocity. In particular, the conception of univocity that I proposed Deleuze seeks to maintain was presented in terms of a complex, subtle and challenging attempt to distinguish an expressive ontological ground from the plurality of beings that it expresses without that ground thereby being distinct or separate from the plurality of beings that are its expression. However, it is precisely this attempt to maintain an ontological position of univocity, while holding that there is an expressive ontological ground that is distinguishable from the multitude of beings that are its expression, that Alain Badiou can be understood as suggesting that Deleuze is unable to sustain. This is to say that for Badiou, Deleuze’s attempt to determine an expressive ontological ground as the distinguishable ground of the plurality of actual beings that it expresses, without that ontological ground thereby being distinct or separate from the plurality of beings that are its expression, collapses into the traditional, opposing relation between the One and the many, reintroducing the Platonic ontological presupposition of transcendence along with the remaining ontological presuppositions associated with the historical responses to the problem of participation.\textsuperscript{493}

To accept Badiou’s critique of Deleuze, therefore, would be to accept the reintroduction of the ontological presupposition of transcendence into the latter’s work, thereby threatening to negate this study’s objective to formulate an account of Life as a universal, impersonal and temporal dynamism, and the manner in which each individual’s living present is to be understood as an
immanent expression of this dynamism. By reintroducing the concept of transcendence, along with the ontological, Platonic presuppositions associated with that concept, then the manner in which Life is to be understood as continually overcoming any present determination or identity in its interminable drive to continually produce new present possibilities, to engender forever renewed present possibilities for the human being to live otherwise, is frustrated. This is to say that one’s possibilities for living otherwise give way to the obligation to actualise the possibilities for one’s life in accordance with that dictated to it by the transcendence characteristic of Platonism. The objective of chapter two, however, was to argue that it is possible to provide a coherent account of the expressive and univocal nature of Life, to understand Life in terms of a distinguishable ground that is nevertheless not distinct from the actual beings that are its ongoing expression, and that by doing so the opposing relation between the One and many can be addressed - along with the ontological presuppositions associated with the historical responses to the problem of participation. However, I proposed that this necessitates a thoroughgoing temporalisation of Life, a conceptualisation of Life in terms of the three passive syntheses of time and, within the context of these syntheses, a reconsideration of Deleuze’s important distinction between the virtual and the actual. It is this temporalisation of Life that enables a coherent formulation of the manner in which each individual’s living present is to be understood as an immediate and ongoing expression of Life, a continual and immanent expression of that which is continually becoming different to what it is at any given moment. In particular, I argued that a reconceptualisation of Life within the context of the three passive syntheses of time enables an understanding of Life
in terms of a universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that constitutes the
dynamic form or temporal character of each individual’s living present, as well
as enabling an understanding of the manner in which each moment of our lives
provides us with the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise.

In presenting the three passive syntheses of time as that which
constitutes the temporal character of each individual’s living present, I proposed
that the first synthesis of time or Habit contracts every present moment that
passes, creating expectations of the future, while the second synthesis of time or
Memory ensures that every present moment is able to pass, and yet retains those
particular former present moments that pass so that they can be recollected,
either voluntarily or involuntarily, in the present moment. However, in addition
to the first and second syntheses of time, I argued that each individual’s living
present is also an expression of, and constituted by, a thoroughly dynamic third
synthesis of time, a third synthesis of time that is to be understood as an ongoing
caesural cutting that is to be identified with the present moment and, in
particular, with the continual or eternal return of a new or different present
moment. This is to say that the third synthesis of time is to be understood as an
ongoing caesural cutting that continually engenders a new or different present
moment which, in its eternal recurrence, continually establishes the formal,
fixed or static characteristics of the living present, the manner in which each
individual’s living present is always characterized by a distinguishable past and
future either side of a present moment. The first and second syntheses of time,
therefore, must be understood as referring to, and as being grounded upon, the
third synthesis of time in so far as it is this latter synthesis that ensures that our
living present is continually characterized by a new present moment,
distinguishable from the past and the future. Without the activity of the third synthesis of time there would be no present moment, no continually renewed present moment that the second synthesis of time could ensure passes and the first synthesis of time could continually contract into a forever renewed present moment. Therefore, although the character of the ground or foundation that the third synthesis of time constitutes challenges the traditional, Platonic conceptualisation of what it means to be a ground, the third synthesis of time is to be understood as the ground of time in so far as it is the temporal synthesis that the first and second syntheses of time must be understood as referring to, a temporal synthesis that engenders a continually renewed present moment without which Habit and Memory would be unable to conduct their respective syntheses.

The passive syntheses of time, however, are not to be understood in terms of a temporality that is confined to the temporal character of the individual’s living present. Rather, the three passive syntheses of time are to be understood as the universal and impersonal temporality of Life itself, such that the temporal character of each individual’s living present is to be understand as an ongoing expression of the temporality of Life and, in particular, as an immediate or immanent expression of this universal temporal dynamic. However, in order to formulate an account of this immanent, expressive relation between Life and the dynamic form of each individual’s living present, I proposed that it was necessary to provide a reconsideration of Deleuze’s important distinction between the virtual and the actual. In particular, I argued that the first, second and third synthesis of time ought to be determined as virtual, such that all three syntheses comprise a dynamic and temporal virtual
structure, while the temporal character of each individual’s living present - the manner in which it is characterised by a forever renewed present moment, a present moment that passes, and by particular expectations of the future - ought to be understood in terms of the actual. This is to say that as that which establishes the actual dynamic form or temporal character of each individual’s living present, the dynamic activity of the three passive syntheses of time is not actual in so far as it is the virtual condition for the actual temporal characteristics of the individual’s living present. Therefore, in so far as the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present is to be understood as being constituted by a universal and virtual temporal structure - the three passive syntheses of time - then the living present is constituted by, and an expression of, that which exceeds the living present. However, while exceeding the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present, the virtual structure that is the condition for it is to be understood as the universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that remains immanent, involved or implicated within those living presents. This is to say that each individual’s living present is an expression of a universal and virtual temporal structure, the universal and impersonal temporality of Life itself, and precisely because that structure possesses a virtual character then it is not unreal or ideal, but ought to be determined as the fully real and immanent condition for the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present.

An understanding of the passive syntheses of time as the virtual, distinguishable and yet not distinct ground of the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present can therefore be understood as radically problematising the traditional, opposing relation between the One and the many
that Badiou proposes continues to be present in Deleuze’s work. As a virtual
ground, the passive syntheses of time - understood in terms of the universal and
impersonal temporality of Life itself - is not to be understood in terms of a One
that is above or transcendent to the many living presents that the virtual ground
is the dynamic condition for. Rather, while the virtual can be understood as the
distinguishable ground of the actual temporal character of the plurality of living
presents that it constitutes, this distinction is made within the context of a
thoroughgoing univocity. This is to say that there is no ontological division, no
equivocity and no ontological hierarchy, between Life as that virtual structure
comprised of the passive syntheses of time and the actual temporal character of
each individual’s living present that is an expression of that virtual structure, but
solely one reality, a single plane of immanence, that is to be understood as
possessing two sides or a double aspect to it. This is to say that while it is not
actual, the virtual is fully real and so to determine the passive syntheses of time
as the distinguishable, virtual ground of the actual temporal character of each
individual’s living present is not to understand that ground as possessing a
distinct or separate reality, it is not to revert to the traditional, opposing relation
between the One and the many where the former is the transcendent
precondition for the former. Rather, to distinguish the passive syntheses of time
as the virtual ground of each individual’s living present is to determine both the
virtual ground and the actual temporal character of the living present as
belonging to the same thoroughly temporal, univocal reality, but it is to
distinguish the former as the virtual side or aspect of that univocal reality and
the latter as the actual side or aspect of that univocal reality.
The temporal character of each individual’s living present is therefore to be understood as an immediate an ongoing expression of the temporality of Life itself, a universal and impersonal temporal dynamic that is to be understood in terms of the three passive syntheses of time. Distinguishable and yet not distinct from the living present, the three syntheses of time comprise a virtual structure that is the fully real, universal and immanent condition for the actual dynamic form or temporal character of each individual’s living present, the manner in which each individual’s living present is characterised by a forever renewed present moment, a present moment that passes, and by expectations of the future. However, in its ongoing caesural cutting, it is the third synthesis of time which ensures that the living present is characterised by a forever renewed present moment, distinguishable from both the past and the future, and which thereby provides each individual with continually renewed present possibilities for living otherwise. To strive to become aware of and to explore the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment engenders is therefore not simply to live in accordance with the actual temporal character of our own individual living present. Rather, in so far as the forever renewed present moment that characterises the living present is constituted by the third synthesis of time, by the foundation of that virtual structure that constitutes the temporality of Life itself, then to strive to explore the present possibilities for living otherwise is to strive to live in accordance with the universal ungrounding that characterises the formless foundation of Life itself. To live in accordance with Life, therefore, does not entail a fixed, overarching plan of how our present possibilities ought to be realised. Understood in terms of the three passive syntheses of time - understood as a universal and impersonal temporal dynamic
that, at its foundation, is characterised by an ongoing caesural cutting, by the eternal return of the new or different - Life does not possess some definite, fixed determination that would oblige us to realise our possibilities in accordance with that determination. Rather, Life is to be understood as that which is continually becoming different to what it is at any given moment, an irrepressible temporal power that, at its formless foundation, continually resists the establishment of any fixed determination, continually overcoming the establishment of any fixed identity, in its interminable drive to produce forever renewed present possibilities for being.

Having formulated an account of the manner in which the actual temporal character of each individual’s living present is to be understood as an immanent and ongoing expression of the virtual temporality of Life itself, the objective of chapter three was to investigate how Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work can also be understood as being concerned with the manner in which the individual’s forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise are hindered, thwarted and negated. However, to the extent that I sought to do so within the context of nihilism, I argued that rather than a reaction to the loss of belief in the existence of God, and the Judeo-Christian form of life that was established upon that belief, nihilism is to be understood as possessing a technical and specifically temporal sense in so far as it is to be determined as a reaction against the universal and impersonal temporal dynamism of Life itself. This is to say that nihilism is to be understood in terms of a reaction against the universal ungrounding or excessive formlessness that characterises the temporality of Life itself, a reaction against the third synthesis of time and the manner in which it ensures that Life, at its formless foundation,
is continually becoming different to what it is at any given moment, continually resisting and overcoming the establishment of any fixed determination or identity. In particular, as a reaction against the formless foundation of Life, nihilism becomes manifest in the positing of an overarching account of the objective organisation of reality, accounts of reality that are characteristic of what Deleuze refers to as plans of organisation and that variously appeal to vertical transcendence - such as the Platonic Forms, the neo-Platonic One or the God of Christianity - or horizontal transcendence - as is evidenced in the eschatological concerns of Christianity, Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit or the dialectical materialism of Marxism. This is to say that the nihilism characteristic of a plan of organisation manifests itself in accounts of the objective organisation of reality that react against the open dynamism that characterises the formless foundation of Life by appealing to a vertical transcendence - by positing an immutable, fixed foundation that is to be understood as the ideal and ontologically superior precondition for the beings of the world - or by appealing to a horizontal transcendence - by positing an overarching and fixed pattern of development that is the ideal and ontologically superior precondition and guiding principle that directs the whole of reality, including all historical and societal developments, towards a predetermined end.

I also argued, however, that the nihilistic reaction against Life that characterises a plan of organisation is not merely manifest in the positing of an overarching account of the objective organisation of reality that appeals to a vertical and/or horizontal transcendence and, in doing so, reacts against the manner in which the third synthesis of time ensures that Life, at its foundation, is characterised by the eternal return of the new or the different. Rather, with the
advent of Christianity, and for the new plans of organisation that follow in the wake of the death of God, there is also an increased concern with subjectivity, an increased concern with the subjective aspects of human existence, that enlarges and intensifies the nihilistic reaction against Life. This is to say that in addition to their particular account of the objective organisation of reality, plans of organisation also present and promulgate an account of the fundamental identity of all human beings, an account of the supposedly deep truth within us all, and do so in terms of a universal and essential condition of dispossession, privation or lack. In concert with their specific account of the objective organisation of reality, plans of organisation occlude, constrain and constrict both the awareness and exploration of the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings by means of the promise of salvation from this condition of dispossession, a redemption from this condition of privation to the extent that the individual actualises their present possibilities in accordance with that form of life promulgated by the plan of organisation. Therefore, the nihilistic reaction against Life that is characteristic of Christianity as a plan of organisation, as well as those new plans of organisation that emerge in the wake of the death of God, is not merely manifest in the form of an account of the objective organisation of reality that reacts against the formless foundation of Life, a foundation that is constituted by the third synthesis of time and is characterised by the eternal return of the new or the different. Rather, with its turning or increased concern with the subjective aspects of human existence, those plans of organisation also circumscribe the open field of present possibilities that are available to human beings and, in doing so, are also to be understood as a nihilistic reaction against the manner in which the third
synthesis of time ensures that each individual’s living present is characterised by forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise.

Having formulated an account of the manner in which the open field of present possibilities that each moment brings is occluded and constrained by the nihilistic reaction against Life, a nihilism that finds its most systematic expression in plans of organisation, I then moved on to consider how we are to respond to the presence and the persistence of nihilism. This is to say that in order to strive to become aware of and to explore our forever renewed present possibilities, and therefore strive to live in accordance with the universal ungrounding that characterises the temporality of Life itself, my objective in chapter four was to consider how we might respond to the presence and the persistence of nihilism and, in particular, how we might respond to the manner in which plans of organisation, in concert with their account of the objective organisation of reality, seek to organise how we actualise our present possibilities. In particular, I suggested that in order to become aware of and to explore the forever renewed present possibility for living otherwise that each moment brings then the response to the presence and the persistence of nihilism ought to be understood in terms of resistance and, in particular, in terms of a resistance to the inheritance and perpetuation of the nihilism that is characteristic of plans of organisation. In doing so, however, I proposed that as with the notion of nihilism, the notion of resistance ought to be understood as possessing a technical, ontological and specifically temporal sense. This is to say that in order to begin to explore the forever renewed present possibilities that each moment brings, in order to strive to live in accordance with the universal dynamism of Life itself, then the resistance to nihilism that this
necessitates must not only be understood within the context of the eternal return of the new or the different that characterises the third synthesis of time, but must also be understood within the context of Habit and Memory, the first and second synthesis of time.

In particular, I argued that an awareness and exploration of the individual’s present possibilities necessitates that they resist the inheritance and perpetuation of the nihilism that is characteristic of ‘traditional’ plans of organisation, such as Christianity’s creationist and eschatological plans, Hegel’s dialectics of Spirit and the dialectical materialism of Marxism. This is to say that the notion of resistance ought to be understood as possessing a technical, ontological and specifically temporal sense in so far as it entails a resistance to the enduring power of plans of organisation to act upon the individual’s living present, a resistance to the adherence and perpetuation of those nihilistic plans of organisation that are part of the vast cultural past that each individual inherits and that, by virtue of the constituting dynamism of Habit and Memory, are contracted and coexist with each individual’s living present. In particular, this resistance ought to be understood as a selective resistance to the perpetuation of, and adherence to, any overarching account of the objective organisation of reality that reacts against the formless foundation of Life by appealing to a vertical transcendence - such as an immutable, fixed foundation that is the ideal and ontologically superior precondition for the beings of the world - or by appealing to a horizontal transcendence - such as an overarching and fixed pattern of development that directs the whole of reality towards a predetermined end. Moreover, I argued that resistance must also be understood in terms of a resistance to, and renouncement of, the manner in which those plans of
organisation promulgate an account of the fundamental identity of all human beings, an account of the supposedly deep truth within us all, and do so in terms of a universal and essential condition of disposssession, privation or lack from which we can be redeemed. This is to say that the resistance ought to be understood as a resistance to manner in which plans of organisation provide the hope of salvation from an ostensible condition of privation, and seek to circumscribe an awareness of the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings by instructing the individual to actualise their present possibilities in accordance with the form of life promulgated by that plan of organisation.

Resistance to the inheritance and the perpetuation of the nihilistic reaction against Life, however, a resistance that necessitates a renouncement of the adherence to both the objective and the subjective aspects of a given plan of organisation, ought to be understood as particularly challenging. Indeed, Deleuze notes that the loss of security that the objective and subjective aspects of a plan of organisation provide, the loss of those ready answers to questions concerning the meaning, purpose and direction that our lives ought to take, can potentially be so difficult for some individuals that not only may they be unable to engage in the resistance to the nihilism that characterises plans of organisation, but it may even be preferable for some to continue to adhere to a plan of organisation and the nihilistic notions of which it is composed. Moreover, to the extent that it has been suggested that one of the salient features of contemporary, Western modernity is an increasing incredulity towards those nihilistic plans of organisation that are part of our cultural and coexistent past, such as Christianity, Hegelianism and Marxism, I argued that resistance ought
not to be understood exclusively in terms of a resistance to the perpetuation of, and adherence to, any overarching account of the objective organisation of reality that appeals to a vertical and/or horizontal transcendence. Rather, the notion of resistance must also be understood in terms of both a sensitivity to, and vigilance against, the manner in which the nihilistic reaction against Life that characterises plans of organisation is able to adopt new forms and new configurations that continue to occlude and constrain the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings. This is to say that resistance to nihilism is also to be understood in terms of a resistance to the emergence, adherence and perpetuation of new nihilistic plans of organisation, such as psychoanalysis, that propagates an account of the subjective organisation of every individual’s psychic reality that is no longer bound to the overarching, objective organisation of reality, and the notions of vertical transcendence and/or horizontal transcendence, that characterises traditional plans of organisation such as Christianity, Hegelianism and Marxism. In addition, I proposed that resistance to nihilism is to be understood in terms of a resistance to the manner in which nihilism manifests itself in increasingly mobile, fluid configurations, in a profusion of broad representational categories or segments that are no longer bound to the universal accounts of the objective and/or subjective organisation of reality that characterise Christianity, Hegelianism, Marxism and psychoanalysis.

Finally, I argued that to respond to Christianity, Hegelianism, Marxism, psychoanalysis and the increasingly mobile representational categories by which people come to be identified with a decisive ‘no’ is an important feature of the notion of resistance, but to simply continue to say no is to be understood as a
minimum and limited form of resistance. Beyond this minimum form, however, and understood within the context of the three syntheses of time, resistance to the nihilistic reaction against Life also entails that the individual employs the vast cultural and coexistent past that is constituted by Habit and Memory as a resource, and does so in order to animate and inspire their present concerns, an exploration, discovery and creative employment of the strategies, techniques and practices that individuals and groups have employed in the past as they attempted to explore their present possibilities for living otherwise. In addition, I suggested that Deleuze’s work also entails that this employment of the past is not simply concerned with employing the vast cultural and coexistent past as a resource, but is also concerned with the manner in which the individual’s own continually contracted and coexistent past can be employed to facilitate the exploration of their present possibilities for living otherwise. Formulated within the context of Deleuze’s imperative to will the event, the employment of the individual’s own specific past does not seek to ignore or deny those often contingent events that have befallen the individual and that seemingly restrict the individual’s present possibilities for living otherwise, such as an event of suffering, illness or injury, and neither does it seek to respond to those events by considering them as unjust, unfair or unwarranted. On the contrary, understood within the context of the imperative to will the event, the notion of resistance entails that when a seemingly restrictive event befalls the individual, an event that seems to obstruct, divert or negate the exploration of their present possibilities for living otherwise, then the challenge that the individual confronts is to actively engage with, and creatively transform, that which occurs, to respond to those events that would seem to restrict their present possibilities
with a decisive yes and, in saying yes, affirm those events precisely as opportunities for exploring new present possibilities for living otherwise.
Notes

1 Miller, Sexus, p. 313. Deleuze & Guattari employ this quote by Miller in Anti-Oedipus (p. 334, 400).
2 The accusation that we do not live life to the full, where this is understood as failing to see, let alone explore the possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings can be evidenced in Deleuze’s work on Spinoza and, in particular, with the dramatic declaration that: ‘We do not live, we only lead a semblance of life; we can only think of how to keep from dying, and our whole life is a death worship’ (Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 26, 40). Similarly, in Dialogues, Deleuze suggests that: ‘In vain someone says, ‘What misfortune death is’; for one would need to have lived to have something to lose’ (p. 61, 76).
3 The intensity of this accusation, however, should not be underestimated. For example, in discussing Primo Levi’s suggestion that the Nazi’s concentration camps have given us a sense of shame at being human, Deleuze proposes that ‘we can feel shame at being human in utterly trivial situations too; in the face of too great a vulgarization of thinking, in the face of TV entertainment, of a ministerial speech, of “jolly people” gossiping’ (Negotiations, p. 172, 233).

[In the extreme situations described by Primo Levi that we can experience the shame of being human. We also experience it in insignificant conditions, before the meanness and vulgarity of existence that haunts democracies, before the propagation of those modes of existence and of thought-for-the-market, and before the values, ideals, and opinions of our time. The ignominy of the possibilities of life that we are offered appears from within. We do not feel ourselves outside of our time but continue to undergo shameful compromises with it (What is Philosophy?, pp. 107-108, 103).

4 Deleuze & Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 503, 628.
6 Deleuze, ‘Immanence: A Life,’ p. 27.
7 Capra, ‘Complexity and Life,’ p. 34.
8 Capra, ‘Complexity and Life,’ pp. 33-34.
11 Capra, ‘Complexity and Life,’ pp. 35-36.
12 Gleick, Chaos, pp. 132-153.
15 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 409, 509.
18 Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype, pp. 4-5.
19 Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype, p. 213.
20 Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype, p. 213.


Colebrook, ‘Deleuze and the Meaning of Life,’ p. 129.

Colebrook, ‘Deleuze and the Meaning of Life,’ p. 129.

Indeed, Deleuze’s earliest works were informed by and innovatively reformed the work of a number of figures from the philosophical tradition, and he continued to employ the philosophical tradition in this manner throughout his work. For example, in *Difference and Repetition* - which Williams has referred to as Deleuze’s masterwork and one of the great philosophical works of the twentieth century (Gilles Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition*, p. 1) - Deleuze provides, amongst other things, a sustained exposition of his ontological account that draws upon, challenges and reforms a diverse range of figures from the philosophical tradition, including Aristotle, Plato, Duns Scotus, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and Bergson.


Simply put, against what he sees as the commonly accepted image of Deleuze as a thinker of difference and multiplicity, indeed as the thinker that seeks to liberate difference and multiplicity from all forms of identity and homogeneity, Badiou proposes that Deleuze’s philosophy is primarily a thought of the One rather than the Many. As he makes clear: ‘Deleuze’s fundamental problem is most certainly not to liberate the multiple but to submit thinking to a renewed concept of the One’ (*The Clamour of Being*, p. 10)

Thus, Badiou asks: ‘What is it in Deleuze that fixes the thought of being to its Nietzschean name, life? This: that being must be evaluated as a power, but as an impersonal, or neutral, power’ (*Of Life as Name of Being*, or, Deleuze’s Vitalist Ontology,* p. 193). Indeed, Badiou suggests that Deleuze gives a multiplicity of names to Being which has led, in part, to the misinterpretations of Deleuze’s work as a thought of the Many and ‘the anarchic multiple of desires’ (*The Clamour of Being*, p. 28).

Although I shall not pursue it in this study, Olma and Koukouzelis have also recently suggested that life may be productively understood in ontological terms which they present as ‘an attempt to liberate life from the disciplinary confines of the (life-) sciences and to develop – among other things – a response to the collapse of the nature-culture dichotomy’ (‘Introduction: Life’s (Re-)Emergences,’ p. 4). In doing so, they chart the manner in which life has been conceptualised in terms of an ‘ontology of morphogenesis’, where this is to be understood in terms of ‘a purely relational ontology of moving forces that throws up ephemeral forms soon to be drowned again in the process’ (p. 3).


For an overview of the meaning of the Stoic imperative to live in accordance with nature, for example, Schofield, ‘Stoic Ethics,’ pp. 239-247, and Sellars, *Stoicism*, pp. 125-129.


However, as Sellars suggests, it is possible to give two quite different readings of the Stoics’ account of nature. The first would focus on the role of *pneuma* as an impersonal force that, in various degrees of tension, forms the material objects of Nature, while the second would see the Stoics as pantheists who conceive of God as the providential ruling force in Nature. Sellars notes, however, that the Stoics are to be understood as thoroughgoing naturalists insofar as God is the term that they identify with *pneuma*, but this pneuma is much more than, for example, an impersonal magnetic or gravitational force; rather, it is to be understood as a conscious and rational, organising principle (Sellars, *Stoics*, pp. 81-106).

Diogenes Laerius, ‘Lives and Opinions of the Philosophers,’ VII 88. In addition, the manner in which living in accordance with nature appears to suggest a fixed, overarching plan of how our life’s possibilities ought to be actualised can be seen in the Stoics’ threefold...


distinction between things that are good, things that are bad and things that are indifferent. Things that are classified as good are those things and actions that contribute to our preservation as rational beings, bad things and actions are those which detract from this preservation, while indifferent things are those things which cannot guarantee us happiness, such as great wealth or a good reputation. In particular, Stoic ethics entails that we ought to focus our attention on doing that which preserves us as rational beings, avoid that which detracts from this preservation and give considerably less attention to the pursuit of indifferents (Sellars, *Stoics*, pp. 110-114).

47 Deleuze’s opposition to an ontological account characterised by a definite, fixed determination can be discerned in his rejection of what he sees as philosophy’s historical preoccupation with the verb *etre* (to be) and with its attempt to determine what being ‘IS’ (see, for example, *Dialogues*, p. 56, 70; *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 25, 37). In contrast, Life - understood as the name that he attributes to his dynamic ontological account - cannot be characterised in terms of the verb *etre*, in terms of IS, because Life is continually becoming more than it IS at any given moment, and should therefore be discussed in terms of the conjunction *et* (AND). Thus, Deleuze advocates: ‘Thinking with AND, instead of thinking IS, instead of thinking for IS…Try it, it is a quite extraordinary thought, and yet it is life’ (Colebrook, *Deleuze and the Meaning of Life*, p. 7).

48 Deleuze’s most systematic treatment of the passive synthesis of time is carried out in chapter two of *Difference and Repetition*, ‘Repetition for Itself’, pp. 70-128, 96-168.

49 I write Deleuze’s ‘Spinozist concept of expression’, rather than ‘Spinoza’s concept of expression’ in so far as the concept of expression, as Deleuze acknowledges, is not defined or deduced by Spinoza (Expressionism in Philosophy: *Spinoza*, p. 19, 15). Despite this, Deleuze provides a reading of Spinoza in which he sees the notion of expression ‘at work within’ Spinoza’s *Ethics*, as that which ‘animates’ that work without being explicitly or immediately present in his model of demonstrative rationality. Indeed, in considering Deleuze’s philosophical ‘encounter’ with Spinoza, Macherey has suggested that: ‘To analyse Spinoza’s philosophy in terms of expression, to see it as expressive, in the sense defined by a certain conception of ‘expressionism in philosophy’, was clearly to introduce a new version of Spinozism that was at variance, if not completely at odds, with the model of demonstrative rationality explicitly adopted by Spinoza himself’ (‘The Encounter with Spinoza,’ p. 141).

50 Deleuze’s most detailed treatment of Bergson’s work and, in particular, his exposition and development of Bergson’s notion of *duree* or duration for his own purposes can be found in his *Bergsonism*. For a detailed account of the influence of Bergson for Deleuze, and how Deleuze’s work can be understood as a Bergsonism, see Boundas, ‘Deleuze-Bergson: an Ontology of the Virtual’.

51 As this suggests, and as I shall discuss in detail in section two of this study, Deleuze identifies the third synthesis of time with his reading of Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal return (see *Difference and Repetition*, p. 90, 122).

52 Thus, in his formulation of the manner in which human beings are a part of, and derive their nature from, the universe at large, Epictetus famously suggested we are all ‘citizens of the cosmos’ (Epicetus, ‘Discourses,’ II 10.3).

53 For example, in describing Seneca’s account of the human being’s investigation into the nature of their own being, Foucault makes it clear that: ‘What is actually involved in this real investigation is understanding the rationality of the world in order to recognize, at that point, that the reason that presided over the organisation of the world, and which is God’s reason itself, is of the same kind as the reason we possess that enables us to know it’ (The Hermeneutics of the Subject, p. 281).

54 Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, II 2. On the priority of reason over the flesh and the breath, he goes on to suggest that: ‘As one already on the threshold of death, think nothing of the first - of its viscid blood, its bones, its web of nerves and veins and arteries. The breath, too; what is that? A whiff of wind; and not even the same wind, but every moment puffed out and drawn in anew. But the third, Reason, the master - on this you must concentrate’ (*Meditations*, II 2).
In particular, Foucault proposes that: ‘I don’t think one can find any normalization in, for instance, the Stoic ethics. The reason is, I think, that the principal aim, the principal target of this kind of ethics was an aesthetic one. First, this kind of ethics was only a problem of personal choice… The reason for making this choice was the will to live a beautiful life, and to leave to others memories of a beautiful existence’ (Foucault, ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics,’ p. 254).

Foucault, ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics,’ p. 266. Similarly, in the same text he writes that: ‘You can see, for instance, in the Stoics, how they move slowly from an idea of the aesthetics of existence to the idea that we must do such and such things because we are rational beings - as members of the human community, we must do them’ (p. 264).

Of course, Foucault and Deleuze can be understood as having held each others work in high regard with the former famously suggesting that ‘perhaps one day, this century will be known as Deleuzian’ (‘Theatrum Philosophicum,’ p. 165), while the latter, apart from writing a monograph on Foucault, suggested that: ‘I still think he’s the greatest thinker of our time’ (Negotiations, p. 102, 139).

On the manner in which Foucault’s work is concerned with exposing any seemingly universal condition as historical and contingent see Deleuze, Foucault, pp. 114-115, 121-123.

Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ p. 315.

Foucault is not, of course, suggesting that we therefore abandon rationality. Rather, he is concerned with engaging in a critical examination of what we understand rationality to be and to show that rationality can itself produce irrationality, that rationality is not diametrically opposed to irrationality and therefore the standard against which irrationality is determined. Indeed, he suggests that: ‘I think that the central issue of philosophy and critical thought since the eighteenth century has always been, still is, and will, I hope, remain the question: What is this Reason we use? What are its historical effects? What are its limits, and what are its dangers? How can we exist as rational beings, fortunately committed to practicing a rationality that is unfortunately crucially cross-advanced by intrinsic dangers’ (‘Space, Knowledge, and Power,’ p. 249).


Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power,’ p. 212.

Indeed, Foucault explicitly rejects any notion of a ‘true self’ in his comments of what he refers to as ‘the Californian cult of the self’ in which ‘one is supposed to discover one’s true self, to separate it from that which might obscure or alienate it, to decipher its truth thanks to psychological or psychoanalytic science’ (‘On the Genealogy of Ethics,’ p. 271). In particular, as a consequence of not possessing a true self, he suggests that ‘we have to create ourselves as a work of art’, that we have to engage with the personal problem of which possibilities of living to actualise which he acknowledges is similar to Nietzsche’s claim [in The Gay Science, 290] that we should give style to one’s character (‘On the Genealogy of Ethics,’ p. 262).

Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ pp. 315-316.

May, Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction, p. 9.


Thus, Foucault suggests that this critical examination of that which has been presented as the nature of human being, this historical investigation into those supposed universal structures that have obliged us to constitute our being in specific ways - what he refers to as a ‘critical ontology of ourselves’ - ought to be understood ‘as a historico-practical test of the limits we may go beyond, and thus as work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings’ (‘What is Enlightenment?’ p.316).

As Deleuze & Guattari suggest, commonly: ‘We think the universal explains, whereas it is what must be explained’ (What is Philosophy?, p. 49, 51). Indeed, this is a key element in how Deleuze, in the English language edition of Dialogues, distinguishes and aligns himself with what he refers to as empiricism in opposition to what he refers to as so-called rationalist philosophies; this is to say that while empiricism is to be understood as that which seeks to explain the emergence of that which is presented as eternal or universal, rationalism starts with eternal or universal abstractions and ‘looks for the process by which they are embodied in the world which they make conform to their requirements’ (p. vii).


Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 169, 153.
Against the tendency to diminish the importance of Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza as a book that deals with the history of philosophy in contrast, for example, to Difference and Repetition in which Deleuze ‘speaks in his own name’, Piercey has suggested that Deleuze’s thought, and his ontology in particular, cannot be adequately understood outside the context of Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (‘The Spinoza-intoxicated man: Deleuze on expression,’ p. 269).

Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 122, 164.

Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics,’ 1003b 15-25. In suggesting that there is a ‘science’ which investigates being qua being, Aristotle is suggesting that there is a philosophical field of inquiry that is concerned with beings, with every thing that exists, and is concerned exclusively with every thing that exists in relation to the very fact of its existing, a field of study that is concerned with ‘existing things qua existing’ (‘Metaphysics,’ I 1005b 10). The important word qua is commonly rendered into English as ‘in the capacity of’ or ‘in so far as’ (Cohen et al., Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy, p. 703), and so to study existing things qua existing, to study being qua being, is to inquire about the ‘attributes’, ‘properties’ or ‘characteristics’ that belong to existing things by virtue of the very fact that they exist, by virtue of the fact that they ‘have being’ or that they are. The philosophical field of study that investigates being qua being therefore possesses a high degree of generality for it not only studies those things under their most general aspect (i.e. precisely as things that exist), but also studies those things. In short, a good copy of a Form is said to possess an internal resemblance to its Form, while a bad copy or simulacrum bears an external resemblance but an internal difference to the Form - a distinction that Deleuze illustrates with the catechism (Difference and Repetition, p. 127, 167; Logic of Sense, p. 257, 297) and which Plato discusses in the ‘Sophist’ with the distinction between likeness (good copy) and semblance (simulacra) (236b-236c). What is important here for Deleuze is that while Plato attempts to account for simulacra in his theory of Forms, the manner in which simulacra are to be understood as possessing an internal difference to the Form actually entails that it cannot cogently be made to fit into the Form/copy schema, depending as it does on internal resemblance. As Deleuze makes clear: ‘The simulacrum is built upon a disparity or a upon a difference. It internalizes a dissimilarity. That is why we can no longer define it in relation to a model imposed on the copies, a model of the Same from which the copies’ resemblance derives. If the simulacrum still has a model, it is another model, a model of the Other (l’Autre) from which there flows an internalized dissemblance’ (Logic of Sense, p. 258, 297).

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 128, 167.

Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 256, 295.

See, for example, Cohen et al. Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy, p. 94; Gottlieb, The Dream of Reason, pp. 171-173.


In the ‘Timaeus,’ for example, Plato proposes that while there is one type of being, the Forms, that are always ‘the same, uncreated and indestructible’ and which are grasped by the intelligence, there is another type of being that is ‘created, always in motion, becoming in
place and again vanishing out of place, which is apprehended by opinion jointly with sense’ (51e-52a).

92 For Socrates pursuit of the definitions of piety, temperance and courage, see Plato’s ‘Euthyphro,’ ‘Charmides,’ and ‘Laches’ respectively.

93 On the introduction of the theory of Forms and the notion of participation, Aristotle notes the high degree of similarity between Plato and the ideas of the Pythagoreans and suggests that: ‘Only the name ‘participation’ was new; for the Pythagoreans say that things exist by ‘imitation’ of numbers, and Plato says they exist by participation, changing the name’ (‘Metaphysics,’ 987b 0-15).

94 See, for example, Plato’s ‘Republic,’ 476a-476e, and ‘Timaeus,’ 52a.

95 Plato, ‘Republic,’ 596b-c.

96 Plato, ‘Republic,’ 597a-b.

97 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 62, 87. In addition, Deleuze proposes that the manner in which the Forms are to be understood as immutable foundations is made clear by the Neo-Platonic distinction of the Imparticipable, the Participated and the Participants, where the Form is to be understood as the imparticipable ground that nevertheless provides the participants or particular sensible things with a given quality to be participated in (Difference and Repetition, p. 62, 87; The Logic of Sense, p. 255, 294).

98 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 137-138, 179-180. In particular, representation is said to have a quadripartite character in so far as difference is subjected and subordinated to identity, opposition, analogy and resemblance, ‘the identity of the concept, the opposition of predicates, the analogy of judgement and the resemblance of perception’ (Difference and Repetition, p. 34, 52).

99 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 30-35, 45-52.

100 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 42-50, 61-71.

101 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 126-127, 165. In Plato’s famous allegory of the cave (‘Republic,’ 514a-517c), the superior Form, the Form of the Good, is identified with the image of the sun and has been presented as that which ‘illuminates’ all other Forms in the intelligible world and thereby makes ‘visible’ correct conduct in the sensible world (Gottlieb, The Dream of Reason, pp. 189-190). Indeed, Plato writes that the Form of the Good is the ‘author of light and itself in the intelligible world being the authentic source of truth and reason, and that anyone who is to act wisely in private or public must have caught sight of this’ (‘Republic,’ 517c). However, the Form of the Good can also be understood as the superior identity that the various Forms or Ideas themselves participate in and obtain their being from. This is to say that the Form of the Good can be understood as the Form of the Forms such that each Form belongs to the superior identity that is possessed by the Form of the Good. Indeed, in his interpretation of the allegory of the cave, Heidegger makes it clear that: ‘The expression “the idea of the good” - which is all too misleading for modern thinking - is the name for that distinctive idea which, as the idea of ideas, is what enables everything else. [It is in this idea that]…the essence of the idea comes to its fulfilment, i.e., begins to be, so that from it there also first arises the possibility of all other ideas’ (‘Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,’ p. 175).

102 It is in his application of the Neo-Platonic distinction between ‘the Imparticipable, the Participated, and the Participants’ to Plato’s theory of Forms that Deleuze can also be understood as illustrating the manner in which the Forms subordinate difference to identity, the manner in which difference is dependent upon and defined in relation to identity. In this distinction, the Form is to be understood as an imparticipable ground or superior identity in so far as it never ‘goes outside itself’ or receives anything ‘into itself’, but is instead supposed to provide something to be participated in; namely, the participated or its quality which is given to the participants or copies. For example, the Form of Justice is the imparticipable ground or superior identity that provides the quality of justice, that to be participated in, while the varying multitude or participants, to varying degrees of difference, lay claim to that quality. Therefore, Deleuze notes that the imparticipable ground or superior identity of the Form is to be understood as ‘a test which permits claimants to participate in greater or lesser degree in the object of the claim. In this sense the ground measures and makes the difference’ (Difference and Repetition, p. 62, 87).

103 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 127, 166.

104 Thus, Deleuze proposes that ‘the principle of participation was always sought by Plato on the side of what participates. It usually appears as an accident supervening on what is
participated from outside, as a violence suffered by what is participated’ (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 169, 153).


In contrast to Plato’s theory of Forms, therefore, the Neo-Platonists, and Plotinus in particular, start from ‘the highest point, subordinating imitation to a genesis or production, and substituting the idea of a gift for that of a violence’ (Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 170, 154).

Plotinus, ‘Enneads,’ V 1 (10) 6.

In fact, Plotinus speaks of the One above Being that, in so far as it confers the attribute of Being on all sensible beings, is itself transcendent to Being. As Beistegui has made clear: ‘When Plotinus says that the One has “nothing in common” with the things that come after it (‘Enneads,’ V, 5, 4), it is to emphasize the fact that the emanative cause is higher than, not the effect alone, but also that which it grants the effect with. And this is precisely the reason why the One, and not Being, is identified as the primary cause: since it grants all beings with their being, it is necessarily beyond being’ (The Vertigo of Immanence: Deleuze’s Spinozism’, p. 93).


Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 171, 155.

Plotinus, ‘Enneads,’ V 3 (49) 16.

Plotinus, ‘Enneads,’ V 3 (49) 15.


As Smith suggests: ‘The Christian concept of God was the inheritor of the Platonic ‘Good’ and the neoplatonic ‘One’, which were ‘above’ or ‘beyond’ Being—that is, transcendent to Being’ (‘The doctrine of univocity: Deleuze’s ontology of immanence’, p. 170).

St. Augustine, Confessions, VII 9.

As the gospel according to John states: ‘All things came into being through Him, and without Him not one thing came into being. What has come into being in Him was life’ (John, 1: 3-4).

McGrath, Christian Theology, p. 224.

May, Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction, p. 33.

St. Augustine, Confessions, VII 10.

‘So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them’ (Genesis, 1: 27-28).

In particular, Deleuze suggests that ‘man is in the image and likeness of God, but through sin we have lost the likeness while remaining in the image’ (Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 127, 167).


While it is primarily the concept of expression that Deleuze discerns and celebrates in the work of Spinoza, Deleuze’s admiration for Spinoza’s work generally cannot be overstated. Indeed, he refers to Spinoza variously as the ‘absolute philosopher’ (Negotiations, p. 140, 191), the ‘prince’ of philosophers (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 11) and even ‘the Christ of philosophers’ (Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 60, 59).

Indeed, on Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza, Badiou has suggested that: ‘Spinoza was a point of intersection but “his” [Deleuze’s] Spinoza was (and still is) for me an unrecognizable creature’ (The Clamour of Being, p. 1). As Macherey proposes, however, Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza is not to be understood as seeking to provide a faithful representation of that philosophy from, as it were, a static point of view, but ‘it is rather a question of dynamically producing, rather than reproducing, the intellectual movement through which this philosophy has become what it is’ (‘Deleuze in Spinoza’, pp. 119-120). In order to understand this, in order to understand the manner in which Deleuze creatively engages with Spinoza’s Ethics in order to discern the concept of expression which he sees as animating that work, it is valuable to note Deleuze’s approach to the history of philosophy in general. In particular, he proposes that, for him, the process of providing a reading of other philosophers is analogous to painting in so far as ‘you have to create a likeness, but in a different material: the likeness is something you have to produce, rather than a way of reproducing anything (which comes down to just repeating what a philosopher says)’ (Negotiations, pp. 135-136, 186). Therefore, while Deleuze’s reading of others can be
understood as a creative and productive process, it is not a reckless or arbitrary one in so far as its creativity consists in attempting to discern what is ‘between the lines’, as it were, of a philosopher’s work. It is in this sense that we can understand Deleuze’s suggestion that his monographs of figures from the history of philosophy resulted in ‘monstrous children’, for although what was produced had a filiation with the philosopher in question ‘the child was bound to be monstrous too, because it resulted from all sorts of shifting, slipping, dislocations, and hidden emissions that I really enjoyed’ (Negotiations, p. 6, 15).

Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 19, 15.

For example, Deleuze writes that: ‘The idea of expression is neither defined nor deduced by Spinoza, nor could it be. It appears as early as the sixth Definition, but is there no more defined than it serves to define anything’ (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 19, 15).

Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 17, 13.

Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 20, 16.

Spinoza, Ethics, ID6, P19.

Spinoza, Ethics, IP1-IP2. In suggesting that Thought and Extension are the attributes of God or substance, Llyod has noted the challenge that Spinoza’s conception of God presents to orthodox understandings in so far as the attributes of the Divine ‘cease to be properties of a transcendent God and become instead ways in which reality is construed, articulated or expressed’ (Spinoza and the Ethics, p. 31).


For example, Spinoza makes it clear that ‘the thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute, now under that’ (Ethics, IIP7S).

Spinoza, Ethics, IP28. As Deleuze suggests: ‘Substance first expresses itself in its attributes, each attribute expressing an essence. But then attributes express themselves in their turn: they express themselves in their subordinate modes, each such mode expressing a modification of the attribute’ (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 14, 10).

Spinoza, Ethics, IIP1-2; May, Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction, p. 33.

Deleuze writes that ‘the first level of expression must be understood as the very constitution, a genealogy almost, of the essence of substance. The second must be understood as the very production of particular things’ (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 14, 10).


Wasser, ‘Deleuze’s expressionism,’ p. 50.

Spinoza, Ethics, IV preface.


Spinoza, Ethics, IP29S.

Wasser, ‘Deleuze’s expressionism,’ p. 50.

Indeed, in highlighting the importance of the Spinozist concept of expression and, in particular, the manner in which it seeks to overcome schemas of transcendence, Deleuze notes that: ‘The significance of Spinozism seems to me this: it asserts immanence as a principle and frees expression from any subordination to emanative or exemplary causality. Expression itself no longer emanates, no longer resembles anything’ (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 180, 164).

As Deleuze makes clear, ‘the essence of substance has no existence outside the attributes that express it’ (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 42, 34).

Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 105, 91.

Beistegui, ‘The vertigo of immanence: Deleuze’s Spinozism,’ p. 90.

Beistegui, ‘The vertigo of immanence: Deleuze’s Spinozism,’ p. 91

Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 175, 159.

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 40, 59.

For example, at the beginning of the Ethics Spinoza stresses the essential and conceptual independence of substance, on its being ‘prior in nature to its affections’ (IP1), and on its being understood as ‘what is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed’ (ID3).


For example, Goodchild has proposed that: ‘The danger of Deleuze’s use of Spinoza...is that the concept of God may be smuggled back in’ (‘Why is philosophy so compromised with God?’ p. 161).

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 40, 59.
In particular, he writes that: ‘To explicate is to evolve, to involve is to implicate. Yet the two terms are not opposites; they simply mark two aspects of expression’ (Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 16, 12).

Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 16, 12.

Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 16, 12.

May, Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction, p. 38.

For example, in The Logic of Sense Deleuze writes that ‘Being is Voice’ (p. 179, 210), while in Difference and Repetition, and perhaps most famously, he suggests that: ‘A single voice raises the clamour of being’ (p. 35, 52).

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 36, 53.


In Difference and Repetition, of course, Deleuze famously asserts that: ‘There has only ever been one ontological proposition: Being is univocal’ (p. 35, 52).


Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 178, 162.

Indeed, May has suggested that: ‘What univocity implies is not that everything is the same, or that there is a principle of the same underlying everything, but, instead, precisely the opposite’ (‘Difference and Unity in Gilles Deleuze,’ p. 43).

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 36, 53.

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 36, 53. It is worth noting that Aristotle also proposed an ‘interplay’ between difference and unity in his assertion that: ‘There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, but all that ‘is’ is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to ‘be’ by a mere ambiguity’ (Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics,’ 10003a 30-35).

Badiou’s primary critique of Deleuze’s ontology is carried out in The Clamour of Being, an excellent summary and critique of which is given by May in ‘Badiou and Deleuze on the One and the Many’. Moreover, while this critique of Deleuze’s ontology is often the focus of Badiou’s engagement with Deleuze, the former also raises political questions against the latter’s philosophy (‘One, Multiple, Multiplicities,’ p. 69), and also how that philosophy implies an ‘ascetic conception of thought’ that is opposed to spontaneity (‘Of Life as Name of Being, or, Deleuze’s Vitalist Ontology,’ p. 195).

For example, identifying expressive Being with Deleuze’s notion of the virtual, Badiou states that: ‘Early in the spring of 1993, I raised the objection to Deleuze that the category of the virtual seemed to me to maintain a kind of transcendence, transposed, so to speak, “beneath” the simulacra of the world, in a sort of symmetrical relation to the “beyond” of classical transcendence’ (The Clamour of Being, p. 45).

Badiou, The Clamour of Being, p. 27.

The primary doublets that Badiou identifies throughout Deleuze’s work include time and truth, chance and the eternal return and the fold and the outside (The Clamour of Being, p. 28).

Badiou, The Clamour of Being, p. 42

Sherman, ‘No werewolves in theology? Transcendence, immanence, and becoming-divine in Gilles Deleuze,’ p. 3.

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 208, 269.

Thus, he writes that: ‘The virtual is the very Being of beings, or we can even say that it is beings qua Being, for beings are but modalities of the One, and the One is the living production of its modes’ (The Clamour of Being, p. 47).

Badiou, The Clamour of Being, p. 42.

As he proposes: ‘Even when successively thought of as distinct from the possible, absolutely real, completely determined and as a strict part of the actual object, the virtual cannot, qua ground, accord with the univocity of the Being-One….In this circuit of thought, it is the two and not the One that is instated’ (Badiou, The Clamour of Being, p. 52).

Badiou, The Clamour of Being, p. 50.

Badiou, The Clamour of Being, p. 52.

Similarly, in summarising Badiou’s critique of Deleuze, May has suggested that: ‘If the virtual is indistinguishable from the actual, then that can only mean either that the virtual has taken on the ‘simulacral’ (if I may be permitted that unwieldy adjective) character of the actual, in which case it is no longer a ground for the actual [i.e. the virtual ground
collapses into actual beings]; or, alternatively, if the virtual remains the ground of the actual, then the object must be thought purely in terms of the virtual, and the actual becomes merely epiphenomenal, a wisp of image overlaying the [transcendental] virtual and not actually existing’ ('Badiou and Deleuze on the One and the Many’, p. 72).

As I have indicated previously, Badiou maintains that confronted with the dichotomous choice between the One or the many, Deleuze ultimately chooses the former, establishing ‘a renewed concept of the One’ (The Clamour of Being, p. 10).

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 70, 97.
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 70-72, 96-99.
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 70-72, 96-99.
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 70, 97.

I am primarily thinking here of two notable examples: the first is the employment of a musical melody by Edmund Husserl to illustrate the character of ‘internal time consciousness’ and, in particular, the manner in which our lived experience is composed of what he refers to as ‘primal impressions’, ‘retentions’ and ‘protentions’ (Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, pp. 37-38). The second is the employment of a musical melody by Bergson to explicate his concept of ‘durée’, the durational nature of our conscious states in which - rather than being thought of as existing side by side in a discrete and separate manner - the succession of our conscious states are directly experienced or lived in such a way that our former conscious states endure, coexist and fuse into our present state (Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 100-101).

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 72, 98.
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 70, 96.
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 79, 108. As I shall discuss, the designation of the first synthesis of time as Habit should not be understood as suggesting that this synthesis is to be exclusively identified with our ‘everyday’ psychological habits.

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 70, 97.
Hughes, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, p. 105.
Turetzky, Time, p. 216.
Deleuze, ‘Bergson’s conception of difference,’’ p. 45, 64.
Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 100.
Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 121.
Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 101. In doing so, Bergson draws the important distinction between a continuous or qualitative multiplicity, and a discrete or quantitative multiplicity. This is to say that the durational nature of our conscious states are to be understood in terms of a continuous multiplicity to the extent that we have a multiplicity of conscious states that meld or that are continuous with one another. In contrast, the subsequent conceptualisation of those conscious states as discrete elements that sit alongside one another, the introduction of space and number into duration, entails a transformation of our conscious states into a discrete multiplicity. Thus, Bergson suggests that ‘the multiplicity of conscious states, regarded in its original purity, is not at all like the discrete multiplicity which goes to form number. In such a case there is, as we said, a qualitative multiplicity’ (Time and Free Will, p. 121).

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 71, 97.
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 70-71, 97.

Heidegger, Being and Time, 81: 422.
In Being and Time Heidegger writes that ‘for the ordinary understanding of time, time shows itself as a sequence of “nows” which are constantly “present-at-hand”, simultaneously passing away and coming along. Time is understood as succession, as a “flowing stream” of “nows”, as the “course of time” (81: 422).
Bergson’s account of durée appears in chapter two of Time and Free Will, pp. 75-139, while the virtual coexistence of the past with the present is famously represented by the cone diagram in chapter three of Matter and Memory, pp. 151-152.
Heidegger discusses the ecstatics of temporality in Being and Time, 65: 324-331.

My intention is not to provide an exposition of Husserl’s, Bergson’s and Heidegger’s accounts of time. Not only would it take us too far from the aims of this study, but it would
be to repeat work that has been done elsewhere. For example, an accessible and detailed exposition of Husserl’s account of time can be found in Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, pp. 130-145; a detailed exposition and critical discussion of Bergson’s account of time can be found throughout Ansell-Pearson’s, *Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual*; and an exposition and comparative analysis of Heidegger’s account of time with Husserl’s can be found in Dostal, ‘Time and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger,’ pp. 141-169.


Aristotle writes that ‘the ‘now’ which seems to be bound to the past and the future - does it always remain one and the same or is it always other and other? It is hard to say’ (‘Physics,’ 218a9). An accessible explication of Aristotle’s account of time can be found in Turetzky, *Time*, pp.18-29.

Durie, ‘Splitting time: Bergson’s philosophical legacy,’ p. 152.


Bauman, *Consuming Life*, pp. 31-35.

Baumann, *Consuming Life*, p. 32.

Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 70, 97. Similarly, he proposes that: ‘The past and the future do not designate instants distinct from a supposed present instant, but rather the dimensions of the present itself in so far as it is a contraction of instants’ (*Difference and Repetition*, p. 71, 97).

Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, p. 58, 53-54.

Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 81, 111.


Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 79, 108. As with Deleuze’s designation of the first synthesis of time as Habit, I shall suggest that the designation of the second synthesis of time as Memory should not be understood as suggesting that this synthesis is to be identified with our ‘everyday’ understanding of memory and, in particular, with the active or conscious recollection of past events.

Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 81,111.

Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 82, 111.


As Deleuze indicates (*Difference and Repetition*, p. 81, 110), his conceptualisation of the second synthesis of time as an a priori, contemporaneous past that is to be understood as a coexistent general region into which former presents pass, and from which they can be recollected, is heavily influenced by Bergson’s work in *Matter and Memory*. Indeed, in *Bergsonism* (pp. 54-57), Deleuze discusses at length ‘the admirable passage’ in *Matter and Memory* (pp. 133-134) in which Bergson discusses the virtual status of the coexistent past in general into which we place ourselves in order to recover a particular memory.

Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, pp. 81-82, 111.

Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition*, p. 94.


Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 79,108.

Hughes, Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition*, pp. 114-115.

Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, pp. 88-91, 119-123.

Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 88, 119.

Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, pp. 88-91, 119-123.

Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, pp. 89, 120.

Shakespeare, ‘Hamlet,’ Act I Scene 5.

Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 89, 120.

Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 88, 120.

Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 89, 120.

Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 89, 120.

Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 89, 120.

Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 89, 120.

The notion of the eternal return is introduced in *The Gay Science* with the following dramatic proclamation: ‘What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: ‘This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but
every pain and every joy and every thought and every sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence…” (341).

Both Kaufman (Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, pp. 316-333) and Schacht (Nietzsche, pp. 253-266) provide detailed discussions of the variety of formulations by which the eternal return has been understood.


Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 90, 122.

As May suggests: ‘For Deleuze, the eternal return is not as it might seem. It is not the eternal return of the same’ (Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction, p.59)

In particular, Deleuze suggests that: ‘To be sure, Nietzsche a few times made statements that remained at the level of the manifest content: the eternal return of the Same which brings about the return of the Similar’ (The Logic of Sense, p. 264, 305).

Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. xi. Deleuze repeats this objection to an understanding of the eternal return as the return of the same in Difference and Repetition (p. 299, 382).

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 90, 122

Ansell-Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual, p. 200.

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 90, 122.

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 41, 59. Similarly, he writes that ‘if eternal return is a circle, then Difference is at the centre and the Same is only on the periphery (Difference and Repetition, p. 55, 78).

If we consider the three syntheses of time within the context of our example of hearing a musical melody in the living present, then the first synthesis ensures that all the notes that have passed are contracted into the present, creating an expectation of future notes and the ongoing continuity of the melody, while the second synthesis ensures that each note of the melody is able to pass and, in retaining those notes in a coexistent past in general, is that which ensures that we are always able to recollect the melody’s past notes and phrases. The third synthesis of time, however, is that synthesis which ensures that we are always able to distinguish a new musical note in the living present, a musical note that is distinguishable from the notes that have passed and the notes that are expected, and it is this synthesis which ensures that we are always able to continually distinguish a new musical note in a continually or eternally renewed present moment.

Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, p. 102.

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 71, 97.


Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 73, 99-100.

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 73, 100.

Ansell-Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual, p. 186.

Deleuze, Bergsonism, pp. 48-49, 53.

Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 227.

Deleuze, Bergsonism, p. 34, 37.

Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 11.

Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 11.

Boundas, ‘Deleuze-Bergson: an Ontology of the Virtual.’

Hughes, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition.

Kerslake, ‘The Vertigo of Philosophy.’

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxvi-xviii.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A80/B106.

As Kant makes clear, ‘the categories refer to objects of experience necessarily and a priori, because only by means of them can any experiential object whatsoever be thought at all’ (Critique of Pure Reason, A93/B126).

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A51/B75.

Hughes, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, p. 96.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A77/B102.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A78/B103.

Burnham & Young, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, p. 78.

Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, p. 15, 25.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A107.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A116.
Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, p. 105, 128.

Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 135, 176-177.

Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, p. 105, 128.

Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, p. 105, 128. Similarly, in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, and in relation to Kant, Deleuze had proposed that: 'Transcendental philosophy discovers conditions which still remain external to the conditioned. Transcendental principles are principles of the conditioning and not of internal genesis' (p. 91, 104). However, in 'The Idea of Genesis in Kant's Esthetics', Deleuze indicates the presence of genetic constitution in Kant’s work, suggesting that 'the first two Critiques [Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason] point to a genesis which they are incapable of securing on their own. But in the esthetic Critique of Judgement, Kant poses the problem of genesis of the faculties in their original free agreement. Thus he uncovers the ultimate ground still lacking in the other two Critiques. Kant’s Critique in general ceases to be a simple conditioning to become a transcendental Education, a transcendental Culture, a transcendental Genesis' (p.61, 86).

Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, p. 98-99, 120.

Hughes, *Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation*, p. 8.

Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, p. 82, 110.

Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, p. 82, 110.


Turetzky, *Time*, p. 215. Similarly, May suggests that: 'Both the past and present exist, both are real, but the past exists virtually and the present is actualised from the virtuality of the past' (‘Badiou and Deleuze on the One and the Many’, p. 75).


Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 212, 274.

Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 212, 274.

Hughes, *Deleuze's Difference and Repetition*, p. 111.

Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p.xv.

Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p.xv.

Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 208, 269.

Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 209, 270.


Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, p. 149.


Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 91, 123.

Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 91, 122.

Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, p. 262, 303.

Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. 21, 25.


Williams, *Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition*, p. 102.

Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. xii.


Deleuze, ‘Nietzsche,’ p. 72.


Roberts, ‘Modernity, mental illness and the crisis of meaning,’ p. 279.


For example, in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze discerns at least three interconnected forms of nihilism in Nietzsche’s work, ‘negative’ nihilism, ‘reactive’ nihilism and ‘passive’ nihilism (p. 152, 174).

Thus, in ‘The Antichrist,’ Nietzsche writes: ‘God as the declaration of war against life, against nature, against the will to live! God - the formula for every slander against “this world,” for every lie about the “beyond”! God - the deification of nothingness, the will to nothingness pronounced holy!’ (18).


Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* p. 92, 89.

Williams, *Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition*, p. 102.

Deleuze & Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* p. 43, 46.

Cohen *et al.*, *Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, p. 10.

Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. 20, 23.

On the relationship between Anaximander’s and Parmenides’ philosophical accounts see, for example, Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, pp. 69-80.

Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. 21, 25.

Vattimo, ‘Toward a Nonreligious Christianity,’ p. 31.

Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, p. 39, 44.

For example, in characteristically strident terms, Nietzsche writes that: ‘On the heels of the “glad tidings” came the very worst: those of Paul…The life, the example, the doctrine, the death, the meaning and the right of the entire evangel - nothing remained once this hate-inspired counterfeiter realized what alone he could use’ (‘The Antichrist,’ 42).


Caputo, ‘Spectral Hermeneutics,’ p. 60.

May, ‘Philosophy as spiritual exercise in Foucault and Deleuze,’ p. 228.


Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. 15, 16-17.


Genesis, 3.1-22.

See, for example, Augustine, *The Enchiridion*, 27.

Borg, *Reading the Bible Again for the First Time*, p. 77.

Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. 20, 22-23.


Borg, *Jesus*, p. 4.

Vattimo, *Belief*, p. 25.

Vattimo, *Belief*, p. 24. Of course, while presenting it in a less moderated and considered manner, Nietzsche was aware of the human significance and, as it were, the functionality of religion, the manner in which it served to address a variety of human needs and appease a number of human fears. For example, he writes that: ‘To ordinary men, finally, the great majority, who exist for service and general utility and who may exist only for that purpose, religion gives an invaluable contentment with their nature and station, manifold peace of heart, an ennobling of obedience, one piece of joy and sorrow more to share with their fellows’ (*Beyond Good and Evil*, 61).

Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, p. 69


I am, of course, thinking here of the often quoted suggestion by Lyotard that ‘the postmodern’ ought to be defined as an ‘incredulity toward metanarratives’ (*The Postmodern Condition*, p. xxiv).

Vattimo, *Belief*, p. 28.

Young, *The Death of God and the Meaning of Life*, p. 79.


Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 233.

Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 18.


Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 788-808.

Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 233.


Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 801.

Marx, ‘Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1884,’ p. 84.


Young, *The Death of God and the Meaning of Life*, p. 78

Marx, ‘Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1884,’ p. 84.

Camus, *The Rebel*, p. 112.

Mark, 1: 15.

For an account of Paul’s eschatology see McGrath, *Christian Theology*, pp. 465-466.


Deleuze, *Spinoza’s Practical Philosophy*, p. 128, 172.

Holland, *Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus*, p.109.

Holland, *Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus*, p.109.

Young, *The Death of God and the Meaning of Life*, p. 75.

Marx, ‘Contribution to the critique of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*: Introduction,’ p. 53-55.


Deleuze, *Spinoza’s Practical Philosophy*, p. 128, 172.

In particular, following an account of ‘the deterioration’ of the Christian ideal to the modern belief in progress towards an arbitrarily determined ideal, Nietzsche concludes that: ‘*In summa*: one has transferred the arrival of the “kingdom of God” into the future, on earth, in human form - but fundamentally one has held fast to the belief in the *old* ideal’ (*The Will to Power*, 339).


Miller, *Sexus*, p. 312.


Indeed, part of Beckett’s admiration for Proust is attributable to the manner in which the pre-reflective persistence of the past with the present and its continued projection into the future is arrested in the works of the latter, the manner in which ‘the death of Habit and the brief suspension of its vigilance - abound in Proust’ (*Proust*, p. 23).


Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 212, 274.


As Badiou argues, one of the commonly accepted images of Deleuze is as that figure who is concerned with ‘liberating the anarchic multiple of desires and errant drifts’ (*The Clamour of Being*, p. 10).


Thus, Deleuze and Parnet write: ‘What are your rigid segments, your binary and overcoding machines...And what are the dangers if we blow up these segments too quickly? Wouldn’t this kill the organism itself...?’ (Dialogues, p. 143, 172).

For example, with reference to the ‘philosophy of life’ that he discerns in Spinoza, Deleuze writes that ‘it consists precisely in denouncing all that separates us from life, all these transcendent values that are turned against life...Life is poisoned by the categories of Good and Evil, of blame and merit, of sin and redemption’ (Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p. 26, 39).

Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, p. 62, 77.
Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche, pp. 34-35.
Levinas, Entre Nous, p. 83.
Roberts, ‘Capitalism, psychiatry, and schizophrenia: a critical introduction to Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus,’ pp. 114-127. In particular, this paper examines Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘desire’ and its employment in relation to subjectivity, time, capitalism, representation and the radical ‘therapeutic’ practice that they refer to as ‘schizoanalysis’. To the extent that the ‘dynamic’, ‘schizophrenic’ and ‘deterritorializing’ characteristics of ‘desire’ are subject to a ‘reactionary’ ‘arrest’ of its deterritorializing tendency, a process that Deleuze and Guattari refer to variously as ‘paranoia’ and ‘fascism’, then ‘schizoanalysis’ is to be understood in terms of a judicious ‘destruction’ and ‘forgetting’ of the repressive power of those representations or territorializations that coexist with, and encumber the present, by remembering to appropriate and employ those representations as the present preconditions from which to create or become something new.
Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 304, 362.
Rand, ‘Did women threaten the Oedipus complex between 1922 and 1933?’ p. 53. Indeed, in stressing the importance of the Oedipus complex to psychoanalysis, Freud made it clear that: ‘With the progress of psycho-analytic studies the importance of the Oedipus complex has become more and more clearly evident; its recognition has become the shibboleth that distinguishes the adherents of psycho-analysis from its opponents’ (‘Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality,’ p. 290).
On the similarly redemptive frameworks of Christianity, and religion more generally, and communism or Bolshevism in particular, Freud noted that: ‘In just the same way as religion, Bolshevism too must compensate its believers for the sufferings and deprivations of their present life by promises of a better future in which there will no longer be any unsatisfied need. This Paradise, however, is to be in this life, instituted on earth and thrown open within a foreseeable time’ (‘The Question of a Weltanschauung,’ p. 795).
Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 304, 362.
Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 101, 120.
Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 131, 163.
Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 38, 51.
Goodchild, Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction to the Politics of Desire, p. 74.
Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 304, 362.
Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 314, 374.
Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 131, 163.
See, for example, Dufresne, Killing Freud & Rand, ‘Did women threaten the Oedipus complex between 1922 and 1933?’ p 65.
Deleuze, Negotiations, p. 8, 18.
Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, p. 124, 151.
Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, p. 128, 155-156.
Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, p. 128, 156.
Roberts, ‘The production of the psychiatric subject: power, knowledge and Michel Foucault,’ pp. 33-42. In particular, this paper employs Foucault’s notions of ‘panopticism’
and ‘power-knowledge’ to examine the manner in which psychiatric knowledge is inextricably linked to power, and how psychiatric power-knowledge relations are central to the process by which human beings are made ‘psychiatric subjects’, subject to others by ‘control and dependence’ along with the manner in which a person’s subjective identity, who or what that person understands themselves to be, is produced by being ‘tied’ to a specific psychiatric identity through a ‘conscience or self-knowledge’. As such, Foucault’s work poses a fundamental and radical challenge to the theoretical foundations and associated diagnostic and therapeutic practices of psychiatry and mental health nursing; he not only calls into question the characterization of psychiatric knowledge as ‘objective’ and independent from power, but also introduces subtle relations of power into areas of contemporary mental health care that have been predominately characterized as ‘caring’, ‘therapeutic’ and free from power.

Elsewhere, I have recently explored this in relation to Deleuze’s employment of the Nietzschean notions of ‘active’ and ‘reactive force’ and the manner in which those notions can be employed to formulate an account of how the active participation of those people who use mental health services is inhibited. In particular, to the extent that active forces are those forces that seek to open up and affirm a person’s possibilities for existence, while reactive forces are those forces that seek to close down or negate a person’s possibilities for existence, then many psychiatric categories - as an expression and dynamic confluence of certain states of forces - can be understood as that which predominately possesses a negative or unproductive sense in so far as they seek to close down the possibilities for a person’s existence, inhibiting their growth, transformation and potential (Roberts, ‘Service user involvement and the restrictive sense of psychiatric categories,’ pp. 289-294).

For example, Derrida writes that ‘in a classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence of a vis-à-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), or has the upper hand’ (Positions, pp. 38-39). Similarly, Haraway has suggested that ‘certain dualisms have been persistent in Western traditions; they have all been systemic to the logics and practices of domination of women, people of colour, nature, workers, animals…Chief among these troubling dualisms are self/other, mind/body, culture/nature, male/female, civilized/primate, reality/appearance, whole/part, agent/resource, maker/made, active/passive, right/wrong, truth/illusion, total/partial, God/man’ (Simians, Cyborgs and Women, p. 177).

Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 292, 358.
Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 105, 133.
Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 292, 358.
Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 105, 133.
Irigaray, This Sex Which is Not One, p. 69.
Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, p. 128, 156.

However, even if an individual is defined in accordance with the representational categories or segments associated with ‘man’, then that individual’s open field of present possibilities for living otherwise continues to be occluded and circumscribed. This is to say that while coming to be identified, and coming to identify oneself, as ‘male’, ‘adult’, ‘white’, ‘rational’ and ‘heterosexual’ entails a position of superiority in relation to the corresponding binary oppositions that those segments foster, those representational categories continue to imply devices of power, normative standards and strictures. To the extent that the individual is identified, and comes to identify themselves, for example, as a rational, heterosexual male, then expectations persist about what the individual, as ‘rational’, ‘heterosexual’ and ‘male’, ought to say and how they ought to behave, and what they ought to refrain from saying and what they ought not to do, such that their forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise are delimited and organised into a form of life associated with those segments.

Indeed, in highlighting the multifarious, dynamic and continuous ways in which modern human beings are segmented, and therefore the manner in which the open field of present possibilities is continually circumscribed, Deleuze and Guattari write that:

‘We are segmented from all around and in every direction…We are segmented in a binary fashion, following the great major dualist oppositions: social classes, but also men-women, adults-children, and so on. We are segmented in a circular fashion, in ever larger circles, ever wider discs or coronas…my affairs, my neighbourhood’s
affairs, my city’s, my country’s, the world’s… We are segmented in a linear fashion, along a straight line or a number of straight lines, of which each segment represents an episode or “proceeding”: as soon as we finish one proceeding, we begin another, forever proceduring or procedured, in the family, in school, in the army, on the job’ (A Thousand Plateaus, p. 210, 256).

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 90, 121.
In particular, Foucault proposed that: ‘To say no is the minimum form of resistance. But, of course, at times that is very important. You have to say no as a decisive form of resistance’ (‘Sex, power, and the politics of identity,’ p. 168).
Melville, Bartleby and Benito Cereno, pp. 3-4.
Melville, Bartleby and Benito Cereno, p. 8.
Melville, Bartleby and Benito Cereno, p. 9.
Melville, Bartleby and Benito Cereno, p. 10.
Melville, Bartleby and Benito Cereno, p. 15.
Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, p. 73.
Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 143, 168.
Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 149, 174-175.
Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 143, 168.
Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, p.141.
Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, VII, 28.
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 199.
Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, p. 140.
Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 149, 175.
Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, p. 155.
Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, p. 155.
Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, pp. 149-150, 175.
Bogue, Deleuze’s Way: Essays in Transverse Ethics and Aesthetics, p. 9
Bousquet, Les Capitales, p. 103. On Deleuze’s repetition of Bousquet’s assertion see, for example, Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 148, 174; Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 159, 151 and Deleuze, ‘Immanence: A Life,’ pp. 31-32.
Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, p. 116.
Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, p. 80.
Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, p. 80.
For example, he writes that: ‘In my mind I took bus rides, unlocked the front door of my apartment, answered my telephone, switched on the electric lights. Our thoughts often centred on such details’ and, in doing so, helped ‘the prisoner find refuge from the emptiness, desolation and spiritual poverty of his existence, by letting him escape into the past’ (Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, p. 50).
Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, p. 80.
Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, p. 81.
Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 1041. To the extent that Deleuze makes reference to Nietzsche’s notion of amor fati within the context of his discussion of Bousquet’s wounding and paralysis (Logic of Sense, pp. 149-151, 175-177) then amor fati should not be understood as simply a love of fate or destiny, where this is understood as a resigned acceptance of that which has occurred, but ought to be understood in terms of a love of that which happens precisely as an opportunity to explore new present possibilities. As Williams has made clear, amor fati ‘is never a love of destiny, but always a love of the event. To love the event is never to accept it in its significance, or to seek to bend it in its entirety, or even
to make it deeper in its wounding...Instead it is to select something to be affirmed within
the physical event’ (Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, p. 156).


Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 66, 75.

Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 66, 75.

Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 173, 203.


Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological, p. 286.

As Canguilhem asserts: ‘The menace of disease is one of the components of health’ (The
Normal and the Pathological, p. 287).


As May makes clear, ‘it is transcendence that Badiou thinks haunts Deleuze’s thought...It is
the problem that threatens the entirety of Deleuze’s philosophical approach’ (‘Badiou and
Deleuze on the One and the Many,’ p. 70).
References


Irigaray, L. (1985) *This Sex Which is Not One* (tr. C. Porter), New York: Cornell University Press.


