A Genealogy of Immanence: 
From Democritus to Epicurus and Nietzsche

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement of Staffordshire University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

December 2012
Dedicated to my father from whom I have learned so much and continue to do so
Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge the support given to me by my academic supervisors Professor Doug Burnham and Dr. David Webb for their encouragement, support and guidance throughout my time at Staffordshire University.

Thanks also to my peers for their continual encouragement throughout. Particular thanks go to Georgios Papandreopoulos for his assistance and support, to Harvey Young for the many informative discussions over the years and to Adonis Frangeskou for his guidance and encouragement.

I would also like to thank my many friends for their support and encouragement.

Finally, I would like to thank my family: Brian, Susan, Daniel, James and Rachel Egan, Roy and Iris Bailey for their love, support, encouragement and financial aid throughout. I could not have done this without you.
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Abstract

The relationship between Epicurus and Nietzsche is an increasingly popular research topic. There are a number of publications that attempt to detail the nature of this relationship by investigating specific aspects of their writings that interrelate. Such research is valuable because it reveals an otherwise hidden dynamic to Nietzsche studies, however, all previous discourse on Epicurus and Nietzsche are limited because they fail to recognise both thinkers as philosophers of immanence. This thesis proposes that ‘immanence’ is the central concept that allows the influence of Epicurus upon Nietzsche’s thought to be revealed most appropriately. Furthermore, it proposes to account for the development of ‘immanence’ within the works of Epicurus and Nietzsche in order to disclose the nature of immanence itself.

By following Nietzsche’s genealogical method, this thesis will demonstrate that Epicurean immanence emerged through the conceptualisation of all existence within the cosmos and nature. Moreover, immanence developed as an atomistic response to the transcendent philosophies of Socrates and Aristotle which opposed Democritean materialism. Nietzsche recognised that the increasing popularity of Platonism in late antiquity led to the event of Christianity, which dominated Western thought until its success eventually destroyed the conditions that maintained it. Nietzsche predicted that in the light of Christianity’s demise, mankind would be plunged into a state of crisis and unparalleled nihilism. In response, he proposed that the body and spirit must be reunited in an act of overcoming, and those capable of that act would ‘inherit the earth’. Immanence for Nietzsche is this unifying act and inheritance, and he demonstrates that redemptive doctrines such as Epicurus’ ataraxia, modelled on nihilism, must be rejected and overcome by a philosophy modelled on ‘cheerfulness’. It is in this respect that his philosophy from The Gay Science onwards can be recognised as a discourse on immanence.
Abbreviations

Translations of Epicurean works are abbreviated as follows (unless otherwise stated):

**DL**   

**L**   

Translations of Nietzsche’s works are abbreviated as follows (unless otherwise stated):

**A**   

**BGE**   

**BT**   

**D**   

**EH**   

**GM**   

**GS**   
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<tr>
<td>NLN</td>
<td><em>Writings from Nietzsche’s Late Notebooks</em>, translated by K. Sturge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).</td>
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What is the purpose of those lying concepts, the ancillary concepts of morality ‘soul’, ‘spirit’, free will’, ‘God’, if it is not the physiological ruination of mankind?...When one directs seriousness away from self-preservation, enhancement of bodily strength, when one makes of greensickness an ideal, of contempt for the body ‘salvation of the soul’, what else is it but a recipe for decadence? – Loss of centre of gravity, resistance to the natural instincts, in a word ‘selflessness’ – that has hitherto been called morality...

Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo
Introduction

The relationship between Epicurus and Nietzsche is an increasingly popular research topic. There are a number of publications that attempt to detail the nature of this relationship by investigating specific aspects of their writings that interrelate. Such research has value because it reveals an otherwise hidden dynamic to Nietzsche studies, however, all previous accounts of Epicurus and Nietzsche are limited because they fail to recognise both thinkers as philosophers of immanence.

This is evident in Arthur Knight’s ‘Nietzsche and Epicurean Philosophy’ which introduces the various moments in Nietzsche’s work that emphasise his affinity to Epicurus. Knight highlights the positive reading that Nietzsche gives to Epicurus during his middle or ‘second’ period. This is a consistent theme that is apparent in the majority of texts that investigate the influence of Epicurus on Nietzsche’s thought. For example Bornmann (1984), Kimmich (1993), Choulet (1998), Königshausen and Neumann (2000), Ebersbach (2001) and Baloudé (2003) all discuss Nietzsche’s initial enthusiasm for Epicurus’ system. However, in the case of Night who only briefly raises issue with Nietzsche’s departure from Epicurus, his account fails to penetrate the deeper significance of Nietzsche’s Epicurus. On the other hand, interpreters, such as those listed above, engage with Nietzsche’s rejection of Epicurus’ system, thereby offering more informative readings. Bornmann (1984) introduces the argument that Nietzsche’s departure from Epicurus happened at the end of his middle period, specifically when Nietzsche began to firm up his account of the Will to Power. Kimmich then builds upon Bornmann’s account to argue that ‘with the change of the concept of desire [Lust], Nietzsche’s evaluation of Epicurus changed. This change is linked with the increasing importance which is given over to the notion of power in Nietzsche’s philosophy, whereas to start with he assumed that all could be explained with the notion of fear and power. Later the notion of will to power turned into his most important principle’. (Kimmich, 1993. p. 237-8). Furthermore, Kimmich argues that ‘as long as fear plays a part, Epicurus was highly rated as a defender of desire [Lust]. However, with the will to power the explanatory paradigm is dynamically enhanced. No longer is Nietzsche interested in a balanced self preservation but in expansion and continued increase in power. Passion is no longer
the self preservation of being, but is generated through an increase in power’ (Kimmich, 1993. p. 238). Furthermore, both Ebersbach and Kimmich agree that with the firming-up of the will to power, Nietzsche re-evaluated Epicurus and the Epicurean ideal of the serenity. Kimmich goes on to argue that this rejection allowed Nietzsche to develop an ‘anthropology of the tragic’ (Kimmich, 1993. p. 240), i.e. research into the sociability of the human under certain conditions. Alternatively, Konigshausen and Neumann (2000) argue that with the development of will to power, Nietzsche re-evaluated the role of desire in the Epicurean sense allowing him to conclude that the desire for power expressed through withdrawal, was symptomatic of a decadent philosophy that denied the fundamental condition of all life as contest (agon). Similar themes to those introduced here will be developed in the course of this investigation, however, because all previous accounts fail to identify Epicurus and Nietzsche as philosophers of immanence, the scope of their analyses are restricted to Nietzsche’s Epicurus. In an attempt to go beyond such limits, this investigation proposes that Nietzsche’s kinship and subsequent departure from Epicurus raises more pertinent philosophical questions regarding the nature of ‘immanence’. Consequently, during the course of this investigation it will be argued that ‘immanence’ is the central concept that allows the influence of Epicurus upon Nietzsche’s thought to be revealed most appropriately. Furthermore, it proposes to account for the development of ‘immanence’ within the works of Epicurus and Nietzsche in order to disclose the nature of immanence itself.

In ‘L’Épicure de Nietzsche: une figure de la décadence’ Choulet (1998) identifies ‘genealogy’ as the primary means for explaining Nietzsche’s departure from Epicurus. Choulet argues that Nietzsche’s re-evaluation of Epicurus arose from his genealogical analysis, which leads Nietzsche to pose the question; ‘to what extent will the moralisation of life no longer find a refuge [nicher]?’ (Choulet, 1998. p. 312) Choulet concludes that, for Nietzsche, Epicurus’ thought was prejudiced by a moral belief in the attainment of truth, a belief that led Nietzsche to conflate Epicurus with the Christian. Furthermore, Choulet argues that Nietzsche’s reading of Epicurus informed the development of his genealogical method, specifically the role of powerlessness and hunger as the motivational drives specific to the individual. Such questioning, Choulet argues, allowed Nietzsche to produce a semiotic interpretation
that sought to expose the prejudices of the philosopher through the question; What life is displayed [exposée] in these values?’ (Choulet, 1998, p. 313). Choulet’s reading confirms that the application of the genealogical method was the method necessary for Nietzsche’s great insight. However, like the German and English interpreters, Choulet’s account is restricted to Nietzsche’s Epicurus and does not extend beyond this limit, whereas this thesis proposes to go beyond such limits by applying the genealogical method to Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence. The method necessary for this disclosure is well known within Nietzsche studies. This method is ‘genealogy’, perhaps Nietzsche’s greatest contribution to Western philosophy. Unlike conventional methods of historical analysis, ‘genealogy’ does not search for the causal origins of events, nor does it attempt to establish values on the basis of such events. Instead, it proposes to signify ‘the differential element of values from which their value itself derives’ (Deleuze, 2001, p. 2). For the purposes of this investigation, ‘genealogy’ is the activity of critical analysis that seeks to differentiate between the modes of immanence presented by Epicurus and Nietzsche. Immanence, for Epicurus is the conceptualisation of all existence (including the existence of the Olympian gods) within the cosmos and nature. It signifies a distinct mode of philosophising that emerged in opposition to the transcendent philosophies of Socrates and Aristotle, and for that reason Democritus cannot be regarded as a philosopher of immanence. For Nietzsche, however, immanence is the union of the body and spirit. The purpose of this investigation is to demonstrate how Nietzsche was able to analyse the entire Western philosophical tradition in terms of this union.

Etymologically, ‘immanence’ derives from the Latin in (in), and manēre (to remain); its literal meaning is to remain or pervade within.³ Two questions immediately follow from this definition. Firstly, what is it that remains or pervades? Secondly, to remain or pervade within what? For Epicurus, such questions meant that all Being has a material foundation and is composed of combinations of atoms and void. For Nietzsche however, the question meant that all Being is derived from the interaction of force. Both thinkers agree that transcendence is a falsification of the world and that immanence is the only legitimate philosophical basis for revealing the inherent meaning of life. In this respect, opposition emerges from within the Western philosophical tradition between immanence and transcendence. The latter, we may
provisionally claim, posits meaning ‘beyond’ the conditions of life, that is, beyond the eternal Becoming of all events in a realm of eternity and perfection. Epicurus and Nietzsche thus consider such a realm to be a fabrication of reality that stems from the desire to escape the inherent suffering of human existence. Moreover, they agree that suffering is the most immediate affect of human existence that exposes the psychological processes which order the world. However by presenting suffering in this way, an ontological problem arises. If suffering is integral to Being and there is no sanctity to suffering, then why suffer, why exist at all? Immediately the philosopher of immanence is confronted with the problem of nihilism, a problem he must overcome by demonstrating that life is inherently meaningful without recourse to transcendence.

Part 1 ‘Epicurus’ Philosophy of Immanence’ will present Epicurus’ philosophy of immanence as a response to these problems. The primary aim of this investigation is to inform our understanding of immanence in a manner that highlights its emergence in opposition to the transcendent philosophies of Socrates and Aristotle. For Epicurus, belief in divine providence and teleological purposiveness was the primary cause of anxiety that stemmed from the fear of divine retribution and death. Furthermore, he proposed that such fears could be overcome, provided one lived in the correct manner. Although man’s bond with the world is expressed through suffering, Epicurus argued that suffering could be limited on the condition that supernatural beliefs were abandoned and that adherence was made to his ‘Principal Doctrines’. This investigation will focus on Epicurus largely independent of the later Epicurean tradition. The main reason for this approach is simply because Nietzsche’s kinship extends to Epicurus rather than the Epicurean tradition; therefore, an investigation that seeks to evaluate the entire Epicurean tradition (Epicurus’ aesthetics and its historical development or his impact on the natural sciences, for example) in relation to Nietzsche’s reading of it would no doubt overcomplicate the less ambiguous relationship between them that is evident in Nietzsche’s own works as well as in the existing commentaries that tackle Nietzsche’s Epicurus. As a consequence, this thesis will focus primarily on Epicurus’ three remaining letters, the doxographical report of Diogenes Laertius in The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers (including The Principal Doctrines) and Lucretius’ On the Nature of the
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Universe, using them to reveal Epicurus’ philosophy rather than its historical development within the Epicurean tradition. Thus, one has to be selective of the testimonial reports. The justification for including the evidence of Diogenes Laertius and Lucretius rests upon Nietzsche’s use of them during his own academic career. Consequently, it would be impossible to present an accurate portrayal of ‘Nietzsche’s Epicurus’ without including their testimonies.

The beginning of Part 2 introduces the problem of crystallisation in language, a problem that is inherent to Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence; however, this problem will be pursued only in so far as it directs our enquiry toward the analysis of ‘Untimeliness’, ‘Affects’ and the central problem of incorporation. The deliberate inclusion of this problem at the beginning of Part 2 is a recognition of its importance to Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence. Nevertheless, the problem of language, if pursued for its own sake, would take us too far from the more pertinent problems of immanence that this investigation will explore.

Part 2 has five main sections. Firstly, ‘Nietzsche’s Epicurus’ will demonstrate that Nietzsche’s investigations into ancient materialism had a profound affect upon his thought. By drawing upon the evidence presented in Part 1, Part 2 will argue that Nietzsche’s conception of ‘cheerfulness’ (*Heiterkeit*) is a hybrid-concept that marries the Democritean ‘dynamic equilibrium’ with the perspective of the Epicurean gods; however, it should be noted that Nietzsche uses multiple conceptions of cheerfulness, and Part 2 ‘The development of Immanence in *The Gay Science*’ will introduce these to demonstrate that cheerfulness (as a hybrid concept) is used by Nietzsche as a methodological device to overcome the problems inherent to his philosophy of immanence (Part 3 will then reveal how Nietzsche employs the term ‘cheerfulness’ to combat the Spirit of Gravity). Further to this, Part 2 will also critically evaluate ‘Nietzsche’s admiration of Democritus and Epicurus’ to demonstrate that both thinkers were key influences upon Nietzsche’s thought during the period when Nietzsche formulated his philosophy of immanence (i.e., whilst writing the first four books of *The Gay Science*). It should be noted that Part 2 is longer than the other parts because it serves as a bridge between Epicurus’ and Nietzsche’s philosophies of immanence. In addition, Part 2 will include an analysis of the philosophical problems that Nietzsche found in Epicurus’ account, problems that he used to avoid
repeating such mistakes. Part 2 ‘The Development of Immanence in The Gay Science’ will demonstrate that having utilised all that he can from Epicurus, Nietzsche begins to unmask his decadence through the recognition of the ‘atomistic need’ which he claims is an offshoot of ‘metaphysical need’ (BGE: 12), one that is inherent to all materialist philosophy. Finally, Part 2, ‘Affects’, will argue that Nietzsche attacks metaphysical claims to Being on the basis that they are a necessary yet illusory projection of the psyche. This section, together with ‘The Development of Immanence in The Gay Science’ will serve as an introduction to Part 3, ‘Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Immanence’. For Nietzsche, the triumph of Christian morality has led to the detachment of spirit from body (i.e., man from nature). Consequently, ‘otherworldly’ values based on redemptive doctrines became the only means for justifying the meaninglessness of suffering experienced by man as a condition of life. Yet, Nietzsche claims that the success of a purely rational (i.e., transcendent) interpretation of the world has meant that the will to truth has become conscious of itself (GM: III, 27). This means that the transcendent realm, upon which the current system of values is based, has become unbelievable. As a result, Nietzsche argues that the individual’s ability to incorporate the ‘truth’ of these nihilistic events will determine the future health of humanity.

Initially, Nietzschean immanence should be regarded as the naturalisation of humanity. This means that ‘otherworldly’ values must be demonstrated to have a worldly origin. For Nietzsche, European culture has peaked and is beginning to decline; consequently, humanity will be thrown into a state of crisis such that an unparalleled nihilism will ensue, unless a new interpretation of the world can be found. Nietzsche proposes that the new interpretation must begin with the ‘de-deification of nature’ (GS: 109). Ultimately this is a destructive and dangerous act because it requires the abandonment of the current system of values as well as a re-examination of consciousness. Part 3, ‘Nietzsche’s system of psychology’, will demonstrate that ‘consciousnesses’ should not be granted the autonomy that the philosophical tradition has allowed; instead, it should be recognised as the affective state populated and conditioned by the body.

Nietzsche argued that the incorporation of ‘otherworldly’ values led to the disembodiment of the spirit. In its need for self-mastery and because of its
powerlessness to end the suffering that is inherent to life, the spirit rejected its most immediate object of suffering – the human body. This means that the spirit no longer operates in the service of life, and consequentially, Nietzsche proposes that the ‘spirit’ must undergo a number of transformations to realign it with the body. If possible, Nietzsche argued that the ‘spirit’ possessed the power to create new values such that life’s inherent meaning would be revealed; however, prior to this, the ‘no-saying’ to life, expressed through the ascetic ideal, must be countered by the imposition of a new ideal that creates meaning for the body and earth through a process of what Deleuze call ‘internal genesis’ (Deleuze G., 2006, p. 91).

In summary, this investigation aims to detail the nature of Epicurus’ and Nietzsche’s philosophies of immanence to reveal the nature and meaning of immanence within their respective accounts. Furthermore, it seeks to highlight the problematic aspects of Epicurus’ philosophy of immanence independently of Nietzsche’s account of it. It will also provide a detailed analysis of Nietzsche’s Epicurus with the aim of highlighting Nietzsche’s reception of Epicurus throughout his career. Nietzsche’s recognition of Epicurus’ philosophy of immanence was a precursor to his own, but only when Nietzsche became critical of Epicurus did his radical conception of immanence emerge. Nietzschean immanence is radical because it cuts through the historical immanence/transcendence divide and in doing so, creates the conditions necessary for the thought and affirmation of the eternal return of the same. Immanence, therefore, requires the abandonment of philosophical, moral, and social prejudices that are clearly detrimental to the joy of human life; demonstrating this, is the purpose of the following investigation.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


3 The same also extends to the German ‘Immanenz’.

4 Due to the lack of original writings from the later Epicureans, defining the ‘Epicurean Tradition’ is a problematic task. One of the most informative accounts of the way the tradition developed can be found in Norman W. DeWitt’s Epicurus and his Philosophy (1954). DeWitt offers a comprehensive account of the development of Epicureanism following Epicurus’ death (approximately 271 BCE) – see ‘Extension, Submergence, and Revival’ (DeWitt, 1954, pp. 328-61). DeWitt provides a synoptic view of Epicureanism that runs as follows; ‘During the lifetime of Epicurus and his three colleagues the chief competitors and adversaries were the Platonists and Peripatetics. During the last two centuries B.C. the chief competitors and adversaries were the Stoics. With the death of Cicero in 43 B.C. the stage of controversy came to an end, and after the turn of the century the process of syncretism was accelerated. This was the work of the Stoics, and the chief names are those of Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. Before the year A.D. 200 the Christians had come forward as the chief competitors and adversaries. This rivalry was the last. By the fifth
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In the 19th century the Epicureans seem to have been absorbed into the Christian community’ (DeWitt, 1954, p. 328).

5 An example of commentaries dedicated to the historical transformation of Epicurean thought can be found in Inwood and Gerson (1997) who propose that arguments concerning the soul led later Epicureans to return ‘to the view of Socrates, that the entire human soul was dominated by reason’ (Inwood & Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy, 1997, p. xvii). Furthermore, they argue; ‘Hellenistic sceptics rejected attempts to explain what is evident by what is non-evident, which is a generalization of the rejection of the attempt to explain the material by the immaterial. The two forms of scepticism in our period, Academic and Pyrrhonist, focussed their attacks on the leading dogmatic schools of their day, and this meant first and foremost the Stoic; the Epicureans were also attacked’ (Inwood & Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy, 1997, p. xix).

6 This will become evident throughout our discussion of Part 2, especially in sections ‘Nietzsche’s Admiration for Epicurus’ and ‘Untimeliness’.

8 In the case of Lucretius, Nietzsche makes the following claim; ‘One must read Lucretius to understand what it was Epicurus opposed: not paganism but ‘Christianity’’ (AC: 58) – Although this is a Nietzschean anachronism it demonstrates that Nietzsche was reading Epicurus through Lucretius. Furthermore, in Lange’s The History of Materialism, which we know Nietzsche repeatedly read (see Brobjer, 2008, pp. 32-6), Lange uses the testimony of Lucretius in order to develop his account of Epicurus – see Lange, 2010, p. 24 fn. 21.

In the case of Diogenes Laertius, we know that during his early career as a philologist, Nietzsche published three studies of Diogenes. Jonathan Barnes claims; ‘The three studies on Diogenes together constitute one half of Nietzsche’s published Philologische Schriften [...] The unpublished notes on Diogenes constitute more than half of Nietzsche’s unpublished philological writings’ (Barnes, 1986, p. 17). We should take this as evidence that Nietzsche was very familiar with the tenth book of Diogenes’ testimony and that it helped him to form his conception of Epicurus.

9 It should be noted that this conception of the ‘dynamic equilibrium’ is taken from Jessica N. Berry’s ‘Nietzsche and Democritus’ (Berry, 2004, p. 104), which shall be introduced at length in Part 2, ‘Nietzsche and Greek Materialism’.

10 Some introductory work on Democritus will therefore be required, which will be undertaken throughout Parts 1 and 2.
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These include, 'The Problem of Representation', 'The Problem of Sensation', 'The Problem of Materialism and Science' and the problem of Epicurus' untimeliness.
Part 1: The Emergence of Immanence from Democritus to Epicurus

Epicurus of Samos (circa 341-270 BCE), the founder of the Athenian school from whom the Epicureans took their name, was idolised by his disciples, despised by his opponents and to this day is hailed as a radical thinker. His contribution toward the development of scientific investigation, hedonism, social contract theory and the reclamation of power from the gods cannot be underestimated. Although he may be recognised as an important philosopher within academia, outside he is relatively unknown with the exception of distorted links with modern hedonism.

The primary reason for this concerns the lack of original literature. Diogenes Laertius reports that Epicurus wrote a colossal thirty-seven volume treatise On Nature, as well as many letters, and the Principal Doctrines. The vast majority has been lost, destroyed or remain undiscovered. This means that complete accounts of his teachings are unavailable, as a result, scholars rely on doxographical evidence to ‘piece together’ an overall picture of his philosophy. Furthermore, because the Epicurean school spanned some 150 years, it is difficult to make completely legitimate claims regarding Epicurus’ ‘original’ philosophy.

In order to overcome this problem, Part 1 will introduce Epicurus as a philosopher of immanence. Throughout Part 1, Epicurus’ philosophy of immanence will be defined against the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophies of transcendence. Such philosophies support, what were for Epicurus, illusory and superstitious ‘beliefs’. These include: incorporeal substance, the rejection of the sensible in favour of the supersensible (intelligible), belief in divine providence and life after the death of the body. For Epicurus, such beliefs were completely unfounded. Furthermore, they were the source of pain and anxiety. Life, as Epicurus saw it, had meaning on the condition that nature (which he maintained was purely corporeal) could be understood on the basis that all sensations were the only conditions for knowledge. Knowledge is not an end in itself (for Epicurus) but merely the affective state of it, which should be sought on the condition that it exposes the illusion of superstitious belief. An immanent interpretation of the world reduces all knowledge to man and man’s worldly being, consequently, any metaphysical or transcendent meaning is lost. Once the physical conglomerations of atoms and void that constitute man and world are dispersed
back into the primordial chaos from which they first emerged, both knowledge and soul can no longer endure. In Book 6 of *On the Nature of the Universe*, Lucretius prophesied an apocalypse which he used to demonstrate the efficacy of the Epicurean maxim ‘death is nothing to us’. With no possibility of an afterlife, death has no meaning; however, this worldly life, as the sole condition of existence becomes inherently meaningful which led Epicurus to believe that pain and anxiety must be overcome in order that man can attain the blessed state of ataraxia.¹

Certain key themes implicit to Epicurus’ thought can be found in the materialism of the pre-Platonic philosopher Democritus. Democritus was the forerunner of Epicurean thought and although Epicurus claimed to be self-taught, such a claim is questionable given the overlaps and developments in ancient materialism that were undoubtedly Epicurean responses to the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition.² In this respect, we should regard Epicurus as the defender of materialism against the idealism that came to dominate ancient Greek thought, an opposition that is recognised by Nietzsche as the pivotal moment in Western history.

Defining the influence of Democritus upon Epicurus is a vital task. Not only will it inform our understanding of the tradition, it will serve to highlight the developments of materialism in the transitional stage from classical to late antiquity. Furthermore, as we shall find in Part 2, Nietzsche combines elements of Democritean and Epicurean thought which he uses in his conception of gay science. Therefore, by separating Democritean and Epicurean thought, it will be possible to reveal the synthesis that Nietzsche uses when developing his own philosophy of immanence.

### Democritean Materialism

Part 2 “Nietzsche and Greek Materialism” will introduce the philosophical problems that Nietzsche found inherent to ancient materialism, problems that led him to and instructed his critique of atomism.³ An independent account of Democritean atomism will serve as a basis for this later discussion.⁴ Furthermore, in order to introduce Epicurus as a philosopher of immanence, a brief analysis of Democritean materialism is required. A number of key differences exist between Democritus’ and Epicurus’ accounts that must be explored prior to an investigation into Nietzsche’s
conception of them. Once these differences have been established, we will find that Nietzsche conflates certain aspects of their philosophies to serve his own agenda – particularly in his conception of *The Gay Science*.

**Ontology**

Upon his return from Egypt, Persia and Babylon, Democritus travelled through Greece whereupon he came under the tutelage of Leucippus. He then refined Parmenides’ ontology and the subsequent alterations made by Empedocles and Anaxagoras into a more coherent theory. In *The Metaphysics* Book Alpha 4, Aristotle provides a doxographical report on the history of material and non-material explanation, which runs as follows:

Democritus said that the elements were full and empty, and that of these the full and the solid were what is and the empty was what is not (accordingly he denies that what is exists any more than what is not, any more than the void exists more than body), and he says that these things are the causes of entities of matter. And just as those who make the underlying substance one produce other things by affections of it, positing that the rare and the dense are the principles of the affections, in the same way these thinkers too say that the differences are the causes of the other things. And these say that these are three, shape, order and position. For they say that what is differs in shape, place and manner only; and of these shape is shape, location is arrangement and manner is position. (Aristotle, *The Metaphysics*, Alpha 4; 985b)

Aristotle concluded that the atomist explanation lacked rigour and was therefore incapable of achieving the complete and scientific explanation he was searching for. However, like many of the later reports Aristotle’s testimony appears to serve his ends rather than those of posterity. Long and Sedley support this claim and argue that ‘Philosopher’s views are summarized or quoted, normally out of context, by later writers who are as often as not their declared enemies’ (Long & Sedley, *The Hellenistic philosophers*: Volume 1, 1997, pp. 8-9). Hussey (1972, p. 145) also supports this claim and argues that Aristotle’s comments on the early atomists are
contradictory because he is unable to decide whether the atomists assumed the theoretical divisibility of the atom above their physical divisibility (assuming they are spatially extended), which in the case of the latter should be taken as a move to counteract the paradox presented by Zeno.\textsuperscript{7} This demonstrates that the testimonial reports of later philosophers should not be accepted without further supporting testimonies.

The picture we are presented with (via a catalogue of doxographical variations) is that Democritus’ universe is random, infinite and somewhat unlawful. ‘Seeds’ or ‘atoms’, move randomly through the void until they eventually:

\[\ldots\] collide at random, entangle and separate from one another at random and occasionally link up in such a way as to produce a vortex-like movement which leads to the formation of worlds. (Rist, 1972, p. 167)

The atoms have two properties: size and shape. In regard to these properties, Democritus explained that atoms could ‘fit together’ in endless combinations due to their variety of shapes and sizes, which he used to account for the variations (or combinations) of matter. Philoponus reports:

\[\ldots\] for Democritus said that matter was the substratum of the atoms and that the formal causes were the shape of the atoms: spherical atoms were the cause of fire, cubical of water, and other things were caused by other shapes. (Taylor, 1999, p. 70)

Some reports claim that Democritus also held weight to be a primary property of atoms and that it determined their motion. \textsuperscript{8} However, such accounts are problematic for two reasons: firstly, weight would introduce a universal path of atoms that would complicate the possibility of collisions and the formation of worlds, and secondly the testimony of Aetius holds that it was Epicurus who added this third property to the atom.\textsuperscript{9} Alternatively Hussey (1972) argues that:

\[\text{Atoms} \text{ were said to have weight in proportion to their size, and weight could be explained in terms of resistance to impact. Whether an atom, if undisturbed, was thought to continue in its state of motion indefinitely or gradually to come to rest is not clear. (Hussey, 1972, p. 146)}\]
Hussey’s explanation maintains weight as a property of atoms only when in motion, which presumably means it is a secondary property. Such an explanation might be used to explain why the debate surrounding weight exists; however, as we shall see, the property of ‘weight’ added by Epicurus has very different connotations.  

The Democritean notion of atom/atomos translates literally to ‘uncuttable’ (Curd, 1995, p. 79), which means they cannot be divided any further, ‘each atom was homogenous throughout, without parts or empty space –in other words, a tiny Parmenidean world’ (Strodach., 1963, p. 10). In his account of motion, Democritus inferred the condition of ‘space’, or an ‘interval’ – an area in which the atoms can move freely (although the possibility of space existing within the atom was completely rejected). This may appear to be a rather insignificant and obvious claim; however, the consequences are significant as it introduces a counter-explanation to philosophies that necessitate the mediation of the gods. Prior to Democritus’ account, Parmenidean logic dictated that being could not come from non-being; ‘For in no way may this prevail, that things that are not, are’ (Curd, 1995, p. 46). The ‘nothingness’ of empty space was considered to be illegitimate and contradictory. Democritus’ account was revolutionary because it introduced nothingness as a necessary condition of motion. Furthermore, the introduction of an interval opened the door to an ontology of Becoming as a legitimate explanation; previous claims of plenum could begin to be questioned.

In spite of this, Democritus’ account became the focus of prolonged criticism because his atomistic account required two problematic, yet, key properties: infinite time and an infinite number of atoms. Infinite time meant the universe was everlasting with no beginning or end, whereas an infinite number of atoms meant that nothing could be added or taken away, Democritus thereby inferred that the atom was indestructible. The main criticisms surrounding these properties were presented by Zeno who exposed the paradoxical nature of the divisibility of matter.

The problem is compounded by reports that suggest Democritus applied no upper limit to the size of atoms. The remaining evidence suggests that the early atomists accepted the theoretical divisibility of the atom but rejected its physical divisibility. Although, as Hussey points out, ‘the doxographical evidence is self-contradictory and of doubtful value’ (Hussey, 1972, p. 145) such as the account provided by Aristotle at the beginning of this section.
One can only speculate as to the Atomist’s solutions to such problems; however, it is clear that by introducing nothingness as an active principle that rejected Parmenidean plenum, Democritus had introduced an immanent explanation of the universe that it did not require some form of divine providence. As Hussey puts it:

The system of the Atomists was revolutionary. All their predecessors had asserted, whither explicitly or implicitly, that the intelligibility and rationality of the universe depended ultimately upon its subjection to a divine power which in some sense was conscious and intelligent [...] The Atomists went counter to the tradition by removing everything ‘mental’ from the list of ultimate constituents. (Hussey, 1972, pp. 147-148)

By challenging the Parmenidean world, Democritus had essentially changed the intellectual conditions from which the world was perceived. Democritean materialism caused a rippling effect in human thought: whether accepted or not, the mere introduction of atomism was enough to cast doubt on the plenum and thereby the ontology of Being.

Epistemology

In respect to Democritus’ epistemological account Sextus Empiricus reports that, ‘by convention [or custom], sweet; by convention, bitter; by convention, hot; by convention, cold; by convention, colour; but in reality, atoms and void’ (Curd, 1995, p. 87). Such reports present Democritus as a reductionist, whereby the descriptive properties of an object and the object themselves are reducible to atoms and void. In this respect ‘truth’ in relation to the evidence provided by the senses cannot be used as the foundation for knowledge. This is consistent with the following report:

[...] in the Canons Democritus says there are two kinds of knowing, one through the senses and the other through the intellect. Of these he calls the one through the intellect ‘legitimate’, attesting its trustworthiness for the judgement of truth, and through the senses he names ‘bastard’, denying its inerrancy in the discrimination of what is true. To quote his actual words: Of knowledge there are two forms, one legitimate, one bastard. To the bastard belong all this group: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. The other is
legitimate and separate from that. Then, preferring the legitimate to the bastard, he continues: When the bastard can no longer see any smaller, or hear, or smell, or taste, or perceive by touch, but finer matters have to be examined, then comes the legitimate, since it has a finer organ of perception. (Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, 1983, p. 412)

This epistemological division is of critical importance because it marks the point where Epicurus departs from Democritus’ teachings. By questioning the validity of the senses in this way Democritus was effectively creating a division between the sensible and the intelligible and in this respect a surprising kinship between Democritus and Socrates emerges, as I will now demonstrate.

For Socrates (similar to the Pythagoreans), the world of appearance is ontologically inferior to the intelligible realm. The evidence of the senses, unmediated by the Form of the Good, cannot present an accurate image of the world. For Democritus, sensations are formed by the reception of effluent atoms, which are received by the sense organs. However, due to discrepancies in their shape and size, the effluent atoms and the atoms that compose the sense organs were non-correlative. This meant that the world of appearance could not be taken as a reliable basis for the attainment of knowledge. Democritus therefore proposed a method that could overcome the invalidity of appearances by uncovering the laws that govern them which became known as the canonic (from Greek kanon, - rule). By following the canonic to its logical conclusion, Democritus proposed that the world of appearance is the product of various combinations of atoms and void, and merely epiphenomenal; ‘a person must know by this rule that he is separated from reality’ (Curd, 1995, p. 87). This led Democritus to a profound conformism such that he rejected the possibility of volition, in favour of determinism. This critical understanding of reality is confirmed by Sextus who reports; ‘In reality we know nothing about anything, but for each person opinion is a reshaping’ (Curd, 1995, p. 87). Denson and McEvilley (1996) regard this as a rejection of an absolute correspondence theory of truth in favour of ‘linguistic categories that ‘correspond’ to things ‘by convention’ (1996, p. 173). Thus, according to Democritus, reality merely corresponds through the conventions that are produced by the intellect; any claims beyond this are merely conjecture. A lack of further literature prohibits a more detailed discussion; however, from what remains, it is clear that Democritus understood mental pleasures
to be far more valuable than their bodily counterparts; this is confirmed by the testimony of Stobaeus:

All those who make their pleasures from the belly, exceeding the right time for food, drink, or sex, have short-lived pleasures – only for as long as they eat or drink – but many pains. (Curd, 1995, p. 88)

If the enduring reality in which we live is merely a product of conventions (as Democritus supposed), and given that the gods have no bearing on this reality, Democritus recommends; ‘Best for a person to live his life being as cheerful (euthymia) and as little distressed as possible. This will occur if he does not make his pleasures in mortal things (Curd, 1995, p. 88).

Democritus’ conception of euthymia or cheerfulness becomes the goal and meaning of life. Taylor (1999) corroborates this claim by arguing that euthymia was recognised by Democritus as the highest good; ‘[Democritus...] is the earliest thinker reported as having explicitly posited a supreme good or goal, which he called ‘cheerfulness’ or well-being’ (p. 227). In order to achieve this state, moderation is required. This ‘mean state’ becomes the focus of life; ‘Cheerfulness arises in people through moderation of enjoyment and due proportion of life’ (Curd, 1995, p. 87).

Yet, moderation implies some form of volition, which so far as the evidence suggests is at best an illusion. It should be noted that Democritus (like Socrates) believed that the soul determines our ‘desires’; therefore, self-mastery concerns the intellect alone – any bodily displeasure should be regarded merely as qualities that have an effect upon us.

This preliminary sketch of Democritean materialism will serve to highlight the difference between his and Epicurus’ materialism in Part 1, as well as introducing euthymia, which I will argue is a crucial concept for Nietzsche in The Gay Science (see Part 2, ‘Nietzsche and Greek Materialism’).
Epicurus

Upon an initial reading of the remaining fragments and testimonia of Epicurus it soon becomes apparent that there is a lack of philosophical rigour, especially when one considers the systematic approach taken by his predecessors. However, we should realise from the start that Epicurus did not attempt to create a philosophy system with the aim of discovering metaphysical truths by way of logical syllogisms. Instead his aim was to remove the anxieties that he associated with false belief in divine providence and an afterlife. His teachings were directed at those who wished to join him in repose. He did not propose nor require strict metaphysical justifications because he believed that they were another source of anxiety. At the beginning of *De Finibus* Cicero comments:

To start with what is easiest, let us first review Epicurus’ system, which most people know best. You will discover that the exposition given by me is no less accurate than that given by the school’s own proponents. For we wish to find the truth, not refute anyone adversarially. (*De Finibus*, V)\(^\text{18}\)

In this respect, one has to see the world through the eyes of Epicurus’ thought in order that its meaning and justifications become known.\(^\text{19}\) This is one reason why Epicurus should be regarded as an early philosopher of immanence. Its meaning pervades from within; one cannot reach this meaning through dialectic oppositions, rather one must attempt to (figuratively speaking) see the world through Epicurus’ eyes. Furthermore, throughout our discussion of the various stages of the canonic, we will find that Epicurus’ account of truth is relative to the individual’s experience. In terms of language and universal appropriations, Epicurus rejects any metaphysical foundations in favour of locally formed derivations produced through utterances of sounds that in a community become accepted and appropriated accordingly. We may provisionally describe Epicurus as a philosopher of immanence because truth (for Epicurus) is not the goal as it was for Socrates. For Epicurus, man’s propensity for truth is another cause of anxiety, one that inhibits his capacity for the attainment of ataraxia. In this respect, Epicurus’ account is similar to Aristotle’s eudaimonism. However unlike Aristotle (who argued in favour of teleological purposiveness), Epicurus denied the possibility that the universe was created, ordered and
demonstrated a grand teleological purpose; all of which were further sources of anxiety.

Now we have an understanding of Epicurus’ place within the philosophical tradition, we are almost ready to enter the main discussion of Part 1. However, before this can be done, a brief investigation of the testimonial idiosyncrasies must be carried out which will help us to navigate through some of the problems typically associated with Epicureanism.

The Testimonial Idiosyncrasies

Similar to Democritus, Epicurus develops a schematic system (known as the canonic) that has three distinct categories; sensations, preconceptions and feelings. However, unlike Democritus, Epicurus used the canonic to legitimise the validity of the sensory information and in this respect Epicurus’ canonic represents a change in Greek thought. Seneca reports that:

The Epicureans held that there are two parts of philosophy, physics and ethics; they got rid of logic. Then since they were forced by the very facts to distinguish what was ambiguous and to refute falsities lying hidden under the appearance of truth, they themselves also introduced that topic which they call ‘on judgement and criteria’ [i.e., canonic]; it is [just] logic by another name, but they think that it is an accessory part of physics. (Inwood & Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy, 1997, p. 81)

Seneca is correct in his initial observation regarding the elimination of logic; however, he incorrectly concludes that the canonic is ‘logic by another name’. In order to present Epicurus as a philosopher of immanence, the inaccuracy of Seneca’s report must be established. By presenting the canonic as a crucial deviation from the traditional format (i.e., physics, ethics and logic), I will argue that Epicurus responds to the problem of false-judgement (raised by Plato in the Theaetetus) by introducing a process of verification. This discussion will continue throughout Part 1 as it is of central importance to Epicurus’ philosophy of immanence. Furthermore, we will find that Epicurus proposes an immediate relationship between appearance and reality, which he uses in response to the problem of false-judgement. This response is
fundamental to his entire philosophy and in order to understand his physics correctly, knowledge of the canonic (i.e., the general rules, principles, or criteria from which they become known) becomes a prerequisite.

One of the main problems we face concerning Epicurean studies is deciding which testimonies to accept and which should be rejected. The contrast between the evidence presents a problem when attempting to build a homogenous picture of a thinker whose work exists only in fragmentary form. For example, Diogenes Laertius reports ‘Ariston says in his Life of Epicurus that he copied The Canon straight out of the Tripod of Nausiphanes, under whom he also studied’ (Inwood & Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy, 1997, p. 4), whereas we also know that Epicurus rejected claims that he had received an education and was self-taught. The testimonial idiosyncrasies that surround Epicurus make it difficult to build a clear picture of his thought. In order to combat such idiosyncrasies we must work through the individual aspects of his thought in order to reconstruct the whole.

In response to the claim that Epicurus was not self-taught, Rist argues:

> It is probable that within The Tripod, Nausiphanes argued that knowledge depends on observation, the evidence of history and inference based analogy. (1972, p. 4)

It seems highly unlikely that Epicurus was self-taught; it may be more appropriate to doubt the testimonies that uphold such claims given the concrete similarities that exist between Epicurus’ and certain aspects of Democritus’ and Nausiphanes’ doctrines.

What we can say is that Epicurus certainly rejected particular aspects of his predecessor’s thought. For example, he was a vehement opponent of rhetoric, and demanded in its place absolute clarity. James Warren (2002) presents a compelling case in which he details the debate concerning two Epicurean views on rhetoric through the latter stages of Epicureanism, revealing the method of rhetoric to be a contentious subject. Fortunately, there remains enough doxographical evidence for us to conclude that Epicurus rejected rhetoric as an acceptable pursuit. Instead Epicurus took perspicuity (clear reasoning) to be of greater importance, Diogenes provides us with the following insight:
The terms he [Epicurus] used for things were the ordinary terms, and Aristophanes the grammarian credits him with a very characteristic style. He was so lucid a writer that in the work On Rhetoric he makes clearness the sole requisite. And in his correspondence he replaces the usual greeting, “I wish you joy,” by wishes for welfare and right living, “May you do well,” and “Live well”. (DL: 10, 13)  

This goes some way to explain Epicurus’ severe criticism of Socrates and the rhetorical devices he employed. In a similar vein Epicurus was critical of mathematics, physics (in terms of the supra-sensible as a condition of Being), and even of music theory. What links these rejections is Epicurus’ disdain for a metaphysical reality that lies hidden beneath appearance. Instead, he proposes (like Democritus) that reality is built upon numerous combinations of atoms and void. However, unlike Democritus, he believes that the canonic can be used and developed to demonstrate that the world of appearance (i.e., through sense-perception) is a legitimate and reliable source of knowledge.

The various testimonial reports of Diogenes Laertius, although idiosyncratic, demonstrate that Epicurus consistently rejected all antecedent philosophical doctrines. In this respect we may claim that Epicurus ‘distanced’ himself from the rest of the intellectual community, particularly the Athenian schools. The ‘garden’ becomes a symbol of Epicurean life and philosophy, an intellectual safe haven secure from the chaotic and declining city that surrounded it. By ‘distancing’ himself in this way, Epicurus’ intellectual territory was clearly defined and the walls of the garden mark a barrier that guarded his disciples from what they considered the contemptible teachings of the polis.

**First Canonic: Sensation**

The purpose of the canonic was to establish a criterion for truth (iudicia rerum) that could be used to validate sense-perceptions without the need for a metaphysics that required divine providence. Epicurus attempted to redefine the conditions of truth by grounding them in a theory of relations rather than in an ‘otherworldly’ reality of transcendence. Rist argues that “criterion” had a double purpose; ‘the criterion is
the criterion of the existence or of the reality of particular things – [...] it is also a criterion of truth and falsehood (Rist. J, 1972, p. 15). “Criterion” in the first sense requires the conditions of atoms and void, which Epicurus attempts to establish the necessity of in his physics, whereas the latter meaning, as Rist points out, refers to the truth of propositions.

The first criteria of truth are sensations (aisthēsis), Epicurus recognised sensations (through the impact of effluent atoms upon the sense organs) as the ‘direct physical contacts between the living being and the external physical reality’ (DeWitt, 1954, p. 134). In the Principal Doctrines we find; ‘If you quarrel with all your sense-perceptions you will have nothing to refer to in judging even those sense-perceptions which you claim are false’ (Inwood & Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy, 1997, p. 32). Epicurus attempted to validate the conditions of the three stages of the canonic by demonstrating the absurdity of rejecting certain propositional truths. In order to achieve this aim, he argued that sense-perceptions are always true, although our judgements about them can be false. The purpose of the canonic was to bridge this gap by establishing a reliable means for distinguishing between accurate and false judgements.

As we found in the previous section, Epicurus must provide an account that explains how false-judgements happen in such a way that the evidence of the senses remains a reliable foundation of knowledge. In the following two sections I will introduce the problem in greater detail and provide an explanation of Epicurus’ response.

**False-judgements & Verification**

Diogenes provides the following account concerning sensations:

> He [Epicurus] starts from the fact that all men have sensations (aisthēsis), and asserts, without proof, that these must be caused by something other than themselves. (DL: 10, 31)

For Epicurus a sensation is the reception of effluent atoms that are produced by an object in the world and emitted by that object, which are then received by the
sense-organs. Epicurus takes this as immediately given and does not (so far as the remaining fragments confirm) attempt to validate this claim through use of rhetorical argumentation, although he does admit that, for an object to be recognised and correctly designated in language, it must undergo a process of verification. Lucretius provides us with the most informative account of this process in the example of the tower (L: 4, 353-380). From a distance (Lucretius claims) a square tower may appear to be round; however, upon closer inspection it is fact it is square. Such discrepancies occur not because the sense-impressions or their reception by the sense-organ is false, but because the effluent atoms are corrupted in transit from the object that emits them to the sense-organs:

Flow is lost, it does not strike our eyes, and the air, while the images travel so far through it, inflicts many blows upon them and blunts them. (L: 4, 356-9)

In this respect, neither the information received by sense-organs, nor that of the sense-impressions themselves can be false. Diogenes reports; ‘Sensation is non-rational and unbiased by memory, for it is neither produced spontaneously (inside the mind) nor can it add or subtract information from its external cause’ (DL: 10, 31). In his ‘Letter to Herodotus’, Epicurus explains that:

[...] falsehood or error always resides in the added opinion <in the case of something which awaits> testimony for or against it but in the event receives neither supporting testimony <nor opposing testimony >. (Her.DL: 10, 49)

The sense-impressions themselves make no claim to truth, although it must be added that ‘a real event takes place in the act of sensing’ (Rist, 1972, pp. 19-20). In order for an object to be correctly identified (for example the tower to be confirmed to be square) it must undergo a process of verification.

Epicurus introduces a notion of supporting testimony, which is required as part of the verification process. In his Principal Doctrines (xxiv), Epicurus presents the following argument:

If you reject unqualified any sense-perception\textsuperscript{31} and do not distinguish the opinion about what awaits confirmation, and what is already present in
the sense-perception, and the feelings, and every application of the intellect to presentations, you will also disturb the rest of your sense-perceptions with your pointless opinion; as a result you will reject every criterion. If, on the other hand, in your conceptions formed by opinion, you affirm everything that awaits confirmation as well as what does not, you will not avoid falsehood, so that you will be in the position of maintaining every disputable point in every decision about what is and is not correct. (Inwood & Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy, 1997, p. 34)

The **supporting testimony** operates as a controlled method of verification. Opinion (doxa) based on reason (logos) is unreliable and can result in falsehood, and for the same reason Epicurus rejects purely rational explanations.

Verification is obtained through a mediated relation between an object and the confirmed sense-impression; this relation remains immanent and does not make any metaphysical claims to truth. Lucretius gives a more detailed account of this process and argues that the closer one is to an object, the clearer the impression of it. The causal explanation for this runs as follows: As there is a reduction in the distance between object and the sense-organs, there is a reduced risk to the flow of effluent atoms being disrupted by the flow of atoms emitted by other objects, although this method leads to some bizarre conclusions. For example, in the Letter to Pythocles we find that, ‘the size of the sun and the other heavenly bodies relative to us is just as big as it appears to be’ (Inwood & Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy, 1997, p. 21).³²

In a similar vein, propositional truths are considered unreliable and misleading when unverified. Epicurus maintains that logical syllogisms are to be considered invalid as they exist in a suspended mental state that cannot be found in or linked to the physical world. As such they cannot undergo the process of verification and consequently they are deemed to be superfluous to knowledge.
Second Canonic: Preconceptions

Once a sensation is received it awaits confirmation. Preconceptions (also known as ‘General concepts’ or ‘prolēpsis’) serve to validate the opinion (doxa) of an object and allow its signification. It is widely accepted that Epicurus follows Aristotle’s argument from Alpha 1 of the Metaphysics; an argument that attempts to unite particular experiences to universals of general propositions. Aristotle claims ‘by nature, all men long to know’ (Met. A 1; 980a). He continues:

For these [i.e., the senses], quite apart from their utility, are intrinsically delightful, and that through the eyes more than others. (Met. A 1; 980a)

Following this he introduces memory:

For it is from memory that men derive their experience. For many recollections of the same thing perform the function of a single experience. (Met. A 1; 980a)

Diogenes Laertius’ testimony confirms Epicurus’ agreement with Aristotle on this matter:

They say that the basic grasp is like an act of grasping or a correct opinion or a conception or a universal idea stored [up in the mind], i.e., a memory of what has often appeared in the external world. (DL: 10, 33)

It follows that a concept such as ‘man’ contains an immediate idea of the thing ‘man’, i.e. as an object existing in the world. It is through repeated exposure to sensory data that the concept ‘man’ is formed, and from this the correct signification may follow. This is a crucial point because it forms the basis for Epicurus’ account of immanence; the problem also extends to Plato’s account of transcendence. In the case of the latter, experience has to be grounded in something other than the empirical world of the senses, which Plato takes as evidence for the necessity of the Forms. But Epicurus cannot make such an appeal, in fact he must demonstrate the opposite; that appeals to transcendence (as the condition of knowledge) are unnecessary and invalid. If Epicurus cannot overcome this problem then his entire system is at stake.
Diogenes reintroduces the problem of falsehood by asking; ‘Is what is standing far off a horse or a cow?’ (DL: 10, 33). In response he claims:

Before making this judgement, we must at some time or other have known by preconception the shape of a horse or cow. We should not have given anything a name, if we had not first leant its form by way of preconception. It follows, then, that preconceptions are clear. (DL: 10, 33)

Yet it would be a mistake to assume that preconceptions exist prior to sensory experience. As we have found, Epicurus follows Aristotle on this matter. In order to distinguish between a horse or a cow, many previous sensory experiences of both animals are required. Having said this, one may still mistake them as a result of applying the incorrect designation in language. In an attempt to overcome this problem, Epicurus argues that any such designations require verification, which can only be achieved by a clear-flow of sense-impressions. This is a familiar argument; in his account of the tower Lucretius arrived at the same conclusion, i.e. that opinions are not derived from the sense-impression (which Epicurus maintains are always true), but from that which awaits verification. This is an important claim because it grounds preconceptions in experience without the mediation of transcendent Forms.

Similarly language can also be the source of false opinion, although significations cannot. Long argues ‘Language is a method of signifying those preconceptions which seem to us to fit the present object of experience’ (Long A. A., Hellenistic Philosophy; Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics, 1974, p. 23). The relation of the signifier and the signified is always the result of ‘clarity’ in the same way the tower is clearly square when seen nearby. It follows that falsehood arises when the incorrect word is used to signify its object. As a consequence the question; ‘is that a horse or a cow?’ arises primarily from the lack of ‘clear flow’ which falsifies the opinion. Therefore the incorrect signification is the result of applying this judgement through language. In order for a judgement to be deemed true, it must be validated by a ‘clear flow’ of sense-impressions. Thus, Epicurus distinguishes between a judgement and opinion by verification, which remains within the confines of experience.

One possible argument against Epicurus’ account of sensation concerns man’s knowledge of the gods because unlike terrestrial objects, the gods are not immediate objects of sensation. As a result, Epicurus must provide an immanent
account of the gods. In the following section I will introduce the foundation of this account; however it should be noted that the legitimacy of this account will be developed throughout the remainder of Part 1.

Ex Silentio

As we shall see, *ex silentio* arguments (arguments from silence) are important justifications for Epicurus’ canonic and the physics. Epicurus uses preconceptions to ground his criterion of truth. They allow him to distinguish between opinions and judgements, and more generally, they form the conditions whereby the immediacy of appearance and reality are realised by perpetual verification. It should be noted that this is an immanent process and does not require arguments of transcendence. Furthermore, *ex silentio* arguments are also used by Epicurus to explain the inference of the non-evident, which includes: atoms and void, the gods, dreams and visions.

*Ex silentio* presents Epicurus with two problems. Firstly, if our understanding of truth requires verification through clarity, how can atoms and void, i.e. the non-evident, be verified? I will provide an explanation of this in Part 1 ‘The Problem of the Non-Evident and the Evident’ following a discussion of Epicurus’ method of inference. Secondly, Epicurus must also explain where knowledge of the gods originates. Although he denied divine providence and the afterlife, Epicurus maintained the existence of the gods. As we shall see in section ‘The Nature of the gods & Blessedness’, Epicurus argues that the gods exist in the *intermundia*. The question therefore remains, how do we have knowledge of them? And how can Epicurus justify his explanation without making transcendent appeals?

The best place to start is with Lucretius’ explanation, which he introduces in Book 4 ‘now I shall tell you what things move the mind’ (*L*: 4, 722) – we should notice that Lucretius offers a purely material explanation. He continues ‘First I say this, that images of things many in many modes wander about in all directions, thin, and easy’ (*L*: 4, 724-6). All objects, organic or inorganic, emit atomic effluences, which in circumstances of ‘clear-flow’ would be received by the senses without disruptions. However, in some cases ‘secondary’ or ‘finer’ effluences (*tenuia simulacra*) are also released. Lucretius provides the following account:
First I say this, that images of things many in many modes wander about in all directions, thin and easy unite when they meet in the air, like spiders’ webs [...] for they penetrate the chinks of the body, and stir the thin substance of the mind and provoke sensation. (L: 4, 727-30)

This explains how creatures such as centaurs, mermaids, Cerberus and ghosts are imagined, which appear as a result of combinations of secondary effluences. However there is a peculiarity to this account that Long addresses as follows:

Instead of accounting for dreams and hallucinations by reference to images entirely created or brought to consciousness by some psychological faculty, Epicurus supposed dreams and hallucination too are explicable by the mind’s contact with atoms that enter it from outside. (1974, p. 24)

In order that the senses can be recognised as reliable and accurate, Epicurus and Lucretius must demonstrate that the origin of supernaturalisms has a material cause. Furthermore, Epicurus’ account should be taken within the context of the times as an attempt first and foremost to remove anxiety by exposing superstitious belief. Long is right to point out the absurdities; however, he fails to recognise the ingenuity of the account in a wider context. The material account proposed by Lucretius may appear fantastical to modern standards. However when it is taken as an attempt at forming an immanent philosophy, one that avoids making appeals to the gods for providence, it seems far less unreasonable. In this light we can see a paradigm shift from a dogmatic and superstitious worldview in which reason and logic are left to their own devices, to one that introduces a new and radical interpretation of phenomena through material explanation. In this respect Epicurus’ method was exceptionally important to the development of scientific enquiry, and although his methods were limited, they should not dampen the spirit of his achievements.

Epicurus accepted the existence of the gods, yet he denied they had any power or interest in human affairs. He must therefore provide an immanent account of their existence, i.e. within the cosmos and nature. Aetius reports; ‘Epicurus [says that] the gods are anthropomorphic and can be contemplated by reason as a result of the fineness of the nature of their images’ (Inwood & Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy, 1997, p. 94). In the same way as objects emit effluences which are received by the senses,
the gods emit finer effluences that are received by the mind. In an endless process of cosmic recycling, the effluent atoms emitted by the gods are replenished by atoms, ‘floating about’ within the universe – this accounts for their immortality and the decay of all other objects. The ‘finer’ atoms emitted by the gods are then received by the mind which produces the images of the gods in the mind. Epicurus’ explanation grounds the existence of the gods in purely material terms without making transcendent appeals. However, his explanation creates a further problem which Long describes as follows:

The real difficulty is [...] that of the grounds for verification. By the concept of ‘clear’ view Epicurus has a standard for verifying perceptual judgements which has some claim to being called objective [...] How we may conceive the gods, on the other hand, is something which cannot be assimilated to perception of empirical objects. Epicurus’ theory of divine ‘images’ puts religious belief in the same category as empirical observation. (1974, p. 25)

Although Epicurus’ gods are deemed to be powerless, they are a necessary part of the cosmos. Thus, by maintaining their physical existence (as a necessary part of the cosmos), it follows that the gods have an indirect influence over human affairs. This seems to suggest that although we should not live in fear of them, without them, we could not live at all. This marks a limitation to Epicurus’ account, the legitimacy of which rests upon responses to such problems. However, within the fragmentary remains no direct response can be found and as a result we must press on with our investigation.

Third Canonic: Feelings (pathē)

The final stage of the canonic marks Epicurus’ departure from Democritus’ materialism. Aristotle was a severe critic of Democritus’ account and although reports claim that Epicurus was self taught, this seems unlikely given that ‘feelings’ form a clear response to the problem of determinism inherent to Democritus’ account. Epicurus introduces an account of ‘feelings’ that operate as an interlocutor between epiphenomenon and volition. Konstan (2008) comments:
In respect to pathos [feelings], as with a number of other technical terms, Epicurus went his own way, and indeed seems almost deliberately to have turned Aristotle’s account on its head. Pathos appears principally as one of the three (or perhaps four) basic epistemological capacities that Epicurus calls “criteria”. (Konstan D. , 2008, p. 3)

If Epicurus was to offer a viable alternative to Plato’s Forms and Aristotle’s account of teleological purposiveness, then his account of feelings must overcome the problems that Aristotle raised against the materialist tradition. In fact, ‘feelings’ bring together various elements of Epicurus’ thought which at times seem disparate. As a result our discussion of feelings will extend throughout the remainder of Part 1. Furthermore, ‘feelings’ provide man with a direct insight into the operations of nature, which is why anything congenial to nature is experienced as pleasurable, while anything uncongenial is experienced as pain (DL; 10, 034). Epicurus takes this as irrefutable evidence that the goal of life is the active removal of pain, which as we shall see in Part 1 ‘The Nature of the Universe’ is consistent with his physics. In this respect, ‘feelings’ should be regarded as the interlocutor as they serve to bridge the gap between man and nature.

In the following sub-sections I will introduce feelings in terms of two distinct categories; mental and bodily (both of which are experienced in terms of pleasure or pain). Epicurus argues that satisfaction of bodily pleasures such as thirst and hunger must be obtained prior to the attainment of the higher mental pleasures which I will introduce in Part 1, ‘Feelings and Mind’. It is worth noting that Diogenes Laertius often cites feeling and sensation together, which highlights the correlations between the three stages of the canonic. However, it should be noted that feelings also mark a division from sensory pleasures and their mental counterpart, which is why I have kept them separate.

Feelings and Sensations

Feelings share a direct relationship with sensations. The effluences of atoms produced by an object are received as sense-impressions, which must be confirmed by a preconception in order to verify the judgement and its signification. Once this
process is complete a true proposition regarding an object can be made. Feelings are the third criteria of truth and determine our behaviour as they determine whether a sensation is experienced as pleasurable or painful. In one sense this will relate to some form of decision or judgement, however the initial sensation can also be thought of as directly relating to pleasure/pain, which emerges from its material cause. For example, a burn or a cut would immediately be considered painful as it causes damage to atomic composition of an arm. The testimony of Cicero provides us with a useful insight concerning the centrality of feelings. Cicero claims that certain truths about sensations are ‘obvious and evident’, such as ‘[...] the heat of fire, the whiteness of snow and the sweetness of honey, none of which need confirmation by elaborate argumentation’ (Cicero, On ends I). He continues:

Since man has nothing left if sensations are removed from him, it must be the case that nature itself judges what is in accordance with or contrary to nature. (Cicero, On ends I)

This is also confirmed in the testimony of Diogenes who reports:

They say that there are two feelings, pleasure and pain, which occur in every animal; and the one is congenial to us, the other uncongenial. By means of them we judge what to choose and what to avoid. (DL: 10, 034)

Both Cicero and Diogenes agree that ‘feelings’ perform a crucial role; they determine the course of our actions in accordance to nature. The concept of nature for the early materialists is all-inclusive; anything congenial to nature (tranquillity of atoms) is accompanied by the feeling of pleasure, whereas anything hostile to it (causing abrasive atomic movement) is painful. Bodily pleasures however, are not good in themselves. In the Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus instructs:

It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry, not sexual love, not the enjoyment of fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul. (DL: 10, 132)
Thus, Feelings and Sensations form the basis of our mental pleasures, yet they require the direction of the mind to determine which should be sought and which should be avoided.

**Feelings and Mind**

The anxiety caused by superstitious beliefs such as divine providence and belief in the afterlife is (for Epicurus) the greatest source of pain. Once a balanced state of bodily pleasures has been achieved (aponia), it is possible through ‘sober reasoning (DL: 10, 132) to satisfy the pleasures of the mind. This also demonstrates that in Epicurean thought body and mind are interdependent and purely corporeal. Diogenes reports:

> He [Epicurus] further disagrees with the Cyrenaics in that they hold that pains of the body to be worse than mental pains; at all events evil-doers are made to suffer bodily punishment; whereas Epicurus holds the pains of the mind to be the worse; at any rate the flesh endures the storms of the present alone, the mind those of the past and future as well as the present. (DL: 10, 137)

The first stage of this process is to abandon superstitious beliefs as no physical evidence exists which supports claims of transcendence. Mental pleasures also determine our moral behaviour as a condition of happiness.

By distinguishing between Feelings, Epicurus is introducing a new avenue of possibilities for understanding man’s relation to the world. We have seen the progression of his ideas from a material basis; feelings represent an *interlocutor* from the material grounding of ‘sensation’ to the psychological state of ‘mind’ that abandons any form of mediation in terms of divine providence by uniting mind and body through feelings.

The mind functions in direct conjunction with its bodily counterpart; this is evidenced by the correlation of sensation with preconceptions, which are formed through repeated experiences. Crucially, our moral behaviour is determined by our knowledge of this process. Our decisions (Epicurus proposes) are made from the
basis of feelings. Diogenes reports that; ‘Pleasure is congenial to our nature, while pain is hostile to it’ (D.L 10, 034). There are then two forms of pleasure and pain. The first relates to the pleasures or pains of the body; if bodily desires such as thirst or hunger can be achieved a state of aponia is achieved. The second is ataraxia which relates the psychological satisfaction of desires and the removal of anxiety caused by fear of the gods and false opinion. Rather than our moral behaviour being determined by a transcendent notion of ‘the good’, which is determined on a purely rational basis (which for the Epicurean is an error due to false-belief); Epicurus proposed that moral behaviour is determined in accordance to one’s feelings (pathê), which are an immediate expression of the atomic movements that constitute the body. Once these states are achieved then the eudemonic state of ataraxia is possible.

Now that we have an understanding of the three stages of the canonic and how they interrelate, we can investigate Epicurus’ method. This is one of the most widely recognised aspects of his thought because it is consistent with (albeit in a basic form) modern scientific enquiry.

**Method of Inference**

The canonic introduced Sensation, Preconceptions and Feelings as the criteria of truth. They are the conditions of knowledge from which inferences regarding the necessary existence of atoms and void are made. Here the problem of ex silentio (arguments from silence) arises once more. In the second canonic (Preconceptions), we found that the problem concerning man’s knowledge of the gods and mythical creatures was accounted for by Epicurus in purely materialist terms. Essentially, Epicurus has to provide an account that bridges the empirical world known through the senses to the underlying necessity of the atomic world. However, he must do this in such a way that does not appeal to an external mediator (arguments of transcendence) by demonstrating that atoms and void are absolute and necessary. The nature of this problem is complicated and will require an extended discussion. In the following section I will introduce the problem in respect to the principle of non-contradiction. Then in the section ‘The Problem of the
Non-Evident and Evident’, I will provide a more direct account of the problem, which will serve as a basis for Epicurus’ physics.

Manetti describes the problem of Epicurus’ position as follows:

One of the key points of Epicurean epistemology was the semiotic principle of making conjectures about facts which are by nature imperceptible to the senses from visible phenomena. The fundamental elements of Epicurean physics (that is, the existence of atoms and of the void, the forms and reasons for celestial phenomena) are established by means of semiotic inferences which start from perceptible phenomena. (1993, p. 111)

Epicurus must demonstrate that the inferences he makes concerning atoms and void are valid. If he cannot, then not only does the canonic fail, his entire moral system will fail and thereby destroy his philosophy of immanence. One of the main problems that the lack of original literature presents is that Epicurus seems to leap between paradigms, i.e. between the empirical, the rational and the moral without appropriately connecting them. His method of inference becomes the only means of bridging such gaps and should be recognised as the central methodology to his account.

In order to validate his method of inference we should consider the argument of non-contradiction that Epicurus introduces in his Letter to Pythocles to reject the possibility that meteorology can produce any end other than the removal of false opinions (we will continue to discuss the problem of the non-evident and evident in the following chapter):

For we should not do physics by following groundless postulates and stipulations, but in a manner called for by the phenomena; for our life does not now need irrationality and groundless opinion, but rather for us to live without tumult. And everything happens smoothly and (providing everything is clarified by the methods of several different explanations) consistently with the phenomena, when one accepts what is plausibly said about them. (Pyth.DL: 10, 86-7)
According to the principle of non-contradiction; one should reject the thesis of a singular truth concerning meteorological phenomena. Instead Epicurus proposed a radical alternative; the explanation should fit the phenomena, rather than the phenomena requiring a single explanation. Almost like a puzzle with a number of alternative solutions, it is at this stage of his writing that we can see a pluralism emerging. Long raises a crucial point:

Epicurus’ use of the axiom of non-contradiction has a largely negative function of leaving open a plurality of possible explanations. But the Epicureans used the principle positively as a grounds to support general statements arrived at by induction. (Long A. A., 1974, pp. 27-8)

Inferences are not held in isolation from the phenomena they describe; they do not form universal laws, and are only valid in the absence of contrary evidence. This helps to explain his objections to the use of purely deductive arguments, which Epicurus disputes on the grounds that they are detached from the phenomena they described. Furthermore, the same argument extends to universal truths, which Epicurus maintains cannot be verified and are therefore unreliable. Epicurus’ rejection of deductive reasoning relates to his use of general statements, which as Long suggests, are, ‘arrived at by induction’ (op. cit.). Having said this, Philodemus provides an example whereby the Epicureans are said to have inferred the non-evident (“men everywhere are mortal”) from the evident (“men in our experience are mortal”). Long explains:

The Epicureans replied that their inference does not make a presupposition that all men are mortal. It is the absence of any man known to be immortal which justifies the general inference about human mortality. (Long A. A., 1974, p. 28)

This is a useful way to understand how general statements operate within Epicurus’ schema; they are based on repeated and therefore reliable experiences through induction, i.e. the inference of general observations from particular experiences.

In order to appreciate the centrality of Epicurus’ method of inference, we must also consider the difference between the inference of atoms and void, and the inferences of observable phenomena (particularly meteorological phenomena). He
explains the former in terms of a singularity; ‘[...] that the elements are atomic, and all such things as are consistent with the phenomena in only one way’ (DL: 10, 086). Whereas in the case of the latter; ‘[these...] phenomena admit of several different accounts of their existence which are consistent with our sense-perception’ (op. cit.). Inference-based analogies are grounded by their relation to phenomena through observation (i.e., induction). Sensory evidence gained via clear-impressions is applied to the preconceptions and from there, determined to be valid or invalid. Then, through repetition in which no contrary evidence occurs (principle of non-contradiction), knowledge of the phenomena itself is possible. In the letter to Pythocles Epicurus explains that:

Some phenomena within our experience afford evidence by which we may interpret what goes on in the heavens. We see how the former really take place, but not how the celestial phenomena take place, for their occurrences may possibly be due to a variety of causes. (Pyth.DL: 10, 87)

We are also told that non-evident phenomena (atoms and void), can only occur in a singularity of ways because observable phenomena (which arise from non-observable phenomena) behave in a stable manner.

For Epicurus, the necessity of this process certifies its plausibility, especially in cases whereby the inference can be made from a singular analogy. On the other hand, because meteorological phenomena have a plurality of causes, they cannot be reduced to a single analogous inference, and we should not attempt to draw single conclusions from them.

The Problem of the Non-Evident and the Evident

One of the main problems with Epicurus’ account is exposed by Long and runs as follows:

In asserting atoms and void to be the ultimate entities which constitute the world, Epicurus is making a metaphysical statement. This is not something we can prove or verify directly from sensations with or without the help of
experiment. He has to establish it by setting up certain axioms and assuming the validity of certain methods of inference. (1974, p. 20)

Long’s criticism exposes one of the main problems inherent to ancient materialism. Given Epicurus’ rejection of metaphysical truths he must provide some form of justification for the existence of atoms and void (i.e., the non-evident), otherwise his entire system will fail.

In the above section we found that atoms and void rely on a singular explanation as the phenomena they produce are stable and predictable. Furthermore, we also know that knowledge of the non-evident is gained through induction – a series of inferences used to generate general propositions about the phenomena they describe. Epicurus believed that knowledge of the non-evident arises from inferences that follow a method regulated by the evident. The application of this method forms the basis of his philosophy of immanence. The greatest challenge Epicurus faced was to provide a transitory discourse between the evident and the non-evident. Having introduced his method of inference, another problem presents itself: when speaking about the evident, one can test the validity of the general statements in a methodical way, i.e. through observation. However, when making inferences regarding the non-evident, such tests only apply indirectly; that is to say, one cannot test for the existence of atoms and void through observation. Rather one has to work on the assumption that the evident requires further explanation which lies beneath the threshold of observation. The problem can be expressed as follows; how can Epicurus know with any degree of certainty that his inferences are legitimate? This marks one of the most problematic aspects of Epicurus’ thought because as we shall see, in the remaining letters, Epicurus does not provide a thorough response. Having detailed the nature of the problem we can now enter a discussion of Epicurus’ physics which is detailed in his letter to Herodotus.
The Nature of the Universe (Letter to Herodotus)

The Letter to Herodotus is the most informative and complete account of Epicurus’ physical doctrine. His opening remarks instruct Herodotus to memorise the ‘General Principles’ (which he sets out in the letter). Students should be able to ‘recall the outline of the entire system’ (Her. DL: 10, 35) in order to remove the anxieties associated with belief in divine providence and the afterlife. In learning and applying these principles through ‘constant activity’ his students (like Epicurus himself) will achieve the state of ataraxia that is the goal of life.

Epicurus tells Herodotus, the first requirement is to, ‘have grasped what is denoted by our words’ (Her.DL: 10, 35). Having already introduced his method of inference we can move quickly through this section; only a couple of points need to be clarified. Firstly, via the first two stages of the canonic, a word and the object denoted correspond; ‘so that our words will not be empty’ (op. cit.). A lengthy, mediating, metaphysical proof is negated. Secondly, by bridging this gap, an immanent relation with the world is possible, one that is inherently meaningful. He calls this the ‘primary conception’, which in modern philosophical language equates to a correspondence theory of truth.

The ‘General’ or ‘First Propositions’ mark Epicurus’ engagement with the non-evident (atoms and void), they are also strikingly similar to those principles of Democritus and should be accepted as a development of his predecessor’s materialism. If we are to correctly understand the universe (and thereby remove the anxieties associated with false belief), we must attain knowledge of the conditions that form the basis of our existence. Epicurus introduces his first proposition; ‘nothing comes into being from what is not’ (Her.DL: 10, 38). It follows that the universe was uncreated with no beginning or end. Lucretius provides a more detailed account of the same argument which runs as follows:

We start then from her [nature] first great principle
That nothing ever by divine power comes from nothing.
For sure fear holds so much in the eyes of men
Because they see many things happen in earth and sky
Of which they can by no means see the causes,
And think them to be done by power divine.
So when we have seen that nothing can be created from nothing, we shall at once discern more clearly
The object of our search, both the source from which each thing Can be created, and the manner in which Things come into being without the aid of gods. [L: 150-160]

Both Epicurus and Lucretius follow the atomist tradition, which demands the indestructibility of atoms and void. Objects do not simply enter into existence as if from nowhere, they have a causal history - the atomists use such inferences as a concrete basis for their logic; ‘And if that which disappears were destroyed into what is not, all things would have been destroyed’ (Her.DL: 10, 39).

For Epicurus, the existence of the universe demonstrates the logical absurdity of the complete annihilation of atoms and void. He proposes that the universe is, and always has been the same, which is analogous to a closed system in which nothing can be added or removed with no possibility of external interference. Epicurus confirms neither the permanence of the Parmenidean world of Being nor the Heraclitean world of Becoming. Rather, on the level of the evident (i.e., phenomenal), the universe exists in a permanent state of becoming; however, at the level of the non-evident the universe is unchanging in terms of the quantity of atoms and void, although their combinations are subject to change.

In addition, nothing outside of atoms and void can be conceived ‘as complete natures’ with the exception of ‘properties or accidents of these [two] things’ (Her. DL: 10, 40). This means that only corporeal objects can be accepted as real, that is, nothing can exist apart from atoms and void, everything from planets to animals must necessarily fall within this limit. If we are to understand the world and its relation to atoms and void correctly (i.e., dispelling irrational fears), it is crucial we reach an understanding of their properties. The first point is the most contentious and concerns the divisibility of atoms. The problem was recognised by Parmenides, developed by Zeno and continued throughout Greece and Rome up until 19th century physics.

Zeno presented the problem as a paradox whereby if the divisibility of an atom were accepted; it would necessitate its infinite divisibility. In response Epicurus argues:

[...] among bodies, some are compounds, and some are those things from which compounds have been made. And these are atomic and
unchangeable [...] Consequently the principle of bodies must be atomic natures. (Her.DL: 10, 40-1)

It is clear that Epicurus’ response (presuming it may be considered so) does not overcome Zeno’s paradox. Yet it does demonstrate that Epicurus was more concerned with what inferences can be drawn from the evidence of the senses above those of logical necessity. Long observes that:

We do not see atoms, but what we see, birth and death, growth and decay, is taken to require the existence of bodies which are themselves changeless and wholly penetrable. (1974, p. 32)

The atoms come in an ‘ungraspable’ variety of shapes (Her.DL: 10, 42), which either attach upon collisions (if they are similar), or repel one another (Her.DL: 10, 43). To this he adds that the atoms are ‘unlimited in respect to the number of bodies and the magnitude of the void’ (Her.DL: 10, 40). The existence of the void is a necessary condition of motion – an argument proposed by Democritus in response to the plenum of the Parmenidean world. To this, Epicurus adds that atoms are in constant motion and unimpeded by void (Her.DL: 10, 44). According to Epicurus, atoms have three properties; shape, size and weight. The first two are also found within Democritus’ account; however the property of weight is reported to be Epicurus’ addition. As we shall see in Part 1, ‘The Atomic Swerve: The Problem of Determinism’, the additional property of weight is crucial to Epicurus’ philosophy of immanence because it allows Epicurus to demonstrate (together with the addition of the atomic swerve) that the universe was created without the need for divine intervention.

At first glance it may appear that Epicurus’ method lacks philosophical rigour especially in his construction of proofs. However, he demonstrates an unwavering conviction in the necessity of the non-evident. The inference of atoms and void without the need for a more rigorous metaphysical proof marks a clear departure from the emerging teleological tradition of Aristotle. It is important to remember that Epicurus was not preoccupied with developing such proofs, similar to Democritus; he wanted to show the purpose of philosophy was to remove the anxieties associated with superstitious beliefs. With this in mind, the metaphysics of Socrates and Aristotle,
so far as Epicurus was concerned, failed to acknowledge the immediacy of this realisation.

Desire

The transition from body to mind is experienced as an affective state of desire. In this respect, desire serves a crucial function in linking Epicurus’ physics to his ethics. Generally speaking, Epicurus believed that our desires perform a crucial role of instruction. This means that from an atomistic basis, our body dictates what it requires in order for steady atomic movements to occur. As Long notes; ‘we are genetically programmed to seek what will cause pleasure and to avoid what will cause pain’ (Long A. A., Hellenistic Philosophy; Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics, 1974, p. 63). Yet this does not mean that all pleasure is to be sought and in his Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus argues ‘One must reckon that of desires some are natural, some groundless; and of the natural desires some are necessary and some merely natural; and of the necessary, some are necessary for happiness and some for freeing the body from troubles and some for life itself’ (Men.DL: 10, 127). Thus, it is important to identify the difference between the types of desires. In order to do this we must refer to Lucretius’ account, which builds upon the above statement in more detail. Furthermore, it is also important to recognise Epicurus’ account of ‘desire’ as a response to the notion of desire proposed by Plato in the Gorgias because it forms part of Epicurus’ rejection of transcendence.

In the Gorgias Socrates makes a reference to an unnamed thinker who describes the soul as an image analogous to a perforated vessel or jar that allows water to pass through it. In reference to an unnamed thinker’s allegory, Socrates states that the vessel cannot be filled because the desires of the soul cause continual and unwanted movements that cause the vessel to spill. Socrates argues that such desires are appropriate to the ‘uninitiate’ that reside in Hades. He continues:

[…] these uninitiated must be the most unhappy, for they will carry water to pour into a perforated jar in a similarly perforated sieve […] and the soul of the foolish he compared to a sieve, because it is perforated and through lack of belief and forgetfulness unable to hold anything. (Gorgias 493 b)
The outcome of uncontrolled desires on the ‘uninitiate souls’ (a reference to those who lack knowledge of the Form of the Good) is catastrophic as they are enclosed in a perpetual task – a prison of ignorance. At the beginning of Book Six, Lucretius alludes to the same passage of the Gorgias. The allusion marks a significant disparity between Epicurus’ (or Lucretius’ account of it) and Plato’s worldview. For Plato, a ‘lack of belief and forgetfulness’ is cited as the cause of the soul’s defect, that is, belief in the eternal and unifying singularity of the Form of the Good. Whereas for Epicurus, the defect is ‘natural’, which means it occurs throughout the body on an atomic level. This may well be a reference to the continual release of atoms from the body that is the cause of aging and decomposition. Whereas for Epicurus the problem is inherent to man’s being and is therefore an ontological problem. For Plato the problem concerns knowledge of the Forms and should be regarded as an epistemological problem.

From lines 9-16 of Book Six, Lucretius diagnoses the symptoms that cause the perforations of the soul. Whereas he describes some as ‘hapless’ and ‘self-inflicted’ which echoes the importance of the mastery of desires, he finds others to be a natural condition of the body. Lucretius proposes that if the state of ataraxia is to be attained, then our desires must first be controlled; if not, they can never be fulfilled:

He [Epicurus] understood then that the vessel itself
Produced the flaw, and by this flaw corrupted
All that came into it however lovely.
He saw that it must leak, being riddled with holes,
And so could not by any means be filled.
He saw that, as it were with noisome flavour,
It tainted everything that entered it.
Therefore with words of truth he purged men’s hearts. (L: 6, 17-24)

This ‘flaw’ is implicit to Lucretius’s account of desire. Desire is a symptom of excess that corrupts everything it contacts. In remarkable poetic style, Lucretius introduces the meaning of the Epicurean summum bonum as convalescence; recovery via limitation; ‘[Epicurus] set a limit to desire and fear. He showed the nature of the highest good’ (Luc: 6, 25-6). The highest good – the active removal of pain in the pursuit of ataraxia sets a boundary to the otherwise ‘unfillable’ desires. As such practical wisdom (phronesis) is valuable because it ensures:
[...] sober calculation, which investigates the reasons of every choice and avoidance and expels the false opinions, the chief cause of the turmoil that takes possession of the souls of men. (DeWitt, 1954, p. 195)

The highest good is a self-imposed limit of desire, which is achievable in the everyday.69 Lucretius explains that all men strive towards this end, an end that is attainable if one follows ‘The straight and narrow path which leads to it, if we go forward with unswerving steps (L: 6, 28-9). Lucretius is able to make a claim to universality (i.e., ‘for which all man strives’) because ‘all men’ are composed of atoms and void and are subject to the same local laws.

Both Epicurus and Lucretius arrive at the stark realisation that man is the origin of his ills and controlling one’s desires is the first step to recovery. The common noun used to describe Epicurus’ ethics is ‘cure’, which is somewhat misguided because man, like all other material objects (including the soul) is produced from a random infinity, and will return to it.70 Therefore, to ‘cure’ man of this would not be a cure at all, rather complete annihilation, which Epicurus describes as an absurd hypothesis.71 In response to this terrific realisation, Lucretius summarises Epicurus’ offering of convalescence as follows:

He showed the evil in the lives of men
Flying far and wide, caused either by natural chance
Or else by force, as nature so ordained.
He showed the sally-ports within the walls
From which each different attack could best be met.
He proved that mankind mostly without cause
Stirred up sad waves of care within their breasts.
For we, like children frightened of the dark,
Are sometimes frightened of the dark,
Are sometimes frightened in the light-of things
No more to be feared than fears that in the dark
Distress a child, thinking they may come true.
Therefore this terror and darkness of the mind
Not by the sun’s rays, not by the bright shafts of day,
Must be dispersed, as is most necessary,
But by the face of nature and her laws.

The revelation that man (the leaking and tainted vessel) produces, then ‘externalises’72 the ‘terror and darkness of the mind’ demonstrated Lucretius’ remarkable insight and grasp of psychology and its relation to physiology.73 The
'darkness' is an allusion to the anxieties caused by false beliefs such as those proposed by Plato and his rejection of the validity of the senses in favour of a truer, intelligible realm – a world of perfection and eternity. The immanent world, this world, the world of ‘sober reckoning’ (Luc: 1, 103) is a flawed and imperfect world, a world of death and rebirth. Yet these imperfections give life meaning and purpose. The structure of Lucretius’ poem exemplifies this; after the plague took Athens ‘... reverence now and worship of the gods counted for little, present grief was all’ (Luc: 6. 1273). By denying a transcendent metaphysics of essence and replacing it with emerging (local) combinations of atoms, the atomists denied the validity of absolutes and in doing so proposed an ethics of repose:

[...] a joy it is, when the strong winds of storm stir up the waters of a mighty sea, to watch from the shore the troubles of another. No pleasure this in any man’s distress, but joy to see the ills from which you are spared, and joy to see great armies locked in conflict across the plains, yourself free from danger. (L: 2, 1-5)

Once the universe is understood as infinite the paradox of limits (developed by Zeno) dissolves; ‘nature prevents the universe from setting any limits to itself’ (L: 1, 1008). The possibility of transcendence, i.e. stepping outside and looking in, is not the perspective of Epicurean ethics but the denial of it. The image of storms ‘stirring the waters’ is observed from a position composed of the same elements (of atoms and void), merely in different combinations – the image remains locked in an immanent sphere. The spectator can never be completely removed from the ‘troubles’ and ‘distress’ because these problem are what define him, the observer can only achieve a temporary convalescence at the time when katestamatic pleasure (pleasure in rest) is achieved.

In summary, we may say that ‘desire’ for Epicurus and Lucretius establishes a strong link between the body and mind, physics and ethics. We may also claim that the nature of this relationship is reciprocal as the body commands the affective state of mind, which uses practical wisdom (gained through experience) to determine and limit the desires. Then through volition, the mind commands the body to perform the tasks (such as eating and drinking in moderation) that will satisfy the desires and
thereby produce steady atomic movements throughout the body. This satisfies the initial condition of aponia, which is required before the mental desire of ataraxia can be attained. In this respect, Epicurus avoids the Democritean epiphenomenalism and replaces it with a notion of emergent reality that acts like a feedback loop. However, this does not account for volition itself, which for the materialist means: the power to control the movement of the body. In order to overcome the problem of determinism (which is inextricably linked to epiphenomenalism), and to create a basis for volition, a condition is required that allows the mind to control the body. This condition is the atomic swerve; the deviation of atomic flow from its determined path.

In order to present an accurate portrayal of the problem, we must begin with a discussion of the atomic swerve before reintroducing the problem of volition as a response to determinism.

**The Atomic Swerve: The Problem of Determinism**

This brings us to one of the most important yet controversial aspects of Epicurean thought; the atomic swerve. Lucretius described how Epicurus:

> [...] showed the evil in the lives of men
> Flying far and wide, caused either by natural chance
> Or else by force, as nature so ordained. (Luc: 6, 30-3)

These two causes; natural chance (atomic swerve) and force (atomic collisions), are crucial to the physics in respect to the creation of the universe and the ethics in terms of free will. Both Democritus and Epicurus held that motion is produced through the impact of atoms which travel through the void:

> [...] the atoms move continuously for all time, some recoiling far apart from one another [upon collisions], and others, by contrast, maintaining a [constant] vibration when they are locked into a compound or enclosed by the surrounding [atoms of a compound]. (Her.DL: 10, 43)\(^75\)

We are presented with a simple, mechanical system that explains all phenomena. It appears as though Epicurus had to some extent produced a complete account of the universe that rejected arguments of transcendence. However, in response to the
problem of determinism and the creation of the universe, Epicurus argued that there must be a motion inherent within atoms that are not caused directly by impact (blows) but (as Cicero testifies) by a ‘swerve from their [natural] course’ (Inwood & Gerson, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, 1997, p. 49). There remains no direct evidence of this swerve within the remains of Epicurus’ writings; however, there are numerous doxographical reports which provide compelling evidence that Epicurus had introduced it to material atomism. 76 It is generally accepted that this modification occurred in response to Aristotle’s criticism of Democritus’ account. Long argues that; ‘In all probability, Aristotle’s discussion of weight as a determinant of movement influenced Epicurus’ modification of Democritus’ (Long A. A., 1974, p. 36). For Democritus, prior to the formation of bodies or ‘dynamic entities’ (Long 1974. P.38), atoms fell downwards in a glorious atomic shower. Epicurus recognised that:

> It is necessary that the atoms move at equal speed, when they move through the void and nothing resists them. For heavy things will not move faster than small and light ones, when, that is, nothing stands in their way. (Her.DL: 10, 61) 77

Whether or not weight was an Epicurean addition or a Democritean one, is irrelevant to the motion of atoms in the void. Aristotle was therefore correct to point out that there is no reason for the shower of primordial atoms to change paths causing impacts (blows) according to Democritus’ theory. The ‘swerve’ was intended to counter Aristotle’s critique. However, as Cicero remarks; ‘The swerve itself is made up to suit his pleasure – for he says that the atom swerves without a cause’ (Inwood & Gerson, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, 1997, p. 46). Furthermore he adds:

> [...] he [Epicurus] said that an atom swerves by a very little bit, indeed a minimal distance, and that in this way are produced the mutual entanglements, linkages and cohesion of the atoms as a result of which the world and all the parts of the worlds and everything in it are produced. (Inwood & Gerson, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, 1997, p. 46)

The problem is clear: this material system, a cause is required that either operates ‘outside’ of the causal chain, or remains immanent to it but cannot be known. Widder (2002) argues; ‘The limit [...] is always permeated by a heterogeneous but immanent beyond; the clinamen [i.e., atomic swerve] is an immanent excess of
movement of the atom’ (Widder, 2002, p. 79). Cicero describes the problem as follows:

[...] for you [Epicurus] do not say that the atom moves from its place and swerves because it is struck from the outside, nor that there is in the void through which the atom moves any trace of a cause for it not to move in a straight line, nor is there any change in the atom itself which would cause it not to maintain the natural motion of its weight. (Inwood & Gerson, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, 1997, p. 49)

This motion is as Plutarch describes, ‘a causeless motion coming from not being’ (Inwood & Gerson, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, 1997, p. 87). Having claimed, ‘nothing comes into being from what is not’ (Her.DL: 10, 38.), a causeless motion appears to stand in direct opposition to Epicurus’ philosophy of immanence. In response we must turn to Lucretius, who re-introduces the now familiar *ex silentio* inference. In Book 2, he develops a progressive argument; the first phase concerns necessity and motion, and to a certain extent acts as a response to Aristotle’s critique of Democritus:

> While atoms move by their own weight straight down<br>Through the empty void, at quite uncertain times<br>And uncertain places they swerve slightly from their course.<br>You might call it no more than a mere change of motion.<br>If this did not occur, then all of them<br>Would fall like drops of rain down through the void.<br>There would be no collisions, no impacts<br>Of atom upon atom, so that nature<br>Would never have created anything. (L: 2, 216-223)

The argument is fairly simple: because the universe exists and is composed of atoms, an atomic motion is required that accounts for the deviation from its unidirectional path. The image of a shower of atoms only serves as a demonstration; there was never a state (at least in our local universe) whereby all atoms were falling as the image suggests. Instead, the Epicurean universe is unbounded and has always existed, although not necessarily in its current form. In his *Letter to Herodotus*, Epicurus claims that, ‘there is an unlimited number of cosmoi’ (Her.DL: 10, 45). This introduction of a local / global state of affairs (i.e., a plurality of conditions) that serves to demonstrate the redundancy of Aristotle’s teleology hypothesis. Accordingly, each
cosmos is governed by a unique and local set of laws. Due to a lack of contrary evidence, that is to say, because this cosmos exists and is governed by laws (temporarily) - a motion is required that has no observable cause.

The second phase of the argument concerns the rejection of determinism, which is a response to the problem of volition. It is at this point that the receptivity of the physics and ethics is most evident. In an attempt to avoid determinism, Lucretius faced a potentially catastrophic problem: by overcoming Democritean determinism and replacing it with the swerve, human actions remain determined by a random and uncontrollable cause. The assumption refers to a reading of Book 2 that seems to exclude the possibility of will from the agent and replaces it with a causeless motion (or swerve):

Again, if movement always is connected,
New motions coming from old in order fixed,
If atoms never swerve and make beginning
Of motions that can brake the bonds of fate,
And foil the infinite chain of cause and effect,
What is the origin of this free will
 Possessed by living creatures throughout the earth?
 Whence comes, I say, this will-power wrested from the fates
 Whereby we each proceed where pleasure leads,
 Swerving our course at no fixed time or place
 But where the bidding if our hearts directs?
 Far beyond doubt the power of the will
 Originates these things and gives them birth
 And from the will movements flow through the limbs. (L: 2, 251-263).

By discussing the limits of this ‘will-power’ in reference to coercion, citing an example of a man being struck and thereby displaced from his original position who then has the ability to halt this motion. Lucretius introduces a very subtle argument that demonstrates how an ‘external’ necessity can be overcome by ‘internal’ necessity:

The same thing therefore we must admit in atoms:
That in addition to their weight and impacts
There is another separate cause of motion,
From which we get this innate power of ours,
Since nothing can be produced from nothing.
For it is weight that prevents all things being caused
Simply by external impacts of other atoms.
But that within the mind there’s no necessity
Controlling all its actions, all its movements,
Enslaving it and forcing it to suffer,
That the minute swerving of atoms causes
In their place nor time determinate. (L: 2, 284-294)
The idea of the atomic swerve (of soul atoms) as the cause of will-power is controversial. In breaking the causal chain and freeing man from the abysmal thought that his actions are determined solely by a chain of material causes, it may be argued that Lucretius simply replaces one abysmal thought with another. Strodach describes the problem as follows:

[An] act of “free-will” is not an act caused by myself, by my settled character, independently of external force or coercion, but by purely accidental atomic irregularities that happen to operate in my will. (Strodach., 1963, p. 25)

The problem Democritus faced concerning epiphenomena was (according to this reading) resurrected by Lucretius at a pivotal moment. As a consequence, the ‘will’ can be no more than an expression of an arcane manifestation of a random and uncontrolled atomic swerve – described by Long as a ‘principle of indeterminacy’ (1974, p. 38). By replacing determinism (i.e., as a mechanism of materialism) with the arbitrary atomic swerve, it was supposed that Lucretius (and formerly Epicurus) had arrived at the logical limit of ancient materialism. According to this reading, the attempt to escape the problem of volition led directly to its reformulation.

Rist offers an anachronistic response that attempts to resolve the problem by offering a reading in line with Aristotle’s notion of character (aretē). He presents a two stage argument: the first stage involves a discussion of ‘external necessity’ whereby he rebuffs claims that bodily movements are determined by ‘blows of atoms’ as the cause of movement. Instead he proposes that ‘internal necessity’ (the second stage) overcomes the external necessity because the swerve breaks the causal chain which provides a platform for voluntas (will). The reception of effluent atoms, for example those that Epicurus believes provide the mind with the ‘image of movement,’ do not necessarily control the body and put it into movement. Rather, they are held in the mind and, depending on one’s ‘character,’ a decision is made to move or not. In this sense the mind is a ‘locality’, partially formed by its own motives and partially by ‘external’ impacts. Rist explains that:
the mind arouses itself so that it wishes to move. First of all the images of movement are received; then the mind decides whether to walk or not. The outcome of the mental ‘debate’ depends on the pre-existing pattern of the mind atoms. If these are arranged in one way, not of course determined at birth, then there is a decision to move. If they are arranged differently, the decision is to remain at rest. (Rist, 1972, pp. 94-95)

Rist utilises the Aristotelian conception of wisdom (phronesis) especially when limiting the idea of ‘character formation... in childhood’ (p. 95). The will (voluntas) is an activity that can actuate movement provided the (atomic) stimuli (effluences) are present:

The voluntas must be saved from a succession of causes which can be traced back to infinity. All (Lucretius) needs... is a break in the succession of causes, so that the source of an action cannot be traced back to something occurring before the birth of an agent. (Rist, 1972, p. 94)

Rist concludes; ‘It is to secure this break in the causal chain that the swerve is introduced’ (op. cit.). Furthermore, he adds that Lucretius, ‘merely remarks that voluntas requires a swerve, not that every or any specific acts of voluntas requires one of its own’ (Rist, 1972, p. 94). This means, the ‘causal chain’ is repeatedly broken each and every time a voluntary movement occurs, any act of will (voluntas) that follows cannot (therefore) be traced back to an event prior to the swerve. Free will (libera voluntas) is possible, Rist argues, because the swerve provides the conditions sufficient to support it:

It is our mind that must be freed by the swerve, not each separate decision. One swerve would be strictly sufficient to ensure that the pattern of the soul is not wholly determined before birth. Too many might make behaviour entirely random, but an indeterminate and small number would be both plausible and effective for Epicurus’ purpose. (Rist, 1972, p. 94)

Free will in this sense is limited by its materiality but not determined by it. The swerve produces breaks (or anomalous deviations) in the causal chain, which the Epicureans took as evidence that the problems inherent to Democritean materialism could be overcome. As a result the Epicureans rejected Democritean conformism in
favour of an ethics of repose. Accordingly, Democritus’ euthymia (cheerfulness) as a form of conformism is replaced by the pursuit of ataraxia, which is recognised by the Epicureans as a free and spontaneous act.\(^8^1\)

It is clear that the atomic swerve is problematic as it highlights the limit of Epicurus’ system and his method of inference. To a certain extent, the inference of atoms and void, as well as the swerve, which ultimately rely on ex silentio arguments, share certain transcendent traits as I will now explain. In the twelfth Principal Doctrine we find the following claim:

> It is impossible for someone ignorant about the nature of the universe but still suspicious about the subjects of the myths to dissolve his feeling of fear about the most important matters. So it is impossible to receive unmixed pleasures without knowing natural science. (Inwood & Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy, 1997, p. 33)

Having already observed that the cause of the swerve cannot be known, how else can it be interpreted, otherwise than an inferred necessity? Yet, this requires a cause that exists in isolation from all others, which clearly contradicts the materialist hypothesis. In effect, Epicurus was claiming that a transcendent cause is required (i.e., one that exists outside of time and space).\(^8^2\) This marks the most problematic aspect of Epicurus’ philosophy of immanence. In an attempt to create an image of the universe that is self-regulated and conditioned from within, Epicurus’ system requires a cause that is inconsistent with the rest of his theory. This highlights the greatest problem of ancient materialism, one that presents the materialist with a choice: Either the universe is determined, in which case there is no possibility for autonomous action, or man’s actions are not determined, in which case an uncaused cause it required. As a result, we must concede that Epicurus did not provide a complete account of immanence because at the heart of the materialist hypothesis there is a logical paradox that cannot be solved from within his account of the cosmos and nature. However, it should be noted that Epicurus’ primary aim was to remove the pain that is caused by the false belief in divine providence and the limitations of Epicurus’ method are of secondary importance to those proposed by the existence of the gods. In the following discussion I will present
Epicurus’ account of the gods in order to demonstrate that their existence remains within the confines of the cosmos and nature.

**The Nature of the Gods & Blessedness**

As we have seen, one of the most fundamental elements of ataraxia is to live without the fear of death and divine retribution. Implicit to this is the rejection of divine providence. In the *Letter to Menoeceus*, Epicurus instructs his disciples to:

> Believe that god is an indestructible and blessed animal, in accordance with the general conception of god generally held. Believe of him everything which is able to preserve his blessedness and indestructibility. For gods do exist because we have clear knowledge of them.  
(Men.DL: 10, 123)

The role of the gods is unique to Epicurean thought as they are powerless to act or control human affairs. Epicurus believed that once the state of ataraxia is attained a further objective should be sought. This concerns the lives of the gods, which (Epicurus believed) should be emulated by man. In order to understand why he places such value on the lives of the gods we must begin by examining their material existence.

The belief that the gods are indestructible was a typical starting point of ancient theological belief. As such, the gods were not subject to the same conditions that governed the lives of man. It was also accepted that obedience to the gods was necessary for gaining their favour as they possessed the power to control man’s fortune. Conversely, the Epicurean gods were not granted such powers, instead they, like all other material objects (both organic and inorganic), were subject to the same destructive process as everything else. Yet Epicurus maintained that the gods were eternal and they played an important role in the cosmic cycle. In order to justify this claim he inferred that unlike all other material objects, the gods existed in the *intermundia*, i.e. the space between cosmoi. Furthermore, he inferred that their bodies were composed of fine atoms that are received by the mind – hence man’s knowledge of their existence. The effluence of atoms from the bodies of the gods
meant that they were subject to decay. In order to legitimise his claim that the gods were eternal, Epicurus proposed that the bodies of the gods could receive as well as emit these fine atoms. Cicero reports that:

It is most worthwhile to reflect long and hard on the tremendous power of infinity, which we must understand is such as to make it possible that all [classes of] things have an exact and equal correspondence with all other [classes of] things. Epicurus calls this *isonomia*, i.e. equal distribution. In virtue of this it comes about that if there is such and such a number of mortal beings, there is no less a number of immortal beings, and if there is an innumerable set of forces which destroy, there are also an infinite set of forces which preserve. (Inwood & Gerson, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, 1997, p. 52)

The process of equal distribution (known as the principle of isonomia) represents a process of cosmic recycling that Epicurus deems necessary from which its legitimacy is inferred. Significantly, Epicurus rejected the use of universal laws on the basis that the conditions between cosmoi vary. The principle of isonomia can be taken as an argument against the necessity of transcendent gods that govern the universe. This is evident in Lucretius' poem:

For the nature of the gods is thin, and far removed from our senses, and it is hardly perceived by the mind. We cannot touch it with our hands; therefore it cannot touch anything that we cannot touch. For that cannot touch which itself cannot be touched. Wherefore their dwelling places also must differ from ours, being thin, like the thinness of their bodies. (L: 5, 148-155)

Crucially, knowledge of the gods is gained analogously through the necessity of isonomia. The fine effluent atoms emitted by gods are absorbed by the fine atoms of the mind, which provides a material basis for man’s knowledge of the gods. In the *Letter to Menoeceus*, Epicurus describes the gods as a ‘blessed animal’ (Men.DL: 10, 123), which confirms their material existence.

It is worth noting that knowledge of the gods cannot be gained by sense-impressions; rather, the effluent atoms emitted by them are received directly by the
mind in dreams or through divine contemplation. Rist takes as evidence that, ‘the objects of the mind are analogous to the objects of sense’ (Rist, 1972, p. 143) and in this respect, we form a general concept of the gods that is consistent with their indestructibility and blessedness. The ‘mind’ is therefore another means (as well as sensations) for gaining knowledge. Accordingly, the application of this knowledge (when combined with preconceptions and feelings) forms a coherent basis for discourse on the gods, which is the topic of the following section.

**Blessedness**

Since Epicurus denied the transcendent existence of the gods, their existence must necessarily be immanent and identified within the cosmos and nature. As we have found, Epicurus uses this to reject the idea of divine providence. In this respect, the life of the gods is of no concern to man, just as the life of man is of no concern to the gods. Yet Epicurus and Lucretius maintain that awareness the nature of the gods knowledge is a valuable source of knowledge as it informs us of the inner working of the cosmos in such a way that instructs our moral behaviour.

Lucretius begins his poem by paying homage to his master’s objectivism:

> When human life lay foul for all to see upon the earth, crushed by the burden of religion, religion which from the heaven’s firmament displayed its face, its ghastly countenance, lowering above mankind, the first who dared raise mortal eyes against it, was a man of Greece. He was not cowed by fables of the gods or thunderbolts or heaven’s threatening roar, but they the more spurred on his ardent soul. Yearning to be the first to break apart the bolts of nature’s gates and throw them open. (L, 1; 61-73)

This image of the open gate encapsulates Epicurus’ philosophy of immanence. By throwing the gates of nature open as Lucretius describes, Epicurus paved the way for an original interpretation of the universe. With no recourse to providence, the Epicurean gods took on a radically new meaning. Take prayer for example, traditionally it invokes images of appeal and appeasement in the hope to gain the favour of the gods. Under the Epicurean system such appeals are pointless; however divine contemplation (i.e., contemplating the live of the gods in their blessedness)
becomes a pursuit because it serves as a model for happiness. The garden of Epicurus is testimony to this because its role was to create the condition in which lives of the Epicurean gods could be emulated. With the ‘garden’, Epicurus created a secure and secluded commune in which only like-minded people dwelt. Such a place mimics the abode of the gods in the intermundia. Thus, Epicurus used the knowledge he gained from divine contemplation for practical purposes, which demonstrates that the lives of the Epicurean gods could be meaningful if the individual so required. Once again we should recognise that knowledge is necessary in the pursuit of happiness. In this respect it was vital that Epicurus could ensure the legitimacy of the god’s dwelling place outside of the conditions of man’s existence but within the conditions of the cosmos and nature.

It seems plausible that in the event that divine contemplation is achieved, the limitations of Epicurus’ philosophy of immanence can be overlooked. If we are to understand the nature of Epicurus’ philosophy correctly, we must approach it holistically. This means that the individual elements of which his system is composed are secondary to the aim of the blessed life and given the above analysis of the various stages of his philosophy, divine contemplation provides man with the ability to situate himself within the universe. Thus, the problems of proofs and legitimacy raised throughout Part 1 are, for the Epicurean at least, insignificant compared to the benefits to be gained by accepting his account in its totality. Thus, the statement that one has to see the whole world through the eyes of Epicurus’ thought in order that its meaning and justifications become known (see Part 1, ‘Epicurus’), should be regarded as an endorsement of Epicurus’ method.

In order to do this, the disciple must begin by incorporating the tetrapharmakon, which is a summary of the PrincipalDoctrines: don’t fear the gods, don’t worry about death. What is good is easy to attain and what is evil is easy to endure. From this basis the pursuit of ataraxia and the blessed life can be systematised as follows: i) Somatic disturbances such as thirst, hunger and overindulgence must be avoided. ii) the psychological anxieties associated with the lives and opinions of the gods can be overcome. iii) upon reaching the state of ataraxia, the lives of the gods can be contemplated and blessedness can be achieved. Lucretius describes the state of blessedness as follows:
The gods appear now and their quiet abodes which no winds ever shake, nor any rain falls on them from dark clouds, nor ever snow congealed with bitter frost with its white fall mars them; but always ever-cloudless air enfolds and smiles on the with bounteous light. There nature everything supplies, and there through all the length of the ages nothing comes to vex the tranquil tenor of their minds. (L: 3, 19-24)

According to Lucretius’ account, nature supplies the gods with all they need, including the replenishment of the fine atoms of which they consist. As such the gods live completely free from all disturbances. It is this state of untroubledness that Epicurus believed could be emulated through divine contemplation; such is the ‘goal of the blessed life’ (Men.DL: 10, 128).

As we have seen, divine contemplation requires a radical transformation of the perspective of the individual and his or her relationship with the universe. For Epicurus, this meant that the fear of death, the problems associated with excessive living and the security that is required in order to live the tranquil life are all possible through emulation and contemplation of the lives of the gods.

**Blessedness and Friendship**

Friendship for Epicurus was synonymous with the good life as it ensured (so the Epicureans believed) one’s safety and well being and is the basis of Epicurus’ social contract theory. In the *Ancient Collection of Maxims* (Inwood & Gerson, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, 1997, p. 34) Diogenes reports:

> Of the things which wisdom provides for the blessedness of one’s whole life, by far the greatest is the possession of friendship.

The same understanding produces confidence about there being nothing terrible which is eternal or [even] long-lasting and has also realised that security amid these limited [bad things] is most easily achieved through friendship’ (DL: 10, 139-154: XXVII-III)
The advantage of security gained from life in the ‘garden’ is fundamental to the individual’s happiness as they help to secure the necessary conditions from which aponia can be gained and ataraxia can ensue. In the Vatican Sayings 52 we find, ‘Friendship dances around the world announcing to all of us that we must wake up to blessedness’ (Inwood & Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy, 1997, p. 38). There is then a sense of universality to friendship, a feeling that all of mankind can share. Once again, it is the universality of feeling that, we find the Epicureans leaning toward. A sense of brotherhood permeates Epicurean friendship, a kinship that unites their ideas and beliefs. The three remaining letters (to Pythocles, Herodotus and Menoeceus) all demonstrate Epicurus’ willingness to share his sagacity, which simultaneously shows glimmers of altruism and utility. Blessedness and friendship are inseparable for Epicurus and in the Vatican Sayings 78 we find, ‘the noble man is most involved with wisdom and friendship, of which one is a mortal good, the other immortal’ (Inwood & Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy, 1997, p. 40). Above the contingent determinations that wisdom offers, it is friendship that reaches beyond the existence of the individual. Although immortality is in reality impossible (as the physical doctrines demonstrate), friendship, for the Epicurean, has a meaning that endures beyond the life of the individual.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

1 The psychological satisfaction of desires and the removal of anxiety caused by fear of the gods and false opinion. Also see: Part 1 ‘Feelings and Mind’.

2 Diogenes reports that Epicurus claimed to be self-taught. See, DL: 10, 013.

3 I will argue that during his early thought and subsequent research on ‘The Pre-Platonic Philosophers’ Nietzsche developed his critical angle of materialism, which in Beyond Good and Evil, led him to recognise ‘atomistic need’ as an early incarnation of ‘metaphysical need’ (BGE: 12).

4 Part 2 ‘Nietzsche and Greek Materialism’.

5 Guthrie, 1980, p. 386.

6 For examples of such changes see Strodach., 1963, pp. 9-10.

7 Zeno, who exposed the paradoxical nature of the divisibility of matter, presented the problem of divisibility as follows: If an object is spatially extended (i.e., three-dimensional and subject to the laws of Euclidean geometry) it follows that any object that occupies space can be divided into smaller and smaller sections ad infinitum. The atomists were confronted with a decision, either the atom is infinitely divisible (in which case it could not be the smallest possible point of special extension) or, it is indivisible and Zeno’s paradox was maintained.

8 For more information on the problems with this account cf. Rist, 1972, pp. 167-8 - ‘Appendix B: The Weight of the Democritean Atom’. This is contrasted by Long A. A., Hellenistic Philosophy; Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. 1974, p. 35 who comments, ‘He [Democritus] probably did not attribute weight to the atom’.

9 See, Inwood & Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy, 1997, p. 86.


11 Epicurus also makes the same argument; see Her.DL: 10, 41-42.

12 David Bostock (1986), demonstrates how the argument ‘nothing comes from nothing’ (an argument that is of fundamental importance to the material atomists) is recognised by Plato. Furthermore, he comments, ‘for Plato a person is both body and soul, and since souls are
immaterial there could be no way of creating them, and similarly no way of destroying them either. Each soul must therefore exist for all time' (Bostock, 1986, p. 59).

13 As we shall find, Epicurus’ epistemological account requires the absolute legitimacy of sensory evidence (see Part 1, ‘First Canonic: Sensation’).

14 Round (1993) argues that for ‘Pythagoras and his followers: the true objects of human knowledge were not the so-called realities available to the senses but the manifestations of a formal order to the discernible behind those alleged realities. By patient ascetic study of this primary world of basically mathematical orderliness the human soul could assimilate the same ordered quality; gradually in the course of a series of transmigrations, the well-ordered soul could free itself from sensory illusion altogether. There is much of this in Plato; specifically, there is a great deal of this in the *Phaedo*’ (Round, 1993, p. 2).

15 We will discuss the effluence of atoms in Part I: The Nature of the Universe.

16 In Part 1 ‘False-judgements & verification’ I will detail Epicurus’ response to this problem.

17 Although the origin of eudaimonism is contested (See fn. 15. (Curd, 1995, p. 110) for a discussion of the origins of eudaimonism) the possibility of an independent and prior explanation than that of Aristotle’s, highlights the significance of Democritus’ account.


19 I will return to this in the sub-section ‘Blessedness’.

20 This will be explained in greater length in Part 2, ‘The Nature of the Universe’.

21 Socrates argues that the mind is like a wax block upon which impressions are made: ‘Whenever we wish to remember something we see or hear or conceive in our own minds, we hold this wax under the perceptions or ideas and imprint them on it as we might stamp the impression of a seal ring. Whatever is so imprinted we remember and know so long as the image remains; whatever is rubbed out or has not succeeded in leaving an impression we have forgotten and do not know’. (Thea. 191de). Following a number of refuted possibilities, Socrates concludes that the problem of false-judgements can only arise from a perception being mismatched to the impression. Socrates uses this to demonstrate that such a mismatch may occur only on the condition that we already have an impression of a particular object prior to the perception. Therefore, knowledge cannot be derived solely from perceptions; rather it must have some other foundation, which for Plato is in the transcendent Form of the Good.
22 'Apollodorus, in his Chronology, asserts that he was a pupil of Nausiphanes and Praxiphanes; but in his letter to Euridicus, Epicurus himself denies this, saying that he was self-taught. He and Hermarchus deny that Leucippus deserved to be called a philosopher; though some authors, including Apollodorus the Epicurean, name him as the teacher of Democritus. Demetrius the Magnesian says that Epicurus was a pupil of Xenocrates also'. (DL: 10, 013).


24 This highlights another idiosyncrasy between Epicurus and Epicureanism. For examples of this see Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Philosophers, X.13 & Cicero, On Ends I.5.14.

25 See also, Cicero, Academica, II.14.45 (Lucullus).

26 See; Cicero, On End-Goals, Good and Bad, II.4.12, Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors, I.1.

27 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors, I.1.

28 See; Cicero, On Ends, II.4.12.


31 Inwood & Gerson translate sense-impressions phantasia as sense-perceptions.

32 According to the testimony of Aetius, Heraclitus made a remarkably similar observation concerning the sun; ‘Its [the sun’s] breadth is the length of the human foot’ (Curd, 1995, p. 38).


34 Inwood & Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy, 1997, p. 41.

35 Set out in the previous section Part 1 ‘False-judgements & Verification’.

36 Inwood & Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy, 1997, p. 41.
37 Long refers to Clement of Alexandria’s claim that Epicurus wrote ‘it is impossible for anyone to investigate... or to form a judgement... independently of preconceptions’ (1974, p. 24 fn. 1).

38 In “Democritean Materialism; Epistemology” we found that Democritus arrives at the conclusion that, ‘the world of appearance is the product of various combinations of atoms and void, and merely epiphenomenal’. However, the term ‘epiphenomenon’ should not be applied to Epicurus. Instead, I propose that ‘emergent realities’ is a more accurate description of what Epicurus has in mind. For example, if the movement of bodily atoms is unstable as a result of hunger, the only way to create steady movements is to satisfy the desire of hunger (i.e., aponia). This requires communication from the atomic level to the level of the body. In order that this may happen a feedback loop is required.

39 See DL.10, 068 /076 /082.

40 DeWitt highlights this difference and argues that to conflate feelings and sensations into the same category results in ‘logical absurdities. Since the Sensations would exclude fears and hopes and all the higher emotions’ (DeWitt, 1954, p. 151).

41 See Part 1 ‘False-judgements & Verification’.

42 See Part 1 ‘Second Canonic: Preconceptions’.

43 See (Cicero, About the Ends of Goods and Evils, Book I (De Finibus, Bonorum et Malorum, Liber Primus), 2003)IX.


47 The remark, ‘irrationality and groundless opinion’ highlights the concern that transcendent appeals originate from purely rational based logical deductions.


49 This may also serve as an argument against metaphysical truths.

51 See, Pyth.DL: 10, 086.

52 The doctrines are the ‘concentrated results’ of his physical doctrines, of which only a few fragments remain and are contained in the Vatican Sayings.
This is clearly a continuation of a tradition in atomism, which can also be found in Parmenides and Democritus. In the *Metaphysics* (985b), Aristotle comments, ‘Leucippus, however, and his companion Democritus said that the elements were the full and empty, and that of these the full and the solid were what is and the empty was what is not (accordingly he denies that what is exists any more than what is not, any more than the void exists more than body), and he writes that these things are the caused of entities as matter’. This is also evidence that Epicurus’ claim to be self-taught is false.


A similar account can be found in: Luc.5: 1204-17.

Parallels have been made between this and accidental properties in Locke. For a more detailed discussion of this and criticisms of Epicurus’ account cf. Strodach,, 1963, p. 28.

For Nietzsche, the mathematician, physicist and philosopher R.J. Boscovich in his *Theory of Natural Philosophy* (1966) solved this problem by removing the physical properties of the atom, replacing them with force points, identifiable only in relation to one another through a theory of relations.

Long (1971, p. 32) supposes that Epicurus rejected the possibility of infinite divisibility because it ‘must lead to its reduction to nothing at all’, which he sees as a fallacy. It seems equally plausible that rather than a reduction to nothing, the expression ‘infinite divisibility’ rejects the reduction to nothing a priori.


A consequence of this is discussed in his Letter to Herodotus. 45, he explains that because of the unlimited number of bodies and the unlimited magnitude of void, it follows that the number of cosmoi is also unlimited. This means that the earth is not the centre of the universe, but a part of it.

Also see Inwood & Gerson, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, 1997, p. 7. fn. 3. Scholiast “and he says a bit later on that they also move with equal speed since the void gives an equal yielding [i.e., lack of resistance] to the lightest and the heaviest”.

Inwood and Gerson translate the same passage as, ‘One must reckon that of desires some are natural, some groundless; and of the natural desires some are necessary and some
merely natural; and of the necessary, some are necessary for happiness and some for freeing the body from troubles and some for life itself” (Inwood & Gerson, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, 1997, pp. 29-30).

64 See, Gorg, 493a.

65 Plato is here referring to the ‘clever fellow, a Sicilian perhaps of Italian’ who devised the allegory.

66 In Greek Mythology, the Danaids were forced to fill a large vessel or bath with water, yet the vessel was perforated which meant their punishment for murdering their husbands was eternal.

67 For a more detailed analysis of the vessel allegory in Lucretius’ poem see Segal (1990) p. 27 body as vessel of soul, p.46 fragility of bodily vessel, p.105 Body as vessel of the soul / Earth as vessel, p.141 vessel as ‘container’ of the soul, p.157 on the weakness of the vessel, p.235 mortal vessel extinguished, p.237 flawed vessel.

68 Also see: Men.DL: 10, 128-132.

69 Also see Letter to Menoeceus, DL: 10, 123.


71 See Letter to Herodotus, DL: 10, 39.

72 For a more detailed discussion of this sense of externalization see, Segal, 1990, pp. 22-23.

73 As we shall find in Part 3, ‘Nietzsche’s System of Psychology’, Nietzsche attempts something very similar. Although his method differs as he rejects the materialist hypothesis.

74 I introduced this notion earlier during Part 1 ‘Third Canon: Feelings’ fn. 33.


76 Long & Sedley note that: ‘[...] the atomic motion theory which is not yet present in the Letter to Herodotus but which is widely reported, and ridiculed, as Epicurus’ own doctrine’ (Long & Sedley, *The Hellenistic philosophers: Volume 1*, 1997, p. 52).


78 See final paragraph at the end of Part 1, ‘Desire’.
The Inwood & Gerson, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, 1997, p. 65 translation is more succinct, ‘But the mind itself does not have an internal necessity in all its actions, and that it is not forced, as in chains, to suffer and endure, that is what this tiny swerve of the atoms, occurring at no fixed time or place, accomplishes’.

Within Cicero’s *On Fate*, lies a description of the relation between the atomic swerve and fate; ‘Epicurus introduced this line of reasoning because he was afraid that if an atom always moved by its natural and necessary heaviness, we would have no freedom, since our mind would be moved in such a way that it would be compelled by the motion of atoms’. (Inwood & Gerson, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, 1997, pp. 47-48).

See Part 1 ‘Democritean Materialism: Epistemology’.

A further reading concerning the minimal deviation of the swerve should be mentioned. David Webb (2000) discusses Lucretius’ account of ‘minimal deviation’ in an essay titled ‘The Complexity of the Instant’. Webb uses the clinamen (atomic swerve) – the ‘uncaused declination’ to introduce Michel Serres’ reading of Lucretius’ atomism as a precursor to modern physics; ‘Lucretian atomism reveals itself to be a rigorous elaboration of a philosophy built around non-linear dynamics’ (Webb, 2000, p. 208). Webb outlines the image of deviation from a laminar flow described by Lucretius to demonstrate how local emergences of order ‘including life itself’ are possible but not measurable. He writes: ‘As a minimal angle of deviation, the clinamen may be treated as an infinitesimal. From this perspective, the fact that we cannot determine precisely when it occurs might be accounted for by its being smaller than the finest possible unit of measurement; it thereby appears instantaneous simply by virtue of its being too brief to measure. The problem with this interpretation is that it presents the instant as a fragment of continuous time, different from duration only in degree. But there is another possible reading of the temporal indeterminacy of the clinamen. If the clinamen here is the event at which the path of the atom falling deviates from a straight line, it could only be in principle fully determinable when described in the idealised geometrical terms of infinitely thin lines and the like. Thus, if the instant is the time at which this event occurs, it too will be indeterminable. It may be therefore, that the instant at which the clinamen occurs cannot be specified because it is intrinsically unstable, indeterminable, complex’ (Webb, 2000, p. 209). This suggests that Lucretius’ account of the swerve/clinamen may be rescued from the problems presented above. Webb’s research highlights the limitations that linear dynamics maintain and by recognising such limitations it becomes increasingly possible that they may eventually be overcome. Although the problems raised within this branch of research are not directly applicable to the problem discussed above, it is
evident that the study of ancient atomism may still be used to open new possibilities of knowledge concerning the philosophy of immanence.

83 For a discussion of the Variety of Epicurean gods see Rist Appendix E (1972, pp. 172-175).

84 Rist argues that such effluences are seen by the mind not through normal sensory detection (Rist, 1972, p. 141).

85 Particularly the paradox introduced at the end of Part 1 ‘The Atomic Swerve’.

86 However, friendship poses a problem because it is unclear whether Epicurus used it to advocate utilitarianism or altruism. Rist presents the problem as follows: ‘We can see then the orthodox Epicurean view and the variant with altruistic overtones which was developed as a result of the criticism of the Sceptical Academy. Cicero tells us in the De Finibus (2.82) that he cannot find the heterodox view in the work of Epicurus himself’ (Rist. J, 1972, p. 131). The lack of primary texts meant that Epicurus’ position on this matter can never be known with any certainty. Epicureanism was not intended as a purely academic project. The geographical location of the garden symbolises this, as it lay outside of the academy. The image of Epicurus teaching his disciples in the marketplace further symbolises a break from the ‘exclusivity’ which the Athenian Academy represented. Self-educated, Epicurus was a man of the people, as Diogenes reports ‘in a word, he was a friend to all mankind’ (D.L. 10.10). For a detailed discussion of such problems, see ‘The Problem of Friendship’ (Rist, 1972, pp. 127-140).
Part 2: Nietzsche’s Epicurus

The foundation of Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Immanence

Within modern Nietzsche studies, the influence of Epicurus upon Nietzsche has been a growing area of research. In the footnotes of The Gay Science (1974), Walter Kaufmann began to link the various references that Nietzsche made to Epicurus. Kaufmann observes that ‘Nietzsche’s sense of kinship with Epicurus seems plain and brings out a side of Nietzsche that has been ignored totally by most of his interpreters’ (Nietzsche F., The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, 1974, p. 110 fn. 37). With the exception of Socrates and Plato, Nietzsche referred to Epicurus more than any other of the Greek philosophers. This is evidence that Epicurus was for Nietzsche an important philosopher and a key historical figure within Western philosophical tradition. Yet rather surprisingly, Nietzsche’s relationship with Epicurus was mixed: at some stages he demonstrates great admiration for him, whilst on other occasions he shows only contempt. Part 2 will investigate the dynamics of this relationship. The section ‘Nietzsche and Greek Materialism’ will critically analyse Greek materialism, to demonstrate that Nietzsche’s early studies of it had a profound effect on his understanding of psychology, which helped him to formulate his own response to the problem of Being, especially in terms of the concept ‘cause’.

Furthermore, this section will demonstrate that Nietzsche used certain aspects of Democritean and Epicurean materialism when formulating the hybrid concept of ‘cheerfulness’. It will be argued that ‘cheerfulness’ is essential to Nietzsche’s proposed gay science. Part 3, will then use the concept of ‘cheerfulness’ to demonstrate that it is a method that the free spirit must employ to combat the Spirit of Gravity in the preparation of the Overman as the immanent ideal.

The section ‘Nietzsche’s admiration of Democritus and Epicurus’, will demonstrate that Epicurus had a profound influence upon Nietzsche’s thought. This is because in Epicurus’ writings, Nietzsche discovered a unique mode of philosophy that he describes as the ‘heroic-idyllic mode of philosophizing’ (WS: 295) – a mode that Nietzsche admired and (at times) emulated. It should be noted that there have
been a number of publications that explore the influence of Epicurus upon Nietzsche’s thought, these include publications by Howard Caygill, Joseph P. Vincenzo and Laurence Lampert. They all offer important and informative accounts of Nietzsche’s Epicurus. However, the narrowness of their analyses results in a failure to uncover the Epicurus / Nietzsche dynamic in a manner that informs our understanding of immanence. It will be argued that immanence is the common factor of analysis from which the influence of Epicurus upon Nietzsche becomes most apparent. Following ‘Nietzsche’s admiration of Democritus and Epicurus’, the problem of ‘Untimeliness’ will be discussed. It will be argued that Epicurus’ ‘heroic-idiyllic mode of philosophizing’, created a peculiar mode of untimeliness that Nietzsche recognised and believed might befall him.

Once this initial investigation has taken place and the Epicurus / Nietzsche dynamic has been revealed, it will be argued that ‘affects’ for Nietzsche in his theory of will to power is comparable to Epicurus’ use of ‘feelings’ (pathē) in his materialist account. The section ‘Affects’ will also explore the role of the human body and the forces that constitute it in reference to Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence. This discussion will serve as a basis for a comparative analysis of the ‘body’ and its affective states within Epicurus’ (and Lucretius’) accounts to that of Nietzsche’s. This will highlight the differences between their respective accounts of immanence and thereby inform our understanding of the nature of immanence.

The final section of Part 2, ‘The development of Immanence in The Gay Science’, will argue that Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence begins with the announcement that ‘God is dead’ (GS: 108). The three sections on The Gay Science will highlight the central problem concerning Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence, particularly the problem of incorporation. It will be argued that the problem of incorporation is the problem central to Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence. Moreover, the success of Nietzsche’s account will depend on the resolution of this problem. However, Part 3 will also demonstrate that the problem of incorporation represents Nietzsche’s greatest task and experiment, one that he returned to throughout his career. The remaining sections of ‘The development of Immanence in The Gay Science’ will also detail Nietzsche’s kinship to Epicurus and explain why Nietzsche’s admiration turns to contempt.
Together with the problem of incorporation, there is another problem inherent to Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence. This is the problem of crystallisation in language: the processes by which fluid philosophical ideas crystallise into a static object of knowledge. Although this problem will not be discussed in detail, it is important to briefly introduce it so that the limitations of this investigation are clearly defined and the problems inherent to Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence are known.

Imagine a turbulent river continually transforming itself, eroding the banks that keep it from the surrounding land. Then imagine, a seasonal change from autumn to winter whereby the temperature suddenly drops, the water particles begin to crystallise, the once free-flowing river shrinks and shivers until eventually it is transformed to ice. The river flows no more. This is the same problem that Nietzsche faced. His philosophy, or better, the expression of his thoughts at one time free-flowing like the river, fell victim to the same process because when they are written and eternalised, they no longer express the meaning he attempted to display. Nietzsche was all too aware of this problem and in the final section of *Beyond Good and Evil* ‘What is Noble?’ we find a side to Nietzsche that is rarely revealed, one that exposes the limit of his task as a philosopher of the future. This limit is specifically one that any writer may one day face, yet for Nietzsche as a philosopher of immanence, the problem is compounded. He writes:

> We immortalise that which cannot live and fly much longer, weary and mellow things alone! And it is only your afternoon, my written and painted thoughts, for which alone I have the colours, many colours perhaps, many-coloured tenderness and fifty yellows and browns and greens and reds: - but no one will divine from these how you looked in your morning, you sudden sparks and wonders of my solitude, you my old beloved – wicked thoughts! (BGE: 296)

The image of capturing that which is about to die sums up his sense of failure; the analogy of the transition of his thoughts from ‘morning’ to ‘afternoon’ is a common motif throughout his work. In passing from morning to afternoon, his thoughts once alive and exuberant, held only in his mind, were transformed into motionless form-like objects as soon as they were passed onto paper. The same problem is recognised by Acompora and Ansell-Pearson who write:
Nietzsche expresses concern that the vitality of his thoughts has been lost in translation to written word, that perhaps the very act of capturing and writing down his thoughts does them a disservice, makes them more likely to be taken as truths. What is “caught” or captured in this form is only what is already on its way toward passing away, what is “autumnal and yellow”.

(Acampora & Ansell-Pearson, 2011, p. 211)

To this reading, it may be added that the problem is much greater than merely a “concern” for Nietzsche. The final section of Beyond Good and Evil represents the greatest problem that any philosopher of immanence faces. Herein lies an important message: communication, especially in written form, crystallises meaning to the extent that it is almost unrecognisable, and once this process has begun it cannot be reversed. Nietzsche’s image of the shadow, which in the morning is spread out in front of him, pointing to the future, eventually reaches the point of minimal cast at noon; the moment of great exaltation. Then slowly the shadows reappear behind him as the sun moves past its highest point, a time when he has the power to paint his thoughts but it is also the time when his thoughts have ‘begun to wither and [are] beginning to lose [their] fragrance’ (BGE:296). This is a problem that Nietzsche, as a writer, cannot overcome. Yet far from this working against his philosophy of immanence, Nietzsche uses this problem to demonstrate that the ‘origin’ of consciousness is the necessity of communal existence and thus communication is not the spontaneous activity that some take it to be. And in this respect, Nietzsche used the limitations of immanence to demonstrate its legitimacy.

**Nietzsche and Greek Materialism**

The introduction to Part 1 claimed that two distinct traditions emerged in late antiquity; immanence and transcendence. In this respect we occupy a similar historical outlook to Nietzsche who regarded Epicurus and Lucretius as the spiritual warmongers who battled against the ‘corruption of souls through the concept of guilt, punishment and immortality’ (AC: 58). Within late antiquity, Nietzsche recognised the battle between ‘latent Christianity’ and ‘Epicureanism’. Spurred by the ‘Chandala revengefulness’ of Paul, ‘latent Christianity’ (i.e., ‘Platonism for the people’) emerged victorious (op. cit.). Prior to this, however, Nietzsche also pays
specific regard to the pre-Socratic tradition, especially Democritus. It is to some extent understandable that Democritus and Epicurus are pigeonholed into the same ‘materialist’ category because as we found throughout Part 1, their theories are inter-connected. However, there are a number of key differences that separate their thought. Having covered a number of these in Part 1, it is important for the advancement of Nietzsche studies to investigate Nietzsche’s account of Democritean materialism to substantiate the claim that Nietzsche combines elements of Democritean and Epicurean thought to form the hybrid concept ‘cheerfulness’. It will be argued that ‘cheerfulness’ (Heiterkeit) is the merger of Democritean euthumia and the blessed perspective of the Epicurean gods.

The ancient Greek philosophical tradition was one of the most intellectually creative epochs of Western civilisation. Such creativity is produced by opposing cultural and philosophical forces that ‘to and fro’ until eventually one emerges dominant. Only by analysing these forces, initially as an opposition between transcendence and immanence, will we be able to fully appreciate the radical nature of Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence.

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In a letter to Erwin Rohde, written in Basel between January and February 1870, Nietzsche expresses his affinity with the Greek tradition; ‘I love the Greeks more and more; there is no better approach to them than the tireless education and cultivation of one’s own small person’ (Nietzsche F, 1996, p. 62). It was from this ‘tireless approach’ that his career in philology continued, although it soon became apparent that his interest would not continue as he first envisioned:

The stage I have now reached is the most shameful confession of my ignorance. The philologist’s existence, with some critical pretensions but a thousand miles away from the Greeks, seems to me more and more anomalous. Also I doubt if I could ever become a true philologist. (Nietzsche F, 1996, p. 62)

It is clear that during this period, Nietzsche was struggling to align his own ideas with traditional philological practices. Instead he wanted to draw much wider conclusions concerning Greek civilisation and German culture than was appropriate
to the tradition. In a letter to Paul Deussen (written later that month) Nietzsche openly admits that his, ‘philosophical, moral, and scientific endeavours strive toward a single goal’ and that he now wants to become the ‘first philologist ever to achieve wholeness’ (Nietzsche, 1996, p. 64).

It is from this new, idealised philological perspective that a more creative element in his conception of history began to blossom, especially concerning the ‘Greek world’. In the same letter he acknowledges an altogether more aggressive side to his thinking; ‘Offense must come. I have, in the main, cast caution aside’ (op. cit.). This marks an important moment in Nietzsche’s intellectual development: no longer was he able to continue down the traditional academic route. By 1872 in ‘The Future of our Educational Institutions’, Nietzsche began to develop a critical angle on German modernity and prior to this with the publication of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche’s place outside of the philological tradition was cemented. Furthermore, within The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche introduced one of the central tenets of his thought; ‘it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that the existence and the world are eternally justified’ (BT: 5). We will look closely at the implications of this statement, in response to Nietzsche’s view of Democritean aesthetics in order to highlight the significance of ‘cheerfulness’.

The purpose of the following discussion is to investigate the impact of Greek materialism, especially Democritean materialism, upon Nietzsche’s thought. Furthermore, this investigation will reveal the complex and overlooked dynamic between Nietzsche’s conceptions of Democritus and Epicurus. A discussion of Democritus is therefore required. Nietzsche uses Epicurean concepts without explaining them; my aim is to shed light on these references (and allusions) in order to contribute to Nietzsche studies and to demonstrate that Nietzsche found Epicurus of particular interest because his philosophy was one of the original philosophies of immanence.

During 1867 in Naumburg, following a brief period of rest, Nietzsche describes how, ‘a well-meaning daimon drove me to get zealously down to a new philological theme, “On the Spurious Writings of Democritus” ’ (Nietzsche F, 1996, p. 31). The previous year he discovered Lange’s History of Materialism, which he describes as a ‘work which is excellent of its kind and very instructive’ (Nietzsche F, 1996, p. 18). This
demonstrates Nietzsche’s interest in the history of materialism of which Democritus was a key figure. Nina Power writes:

Nietzsche himself took great care to stress the creative nature of atomist thought [...] the ancient atomists provided Nietzsche with a set of critical tools with which to explore the relationship between philosophy, science and art. (Power, On the Nature of Things: Nietzsche and Democritus, 2001, p. 119)

Power also discussed the influence of Lange, Schopenhauer, Kant and Democritus upon Nietzsche’s early thought and argues that:

[...] the historical ‘outsider’ Democritus is so important to Nietzsche, not only because (even as one of the first atomists) he avoids the traps of naive or dogmatic materialism such as positing blind mechanism or insisting on a strict adherence to sense-data, presenting us instead with a sceptical, non-teleological and ultimately, non-sentimental universe, but also because he provides resources for Nietzsche’s own ideas – still latent at this point but of vital importance nevertheless – concerning the ‘nature of things’ as he conceives it. (Power, On the Nature of Things: Nietzsche and Democritus, 2001, p. 122)

Power is correct to observe that Democritus was an important influence on Nietzsche’s early thought, and that Nietzsche recognised the significance of Democritus’ contribution. However, in her summary Power claims that:

Nietzsche’s Democritus does not so much resemble the ancient thinker we know primarily through Epicurus and Lucretius, but rather a strange hybrid of abstract propositions concerning ‘the nature of things’, consciously filtered through the web of 19th-century questions about matter, idealism and knowledge. (Power, On the Nature of Things: Nietzsche and Democritus, 2001, p. 123)

Claiming that we know Democritus through Epicurus is to overlook one of the key stages of Atomism, namely the development that occurred between the two. One of the key differences concerns the centrality of the canonic, which for Democritus was a means of distinguishing the intelligible from the sensible when establishing
“truth”; whereas, for Epicurus, the canonic could only establish “truth” via a threefold process that united appearance and reality.¹⁴ Lange describes how Democritus’ ‘words were, it appears, more eagerly copied from than copied out; and his whole philosophy was finally absorbed by Epikuros’ (Lange, 2010, p. 17). This suggests that Epicurus had merely regurgitated Democritus’ materialism, making the necessary alterations that were required following Aristotle’s criticisms of Democritus’ theory. However, it would be a mistake to accept this particular aspect of Lange’s thesis because given Epicurus’ rejection of the intelligible, it is clear that Epicurus did much more that merely regurgitate Democritus’ materialism. Furthermore, Epicurus’ writings offered a polemic against the Platonic transcendence of ‘otherworldliness’, while Plato offered a polemic against Democritean materialism. Both Democritus and Epicurus rejected the possibility of the soul enduring after death and of divine providence. However (as we found in Part 1), there is a surprising kinship between Democritus and Socrates as they both rejected the validity of the senses, in favour of the intelligible.¹⁵ This rejection led Socrates to posit his Theory of Forms (a most contentious point as far as Nietzsche was concerned),¹⁶ whereas it led Democritus to develop the ‘rule’ (kanon) to uncover the inner-workings of the universe that the evidence of the senses could not provide.¹⁷

According to Lange, Democritus had, ‘furthered the development of Dialectic’ proposed by Empedocles and Anaxagoras who ‘refer all becoming and perishing to combination and separation’ (Lange, 2010, p. 17). This meant that the emerging qualities of the combination and separation of atoms populate the objects of the senses. In ‘The Pre-Platonic Philosophers’ concerning Anaxagoras, Nietzsche clearly recognised this development:

> Becoming and Passing away do not exist, but rather everything is the same into all of time. All difference concerns motion; motion is thus what it is to be genuinely alive. (Nietzsche F., The Pre-Platonic Philosophers, 2001, p. 97)

For Anaxagoras, motion was the condition that allowed phenomena to arise, which meant that pluralities of qualities ‘exist’, and ‘therefore must be eternal’ (Nietzsche F., The Pre-Platonic Philosophers, 2001, p. 96). Furthermore, Nietzsche observes that:

> Democritus proceeds only from the reality of motion, because to be precise, thought is motion [...] “There exists motion, since I think that thought
Democritus’ atomism introduced non-being as a condition of motion. However, for Nietzsche this form of non-being is still restricted to Parmenidean oneness and remained an ontology of Being. Following a four-part deduction, Nietzsche concludes: ‘Not-Being is therefore that which is full’ (op. cit.). The necessity of motion and therefore Not-being (i.e., the active principle of void posited as the grounding reality) led to a profound sceptical position that rejects the possibility of knowledge.\textsuperscript{18} Sextus reports that, for Democritus, this meant; ‘In reality we know nothing about anything, but for each person opinion is a reshaping’ (Curd, 1995, p.87). Nina Power recognised the significance of this claim:

[...] it is precisely the coupling of Democritus’ epistemological scepticism with a drive to explain the world scientifically, \textit{without} recourse to a \textit{deus ex machina}, that Nietzsche sees as worthy of note. (Power, On the Nature of Things: Nietzsche and Democritus, 2001, p. 125)

Power is correct in her analysis, but we can go a step further and claim that Democritus’ contribution was important for Nietzsche because it paved the way for a philosophy of immanence, especially in regards to his conception of ‘cheerfulness’ which Nietzsche develops in \textit{The Gay Science}.

Towards the end of the section on Leucippus and Democritus in \textit{The Pre-Platonic Philosophers}, Nietzsche berates the materialist’s conclusion concerning volition. He summarises the Democritean ‘origins of \textit{animated} creatures’ as follows:

The essence of spirit [Seele] lies in invigorating force [belebende Kraft]; it is this that moves spirited creatures. Thought is a motion. Consequently, spirit must be formed from the most mobile matter, of fine, smooth, and round atoms, from fire. These fiery particles extended throughout the entire body; a spirited atom [Seelenatom] is inserted between every two physical atoms. They are in continual motion. (Nietzsche F. , \textit{The Pre-Platonic Philosophers}, 2001, p. 128)
The idea that the atoms are in continual motion is crucial. In a similar vein to the discussion covering ‘Desire’ in Part 1, Democritus discusses the analogy of the body as a vessel of the soul. Lange comments:

Demokritos therefore recognises a distinction between soul and body, which our modern materialist would hardly relish; and he knows how to utilise this distinction, for his ethical system [...] The soul is the seat of happiness; bodily beauty without reason is in its nature merely animal. (Lange, 2010, p. 29)

For Nietzsche, this is where early materialism becomes problematic because Democritus could not provide an account of ‘will and action’. Aristotle recognised this very problem and belittles the materialists by comparing them to Daedalos and the Statue of Aphrodite. Nietzsche also recognised this limitation and observes; ‘here the genuine embarrassments of materialism always enter, because here it suspects “all is false”’ (Nietzsche F., 2001, p. 129). Nietzsche was concerned with the circularity of the materialist’s argument. He argues; ‘the materialists want to deduce the truly immediate given – representation [Vorstellung] – out of a given of this sort’ (Nietzsche F., 2001, p. 130). Nietzsche (who takes the argument from Schopenhauer), argues that the materialists falsely start from the position of objectivity, that is, the thought of an immediate objectivity of matter, which can in fact only ever be a representation (Vorstellung) of it. The position of objectivity can therefore only ever commence from a subjective foundation, which led Nietzsche to conclude:

The absurdity consists in this, that he proceeds from objectivity, while in truth everything objective is conditioned by the knowing subject in multifarious ways and consequently vanishes entirely whenever the subject is denied. (Nietzsche F., The Pre-Platonic Philosophers, 2001, p. 130)

One might expect Nietzsche to abandon the materialist hypothesis on that basis. However, on the contrary, he still regards it as valuable:

[...] materialism is a worthwhile hypothesis of relativity in truth; accordingly, “all is false” has been discovered to be an illuminating notion for natural science. We still consider, all its results to be truth for us, albeit not absolute.
It is precisely our world, in whose production we are constantly engaged.
(Nietzsche F., The Pre-Platonic Philosophers, 2001, p. 130)

Such reflections are testimony to Nietzsche’s philosophical progress, a progress that (during his early career) pointed towards an aesthetic interpretation of the world above a scientific one (as was evident in The Birth of Tragedy).\(^{21}\) For the moment, we will continue to concentrate on the aesthetic side of Nietzsche’s thought, although it should be noted that during the middle-late period, particularly in The Gay Science, Nietzsche would call for a merger of the two. This is one of the most important aspects of Nietzsche’s thought, and it is crucial to observe its development because in Part 2, ‘The development of Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence...’ and in Part 3, it will become clear that the seeds that are these early reflections, bear fruit in his mature thought.

As stated above (for Nietzsche), Democritean materialism remains an ontology of Being, and even though it introduced the necessity of void for motion, it is a void that remained within the confines of Parmenidean oneness. Furthermore, because Nietzsche regarded himself (along with Heraclitus) as a philosopher of Becoming, he must provide an account of Being as a derivative of Becoming, and it is here that we find such an account, albeit in its juvenile form.

The ‘discursive intention’ (Swift, 2008, p. 14), that is, the ‘ordering’ or production of ‘our world’ as Nietzsche sees it, occurs from an aesthetic condition of life – a position he develops in The Birth of Tragedy through the dual images of Apollo and Dionysus. Burnham and Jesinghausen (2010) summarise Nietzsche’s attempt to redefine the tradition of idealist metaphysics as follows:

Nietzsche attempts to redefine [...] traditional metaphysics] by envisaging ‘drives’ that could be called ‘living concepts’ because they are rooted in the body, and manifest themselves variously in historical cultures [...] the crucial question Nietzsche seeks to answer in his work, from The Birth of Tragedy onwards, is this: how can metaphysical principles be demonstrated as physically manifest in the phenomena of the empirical world? Nietzsche’s answer here is that only in art does genuine metaphysics become manifest. (Burnham & Jesinghausen, Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy, 2010, p. 45)
The idea of ‘drives’ or ‘living concepts’, ‘rooted in the body’ is integral to Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence because Nietzsche uses them to naturalise metaphysical concepts. Furthermore, the image of remaining within the body gives us a real sense of immanence. From this we can begin to appreciate Nietzsche’s epistemology as one that must always ‘remain within’ the confines of the body. Nietzsche’s primal concern during this early stage is to provide a physiological grounding of all phenomena. This begins with an account of representation that links the phenomenal world to the subject, which introduces relativism to truth. The proposition “all is false” overcomes its sceptical origin and takes on a new and altogether more dangerous meaning as it reduces teleological purposiveness to an altogether ‘human, all too human’ function of the intellect. In the opening section of ‘On Truth and Lie in a Non-Moral Sense’, Nietzsche offers a fable to illustrate, ‘how miserable, how shadowy and transient, how aimless and arbitrary the human intellect looks within nature’ (OTL: 1). He describes how the ‘clever animals invented knowledge’ and that, ‘only through forgetfulness’ could man ‘ever achieve the illusion of possessing a “truth”’. This is comparable to Democritus’ claim that, ‘in reality we know nothing, for truth lies in the abyss’ (Her.DL: 9, 72).

Nietzsche, like Lange, recognised Democritean materialism as a monumental event, one that helped to form the sceptical analysis implicit to scientific development. Lange takes this event so seriously that he declared; ‘We shall prove in the course of the History of Materialism that the modern atomic theory has been gradually developed from the Atomism of Demokritos.’ (2010, p. 18). Nevertheless, this tradition, far from being free to develop under its own critique, was opposed by another monumental event – the birth of idealism. Following his account of Democritus, Lange dedicates an entire chapter to what he considered the ‘Reaction against materialism’:

Materialism explained natural phenomena by immutable necessary laws: the reaction introduced a reason fashioned after human models haggling with necessity, and so demolished the basis of all natural science by the convenient instrument of arbitrary caprice. [Lange, 2010, p. 52]

Lange cites Plato’s ‘Timaeus’ as the instigator or ‘teleological and natural cause’. A causality that operates above the ‘immutable necessary laws’ (op. cit.). This aspect of Lange’s analysis can also be found in the first section of Human, all too Human,
‘Of First and Last things’. Here Nietzsche works though a large number of themes at an astonishing pace including: feelings, science, nature, metaphysics, dreams and appearance and reality. In section 7, ‘The Troublemaker in Science’, Nietzsche claims that:

Philosophy divorced itself from science when it inquired which knowledge of the world and life could help man to live most happily. This occurred in the Socratic schools: out of a concern for happiness man tied off the veins of scientific investigation – and does so still today. (HH: 7)

If we accept Michael Haar’s account that; ‘Science retrieves in the icy, bloodless, and discoloured concepts, the image and schemas that language had primordially superimposed on the world’ (Haar M., 1996, p. 26); and if we take philosophy as an aid to man’s health (health understood here as happiness); then we may conclude that (for Nietzsche) Socrates was unable to differentiate the intellectual pursuit of happiness from its physiological cause, which not only stunted mankind’s scientific development but also led to a life-denying morality.

We should hereby recognise the significance of this claim because (for Nietzsche), the philosophical tendency to ‘apply the concept “inside and outside” to the essence and appearance of the world’ (HH: 1, 15) was akin to the way Democritus incorrectly, ‘applied the concepts of above and below to infinite space, where they have no meaning’ (op. cit.). For Nietzsche, such errors became an integral part of man’s conception of the world and in Human, all too Human he claims; ‘that which we now call the world is the result of a number of errors and fantasies, which come about gradually in the development of organic beings’ (HH: 1, 16). He elaborates on these errors as follows:

[...] a feeling is deep because we hold the accompanying thought to be deep. But the deep thought can nevertheless be very far from the truth, as is, for example every metaphysical thought. (HH: 1, 15)

Nietzsche is alluding to the process by which the affective states of the body (expressed here as feelings), which are in reality a multiplicity of individual events, are taken in ‘thought’ as a unity. The metaphysicians mistakenly assume that feelings and thoughts correspond. However, in Part 3, ‘The Grounding of Psychology in
Physiology’ we will find that such correspondence is produced by the deceptive quality of the ‘spirit’. For Nietzsche, Democritus was on course for a similar realisation. However, the progress and popularisation of the Socratic schools meant that the ‘concern for happiness’ (as Nietzsche describes it), ‘tied off the veins of scientific investigation’ (HH: 7) thereby limiting the progress of Democritus’ account. Although it would take Nietzsche a number of years to arrive at the notion of ‘spirit’ (see Part 3 ‘Note on Spirit’), the role of illusion as a necessary psychological process can be found throughout Nietzsche’s writings.

Nietzsche explores the necessity of illusion and finds it to be a basic psychological requirement that aided man’s survival. He also describes how over many years, the illusion becomes embedded in the minds of men to the extent that it is no longer considered an illusion. One part of this illusory process is the need to ‘externally impose unity’ (Power, On the Nature of Things: Nietzsche and Democritus, 2001, p. 127). Nietzsche proposed this in The Birth of Tragedy as a reformulation of Schopenhauer’s principle of individuation. Nietzsche presents the Apollonian art-drive on the side of appearance, whereas individuation is presented as an illusion (albeit a necessary one). Although the Apollonian art drive is veiled from us, nevertheless, the veil itself is a product of the creative art-drive and according to his analysis of dreams, the individual is in fact aware of the illusion and must continually justify it in the same way that ‘the dreamer wants to continue dreaming’ (Burnham & Jesinghausen, Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy, 2010, p. 42). Burnham and Jesinghausen conclude:

Thus, properly understood, the metaphysical commitment of the Apolline is not merely about the nature of reality but also about its value: reality as appearance is justified only through the beauty of illusion. (Burnham & Jesinghausen, Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy, 2010, p. 42)

For Nietzsche, traditional metaphysics, i.e. ‘the impetuous demand for certainty’ (GS: 347), meant that questions of value could not be distinguished from truth. As such, metaphysics longed for the certainties that could only be found in the unconditioned (i.e., ‘truth’). This meant that the metaphysicians spent all of their effort attempting to uncover ‘truths’ hidden beneath a veil of representation. One aspect of Nietzsche’s method is to provide an account that would reveal metaphysics to be an offshoot of the will and to provide a physiological explanation
of the will. This meant that metaphysics could no longer be considered in isolation from the socio-cultural conditions that determine it. Consequently, Nietzsche rejected transcendence and the transcendental on the basis that they create standards which are, strictly speaking, not the objects of knowledge that the metaphysicians take them to be, but manifestations of the will (in its unified form).

We see a number of reformulations of this problem throughout Nietzsche’s oeuvre, and it is no coincidence that in the first section of *Human, all too Human* (as well as examining the tendency to ‘apply the concept inside and outside’, i.e. the grounding of traditional metaphysics) he examines the ‘Logic of Dreams’ and presents us with the following image:

> [...] man still draws conclusions in his dreams as mankind once did *in a waking state*, through many thousands of years: the first *causa* which occurred to the mind to explain something that needed explaining sufficed and was taken for truth [...] This old aspect of humanity lives on in our dreams, for it is the basis upon which higher reason developed, and is still developing in every human: the dream restores us to distant states of human culture and gives us a means by which to understand them better. (HH: 13)

For Nietzsche, the ‘first *causa* [...] taken for truth’ evolves into a propensity to ‘externally impose unity’ (op. cit.). Expressed as ‘need,’ the most appropriate example of this can be found in *Beyond Good and Evil*, where Nietzsche reduces materialism to a psychology of ‘atomistic need’ (BGE: 12). The need is the belief in the indestructibility of matter – an imposed unity that (in reality) is a remnant of force presented to the intellect. By linking the ‘atomistic need’ to ‘soul atomism’, under the guidance of reason, Nietzsche argues that metaphysics requires the idea of the immortal soul. From a historical perspective and given Lange’s claim regarding the importance of Democritus’ account, Nietzsche may well have attributed the ‘atomistic need’ to Democritus. However, it is the progression of ‘atomistic need’ to ‘soul atomist’ that Nietzsche finds particularly unfavourable.

As noted above, Democritus reportedly claimed; ‘In reality we know nothing about anything, but for each person opinion is a reshaping’ (Curd, 1995, p.87). For Nietzsche, such a ‘reshaping’ is not a metaphysical proposition but represents the
‘overall development of organic beings, fusing with one another’ (HH: 16). Therefore, it should be considered as a social-historical reshaping. Although Nietzsche’s admiration for Democritus may originate with his rejection of divine providence, the most important aspect of Democritus’ work concerns the aesthetic observations he made regarding his physics. Swift (2008) describes how early in his career:

Nietzsche postulates physiological-aesthetic categories (the Dionysian-Apollonian duality) to explain elements traditionally lying outside of the aesthetic dimension, to view even epistemology and ontology as artistic expressions, a subversive move foreign to most traditional philosophical enterprises. Rather than considering the aesthetic dimension from the perspective of science, Nietzsche attempts to consider the significance of science from the perspective of the aesthetic condition of life. (Swift, 2008, p. 14)

The relationship between Democritus, Lange and Nietzsche presented by Swift centres around Lange’s interpretation of philosophy as a “poetry of concepts” (Swift, 2008, p. 7). By rejecting correspondence theories of truth, Lange and Nietzsche (that is, the ‘young Nietzsche’) agreed that the world of representation is mediated by unknown cognitive devices, which are themselves subject to the ‘overlapping of organic beings’ (op. cit.). Furthermore, by rejecting the possibility of ‘absolute truth,’ the description of the ‘world’ within philosophical discourse has an innate aesthetic quality and as Swift argues; ‘this type of assessment recasts the purpose and limits of philosophy by envisioning philosophy as something that is very close to a work of art’ (Swift, 2008, p. 9). Of course, Nietzsche went on to develop his own, unique understand of aesthetics and philosophy (presuming they can be understood independently), but it is clear that Democritus and Lange played an important part in his early evaluation of philosophical enquiry.

There is another aspect of Democritus’ thought that will help us to understand Nietzsche’s conception of Wissenschaft. Democritus was jokingly known as the ‘cheerful philosopher’ due to his conformism. Even though Democritus was a vehement opponent of teleology, he did prescribe purpose to human life, which he derived from his conception of the universe via his canonic. Diogenes reports:
[According to Democritus] The end (telos) of action is tranquillity, which is not identical with pleasure, as some by a false interpretation have understood, but a state in which the soul continues calm and strong, undisturbed by any fear or superstition, or any other emotion. (DL: 9, 45)

It is important to recognise that Democritus introduced telos prior to Aristotle, and that it does not point towards an end state of divine perfection. In ‘Nietzsche and Democritus: The Origins of Ethical Eudaimonism’, Jessica Berry re-evaluates traditional conceptions of Nietzsche and metaphysics by proposing that, ‘the best way to characterize Nietzsche’s attitude towards metaphysical problems is on the model of scepticism in antiquity – particularly Pyrrhonian scepticism,’ which, she claims, ‘if correct, has significant consequences for the interpretation of some of Nietzsche’s best-recognised doctrines’. (Berry, 2004, p. 98). Berry uses the Sceptic’s notion of ataraxia and its expansion into Democritean ethics to develop a threefold model for eudaimonism:

First, that there is some end (telos) or aim (skopos) to the activity that makes up an individual human life, specifically the attainments of some particular state of well-being; second, that this final end, however it is specified, operates as a normative constraint on our other activities – that is, the value of the projects we undertake is to be determined by their promotion of our progress toward our final end; and, third, that reflection on our final end or aim is the starting point for ethics proper. (Berry, 2004, p. 102)

Berry explains that the state of ‘well-being’ is of particular interest to Nietzsche because, like Democritus, Nietzsche was primarily concerned with ‘the “health” of human beings and with what constitutes their success or failure’ (op. cit.). Following an analysis of the Preface to the Second Edition of The Gay Science, Berry argues that Nietzsche ‘proposes to treat philosophical systems as symptoms of psychological health and disease’ (op. cit.). Berry is correct to analyse the Preface in this way; however, given Nietzsche’s interest in Anaxagoras’ and Democritus’ aesthetic evaluations, it is crucial that we consider ‘philosophy as a symptom of health and disease’ in conjunction with philosophy as an expression of aesthetic phenomena. In order to do this, we must recognise the impact of euthumia upon Nietzsche’s philosophical project of Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft.
Berry recognises the link between Democritean euthumia and gay (fröhlich) /cheerful (heiter). However, she fails to differentiate between the two. Instead she uses them interchangeably. Failing therefore, to acknowledge the fundamental difference between fröhlich as the call for a new mode of philosophy that marries science and aesthetics, and heiter, as the hybrid concept of cheerfulness. In his ‘Translator’s Introduction’ to The Gay Science, Kaufmann (1974) deals with the problem of misinterpretation on the basis of mistranslation. He claims that Nietzsche uses fröhlich (‘gay’, perhaps even ‘joyful’) and Heiter independently, which is evidenced by the title of the book ‘Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft’ (The Gay Science), and the title of section 343, ‘Was es mit unserer Heiterkeit auf sich hat’ (The meaning of our cheerfulness). Kaufmann makes it clear that there are a number of ways in which Nietzsche used fröhlich. For example, he uses it in reference to ‘types’ and in particular the ‘northern’ and ‘southern’ (or subterranean) types, which is a continual theme throughout his work and is especially in GS: 350, GS: Songs of Prince Vogelfrei: ‘In the South’ and throughout Part 8, ‘People and Fatherlands’ of Beyond Good and Evil. As a result, Kaufmann cites Nietzsche’s affinity with Provence, and more likely than not, the culture of the twelfth century troubadours to explain his use of Fröhlich (in the title) more adequately than the link Berry attempts to establish between Democritean euthumia and Fröhlich. This reading is confirmed in Ecce Homo; ‘call to mind quite explicitly the Provençal concept of ‘gaya scienza’, that union of minstrel, knight and free-spirit by which that marvellous early culture of the Provençals is distinguished from all ambiguous cultures’ (EH: The Gay Science).

Berry does, however, succeed in establishing euthumia and ataraxia independently, which were falsely amalgamated by the doxographers Cicero and Stobaeus. The amalgamation gave the false impression that Democritean euthumia was tantamount to Epicurean ataraxia, the passive psychophysical state produced by devotion to the hedonistic lifestyle symbolised by the image of Epicurus’ garden. Instead, Berry proposes that, euthumia can only be achieved by a soul ‘conditioned’ to be resilient ‘or shock-resistant’ (p.104). She argues that, ‘Democritean psychophysics do not allow for such a state’ of rest (op. cit.). Moreover, Berry demonstrates that the cheerful soul for Democritus must be understood as a ‘dynamic equilibrium’. This means that, in order to achieve the cheerful (euthumos) state, certain conditions of ‘duress’ are required. Berry continues by arguing that the ‘dynamic equilibrium’ is a condition that Nietzsche believed to
be a prerequisite for certain types.\textsuperscript{29} There is a clear link between \textit{euthumia} and \textit{heiter} in Nietzsche’s work; however, the link is not directly evident in the title of \textit{The Gay Science}. Berry’s reading demonstrates the Epicurean state of \textit{ataraxia} to be uncongenial to \textit{euthumia} as it negates the possibility of a ‘dynamic equilibrium;’ an equilibrium that requires, ‘the enemy within,’ a ‘spiritualised enmity’ which imposes value. For Nietzsche this meant that, ‘One is fruitful only at the cost of being rich in contradictions; one remains young only on condition the soul does not relax, does not long for peace...’ (TI: Morality as Anti-Nature, 3).\textsuperscript{30}

In the \textit{Preface} to \textit{The Gay Science}, Nietzsche warns of the dangers that emerge when enmity is denied and peace is sought. These dangers relate specifically to the needs of the ‘educated mob’ who, in wanting peace, turn away from life (and the dangers inherent to it) and instead seek refuge in, and long for the art of the ‘elevated, inflated and exaggerated!’ (GS: P, 4). Thus, they will concealment and illusion from the reality that confronts them, which in effect, suppresses their appetites and desires. This is a particularly unhealthy mode of life, one that Nietzsche repeatedly warns against.\textsuperscript{31}

In section 4 of the \textit{Preface} to \textit{The Gay Science}, we are confronted with the following statement:

\begin{quote}
In the end, lest what is most important remain unsaid: from such abysses, from such severe sickness, also from the sickness of severe suspicion, one returns newborn, having shed one’s skin, more ticklish and malicious, with a more delicate taste for joy, with a tenderer tongue for all good things, with merrier senses, with a second dangerous innocence in joy, more childlike and yet a hundred times more subtle than one has ever been before. (GS: Preface, 4)
\end{quote}

Firstly, we should recognise that this is a reference to the transformation of the ‘spirit’ in the ‘Three Transformations’ from \textit{Zarathustra} (which will be discussed in detail in Part 3, ‘Nietzsche’s System of Psychology’). In Part 3, it will be argued that Nietzsche regarded himself as a ‘free spirit’, or at least ‘an attempter’ (Versucher) of self-overcoming (BGE: 42). In this sense Nietzsche was able to see the ‘educated mob’ from a distance.\textsuperscript{32} Secondly, the above statement addresses what Nietzsche regarded as the ‘necessary’ dangers that face the free spirit. The art of the
‘educated mob’ leads to stagnation and decay, which leads to the idealisation of ‘otherworldliness’. For Nietzsche, on the contrary, ‘if’ the ‘convalescent’ still requires art (which marks a transition from his thinking in *The Birth of Tragedy*), then it must be, ‘a mocking, light, fleeting, divinely untroubled, divinely artificial art that like a pure flame, licks into unclouded skies’ (op. cit.). This art is the aesthetic perspective of the Epicurean gods – the unconcerned and impartial observers. Yet, such art is predicated on Democritean *euthemic* cheerfulness, which emerges from a ‘dynamic equilibrium’. In the Preface to *The Gay Science* Nietzsche marries Democritean *euthumia* with the blessed worldview of the Epicurean gods. The result is a hybrid-concept of ‘cheerfulness’ (*Heiterkeit*) which Nietzsche uses in Book 5 of *The Gay Science*. This is why a separation of Democritean and Epicurean materialism must be maintained (as stated in the introduction to Part 2, ‘Nietzsche’s Epicurus’), in order that the hybrid concept that is ‘cheerfulness’ in the Preface and Book 5 of *The Gay Science* can be revealed.

Furthermore, in the Preface section 4, following his call for ‘cheerfulness’, Nietzsche immediately expresses his concern for modernity and the enlightened conception of science which, he argues, are directed and organised by a will to truth. In a profound declaration he warns:

> One should have more respect for the bashfulness with which nature has hidden behind riddles and iridescent uncertainties. Perhaps truth is a woman who has reasons for not letting us see her reasons? Perhaps her name is – to speak Greek – *Baubo*. (GS: P, 4).

The will to truth, although useful in the aid of man’s survival, has become stagnant, which is a typical characteristic of a will to power in its dying stages (i.e., decadence). Nietzsche identifies ‘science’ as a rejuvenated continuation of this will. The will to truth jeopardises man’s most creative drive, the drive that Nietzsche recognised in Democritus’ aesthetic evaluation. In part, the practice of *Wissenschaft* should therefore be considered as the continuation of the Greek ‘Olympus of appearance’; the aesthetic expression of a philosophical ideal that ‘stops’ and ‘dances’, ‘courageously at the surface... to adore appearance’ (GS: P, 4). Only by understanding the health metaphor as an aesthetic phenomenon can we begin to appreciate Nietzsche’s philosophy of the future.
Having established Democritus as a key influence upon Nietzsche (particularly during his early period), it is surprising that in his later works we rarely find any mention of him. Moreover, when Nietzsche does he does so fleetingly in reference to the ‘highest type’ along with: Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, who he identifies as ‘Hellenising ghosts’. Crucially, however, Nietzsche hopes that one day they may be more than ghosts and enter into ‘our bodies’ (WP: 419). This is a reflection of Nietzsche’s “untimeliness”. He finds comfort in the thought that one day, sometime in the future, his “untimeliness” will be conflated with his greatness in the same way that Nietzsche embodies the ‘Hellenizing ghosts’.

**Note on Cause**

In a note from 1887-1889, Nietzsche presents a Critique of the Concept “Cause”. Here, he attempts to demonstrate that:

> We have absolutely no experience of a cause; calculated psychologically, we get the whole concept from the subjective conviction that we are a cause, namely, that the arm moves ... But that is an error. (NLN: 14[98] / WP: 551)

Arthur Danto explains that for Nietzsche, like Hume: ‘our experience of nature, consists in isolated events [...] causes simply are relations between pairs of events’ (Danto, 1980, p. 93). The experience of cause is a fiction necessitated by survival and the product of a unified will. Nietzsche links the concept of cause to the problems of determinism, and the problem of determinism to teleology by claiming that:

> We have combined our feeling of will, our feeling of “freedom,” our feeling of responsibility and our intention to perform an act, into the concept “cause”: causa efficiens and causa finalis are fundamentally one. We believe that an effect was explained when a condition was detected in which the effect was already inherent. In fact, we invent all causes after the schema of the effect. [...] We search for things in order to explain why something has changed. Even the atom is this kind of super-added “thing” and “primitive subject”. (WP: 551)
Nietzsche has revised his original study of materialism, this time with specific regard to the will to power. By introducing the concept ‘cause’ under the concept of ‘subject,’ Nietzsche was able to pursue a radical critique of metaphysics such that the concept ‘cause’ is no longer a metaphysical problem but a psychological one. Consequently, any notions of ‘free-will’ quickly perish and can be dropped into a bin entitled ‘generated fictions’. Having said this, Nietzsche’s proposal is so radical that traditional metaphysics of ‘cause and effect’ no longer apply this means that:

From the fact that something ensues regularly and ensues calculably, it does not follow that it ensues necessarily. That a quantum of force determines and conducts itself in every particular case in one way and manner does not make it into an “unfree will.” “Mechanical necessity” is not a fact: it is we who first interpreted it into events. (NLN: 9[91] / WP: 552)

Here, Nietzsche is referring to the tendency to externally impose unity. A unity that makes the world appear calculable and regular. Yet, when the world is understood in terms of will to power (as a theory of force), such unities become illusory. As such, all materialist accounts fall into the dogmatism of ‘atomistic need’ the metaphysical need to artificially impose unity on the world, which leads to epistemological scepticism and determinism. By rejecting ‘unfree will’, Nietzsche is not advocating ‘free will’, but highlighting the gap in logic that remains when cause and effect are brought into question.

Ultimately, Nietzsche’s critique of Greek materialism and his critique of teleological purposiveness must be considered in unison. In The Birth of Tragedy this insight was understood as a consequence of the Apollonian art-drive on the side of appearance; whereas in his later writing it is, ‘merely the consequence of the will to power manifest in all events; that becoming stronger involves an ordering process which looks like a sketchy purposiveness’ (NLN: 9[91] / WP: 552). For Nietzsche, ‘truth’ is born from the need to ‘make firm’ as an act of the creative will, which itself must be discovered and accounted for. The fact that no two events are the same, yet are interpreted by the ‘subject’ as the same, confirms his hypothesis that the crystallisation of truth is in fact an attempt to overcome that which has no end; ‘as a processus in infinitum, an active determining – not becoming-conscious of something that is in itself firm and determined. It is a word for the “will to power” ’ (NLN: 9[91] / WP: 552). Although Democritus was unable to overcome the ‘atomistic need’, he
Nietzsche’s Admiration of Democritus and Epicurus

Nietzsche consistently expressed admiration for Epicurus. In his correspondence to Peter Gast\(^3\) he wrote, ‘I have once again contemplated Epicurus’ bust: strength of will and spirituality are expressed in the head to the highest degree’ (Nietzsche F. , The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, 1974, p. 110. fn. 37). He also shows interest in the discovery of new Epicurean text from the Herculaneum library, and emphasises the importance of discovering ‘authentic writings by Epicurus’ (Nietzsche F. , 1996, p. 217). Although the reported new findings cannot give credence to the impact they had on Nietzsche, they demonstrate Nietzsche’s excitement towards the possibility of new Epicurean discoveries. We see something similar in a letter to Franz Overbeck, written around the same time (end August 1883) in Sils Maria:

\[
\text{Köselitz’s letter contains remarks on Epicurus (and the earlier one concerned Seneca) which shows an incomparably profound and human grasp of this philosophy; he indicates that he has “personal philologists,” whom he herds into the library to find what there is of Epicurus in the patristic writers and other pen pushers (Nietzsche F. , 1996, p. 219) }
\]

Apart from his interest in the practice of philology, the letter demonstrates that Nietzsche was attentive to the developments of the transitory period from late Epicurean to the Christian era, the significance of which will become more apparent in the reception of Epicurus in Nietzsche’s later work.

Aside from his philological interests, Nietzsche’s admiration for Epicurus followed a more personal route. We know that both Epicurus and Nietzsche suffered from continuous physiological distress and that Epicurus died following a fortnight of ‘ill
health’ most likely because of kidney stones (DL: 10, 016). But Nietzsche was subjected to considerably more physical ailments, all of which contributed to bouts of extreme creativity. In a letter to Erwin Rohde following a fall from a horse he wrote: ‘Now as I think back over an extremely various year, a year full of warm emotion and of uneasy emotion, full of ascetic and eudemonistic experiences’ (Nietzsche F. , Selected Letters, 1996, p. 32). Given both thinkers experienced high levels of physical distress, one might expect them to share a depressing and gloomy outlook on life; however nothing could be further from the truth. Epicurus is reported to have left a letter in his will to his friend Idomeneus:

On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could augment them; but over and against them all I set gladness of mind [i.e., cheerfulness] at the remembrance of our past conversations. But I would have you, as becomes your life-long attitude to me and to philosophy, watch over the children of Metrodorus in a manner befitting the devotion you have given to me and to philosophy since you were a youth. (DL: 10, 022)

In a letter to Peter Gast Nietzsche wrote:

My health is disgustingly rich in pain, as formerly; my life much more severe and lonesome; I myself live on the whole almost like a complete saint, but almost with the outlook of the complete, genuine Epicurus [genuine, as opposed to the popular misconceptions that find expression in the general use of “epicurean”] – with my soul very calm and patient and yet contemplating life with joy. (Nietzsche F. , The Gay Science, 1974, p. 110. fn. 37) (January 22, 1879)

Not only did Nietzsche and Epicurus experience extreme suffering, they experienced it in a peculiarly positive manner. In fact, Nietzsche recognised that suffering is crucial for the order of rank:

Profound suffering ennobles; it separates. One of the most subtle forms of disguise is Epicureanism and a certain ostentatious bravery of taste which
NIETZSCHE’S EPICURUS

takes suffering frivolously and arms itself against everything sorrowful and profound. (BGE: 270)

Suffering produced the basis for Epicurus’ ethical eudaimonism; freedom consists in the removal of both physical (aponia) and emotional (ataraxia) distress. It is clear from Nietzsche’s letter that he too experienced something similar to ataraxia, as stillness in contemplation. There is a certain curiousness in the way Nietzsche contemplates Epicurus during times of discomfort. In Part 1 ‘Blessedness’ we considered how Epicurus believed contemplation and emulation of the lives of the gods could be used ‘as a model of happiness’. In Nietzsche’s letters to Gast he seems to emulate the practice of blessed contemplation; replacing the lives of the gods with Epicurus’, which one could argue (from an Epicurean perspective) was itself an emulation of the lives of the Epicurean gods. Was Nietzsche therefore an Epicurean? Certainly not! – Although, at times, he did follow the model of Epicurean contemplation.

His kinship towards Epicurus is confirmed in the Wanderer. There are three aphorisms which provide a profound insight into Nietzsche’s Epicurus. The first: ‘Two means of consolation’, symbolises his view of Epicurus. Nietzsche tells us:

Epicurus, the soul-soother of later antiquity, had a wonderful insight, which still today as rarely to be discovered, that to quieten the heart it is absolutely not necessary to have solved the ultimate and outermost theoretical questions. (WS: 7)

Nietzsche is referring to Epicurus’ four-fold cure, which Philodemus summarises as follows:

Don’t fear the god,
Don’t worry about death,
What is good is easy to get, and
What is terrible is easy to endure. (Inwood & Gerson, 1994, p. vi)

Philosophy as consolation is a topic discussed in detail by Howard Caygill, who writes:
The consolation of philosophy can be a mixed blessing, for when it meets the fear of death with fables of restitution it makes life liveable by denying it; yet when it is ‘absolute for death’ it can intensify the sense of what is being lost. Moreover, on some bleak occasions the consolation of philosophy manages both to devalue life and intensify the fear of losing it, a movement exemplified by Plato’s Phaedo, and, more tangentially, by Epicurus’s reply to him in his letter to Menoeceus. (Caygill, The Consolation of Philosophy or ‘Neither Dionysus not the Crucified’, 1994, p. 132)

Caygill’s analysis opens an interesting study concerning the nature of philosophy in its relation to body and soul. Caygill reduces the consolation of philosophy in the ‘Phaedo’ to the division of body and soul. He argues that in order to save wisdom, Socrates ‘loves life by denying the body and redeeming the soul’ (Caygill, 1994, p. 133). Yet, this formula has a crippling effect, ‘which creates the illness – fear of death – which it purports to cure’ (Caygill, 1994, p. 137). For Nietzsche, the consolation offered by Epicurus is one of pacification, and in ‘Under Epicurean Skies’ (2006), Caygill argues that Nietzsche reduces Epicurus’ four-fold cure to ‘two basic principles’ (Caygill, 2006, p. 110), which can be found in the Wanderer and runs as follows: ‘Firstly, if that is how things are they do not concern us; secondly, things may be thus but they might also be otherwise. (WS: 7). The latter principle is a reformulation of the argument discussed in Part 1 ‘The Method of Inference’, in which Epicurus’ method of inference is open to a plurality of explanations. Nietzsche describes this as a ‘multiplicity of hypotheses’ (WS: 7), which may be taken in direct contrast to the singular hypotheses of Plato and Aristotle. It is worth noting that if Caygill is correct, then Nietzsche found in Epicurus an argument for contingency. Such a reading is acceptable given Epicurus’ arguments against determinism, yet it is also worth noting that during Nietzsche’s middle-late period, contingency becomes a particularly negative aspect of the Spirit of Gravity.

The next reference to Epicurus in the Wanderer is more ambiguous. In section 270 ‘Eternal Epicurus’, Nietzsche introduces the notion of an Epicurean mask and attempts to demonstrate that Epicurus remains a prominent, although unknown influence even to those ‘who have called and call themselves Epicureans’ (WS: 270). Nietzsche claims that even Epicurus ‘has forgotten his own name: it was the heaviest pack he ever threw off’ (WS: 270) –this is a strange and important claim. For
Nietzsche, this side of Epicurus is akin to Dionysus who, ‘does not, or cannot present himself as he is’ (Burnham D., 2007, p. 219). Thus, Epicurus, like Dionysus represents a particular mode of life. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche claims, ‘It took a century for Greece to find out who this garden god Epicurus had been. – Did it find out? -’ (BGE: 7). Thus, Epicurus remained unknown even to himself (Nietzsche argues) because of his untimeliness. In order to understand what Nietzsche has in mind we must look at the following passage.

In the Wanderer; 295 ‘Et in Arcadia Ego’, Nietzsche declares his deep (and unique) understanding of Epicurus:

The beauty of the whole scene induced in me a sense of awe and of adoration of the moment of its revelation involuntarily, as if nothing were more natural. I inserted into this pure, clear world of light (in which there was nothing of desire or expectation, no looking before or behind) Hellenic Heroes

[...] And that is how individual men have actually lived, that is how they have enduringly felt they existed in the world and the world existed in them; and among them was one of the greatest of men, the inventor of an heroic-idyllic mode of philosophizing: Epicurus. (WS: 295)

This ‘special relationship’ is confirmed by Nietzsche in The Gay Science; ‘Epicurus.- Yes I am proud of the fact that I experience the character of Epicurus quite differently from perhaps everybody else’ (GS: 45). It is through this ‘heroic-idyllic’ mode that Nietzsche ‘experiences the character of Epicurus’ (op. cit.). In the same aphorism, Nietzsche describes how he can imagine Epicurus’ ‘eyes gaze upon a wide, white sea, across rocks at the shore that are bathed in sunlight, while large and small animals are playing in this light, as secure and calm as the light in his eyes’ (op. cit.). The imagery Nietzsche invokes to convey his kinship with Epicurus is present throughout his work. It is a tranquil image we are presented with, playful in the sense that there is no divinity to control life on earth. The Epicurean sun is not divine; it does not promise life on the condition of sacrifice and worship but secures the lives of all that live under it.
**The Problem of Representation**

In the passage from the Wanderer above, there is a subtle undertone of paganism, which Nietzsche clearly admires. Furthermore, the image of the sun here is a reference to the immanent nature of his philosophy. In Plato’s analogy of the cave, we find prisoners shrouded in darkness, only able to see images on the wall of the cave cast by puppeteers and firelight. The Form of the Good is the real intelligible character of the world; knowledge can only be gained through conditioning and attuning oneself to the intelligible realm. This meant that the world of sensation is merely a representation (three times removed) from the Form of the Good. For Epicurus on the other hand, we do not see images (shadows cast on the wall of the cave); rather, the world is as it appears to be. Nietzsche continues:

> Such happiness could be invented only by a man who was suffering continually. It is the happiness of his eyes that have seen the sea of existence become calm, and now they can never weary of the surface and of the many hues of this tender, shuddering skin of the sea. Never before has voluptuousness been so modest. (GS: 45)

This is an important observation concerning Epicurus’ gaze. Firstly notice how (for Nietzsche) Epicurean happiness is an invention of the subject that is born from an unconscious psychological need to justify suffering through repose. Furthermore, Nietzsche describes how it is in the ‘eyes’ that, ‘the sea of existence becomes calm’ (op. cit.), not the sea in itself, which means that the ‘calmness’ relies on the representation of the subject. It is perception that is ‘joyful’ – dancing on the surface. ‘Voluptuousness’ (i.e., sensual in appearance), is so ‘modest’ that we almost overlook it. Nietzsche is referring to the mode of life Epicurus promotes, which begins with the immediacy of the senses.44

This may appear to be a bizarre compliment given the praise he directs towards Plato for rejecting sensation as the basis of knowledge (see BGE: 14). So where does Nietzsche stand – on the side of Plato or Epicurus? In response, we must look at the distinction of appearance and reality. Epicurus does not differentiate between appearance and reality, instead he takes them together as a given. On the other hand, Plato does make the distinction, and in the *Analogy of the Divided line* in Book
VI of the ‘Republic’ he presents two worlds. The first is the world of appearance which includes imagination (eikasia) and belief (pistis), the changing world which is presented to the senses. This is held to be ontologically inferior to the intelligible world of reasoning (dianoia) and understanding (noesis).

For Nietzsche, the problem is more complex because the German idealists, led by Kant, introduced the concept of the thing-in-itself as the condition for appearance. To a certain degree Nietzsche praised Kant for his attempts to salvage appearance from the clutches of the subjective idealists who denied all accounts of material reality and posited the ‘real’ in the intelligible realm. For our purposes we may consider this a much later development of Platonism. Kant proposed that the thing-in-itself and the phenomenon that we derive through our sense-perceptions are coherent (thereby denying subjective idealism); however, there is a crucial difference because the mind can only represent things as the ‘appear’ and not as they ‘are’. In this respect we may claim (for the purposes of this discussion only) that Kant sits somewhere between Epicurean sensualism and Platonic idealism. For Nietzsche, Kant’s ‘inbetweenness’ is untenable and in Beyond section 34-6 he provides a detailed account of the problem and his opposition to it. For Nietzsche, the distinction between the thing-in-itself as the intelligible and the phenomena that we perceive through our senses is denied. Like Epicurus, Nietzsche wanted to collapse this distinction. However, unlike Epicurus who introduced the canon for legitimise our senses and sense-impressions in order to legitimise his criterion of truth, for Nietzsche, truth cannot be arrived at (as Epicurus supposed) but is (like the calmness of the seas in the eyes of Epicurus) an invention of the subject. Furthermore, Nietzsche claims; ‘Granted that nothing is ‘given’ as real except our world of desires and passions, that we can rise or sink to no other ‘reality’ than the reality of our drives’ (BGE: 36); we may therefore claim that the world is as it appears to be (in the Epicurean sense) only insofar as our drives require it to be. Thus, Nietzsche’s admiration for Epicurus extends only insofar as he introduced the ‘heroic- idyllic mode of philosophizing’ (WS: 295) that revealed the immanent character of the world. Beyond this (as I shall demonstrate in more detail in Part 2 ‘The development of immanence in The Gay Science’) Nietzsche abandoned Epicurus’ claim that the senses can be used to provide a criterion of truth on the basis that truth is an expression of a decadent mode of life.
The Problem of Sensation

In the ‘Twilight of the Idols’, Nietzsche discusses ‘the idiosyncrasies of philosophers’ (TI: 3, 1). He criticises philosophers for their ‘Egyptianism’ and claims; ‘there is a lack of historical sense’ (op. cit.). The point is that philosophers share a tendency to immortalise because they want to see through the eye of eternity. In order to do this, they must deny the validity of the senses in order to prove; ‘What is, does not become; what becomes, is not...’ (op. cit.). In this respect, Nietzsche claims that the world is posited as false because reason demands solidity, eternity and anything which lies outside the transformative nature of time. Morality too makes this demand, it de-historicises and neglects Becoming. Once the senses have been rejected, Nietzsche claims that a further rejection is required –the body as the ‘idée fixe of the senses’ (op. cit.). The body as such becomes the object and the new target of reason. It is the receptacle object, the receiver of sensations and the cause of despair. The attainment of the ‘real world’ (in the Platonic sense) requires the rejection of the body – the object which is ‘infected with every error of logic there is’ (op. cit.). In Part 1 ‘Desire’ the idea of the body as vessel was introduced; we discussed how for Plato it was ‘perforated’ and ‘unfillable.’ One must therefore escape the body to be moral; one must escape the diseased container in order to live in the ‘true world’.

The philosopher’s response to change and decay is idiosyncratic because it led to a denial of the earth and the body. Nietzsche provides a detailed account of this problem in Zarathustra and we will discuss this in Part 3 ‘The Despisers of the Body’. For the moment it is important to recognise that it was Epicurus’ affirmation of the earth and body that Nietzsche admired the most. Although Nietzsche would eventually abandon Epicurus by labelling him a ‘decadent’ (AC: 30), it is clear that they share a specific desire to ‘remain true to the earth’ (Z: Prologue, 3). This is what unites them as philosophers of immanence and historically we may claim that Nietzsche took his lead from Epicurus and Lucretius.

In response to the ‘idiosyncrasies of philosophers’, Nietzsche proposed that it was ‘reason’ and in particular ‘metaphysical reason’ that led the metaphysicians to question the validity of the senses. George Miller (1998) observes that:
For Nietzsche, not the senses but what we make out of the senses is a lie. Whenever we abstract, we induce metaphysical lies into the world. On the other hand, the testimony of the senses reveals to us the world as it actually is. Metaphysical abstractions like unity, thinghood, substance and permanence are the lies. Our immediate sense experience represents the truth. (Miller, 1998, p. 17)

In this sense, Epicurus and Nietzsche’s kinship extends into their understanding of the nature of reality as they both acknowledge the immediacy of the senses by rejecting metaphysical abstractions. For Epicurus, who placed the ‘criteria of reality (iudicia rerum) in the senses’ (Rist, 1972, p. 14) change, decay and transformation are all held to be valid. As we found in Part 1 ‘False-judgements & Verification’, the effluence of atoms is always real and not subject to falsehood. Furthermore, it is the judgement about the object that is false rather than the sense-impression itself. In ‘Twilight’, Nietzsche appears to agree and claims, ‘Heraclitus too was unjust to the senses, which lie neither in the way the Eleatics believe nor as he believed – they do not lie at all’ (TI, Reason in Philosophy: 2). For Epicurus, the reality of an object is confirmed by the repetition of sensations, which eventually form (through memory) a preconception of the object.46 Furthermore, we found that our ‘feelings’ (pathê) guide our behaviour: feelings are felt in accordance to nature,47 man as a part of nature (and not under the rule of the gods) lives within this schema and anything congenial to their nature (tranquillity of atoms) is accompanied by the feeling of pleasure, whereas anything hostile (causing abrasive atomic movement) is painful. Moreover, we found that morality (for Epicurus) is subject to changeable conditions; what may be considered moral at one point in time may be immoral in another depending on its congeniality to the ‘body’, i.e. the conglomeration of atoms and void that constitutes it.

The Problem of Materialism and Science

If Epicurus and Nietzsche share a similar standpoint regarding the immediacy of the sense-impressions, there is a definite ‘cut-off’ point to this relationship. For Nietzsche the materialist’s dependence on the solid and enduring ‘atom’ (i.e., the underpinning regularity behind motion and change), is predicated on a
metaphysical prejudice that Nietzsche seeks to expose. The ‘sub-real world’ from which sensations derive is essentially a world of Being. Paying homage to Heraclitus Nietzsche comments:

‘Reason’ is the cause of our falsification of the evidence of the senses. In so far as the senses show becoming, passing away, change, they do not lie ... But Heraclitus will always be right in this, that being is an empty fiction. The ‘apparent’ world is the only one: the ‘real’ world has only been lyingly added...’ (TI: 3, 2)

He continues with an explanation of ‘fiction’ and argues that it is a part of science and language. Science, for Nietzsche still searches for ‘reality’ but it does so blindly, unaware of its internal prejudices. Scientific inquiry, ‘decided to accept the evidence of the senses’ (TI, 3, 3), honing this practice along the way; in this sense it is a positive endeavour. However, because scientific language supports certain grammatical prejudices, which are predicated on the concept of Being they too carry the burden of God. In addition Nietzsche claims that reason, ‘sees everywhere deed and doer; this which believes in will as cause in general’ (TI: 3, 5). The ‘ego’ is ‘projected’ upon all of its objects, until it is seen everywhere, it is taken as something solid, stable and enduring until the ‘will’ is seen as something which ‘produces an effect – that will is faculty ... Today we know it is merely a word’ (op. cit.). This is a reference to the creative act of ‘forgetfulness,’ a concept he develops at length in the Genealogy (we will return to this in Part 3). For the moment it is important to establish that ‘reason’ (for Nietzsche) is not the answer to man’s propensity to error (as it was believed to be during the Enlightenment), but propagates error and thereby falsely applies concepts. Science, although capable of internal critique and self-overcoming, remains under the guidance of reason, which strictly speaking, is a will to truth. Deleuze summarises the problem as follows:

What [Nietzsche] attacks in science is precisely the scientific mania for seeking balances, the utilitarianism and egalitarianism proper to science. This is why the whole critique operates on three levels; against logical identity, against mathematical equality and against physical equilibrium (Deleuze G., 2006, p. 45)
Deleuze claims that ‘science mania’ occurs from the misappropriation of qualitative and quantitative differences, which is to say that science operates at a level that seeks metaphysical appropriations. It seeks unities which themselves are predicated upon the ontological confines of Being. In this respect, science still seeks ‘the real world’ behind the world that is populated by the senses.

Once I have introduced the peculiar notion of ‘Untimeliness’ that Nietzsche recognised in Epicurus, I will introduce Nietzsche’s conception of ‘affects’. Towards the end of section ‘The Problem of Representation’, I concluded that, ‘we may therefore claim that the world is as it appears to be (in the Epicurean sense) only insofar as our drives require it to be’. We are now ready to explore the meaning of this statement in greater detail as it relates to the forthcoming section ‘Affects’. This is a challenging task and as Heidegger claims, ‘What is an affect? To this, Nietzsche provides no clear answer’ (Heidegger, 1991, p. 44). It is important, while we remain in the realm of Nietzsche’s admiration of Epicurus, that we recognise an important link between Nietzsche’s use of ‘affect’ and ‘feelings’ for Epicurus. In his notes, following his intimation of ‘affect’ we find this following passage:

That there is considerable enlightenment to be gained by positing power in place of the individual ‘happiness’ each living thing is supposed to be striving for: ‘It strives for power, for an augmentation of power’ - pleasure is only a symptom of the feeling of power achieved, a consciousness of difference - - it doesn’t strive for pleasure; rather, pleasure occurs when what was striven for has been achieved: pleasure accompanies, it doesn’t set in motion ... (NLN 14[121] / WP: 688) – (March – June 1888)

Nietzsche recognised the connection between power and the increase in the ‘feeling’ of pleasure while Epicurus did not. Yet this does not mean that he simply abandoned certain aspects of Epicurus’ schema. In fact, we will find that ‘affects’ for Nietzsche perform a similar role as ‘feelings’ did for Epicurus in that they act as an interlocutor. Heidegger notes that Nietzsche often equates affect, passion, and feeling (Heidegger, 1991, p. 45) – a reading that holds authority. However, Heidegger scours through Nietzsche with a phenomenological eye. This is evident in the following passage:
With these three words [affect, passion, feeling], each an arbitrary substitute for the others, we depict the so-called irrational side of psychic life. For the customary representational thought that may suffice, but not for true knowledge, and certainly not if our task is to determine by such knowledge the Being of beings. Nor is it enough to revamp the current “psychological” explanations of affects, passions, and feelings. We must above all see that here it is not a matter of psychology, nor even for a psychology undergirded by physiology and biology. It is a matter of the basic modes that constitute Dasein, a matter of the ways man confronts the Da, the openness and concealment of beings, in which he stands. (Heidegger, 1991, p. 45)

Heidegger’s concern is alien to Nietzsche’s, and to suggest that affect, passion, and feeling should not be read on a psychological or physiological level runs counter to the reading that will be given here. In fact, in the following paragraph, Heidegger admits that; ‘We cannot deny the things physiology grapples with particular states of the body’, although he goes on to claim that Nietzsche mistook ‘bodily states’ to be non-metaphysical ‘to his own detriment’ (Heidegger, 1991, p. 45). Heidegger’s reading is, as Deleuze suggests, ‘closer to his own thought that to Nietzsche’s’ (Deleuze G., 2006, p. 220. fn. 31). Furthermore, it is my contention that Nietzsche’s conception of the human body is similar in respect to Epicurus’ precisely because they both offer conceptions of it that negates the need for metaphysical explanations. In fact, this is where the influence of Epicurus becomes most clearly manifest. Firstly in terms of immanence, because for Nietzsche, affects act as the interlocutor between will to power and our feeling of it in a spiritualised form. Body is posited as the discrete object through which this process occurs (and in this respect Nietzsche is close to Epicurus). Secondly, and on an altogether different note, Nietzsche follows Epicurus’ lead in the sense that his greatest concern is not knowledge (as it is for Heidegger) but life. In Part 1 ‘The Nature of the Universe’, we found that the purpose of philosophy (for Epicurus) was to remove the anxieties associated with superstitious beliefs in order to live well. Although Nietzsche rejects the eudaimonist telos, he does promote life (in terms of self-overcoming) as having the highest value. Therefore we may conclude that both thinkers place life before knowledge.
Untimeliness

The problem of untimeliness was a continual concern for Nietzsche. On the one hand, “untimeliness” represents a positive method of interpretation. Nietzsche pursued a critical angle concerning the time in which he lived, i.e. his modernity. In this respect he found himself isolated from his contemporary setting, with specific regard to the political especially the Christian democracy that was sweeping through Europe. The opinion of the masses, the ‘herd’ perspective, the democratic utility of his times, reflected a decadent mode of life. In this respect, Nietzsche used his untimeliness as a methodological tool to open a critical analysis of modernity. Schrift is therefore correct to conclude that, ‘Nietzsche regards untimeliness and inappropriateness as a sign of distinction’ (1990, p. 190). On the other hand, Nietzsche’s untimeliness reflects his isolation and more particularly the problem of readership that increasingly concerned him. Having said this, it is also clear that Nietzsche’s isolation was to a certain extent self-induced. This is confirmed by his hyperbolic writing style which should be considered as a deliberate attempt to separate those who (like the free spirit) can ‘read’ him correctly, from those who cannot. Such a claim is also supported by the extended title of Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everybody and Nobody’. Faulkner recognises the strategic separating of readership and writes:

 [...] faced with the problem of having to reach a particular audience, but not knowing whom one addresses in advance, the writer must encrypt his message such that it is broadcast to all but heard by only a chosen few.
(Faulkner, 2010, p. 84)

Yet Nietzsche placed himself in a daringly precarious situation. Not only did he face the prospect of being misread, he also faced the danger of not being read at all. In a letter to Peter Gast August 1883, Nietzsche writes:

What I envy in Epicurus are the disciples in his garden, aye, in such circumstances one could certainly forget noble Greece and more certainly still ignoble Germany! And hence my rage since I have grasped in the broadest possible sense what wretched means (the depreciation of my good name, my character and my aims) suffice to take from me the trust of, and therewith the possibility of obtaining, pupils. You will believe me
when I say that I have not written a single line “for the sake of fame”; but I fancied that my writings might prove a good bait. For, after all, the impulse to teach is strong in me. And to this extent I require fame, so that I may get disciples. (Levy, 1921, p. 164)

This demonstrates that Nietzsche really did admire Epicurus for the manner in which he conducted his life and demonstrated great restraint and contempt for his contemporary setting. The seclusion of Epicurus’ garden represents (for Nietzsche) a mastery of his untimeliness; his ability to use it to his advantage to create an enduring and symbolic place of convalescence for those who are prepared and are able to ‘hear’ his message. It also demonstrates that Nietzsche was concerned that his message would remain unheard. In the ‘Foreword’ to Ecce Homo, written some twelve years after the letter above, he reiterates the problem:

[...]

In this respect there is a sense of powerlessness that accompanies the untimely man. Yet, if this is the case then Epicurus was able to use his untimeliness to his advantage because, not only was he popular during his lifetime, his popularity peaked following his death. The real problem of untimeliness that Nietzsche believed Epicurus was exposed to relates to the transformation of his message – a problem that Nietzsche held Epicurus responsible for. In a letter dating July 1st 1883 Nietzsche wrote:

Epicurus... so far all the world has paid him back, beginning in his own time, for allowing himself to be taken for someone else and for taking a light, divinely light view of opinions about himself. Already during the last period of his fame the pigs crowded into his gardens... (Nietzsche F., The Gay Science, 1974, p. p.111 fn. 37)

The phrase ‘allowing himself to be taken for someone else...’ implies that Epicurus deceived his disciples, yet this in not what Nietzsche has in mind. Nietzsche’s criticism relates to the seclusion of the garden and Epicurus’ indifference in regard to the political and sociological problems that lay outside the walls of his garden. Above all, this meant Epicurus was isolated and unable to respond to false accusations and
misinterpretations of his teachings. Furthermore, Epicurus also represents a peculiar mode of untimeliness for Nietzsche, which Nietzsche demonstrates in BGE: 7. Here Nietzsche criticises the ‘malicious’ remarks that Epicurus made against Plato, calling them ‘Dionysiokolakes’, i.e. ‘actors’ or ‘flatterers of Dionysus’.

For Nietzsche, this display revealed Epicurus’ ‘ambitious envy’ for Plato and his increasing popularity (i.e., timeliness).

This highlights a particular aspect of Epicurus’ misinterpretation that Nietzsche felt might befall him. The lack of readership and his inability to ‘teach’ is a central motif in Zarathustra and in particular the Prologue, where Zarathustra’s first descent is poorly received by the crowd in the marketplace. Ultimately this is a problem of untimeliness; we touched upon a similar problem earlier in the section ‘Nietzsche and Greek materialism’ in which Nietzsche saw himself in Democritus as a ‘Hellenising ghost’ whose eventual return would be heralded. Nietzsche realised that Zarathustra’s message; ‘the superman shall be the meaning of the earth’ (Z: Prologue, 3) was delivered too early. Man, who still lived under the shadow of God, was unprepared and therefore unable to ‘hear’ the message. In fact, a similar message has been presented before and when Zarathustra consoles the tightrope walker he merely repeats the message of Epicurus and Lucretius written some 2000 years earlier; ‘there is no Devil and no Hell. Your soul will be dead even before your body: therefore fear nothing any more!’ (Z: Prologue, 6). Thus, the problem is not simply that man is unprepared; man is unwilling to hear the message.

This is an important point and is reiterated in section 285 of Beyond where Nietzsche writes:

The greatest events and thoughts – but the greatest thoughts are the greatest events – are comprehended last: the generations which are their contemporaries do not experience such events – they live past them. What happens here is similar to what happens in the realm of the stars. The light of the furthest stars comes to men last; and before it has arrived man denies that there are – stars there. ‘How many centuries does a spirit need to be comprehended?’ – that too is a standard, with that too there is created an order of rank and etiquette such as is needed: for spirit and star. – (BGE: 285)
The problem of untimeliness does not simply relate to those who are untimely in terms of their lateness, it may also apply to their punctuality or, more appropriately their over-punctuality. Nietzsche asks; ‘How many years does a spirit need to be comprehended?’ (op. cit.) – although a rhetorical question, it implies that time for rumination is required especially when digesting the ‘greatest thoughts’. Therefore, one can be too early or too late. Nietzsche recognises this problem within Epicurean thought. Deleuze claims that, ‘philosophy has an essential relation to time: it is always against time, critique of the present world’ (2006, p. 107). Like the light of the stars, the philosopher’s untimely truths are continually working toward an age when their time will come. Far beyond any concern of untimeliness in terms of lateness, Nietzsche was more concerned with the possibility of his over-punctuality. This is most clearly expressed in Ecce Homo; ‘Listen to me! For I am thus and thus. Do not, above all, confound me with what I am not!’ (EH; Foreword, 1).

In Part 2 ‘Nietzsche’s admiration of Democritus and Epicurus’, we found that in the Wanderer section 270, Nietzsche claimed that Epicurus ‘has forgotten his own name: it was the heaviest pack he ever threw off’. During that discussion our primary aim was to reveal Nietzsche’s affinity to Epicurus, here we can make a more important observation concerning the mode of life that Epicurus represents. In the following section from the Wanderer, we found that what Nietzsche admired above all was the ‘heroic-idyllic mode of philosophizing’ that Epicurus invented. Yet, in this respect, Epicurus found purpose for suffering in repose – the withdrawal from the world in blessed contemplation. Such withdrawal (exemplified by life in the garden) and unconcern for the manner in which his teachings were interpreted by those outside the walls, become a concern for Nietzsche because of his detachment from academic circles. This is expressed in a letter to Gast (August 1883); ‘Epicurus is precisely the best negative argument in favour of my challenge to all rare spirits to isolate themselves from the mass of their fellows’ (Levy, 1921, pp. 158-9). In fact, Nietzsche recognised ‘Epicureanism’ as a problem of untimeliness as early as 1872 during his lecture on ‘The Future of our Education Institutions’ when he claimed that:

Any education is hateful here that makes solitary, that sticks goals above money and acquisition, that wastes much time: one is well accustomed to do away with such other educational tendencies as ‘higher egoism’ as ‘immoral [unsittliche] educational Epicureanism. (Nietzsche F., 2004, p. 37)
Above all, Nietzsche desired recognition and in the same letter highlights the dangers that Epicurus’ isolated philosophical mode promoted. Here Nietzsche criticised Seneca for his untrustworthy translations (a Stoic), although his writings on Epicureanism are generally held to be positive. For Nietzsche, Seneca merely wore a ‘friendly mask’ to disguise the transformative nature of his translations.

Epicurus’ misrepresentation is symbolic of the concerns Nietzsche felt might posthumously befall him (and he was correct to be concerned).\(^{53}\) This highlights the problem of being read too early, which Nietzsche also applied to Kant.\(^{54}\) The problem is raised when he writes of Epicurus, ‘it took a century for Greece to find out who this garden God Epicurus has been – Did it find out?’ (BGE: 7). Furthermore, it is a problem that is not restricted to people but extends itself to events.\(^{55}\) As Nietzsche found with Seneca, interpretation (as a mode of translation) is transformative and when one remains isolated from one’s contemporary setting (as Epicurus was) and refuses to participate in public life then interpretive accounts become the only mode of analysis. Thus, the question ‘Did it find out?’ applies to Nietzsche’s own untimeliness.

**Affects**

Now we are more familiar with the influence of Epicurus upon Nietzsche’s thought and the problems that Nietzsche found within Epicurus’ account, it is possible to reintroduce a topic that is central to both philosophers accounts of immanence. As we found in Part 1, ‘feelings’ (pathê) for Epicurus provide man with a direct insight into the operations of nature, which is why anything congenial to nature is experienced as pleasurable, while anything uncongenial is experienced as pain. Consequently, ‘feelings’ are the most immediate expression of affectivity. It is my contention that ‘affects’ perform a similarly central role for Nietzsche as they are the most immediate expressions of the most primordial natural state (will to power); whereas for Epicurus, the interaction of atoms and void are experienced in the affective state of pleasure or pain. For Nietzsche, will to power as a theory of relations is the primordial state of nature from which affective states of feelings derive. This is evident in an 1888 note; ‘[My theory would be: –] that the will to power is the primitive from of affect, that all other affects are only developments of it’ (WP: 688 /
Yet as Heidegger notes, Nietzsche never provided an informative account of ‘affect’ which means that its meaning remains ambiguous. The following account will analyse Nietzsche’s use of ‘affect’ to demonstrate that, as in Epicurus, its meaning is central to his philosophy of immanence. Furthermore, it will demonstrate that Nietzsche uses Epicurean concepts in order to inform his own theory, although there are key differences that will be introduced throughout this section.

**Force**

Deleuze claims that, Nietzsche, like Spinoza, wanted ‘a new direction for science and philosophy’ (Deleuze G., 2006, p. 39). What then does this new science and philosophy look like? For Deleuze, Nietzsche claims that the first step is to understand the ‘body’ afresh, that is, we must understand body in terms of the forces that constitute it. Nietzsche was adamant that consciousness should be explained as an affect of the body and in support of this Deleuze claims:

To remind consciousness of its necessary modesty [...] to take it for what it is: a symptom, nothing but the symptom of a deeper transformation and of the activities of entirely non-spiritual forces. (Deleuze G., 2006, p. 39)

Consciousness is defined by Deleuze ‘as the region of the ego affected by the external world’ (*op. cit.*) He also claims that a further distinction is required between consciousness and unconsciousness, although to make this distinction exteriority is subordinated to ‘superiority (in terms of values)’ (*op. cit.*). Body cannot therefore be defined as a ‘field of forces,’ or in Lucretian terms as a ‘vessel’, because this presupposes a ‘quantity of reality,’ whereas ‘all reality is already quantity of force’ (Deleuze G., 2006, pp. 39-40). Epicurus proposed that ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain,’ or at least the ‘feelings’ of them constitute the desires that define the body and in this respect Desires project his theory of sensation towards a state of equilibrium. For Nietzsche this was a mistake, and like all materialists, Epicurus was directed by a will that in *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche describes as ‘atomistic need’ (BGE: 12). This need relates to a particular demand of the Ego, which seeks, creates and maintains states of equilibrium by artificially creating unities. These unities are metaphysical
abstractions that can only express the logic of the Ego and do not represent the causal force of will to power (although they are expressions of it). This is confirmed in Nietzsche’s notes when he argues:

The mechanistic worldview is imagined the only way that eye and fingertips can imagine a world (as ‘being moved’) in such a way that it can be calculated – that unities are invented, in such a way that causal unities are invented, ‘things’ (atoms) whose affect remains constant (--the false concept of subject is transferred to the concept of the atom) (NLN: 14[79])

Thus, it is the subject who brings regularity and order to the world. Accordingly, Nietzsche proposed that we go a step further and experimentally regard concepts such as ‘number,’ ‘thing,’ ‘activity,’ and ‘motion’ (op. cit.) as phenomenal additions. Then, if we ‘eliminate these additions’ (i.e., the unities produced by the Ego) we find that only ‘dynamic quanta’ remain. He concludes; ‘The will to power not a being, not a becoming, but a pathos – is the most elementary fact, and becoming, effecting, is only the result of this...’ (op. cit.). All other feelings are derived from this ‘primitive affective form’ (Deleuze G., 2006, p. 62).

Although ‘pathos’ should be defined as ‘feeling(s)’, for Nietzsche it signifies a more complicated and dynamic theory of relations. In Part 1 (Third Canonic: Feelings) we found that ‘feelings’ are central to the Epicurean canonic, acting as interlocutor between epiphenomenon and volition. We also know that Nietzsche was influenced by Schiller who uses ‘pathos’ to signify ‘a struggle for freedom against external obstacles’ (Pugh, 2000, p. 64). In this respect both Epicurus and Schiller’s use of pathos relates to suffering, and it is my contention that Nietzsche uses it in a similar, yet more developed manner.

For Nietzsche, we ‘experience’ will to power in its ‘affective form’ through pathos as suffering. In Beyond Good and Evil, he extends the idea of pathos to ‘value’ and argues that the feeling of superiority within classes establishes ‘pathos of distance’ (BGE: 257). To this he adds; ‘a more mysterious pathos [...] the ‘self-overcoming of man’ develops, which longs for ‘an ever-increasing widening of distance within the soul itself’ (op. cit.). ‘Man’ is defined against himself, which is a typical trait of aristocratic society but can also be found within the soul of the individual. It is the
latter sense that is of interest to us. The problem concerns Christian morality which came to dominate the original and more ‘natural’ barbarian caste. Nietzsche argues that, ‘their superiority lay, not in their physical strength, but primarily in their psychical [i.e., soul] – they were more complete human beings’ (BGE: 257). Acampora & Ansell-Pearson (2011) observe that this is an argument against the ‘anti-natural’ hostility to life that Christian morality introduced (Acampora & Ansell-Pearson, 2011, p. 198). The problem that faces the free spirit is how to overcome this anti-natural outlook, ‘which affects not only how things are seen but also what can be seen’ (Acampora & Ansell-Pearson, 2011, p. 119). This is what happens when a redemptive quality is imposed onto (i.e., from outside) the affective state of suffering, it requires a justification that can only be found in the mode of transcendent contemplation, i.e. ‘otherworldliness’. Although Nietzsche will eventually reject the Epicurean response to suffering, he acknowledges the Epicurean realisation that suffering cannot be justified with the promise of the afterlife. Thus, so far as Nietzsche was concerned, suffering is crucial for survival and for the development of society. It is a condition of life and cannot be overcome (perhaps only in death). Therefore, (like Epicurus) Nietzsche’s account of pathos is inextricable linked to suffering. As we have seen, materialist accounts were (for Nietzsche) limited by an underlying will to artificially create unities and in this respect they were driven by the will to truth. Alternatively, Nietzsche offers a radical interpretation of this problem through the eternal recurrence. Instead of positing the solid corpuscular atoms that interlock, eventually producing discrete bodies that are capable of receiving sense-impressions etc, as we found for the materialists, Nietzsche develops a theory of force that (he believed) disposed of the inherent tendency to conceive the world through a will to truth. Furthermore, although he refuted the materialist foundation (i.e., of Becoming emerging from the Being of atoms and void), Nietzsche acknowledged that in order for life to function on a phenomenal level, an ‘idée fixe of the senses’ (TI: 3, 1) was required. This is a necessary condition of appearance, and its most immediate object is the body. However, its conception has been plagued with erroneous evaluations that by rejecting the senses have rejected its fixed object (i.e., the body). In response, Nietzsche proposes that ‘body’ is the object that requires our attention above all others (he develops this position in Zarathustra, a discussion that we will continue in Part 3). The question we are faced with is, given Nietzsche’s rejection of materialism, what constitutes body?
Deleuze claims that ‘Every relationship of force constitutes a body’ (2006, p. 40). He continues:

In a body the superior or dominant forces are known as active and the inferior or dominated forces are known as reactive […] Because forces which enter into a relation do not have quantity without each of them having, at the same time, the quality corresponding to their difference in quantity as such. This difference between forces qualified according to their quantity as active or reactive will be called hierarchy. (2006, p. 40)

The qualities of force are determined either as ‘active’ or ‘reactive,’ nevertheless these are only ever expressions of quantities. Yet, as stated above, ‘all reality is already quantity of force’ (Deleuze G., 2006, pp. 39-40). This is the level of the phenomenal and is therefore a concession that Nietzsche has to make. It is also the reason why (for Nietzsche), all phenomena are recognised as a symptoms of these qualitative differences and most importantly it is through the concept ‘body’ that such differences first become manifest. Deleuze notes; ‘Any two forces, being unequal, constitute a body as soon as they enter into a relation’ (Deleuze G., 2006, p. 40). Subsequently, ‘body’ operates at the phenomenal level, but it is used by Nietzsche to express pathos in terms of ‘active’ and ‘reactive’ forces psychologically, morally and socially. Pathos of distance is an example of the expression of the cultural forces that dominate and react against one another; the forces that form an ‘aristocratic society’. Furthermore, it is the creation of ‘distance’ that the ‘formation of ever higher, rarer, more remote, tenser, more comprehensive states’ elevate the ‘type man’ (BGE: 257). The original pathos is therefore very much like the interlocutor – the ‘feeling’ of the primordial forces as expression of will to power that not only constitute man, but also create the hierarchy that sociologically he exists within. This is an expression of Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence. The concept of ‘body’ is a recurrent theme throughout Nietzsche’s work. We have seen how it emerges via a multiplicity of forces. For Nietzsche, body, like any object must be understood primarily as an expression of these forces.

Traditionally, ‘body’ carries with it a number of metaphysical problems. For example, it is steeped in the dualistic metaphysics of Descartes which stretches back to the Pre-Socratics. In this sense the concept ‘body’ has a history within the philosophical tradition. This is the reason why Nietzsche agrees with Spinoza that, ‘[…] nobody as
yet has determined the limits of the body’s capabilities’ (Spinoza, 2002, p. 280). Throughout the idealist tradition, body is taken primarily in opposition to the concept ‘mind,’ in the sense that the mind transcends the body. For Nietzsche, because dogmatic metaphysics takes ‘mind’ to be ontologically superior to body, philosophy is plagued with absurdities that obstruct knowledge and scientific development. If however, we collapse the distinction and understand mind through the concept ‘body’ (i.e., immanently) as Nietzsche does, then new possibilities of knowledge emerge.

**Note on Consciousness & Communication**

‘Mind’ emerges from ‘body’ and body emerges (as Deleuze suggests) through unequal forces. Once mind is understood through the concept ‘body’, then we can appreciate them both as different expressions of the same process: will to power. Nietzsche asks, ‘For what purpose, then, any consciousness at all when it is in the main superfluous?’ (GS: 354). His answer concerns the utility of communication. Communication (for Nietzsche) is only really useful ‘between those who command and those who obey’ (op. cit.). Only from a communal perspective does the origin of consciousness as need (in terms of survival and protection) make sense. Nietzsche develops the following argument:

In brief, the development of language and the development of consciousness [...] go hand in hand. Add to this that not only language serves as a bridge between human beings but also as mien, a pressure, a gesture. The emergence of our sense impressions into our consciousness, the ability to fix them and, as it were, exhibit them externally, increases proportionally with the need to communicate to others by means of signs. The human being inventing signs is at the same time the human being who becomes ever more keenly conscious of himself. It was only as a social animal that man acquired self-consciousness – which he is still in the process of doing, more and more. (GS: 354)

We see a similar argument developed by Epicurus, as language is presented via a process of signification, which is conducive to the objects presented to the mind via
sensory information. Preconceptions (as repeated sense-impressions) are held in the mind (i.e., fixed) and thereby serve to validate the opinion (doxa) of an object and allow its signification. Epicurus reduces language to a theory of signs, which he argues have purpose in utility in respect to a social contract. Both Nietzsche and Epicurus deny the possibility of a transcendent language-legislator, instead they propose that language emerges on the condition of sense-impressions. As such, language and consciousness are not produced by the individual, but in the relationship between individuals through their mutual need. However, this does not mean that consciousness cannot surpass this original need, and this is why Nietzsche deems it ‘superfluous’ (GS: 354). Thus, by collapsing mind / body dualism and understanding mind through the body, consciousness can no longer be regarded as the highest form of the human condition. Instead it should be recognised as a function of the body – a recognition that Nietzsche believes has been overlooked by the philosophical tradition.

**Note on Truth**

Nietzsche claims that, ‘One should have more respect for the bashfulness with which nature has hidden behind riddles and iridescent uncertainties (GS: 4). The imposition of truth upon ‘the world’ has led to a number of falsifications that (Nietzsche argues) are still present; for example in the materialistic predisposition of science. Yet, so far as Nietzsche is concerned, we continue to fall under the seductive spell of truth due to its erotic nature, i.e. truth as woman (see BGE: Preface).

The will to truth, for Nietzsche, is a mode of the will to power. However, man has lost sight of this will and as a result ‘truth’ has become detached from its servitude to life. Historically, Nietzsche holds the Platonic victory over Epicureanism to account. Consequently, truth became a reactive force, and rather than being in the servitude of life (which for Epicurus meant the earthly life) it is now hostile to it, especially in regards to Platonic ‘otherworldliness’, which posits meaning beyond this world. Nietzsche argues:

> Granted that nothing is ‘given’ as real except our world of desires and passions, that we can rise or sink to no other ‘reality’ than the reality of our
drives – for thinking is only the relationship of these drives to one another.
(BGE: 35)

Truth in this respect is one aspect of our ‘will’ in an objectified form. The greatest mistake that philosophers have made was to isolate the will to truth from its affective state. In this light, the will to truth must be considered a symptom of degeneration and no longer as a goal of human endeavour. Instead we must look ‘cheerfully’ upon truth in a manner similar to the way Democritus did. Burnham analyses Nietzsche’s cheerful approach as follows:

When the philosopher has [...] realigned himself to the will to power, truth is not a representation [i.e., an outward characterisation] of an objective something, but an expression of an underlying joy of life. (Burnham D., 2007, p. 62)

As we found in Part 2: ‘Nietzsche and Greek Materialism’, ‘Cheerfulness’ is a central concept for Nietzsche; one that must be employed as a methodological approach when considering life. Only by following this approach can we reach a profound understanding of the world; ‘The world seen from within, the world described and defined according to its ‘intelligible character’ – it would be ‘will to power’ and nothing else - ’ (BGE: 35). This new understanding of the world, i.e. from within, is Nietzsche’s most important intimation of his philosophy of immanence. Rather than looking at the world in an objectified form, mediated by metaphysical truths (which Nietzsche describes as fictitious), the philosopher of the future must comprehend the world from within according to its ‘intelligible character’; i.e. through our ‘passions’ and ‘drives’. Crucially, Nietzsche is claiming that ‘thinking is not a representation of these drives or of the world; rather, thinking is inside or at the level of these drives’ (Burnham D., 2007, p. 62). Thinking is an immediate act and expression of an affect characterised by will to power - ‘the will to power is the primitive from of affect’ (NLN 14[121] / WP: 688). Although hesitant, Burnham is justified to make the following statement; ‘Thought and affect are thus closely related; thought might even be affect “spiritualised”’ (2007, p. 65).
Illusory Homogeneity of the Will

Unlike the Schopenhaurian ‘will’ which is taken as a unity expressed by the ‘I,’ Nietzsche claims that the will is a multiplicity of drives which must be regarded ‘un-philosophically’ (BGE: 19), i.e. against the philosophical tradition that assumes its unity. The will should be considered as, ‘a plurality of sensations’ (op. cit.) and in BGE: 19, Nietzsche gives three instances where wills have been homogenised. The first is a transitory state; to ‘leave’ and to ‘go’, which along with an ‘accompanying muscular sensation’ is expressed as ‘feelings’ (which are many and varied). Secondly, he refers to a ‘commanding thought’ which cannot be ‘separated from ‘willing’’. Thirdly as well as being ‘a complex of feeling and thinking’, willing is, ‘an affect: and is in fact an affect of command’ (op. cit.). It is in commanding that the homogenisation of the will occurs, and when presented consciously in the unification of the ‘I,’ a fourth aspect of willing emerges; that of ‘command and obey’. What follows are the ‘erroneous conclusions’ and ‘false evaluations’ that ‘willing suffices for action’ (op. cit.). It follows that the (illusory) freedom of will occurs because the accompanying sensation of pleasure is experienced as success, i.e. willing into action:

[... ] will and action are somehow one – he [the agent] attributes the success, the carrying out of the willing, to the will itself, and thereby enjoys an increase of that sensation of power which all success brings with it. (BGE: 19)

Presented in this way we can begin to appreciate the way that Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence reduces affective states to a schema of power through ‘internal genesis’ (Deleuze G. , 2006, p. 91). Furthermore, in the same section he claims:

He who wills adds in this way the sensation of pleasure of the successful executive agents, the serviceable ‘under-wills’ or ‘under-souls’ – for our body is only a social structure composed of many souls – to his sensation of pleasure as commander. (BGE: 19)

There is an allusion to Epicurus here because as we have said, ‘feelings’ for Epicurus act as an interlocutor between epiphenomenon and volition, that is, from will to
action (in Nietzschean terms). Moreover, for Epicurus, bodily desires manifested phenomenally as hunger, for example, and when such desires are satisfied they are accompanied by the feeling of pleasure (aponia). For Nietzsche, Epicurus was unable to translate ‘feelings’ into a schema of power. Furthermore, for Epicurus, mental pleasures (ataraxia) were possible only on the condition that bodily pleasure (aponia) had already been achieved. For Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence this is a false divide. Both agree that mind emerges from the body, i.e. the spiritual from the physical; ‘it is a social structure of many souls (that is, many drives, desires, needs’) (Burnham D., 2007, p. 36). However, pleasure, for Nietzsche, is not a goal (as it is for Epicurus’ eudaimonism) but merely the affective state of superiority expressed in the homogenisation of a plurality of wills to the singular ‘I’. Furthermore, in his appropriation of ‘affects,’ Nietzsche rejects the immediacy of ‘feelings’ in the Epicurean sense. Instead he proposes that feeling and thinking are based on the illusory homogeneity of willing:

[... as feelings [Gefühle], and indeed many varieties of feeling [Gefühl], can therefore be recognised as an ingredient of will, so in the second place, can thinking [Denken] [...] and do not imagine that this thought can be separated from the ‘willing’. (BGE: 19]

For Epicurus, feelings interlock epiphenomenon and volition, and pleasure is (ultimately) dependent on the ability to control one’s desires (i.e., the affective state of willing) to reach the state of ataraxia; whereas for Nietzsche, feelings are already an affect, they are not neutral in the way Epicurus deemed but are value-laden. Feelings are manifestations of drives, and as such are subject to command or obedience (active / reactive forces). Furthermore, under the Epicurean schema of feelings, one acts according to one’s feelings and generally speaking, an act is moral for the Epicurean if it produces pleasure (pleasure, that is, through negation of pain). For Nietzsche, the act is moral because it increases the feeling of power, i.e. power as the affectivity of command. Deleuze writes:

[F]or Nietzsche, the capacity for being affected is not necessarily a passivity but an affectivity, a sensibility, a sensation. It is in this sense that Nietzsche, even before treating power as a matter of will to power he treated it as a matter of feeling and sensibility. But when he elaborated the full concept of
the will to power this first characteristic did not disappear – it became the manifestation of the will to power. (Deleuze G., 2006, p. 62)

In Part I, we found that feelings, ‘tell us whether a sensation is pleasurable or painful’ (p.35). For Epicurus, this meant that the atomic structure of a body was such that anything congenial to it was felt as pleasurable (inclination) and anything uncongenial was felt as painful (aversion). In Daybreak we find Nietzsche criticising such an account:

*Feelings and their origination in judgements.* – ‘Trust your feelings!’ – But feelings are nothing final or original; behind feelings there stand judgements and evaluations which we inherit in the form of feelings (inclinations, aversions). The inspiration born of a feeling is the grandchild of a judgement! – and in any event not a child of your own! Trust one’s feelings [Gefühle]– means to give more obedience to one’s grandfather and grandmother and their grandparents than the gods which are in us: our reason and experience. (D: 1, 35)

For Nietzsche, feelings are ‘inherited’; they have a history which lies beyond the self, and they cannot be used as a criterion of truth/reality. Instead of being the immediate and ‘truthful’ manifestations of atomic combinations, they are ‘affective’ states presented to the unified will. As such feelings have a moral determination; they are taken (falsely) as real, that is, in isolation from the drives which produce them as the power to command both body and mind. Furthermore, because Epicurus relied so heavily on the grounding of feelings (pathē) as the third and most important aspect of his canon, his philosophy was predicated on the passive negation of pain. For Nietzsche this is typical of a philosophy which seeks to soothe, and as a result it stands in contrast to Dionysian Joy, which affirms all aspects of life.
The development of Immanence in The Gay Science

Having now worked through the key themes that unite Epicurus and Nietzsche as philosophers of immanence, it is clear that Nietzsche held both Democritus and Epicurus in the highest regard. By examining Nietzsche’s relationship with both thinkers an insight into Nietzsche’s thought has been achieved that would otherwise be impossible. For Nietzsche, the historical immanence / transcendence divide is crucial if we are to use history in the service of life. However, Nietzsche also makes it clear that the moment had arrived when such historical oppositions must be overcome. As Lampert observes, there is a point when ‘Nietzsche must go beyond Epicurus [...]’ (Lampert, 1993, p. 426). The following section will demonstrate that Nietzsche goes beyond Epicurus in The Gay Science. What Nietzsche required above all was a method of interpretation that could sink to the depths such that the will to truth could be revealed, a method that Nietzsche named The Gay Science. Through the application of this method a radical conception of immanence emerged that Nietzsche continued to developed throughout his career and is best exemplified in the statement, ‘The world seen from within, the world described and defined according to its ‘intelligible character’ - would be just this “will to power” and nothing else’ (BGE: 36).

In order to fully appreciate the scope of Nietzsche’s aims, an analysis detailing the progression of Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence is required. This occurs mainly in The Gay Science sections 108-125 as Golomb (2001) suggests, and our preliminary investigation will seek to detail this account. This will be followed by an investigation into Nietzsche’s references to Epicurus in The Gay Science after section 125. This will further reveal the influence of Epicurus upon Nietzsche during this crucial period of his thought.

Book 3 of The Gay Science: The Incorporation of Truth

Nietzsche immediately announces ‘God is dead’ at the beginning of his immanent account. This is symbolic of what will follow. He argues that men still live under the shadow of God and the task of the philosopher is to ‘vanquish his shadow’ (GS: 108).
It is here in *The Gay Science* that Nietzsche develops his method with this purpose in mind – a method that he continued to develop in his later works as *genealogy*.

Nietzsche’s task is the ‘de-deification of nature’, that is, to bring to light the dogmatic errors that are inherent to reason. In Part 3 ‘Nietzsche’s System of Psychology’ we will discuss Nietzsche’s account of reason in greater detail but for the moment we should recognise that by ‘reason’, Nietzsche has in mind what (in *Zarathustra*) he will coin ‘little reason’—; ‘conscious reason, known by the mind’ (Benson B. E., 2008 , p. 63). Such reason, Nietzsche warns, entails the conception of the world as a ‘living thing’ (GS: 109), which introduces ‘purpose’ to it. Instead, we must wear a Heraclitean mask – the worldview of chaos and becoming. Through this mask, our world is the ‘exception of exceptions’ (op. cit.). ‘Reason’ as the conscious ordering of the world becomes the object of critique, and with it, so do our ‘moral’ and ‘aesthetic’ judgments, together with universal laws of nature. Yet Nietzsche is not proposing a critique of (pure) reason as Kant did. As we found in Part 2 ‘Affects’, the body as a multiplicity of drives and forces has precedence over reason. Therefore, before we can attend to the question of ‘reason’, we must first understand the capabilities of the body.

In prophetic style, Nietzsche asks; ‘When will we complete our de-deification of nature? When may we begin to “naturalize” humanity in terms of a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature?’ (GS: 109). The question implies that the time for humanity’s naturalisation is imminent. Following the death of god, the conditions for this process will present themselves once again as they did for Epicurus. The question is, is humanity ready? Has man the spiritual capacity for this transformation? Or, like Epicurus, will Nietzsche’s message be defeated (perhaps by science) and condemned to obscurity? Nietzsche’s primary task is to break the clouds that cast the shadow of God. Like Epicurus, he must reveal to man the ‘unclouded skies’ through a ‘mocking, light, fleeting, divinely untroubled, divinely artificial art’ (GS: P, 4).

In GS: 110, Nietzsche addresses the ‘Origin of knowledge’ as the cause of the clouded skies. He dispels the Eleatic’s proposal that knowledge is a ‘free and spontaneous activity’, claiming instead that knowledge is inherited (through a process of internalisation). He calls such knowledge, ‘articles of faith’ and explains that inherited errors (Nietzsche has in mind the ‘four errors’ see GS: 115) undergo a
process of incorporation in which our ‘perception and sensations’ are determined by this internalised outlook until ‘truth emerged–as the weakest form of knowledge’. The problem as Nietzsche sees it consists in this: Knowledge is no longer a source of ‘innocence and happy like play’ as it was for the pre-Socratics. Instead, under the Socratic formula; ‘reason = virtue = happiness’ (TI: Socrates, 4), knowledge developed into a means for gaining power, that is, intellectual domination. This became a ‘fight’, eventually ‘finding its place and a need amongst other needs’. In this respect, knowledge was incorporated into life, however this contrasted with the more primitive (the more ‘evil’) instincts. Knowledge and instinct are diametrically opposed; man is now defined by this opposition – ‘A thinker is now that being in whom the impulse for truth and those life-preserving errors clash’. Upon this recognition the great question of man’s future confronts him; ‘To what extent can truth endure incorporation?’ (GS: 110) – The term ‘incorporation’ [Einverleibung] is highly significant, yet it eludes definition. Keith Ansell-Pearson details the nature of the problem, particularly in terms of ‘ultimate truth’, which appears to restrict man’s capacity to present becoming as an object of knowledge. The problem, as Ansell-Pearson suggests, may well be a derivative of what Nietzsche identifies as ‘spirit’:

That commanding something which the people calls ‘spirit’ wants to be master within itself and around itself and to feel itself master: out of a multiplicity it has the will to simplicity, a will which binds together and tames, which is imperious and domineering [...] The power of the spirit to appropriate what is foreign to it is revealed in a strong inclination to assimilate the new to the old, to simplify the complex, to overlook or repel what is contradictory. (BGE: 230)

As a consequence, and given the nature of knowledge described in GS: 110, it is possible that knowledge and becoming will remain forever mutually exclusive. The question; ‘To what extent can truth endure incorporation?’ is provocative. Man, no longer ‘the knower’ who experiments, man has become the experiment – his future in undetermined! As we shall find, Nietzsche reflects on the problem of incorporation throughout the remainder of The Gay Science. As a result, I will highlight these reflections in order to develop a coherent conception of the problem. Then in Part 3, I will continue to develop the problem in order to demonstrate the necessity of it for the realisation of the ‘immanent ideal (“the meaning of the earth”)’ (Ansell-Pearson
In the meantime, it is important that we continue the discussion of Nietzsche’s Epicurus within The Gay Science in order to recognise why Nietzsche departure from Epicurus’ philosophy of immanence.

In the following two sections (GS: 111-2) Nietzsche develops the problem (or experiment) in terms of causality. He introduces ‘Logic’ and ‘Cause and Effect’, both of which are typically understood as tools of knowledge and asks; ‘How did logic come into existence in man’s head? (GS: 111). He explains that the human capacity to make logical inferences, i.e. to ‘treat as equal’ the unequal, was necessary for survival. However, the consequence of this ‘logical tendency’ pushed aside the true nature of reality (i.e., flux), allowing the ‘concept of substance’ to be posited as real. Similarly with the concepts cause and effect – we do not ‘explain’ but offer ‘descriptions’ (GS: 112). He argues that, although we have managed to overcome the dualism of the two, seeing them now as a ‘series of causes’, we continue to make logical inferences that ‘isolate only a couple of pieces’ of a ‘continuum’ (GS: 112). If, however, our intellectual capacity was not restricted by logical inferences, and was therefore able to see ‘cause and effect as a continuum and a flux [... we] would deny the concept of cause and effect and deny all conditionality’ (op. cit.).

Thus, the problem of incorporation (i.e., truth no longer posited as an object of knowledge that guides man, but as a barrier that restricts man’s capacity to describe and define the world according to its ‘intelligible character’ [BGE: 35]), is a problem of consumption. As Ansell-Pearson notes, the problem is characterised by Nietzsche as a problem of digestion; ‘Nietzsche states that the organs of a living system work in favour of error, and therefore the “ultimate truth” [die letzte Wahrheit] of the flux of things cannot stand incorporation’ (Ansell-Pearson K., 2006, p. 237). Hence, the problem of incorporation runs parallel to the problem of crystallisation, because they both represent an immediate limitation to his philosophy of immanence. In his notes Nietzsche details how the will to truth, in its propensity to interpret Becoming as Being and to project this view onto the world, is a will that can be overcome:

Truth is thus not something that’s there and must be found out, discovered, but something that must be made and that provides the name for a process - or rather for a will to overcome, a will that left to itself has no end:

inserting truth as a processus in infinitum,” an active determining, not a
becoming conscious of something that is 'in itself' fixed and determinate. It is a word for the 'will to power' [NLN: 9[91] / WP: 552]

However, this “ultimate truth” acts like a hiatus, blocking the possibility of truth’s incorporation. This is another reason why ‘incorporation’ must be considered an ‘experiment’; it is as yet unchartered territory.

GS: 112, is followed by an account of science, which suggests that Nietzsche identified contemporary science with the logic of cause and effect, an error therefore that needs to be exposed: ‘Originally’ Nietzsche claims, science became separated into different branches. However, in their isolation, the different branches of science began to compete, effectively poisoning each other with contradictions. Eventually however, these impulses ‘learned to comprehend their coexistence’ - an allusion to Darwin as the instigator of this coexistence. Nietzsche claims that a similar coexistence is required that will bring together science (now understood in terms of Natural Selection) and ‘the practical wisdom of life’ (GS: 113). This is the purpose, or ‘experiment’ of The Gay Science.

In section 115, Nietzsche introduces the ‘four errors’. These errors relate to the problem of incorporation, particularly the first error – that man ‘always saw himself only incompletely’. This is an allusion to the role of ‘reason’, which operates on a conscious level. In Part 2, ‘Consciousness & Communication’ we found that consciousness is an activity of the herd. Its evolution led to the second error – that ‘man endowed himself with fictitious attributes’; such as morality. This gave man a sense of superiority over animals and nature, which created a ‘false order of Rank’. And finally, man created ‘tables of goods’ then de-historicised them, believing them to be ‘eternal and unconditional’. Once again, we should relate these errors to the ‘experiment’ that Nietzsche is proposing. The four errors, Nietzsche claims, have ‘educated man’, they also now define him. This means that man has internalised these errors. The question is can man consume knowledge of these errors? – i.e. has man the stomach to swallow his ‘dignity’?

In sections 118-120, Nietzsche argues that ‘function’ is ascribed not from a moral perspective but from rank depending on one’s role within a hierarchy (an argument that highlights Nietzsche preoccupation with the de-deification of nature). He attempts to demonstrate this on a number of levels; the individual’s place within the
herd (GS: 117), the cellular (GS: 118) and adaptation (GS: 119). The point is that function is relative to type which at its most fundamental level can be described as the ‘impulse to appropriate’ or the ‘impulse to submit’ (GS: 118). The problem of function relates to the ability to fulfil function, not the appropriation of function. Nietzsche claims that, if a being is unable to fulfil its function then, ‘they become grumpy, irritated, and devour themselves’ (GS: 119). An idea developed at length in the Genealogy as sublimated drives. Function therefore, is a question of ‘Health of Soul’ (GS: 120). Yet, health (in terms of appropriation) is relative to type; ‘In one person, of course, this health could look like its opposite in another person’ (GS: 120). As a consequence, ‘illness’ cannot be regarded as the privation of health; instead we must consider the possibility that it is a function of the organism. In support of this Sarah Kofman writes: ‘Illness is not a negation of health, it is not its other, it does not result from the operation of an opposing death force which inhibits life. It is life which, going too far in its own [propre] direction, ends up like all excellent things by ‘sublating itself [se ‘relever’ ellême]’ (Kofman, 1993, pp. 52-3).

Section 121 is a summary of the previous sections. By ‘Life no argument’, Nietzsche seeks to demonstrate that life can only be endured on the condition that the ‘articles of faith’ (i.e., to project being onto the world) also endure. However, this does not ‘prove them’, because ‘the conditions of life might include error’ (GS: 121). Again, this relates to the problem of incorporation: If error is to be considered as a ‘condition of life’, then the value of ‘truth’ is relegated to the same level of error. In GS: 110 we found that ‘truth emerged—as the weakest form of knowledge’, our capacity to know, is for Nietzsche, no longer dependent on or limited by metaphysics, but by our capacity to incorporate these ‘untruths’ through ‘recognition’; ‘To recognise untruth as a condition of life, to be sure means to resist customary value-sentiments in a dangerous fashion: and a philosophy which ventures to do so places itself, by that act alone, beyond good and evil’ (BGE: 4).

In section 123, Nietzsche develops his new conception of knowledge set out in section 109. Here he explains that even without the ‘passion for knowledge’ science would still be promoted. What is it about science then that can override this will to truth? Science in Nietzsche’s contemporary Germany (following the enlightenment) is no longer a means to virtue. Zwart comments, ‘Science seems to be regarded by Nietzsche as an end in itself’ (Zwart, 1996). And as such it is no longer an
‘unconditional’ passion but a condition of the modern state. Nietzsche dramatised
the decline of Christianity and the growing popularity of science as a model of
progression. Supernatural beliefs were still a part of everyday life and Nietzsche refers
to Pope Leo X’s inability to break from the security of the ‘eternal salvation of the
soul’ (GS: 123). He describes such judgements as ‘the truly Christian judgement
about science’ (op. cit.) and claims that such judgements are typical of those who
place virtue above science, making science merely a means. However, following
the death of God these Christian judgements have become superfluous. Nietzsche
claims that this new knowledge, no longer restrained under the model of virtue, is a
revelation; ‘knowledge wants to be more than a mere means’ (op. cit.).

Knowledge is no longer conditioned by the ‘four errors’; ‘we have left the land and
embarked’ (GS: 124). No longer does man live under the horizon imposed by a
transcendent deity. Nor the security of a self-imposed horizon that Epicurus’ garden
and the blessed contemplation of the gods symbolises. Man is confronted with the
‘horizon of the infinite’ – a particularly dangerous yet empowering sense of the
boundless. Nietzsche predicts that man will mourn God’s death and in doing so will
remain under his shadow. Burnham & Jesinghausen explain that the madman in GS:
125:-:

[...] carries a lamp in the daytime (the allusion is to Diogenes of Sinope). The
madman does this, Nietzsche implies, so as to illuminate those things that,
even in the daytime, are still under the shadow of God. So, for example, in
physics Nietzsche detects as still operative concepts whose only legitimacy
is theological. (Burnham & Jesinghausen, Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, 2010, p. 19)

At the end of section 108 Nietzsche claimed, ‘we still have to vanquish his shadow,
too’. Therefore, merely to claim, ‘God is dead’ is not enough. Furthermore, when the
madman insists ‘we have killed him – you and I’ (GS: 125), he places the responsibility
of this act on man’s shoulders and in this respect mankind had to rise to the level of
God to perform this act. The death of God was unavoidable; eventually man had to
overcome God because as ‘creator, the source of Being and of all things’ (Allison D.
B., 2001, p. 91) God stood in man’s way. The new knowledge of science could no
longer permit, nor posit (in its Darwinian unification) a God worthy of worship.
Science rejects the virtue formula, the unification of science could no longer be
subordinated under God; rather, God must be subordinated under and incorporated into science as a psychological phenomenon. Allison summarises the argument as follows:

This is the God of Plato, the God who demands inspection and answers, for he is the source of all truth. Nietzsche asserts that this doctrine of seeking the truth, which has both moral and metaphysical dimensions of enormous proportions, was a mistake. In it lay the seeds of God’s own death, a death which first becomes evident, as we saw in the rise of New Sciences. (Allison D. B., 2001, p. 94)

God’s death is therefore immanent; its occurrence is a purely natural development. Yet science remains under the shadow of God because it is unaware of its boundlessness; ultimately this is the problem that the ‘Madman’ introduces.

In GS: 125, the message that Nietzsche has been communicating from the beginning of Book 3 is too great for the ‘listeners’ to comprehend. The ‘listeners’, unable to free themselves from the shadow are cast back into the depth of the shadow. Nietzsche uses the image of daylight and the movement of the sun to deliver his message analogously. The point is that even in daytime the sun (image of the slaves freed from the cave in Plato’s ‘Republic’) continues to cast a shadow albeit a pale one. In GS: 344 (written five years later), Nietzsche reintroduces the shadow analogy (the significance of which had been missed in the first incarnation of the madman). Thus, Nietzsche proposes that we are still pious because we fail to recognise that our new faith (i.e., science) is predicated upon ‘metaphysical faith’:

[...] that even we seekers after knowledge today, we godless anti-metaphysicians still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by a faith that is thousands of years old, that Christian faith which was also the faith of Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is divine. (GS: 344)

The lantern carried by the madman is tainted by the flame from which it was first lit; therefore the lantern also casts a shadow. In Part 2, ‘The Foundation of Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Immanence’, we found that, in the morning when Nietzsche’s ideas were so ‘fragrant’ and ‘full of thorns’ he was unable to communicate them because they eluded expression (the shadow lies in front of him). The lantern carried by the
madman (in the GS: 125), is an attempt to disperse the shadow. However, the madman quickly realises that his arrival is premature; ‘my time is not yet’ – it is still ‘in the bright morning hours’ (GS: 125). Thus, the problem of communication reiterates the problem of untimeliness.

In a letter to Paul Deussen, Nietzsche proposes that Kant was ‘a genius, to whom has been given the same terribly sublime lot of coming a century before he could be understood’ (Nietzsche F., Selected Letters, 1996, p. 64). Moreover, the same problem is evident for Epicurus; ‘it took a century for Greece to find out who this garden God Epicurus had been – Did it find out?’ (BGE: 7). The first point to make continues with the theme of untimeliness. By the time a culture is ready to hear the message, the appropriate time has passed. The message has changed; either through misinterpretation or the transformative nature of the message. The reference to Kant’s premature reception is a reference to Nietzsche’s conception of Kant. Nietzsche supposes that only he was able to realise the true nature of Kant’s critical reasoning, but during the one hundred years that had passed since Kant, the problem had changed from a Critique of Pure Reason to the value of such a critique. It is important to remember that (for Nietzsche) the world is not the fixed and certain place it appears to be. Especially now ‘God is dead’, the meaning of man is no longer static. Therefore, over time, the values man gives to himself will no longer remain ‘eternal and unconditional’ as they once did under Christian morality (see GS: 115).

The second point concerns the nature of an immanent philosophy. In Part 1, I presented Epicurus as a philosopher of immanence. We can also extend this to Kant, however we have to be careful not to confuse transcendence with transcendental. Fortunately, Deleuze has does much of this work for us:

Kant’s genius, in the Critique of Pure Reason, was to conceive of an immanent critique. Critique must not be a critique of reason by feeling, by experience or by any kind of external instance [...] Kant lacked a method which permitted reason to be judged from the inside without giving it the task of being its own judge. And, in fact, Kant does not realise his project of immanent critique. Transcendental philosophy discovers conditions which still remain external to the conditioned. Transcendental principles
are principles of conditioning and not of internal genesis (Deleuze G., 2006, p. 91)

This is an important distinction. For Nietzsche, Kant’s method was so radical that a long period of rumination was required, so long in fact that by the time his ideas had been digested his method was already outdated. Kant was unable to pose the question of critique in terms of value. Value, as we have seen was placed above truth and knowledge. On this basis, an immanent critique should ask; what is the value of values? But is this a legitimate question? For Deleuze, the question presents the same problem as it did above for Kant, i.e. it presupposes transcendental conditions, which are not appropriate for Nietzsche’s immanent philosophy: ‘Transcendental principles are principles of conditioning and not of internal genesis’ (Deleuze G., 2006, p. 91). It is possible that Deleuze has in mind a comment that Nietzsche makes in his notes; 'Man projects his drive to truth, his “goal” in a certain sense, outside himself as a world that has being, as a metaphysical world, as “thing-in-itself,” as a world already in existence’ (NLN: 9[91] / WP: 552). In this sense, transcendental principles require the positioning of reason at the peak of the hierarchical structure of consciousness. Under these conditions, Kant was right; however, as we shall see in Part 3 ‘Nietzsche’s System of Psychology’, Nietzsche does not consider reason as an independent faculty, that is, independent from the physiological foundation of the body. Therefore, Nietzsche (as a philosopher of immanence) must seek an alternative critical angle and as Deleuze states:

This is why Nietzsche, in this domain as in others, thinks that he has found the only possible principle of a total critique in what he calls his “perspectivism”: there are no moral facts or phenomena, but only moral interpretation of phenomena; there are no illusions of knowledge, but knowledge itself is only an illusion, knowledge is an error, or worse, a falsification. (Deleuze G., 2006, p. 90)

From this new critical position, Nietzsche reformulated traditional metaphysics from ‘discovery’ to a ‘creative’ act. Therefore, will to power was not discovered, but created: ‘an active determining – not a becoming conscious of something that is in itself firm and determined’ (NLN: 9[91] / WP: 552). Although this ‘active determining’ was realised five years after the first publication of The Gay Science, aphorisms 108-125 should be regarded as implicit to this later realisation. With this realisation in mind,
the philosopher of the future must accept the role of legislator, he must create new values, but this is not possible via transcendental philosophy:

“The idea of transcendental philosophy,” according to Kant, is to provide “universal knowledge” concerning the possibility of human cognition; universal knowledge “must have the character of inner necessity, independent of experience, being clear and certain before itself. (Krell, 1996, p. 11)

Instead, Nietzsche will propose a new method (later termed genealogy), one that includes the psychology of the philosopher.91

Genealogy thus functions in the Nietzschean text primarily as a method of deconstructive critique to uncover the significance of the affirmation of certain values within social praxis rather than as a tool for the acquisition of knowledge or the discovery of true descriptions regarding states of affairs. (Schrift, 1990, p. 173)

Nietzsche’s new method does not come into fruition until Book 5 of The Gay Science published in 1887, although aphorism 125 demonstrates his concern that man is unprepared and therefore unable to comprehend the dangerous future that awaits him. This is evident when the madman claims, ‘This deed is still more distant from them than the most distant stars—and yet they have done it to themselves’ (GS: 125),82 which indicates that the death of god ‘We have killed him—you and I’ (GS: 125) is a problem that concerns man’s future; however, in order to avoid European nihilism something must change in the present. Thus, both the madman and Nietzsche face the same problem of communicating a problem that, like the light of the stars, will not be known until it is too late. For Nietzsche, the ‘origin’ of consciousness is the necessity of communal existence and thus communication. Consciousness, it seems, is always of the herd. Thus when the ‘listeners’ first hear the message they ‘fall silent’ – they do not possess the ears to hear, nor the mouths to respond. Yet the madman does, which means that his task must become one of preparation.

Nietzsche describes how the capacity for communication had developed up to the point where it might be ‘squandered’. He refers to the ‘artists’ as the ‘heirs’ of such
squaderning and claims they are the ‘late born’, which indicates that they have ability to utilise the superfluity of language creatively. Thus, although consciousness, communication and language originate from the necessity of communal existence, and are limited by it, certain types (i.e., men of late culture – Epicurus born into late antiquity) can overcome these limitations and go beyond good and evil. In BGE: 200 Nietzsche claims that the ‘contrary drives and values which struggle with one another rarely leave one another in peace’, in this event two possibilities present themselves. On the one hand, Nietzsche claims; ‘such a man of late cultures and broken lights will, on average, be a rather weak man’. Within this bracket he places the ‘Epicurean or Christian’ and interestingly the madman (broken light seems applicable to the smashing of the lantern in GS: 125). Such a man, he claims, ‘desire that the war which he is should come to an end’, and in this respect they seek repose and tranquillity. On the other hand, there is another type, like Caesar and Da Vinci, whose internal war ‘acts as a stimulus and enticement to life’, such ‘incomprehensible and unfathomable men’ are, Nietzsche claims, ‘destined for victory and the seduction of others’. It is this type alone that Nietzsche finds ‘agreeable’ and in whom he rests his faith for the future.

To return to our discussion of consciousness and language we should observe that Nietzsche is making a similar claim to Democritus concerning the epiphenomenon. Although Nietzsche rejected Democritus’ conformist conclusions, he recognised epiphenomenalism as a condition of consciousness, which leads us to an important distinction. In Part 1, we found that Epicurus attempted to overcome the limitations of Democritus’ account (and Aristotle’s criticisms of it) by introducing the atomic swerve. As a result, Epicurus leant heavily upon ‘feelings’ as an interlocutor between epiphenomenon and volition. Robin Small (2001) suggests that having read Dumont’s treatise Vergnügen und Schmerz (1876), Nietzsche was aware of what Dumont considered the ‘Epicurean’ view:

[...] pain arises from obstacles from the satisfaction of our wishes and that pleasure is the overcoming of such obstacles. Hence pleasure is always bound up with pain’ and accordingly, avoiding pain is more important than achieving pleasure. (Small, 2001, p. 167)
Small argues that in his later works (of which Book 5 of The Gay Science may be considered) Nietzsche developed his own theory of pleasure and pain under the influence of Dumont:

[...] he [Nietzsche] agrees that pleasure and pain are not primary facts of consciousness but only epiphenomena. Hence the absurdities of those philosophies, such as hedonism and utilitarianism, which take pleasure and pain as their standard for evaluating the world [...] And because they are only epiphenomena, Nietzsche concludes that pleasure and pain are not motives for action. (Small, 2001, p. 166)

Small argues that Nietzsche disagrees with Dumont’s conclusion and sides with Jerome Cardan who, ‘suggested that we must seek out what causes pain, in order to gain greater pleasure by overcoming it’ (Small, 2001, p. 167). As a result, Small concludes that Nietzsche:

[...] is prepared not only to admit the interdependence of pleasure and pain, but to go further, questioning whether they are really distinct, let alone opposites. Pleasure may be a series of small pains, he suggests, a ‘game of resistance and victory’. (Small, 2001, pp. 166-167)

Although Nietzsche rejects Epicurus’ theory which holds feelings to be an interlocutor between epiphenomenon and volition, he recognised (as Small argues) that pleasure and pain are dependent on one another (as Epicurus did), placing the emphasis on pain above pleasure, which is particularly relevant to Epicurus’ conception of *aponia*. Having said this we must also consider what Nietzsche says about those who, like Schopenhauer, have ‘never even attempted an analysis of the will because, like everybody else, he had faith in the simplicity and immediacy of all willing – while willing is actually a mechanism that is so well practiced that it all but escapes the observer’s eye’ (GS: 127). He argues that there are three consequences to such thinking. I) “For will to come into being an idea of pleasure and displeasure is needed”. II) Such a ‘stimulus’ is interpreted below the level of consciousness. III) Only in ‘intellectual’ beings are ‘pleasure, displeasure and will to be found’.88 Nietzsche’s analysis of willing confirms our initial reading in Part 2 ‘Illusory Homogeneity of the Will’ where we found that ‘feelings’ cannot be granted autonomy, rather they are i) inherited and ii) are an affect of our bodily drives.
Consequently, we must consider ‘feelings’ to represent a particular epiphenomenal state that will (in his later works) become conducive to his theory of will to power. Kaufmann confirms this reading as follows:

Briefly stated, Nietzsche claims not only that the feeling of pleasure is an epiphenomenon of the possession of power, but also that the striving for pleasure is, similarly, an epiphenomenon of the will to power which, in turn, is independent of consciousness. (Kaufmann W, 1974, p. 262)

One of the greatest mistakes that Nietzsche believes has plagued humanity is the overriding belief in the autonomy of consciousness, i.e. free will. This is one of the reasons why he held Democritus in such high esteem, because he denied the sovereignty of consciousness. On the other hand, Epicurus (perhaps in response to Aristotle) resubmitted willing under the guidance of ‘feelings’, and therefore inverted the formula of Democritus that Nietzsche favoured. Volition (for Epicurus) is guided by feelings; ‘Pleasure is congenial to our nature, while pain is hostile to it’ (DL. 10, 034). For Nietzsche, Epicurus mistakenly assumed human consciousness to be above that of animals and in doing so confirmed a false order of rank. This is confirmed in the GS: 115 ‘The four errors’, where he claims that man, ‘placed himself in a false order of rank in relation to animals and nature’. This is also confirmed in Twilight ‘The Four Great Errors’. Bernstein comments:

That a large number of philosophers and theologians have defended free will in order to defend responsibility, and responsibility partly in order to defend judgement, positive or negative, cannot be denied. Even Epicurus, no lover of priests and normally treated very gently by Nietzsche as an antithesis, if hardly the best antithesis, to slave-morality, exhibits this. (Bernstein, 1987, p. 77)

It is possible that Nietzsche had in mind Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus (see D.L. X. 134-135), in which Epicurus rejected fatalism by maintaining the necessity of chance. In Part 1, ‘The Atomic Swerve: The Problem of Determinism’, we found a number of problems concerning Epicurus’ attempt to overcome determinism. In Daybreak, Nietzsche claims that; ‘the space between knowledge and action has never been bridged even in one single instance? Actions are never what they appear to us to be’ (D: 116). In respect to Epicurus this means that he had inadvertently placed the
mind above the body in the order of rank (ataraxia as the goal, aponia as the means) as the basis for his moral hedonism. In his notes Nietzsche claims that; ‘Epicurus denied the possibility of knowledge, in order to retain moral (or hedonistic) values as the highest values’ (WP: 578). This is a reference to Epicurus’ rejection of universal laws (see Part I; ‘Method of Inference’), and along with them the possibility of a created universe, governed by regularities. Accordingly, knowledge is secondary to the attainment of ataraxia. In another note Nietzsche claims:

The “predominance of suffering over pleasure” or the opposite (hedonism): these two doctrines are already signposts to nihilism. For in both of these cases no ultimate meaning is posited except the appearance of pleasure or displeasure. (WP: 35)

Sensualist accounts are, for Nietzsche, nihilistic because they involve a withdrawal from life – this is confirmation of Epicurus’ weakness as a man of ‘late culture’ in BGE: 200. This is fundamentally the basis upon which Nietzsche rejects Epicurus’ philosophy of immanence. Although Epicurus was able to posit the world without the necessity of divine providence, he was unable to overcome the shadow of the gods. Allison claims:

[...] the death of God is the greatest event in history; it is the beginning of a resolutely autonomous human history as such. No longer are we but a dim reflection or a “moving image” of eternity. With the death of God, we have fallen into time. (Allison D. B., 2001, p. 103)

The death of god marks a crucial transition not only in Nietzsche’s thinking but more generally within the history of philosophy. With it we find that the ‘opposition between human and divine, between immanence and transcendence, not to speak of the opposition between what is absolute and what is historical or relative’ collapses (Allison D. B., 2001, p. 103). In this respect our understanding and experience of the world has changed because man no longer has recourse to eternity. And although this is a positive realisation for Nietzsche, he forecasts that without God and optimistic horizons the majority of humanity will plummet into a state of crisis.
We have now covered some of the major problems that Nietzsche believes will prevent man from liberating himself from ‘the shadow of God’. These include; the de-deification of nature, an introduction to Nietzsche’s critique of reason, the task of the madman, the problem of knowledge and incorporation, the problem of logical inferences, science as perpetuating the shadow of god, the horizon of the infinite, the incorporation of the philosopher’s psychology, the problem of untimeliness and its relation to immanence as a problem of crystallisation and epiphenomenal consciousness. The length of this list demonstrates that ‘death of God’ as the basis of Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence raises as many questions as it answers. Yet there has been little research which investigates Nietzsche’s immanent account, and none which links Epicurus to Nietzsche through immanence. In the following section I will bring together the references to Epicurus in Book 4 to demonstrate the influence of Epicurus.

**Book 4 of The Gay Science: A New Approach to Cheerfulness**

The title of Book 4, *Sanctus Januarius* indicates a new approach and a refreshed Nietzsche. The title is a play on the miracle of St. Januarius whereby a vial containing the blood of St. Januarius is displayed on feast day revealing its transformation from a coagulated solid into liquid form. This represents the transformation that Nietzsche underwent because of his new passion for life which he experienced through *Amor fati*.

GS: 277 contains Nietzsche’s second reference to Epicurus in *The Gay Science*. Book 3 can be read as a demonstration of how to recognise ‘the shadow of god’ and how, through the process of tragic/comic enlightenment, to disperse this shadow. However, given this new freedom, Nietzsche claims that we remain on the verge of ‘the greatest danger [...] spiritual unfreedom’ (GS: 277). The problem is almost identical to the one that faced Epicurus following his rejection of the logic of divine providence. For Nietzsche, once God’s authority is abandoned, man is raised to the level of the God. From this viewpoint, all events ‘appear’ as though they happened for us – a spellbinding worldview that is characteristic of humanity’s egotism. Nietzsche regards this as a dangerous way of thinking because such a feeling of glorified self may well lead back to the belief in a ‘petty deity’ (the Christian God).
who cares and serves us (a modern example of this would be Christians who interpret evolution as ‘God’s plan’). Such a transition is synonymous with the incorporation of Epicureanism into Christianity following the latter’s victory following Paul’s conversion (see AC: 58).

In the final paragraph of GS: 277, Nietzsche draws a line under such alluring misconceptions which overlook ‘our own practical and theoretical skills’ such as logic and the application of cause. Interestingly, he introduces chance for only the fourth time in the entire book. Having discussed the role of the swerve in Part 1, it is no coincidence that he introduces chance immediately following his reference to Epicurus. But whereas Epicurus introduced the swerve to reject the determinist conclusion that Democritus proposed, Nietzsche introduces chance (on this occasion) to mean something very different. He explains that; ‘now and then chance guides our hand, and with the wisest providence could not think up a more beautiful music than that which our foolish hand produces then’ (GS: 277). This implies that man is a medium through which the forces that constitute him express themselves. Such a reading is confirmed in EH: Z, 3, where Nietzsche discusses ‘inspiration’ as a kind of reward feeling for expressing in language ‘all becoming’ which ‘wants to learn speech from you’. In this sense the Epicurean swerve detracts from the ‘beautiful music’ that is expressed through the body. Thus, personal providence presents us with the problem of ‘spiritual unfreedom’, that is to say, the rejection of the forces that constitute man. For Nietzsche, this meant that ‘we still have to pass our hardest test’, which we should understand as the problems of incorporation.

Aside from this reading of GS: 277, in ‘Under Epicurean Skies’, Howard Caygill discusses the significance of Nietzsche’s passing reference to the weather in GS: 277:

The seemingly casual reference to weather in Aphorism 277 forms part of a broad and systematic mobilisation of meteorology throughout the writings of Nietzsche, one so ubiquitous as to become nigh invisible, part of the climate of his thought. (Caygill, Under Epicurean Skies, 2006, p. 108)

He also claims that, ‘Nietzsche mobilised Epicurus as part of his own attacks on Platonism and Christianity’ (op. cit.). This is exactly what Nietzsche does and it highlights Nietzsche’s use of the Epicurean mask.
Section 278 may also be an allusion to Epicurus. In (GS: 278) ‘The thought of death’, Nietzsche finds that the thought of death stands like a shadow behind man and that in an attempt to flee this shadow, man grasps towards the future in which death is the only certainty. For Nietzsche, this paradoxical state highlights the futility that thinking about death brings. Part 1 found that death for Epicurus and Lucretius is a central theme, and although they taught that death should not be feared, as part of the tetrapharmakon it remained one of the most immediate thoughts that the Epicurean should bring to mind during times of tumult; as such, the thought of death remained a constant in the minds of the Epicureans. For Nietzsche however, any thought of death should be dispelled and replaced with something that would make the thought of life even ‘a hundred times more appealing to them’ (GS: 278). The contrast is clear, we should take it as an indication that the ‘greatest danger [...] of spiritual unfreedom’ (GS: 277) cannot be overcome by following and adhering to the tetrapharmakon, which for Nietzsche is an intellectual device designed for those who suffer from an impoverishment of life. Rather, the free spirit, must follow the ‘Yes-sayers’ motto of Amor fati.

Following this, the next reference to Epicurus is in GS: 306 ‘Stoics and Epicureans’. Here Nietzsche proposes that the type ‘Stoic’ and ‘Epicurean’ can be defined by their physiological constitution, particularly in reference to digestion:

The Epicurean selects the situation, the persons, and even the events that suit his extremely irritable, intellectual constitution; he gives up all others, which means almost everything, because they would be too strong and heavy to digest. (GS: 306)

This is an allusion to the problem of incorporation in terms of the internal war which now constitutes man (see Part 2: ‘Book 3 of The Gay Science: The Problem of the Incorporation of Truth’). As we found above, incorporation is a problem of digestion. The man of late culture, i.e. Epicurus (like the Christian and the madman) is unable to affirm Dionysian Joy and thereby finds solace by withdrawing into the garden. The Stoic, on the other hand has a solid constitution; he, ‘trains himself to swallow stones and worms, slivers of glass and scorpions without nausea’. Nietzsche advocates Stoicism to those whose lives involve change and danger; they require a solid constitution to quickly process life. However, for the Epicurean, such mercurialness would be a disaster ‘for those whose work is of the spirit’ because they need their
‘subtle irritability’ in order to fulfil their function as artists (i.e., the ‘squanderers’ from GS: 125).

There are no more references to Epicurus in the first edition of The Gay Science; however, in order to provide an accurate picture of the development of Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence we cannot bypass sections, 340, 341 and 342 because it is here that the full ramifications of immanence are exhibited. In GS: 340, Nietzsche demonstrates his admiration for Socrates. Paul Loeb offers a fruitful interpretation of this section. He argues that unlike Plato’s account of death in the ‘Phaedo’ (80a-81c), Nietzsche’s exegesis of Socrates’ death is revealed in his famous last words, ‘O Crito, I owe Asclepius a rooster’. Loeb argues:

It was thus a veiled expression of Socrates’ last judgement and inmost feeling that life was an illness which he hoped death would cure. Socrates, he [Nietzsche] writes, had concealed his pessimism from everyone all his life under a cheerful disposition – until something loosened his tongue at the moment of death and caused him to take his revenge in this way for the suffering which life had inflicted on him. (Loeb, 2010, pp. 35-6)

Thus, the dying Socrates avenges his imminent death by revealing his deep pessimism through the removal of his cheerfulness mask. This is confirmed, as Loeb suggests, in Twilight, where Socrates had ‘courageously given himself the cup of poison by forcing Athens to give it to him’ (2010, p. 36). Loeb concludes; ‘Socrates’ last word, Nietzsche speculates, was therefore a coded insight that death alone might be a physician for Socrates’ own illness’ (op. cit.). For Nietzsche, there is a concealed pessimism masked by a charade of ‘cheerfulness’. The mask of cheerfulness is a theme that Nietzsche develops after the first publication of The Gay Science. On the one hand it is a tool used to deceive (BGE: 270), while on the other hand Nietzsche uses ‘cheerfulness’ as a hybrid concept – (see Part 2 ‘The foundation of Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Immanence’ & ‘Nietzsche and Greek Materialism’) in the most positive life-affirming sense (GS: 343).

Section 341 ‘The Greatest Weight’, is another crucial section because it is here that Nietzsche elaborates on his doctrine of the eternal return that he alluded to in GS: 109 and GS: 285. In these sections Nietzsche planned to “naturalize” humanity in terms of a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature [...]’. In this early
formulation, the Greatest Weight is a purely ethical signification. Nietzsche believes that there are two possible outcomes to the thought of the eternal return: ‘would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus?’ Or, respond affirmatively; “You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine” (GS: 341). With the death of god, European morality no longer revolves around man as God’s greatest creation. The image of weight symbolises this displacement; man can either be crushed by this weight and fall headfirst into European nihilism, or he can affirm his new role through the yes-saying of Amor fati.

Keith Ansell-Pearson explains that; ‘The new teaching of the eternal return seeks to provide a new centre of gravity focused on the immanent conditions and form of our life’ (2005, p. 74). These ‘immanent conditions’ are based upon a radical alternative to the transcendent conditions that have, until now, steered the course of European morality – particularly Christian morality. Thus, the ‘reaching beyond’ that happened as a result of ‘otherworldly’ values proposed by Socrates and developed throughout the Christian tradition must be rejected and in favour of ‘earthy values’. Whereas for Socrates death was the only remedy to the suffering inherent to life, the eternal return becomes, for Nietzsche, ‘the hope for health and the intoxication of convalescence’ (GS: Preface 2nd ed. 1).

In the thought of the eternal return, Nietzsche describes how he has found a ‘reawakened faith in tomorrow and the day after tomorrow’, a faith that should not be confused with the ‘reaching beyond’ that we found in GS: 278 but the affirmation of ‘this world’ as the only solution to the problem of nihilism.99 This theme is developed in GS: 342 where Zarathustra is introduced for the first time in Nietzsche’s published works. It is worth noting that in the original publication of The Gay Science, section 342 marked the end of the book and in this respect Nietzsche considered it to be, ‘the opening of Zarathustra itself’ (EH: Zarathustra, 1).100 The title to GS: 342 ‘Incipit tragoedia’, was revisited by Nietzsche in the Preface for the second edition. Here the emphasis is redirected to incipit parodia because Nietzsche felt that the meaning of Zarathustra was missed. Zarathustra is a parody of Zoroaster and the religion which created the standard from which the judgment of ascension or damnation is made. The analogy of weight (see above) is a play on this: too heavy (i.e., relating to the balance of one’s life in terms of good and evil) and you will fall into the abyss. If on the other hand, the balance tips in your favour, you will ascend.101 Yet Zarathustra, who no longer lives under the shadow of God, finds that the moral judgements such
as good and evil are meaningless given the realisation of the death of God. Thus Zarathustra parodies Zoroaster by replacing his transcendent values with immanent values, i.e. values that are generated from and consistent with the will to power and the thought of the eternal return.\textsuperscript{102}

Zarathustra commences in a pagan tone by paying homage to the sun, its eternal cycle overflowing blessedness. The image of abundance represents the overflowing of knowledge that Zarathustra experiences – a transfigured knowledge which he must expel ‘to become man again’. Yet like the sun, Zarathustra must descend, ‘Like you I must go under’ he cries. The image of going under to go over is crucial, it represents the conditions of overcoming, i.e. ‘[the] immanent conditions and form of our life’ (Ansell-Pearson K., How to read Nietzsche, 2005, p. 74). These conditions are necessary for the creation of new ideals (ascent), which remain true to the earth (Z: P, 3). However, for this to happen, God and otherworldliness (i.e., transcendence) must be rejected and the ‘shadow of God’ (i.e., transcendent conditions) must be vanquished. In Zarathustra, this overcoming forms part of Zarathustra’s metamorphosis as ‘rebirth’. In the The Gay Science however, such a metamorphosis awaits like the light of a distant star; before this light can be seen and ‘known’ Zarathustra must go down and destroy the old ideals, only then can the new ideals be formed and sealed, only then can Nietzsche fulfil his wish to be a ‘Yes-sayer’ (GS: 276). It should be noted that the last few sections, although not about Epicurus, respond to the problem of divine providence and the fear of death. It is interesting to note that the image of weight and gravity is also used by Lucretius. Segal (1990) summarises the argument as follows: ‘Lucretius [...] utilizes] the language of the traditional funeral prayer; “May the earth lie light upon you,” as well as drawing upon the moralizing rhetoric of Epicureans and Cynics. But the feeling of physical weight also stands in close relation to the psychological oppression of anxious thoughts (Segal, p. 165). Crucially, however, weight for the Epicurean represents the anxieties associated with belief in the providence of the gods and the fear of death. As a result, the individual is faced with a choice; he or she can either reject divine providence and pursue the blessed life, or accept divine providence and continue to live in fear; whereas for Nietzsche and modern man, the death of God has exposed the Epicurean model of repose to be a meaningless pursuit because there are no gods to emulate. Therefore, for Nietzsche, the problem has fundamentally
changed and the weight that now oppresses the modern European concerns the decision between nihilism or the eternal return.

**Book 5 of The Gay Science: Unmasking Epicurus**

Published in 1887, following the publications of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and *Beyond Good and Evil*, Book 5 begins ‘fearlessly’. In the first section ‘The meaning of our cheerfulness’, Nietzsche explains that, ‘belief in the Christian god has become unbelievable’ (GS: 343). The event of the death of god has arrived and the shadow cast by it is beginning to form over Europe. Yet Nietzsche claims that we wait ‘on the mountains’ which is the closest point to the stars where Nietzsche and his disciples can be the first to see their light. Furthermore, as the ‘firstlings and premature births of the coming century’ Nietzsche’s time and that of his disciples (i.e., the free spirits) is of ‘today and tomorrow’, unlike the late born, who cling to the past and represent the climax and decline of a culture. Nietzsche asks; ‘why is it that even we look forward to the approaching gloom without any real sense of involvement and above all without any worry and fear for ourselves?’ (op. cit.). Here Nietzsche is wearing the mask of the Epicurean gods who are unconcerned with human affairs. Nietzsche proposes that, unlike the rest of European men, the free spirit has incorporated Zarathustra’s message. This means that the free spirit has overcome the prospect of European nihilism by setting himself a new goal in preparation of the Overman as the immanent ideal. As we shall see in Part 3 ‘The Three Transformations’, the free spirit is able to conceive of ‘a new kind of philosophical practice conceived as the art of transfiguration’ (Ansell-Pearson K., 2005, p. 85). This will require the transformation of the ‘spirit’ for the creation of new values.

The ‘meaning of our cheerfulness’ relates directly to the perspective of the Epicurean gods alluded to above and the task that awaits the free spirit. In Part 3, it will be argued that the ‘task’ is such that it can only be recognised by the type who seeks danger rather than safety in repose. Thus, the Epicureans along with the Christians are excluded from Nietzsche’s vision of the future. The free spirit is defined by the internal struggle specific to their type. In this sense we must recognise
Nietzsche’s inclusion of the ‘dynamic equilibrium’ proposed by Democritus. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s conception of cheerfulness articulated in *The Gay Science* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is fundamental for the attainment of ‘great health’ (GS: 382). However, this is not a health that cannot endure eternally (as the health of the Epicurean gods does), rather it is ‘the great health – that one does not merely have but also acquires continually, and must acquire because one gives it up again and again, and must give it up’ (GS: 382). In this respect ‘Great health’, in its fleetingness, is similar to health for Epicurus because it can only be achieved temporarily, such is the condition of *aponia* and *ataraxia*. For Nietzsche, the idea of non-disturbance contradicts man’s the most basic of drives expressed in feelings as the affectivity of command (i.e., this increase in the feeling of power). As a result health for Nietzsche cannot be integrated with health for Epicurus, although in *Beyond Good and Evil* there is evidence to suggest that the tension of spirit that now constitutes man (i.e., following Christianity) was born from the historical tension that developed from Epicurus’ war on Plato:

To be sure, to speak of spirit and the good as Plato did meant standing truth on her head and denying perspective itself, the basic condition of all life [...] But the struggle against Plato, or, to express it more plainly and for ‘the people’, the struggle against the Christian-ecclesiastical pressure of millennia – for Christianity is the Platonism for ‘the people’ – has created in Europe a magnificent tension of the spirit such has never existed on earth before: so with this tense bow we can now shoot for the most distant targets. (BGE: Preface)

This suggests that man’s dualistic nature (i.e., tension of spirit) occurred after Epicurus’ and Lucretius’ reign. In *The Anti-Christ*, Nietzsche claims:

One must read Lucretius to understand what it was Epicurus opposed: not paganism but ‘Christianity’. Which is to say corruption of souls through the concept of guilt, punishment and immorality. – He opposed the subterranean cults, the whole latent Christianity – to deny immorality was already in those days a real redemption. – And Epicurus would have won, every mind of any account in the Roman Empire was an Epicurean: *then Paul appeared.* ... (AC: 58)
We must be careful not to apply the problems of the modern European (as Nietzsche sees them) to Epicurus because, as we found at the end of the previous section, the problems that confronted the man of late antiquity are not the same problems that face the modern European. It is highly probable that Nietzsche used tranquillity variably. This is evident in *Zarathustra*: ‘At Noontide’, when ‘the wanderer’ who experiences the desire to quench his thirst ‘experiences a greater desire to do something else, ‘to lie down beside the tree at the hour of perfect noon and sleep’ (Z: 4, 10). It is important that we recognise the moment of ‘noontide’ as the cessation of desire in the Augenblick. This is the same for Epicurus and Lucretius as we found in the discussion of ‘Desire’ (see Part 1). However, it is clear that Epicurean health is rejected by Nietzsche because it is fundamentally unsustainable. In fact Nietzsche takes Epicurus’ notion of health and uses it to make a distinction concerning types. This is evident in GS: 370: Here Nietzsche recognises that ‘philosophical pessimism’ and ‘German music’ share the ‘distinctive character’ which is ‘their romanticism’. From this basis he makes the following observation; ‘What is romanticism? – Every art, every philosophy may be viewed as a remedy and an aid in the service of growing and struggling life; they always presuppose suffering and sufferers’ (GS: 370). He continues by making a crucial distinction between, i) ‘those who suffer from the overfulness of life’ – the tragic art of the Dionysian, and, ii) ‘those who suffer from the impoverishment of life and seek rest, stillness, calm seas [...]’. This distinction is fundamental to Nietzsche’s later writings and for our purpose we should take this as the moment when Nietzsche’s affinity to Epicurus is abandoned.

The sufferers of ‘over-fulness’, Nietzsche claims, are the ‘Dionysian god and man’. We should take this as the affectivity of the death of God: Man rose to the level of God following God’s murder (GS: 125) and with the ‘tragic outlook’ he poses a ‘pessimism of strength’ which is a prerequisite for the ‘total affirmation of the world’ (Benson B., 2008, p. 192). The Dionysian, ‘cannot only afford the sight of the terrible and questionable but even the terrible deed and any luxury of destruction, decomposition and negation’ (GS: 370). Thus, destruction is a positive endeavour; ‘it rids us of two millennia of withered pieties, of sanctimonious shrouds’ (Allison D. B., 2001, p. 106). Overfulness is the outpouring of this creative desire. In ‘At Noontide’, we find Zarathustra willing himself to wake from his sleep, ‘Up! (he says to himself) up, sleeper! [...] you have still a long way to go’ (Z: 4, 10). The time for the Dionysian
waits, continually in the future. As Vincenzo suggests; the Augenblick collapses the man / nature divide, yet this divide is not abandoned by Zarathustra when he awakens. Rather, he awakens transformed with the Dionysian view of nature – the world appears immanently for Zarathustra. Allison observes:

[...] it is not so much a question of projecting ourselves onto the world from without, as if we, once again, were claiming hegemony over it. Rather, it is quite the reverse; it would be as if nature, world, history, and humanity became us, became transformed and included-introjected into our history, as if they constituted precisely what we are! All this unfolds itself through us (Allison D. B., 2001, pp. 107-8).

In contrast to those who suffer from ‘pessimism of strength’, the sufferer of ‘impoverishment of life’, whom Nietzsche claims, ‘suffer most’ (GS: 370) require above all:

[...] mildness, peacefulness, and goodness’ [...] also a god who would be truly a god for the sick, a healer and a saviour; also logic, the conceptual understandability of existence – for logic calms and gives confidence – in short, a certain warm narrowness that keeps fear and encloses one in optimistic horizons. (GS: 370)

There are two important images here. Firstly, the notion of logic which applies to Epicurus. It is highly plausible that Nietzsche has in mind the fourfold cure (tetrapharmakon) found at the beginning of his letter to Menoeceus (see Part 1, ‘Blessedness’). Epicurus instructed his disciples to:

Practice these and the related precepts day and night, by yourself and with a like-minded friend, and you will never be disturbed either when awake or in sleep, and you will live as a god among men. (DL. 10, 134)

Thus, when Epicurus identified the basic parameters of existence in his canonic (sensation, preconceptions and feelings\textsuperscript{107}) this confirmed Nietzsche’s analysis of Epicurus as the ‘soul soother of late antiquity’ (WS: 7) who, unable to affirm the tragic, seeks to soothe the man of broken lights and late culture by nullifying his internal war through repose. Secondly, the garden is no longer seen by Nietzsche as before (i.e., as a place of convalescence).\textsuperscript{108} Instead, by the time Book 5 of The Gay
Science was written, the garden represents a container of ‘fear and encloses one in optimistic horizons’, which as we shall see, is a denial of Dionysian Pessimism (GS: 370).

In *Nietzsche Contra Wagner*, Nietzsche describes the impoverished type as wanting: ‘Revenge against life itself—the most voluptuous kind of frenzy for those so impoverished!’ (NCW: 66). Earlier in *The Gay Science*, when describing Epicurus, Nietzsche claimed: ‘Never before has voluptuousness been so modest’ (GS: 54). Thus, the compliment of ‘modesty’ is transformed into a critique of impoverishment. No longer does Nietzsche share the, ‘outlook of the complete, genuine Epicurus’ (Nietzsche F., *The Gay Science*, 1974, p. 110. fn37). This is confirmed in GS: 370 by the claim, ‘also the “Christian” who is actually only a kind of Epicurean—both are essentially romantics’. In *Nietzsche Contra Wagner* (which is almost identical apart from the following amendment), Nietzsche continues, ‘and who, with his belief that “faith saves,” carries the principle of Hedonism as far as possible—far beyond all intellectual honesty…. ’ (NCW: 67). Thus, the Christian and Epicurean doctrines share a mutual propensity for ‘remedy’ as an ‘aid’ to the sick, ‘in the growing service of struggling life’ (GS: 370). For Nietzsche, this impoverished mode of life masks itself in ‘optimistic horizons’, thereby protecting and sustaining itself to the detriment of a healthier and stronger type. Once Nietzsche makes this realisation, his admiration for Epicurus quickly dissolves and he turns his critical eye to Epicurus’ methods. This begins with a critique of the Epicurean method of inference. Crucially however, Nietzsche does not reject Epicurus’ inferences outright; rather he specifically highlights the problematic nature of ‘backward inferences’. This is an important distinction because if Nietzsche were to reject inferences altogether then the inferences he makes concerning the will to power would also become questionable. Rather, the point is that aesthetic values are prejudicial because they infer from the wrong direction, i.e. ‘from the work to the maker, from the deed to the doer’ (GS: 370). This is akin to the problem raised earlier concerning personal providence (see GS: 277) in which all events look as if they have happened for us. Nietzsche is claiming that when we make ‘backward inferences’, we are effectively creating a causal relation where there is none. Furthermore, these connections are rewarded with a glorified sense of self, which in Part 3 ‘Nietzsche’s System of Psychology’ we will find is crucial for the ‘spirit’ will to mastery. Nevertheless, what is interesting is that Nietzsche admits that he fell victim to the ‘capricious form of
backward inferences in which most mistakes are made’ (GS: 370). This suggests that his previous evaluations of Epicurus were incorrect and his kinship towards Epicurus was built upon an error.

Once Nietzsche realises this mistake he immediately seeks to rectify it by proposing a new mode of interpretation. Here Nietzsche provides an informative account of pessimism in the attempt to demonstrate that all modes of human life must be understood in relation to suffering, which should be taken as an indication that will to power is experienced most immediately in the affective state of suffering. In this respect, Epicureans and the Christians, in their propensity to enclose themselves in ‘optimistic horizons’, must deny the reality that confronts them; he names this Dionysian Pessimism. In place of his old method of evaluation (i.e., backward inferences) Nietzsche introduces a new method that begins by asking the following question; ‘is it hunger or superabundance that is creative here?’ (GS: 370). In the case of Epicurus and the Christian, Nietzsche finds that impoverishment (or hunger) is the creative drive, which finds expression in the ‘desire to fix, to immortalize’ (op. cit.); whereas, the creative drive for superabundance is expressed in the need for destruction, which requires a dual interpretation. Firstly, as is the case with the ‘Dionysian’, as ‘an overflowing energy that is pregnant with future’, which encompasses the prospect of Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence. Secondly, through ‘hatred’ and the desire for destruction that is expressed by the ‘anarchist’ who is ‘outraged’ at all ‘being’ (op. cit.) Further to his analysis of the Epicurean (and the Christian), Nietzsche claims that yet another dual interpretation can be made. On the one hand the will to immortalise can find expression in ‘gratitude and love’, which is the case of an art of ‘apotheosis’. Alternatively the will to immortalise can be expressed in a tyrannical will, which Nietzsche believes was the case for Schopenhauer’s philosophy of will and Wagner’s music who he classifies as romantic pessimists. Finally, Nietzsche claims that another kind of pessimism is possible: ‘pessimism of the future’ – ‘Dionysian pessimism’ (op. cit.) a type that Nietzsche calls his own.

In addition to this reading of GS: 370, Howard Caygill discusses the ambivalent nature of Nietzsche’s thought concerning, on the one hand; Epicurus and Christianity, and on the other; Epicurus and Dionysus. His analysis runs as follows:
[...] perhaps there is more to Nietzsche’s ambivalence with respect to Epicurus than the deliberately anachronistic question of his pre- and anti-Christianity. For Epicurus is also in an ambivalent relationship with Dionysus: he is the “opposite of a Dionysian pessimist” in offering consolation for suffering but also, like Dionysus, is able to transfigure existence. (Caygill, Under Epicurean Skies, 2006, p. 109)

In respect to Epicurus and Dionysus, the moment of transfiguration that Caygill refers to is evident in The Wanderer and his Shadow ‘Et in Arcadia ego’ and Zarathustra ‘At Noontide’ (although Caygill does not make the latter link). Both Nietzsche and Zarathustra experience transfiguration as the perfect moment in which:

All striving ceases [...] Thus the transformation is accomplished in the moment of timeless time [...] but it is also the nuclear difference of past and future, becoming itself. (Burnham & Jesinghausen, 2010, pp. 180-1)

However, as Burnham and Jesinghausen observe, ‘Nietzsche thinks of this moment as one in which humanity is taking charge of itself for the first time in history: finally we are taking “fate into our own hands”’ (2010, p. 10). We can take from this that Nietzsche’s contemplation of Epicurus aided his own transfiguration. For Caygill, Epicurus’ bust, ‘was for him [Nietzsche] a herm, facing both ways’ (2006, p. 109). This reading confirms Burnham and Jesinghausen’s observation that the moment of transfiguration marks the ‘nuclear difference of past and future, becoming itself’ (op. cit.), and on this basis Caygill concludes that Nietzsche’s Epicurus was, ‘not just the philosopher of the idyllic consolations of looking away from a world of suffering, but one who combined the idyll with heroic struggles of transfiguration’ (Caygill, 2006, p. 109).

In respect to Epicureanism and Christianity, Caygill aptly observes that when Nietzsche claimed the Christian ‘is only a kind of Epicurean’ (AC: 58), he based this claim on the ‘physiological realities’ set out in AC: 30. Here Nietzsche uses a subtle materialist metaphor: the atomistic duality of love and strife / attraction and repulsion, in order to reappropriate the Christian as a ‘kind of Epicurean’ (GS: 370). Nietzsche compares the ‘two physiological realities upon which, out of which the doctrine of redemption has grown’ (AC: 30). On the side of strife / repulsion, ‘Instinctive hatred of reality’, ‘no longer wants to be touched’ – presumably a
reference to Platonists; and on the other, love / attraction, rejection of resistance ‘as an unbearable displeasure […] and knows blessedness (pleasure) only in no longer resisting anyone or anything […] love as the sole, as the last possibility of life’ (AC: 30). Thus the Christian and the Epicurean share ‘the fear of pain, even the infinitely small in pain’, which ‘cannot end otherwise than in a religion of love...’ (AC: 30).

Epicurus stands in opposition to both the Christian and Dionysus whilst simultaneously uniting them. Caygill concludes:

Epicurus remains a “soul doctor,” a saviour figure himself afflicted with dearth and suffering. This Epicurus offers ways to live with suffering, while the other offers images of transfigured existence much closer, but not fully identical with Dionysian plethora. Viewed from both perspectives, Nietzsche’s Epicurus emerges as a distinct figure, encompassing and exceeding the opposition of Dionysus and the Crucified. (Caygill, Under Epicurean Skies, 2006, p. 109)

By highlighting Nietzsche’s ambivalence towards Epicurus, Caygill manages to manoeuvre the reader through the various aspects of Nietzsche’s Epicurus. However, because Caygill’s analysis focuses primarily upon Nietzsche’s ‘acceptance of Epicurean cosmology and its distinction between world and universe’ (Caygill, 2006, p. 107), his account is limited to Nietzsche’s kinship and does not therefore extend to Nietzsche’s rejection of Epicurus. I propose that Nietzsche’s rejection of Epicurus is vital if we are to understand Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence correctly. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s rejection of Epicureanism characterises his exclusivity within the history of philosophy. We have touched upon this point of departure briefly, which occurs at GS: 270. Crucially, it is only once Dionysus returns to Nietzsche’s text (which barely happens from The Birth of Tragedy until Book 5 of The Gay Science) that Epicurus falls under Nietzsche’s hammer. It is important to remember that the Augenblick is the moment of transfiguration, ‘the realignment of will to the nature of life’ (Burnham D., 2007, p. 217). This is the same experience that Nietzsche believed Epicurus’ blessed contemplation provided. However, while for both philosophers this moment is short lived, Epicurus proposed that the goal of life is to repeat this moment, thereby removing oneself from the linearity of time in an attempt to achieve repeated states of blessedness. While for Nietzsche the moment is surpassed, Zarathustra’s task is therefore greater than that of Epicurus’. This is made
clear in Zarathustra ‘At Noontide’ when following Zarathustra’s moment of transfiguration (experienced by Epicurus as the heroic-idyllic) Zarathustra tells himself to ‘Get up, you little thief, you lazybones’ (Z: 3, 10). In this respect Epicurus arrests the passage of time for Nietzsche because he fails to affirm life in all of its abysmal glory and seeks to soothe the sufferer through his ethics of repose. Ultimately this act is a refutation of Dionysian pessimism in favour of blessed contemplation. For Nietzsche, this is Epicurus’ great failing, and in the Genealogy, Nietzsche finally recognises Epicurus as a propagator of ‘the hypnotic feeling of nothingness, the tranquillity of deepest sleep’ (GM: 3, 17). This is a sign of décadence, born from the ‘impoverishment of life’ (GS: 370) that masks itself in Epicurus’ ethics.

In summary, we may claim that Epicurus’ philosophy of immanence achieved a certain amount of success in Nietzsche’s eyes in respect to the affirmation of the condition of the ‘body’. However it failed to affirm the world in all of its tragic glory. Above we found Caygill concluding that Epicurus’ Nietzsche was ‘the philosopher of the idyllic consolations of looking away from a world of suffering (Caygill, Under Epicurean Skies, 2006, p. 109). Yet, unlike Epicurus, Zarathustra cannot avoid the ‘intolerable burden’ of the past and present – he is; ‘A seer, a willer, a creator, a future itself and a bridge to the future’ (Z: 2, 20). For Nietzsche, man’s redemption lies in the possibility of self-overcoming; this is the heartbeat of Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence and the reason why Nietzsche describes Epicurus as the ‘soul soother of late antiquity’ (WS: 7). This reading is confirmed in the Genealogy when Nietzsche asks us to ‘listen to the tone, the suffering, the happiness, the gratitude’ of Schopenhauer’s writings (GM: 3, 6). Nietzsche directs us to Schopenhauer’s definition of Epicurean blessedness; ‘relieved of the base cravings of the will, we celebrate the Sabbath from the penal servitude of volition’ (op. cit.). The ‘prophet’ or ‘soothsayer’ from Zarathustra represents Schopenhauer as an Epicurean, i.e. the “Eternal Epicurus” ‘that lives at all times and is living now’ (WS: 227). In this respect, Nietzsche’s Epicurus is twofold. Firstly, he is the ‘heroic-idyllic mode of philosophizing’ (WS: 295), and secondly Epicurus represents the decadent who, like the Christian, ‘has an aversion to life’ and ‘prefers to will nothingness, than not will...’ (GM: 3, 28). Nietzsche must abandon Epicurus on this basis because his philosophy of immanence is one of overcoming, an overcoming that must, on the one hand, defeat the psychological need for transcendence, whilst simultaneously resisting the nihilistic character of immanence as an ethics of repose.
This marks the end of our discussion of Nietzsche’s Epicurus. Throughout Part 2, I have attempted to demonstrate that Epicurus had a profound influence upon Nietzsche’s thought, particularly during his early-middle period. Along the way we found that Nietzsche’s position on Epicurus is ambiguous because at times he idolised the master from Samos, whilst as a historical figure Nietzsche regarded Epicurus as the spokesperson of a life denying force. Through Nietzsche’s reading of Epicurus, I highlighted the limitations of Epicurus’ philosophy of immanence, which for Nietzsche, crumble under the strain of the ‘greatest weight’, which leads man to nihilism. Our next task is to investigate Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence following his rejection of Epicurus. This will further our understanding of immanence and Nietzsche’s philosophy as a whole.
1 The title of this chapter is representative of Nietzsche’s method of historical analysis. In Part 1: ‘Epicurus’ Philosophy of Immanence’, I demonstrated that, independent of Nietzsche, we can view Epicurus as one of the founding philosophers of immanence. To historicise Epicurus in this way is a positive endeavour because it provides the modern reader with a basis from which one can recognise the essential characteristics that Epicurus’ and Nietzsche philosophies of immanence share.

2 I will also demonstrate that Nietzsche rejects the materialist hypothesis on the basis that it failed to recognise the necessity that behind all Being lay an ontology of Becoming. For Nietzsche, the foundation of all existence is will to power; a theory of relations constituted by force alone. Therefore any conception of Being (i.e., of an enduring state of existence) must necessarily be derived from the primordial state of flux.

3 See Part 3, ‘The Spirit of Gravity’, where I develop this reading of cheerfulness in conjunction with Ansell-Pearson and Duncan Large’s notion of, ‘[...] the Overman is an immanent ideal ("the meaning of the earth")’ (2006, p. 250).

4 I will offer a critical examination of them where appropriate in Part 2.

5 Having grouped together all of the various references Nietzsche made to Epicurus (within his published works) it is possible to build a comprehensive and exhaustive account of Nietzsche’s Epicurus. However, it soon became apparent that the scope of such a project would reach far beyond the funds available in terms of time and word length. Like Kaufmann, I believe that a complete account of Nietzsche’s Epicurus would be highly beneficial to Nietzsche studies; however such an endeavour remains.

6 This is its first occurrence within Nietzsche’s published works.

7 For the moment, we should regard incorporation as Ansell-Pearson initially does; ‘Like the English word incorporation, Einverleibung means literally taking into the body, and on the level of human existence it denotes the complex practice of spiritual ingestion’ (Ansell-Pearson K., 2006, p. 235). However, it should also be noted that once we have a better understanding of Nietzsche’s conception of the spirit (Geist), we will find that the problem of incorporation must be redefined.

9 This statement will be explained in detain in Part 2, ‘Consciousness & Communication’.
10 Such an analysis can be found in Lange’s *The History of Materialism*. See Chapter III, ‘The Reaction Against Materialism and Sensationalism: Sokrates, Plato and Aristotle’ (pp. 53-93).

11 In [Nietzsche F., *Daybreak: Thoughts on the prejudice of morality*, 2011, p. ix] Hollingdale introduces Nietzsche’s concern with the philological tradition: ‘[...] Nietzsche was always ill-at-ease with the narrow academic horizons of professional philology. He sought to do more that solve mere scholarly “puzzles”; he wanted to connect the study of classical civilization to his far more pressing concern with the state of contemporary German culture. It was this project the he undertook in *The Birth of Tragedy*, a book that was, not surprisingly, poorly received by his academic peers.’

12 Nietzsche uses this strange notion of *daimon* again when he introduces Zarathustra at the end of Book IV of the ‘Gay Science’. For an introduction of Nietzsche’s use of *daimon* see Ansell-Pearson K., 2005, p. 77. Pearson also discusses its use within the history of philosophy from Homer to Plato.

13 See Part 1, ‘Democritean Materialism’ & ‘Epicurus’.

14 See Part 1, for a discussion of the three elements of Epicurus’ canonic.


16 In *The Twilight of the Idols*, ‘How the ‘Real World’ at last Became a Myth’, Nietzsche initiates his account of ‘History of an error’ with Plato, ‘The real world, attainable to the wise, the pious, the virtuous man – he dwells in it, he is it’.

17 Sextus Empiricus reports, ‘None the less he is found condemning them [the senses]. For he says, “we in fact understand nothing exactly [or, exact], but what changes according to the disposition both of the body and the things that enter it and offer resistance to it”’. (Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.136 = 6889). (Curd, 1995, 86.).

18 Plutarch reports, ‘. . . when [Democritus] declares that the thing is no more than the nothing, he is calling body thing and void nothing, and declaring that this too [void] has some nature and existence of its own’. (Plutarch, *Against Colotes* 4.1109A = 68B156, tr. Curd) (Curd, 1995, 84.).

19 (Lange, 2010, p. 29) ‘Daedalos is said to have made a moving statute of Aphrodite: this the actor Philippus explained had been done probably by pouring quicksilver into the interior of the wooden figure. In the same way Aristotle would Demokritus have man moved by the mobile atoms within him’.

21 Another such reflection in made by Swift (2008), and concerns Nietzsche's critical analysis of teleological purposiveness. Swift argues that teleological purposiveness illuminates (for Nietzsche) the illusory nature of reason, which explains why reason contorts the world to the extent that it projects 'purpose' onto the world. Whereas in reality, 'like aesthetic judgements, existing only within the network of organisation of a subject' (Swift, 2008, p. 13). Exposing and accounting for 'the network of organisation of a subject' within Nietzsche’s works will be the basis of our discussion in Part 3, ‘Nietzsche’s system of psychology’. Although it is clear that, even at this early stage (with the help of Lange and Kant), Nietzsche was developing an immanent method that did not seek to oppose traditional metaphysics with yet more metaphysics, but sought to expose the conditions from which metaphysics arise.

23 Taken from, Swift, 2008, p. n 43, p.39.

24 Emphasis added.

25 We will return to this idea on a number of occasions throughout Parts 2 & 3, as 'spiritualisation'.

26 A longing that originated in ‘believers and their need to believe’ and now finds expression in a scientific positivistic form’ (GS: 347).


29 An example of this can be found in GS: 169; ‘it follows that some people need open enemies if they are to arise to the level of their own virtue, virility, and cheerfulness’.

30 In ‘Twilight of The Idols’: Morality as Anti-Natural, 3. Nietzsche defines ‘Spiritualization of enmity’ as, ‘It consists in profoundly grasping value of having enemies: in brief, in acting and thinking in the reverse of the way in which one formerly acted and thought!’ (p.43).

31 In Part 3 ‘Asceticism and the Ascetic Ideal’, I will continue this discussion.

32 We will discuss this notion in detain in Part 3, ‘The Spirit of Gravity’.

33 In Part 3, 'The Origin of God and the Afterworld' I will discuss Nietzsche’s psychological account of the idealisation of ‘otherworldliness’ in detain.
First published in 1887, five years after the first publication of *The Gay Science* and therefore after *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883-1885).

35 See also Part 2, ‘Note on Cause’ in which Nietzsche argues that ‘truth’ is born from the need to ‘make firm’.

36 This is the problem that the ‘gay science’ attempts to overcome, which I discuss in Part 3, ‘Asceticism and the Ascetic Idea’. - Nietzsche also recognises that Socrates performed a similar act of rejuvenation. See Part 3, ‘Note on Socrates’.

37 The will to truth becoming conscious of itself is the event of moralities destruction. (See, *GM*; III, 27).

38 A pseudonym for Johann Heinrich Köselitz.

Also see Part 1, ‘Blessedness’.


Towards the end of BGE: 62, Nietzsche asks us to wear the mask of the Epicurean gods, i.e. one of disinterestedness, unconcerned with human affairs. He argues that through this mask, European history ‘seems’ to be dominated by ‘one will [...] the will to make man a sublime abortion?’ Viewed from the perspective which great distance lends itself, man wills his own destruction, that is, to nihilism; a will to nothingness. By removing this mask and replacing it with a desire of interestedness, Nietzsche claims that man would see the destructive and parasitic nature of his deeds, which occur as a direct result of the creation of a surplus. Nietzsche argues that man does not posses the strength for ‘the artistic refashioning of mankind’; man (i.e., the Christian) cannot see beyond his foreground valuations, which preserves the suffering of the sufferer to the level of ‘equal before god’. Nietzsche states that the ‘European of today’ is a lowly ‘herd animal, something full of good will, sickly and mediocre’ (BGE: 62). The triumph of Plato over Epicurus, the transcendence from this-world to the other-world instigated this mediocrity, this equality of man. As such, man can no longer justify their existence, in the *Genealogy of Morality* he claims, ‘In losing our fear of man we have lost our love for him, our hope in him and even our will to be man. The sight of man now makes us tired – what is nihilism today if it is not that?... We are tired of man ...’ [GOM1:12].

The death of God, first envisioned in *The Gay Science*, heralded the demise of Christian values, values which were legislated on a transcendent divide that for Nietzsche culminated before the Christian era. In his notes dating Spring 1888, he makes an important
characterisation of the threefold relationship between Epicurus, Christianity and Plato. He begins by pitching Epicurus against the “old faith”, which he claims was “a struggle against pre-existing Christianity” (WP: 438). This ‘old faith’ is to be understood as the ‘moralization’, i.e. ‘soured feelings of guilt’ first introduced by Plato (he makes an important distinction concerning ‘moralization’ and ‘moral corruption’. The latter would not be possible without the conditions of the former). This meant that the psychological conditions were ripe for Christianity to ‘take root’. In this sense Epicurus’ ‘struggle’ was doomed to failure because Plato had already ‘destroyed paganism’ (which should be interpreted as earthly values), ‘by revaluing its values and poisoning its innocence’ (op. cit.). He concludes that, ‘We ought finally to understand that what was then destroyed was higher than what became master’ (op. cit.). Moralisation should be considered as the break from this-world to otherworldliness; reason above instinct. In this sense, man lost sight of himself as an earthly creature from which his earthly values were born, and in doing so defiled himself, making man a ‘weak’ and ‘sickly’ creature. Christianity and in particular the tradition of St. Paul (which Nietzsche believes underwent a similar transformation that happened from Epicurus to Epicureanism) aligned itself with weak or lower types (WP: 198).

43 This is most evident in the Poem ‘In the South’ & the Dionysian Dithyramb ‘The Sun Sinks’.

44 An account of Epicurus’ theory of sensation can be found in Part 1, ‘First Canonics: Sensation’.

45 As we saw above, Caygill also recognises the importance of this rejection in order to ‘save wisdom’ (Caygill, ‘The Consolation of Philosophy or ‘Neither Dionysus not the Crucified’, 1994, p. 133) & (Part II, p. 25).

46 See Part 1, ‘Preconceptions’.

47 Also see DL: 10, 034; ‘Feelings they say are two: pleasure and pain, which affect every living being. Pleasure is congenial to our nature, while pain is hostile to it. Thus they serve as criteria for all choice of avoidance’. And, (Laertius, 2003) 10, 737 ‘He cites as proof that pleasure is the chief good the fact that all animals from the moment of their birth are delighted with pleasure and distressed by pain by their natural instincts, without need of reason’.

48 See Part 2, ‘Nietzsche and Greek Materialism’.

49 See TI:‘Reason in Philosophy’, 5.

Kaufmann observes that the reference to the ‘pigs’ (see above) is a reference to Horace’s Epistles I.4.16, where the poet ends his letter to Albius Tibullus, ‘When you have a mind to laugh, you shall see me fat and sleek with good keeping, a hog of Epicurus’ herd’. Horace was not an Epicurean in the traditional sense. Eduard Fraenkel examines the possibility that Horace underwent a religious conversion and his allegiance to Epicureanism was founded on an ethical basis alone, ‘The doctrine of Epicurus explained thunder as caused by the clashing of clouds. But Horace hears thunder in a clear sky: therefore, he reflects, Epicureanism in false’ (Fraenkel, 1957, p. 255). Horace’s adherence to Epicurus is not as clear as Fraenkel suggests, and rather than dismissing Horace as a non-Epicurean we should take seriously the claim Nietzsche makes concerning the ‘pigs crowded in his garden’. It is claimed that both Horace and Virgil were influenced by the Augustan Revival, that is, the restoration of ‘worship of the gods’ (D’Alton, 1962, p. 95). During this period Epicureanism was gathering momentum, yet there was still a religious undercurrent in Rome. In this respect, the Revival was a reactive force against Epicureanism. D’Alton comments; ‘The Augustan Revival will account, too, as I have said, for Horace’s conversation. He had never probably made a very profound study of Epicureanism. He gives no indication of having realised the full important message of Lucretius’ (D’Alton, 1962, p. 96). The message is of course that the gods were not to be feared. D’Alton suggests that both Horace and Virgil were, ‘essentially of a religious temperament’ (1962, p.95). Furthermore, he argues; ‘at the time when he was under the influence of Epicureanism, Horace should display solicitude for the ruined temples of the gods. It looks as if Horace already knew something of the designs of Augustus for the restoration of ancient worship’ (1962, pp. 94-95). Yet D’Alton also claims that Horace, ‘did not feel himself bound to surrender [the Epicurean] doctrine of Pleasure, and he frequently interpreted this in a way that would have probably shocked Epicurus’ (p. 97). This is an important point, and one that Nietzsche identifies with; the problem of being misinterpreted, deliberately or otherwise. The revised preface; Attempt at Self-Criticism (1886) to The Birth of Tragedy, the Preface to the Second Edition of The Gay Science and the ‘Preface’ to Beyond Good and Evil and Ecce Homo, all demonstrate Nietzsche’s preoccupation with this problem. To re-examine one’s own work repeatedly may be a symptom of a paranoid mind but we should understand that it etiological problem. One of the most interesting points about Nietzsche’s allusion to Horace relates to Horace’s choice of the parts of Epicurus’ ethics that suited his taste. Consequently, Epicurus’ teachings were transformed and their original meaning changed from Epicurus’ to Epicurean. If we accept this transformation in the way D’Alton does, then a strange hybrid of hedonistic ethics merging with declining religious instinct emerges. The significance of this transition will become more apparent as we work our way through the references Nietzsche makes to Epicurus in The Gay Science. However, for the moment, we need to recognise Nietzsche’s concern with such events.
It should be noted that the slanderous remarks that Nietzsche refers to are found in Diogenes Laertius’ account.


In a letter to Paul Deussen from February, 1870, Nietzsche wrote, ‘Kant, a genius, to whom has been given the same terribly sublime lot of coming a century before he can be understood’ (Nietzsche F., Selected Letters, 1996, p. 64).

Nietzsche claims that this was the case of the French Revolution ‘interpreted from a distance their own indignations and raptures so long and so passionately that the text disappeared beneath the interpretation’ (BGE: 38).

Deleuze is referring here to the following statement: ‘[…] nobody as yet has determined the limits of the body’s capabilities: that nobody as yet has learned from experience what the body can and cannot do’ (Ill. Prop. 2 Sch.) – See (Spinoza, 2002, p. 280).

Part 3, ‘Nietzsche’s System of Psychology’ is an exploration of such matters.

Also see (WP: 635) ‘Mechanistic theory formulates consecutive appearances, and it does so semiotically, in terms of the senses and of psychology (that all effect is motion; that where there is motion something is moved) it does not touch upon the causal force’.

This is a particular task that Nietzsche attributes to the task of the ‘philosopher of the future’, which he expands upon in section 42 of Beyond Good and Evil. The term Versucher may also be translated as ‘attempters’.

In BGE: 62, Nietzsche argues that the lowly and degenerate (i.e., the ‘surplus’), would normally not survive under the barbarian system. Religion become sovereign because it redeems suffering and provides the ‘surplus’ with meaning by presenting them as the righteous and thereby protecting them. For Nietzsche this was a negative event because it led to the ‘corruption of the European race’ (BGE:62), i.e. the inversion of values. This inversion had dramatic consequences; it led to the conquering of the ‘instincts proper to the highest and most successful of the type ‘man’’ (op. cit.). Crucially, the inversion, through ‘remorse of conscience’ had the unfavourable consequence of transforming ‘the whole love of the earthly and of dominion over the earth into hatred of the earth and the earthly’ (op. cit.). In
effect, immanence was transformed into transcendence, i.e. ‘unworldiness’ (op. cit.). This event is so important Nietzsche develops his method of genealogy specifically to unravel its mysteries.

Bracketed addition: Acampora & Ansell-Pearson translate the same passage as follows; ‘predominance did not lie mainly in physical strength but in strength of the soul’ (2011, p. 198): ‘der seelischen’ from die Seele= soul. I included the bracketed addition for the sake of clarity.

Deleuze notes that for Nietzsche, “Our knowledge, he says, has become scientific to the extent that it is able to employ number and measurement. The attempt should be made to see whether a scientific order of values could be constructed simply on a numerical and quantitative scale of force.” (Deleuze G., 2006, p. 43).

A similar case is presented by Deleuze concerning consciousness; once again he presents it in terms of qualitative differences and argues, ‘Consciousness merely expresses the relation of certain reactive forces to the active forces which dominate them’ (2006, p. 41).

See Part 1, ‘Second Canonic: Preconceptions’.

In the Principal Doctrines (DL. 10, 139-154) XXXI-XL – Diogenes Laertius reports Epicurus’ social contract theory, see (Inwood & Gerson, The Epicurus reader: selected writings and testimonia, 1994, pp. 35-6).

A transcendent notion of language-legislator is provided by Plato in ‘Cratylus’.

We will continue this discussion in Part 2, ‘Book 3 of The Gay Science: The Problem of the Incorporation of Truth’.

This conception of immanence should also be related to the discussion of Kant and the difference between transcendental and transcendence in Part 2, ‘Book 3 of The Gay Science: The Problem of the Incorporation of Truth’.

Although Deleuze claims that Lucretius did pose the question in terms of power; ‘Lucretius exposes the trouble of the soul and those who need it to establish their power’ (Deleuze G., 2006, p. 190).

i.e., as the bridge between the non-evident and the evident.

See Part 1, ‘Third Canonic: Feelings (pathê)’.
In ‘Nietzsche’s positive religion and the Old Testament’ Golomb claims; ‘One of the basic intuitions of Nietzsche’s thought is the concept of immanence, formulated in sections 108-125 of The Gay Science. Transcendent entities of supra-natural powers do not exist; there is no ‘pure reason’, no other world, no domain different from or superior to our own’ (Golomb, 2000, p. 51).

74 Also ‘embodiment’.


76 We will return to Nietzsche’s use of ‘spirit’ in Part 3.

77 See Part 2, introduction to ‘Nietzsche’s Epicurus’.

78 Neither of which demonstrate any noble authority in terms of ‘strength’ or ‘weakness’, which he claims are only ‘relative concepts’ (GS: 118).

79 Also see BGE: 4.

80 In Wanderer aphorism 15 Nietzsche states: ‘The modern Diogenes.— Before one seeks men one must have found the lantern. Will it have to be the lantern of the cynic’.

81 This point is also reiterated in GS: 375 ‘Why we look like Epicureans’.

82 Nietzsche makes a similar point in BGE: 285.

83 This reading fits well will Nietzsche’s admiration of Epicurus, particularly in GS: 45 where he claims: Epicurus.- Yes I am proud of the fact that I experience the character of Epicurus quite differently from perhaps everybody else’.

84 For an account of Democritean determinism see Part 1, ‘Epistemology’.


86 See Part 1, ‘Third Canon: Feelings (pathê)’.

87 Small makes a reference to WP:699.

88 In fn. 22 p.184 Kaufmann recognises that Nietzsche modifies the third point, eventually extending will (to power) to living and non-living creatures.

89 It should be noted that the title of this section ‘Personal providence’ and the title of the following section ‘The thought of death’ are both fundamental themes in Epicurean
philosophy as we found in Part 1. It seems clear that Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence, is, up to this point at least, following a similar path to Epicurus and Lucretius.

90 The first is in, GS: 40. The second, GS:109 and the third, GS: 258.


92 We will return to the problem of incorporation throughout this section and in Part 3.

93 See Part 1 ‘Blessedness’ in which the tetrapharmakon is introduced.

94 Nietzsche will return to this theme some five years later in Book 5 of The Gay Science. I will continue this discussion in Part 2, ‘Book 5 of The Gay Science: Unmasking Epicurus’.

95 This theme is developed in a note from 1885 in which Nietzsche makes the following comparison; ‘The Epicurean kind of Christain and the Stoic kind – the former includes Francoies de Sales, the latter Pascal. The Victory of Epicurus – but precisely this kind of man is imperfectly understood. The Stoic kind (which has need of struggle and consequently sets the value of the struggler unreasonably high-) always slanders the ‘Epicurean’!’ (Nietzsche F. W., 2003, p. 53).

96 Kaufmann notes that, ‘alle Menschen der geistigen Arbeit: artists, scholars, writers’ (Nietzsche F., 1974, p. 254. fn. 31.).

97 Asclepius was the ancient God of medicine and healing.

99 This is confirmed in GS: 370 during Nietzsche’s discussion of pessimism. Here he claims that the ‘desire for destruction, change and becoming can be an expression of an overflowing energy that is pregnant with future (my term for this, is known as, “Dionysian”).

100 Note: In the original edition of the ‘Gay Science’, 341 is the final aphorism.

101 For an introduction to Nietzsche’s Zoroaster parody see (Burnham & Jesinghausen, Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 2010, p. 3) & (Ansell-Pearson K., How to read Nietzsche, 2005, p. 75).

102 It should be noted that in GS: 370, Nietzsche returns to and develops this discussion in more detail by making a number of distinctions concerning sufferers of impoverishment and sufferer of overabundance – see Part 2 ‘Book 5 of The Gay Science: Unmasking Epicurus’.

103 See Part 1, ‘The Nature of the gods & Blessedness’.
Nietzsche’s use of ‘wandered’ here implies the notion of ascent of self ‘whatever may yet come to me as fate and experience – a wandering and a mountain-climbing will be in it: in the final analysis one experiences only oneself (Z: 3, 1).

Joseph P. Vincenzo in ‘Nietzsche and Epicurus’ presents the following argument: Nietzsche presents us with an instance of kinetic pleasure, to speak in Epicurean language. But as he stretches out his arm to do so, he feels a still greater desire to lie down beside the tree at the perfect hour of noon to sleep. This seemingly insignificant action is important for our purposes, for it casts light on the relationship between man and nature during the Augenblick. If we interpret the grapes at this moment not as Dionysian grapes, but as the grapes of kinetic pleasures, and if we interpret Zarathustra’s desire to break off a grape to quench his slight thirst as the last remnants of man’s will understood as a lack striving for fulfilment, we find that Zarathustra’s greater desire points to something more crucial – it points to the higher static kinetic pleasure wherein this all-too-human will is dissolved and overcome by a still greater desire – to lie down at the perfect hour of noon and to sleep. (Vincenzo, 1994, p. 393).

Vincenzo basis his argument on the assumption that the desire for sleep is a kinetic pleasure. However, it is not clear if sleep for Epicurus (and Lucretius) is in fact a kinetic pleasure. On the one hand, a privation of sleep could be the cause of atomic disturbances. However, we find that during sleep, and through dream images and preconceptions the images of the gods derive. This presupposes that during sleep the body is free from disturbance. If we accept Vincenzo’s thesis that the grape does not represent the ‘Dionysian grape’ of intoxication, but the Epicurean desire to fulfil his kinetic desire to quench his thirst; we face a problem because in order to achieve ataraxia, kinetic desires must be stilled. Zarathustra however does not fulfil his initial desire. He is overcome by a ‘greater desire’; ‘For as Zarathustra’s saying has it: One thing is more necessary than another’ (Z: 4, 10). This can be directly related to Vatican Saying 73: ‘Even some bodily pains are worthwhile for fending off others like them’ (Inwood & Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy, 1997, p. 39). Thus, Vincenzo’s argument confirms Zarathustra’s saying and we should therefore interpret sleep in this instance as a kinetic pleasure as a means for the attainment of ataraxia. In summary we should note that Nietzsche’s ‘health’ was not Epicurus’. This, when taken with the decisions that face the modern European, demonstrate that Nietzsche recognised Epicurus’ attempts to overcome the problems inherent to a philosophy of immanence. However, he also recognised that the problems have changed and therefore require different solutions.

For example in August 1883 he wrote to Peter Gast; ‘What I envy in Epicurus are the disciples in his garden, aye, in such circumstances one could certainly forget noble Greece and more certainly still ignoble Germany!’ (Levy, 1921, p. 164).

‘Such happiness could be invented only by a man who was suffering continually. It is the happiness of his eyes that have seen the sea of existence become calm, and now they can never weary of the surface and of the many hues of this tender, shuddering skin of the sea. Never before has voluptuousness been so modest’ (GS:45).

see Part 1 ‘Method of Inference’.

This is consistent with BGE: 196 in which Nietzsche discusses the importance of knowing how to make the correct inferences from the evidence that remains, both in terms of astronomy and moral psychology.

See Part 2 ‘Affects’.

In the parallel passage from NCW Nietzsche describes Epicurus as ‘the opposite of a Dionysian Greek’, which indicates that he abandons his claim that ‘Dionysian Pessimism’ remains a possibility.

As Kaufmann notes; ‘Nietzsche answered his own question, “why am I destiny,” by claiming that he was the first to have “uncovered” Christian morality. He believed that after him, no secular Christian system would be possible any more; and he considered himself to be the first philosopher of an irrevocably anti-Christian era’ (Rist. J, Epicurus; An Introduction, 1972, p. 408). We may now add that Nietzsche’s ‘uncovering’ developed as a result of his Epicurean studies through which he came to make the above distinction between the Epicurean and Christian sufferer of ‘impoverishment’ and the Dionysian pessimist who suffers from ‘overfulness’ (GS: 370).
Part 3: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Immanence

Part 2 introduced the development of immanence in Books 3 and 4 of The Gay Science. Within this central text, Nietzsche announces the death of god and the thought of the eternal return for the first time in his published works. Although Nietzsche will continue to develop both doctrines throughout the remainder of his active writing life, it is in Zarathustra and On the Genealogy of Morality that his philosophy of immanence comes to fruition. Part 3 will use particular elements of these texts to formulate an understanding of the body and earth through which immanence emerges. Part 2 (‘The Foundation of Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Immanence’), introduced the problem of crystallisation, which for Nietzsche, is an unavoidable problem that occurs during the writing process. Crystallisation is the processes by which fluid thoughts crystallize into a static object of knowledge. Although this problem cannot be avoided, we can at least be aware of it when forming our own conception of immanence. This means that whatever definition is arrived at, it will never fully capture a complete understanding of the operations of will to power in formal language. Having said this, it is possible to investigate Nietzsche’s method, which in both of the above texts repeatedly calls for an ‘earthly head that creates meaning for the earth’ (Z: I, 3), a method that seeks to affirm life through a new form of knowledge with the body and earth at its centre.

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In Zarathustra, Nietzsche develops his account of the problems proliferated by man. These include the problems of false beliefs, the consequences of such beliefs and Nietzsche’s proposed means for overcoming them. In this sense, both Epicurus and Nietzsche share the goal of exposing the erroneous, yet necessary rational formulations of divine providence and belief in the afterlife. Part 1 claimed that such beliefs must be overcome if the individual is to achieve happiness. Part 2 claimed that Nietzsche recognised the significance of Epicurus within the Western philosophical tradition, as well as the heroic attempts he made in combating Platonism. Ultimately however, Epicurus was unable to recognise the psychological devices that his system supported, which for Nietzsche, are typical of a decadent philosophy. The final section of Part 2 ‘The development of Immanence in The Gay
Science’, claimed that with the announcement of the death of God, Nietzsche began to focus on exposing the moral, religious and philosophical prejudices that consume mankind’s ability for self-overcoming at a time when it is needed most. This is why psychology was so important for Nietzsche because it is the only means for exposing such prejudices. For Nietzsche, post-Socratic philosophy has almost entirely been directed towards a metaphysics that is focused ‘outside’ of the body. It was on this basis that man created a pseudo-reality that sought to overcome ‘this world, the eternally imperfect’ in favour of a perfect and transcendent world free of decay and destruction. If man is to awaken from the illusion that now threatens his existence, he must become aware of the psychological devices that support it, and realign himself with the immanent character of the will to power. Once such devices have been exposed, and in effect, man has come to know himself and no longer rejects his instinctive nature, only then can he become aware of the dangers of nihilism that confront him.

Nietzsche’s System of Psychology

Nietzsche considers human psychology to be a derivative of the physiological struggle of the body. In order to demonstrate this, he argues that any notions of the ‘self’, ‘ego’, ‘subject’ and ‘consciousness’ are all bodily affects. If we ask, what is the human body? Then Nietzsche’s response would run as follows: Body is the unity posited by the creative will (great reason).1 It is composed of a multitude of parts that can be further reduced to an even greater aggregate number. This reduction can continue until no things remain, ‘only dynamic quanta’ (NLN 14[79] / WP: 635). ‘Dynamic’ is an important term because it introduces a theory of relations. For Nietzsche, all existence depends on the interplay of force. This led him to reject any conceptions of equilibrium because such conditions would destroy life, not maintain it. Part 2 ‘Nietzsche and Greek Materialism’, used Nina Power’s concept of the Democritean ‘dynamic equilibrium’ to introduce the necessity of struggle as a condition of life. Nevertheless, Nietzsche rejects atomism on the basis that the concept ‘atom’ is a metaphysical unity that is produced by the false transference of the ‘concept of the subject’ to the ‘concept of the atom’ (NLN 14[79] / WP: 635). He recognised the need for ‘dynamic equilibrium’ as a necessary condition for life. Part
1, claimed that Epicurus developed his account of atomism on the basis that it could remove the anxieties associated with belief in the gods and the fear of death. For Epicurus, rapid atomic movements within the body are the cause of pain. Creating steady atomic movements through abstinence and removing false opinions was the only means to pleasure, the goal of life according to the Epicurean model. Although Nietzsche admired this ‘heroic- idyllic mode of philosophizing’ (WS: 295), ultimately he rejected atomism on the basis that it denied the fundamental nature of existence, will to power as a theory of relations. Where Epicurus sought equilibrium, Nietzsche found struggle and consequently he abandoned Epicurus as a ‘typical décadent’ (AC: 30).

One of the major problems that confronts Nietzsche’s discourse on the body is that of reconciling the ‘fundamental will of the spirit’ (BGE: 230) with the body. From the need to communicate the body created ‘that commanding something which the people calls ‘spirit’ [which] wants to be master within itself and around itself and to feel itself master’ (BGE: 230). This indicates that the people’s conception of spirit is misguided and Nietzsche wants to demonstrate that the spirit, like everything else, is a function of the body. Although highly successful, particularly in terms of survival, the spirit has created for itself (in its need for self-mastery) a divide between body and soul. This disembodied existence, when taken as ‘real’ or ‘truthful’, has led to a rejection of the body and the earth, as both of are deemed the cause of pain and suffering. For Nietzsche, this is dangerous for two reasons. Firstly, by rejecting the body, the spirit has become reactive. It now operates against the bodily conditions that maintain its existence. Secondly, if the spirit continues to reject the body, following the death of God (the ideal of immaterial existence), humanity will be faced with the prospect of European nihilism (the absence lack of purpose and meaning). In this respect, much of Nietzsche’s work is preparatory. He details the problem so that we may become aware of the dangers that face mankind. To overcome the prospect of European nihilism, Nietzsche proposes that the spirit must be incorporated. This means that the spirit and the body must become reunited through realignment of will to power. In effect, Nietzsche is telling us that we must come to know what the body can do. He makes this clear in Zarathustra; ‘The body is a great intelligence, a multiplicity with one sense, a war and a peace, a herd and a shepherd’ (Z: I, 4). Only by recognising the capability of the body can ‘truth endure incorporation’ (GS: 110). Yet this is an ‘experiment’ that lies in wait. As
Zarathustra explains, ‘I walk among men as fragments of the future: of the future which I scan’ (Z; 2, 20). This means that the reconciliation of man is the incorporation of his parts (body and soul) into the whole, i.e. the Overman.

The following section will present a detailed analysis of Nietzsche’s system of psychology beginning with a discussion of mechanistic theory and the necessity of causal concepts for the production of the concept body. This will be followed by a discussion of force, pathos, and the division that ‘pathos of distance’ achieves. Such divisions are necessary for communication, which presupposes a hierarchical structure internal to the body. Further to this, Nietzsche also recognised that the same command structure is mimicked externally. That is to say, the hierarchical structure that produces consciousness also manifests itself sociologically and politically.

From this basis it will become clear how and why disembodied existence happened and what problems ‘incorporation’ involves. Then, before moving onto Nietzsche’s most informative account of his system of psychology in Zarathustra, the section, ‘Note on Spirit’ will clarify Nietzsche’s use of the term Geist and its importance for understanding his notion of immanence.

**Grounding psychology in physiology**

To talk about the ‘subject’ and his or her relation to the body is for Nietzsche, an invention that presupposes the legitimacy of causal relations. These ‘causal relations’ become the focus and object of the will. This introduces the ‘affectivity of command’ while ignoring the ‘causal force’ itself. Essentially, this is what Nietzsche terms ‘mechanistic theory’; the process by which we have ‘borrowed the concept of unity from our ‘I’ concept – our oldest article of faith’ (NLN 14[79] / WP: 635). The mechanistic worldview is subject to an array of sensual and psychological functions that operate semiotically, i.e. by upholding the ‘habit into which our senses and language seduce us’ (NLN 14[79] / WP: 634). Falsifications and generated fictions are the epistemological conditions necessary for this worldview. However, it must be noted that the psychological processes through which such falsification occur are not presented consciously. As a result, mechanistic concepts, which are necessary and help to organise the enduring structure and familiarity of the world (and
therefore the concept ‘world’), are in reality nothing more than ‘additions’ that stabilise the ‘dynamic quanta’ (op. cit.). The relations between quanta interest Nietzsche because these relations are the essence of will to power. Devoid of mechanistic concepts, Nietzsche claims, ‘no things remain but only dynamic quanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta, in their “effect” upon the same’ (NLN 14[79] / WP: 635). As we found in Part 2 (‘Affects’), this is the will to power conceived in its most elemental form – pathos.

Part 2 established two variations of pathos. Firstly, as the interlocutor between epiphenomenon and volition (Epicurus’ pathos). Secondly, as the overcoming of suffering (Schiller’s pathos). Both were defined in relation to suffering, which was taken as evidence for Nietzsche’s conception of pathos as the feeling of suffering. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche discusses pathos in terms of pathos of distance, i.e. as the increase in the feeling of ‘distance or space that grows with insight’ (Burnham D. , 2007, p. 90). The notion of pathos here may be taken as a development of the most crucial event in human history. The instinctive creation of a division becomes manifest in and maintains the order of rank. In this sense pathos relates to the affectivity of command that operates at two levels. Firstly, on the unified will (i.e., desires and passions). Secondly, at a level below, or prior to the unification of the will (i.e., drives). The latter state goes some way in explaining the statement; ‘The will to power not a being, not a becoming, but a pathos’ (NLN 14 [79] / WP: 635). The implications of which meant that, ‘we ‘experience’ will to power in its ‘affective form’ through pathos as suffering’ (Part 2, ‘Force’). We also found that ‘a more mysterious pathos emerges’, that seeks ‘ever increasing widening of distance’ and manifests itself as the ‘self-overcoming of man’ (BGE: 257). The following investigation will begin with a discussion of the affectivity of command at the level of the unified will. This is a central argument to Nietzsche’s system of psychology and a discussion of it will inform our understanding of immanence.

Deleuze defines Nietzsche’s conception of ‘body’ as a conglomeration of active and reactive forces within a hierarchical relationship; ‘Any two forces, being unequal, constitute a body as soon as they enter into a relation’ (Deleuze G. , 2006, p. 40). It should be noted that Deleuze’s conception of ‘body’ can mean anything from an inanimate object, such as a stone on a physical level, to a social body on a political level. Deleuze takes his conception of body from Nietzsche’s notes and
develops the fragments into a coherent whole by presenting it as a theory of relations constituted by active and reactive forces; whereas, in his published works of the mid-late period, Nietzsche’s account of the body is more specific and concerns the human body and its structure. Nevertheless, Deleuze’s conception of body must necessarily extend to the human body, because all bodies emerge from a multiplicity of forces as an expression of these forces. Nietzsche argues that the mind emerges from the human body and consciousness is a unified expression of these forces but by no means a complete expression of them. Deleuze reduces Nietzsche’s conception of consciousness to the region of the ego ‘affected by the external world’ (Deleuze G., 2006, p. 39). Consciousness is required for the communication of commands, and as a result, language (being the primary and most developed form of communication) is locked within this dynamic relationship such that it appears to be unrestricted and free but is itself limited and coerced by the forces that constitute what in Zarathustra Nietzsche will call the ‘Self’. As Deleuze explains:

In Nietzsche consciousness is always the consciousness of an inferior in relation to a superior to which he is subordinated or into which he is “incorporated”. Consciousness is never self-consciousness, but the consciousness of an ego in relation to a self which is not itself conscious. It is not the master’s consciousness but the slave’s consciousness in relation to a master who is not himself master […] This is the servility of consciousness; it merely testifies to the “formation of a superior body”.

(Deleuze G., 2006, p. 39)

For Nietzsche, the human body (henceforth described as ‘body’) is the most fundamental of all concepts, perhaps even the founding concept, especially in consideration of pathos as the most elemental form of will to power. Nietzsche describes the body as the most fundamental belief; ‘[…] more fundamental than belief in the soul: the latter arose from an unscientific reflection on the body; i.e. ‘something that leaves it. Belief in the truth of dream’ (WP: 491). To talk of ‘body’ presupposes unity, a unity that is presented to consciousness as a singular phenomenon. Unravelling the mysteries of this unity is the aim of Nietzsche’s psychological investigation. Behind the unity of body there is a great multiplicity of physiological drives acting and reacting against one-another. These drives are expressed in a quasi-unity, presented consciously to the unified will, and in which
metaphysics finds its roots. Metaphysics begins on the basis of this unity – ‘the belief in substance’ and by doing so posits as real ‘the soul’, ‘the ego’ and ‘the subject’ (NLN 9[98] / WP: 488). Nietzsche, on the other hand, insists that we ignore these so-called metaphysical realities and start once more from the physiology of the body:

Starting point the body and physiology: why? - What we gain is the right idea of the nature of our subject-unity - namely as rulers at the head of a commonwealth, not as ‘souls’ or ‘life forces’ - and likewise the right idea of these rulers’ dependence on the ruled and on those conditions of order of rank and division of labour which make possible both the individual and the whole. (NLN 40[21] / WP: 492)

As we can see, Deleuze’s analysis of the body as a hierarchical structure is evidenced here but we must be careful not to apprehend at the top of this hierarchy a conscious ruler. Instead we must think abstractly and avoid (where possible) projections that impose consciousness upon what psychologists of the 19th Century will name the ‘subconscious’. In order to present an accurate picture of Nietzschean consciousness (as subordinate to the body), we must investigate the structure of consciousness which is determined by the order of rank. This is the purpose of the following discussion.

For Nietzsche, ‘order of rank’ is a phenomenon that is internal to the body in terms of a hierarchical structure of wills (drives), and progresses outside of the body into political and social structures. In a note written between 1885-6 ‘The body as political structure,’ Nietzsche develops this idea in greater detail. He finds that the conscious processes that find expression in social psychology (particularly on a political level) are, to a greater or lesser extent, the unconscious manifestations of the subconscious processes internal to the body. Nietzsche applies the hierarchical model of aristocracy from the Genealogy (which would not be completed for another two years) to the organic synthesis of the body:

The aristocracy in the body, the majority of the rulers (struggle between cells and tissues). Slavery and division of labour: the higher type possible only through the subjugation of the lower, so that it becomes a function. (NLN 2[76] / WP: 660)
Gregory Moore develops this theme in detail. He argues; ‘for Nietzsche the human organism is not a homogenous whole, but rather a plurality (Moore, 2002, p. 35). Moore traces the development of the nature of the organic individual through Lange and Goethe as a ‘plurality […] of independent beings’ (op. cit.). Moore also argues that Lange recognised Rudolf Virchow as the instigator of a new branch of cytology that analysed ‘organisms as molecular composites’. Moore observes how Virchow, ‘viewed the cells as autonomous ‘citizens’ forming a ‘cell state’ (Zellenstaat) (op. cit.). Nietzsche takes this idea and develops it in light of Haeckel’s research to identify the body as a hierarchical structure, one that is regulated by ‘a command structure and competitive struggle that necessarily takes place within organisms’ (Moore, 2002, p. 36). In Beyond Good and Evil ‘What is Noble?’ Nietzsche provides an account of the origins of ‘higher culture’ (i.e., aristocratic society) that is founded upon the domination of the weaker by the stronger. This aristocratic model operates in a tier-like manner, whereby a layering occurs. Moore argues that Nietzsche finds affirmation of this model in the biological processes of the human body, which he takes from Roux. Here we find that:

The development of such ‘aristocratic’ hierarchies, in which the strongest parts within the organism direct and subdue the weaker ones, is for Nietzsche – and here he is again following Roux – the means by which specialisation of function takes place, with a more complex structure through the subsumption of lower forms by higher ones: cells by tissues, tissues by organs and so on. (Moore, 2002, p. 38)

According to Moore’s analysis, this hierarchical structure requires a command and obey chain. Volition does not only occur at the highest level within this chain, it happens throughout at a ‘unicellular level’ (Moore, 2002, p. 39), and when Nietzsche claims, ‘our body is only a social structure composed of many souls’ (BGE: 19), he has in mind what Moore refers to as an ‘extended, interlocking chain of ‘underwills’’ (op. cit.). If Moore is correct, and we accept his account of Nietzsche’s conception of the biological processes that operate within the human body, then we can confirm that consciousness cannot be the ruler of the body, but is the product of the biological processes within the body and is therefore determined by it. As a result, we can confirm the Deleuzian thesis; ‘In Nietzsche consciousness is always the consciousness of an inferior in relation to a superior to which he is subordinated’ (Deleuze G. , 2006,
This brings the discussion of consciousness and the order of rank to a close. It should be noted the results of this discussion will be used as a basis for the forthcoming discussion of ‘The Origin of God and the Afterworld’.

The following discussion will introduce Nietzsche’s use of ‘soul’ to illustrate how it is synonymous with spirit. This discussion will also provide a preliminary examination of the spirit’s need for mastery in a manner that introduces asceticism as ‘repressed power-will’, which expresses itself by denying its most immediate objects – the body and earth. In an 1885 note, Nietzsche explains that; ‘In every era people have believed better in the body as our most certain being, in short as our ego, than in the mind (or the ‘soul’ - or the subject, as the language of schoolmen now prefers to term it)’ (NLN 36[36] / WP: 659). This confirms that soul and spirit are synonymous for Nietzsche; it also confirms that man’s natural inclination was correct in that the body was rightly considered as the foundation of the ego. As such, we may ask; on what basis did the body become secondary to the soul? Nietzsche explains that the ‘philosophers and religious teachers’ used their ‘logic and piety to consider their bodies a deception’ (op. cit.). Thus, the natural or instinctive inclination was suppressed and replaced by a rational desire to reject the body as the foundation of pain and suffering. For Nietzsche, this is the origin of the priestly ascetic conflict, and because they could not will away their bodies a great struggle ensued. He finds that, ‘the strangest witnesses’ for this struggle ‘are to be found partly in Paul, partly in the Vedanta philosophy’ (NLN 36[36] / WP: 659). Nietzsche develops this idea in the Genealogy:

For an ascetic life is a self-contradiction: here an unparalleled ressentiment\textsuperscript{10} rules, that of an unfulfilled instinct and power-will which wants to be master, not over something in life, but over life itself and its deepest, strongest, most profound conditions. (GM: III, 11)

He asks, on what or how would such repressed power-will find expression? And answers; ‘On that which is experienced most certainly to be true and real’ (GM: III, 12), which is the body – i.e., ‘Starting point the body and physiology’ (NLN 40[21] / WP: 492). Once again, Nietzsche names the Vedanta philosophy as an example whereby, ‘physicality is demoted to the status of illusion’ (GM: III, 12). This means that under the conditions of asceticism, reason is turned against itself. Nietzsche calls this the ‘lewd ascetic conflict [Zwiespältigkeit]’ (GM: III, 12). This ‘conflict’ has an ‘ascetic’
quality because it excludes itself from the ‘realm’ of ‘truth and being’, which it posits as real (op. cit.). By realm of ‘truth and being’, Nietzsche is extending the denial of the body to the denial of the earth and in *Zarathustra*, explains; ‘Once the soul looked contemptuously upon the body; and this contempt was the supreme good – the soul wanted the body lean, monstrous, famished. So the soul thought to escape from the body and from the earth’ (Z: Prologue, 3). Burnham and Jesinghausen (2010) argue that; ‘To despise the earth is to despise life – both Platonism and Christianity celebrate and long for death’ (p. 21). The same can be said for the body; to despise it is to despise life. There is clearly an important relationship between body and earth for Nietzsche. Adrian Del Caro (2004) recognises the centrality of this relationship when he proposes:

> Body and Earth are the ground and “reason” of all pain and suffering, just as they are the ground and reason of all joy. Those who malign the earth and create (or wish for) the “real world” or the “eternal life” without pain are basically wishing for a disembodied existence, but even this wishing is an act of the body. (Del Caro, 2004, p. 76)

Del Caro is correct to make this observation. However he overlooks a key point. The problem of disembodied existence cannot be solved by no longer “wishing”. For Nietzsche, the problem has become internalised and there is a real divide between mind and body in the sense that consciousness posits the divide as real. This conscious act forms part of our ordered reality and cannot simply be ‘wished’ away. What Nietzsche proposes is more of a long-term project. Both ‘body’ and ‘earth’ must be incorporated. Incorporation is not only an intellectual problem but also a physiological one, which for Nietzsche, reveals itself through human psychology. If man is to undergo incorporation, he must understand the processes that led to his disembodiment. The purpose of the sections, ‘The Three Metamorphosis’, ‘The Origin of God and the Afterlife’ and ‘Despisers of the Body’ is to provide an account for these processes.

The role of ‘spirit’ is central to Nietzsche’s system of psychology, particularly in terms of incorporation. Nietzsche recognises that the ‘spirit’ performs a crucial function. It assimilates states of multiplicity (Becoming) into the one (Being) thereby creating a manageable environment. However, in doing so, spiritualisation establishes a distance between body and soul that has led to man’s disembodiment. As a result,
before we can enter into a discussion of the ‘Three Metamorphoses’ which deals specifically with the problem of incorporation, it is vital that we understand precisely what Nietzsche means by ‘spirit’.

**Note on Spirit**

Nietzsche’s use of ‘spirit’ (Geist) is complex. The term itself can be employed in a variety of ways. For example, the German word Geist can designate, mind, intellect, consciousness, alcoholic drink and wit. In the above discussion we made a number of remarks concerning Nietzsche’s conception of ‘soul’, ‘spirit’ and ‘the subject’. Generally, in philosophy and religion all three are held in opposition to the body. Alternatively, ‘ego’ remains within the possession of the body. Above, we asked how does this disparity occur? As part of his method of naturalisation, Nietzsche attempts to reduce all ‘superterrestrial’ states back to their terrestrial foundations. Yet within the history of philosophy, ‘spirit’ has many different meanings and uses. This is evident from Homer to Descartes, whereby the meaning of ‘spirit’ is continually transformed. In Christianity, ‘spirit’ is used interchangeably with ‘soul’, typically to designate the ‘holy spirit’ or the ‘breath of life’. It is likely that this is a progression of the Latin ‘Spiritus’, which developed from the Aristotelian ‘psuchē’ (that which animates or gives life to living things). Then we have the anima (spirit) / animus (mind) division which Lucretius presented. Further to this, the Greek term psuchē also designate three aspects of the soul. 1) Spirit in terms of spirited (thumos). 2) The spirited part of the soul (thumoeides). 3) Appetite / desire (epithumia). Such terms mainly associated with Plato’s conception of the soul from ‘The Republic’. There is also a long tradition of Geist in the German Idealist tradition, particularly that of Hegel’s Weltgeist. All of these are important concepts, however a discussion of them would lead us away from the forthcoming discussion.

Throughout the Western philosophical tradition, ‘spirit’ has different meanings and uses, the result of which makes it impossible to give a single definition. Moreover, Nietzsche’s use of Geist adds to the complexity. For example, in The Birth of Tragedy, Geist is used in the title to express the affective state that atmospheric involvement with music produces within the individual. Then we have the spirit of gravity, the three metamorphoses of the spirit, the free spirit, the German spirit and the list goes on.
Defining Nietzsche’s use of spirit is tricky because he employs the term in a variety of ways. Thus, given the complexity of ‘spirit’, it would far outreach the scope and recourses of this project to provide an authoritative account of its meaning in relation to its particular uses. Therefore, for our purposes, we will define ‘spirit’ as the naturalisation of the concept ‘spiritualisation’. This is consistent with the definition Nietzsche provides in Beyond Good and Evil section 230. For Nietzsche, ‘spirit’ is an entirely natural phenomenon, and because he rejects the possibility of God as a transcendent entity – any religious or transcendent notions of spirit must be abandoned. Instead, he proposes that ‘spiritual’, in the Christian sense, should be considered as, ‘the symbolic-psychological’ (WP: 225), which indicates that it can only be a bodily affect.

Part 2 (‘Book 3 of The Gay Science: The Problem of the Incorporation of Truth’) introduced the problem of incorporation as a derivative of what Nietzsche identifies as spirit. Nietzsche regards the body as a multiplicity of forces that are known through the process of ‘spiritualisation’ by which the multiple is reduced to the singular (i.e., multiple wills reduced to a homogenous one); although, in reality the body remains a multiplicity of conflicting forces, when presented consciously it appears as a unified and extended object. Nietzsche claims that the ‘spirit’ performs the act of reducing the multiple (wills) to the singular ‘I’. In addition to this, the ‘spirit’ performs another act. It seeks mastery of that ‘around itself and to feel itself master’ (op. cit.). Nietzsche describes this as ‘The fundamental will of the spirit’ (BGE: 230), and explains that it is the process by which the ‘spirit’ masters its environment and thereby increases its ‘feeling’ of power:

The power of the spirit to appropriate what is foreign to it is revealed in a strong inclination to assimilate the new to the old, to simplify the complex, to overlook or repel what is wholly contradictory; just as it arbitrarily emphasises, extracts and falsifies to suit itself certain traits and lines in what is foreign to it, in every piece of ‘external world’. (BGE: 230)

This process is one of ‘incorporation’; ‘the absorption by life of what is around it into its body’ (Burnham D., 2007, p. 165). Nietzsche claims that ‘the spirit’ is more like a stomach than anything else’ (BGE: 230). He uses the metaphor of digestion to demonstrate that incorporation is an entirely natural process and remains in the
strictest sense a process that is conducive to life. Yet, the spirit must also possess a will to deception. Acampora and Ansell-Pearson argue that:

This will is also served by an instinct that appears to be something opposite such as a decision in favor of ignorance, for arbitrary conclusions, a defensive posture against much potential knowledge, being content with un-enlightenment (a certain darkness), a limited horizon, and so on. (Acampora & Ansell-Pearson, 2011, p. 162)

Such a will performs a crucial act in respect to the herd because it increases the instinct for mediocrity, which is experienced as joy and adheres to the protective instinct of life at the level of the species. In addition to this, the spirit performs yet another role. It masks and protects itself from ‘other spirits’ through deception (also experienced as joy). Thus, there is simultaneously a utilitarian (in the case of the species) and altruistic (in the case of the individual) aspect of the spirit. Crucially, however, the operations of the spirit have achieved a level of success that is now detrimental to the advancement of life. For Nietzsche, life requires some form of contest (agon). In fact, contest is the essential condition of life because will to power is relational. If all life were to follow the same path then life would degenerate. Thus, the free spirit is the condition for human life’s self-overcoming because in the free spirit, the will to deception is opposed. This means that the free spirit must, in effect, overcome his or her will, or at least the element of it that finds joy in mediocrity.

In the above passage from Acampora and Ansell-Pearson, we found that the will to deception is content with ‘un-enlightenment’ and ‘limited horizons’ (op. cit.), the consequences of which have become manifest in religious as well as philosophical and scientific practices. For example, in Part 2 (‘Nietzsche and Greek Materialism’), we found that Nietzsche rejects the materialist hypothesis on the basis that such theories rely on the artificial reality of Being. Such devices are consistent with the various operations of the spirit including: refinement, appropriation, assimilation, simplification, overlooking and falsification. In this respect, knowledge remains a superficial pursuit conditioned by the incorporation of error (see Part 2 ‘Book 3 of The Gay Science: The Problem of the Incorporation of Truth’). To counteract this degenerate state, Nietzsche proposes that ‘the terrible basic text homo natura must again be discerned’ (BGE: 230). This means that the free spirit must defeat the spirit’s propensity to raise man above nature. This is Nietzsche’s proposed contest, one
fraught with danger because it opposes the conditions of life from which man has hitherto thrived. The role of the free spirit is to bring about this change, to ‘translate man back into nature’ (BGE: 230). Yet, to achieve this, the spirit must oppose itself, that is, the spirit must first master itself ‘through the complex process of spiritual ingestion’ (Ansell-Pearson K., 2006, p. 235). Once again, we return to the problem of incorporation. In order to ‘translate man back into nature’, we must again ask: ‘To what extent can truth endure incorporation?’ (GS: 110). This is the experiment that Nietzsche proposes; it is a call for the transformation of the spirit.

Of the Three Metamorphoses

Following Zarathustra’s first descent we find that man is incapable of grasping the magnitude of his message. Zarathustra reluctantly admits that; ‘I am not the mouth for these ears’ (Z: Prologue, 5). The mockery of the laughing crowd does not represent an outright rejection of Zarathustra’s message, but their inability to digest his message. Their laughter is a variant reaction to the horror of Zarathustra’s message. When the tightrope walker falls, his ‘body’ falls to the ‘earth’ next to where Zarathustra is stood which represents a transition in man’s ideals. The tightrope walker (who lives in the shadow of God), denotes man’s high-mindedness (the tightrope walker is literally above the earth). Whereas man once believed he was only second to God, he is now faced with the reality that he is a ‘bridge’ to the Overman. Once the tightrope walker becomes aware of his place within the evolutionary process (i.e., that he will be surpassed and that his ideals and beliefs are false), he throws himself back to the earth. This highlights the danger of Zarathustra’s message and the horror of Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence. Allison (2001) comments, ‘failure to embrace this world, to honestly accommodate ourselves to the reality and truth of this vital natural existence – the “meaning of the earth” – is to do so at the very risk of our own survival’ (p. 133). Yet, it must also be noted that the reverse is also true. Humanity’s failure to accommodate itself with its ‘vital natural existence’, i.e. to live in error, has aided man’s survival. However, because man is now capable of recognising these errors, he faces a new set of dangers. Thus, the transformation of the spirit is necessary so that man can overcome himself and the errors that define him.
The first transformation begins with an account of the weight-bearing spirit. Like the camel, an animal that has evolved into a hardy beast of burden, the weight-bearing spirit seeks the greatest challenges. In this respect the image of the camel relates to the task of the free spirit, those capable of completing the greatest of tasks with little sustenance (the image of weight is important as it evokes the image of the ‘Greatest Weight’ which is the first incarnation of the eternal return in GS: 110). Such tasks are fraught with danger and there are no shortcuts, no easy or quick solutions to the problems that faces the free spirit. The problem of nihilism is evident here; laden with the burden of humanity (defined by error under the shadow of God) most animals would slowly sink into the sands of nihilism. However the camel, evolved for this purpose with its wide feet that resist the sands is the only animal capable of fulfilling this dangerous task. The camel therefore represents the necessity of struggle, qualities that are found in the free spirit and serve as a means for self-overcoming.

Once in the desert, there is a second transformation, from camel to lion. The burden borne by the camel is twofold. First, weight understood as the shadow of God. Second, weight in terms of the thought of the eternal return. Thus, the camel carries with it God as the dragon and the possibility for its overcoming, which should be regarded as a rejection of transcendence. The dragon claims; ‘All values have already been created, and all created values – are in me’ (Z: I, 1). This is a rejection of the creation of new values independently of God. However, the lion, although incapable of creating new values, must at least create the possibility for them. To do this, it must destroy the dragon and become master of itself (‘I will’) and of its surroundings. Nietzsche has in mind ‘that commanding something which the people call ‘spirit’ [which] wants to be master within itself and around itself and to feel itself master’ (BGE: 230). For Nietzsche, the spirit’s propensity for self-mastery evolved from belief in God. Thus, to conquer the dragon, the lion spirit must effectively ‘steal’ this ‘freedom’ from the Christian religion of love.

However, because the lion is incapable of creating new values, the spirit must undergo its final transformation to the child spirit. The child is the embodiment of ‘innocence and forgetfulness’ (Z: I, 1). The final stage of the spirit’s transformation marks a ‘new beginning’, one that is not prejudiced by the ‘Thou shalt’ of Christian values, but ‘now wills its own will’ (op. cit.). The spirit’s original claim to transcendence, i.e. ‘sundered from the world’, is defeated through an act of
overcoming. The child spirit, ‘now wins its own world’ – and as a result any other worldly (transcendent) values will become redundant in light of the newly created immanent values (created from the body and earth). The child also represents the innocence of chance as opposed to the Jewish and Christian belief that all events are in accordance to God’s will (AC: 25). Nietzsche takes this from Heraclitus: ‘lucky throws in the dice game of Heraclitus’ ‘great child’, call him Zeus or fate’ (GM: II, 16). It may also be an allusion to ‘Before Sunrise’ in Zarathustra whereupon Zarathustra praises the purity of the sky for providing Zarathustra with the vision of redemption through chance. In either case, following the final stage of transformation, the spirit, no longer ruled by the ‘Thou shalt’ (i.e., God’s will) has become realigned with will to power. The ‘Yes-saying’ of the child spirit is the affirmation of the spirit’s union with the body and represents the return to a state of nature.

In the above ‘Note on Spirit’, we found that spiritualisation was the process by which the spirit assimilates states of multiplicity (Becoming) into the one (Being). Here however, Nietzsche has the reverse in mind, which indicates that the union of body and spirit is of profound importance. In the Genealogy, Nietzsche develops this idea as the ‘inpsychated’ experience or ‘spiritual ingestion’. Kirsten Brown (2006) comments: ‘ [...] consistent with his strategy of prioritizing the body, Nietzsche’s language valorises and even encourages the “return” of we “men of knowledge” to the body’ (p. 112). Nietzsche proposes that the manifold of experience does not occur at a conscious level; rather it occurs within the bodily (i.e., physiological) at the level of great reason. Implicit to this process is the activity of forgetfulness, and Brown correctly observes that for Nietzsche:

Forgetting [...] provides another example of transposition in the direction of the manifold “physiological.” We see, then, that transposition moves towards both the more simple (intellection) and the more complex (incorporation) [...] (Brown, 2006, p. 113)

Thus, in absorbing the more complex, forgetfulness acts like the stomach, slowly ingesting what the body needs or great reason demands. Forgetfulness filters the ‘thousand-fold processes’ (GM: II, 1) of experience and presents them directly to the subconscious, whereby, ‘the windows of consciousness’ are closed so ‘not to be bothered by the noise and battle with which our underworld of serviceable organs work with and against each other’ (GM: II, 1). Yet the ‘transposition’, which operates
in both directions, although necessary, creates a disparity. This means that the body (as multiplicity) presents to consciousness (via the process of spiritualisation) a unity. Whereas the activity of forgetfulness (although unconscious) presents a unity to multiplicity. This disparity has the profound consequence of creating disembodied existence that seeks above all to escape the torment of the body (an almost purgatory-like state). This is why the spirit must be incorporated. If it can endure this process and the body and spirit are united, then the spirit’s need for mastery will no longer oppose its foundation (i.e., the body). For Nietzsche, the affects (i.e., consciousness / intellect) operate symbolically or metaphorically, whereas the body operates through a system of drives. If the spirit can undergo the transformation required and no longer functions in opposition to the body, then the bridge that is man has attained its goal in the Overman.

The transformation of the spirit is the only means for creating new values. In order for the spirit to undergo the transformations required, Nietzsche must naturalise the ‘origin of God’ and the ‘Afterworld’ by revealing their immanent origins. The following two sections will provide an explanation of the naturalisation process in preparation of the forthcoming discussion of the ascetic ideal.

The Origin of God and the Afterworld

In ‘Of the Afterworldsmen’, Nietzsche provides an ontological account of belief. The first thing to notice is that ‘belief’, for Nietzsche, is a symptom of degeneration. Beliefs are primarily (although not exclusively) associated with an ontology of Being – belief in that which endures. There is, therefore, an immediate association between belief and otherworldliness. Zarathustra claims:

Ah, brothers, this God which I created was human work and human madness, like all gods!

He was human and a poor piece of man and Ego: this phantom came to me from my own fire and ashes, that is the truth! It did not come to me from ‘beyond’! (Z: I, 3)
Nietzsche is confirming the immanent origin of God from within man and not beyond him. Furthermore, he uses the image of light (the burning of his ‘own’ ashes on the mountain) an idea typically associated with Plato (sun analogy) and Christianity (God as the light), and reverses, or even steals it as Prometheus stole light from Zeus. This theft transforms Zarathustra’s perspective and feeling of suffering: ‘Now to me, the convalescent, it would be suffering and torment to believe in such phantoms’ (op. cit.). The answer to the question of where the afterworld originated is in suffering. By reaching beyond or ‘looking away’ from this world man sanctified suffering through religious practices. When Zarathustra claims, ‘it was the body that despaired of the body’, he means that suffering originates within the body. For Nietzsche, suffering is a life-strategy because, ‘Profound suffering ennobles; it separates’ (BGE: 270)\textsuperscript{17} and thereby creates new conditions in the service of life. As Deleuze observes; ‘Any two forces, being unequal, constitute a body as soon as they enter into a relation’ (Deleuze G., 2006, p. 40). In this sense, the body is maintained by a dynamic equilibrium that in an affective state (i.e., in consciousness) is experienced as suffering.\textsuperscript{18} Therefore, in order to free itself from suffering, the body (which is in this instance the conscious state of the body) rejected its material foundation. Further to this, Zarathustra claims; ‘It was the body that despaired of the earth – that heard the belly of being speak to it’ (Z: I, 3). Thus, in order to free itself of suffering, the spirit deemed it necessary to reject its bodily foundation and the foundation of the body’s existence, i.e. the earth.

It is important that we gain a greater understanding of what Nietzsche means by ‘the belly of being’. However, there are a number of interpretations that lay claim to it. The first is in reference to Paul, whereby the ‘belly-devotees are disguised servants of Satan’ (Sandnes, 2002, p. 170). Paul, who for Nietzsche was the instigator of body-despisers within the Christian tradition, uses the image of the serpent as a symbol of desire:

\begin{quote}
I urge you, my brothers: watch out for those who cause divisions and upset people’s faith and go against the teaching which you have received. Keep away from them! For those who do such things are not serving Christ out Lord, but their own appetites. (Rom: 16, 17-18).
\end{quote}

Appetites relate to earthly desires (with a pagan undertone), which in biblical terms means self-service as opposed to living in the service of God. Alternatively, because
the event of the death of God has already occurred, we may read the passage as follows: The body acts a receptor of nature; the interlocutor of interiority and exteriority (as we found in ‘The Three Metamorphoses’). When Zarathustra declares, ‘It was the body that despaired of the body – that touched the ultimate walls with the fingers of the deluded spirit’ (Z: I, 3), he is referring to the sublimated drives (such as the example of passions given above), which have become reactive and express their power by despairing of the body. Further to these readings of ‘the belly of being’, Murray (1999) offers an alternative explanation:

In this conceptual world, “the body [Leib] despaired of the earth” and thus “the belly of being” [Bauch des Seins] spoke to it, trying to get the body into the other world – “an inhuman dehumanized world which is a heavenly Nothing”. For Nietzsche, this world, like all others, speaks only “as man”. (Murray, 1999, p. 180).

In response to these readings, I propose that the ‘belly of being’ is a development of the Dionysian Ureine (primal oneness), i.e. the desire to return to the womb of Dionysus, which he describes as ‘the womb of the sole true reality’ (BT: 22). Although this particular desire (for Nietzsche) was the affliction of the ancient Greeks finding expression in Greek tragedy, Nietzsche reconstructs and develops it as the will to power in his later works. In this light, the earth represents the three modes of will to power, creation, sustenance and destruction. Suffering is merely an affect of this process. Therefore when Zarathustra claims ‘the belly of being does not speak to man, except as man’ (Z: I, 3), he is attempting to collapse, or even abandon the Platonic and Christian thesis that body and soul are opposed (i.e., the transcendence / immanence divide). This is why for Zarathustra, ‘Ego, with its contradiction and confusion, speaks most honestly of its being’ (Z: I, 3). The more we listen to it, ‘the more it finds titles and honours for the body and the earth’ (op. cit.). Nietzsche is claiming that we must reject purposiveness (teleology), to carry the earthly head ‘freely’, i.e. without the authority of providence. ‘Appetites’, therefore, must be allowed to express their power. If they are not permitted this luxury and are suppressed (in the Pauline sense), they turn against their most immediate object (the body) and become reactive. As a result, to ‘carry an earthly head’ means, to listen to the appetites of the body. If this can be done, then ‘the earthly head’ may create ‘meaning for the earth’. This is Nietzsche’s proposal of an ethics of receptivity. Once
the spirit has completed its final transformation, the child spirit (with its earthly head) is capable of creating new values.

By ‘earthly head,’ Nietzsche has in mind the ‘ego’ (as we found above, we experience the ‘ego’ as if from within). Furthermore, ‘Ego’ – being the most ‘honest being’, must be given time to develop the communicative skills between ‘body’ and ‘earth’: the ‘Ego’ acts as an interlocutor between the two. Zarathustra says, ‘Listen [...] to the voice of the healthy body’, the voice of the convalescent does not despise the body nor the earth; this is Nietzsche’s vision of ‘Great Health’. Not a health of continuity and tranquillity but one of continual renewal and regeneration. This is demonstrated by Zarathustra’s convalescence which is in not a singular occurrence, but must be repeated (Z: III, 13). Just as the earth is bound within the threefold modes of will to power (creation, sustenance and destruction), so too is the body, and in order for the Ego to communicate between body and earth, convalescence is required. However, because Zarathustra is not ready for the abysmal thought of the eternal return, his body is also unprepared. Thus, the transformative effect of the ‘earthly head’ upon the body is incomplete. The process of incorporation is yet to reach its fullest state of actualisation and remains in a suspended state of animation. Yet Zarathustra must be careful not to catch himself in the snare of the will to truth, which would be to replace the ideal of Christian belief (heaven) with an idealised notion of earth. Instead he must, as Murray argues, ‘expose a falsehood in the belief in the super-sensible such that it can be shown that such a belief already depends on the body and earth’ (Murray, 1999, p. 181).

Nietzsche’s aim is to demonstrate that religious beliefs are predicated on a psychological determination that creates the illusion of Being. Once the ‘ego’ has established this state and conceives it as real, it seeks the assurance that suffering is meaningful and has purpose beyond any that can be found on earth. In so doing, it posits meaning in a world in which decay, death and destruction are not permitted (i.e., in the Afterworld). For Nietzsche, it is important to understand the operations of the ego in order that the transformation of the spirit may happen. The ego plays a pivotal role in this transformation because it acts like a transponder, sat between the body and the earth. If the ego can be redirected to the earth, then it will give meaning to the earth. Zarathustra makes an important distinction between those
who can and cannot make this transformation. Furthermore, the distinction leads to a number of insights concerning the operation of the ego.

**Despisers of the Body**

In *Zarathustra* section 4 ‘Of the Despisers of the Body’, Nietzsche presents the most revealing account of his system of psychology. To a large extent, Part 1, sections 1 and 3, as well as the Prologue of *Zarathustra* are intended to prepare the reader for this key discussion. Here we find Zarathustra addressing the ‘despisers of the body’; ‘Let them not learn differently nor teach differently, but only bid farewell to their own bodies – and so become dumb’ (Z: I, 4). This marks a significant difference between the ‘Afterworldsmen’ and the ‘Despisers of the body’. In the case of the former, Zarathustra claims to have once thought as they do, casting his ‘fancy beyond mankind’ (Z: I, 3). There is a certain plasticity to this type. Unlike the despisers, they do not teach but listen which suggests they are capable of three things. Firstly, in an act of ‘human madness’ to create God. Secondly, convalescence. Thirdly, forgetfulness. The ‘afterworldsmen’ are therefore capable of transformation, so too is Zarathustra. By contrast, the ‘despisers’ are deemed incapable of such a transformation. Instead, they ‘learn’ and ‘teach’ in a dreamlike state, Nietzsche has in mind Christians, and the Vedantists who (as we found in the introduction to ‘Nietzsche’s system of Psychology) use the ‘ego’ to deny the existence of this world. The Idealists stand in stark contrast to the, ‘awakened, the enlightened man’ who says, ‘I am body entirely, and nothing beside’ (Z: I, 4). Crucially, the enlightened man must speak like the child, which confirms the necessity of the final transformation. However, there is a disparity here because the enlightenment also confirms naive empiricism, which Zarathustra must also overcome (a problem that we will return to).

In section 4, Nietzsche turns his hand to psyche-cartography; the mapping of the mind. Zarathustra states; ‘The body is a great intelligence, a multiplicity with one sense, a war and a peace, a herd and a herdsman’ (Z: I, 4). The first thing we should notice is Nietzsche’s disregard for antithetical values. He uses seemingly opposite terms as a mode of definition. This suggests that they are not opposites at all. Huskinson comments, ‘Nietzsche repudiates opposites because they presuppose a metaphysical reality [...] what appear to be opposites are in fact simply different
modes of the same thing’ (Huskinson, 2004, pp. 21-22). Furthermore, Nietzsche claims; ‘The fundamental faith of the metaphysicians is the faith in antithetical values’ (BGE: 2), which in a broader sense can be understood as, ‘physiological demands for the preservation of a certain species of life’ (BGE: 3). However, it is clear that these demands have moved beyond their need, and have become hostile to life. Therefore, Nietzsche proposes that metaphysical opposites must be reinterpreted from a psychological perspective. He begins by making a distinction between ‘little reason’ and ‘great reason’. Benson defines them as follows; “Little reason” [...] is conscious reason, known by the mind. In contrast, “great reason” is the conscious reason known by way of the body’ (Benson B. E., 2008 , p. 63). It should be noted that the latter claim is misleading because ‘great reason’ must be ‘unconscious’ reason known by the body, because it is the foundation of consciousness. Once again, Nietzsche is presenting a hierarchical structure within the body; ‘great reason’ is great precisely because it commands. However, it does so prior to ‘little reason’, which Zarathustra describes as a ‘toy’. ‘Little reason’ should be understood as an emergent reality, which rather than being an affect with no recourse for volition, serves an important role within communication. Strictly speaking, ‘little reason’ does not command but passes on the commands.

Nietzsche’s psyche-cartography continues with a critique of Idealism. Zarathustra addresses the Idealists, who are so proud of the ‘I’. Here Zarathustra claims that the cogito ergo sum is a nonsense that requires a body in order to ‘perform’ the creative act of the ‘I’. In a note dating spring-autumn 1887, Nietzsche critiques Descartes’ mode of ‘argumentation’. Nietzsche’s aim was to demonstrate the necessity of a thinking substance. However, all his metaphysics managed was a ‘mere tautology’ based on the grammatical custom ‘that adds a doer to every deed’ (WP: 484). Therefore (Nietzsche argues), Descartes mistook, ‘a very strong belief’ for ‘an absolute certainty’. In a similar vein, Zarathustra argues that ‘little reason’ takes itself as an absolute, when it is in fact only a product of something much greater (i.e., the body). When Zarathustra claims; ‘but sense and spirit would like to persuade you that they are the ends of all things’ (Z: I, 4). He is alluding to, and warning against the empiricist and rationalist traditions respectively. Under both models, the ego performs the act (which it is intended to do) of presenting events egotistically. That is to say, the ego interprets events as though they were performed for the purpose of the individual who experiences them. This is an important function, and in the case of
the ‘Afterworldsmen’, it is a function that is required in order that the ‘Ego’ ‘find[s] titles and honours for the body and the earth’ (Z: I, 3). However, in order that the ego can do this, Nietzsche must demonstrate that the ego can be redirected.

This brings us to a discussion of the Self. For Nietzsche, ‘Sense and spirit are instruments and toys’ and ‘behind them still lies the Self’ (Z: I, 3). His use of Self relates to the above passage in which Zarathustra claimed; ‘The body is a great intelligence, a manifold with one sense’ (Z: I, 4). Burnham and Jesinghausen spot an important variation of ‘eine Vielheit’, which can be translated as ‘multiplicity’ or ‘manifold’. The former is specific to Hollingdale’s translation and can be taken as the inference of the multiple into the singular, whereas the latter has very different connotations:

‘Manifold’ is one of Kant’s key notions, meaning the disparate field of various sensations internal and external which (for Kant) are subject to synthesis in an act of understanding, such that there can be thought properly speaking and consciousness. Nietzsche’s wording suggests that this ‘manifold’ already has a sense running through it, long before the ‘small reason’ or the ‘I’ perform the synthetic act, even if elements of that act seem to be diametrically opposed. (Burnham & Jesinghausen, Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 2010, p. 36)

This reading supports our initial findings that Nietzsche is attempting to naturalise the different elements that philosophy has traditionally taken as super-natural such as: ‘I’, ‘self’, ‘soul’ ‘spirit’ and ‘the subject’. Although he wants to invalidate their prior use (especially within the idealist, rationalist and empiricist traditions), they remain important concepts for determining the different aspects of the psyche. When Nietzsche employs the terms, they highlight the various roles and operations within “great reason,” which as we mentioned above ‘is the conscious reason known by way of the body’ (Benson B. E., 2008, p. 63). ‘Sense’, ‘spirit’ and ‘ego’ rather than operating at the peak of the hierarchical structure of the psyche, are subordinated under what Nietzsche terms Self.

Self becomes the locus of Nietzsche’s system of psychology. It also becomes apparent that Self is fundamentally aligned with will to power. Zarathustra claims that the Self: ‘compares, subdues, conquers, destroys. It rules and is the Ego’s ruler’ (Z: I, 4). This adds a second dimension to the Ego, it needs to believe in its autonomy of
action. However, behind it is the Self which ‘prompts its conceptions’ (op. cit.). Next Zarathustra adds a third dimension to the Ego, which under the command of the Self is to feel ‘Pain’ or ‘Joy’. Further to this, it seeks to end or extend such feelings, ‘and it is meant to think for that purpose’ (op. cit.).

The problem with the ‘despisers’ relates to the role that the Ego carved for itself. The ‘despisers’ are a particular type in which the conquering and destructive aspect of Self has become dominant. This is not uncommon and represents the diversity of will to power (of which Self is a particular manifestation). If we go a step further and consider the body as a multitude of forces struggling against each other (as Deleuze does), eventually a dominant force will emerge. Such domination directly relates to the description of health that Benson provides; ‘For Nietzsche, one is healthy when the various “powers” (forces, instincts) of the individual are unified so that one of them proves dominant’ (Benson B. E., 2008, pp. 62-3). In the case of the despisers of the body, their health consists in the dominance of forces that seek destruction (i.e., in their sickness). Once again, Nietzsche suspends the metaphysical opposition which “small reason” holds valid in order to demonstrate the unity of opposites when understood through “great reason”.

Zarathustra lists the creative acts of the Self as ‘esteem’, ‘disesteem’, ‘joy’ and ‘sorrow’ and the creative acts of the body as ‘spirit’ (and presumably ‘Ego’ although he does not state it). Although the ‘despisers’ share these creative acts, they are not able to ‘perform the act which it [the Self] most desires to perform: to create beyond itself’ (Z: I, 4). In terms of will to power, this Self is capable of sustenance (self-preservation) and destruction (self-destruction), but incapable of creating beyond itself (self-overcoming). As a result, the despiser’s Self, ‘wants to die and turn away from life’. This explains why at beginning of the section, Zarathustra wills them to ‘bid farewell to their own bodies – and so become dumb’; they are incapable of change in themselves, but capable of changing those who are prepared to listen. Their teachings act like poison to the Afterworldsmen who teeter on the balance. We should make an important distinction here between life as such (or will to power as such) and individuals or groups who are in some way degenerate or diseased. The latter may wish to turn away from life. But it is life itself that says this such turning away from life is precisely a strategy for life. Thus, although the last man ‘wants to die’, ultimately he is ineradicable.
As stated at the beginning of this section, Nietzsche’s account of the Despisers of the Body is his most revealing account of psychology. The distinction he makes concerning the Despisers and the Afterworldsmen establishes a division between those capable of change and those who are not. Through his analysis of the Ego and its relation to the Self, Nietzsche demonstrates that the body is a manifold with one sense. Furthermore, by establishing the manifold act prior to consciousness, Nietzsche is able to demonstrate that consciousness (or little reason) is not the master, but the massager of great reason. Under the light of this revelation, Nietzsche analyses the operation of the Ego and finds that its autonomy is determined by the Self and therefore the body. As such, Nietzsche is able to form the conclusion that the Despisers represent a particularly dangerous mode of humanity. By addressing the Despisers in this way, Nietzsche hopes that their poisonous chatter will be contained and those capable of recognising their poison tongues will develop a natural aversion to them.

Summary

Nietzsche’s system of psychology forms the core of his philosophy of immanence. He integrates an array of devices from mechanistic theory to the cellular ontogeny, in order to demonstrate that at the axis of all Being the body is king. Yet we soon find that ‘body’ cannot be defined in terms of a solid, enduring whole, but is merely the production of dynamic-multiplicity consisting of quanta of force that struggle for domination. In this respect ‘body’ is, like everything else, a manifestation of will to power. This is the reason why Nietzsche rejects dogmatic metaphysics that commences from the assumption of an independent conscious unity. Instead, he proposes a re-evaluation of ‘body’, one that begins on the basis that the first and most instinctual act is to create unities and order. This is not only a metaphysical claim but a quasi-empirical one. He finds evidence for it historically (especially in ancient Greece), sociologically (in his modern Germany) and biologically. He suggests that volition is not a conscious activity but one that happens throughout an organism at every level. In order, therefore, for an object to become manifest and be presented to consciousness (which we can now understand as ‘little reason’), a number of processes must already have occurred. Such processes are synthetic acts.
However, they are not conscious synthetic acts. By twisting the Kantian manifold back upon itself, Nietzsche introduced an original notion of ‘Self’. One that countered the metaphysical tradition that he believed had plagued philosophy since late antiquity.

This means that consciousness is not the operation of an autonomous agent; instead it is subordinate to the operation of the body. ‘Body’ and ‘Self’ emerge from within this incongruent process, they do not stand in opposition to one another, nor the earth, but represent an ontology for which there is no formal language. This is perhaps the greatest problem that faces the Nietzschean scholar. Yet Nietzsche does not propose a new linguistic discipline that might avoid the trappings of an ontology of Being. Rather, he proposes a perspectivism that begins and ends in the service of life. Man’s ability to ‘make firm’, to conceptualise the world around him has served a unique purpose – one that now defines him and allows him to be defined. Such conceptual abilities are falsely taken as the end or goal of man’s endeavour. However, this is the work of an Ego that wants to rule, which is unknowingly in the service of a ‘greater’ and more primordial force that cannot be grasped conceptually because it does not operate on a conscious level (as Deleuze suggests). This is the deceptive quality of the Ego; it creates unities, where strictly speaking there are none. Yet, as Zarathustra tells us; ‘Ever more honestly it learns to speak, the Ego: and the more it learns the more it finds titles and honours for the body and earth’. (Z: I, 3). Parts 1 and 2 demonstrated that from Socrates onwards, the Western philosophical tradition had taken a different course than it could have done. For Nietzsche, the course of these events has reached its declining moment. The way man thinks and the way he lives are remnants of this history in which he is inextricably bound. In order to demonstrate that man is reaching the end of this cycle, Nietzsche must reveal the conditions that have led man to this point. These conditions are the ascetic ideals.

Having gained an understanding of the psychological basis through which man sees himself and the world. It is possible to introduce the ascetic ideal as the overriding drive within man for truth on a conscious level and for life at the level of the body.
Asceticism and the Ascetic Ideal

Nietzsche’s analysis of the ascetic ideal is the most informative account of his philosophy of immanence. The ideal reflects an evaluative mode of life that has peaked and is beginning to fail. This means that the success of its life-preserving properties had effectively destroyed the conditions of the contest from which the ideal first emerged. Without something external to struggle against, the ideal becomes reactive and turns against itself. However, the decline of the ideal is possible only on condition that ‘the ascetic ideal is internally defective in such a way that it causes its own demise’ (Ansell-Pearson K., 2006, p. 366). This is important because the ‘internal defect’ is the possibility for the overcoming of the ascetic ideal. However, because the ideal encompasses all aspects of knowledge, the conception of a counter-ideal (i.e., outside of the current conditions of knowledge) becomes the problematic central to Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence. The problem can be stated as follows; can a counter-ideal be conceived in such a way that it is not a reformulation of the ascetic ideal? One might expect that science is the counter-ideal. However, Nietzsche dismisses science as the ascetic ideals ‘most recent and noble manifestation’ (GM: III, 23). The problem is described by Nietzsche as a ‘faute de mieux’, i.e. as a lack of anything better, which Conway suggests, ‘is attributable not to any characteristics or properties essential to the ideal itself, but to the lack of alternative ideals and external challenges’ (Conway, 1997, pp. 102-3). In Ecce Homo concerning the Genealogy, Nietzsche makes the following claim:

The third essay gives the answer to the question where the tremendous power of the ascetic ideal, the priestly ideal, comes from, although it is the harmful ideal par excellence, a will to the end, a decadence ideal. Answer: not because God is active behind the priests, which is no doubt believed, but faute de mieux – because hitherto it has been the only ideal, because it had no competitors. ‘For man to will nothingness than not will’ ... What was lacking above all was a counter-ideal – until the advent of Zarathustra. – I have been understood. (EH: Genealogy)

This demonstrates that within Zarathustra, the counter-ideal has already been formulated and proposed. In fact, Part 3 ‘Grounding psychology in physiology’
already hit upon the conditions that (Nietzsche believes) have presented themselves as the counter-ideal. These conditions are the body and earth, i.e. the immanent conditions from which the will to nothingness can be opposed. This is the reason why in the opening sections of *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche begins with his proposed system of psychology. Only by demonstrating that the mind is an affective state of the body can the counter-ideal that is the Overman become known. This means that the *Genealogy* ends where *Zarathustra* begins. For this reason, the following investigation will present an account of asceticism and the ascetic ideal that extends beyond the *Genealogy*. Beginning with a preliminary investigation into ‘The Origin of Asceticism’ this account will find that asceticism emerged in light of self-reflection, a quality specific to the Greeks of late antiquity that emerged from the will’s yearning for control over past events. Following this, the section ‘Ascetic Ideal’, will establish the problematic nature of the ascetic ideal in relation to Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence from the *Genealogy*. This will be followed by a discussion of Nietzsche’s proposed responses in *Zarathustra*. It should be noted that at this point, the notion of ‘cheerfulness’ introduced in Part 2, will be reintroduced as a crucial methodological tool that Nietzsche employs to combat the Spirit of Gravity.

**The Origin of Asceticism**

While writing *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche remained under the influence of Schopenhauer. This is evident throughout his analysis of Greek Tragedy, and in the second section of the book he introduces the Schopenhaurian ‘*principium individuationis*’ – the fragmentation of individuals from the *Ureine* (primal oneness) of the will. During his early period, Nietzsche employed the principle in a similar manner to Schopenhauer to account for the inherent suffering of existence. Yet Nietzsche did not seek to revive Schopenhaurian metaphysics but to develop certain aspects of it in an attempt to demonstrate that Apollonian redemption (i.e., redemption in appearance) was possible. For Nietzsche, the ‘breakdown’ of individuation is characterised as an ‘artistic phenomenon’ (BT: 2). The artistic ‘Dionysiac revellers’ are able to transfigure their existence and experience pain (the fracture of primal oneness) as joy. Nietzsche notes how; ‘Those lost Greek festivals reveal a sentimental trait in nature, as though she were bemoaning her
fragmentation into individuals’ (op. cit.). His use of ‘sentimental’ is a reference to Schiller’s aesthetic evaluation of an idealised world, perhaps how the world should be or even the Kantian thing-in-itself. There is a sense of nostalgia that accompanies the Dionysiac, a ‘yearning lamentation’ for the return to primordial oneness. In order to express this ‘source of form, of nature itself’, Nietzsche claims that a ‘new world of symbols was required’ (op. cit.). He argues that, ‘it was a symbolism of the body’ – one that integrated all forms of ‘impetus expression’ (i.e., the Apollonian and the Dionysiac), in order that ‘the innermost core of the world is ‘revealed to him in a symbolic dream-image’ (op. cit.). It is interesting to find that even at this early stage, Nietzsche had already hit upon an ascetic ideal: Body, as the symbolic manifestation of a unity, negated in the expression of the forces that constitute it. This means that the body, presented as a unity in a symbolic dream image, becomes the object in which the Apollonian and the Dionysiac appear together (in contest) for the first time. However, this is not a harmonious relationship; instead it is experienced as the affective state of suffering. Whereas the Dionysian revellers can affirm this state, there emerges another type who cannot. Thus for the latter type, the world of Becoming, expressed in the interplay of forces that constitute the body, is negated and a new order is imposed by the will that demands Being and rejects Becoming.34

However, the Apollonian drive (taken here as the drive for culture, form and individuals), should not be regarded as the moment of decline but the realisation of a stronger race, ‘a brilliant society of Olympian beings’ (BT: 3). – A race in which, ‘nothing suggests asceticism, spirituality or duty’ (op. cit.). For Nietzsche, the Hellenes represent a particularly noble type of aristocracy from which Epicurus and the ‘heroic-idyllic mode of philosophizing’ were born (WS: 295). Yet, this ‘brilliant society’, formed from the dream-image of Apollo, was constructed from a particular need – a need that Nietzsche will consider the work of ‘great reason’ in his middle to later writings. This need sought to ‘hide and even protect the Greeks from a deep awareness of universal suffering and the dissolution of the principium individuationis’ (Burnham & Jesinghausen, 2010, p. 52). This protective instinct helped the Greeks to avoid the possibility of suicidal nihilism. Nietzsche uses the story of King Midas to illustrate the problems that confronted this noble race. Here the Greeks were faced with a moment of profound realisation. Silenus is forced to reveal the abysmal nature of existence; ‘The best of all things is something entirely outside your grasp: not to be
born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second-best thing for you – is to die soon’ (BT: 3). The phrase ‘outside your grasp’ is important as it demonstrates that, prior to Silenus’ revelation, the need for the Apollonian dream image (as Nietzsche would have it) had overcome the possibility of suicidal nihilism. Thus, it is ‘beyond your grasp’ because, insofar as you have a ‘grasp’, you are already something and not nothing. However, Silenus’ revelation opened the ‘Olympian magic mountain [...] revealing its roots’, thereby revealing the ‘horrors of existence’ (op. cit.). Nevertheless, the will to life, born from the Olympian world of the gods, was so powerful that the Greeks were able to overcome this original form of asceticism by maintaining the mask and thereby concealing the disclosure of the Ureine. The Apolline mask had a double purpose. Firstly, it veiled the Ureine. Secondly, it found redemption in appearance (see previous paragraph). It therefore remains immanent but appears in a mode of transcendence.

This introduces an important point concerning illusion and dream. In section 4 of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche discusses the ‘deep inner delight in the contemplation of dreams’ and its antithesis, ‘the day and its terrible intrusiveness’ (BT: 4). What Nietzsche finds important here is the need for ‘illusion and for redemption by illusion’ (op. cit.). In order to overcome the constant yearning for the breakdown of individuation, which is experienced as suffering, a ‘delightful vision’ is required. Thus, the illusion is experienced as pleasurable. This is the redemptive doctrine of the Greeks. Furthermore, this process is reciprocal. Both the Ureine and the Apollonian illusion must be willed so to ‘create the redeeming vision’ (BT: 4). However, the combination is defective because it eventually reveals the illusion. This introduces a self-destructive element to Hellenism through the ‘deification of individuation’ (op. cit.).

Nietzsche recognises the paradoxical unity of individuation born from ‘Apollo, as an ethical deity’ (BT: 4). ‘Know thyself’ and ‘Nothing to excess’, are the principles of self-knowledge and form the bedrock of Apolline Greek culture.35 Through self-knowledge, the Apolline Greeks learned to reflect upon their lives. Yet, this new knowledge brought with it a disturbing element; the past becomes an activity of the present. This is expressed in Sophocles’ ‘Oedipus Rex’. Oedipus’s solution to the riddle represents (for Nietzsche) the moment that the principium individuationis is collapsed. Here the Dionysiac reality is confronted; ‘The individual, with all his restraints and
moderations, was submerged in the self-oblivion of the Dionysiac state and forgot the Apolline dictates’ (BT: 4). In effect, an irreparable fracture opened. The Apollonian illusory formula could no longer be maintained and neither could the redemption of appearance:

Thus, through this gulf of oblivion, the worlds of everyday and Dionysiac reality became separated. But when one once more becomes aware of this everyday reality, it becomes repellent; this leads to a mood of asceticism, of denial of the will. (BT: 7)

Self-knowledge led to the positing and apprehension of the ‘Titanic’ and ‘barbaric’ in the Apolline Greeks past. In solving the riddle of the Sphinx, Oedipus assumed responsibility for his past deeds. Yet he was able to affirm them, such was the strength of the Hellenic impulse. In his search for knowledge, Oedipus was confronted with the abysmal truth of existence which Ansell-Pearson summarises as follows:

[...] Greek tragedy, is the realisation that even a person’s deliberate acts are in a large measure the result of innumerable causes in their past over which they have little control. This did not mean, however, that one could not assume ‘responsibility’ for them. This conception of responsibility neither rests on a notion of free will (character as fate not as free choice) nor espouses a notion of sin (Ansell-Pearson K., 1994, p. 133)

Although this notion of ‘responsibility’ differs from its later development in Christianity, it remains bound to a feeling of powerlessness. Thus, self-reflection created a longing to control past events that could not be satisfied and this is the abysmal truth of existence. Oedipus becomes the representative of a particularly dramatic moment in Greek culture. The pinnacle of Greek tragedy was expressed in the Sophoclean plays. However, with them came an inevitable decline. Although Oedipus was able to overcome all of obstacles that confronted him, the self-reflective nature of his truths paved the way for the ‘Socratic impulse’ (BT: 14): the rejection of tragic insight in favour of a more structured and purposeful notion of reality. Nietzsche insists that in Socrates we find a re-appropriation of the ‘Apolline tendency cocooned within its logical schematism’ (op. cit.). This protective element (image of a cocoon) acts to reinforce the Apolline tendency by presenting it under optimistic horizons which
ultimately replaced tragic pity. However, this does not mean that the Dionysiac impulse was defeated. Rather, Nietzsche interprets this event as another reformulation of the Greek redemptive doctrine (redemption by illusion). Thus, the Dionysiac impulse remained, although it could no longer be disclosed as a direct result of the decline and eventual elimination of the chorus.

Nietzsche insists that during his trial, Socrates realised that the Dionysiac impulse remained and was expressed in Socrates’ ‘dream vision’. A vision that instructed Socrates to make music (a dream that he acted upon). In doing so, Nietzsche believed that Socrates demonstrated awareness for the possibility of ‘a logical realm from which the logician is excluded’ (BT: 14). As a result, Nietzsche asks the following question; ‘Might there even be a necessary correlative and supplement to science?’ (BT: 14). In response Nietzsche considers the development of the Socratic impulse in science and the propensity in man to experience theoretical optimism as delight. For Nietzsche, this indicated that the more successful science becomes, the faster its ‘optimism essential to logic collapses’ (BT: 15). This is the same realisation that Socrates made prior to the event of science itself. Although in The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche will call for ‘a new form of knowledge, tragic knowledge’ (op. cit.) to replace scientific knowledge, it is clear that during this early stage, he was aware that some form of union between science and art was necessary. From this, we can infer that ending asceticism was not Nietzsche’s aim, nor was appending any blame to Socrates for the demise of tragedy. Rather, as always, Nietzsche’s greatest concern was for the future and how the past may inform us of it. Thus, the origin of asceticism revealed to Nietzsche a problem that would be repeated in Nietzsche’s lifetime. The problem is not how to end asceticism but how to recognise its decline in order to rekindle the flames of the contest so that life (defined and sustained through contest) never ends.

**Note on Socrates**

It is a mistake to assume that Nietzsche holds Socrates responsible for the demise of tragedy within late antiquity. Instead, tragedy died of suicide, a pronouncement that Nietzsche makes at the beginning of BT: 11. As a result, Socrates should be considered as the instigator of the transition from antiquity (mythos) to modernity,
‘the age of reason and logic’ (Burnham & Jesinghausen, 2010, p. 12). A transition that suppressed the ‘mythical drives’ of the Apollonian and Dionysian with the ‘hegemonic expansion of logos as a powerful new cultural agent’ (op. cit.). Sixteen years after writing The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche revisited the ‘Problem of Socrates’ in the ‘Twilight of the Idols’. Here Nietzsche offers his strongest polemic against Socrates. However, before this begins Nietzsche makes an interesting claim:

One must reach out and try to grasp this astonishing finesse, that the value of life cannot be estimated. Not by a living man, because he is a party to the dispute, indeed its object, and not the judge of it. (TII: Socrates, 2)

The image of ‘reaching out’ in order to grasp is symbolic of Socrates’ endeavour to rationalise the world in a web of knowledge; but where does one reach to? This is where Nietzsche’s critique of rationalism begins. The ‘reaching out’ represents the paradox inherent to transcendence. In an attempt to ‘reach out’, Socrates (and the rationalists) must negate the object that, in effect, does the reaching, which represents the impossibility of reaching out. This means that one cannot escape or transcend the conditions of their subjectivity (i.e., the conditions of time and space), which is precisely what (Nietzsche believed) the rationalists were attempting to do. Therefore, the value of life cannot be estimated because all estimations must occur within life and not outside of it. In a note written between Spring and Autumn 1887, Nietzsche claims:

Life is founded on the presupposition of a belief in things lasting and regularly recurring; the more powerful the life, the wider must be the divinable world - the world, so to speak, that is made to be. Logicising, rationalising, systematising as life’s resources.

In a certain sense man projects his drive to truth, his ‘goal’, outside himself as a world that is, as a metaphysical world, as a ‘thing-in-itself’, as an already existing world. (NLN 9[91] / WP: 552)

As we found in Part 2, materialism takes on a similar path, but it is in Socrates that Nietzsche finds man reaching ‘outside’ of himself to the ‘other world’, the world of forms, of eternal truth and Being.
Nietzsche also claims that Socrates managed to transform 'Greek taste', from anti-dialectic to pro-dialectic via his great eroticism (TI: Socrates, 8). Socrates led a revolution ‘with the knife-thrust of the syllogism’ (TI: Socrates, 7), which conquered the failing aristocracy of which tragedy was a part. The instinctual creation of pathos of distance (between man / nature, man / man etc.) and the noble conceptual transformation, was inverted by Socrates. His formula ‘reason = virtue = happiness’ (TI: Socrates, 10) became the moral schema of Western thought; ‘producing a permanent daylight’ (op. cit.). Self-overcoming became the suppression of instincts, ‘understood [as] spiritual growth as the transcendence of some given human reality’ (Burnham, 2007, p. 194). By inverting the formula of the conceptual transformation and applying it to an already declining culture, Socrates introduced a pessimism of weakness. The immediacy of forgetfulness was replaced with a new and greater need to ‘hold firm,’ and as a consequence, the will to truth became manifest in the conscience of man.

**Ascetic Ideal**

In the final section from the third essay of the *Genealogy*, Nietzsche confronts the problem of asceticism. He claims that suicidal nihilism (i.e., a will not to will) was countered by the ascetic ideal. This was the most profound and dangerous phase for humanity, so dangerous that the will immediately imposed a new order:

> At this point, its life-preserving powers intervened, and, rather than choosing death, the human animal chose to will nothingness (das Nichts) – that is, to will a denial and hatred of itself, of life, and the most fundamental presuppositions of life. (Loeb, 2010, p. 134)

Nietzsche suggests that certain aspects of the ascetic ideal are in decline and if a counter-ideal cannot be formed then man faces the prospect of European nihilism. Whereas the ascetic ideal (which we may provisionally claim is the will to nothingness), intervened to counter the prospect of suicidal nihilism (i.e., the will not to will) by giving meaning to suffering in the rejection of the body as the most immediate object of the will. Nietzsche believes that European nihilism, ‘the will to truth’s becoming conscious of itself’ (GM: III, 27) will engulf humanity following the
death of God. This means that the current system of values upon which European thought was founded (i.e., Christian morality) will be recognised as a ‘trick for the preservation of life’ (GM: III, 13). Christoph Cox summarises the problem as follows:

The “monstrous logic of terror” set in motion by the “death of God” is brought about from the inside, through a critique necessitated by the very presuppositions of European thought. In short, for Nietzsche, the “death of God” marks the beginning of self-overcoming of the foundational structures of European thought. (Cox, 1999, p. 17)

As Cox suggests, for Nietzsche, European nihilism is unavoidable and although it is ‘the most terrible, most dubious drama [...]’, it is ‘also the most rich in hope’ (GM: III, 27). European nihilism represents the decline of the ascetic ideal and the dawn for a new European era, provided that ‘the will to truth’s becoming conscious of itself’ can endure incorporation. In order for this to happen, Nietzsche must find a counter-ideal so that a new contest can be created and the ‘will’ of the free spirit has a goal. To understand how Nietzsche formulates his response, we must look at the immanent conditions from which the ideal arose; ‘what it means, what it indicates, what lies hidden behind, beneath and within it’ (GM III, 23). As Keith Ansell-Pearson claims; ‘In short, the task is to bring this ideal to self-knowledge by uncovering what lies beneath it’ (Ansell-Pearson K., 2005, p. 96). It should be noted that this task is more difficult than it may appear because once the ideal is brought to self-knowledge, a deeper fracture within man is created – the consequences of which cannot be forecast.

This is representative of the experimental nature of the problem of incorporation. Furthermore, because the scope of the ideal penetrates all aspect of knowledge, Nietzsche cannot simply provide a normative account of the ideal. That is to say, he cannot ask ‘what is the ascetic ideal?’ because this would require a normative response that would presuppose a metaphysical notion of ‘truth’. Rather in the title of the third essay he asks, ‘What do ascetic ideals mean?’ which is a question of value. He applies the question to the artist, philosopher, women, and priests. This means that the parameters of the ideal vary (i.e., they are not static objects of knowledge); therefore whichever category one falls into alters the answer. For example, in the case of the artist he claims that it means ‘nothing at all’ (GM: III, 4). On the other hand, when the question is applied to the philosopher, specifically to Schopenhauer, the ideal becomes the obstacle that the will must overcome through
negation. More generally, the ideal favours the philosopher who, ‘on seeing an ascetic ideal [...] smiles because he sees an optimum condition of the highest and boldest intellectuality’ (GM: III, 7). The problem that Nietzsche wants to raise is, what will happen once the ideal (in its most general formulation) degenerate? More specifically, upon the inevitable decline of Christian morality (as a mode of the ideal), what will replace it? The obvious answer would of course be science. However, Nietzsche proposes that science is the most recent incarnation of the ascetic ideal. This is an important element of the ascetic ideal. However, Nietzsche’s critique of science lies outside the scope of this project. As a result we must accept his analysis of science as a mode of ascetic ideal without further deliberation in order to move onto more pertinent matters.

The question of what will replace the ascetic ideal remains. This is the real dilemma of the ideal. Not only does it penetrate all aspects of our lives, it does so under a veil. In a similar vein to the Apolline Greeks, man (European man) must deceive himself about the existence of the ideal so that life remains meaningful. This self-deceptive quality relates to the distinction we made earlier concerning ‘little’ and ‘great’ reason. Throughout the *Genealogy*, Nietzsche makes subtle references to the physiological processes that produce and (ultimately) control consciousness. For example, at the beginning of the second essay when introducing the value of forgetfulness he claims:

> To shut the doors and windows of consciousness for a while; not to be bothered by the noise and battle with which our underworld of serviceable organs work with and against each other, a little peace, a little *tabula rasa* of consciousness to make room for something new, above all for the nobler functions and functionaries, for ruling, predicating, predetermining [...] – that, as I said, is the benefit of active forgetfulness, like a door keeper or guardian of mental order rest and etiquette: from which we can immediately see how there could be no happiness, cheerfulness, hope, pride *immediacy*, without forgetfulness. (GS: II, 1)

The deceptive quality of the ideal operates below the level of consciousness. In order to create meaning and purpose for man (through a will to nothingness), ‘Great reason’ must project ascetic ideals into the architecture of consciousness. Consciousness and its epistemological pursuits, such as art, philosophy, science and
religion are inextricably bound within this process. The grand operation of forgetfulness is to ‘close the doors’ on great reason, and in doing so supply the Ego with a unique sense of purposiveness. This supports the Deleuzian thesis that consciousness is the region of the ego ‘affected by the external world’ (Deleuze G., 2006, p. 39).

Towards the end of the third essay, Nietzsche asks, ‘Where is the counterpart to this closed system of will, goal and interpretation?’ (GM: III, 23). Adrian Del Caro (2004) claims that three things must be considered when formulating a response:

First, the ascetic ideal represents a closed system, a trap, in which human being is arrested and held in stasis; secondly, science cannot function as a “way out” of a closed system because science, noble as it is and representing the pinnacle of what can be achieved under the ascetic impulse, is nonetheless history’s most recent from of asceticism; and thirdly, we still need the counter, we still need the match, the equal of this powerful ascetic ideal. (Del Caro, 2004, p. 178)

Del Caro’s analysis confirms the problematic aspects that science raises when considering alternatives to the ideal. However, rather than focusing primarily on the notion of asceticism that Nietzsche provides in the Genealogy, the following discussion will explore a wider variety of recourses to substantiate the claim that; to counter the ideal, certain immanent conditions must first be realised.

Bruce Benson provides an account that attempts to ‘Rethink Asceticism’. He argues that, ‘it is neither clear that Nietzsche is simply, “against” asceticism nor clear that his “counter-ideal” must necessarily be “nonascetic” in nature’ (Benson B. E., 2008, p. 65) The ambiguity that surrounds Nietzsche’s asceticism rests on the interpretation that we give to the ideal. For example, it may operate ‘to the detriment of life’ – as in the case of the priestly ascetic, and yet Nietzsche claims that the ideal has ‘been crucial to the development of human beings’ (GM: III, 23). Furthermore, even the priestly ascetic has produced an advantageous outcome. For example, Nietzsche explains that, ‘the human soul became deep in the higher sense and turned evil for the first time – and of course, these are the two basic forms of man’s superiority, hitherto, over other animals!...’ (GM: I, 6). It seems that whichever way we interpret the ideal, we face a problem of ambivalence. In response, Benson argues:
Nietzsche cannot be read as simply against asceticism: to be against asceticism would mean being against life. Although it may seem that the ascetic represents “life against life,” Nietzsche labels any such view as “simply nonsense”. Any ascetic “attack” on life, then, “can only be apparent”. (Benson B. E., 2008 , p. 65)

Benson makes the mistake of assuming that the ideal operates on a conscious level and therefore qualifies as an operation of the unified will. However, Nietzsche makes it clear that the ascetic ideal is a trick for the preservation of life’ (GM: III, 13) – a ‘trick’ that occurs at the level of ‘Great reason’. Thus, any ascetic attack on life can only be ‘apparent’ precisely because it appears (i.e., at the level of Little Reason) to be that way. Nietzsche makes it clear that the will (as it is known at a conscious level), is merely the result of innumerable processes that operate on all levels of from the biological, physiological, psychological and extending all the way through to the sociological. Thus, the ambivalence occurs because of the various operations of a multiplicity of wills.

Throughout the Genealogy, Nietzsche toys with asceticism and the ascetic ideal in order to reveal their dualistic nature. The ambiguity that surrounds them within Nietzsche’s oeuvre is contrary to what one might expect, and rather than assuming that Nietzsche remained unsure of their specific meaning we should regard the ambiguity as revealing. Keith Ansell-Pearson is one of the few interpreters to recognise this:

The ascetic ideal is not what we might suppose; it is not, for example, a transcendence of the conditions of life (change, death, becoming) but a struggle with and against them. It amounts in effect, to ‘a trick for the preservation of life’. The disgust with life and nausea at existence that are at the heart of the ascetic ideal cannot transcend the conditions of life but only express them in a specific way. (Ansell-Pearson K. , 2005, pp. 97-8)

Ansell-Pearson’s use of ‘express’ is interesting. It indicates that the ideal must always remain within the confines of the conditions from which it arises. That is, no matter how life-denying the ideal may appear to be, it must remain in the service of life. The ‘otherness’ of the priestly ascetic (i.e., the denial of the body and earth) highlights
the success of the ‘trick for the preservation of life’, which must be regarded as the necessity of the ideal.

The ambiguity is representative of this struggle, and Nietzsche’s opposition to the ideal is specific. It relates to certain modes of the ideal that have become poisonous and are in decline. In this respect the priestly ascetic (which denies the body and earth), does not promote life in terms of overcoming but preserves a static mode of life – a typical characteristic of decadence.\(^4^0\) For example, Nietzsche cites the ideal pursued by the ascetic priest, the ‘unscrupulous and dangerous systematization of all the methods of emotional excess under the protection of holy intentions’, to be; ‘the real catastrophe in the history of health of European man’ (GM: III, 21). In *The Gay Science*, 327: ‘Taking Seriously’, he highlights the problems inherent to the scientific approach. In an attempt to ‘think well’, scientists attempt to control the ‘creaking machine’ that is the intellect by taking matters seriously. This assumes that, ‘where laughter and gaiety are found, thinking does not amount to anything’ – a particularly dangerous prejudice against Nietzsche’s proposed ‘gay science’ (GS: 327). ‘Dangerous’, because science is unwittingly pursuing a ‘straight path’ (i.e., a will to truth), similar to the one that Christian morality has followed for millennia by submitting to metaphysics. The advantage of ‘gay science’ is unparalleled; to combat the metaphysical faith of Christian morality and its most recent manifestation in science, the free spirit must possess the ability to laugh and dance by taking a ‘cheerful’ and at times ‘indifferent’ approach. Richard White writes:

> [...] *Gay Science* is a work of philosophy that continually calls philosophy into question; although, as Nietzsche comments, the fact that it cannot take itself seriously is perhaps the mask of its own “deeper” seriousness. (White, 1997, p. 90)

Thus, ‘gay science’ is a radical solution to the problem concerning the prejudicial path of science as the most recent mode of the ascetic ideal. Furthermore, the problem of ambiguity concerning the ideal is inherently a problem of immanence. This is because the will, which always needs an target, is directed by the ascetic ideal to ‘will nothingness rather than not will’ (GM: III, 1). However, because the will is merely the affective state of a multiplicity of wills raised to a conscious level, the danger of the ascetic ideal (and Nietzsche specifically has in mind the priestly ideal) is its conformity to a singular path that cannot be sustained because it lacks the
creative venom that is produced through contest (agon). This is precisely why Nietzsche regards Christian morality as a dangerous system of values because it seeks to sustain the weak and ill-constituted, whereas an altogether healthier system of values would seek, ‘more power; not peace at all, but war; not virtue, but proficiency’ (AC: 2).

For Nietzsche, a direct parallel can be drawn between contest (agon) and the will to power. This is evident throughout Nietzsche’s writings from Homer’s Contest (1872) in which Nietzsche describes how Greek vitality was sustained through ‘envy, jealousy and competitive ambition’, to the closing lines of Ecce Homo; ‘- Have I been understood? Dionysus against the Crucified...’ (EH: Why Am I Destiny: 9). At the heart of Nietzsche’s conception of life is the necessity of some form of contest. Yet, the nature of the contest is not what we might suppose. It does not demand the annihilation of one’s opponent but the survival and subsequent domination of the opponent. Conway (1997) proposes that, ‘Nietzsche strives not so much to win his quixotic contest within modernity – which would, if it were possible, extinguish the agon – as to prolong its duration while continually raising the stakes of participation’ (Conway, 1997, p. 69). Conway limits his reading to Nietzsche’s critique of modernity. However, Conway’s reading of the agon extends to all aspects of life. Take the body, for example; the higher structure demands the sustenance of the lower structures. If the contest of the body were otherwise, and the ruler destroyed the ruled, then the body would quickly perish.

For Nietzsche, life is sustained through contest not utility because contest is the condition of health and overcoming. To create a contest, at least two opposing forces are required. The free spirit is the embodiment of the internal conflict produced by the suppression and sublimation of drives. Only they possess a depth of soul, strong enough to endure the incorporation of truth. However, without a target, the free spirit is ineffective. This is why in the Preface of BGE Nietzsche claims: ‘[...] we good Europeans and free, very free spirits – we have it still, the whole need of the spirit and the whole tension of its bow! And perhaps also the arrow, the task and, who knows? The target...’ (BGE: Preface).

The target that Nietzsche alludes to is Overman as the immanent ideal. However, to achieve this (presuming it can be achieved) the ascetic ideal (known in Zarathustra as the Spirit of Gravity) must be overcome.
**Spirit of Gravity (backward willing)**

Part 2 found that Nietzsche introduces his philosophy of immanence with the announcement that ‘God is dead’ and that the task of the philosopher of the future is to ‘vanquish his shadow’ (GS: 108). Part 2 also found that the question, ‘why science?’ was a problem of morality because (for Nietzsche) human life depends on a deception that is integral to the will to truth. To overcome this problem, Nietzsche proposed that science should commence from a position of ‘disutility and dangerousness’, rather than its current basis of ‘calculus of utility’ (GS: 344). In the *Genealogy*, Nietzsche redirects the reader back to *The Gay Science* in which he discovered:

> [...] the truthful man, in that daring and final sense which faith in science presupposes, *thus affirms another world* from the one of life, nature and history; and insomuch as he affirms this “other world”, must he not therefore deny its opposite, this world, our world. (GM: III, 24)

Faith in metaphysical values limits by denying perspective. It follows a single path that does not relate to this world but an imagined one. Only from the basis of ‘gay science’, a practice that is capable of self-critique through a ‘cheerful’ approach, can science truly become capable of self-overcoming. This is also confirmed in GS: 343 ‘The meaning of our cheerfulness’ and by Zarathustra when he declares:

> I came to my truth by diverse paths and diverse ways [...] All my progress has been an attempting and questioning [...] ‘This – is now my way: where is yours?’ Thus I answered those who asked me ‘the way’. For the way – does not exist! (Z: III, 11)

When examining cheerfulness as a methodological tool required for combating the ‘Spirit of Gravity’, it is important not to confuse the manner in which Nietzsche employs the terms. Ansell-Pearson and Duncan Large explain that:

> There is a real intricacy to Nietzsche’s conception of gay science, and its precise nature and specific tasks merit being worked through carefully: there is a new seriousness but one that is executed with a spirit of laughter and of comedy. (Ansell-Pearson & Large, 2006, p. 158)
On the one hand we have the ‘seriousness’ that is associated with the spirit of gravity, while on the other we have a seriousness of ‘laughter’. The latter is the method that Nietzsche implores the free spirit to employ in order to overcome the former. Furthermore, Nietzsche uses the image of ‘gravity’ in a variety of ways. For example, in ‘Taking Seriously’ (GS: 327), he alludes to the seriousness of science (as a mode of the ascetic ideal and spirit of gravity) and the manner in which science conceives of itself. He also uses ‘gravity’ to signify ‘bitterness, resentment, guilt and shame brought on by the traditional moral doctrine’ (Allison D. B., 2001, p. 119). Thus, the image of ‘gravity’ encompasses a number of things for Nietzsche. However, there is a common theme that unites them. This is the relation between the will and the burden of the past (i.e., the will’s inability to change what has come to pass). This is one of the central aspects of the will’s nihilistic character and a problem that Nietzsche must overcome. In the case of Christianity, the will creates purpose for itself in the figure of Christ the redeemer. Miracles offer a solution to the problem of the past. Throughout ancient times, it was common to believe that deformities of the body were the result of the parent’s sins. Thus, by curing the physical ailments, Christ absolved the sins of the past on the proviso that the cured repent. Yet, with the event of the death of God, Christian redemption is no longer a possibility (see GM: III, 21 – ‘God sacrificing himself for man’s debt’). Aside from this, Nietzsche also reflects on Schopenhauer’s nihilistic solution to the problem of suffering, i.e. as the will to nothingness. Nietzsche must find a more radical solution, one that avoids positing meaning beyond this world and escapes Schopenhauer’s nihilistic alternative.

In ‘Of Redemption’, the Spirit of Gravity takes the form of a hunchback. The hunchback asks Zarathustra to perform the same miracles as Christ, but Zarathustra cannot fulfil this request. Turning to his disciples Zarathustra says; ‘The present and the past upon the earth – alas! my friends – that is my most intolerable burden; and I should not know how to live, if I were not the seer of that which is to come’ (Z: II, 20). The will, powerless to alter the past, directs its power against itself and in doing so it becomes reactive. This is what Nietzsche terms ‘the spirit of revenge’ in ‘Zarathustra’ and the origin of ‘bad conscience’ in the Genealogy (see GM: II, 17). Nietzsche must find a way to reunite the will with its past. Only by creative willing can the will find redemption and become active; ‘To redeem the past and to transform every ‘It was’ into an ‘I willed it thus!’ – that alone do I call redemption!’ (Z, II, 20). Ansell-Pearson and Large name this ‘immanent redemption’, and explain that it is the ‘redemption
of chance through the imposition of his will’ (Ansell-Pearson & Large, 2006, p. 252). Burnham and Jesinghausen summarise the problem as follows:

The will is furious that time is not running backwards, but it is at least possible for it to reconcile itself with time by redeeming the past so that it be no longer a burden to time that runs forward. (Burnham & Jesinghausen, Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 2010, p. 119)

However, because ‘immanent redemption’ cannot make the same promises that Christian redemption can, i.e. to redeem the past in the promise of heavenly paradise, Zarathustra is ‘seized by extremest terror’ (Z, II, 20). The terror relates to the paradoxical state of the eternal return which is symptomatic of Sisyphean fate. Thus, immanent redemption is not merely an explanation of backward willing but also the terrifying truth of what the eternal return involves. Not even Zarathustra is prepared for this and as Ansell-Pearson and Large observe, Part II of Zarathustra ends before Zarathustra can incorporate the profundity of his own message.

In order to see how Nietzsche attempts to combat the Spirit of Gravity it is vital that we become accustomed to the devices that Nietzsche employs to raise the free spirit to a level that can conceive of the ideal without crumbling under its weight. We should again note that Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence involves a gradual unfolding and the abrupt end to Part II is evidence that the attainment of the immanent ideal requires time and convalescence. It is clear that the Spirit of Gravity is Nietzsche’s more stylistic incarnation of the ascetic ideal. Paul Loeb comments:

Since the concept of the all-powerful spirit of gravity in Zarathustra is an earlier incarnation of the concept of the all-powerful ascetic ideal in Genealogy, we may say more precisely, then, that the counter-ideal to the ascetic ideal is Zarathustra’s recurrence- affirming, backward-willing, and no-longer-human soul. (Loeb, 2010, p. 236)

Both Del Caro and Loeb address the eternal return as the counter-ideal, although they fail to recognise the role of cheerfulness within Nietzsche’s proposed method. This amounts to a serious limitation because cheerfulness is the method that Zarathustra must employ in order that the eternal return can be embraced. Thus, if Nietzsche is to successfully navigate Zarathustra through the terrifying thought of the
eternal return, he must do so by wearing a ‘cheerful mask’. This involves a sense of elevation that becomes evident at the end of Part II when Zarathustra forsakes his friends and makes his way over the ‘ridge of the island’ at the beginning of Part III. As we found in Part 2, ‘cheerfulness’ requires the blessed perspective of the Epicurean gods. Zarathustra must therefore rise to the highest point, and in the epigraph to Part III, Nietzsche makes this explicit when he claims; ‘He who climbs the highest mountains laughs at all tragedies real or imaginary’. Furthermore, Nietzsche introduces the second part to the hybrid-concept of cheerfulness at the beginning of Part III in the Wanderer. Here we find confirmation of the necessity of ascent and of the conditions of duress (dynamic equilibrium). We should also note that the ascetic ideal is not something that can be overcome by the type ‘man’ because man is incapable of making the ascent. Rather, the free spirit alone possesses the strength of character that compels him to seek danger and destruction. It is at this point that Nietzsche reclaims the Democritean ‘dynamic equilibrium’ by utilising conditions of ‘duress’ that empower him and drive him towards this goal. Furthermore, the employment of ‘cheerfulness’ is also confirmed by Zarathustra when he cries:

And when I beheld my devil, I found him serious, thorough, profound, solemn: it was the Spirit of Gravity – through him all things are ruined.

One does not kill by anger but laughter. Come let us kill the Spirit of Gravity (Z: I, 7)

This highlights the centrality of cheerfulness as a methodological approach. Nietzsche is proposing that any counter-ideal cannot destroy the ideal head-on. For example, one could not demonstrate that science follows a linear path (a will to truth) and is an offshoot of Christianity by way of science itself. The only way of doing this would be to carry the burden (as the camel does) into the desert, or to carry the dwarf up the mountain to show it the gateway and thereby reveal the eternal return.

Nietzsche’s most informative account of ‘gravity’ is to be found in the GS: 380 ‘“The wanderer” speaks’. Here he makes a claim that clarifies the problem of the ascetic ideal. In order to situate the problem of ‘European morality’ against other moralities ‘past and present’, one must be able to go ‘up there’. Once again, this
demonstrates that the perspective of the Epicurean gods is a method that must be employed. From the herd perspective this would of course be a ‘minor madness’ because the tamed animal’s mediocrity prohibits the expression of individualism. Nevertheless, this is the calling of the free spirit; the question then becomes a matter of:

[...] how light or heavy we are—the problem then becomes one of our “specific gravity.” One has to be very light to drive one’s will to knowledge into such a distance and, as it were, beyond one’s time, to create for oneself eyes to survey millennia and, moreover, clear skies in these eyes. One must have liberated oneself from many things that oppress, inhibit, hold down, and make heavy precisely us Europeans today. The human being of such a beyond who wants to behold the supreme measures of value his time must first of all “overcome” this time in himself—this is the test of his strength—and consequently not only his time but also his prior aversion and contradiction against this time, his suffering from this time, his un-timeliness, his romanticism. (GS: 380)

Once again, Nietzsche employs the mask of the Epicurean gods in order to raise himself above the conditions of his subjectivity. This is evident by the claim, ‘to create for oneself eyes to survey millennia and, moreover, clear skies in these eyes’, which should be regarded as an allusion to the blessedness of the Epicurean gods who view the course of humanity with an ‘unconcerned eye’ (BGE: 62). This is also a method that the free spirit must employ in order to liberate itself from its own prejudices, prejudices that Nietzsche admits once afflicted him. For example, in the above discussion of GS: 370, Nietzsche confesses that he fell victim to the:

[...] captious form of backward inference in which most mistakes are made: [...] from the ideal to those who need it, from every way of thinking and valuing to the commanding need behind it. (GS: 370)

This ‘commanding need’ is the manifestation of the burden of time within the individual. Nietzsche recognises that, ‘how light or heavy we are’, ‘may depend on manifold conditions’ (GS: 380), i.e. a synthesis that occurs in ‘great reason’ prior to its release to ‘little reason’, which communicates the command. Therefore, the free spirit cannot combat gravity (i.e., the constitutive conditions of the individual) for this
NIETZSCHE’S PHILOSOPHY OF IMMANENCE

would be absurd. However, he or she can oppose its spirit (i.e., the need to make small – see BGE: 230), by abandoning faith in metaphysics.

Furthermore, Nietzsche proposes a perspectivism such that, ‘we have no bare facts – facts independent of our perspectival interpretations – to which we can appeal for foundational justification of our truth-claims’ (Bellioti, 1998, p. 11). If the free spirit has a strong constitution and can abandon their faith in metaphysics, then they will ascend. In BGE: 30, Nietzsche makes a distinction between the ‘esoteric’ perspective, which sees from above and ‘exoteric’ which sees things from below. He argues that; ‘There are heights of the soul seen from which even tragedy ceases to be tragic; and, taking all the woe from the world together [...]’. Such esotericism is clearly a development of the perspective of the Epicurean gods. Moreover, it also demonstrates that once one stands apart from the herd, it becomes evident that their system of values (i.e., Christian values), which are grounded by faith in metaphysical values, limit by denying perspective. Therefore, in response to the task raised by Ansell-Pearson at the beginning of the section; ‘In short, the task is to bring this ideal to self-knowledge by uncovering what lies beneath it’ (2005, p. 96), we have found that the hybrid-concept of ‘cheerfulness’ is the method that must first be realised and then employed by the free spirit so that they can ascend and thereby uncover what ‘lies beneath’ the ascetic ideal (i.e., its immanent conditions). Only then can Nietzsche’s counter-ideal of the Overman as the ‘immanent ideal’ be realised. In this respect the Overman, when understood as the immanent ideal, creates the conditions for contest (agon) and the continuation of the contest that is essential to life.

As we have found throughout this section, the image of rising above one’s subjectivity is deeply akin to the perspective of the unconcerned ‘Epicurean god’ (BGE: 62). However, unlike Epicurus who experienced the redemptive quality of this ‘noble lightness’ (Burnham, 2007, p. 97) through withdrawal, the free spirit must confront the Spirit of Gravity. The following section will set out the nature of this contest in order to demonstrate the answer to Zarathustra’s riddle must be understood in relation to the contest and the problem of incorporation.
Of the Vision and the Riddle

In ‘Of the vision and the riddle’, Zarathustra carries the Spirit of Gravity upwards; this is representative of the burden the camel must bear in the first metamorphosis. The Spirit of Gravity, who enters the narrative in the form of a half dwarf, half mole (image of the deformed or incomplete human digging into Zarathustra’s ‘Great’ reason) oppresses Zarathustra relentlessly until something inside Zarathustra, which he calls ‘courage’, stops him and says, ‘Dwarf! You! Or I!’ (Z: III, 2). Nietzsche explores the notion of courage at some length as it symbolises the second transformation of Zarathustra’s spirit into the second metamorphosis of the lion. The dwarf jumps from Zarathustra’s shoulder, onto a stone, Zarathustra immediately feels ‘lightened’ and then the gateway named “Moment” appears. Here we encounter Zarathustra’s teaching of the eternal return. Upon the initial explication of the doctrine, the dwarf annoys Zarathustra by taking his teaching ‘lightly’. This is significant because the dwarf seemingly mimics Nietzsche’s ‘cheerful’ approach. Thus, the dwarf is contesting Zarathustra’s teaching though the veil of Zarathustra’s own method. However, it should also be noted that the dwarf is merely an observer, sitting on the stone and therefore suspended from the moment. In this respect he symbolises the time of transcendence (eternal being), whereas Zarathustra, standing on the path, symbolises the time of immanence (through becoming). Upon Zarathustra’s second attempt to teach the doctrine he is startled by the barking of a dog, which is an image from Nietzsche’s childhood that causes him to recollect the guilt of his father’s death. This autobiographical element breaks the narrative and when Zarathustra turns, once more to face the dwarf, he finds that the dwarf, spider and gateway are gone. Zarathustra’s courage has been subverted by pity, which indicates that he has not incorporated his own message. Zarathustra’s will still yearns for power over the past (possibly to help his father), and in this respect his will remains reactive.

Nevertheless, Zarathustra is then confronted by a young shepherd, choking on a black snake. In the shepherd, Zarathustra sees himself confronted with the riddle for the first time. Horrified by the image, Zarathustra asks; ‘Has he, perhaps, been asleep? Then the snake had crawled into his throat – and there it had bitten itself fast?’ (Z: III, 2). The dream image evokes Nietzsche’s original conception of the ‘greatest weight’ (GS: 341) – the first conception of the eternal return, where a daemon forces its way into the mind, which is akin to the snake forcing its way down
the shepherd’s throat. The image of the serpent simultaneously represents man’s fall from grace (abandoned by God) and the circularity of time expressed in the eternal return. Then, once more, a voice cries from within Zarathustra, ‘Bite! Bite!’ (op. cit.). This is the second time in the passage that Zarathustra receives a command from ‘Great Reason’ – he then receives a third command, ‘Its head off! Bite!’ indicating that the spirit is prepared for its final transformation. Zarathustra cries, ‘my horror, my hate, my disgust, my pity, all my good and evil cried out of me with a single cry’ (op. cit.). This is immediately followed by a call for the solution to the riddle and upon hearing these words the shepherd bites as Zarathustra’s inner voice commanded. Thus the shepherd is released from the torment of the Spirit of Revenge that choked him. His spirit transformed for the final time and thereby realigned with the will to power; ‘No longer a shepherd, no longer man – a transformed being, surrounded with light, laughing!’ (op. cit.). The transformed shepherd’s laughter is a joyous laughter of empowerment, the light that shines from him is akin to the thunderbolt that Zarathustra prophesied in the Prologue. This also indicates that man no longer needs the light of God as the transcendent ideal; rather man can now take his light from the Overman as the immanent ideal. Finally in the Overman the truth that man is the answer has been incorporated.

Crucially, however, this is Zarathustra’s vision and not an event that in the linearity of time (presented through the structured narrative of the text) has yet occurred. This is why the Overman remains an immanent ideal – his time awaits. As a result, the experiment which is the incorporation of truth is yet to be achieved although we are at least told how this experiment should proceed. As Kaufmann observes, ‘unlike many of his readers, [Nietzsche] never loses sight of the fact that he himself was an ascetic’ (Nietzsche F., The Gay Science, 1974, pp. 258, fn. 54). This is reflected by the fact that in the vision, it is the shepherd and not Zarathustra who undergoes the transformation. Thus, even if the shepherd is interpreted as Zarathustra’s future self, there remains a separation. This is confirmed in the final section of the book ‘The Sign’ where Zarathustra leaves his disciples who are suspended between the lion spirit and the child spirit in a fragmented state intoxicated in their convalescence. As Zarathustra states, ‘My children are near, my children’ (Z: IV, 20). In respect to incorporation, the meaning of Zarathustra’s final remarks remains open to interpretation and although Nietzsche intimates that the final transformation may
occur (as the lion laughs), this does not mean the final transformation will occur. Evidence for such a reading can be found in the Anti-Christ when Nietzsche states:

The problem I raise here is not what ought to succeed mankind in the sequence of species (the human being is an end): but what type of human being one ought to breed, ought to will, as more valuable, more worthy of life, more certain of the future. (AC: 3)

The first thing to note is Nietzsche’s apparent critique of Darwinian evolution. ‘Apparent’ because as Ansell-Pearson suggests:

[...] it is important to appreciate that even when Nietzsche presents himself as ‘contra’ Darwin, he is, in fact, frequently writing ‘pro’ Darwin and refuting only erroneous images of Darwin which he has derived from popularizations of his thought. (Ansell-Pearson K., Viroid Life, 1997, p. 86)

Nevertheless, Nietzsche is not proposing a succession of the human species but the development of a particular ‘type’, which also sheds light on Zarathustra’s claim that; ‘What is great about man is that he is a bridge and not a goal’ (Z: P, 4). In respect to the closing of Zarathustra, because evolution is non-teleological, it is pointless to make predictions regarding its direction. However, by ‘breeding’ and ‘willing’ the more ‘worthy of life’, Nietzsche believed that a future based upon immanent values could be realised.

Both Nietzsche and Zarathustra are effectively bound within their immanent conditions, their bodily horizons. Although transfigured, in the sense that they have become what are, they cannot become what they are not (i.e., the Overman). Thus, Zarathustra’s message of the coming of the Overman remains an immanent ideal. Man’s redemption therefore lies in his capacity to undergo incorporation, which requires the selective ‘breeding’ and ‘willing’ of the free spirit because they are the only ‘type’ capable of undergoing the transformation of the spirit.
Summary

Throughout this section we have witnessed Nietzsche’s attempts to reveal the nature of the ascetic ideal. By drawing upon a wide variety of recourses including The Birth of Tragedy, The Gay Science, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, On the Genealogy of Morality and his notes we have found that asceticism and the ascetic ideal are problems that extend throughout his active writing life. In the introduction to this section it was argued that the ideal, which penetrates all aspects of knowledge, has finally revealed itself as the will to nothingness. Although this will was necessary to overcome suicidal nihilism (as demonstrated in ‘The Origin of Asceticism’), its manifestation in consciousness (as the will to truth) ‘forbids itself the lie entailed in the belief in God’ (GM: III, 27). However, as a consequence of the will to truth, the spirit remains in a reactive state and therefore the problem of disembodiment remains. In ‘Nietzsche’s System of Psychology’ we found that, in his great resourcefulness, Nietzsche utilised the problem of disembodiment to demonstrate that psychology (spirit) has a physiological (bodily) basis. In doing so, Nietzsche revealed how affective states, such as, ‘consciousness’, ‘soul’, ‘I’, and the subject, when taken in isolation from the body, were driven by the spirit’s need for self-mastery. In this respect, the nature of the spirit is such that it set free the Ego like a child who released a balloon only to see it climb to the heavens. For Nietzsche, since the event of Socrates, Western society has been driven by a will with one aim; to end the contest of the body that in an affective state is experienced as suffering. We found that the will, although powerful, could not destroy itself due to the imposition of the ascetic ideal. However, through its cunning, it created (for itself) a world in which suffering, decay and overcoming were abandoned in favour of an eternally perfect transcendent world. In this act, the will expressed its creative capacity, which for Nietzsche, was a sign that European nihilism could be overcome provided the spirit and the body could be united.

Nietzsche makes a crucial distinction between those who are capable of this transformation and those who are not. Whereas the former refers to the stronger type, who seek danger and destruction, the latter is a reference to man as herd animal that wishes to remain one of the flock. Nietzsche finds such recourse to mediocrity hazardous because the herd animal man lacks the creative will for self-overcoming. The instinct of the ancient Greek aristocracy, who were capable of self-
overcoming and creating new values, was replaced by the divine belief in the power of reason and the suppression of bodily instincts. Such instincts were regarded by the herd as bestial and the will, sickenened by the body and in effect made sick by the body as the source of suffering, found redemption in Christ the saviour. With the ability to free humanity from the scourge of the past and with the symbolic gesture of the crucifixion, the mutilated body of Christ represented (for the Christian in the Pauline tradition) freedom from sin and suffering. Yet such beliefs, predicated on ‘Chandala revengefulness’ (AC: 58), could not endure forever. Eventually man will be confronted with the truth that he is not the divine being blessed by the grace of God, but an incomplete animal driven by his instincts.

Once again we return to the problem of incorporation, which has reappeared throughout of Parts 2 and 3 of this study. The reason for this is simple: The problem of incorporation is the problem that Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence must overcome if it is to succeed in vanquishing the shadow of God. As we have found, the task of the free spirit is to combat the Spirit of Gravity, who like the serpent blocks the incorporation of truth. The free spirit must rise above the conditions of their subjectivity by employing the ‘cheerful’ method. As Nietzsche states, it is a question of ‘how light or heavy we are’ (GS: 380). Upon its ascent, the free spirit will destroy the spirit of gravity as the lion destroyed the dragon. However, because the free spirit cannot incorporate the truth and thereby create new values, it cannot undergo the final transformation. The child spirit remains an ideal both for Nietzsche and Zarathustra. Thus, the task of the free spirit is preparatory as it is the only being capable of creating the conditions for the contest that is required. This is the reason why the incorporation of truth is an experiment yet to happen because the ‘breeding’ and ‘willing’ a certain type has not yet occurred. As a result, we must concede that Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence fails in its primary task of vanquishing the shadow of God. However, such a failure is perpetual and must itself be willed because if the immanent ideal was realised and the will achieved its goal, then what target would remain? If the answer is none, then a new state of nihilism would present itself once more.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

1 See discussion of Little and Great Reason (Part 3, ‘Despisers of the Body’).

3 This is confirmed in Zarathustra, when he claims, ‘Your small reason what you call “spirit”, is also a tool of your body, my brother, a small work – and plaything of your great reason’ (Z; I, 4).

4 In Part 3 ‘Note on Spirit’, I will introduce the complexity of the concept ‘spirit’ and Nietzsche’s use of it.

5 Adrian Del Caro translation taken from, Nietzsche F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 2006, p. 23.

6 Nietzsche uses the term semeiotics to describe the process by which mechanistic theory increases its feeling of power and control over life. More generally, it is an attack on positivism which is reflected in the following note: ‘Life, as an individual case: hypothesis starting from here and extending to the total nature of existence:

: strives for a maximum feeling of power

: is essentially a striving for more power

: striving is nothing other than striving for power

: the most basic and innermost thing remains this will: mechanics is a mere semiotics of the consequences.’ (NLN 14[82] / WP: 698).

7 However, in the section ‘Asceticism and Ascetic Ideal’, we will also find that consciousness plays another crucial role concerning the ego’s sense of purposiveness.

9 I have omitted the editorial addition of ‘[the agonies of]’. See fn. 4 WP:491. p. 271.

10 In the Genealogy, Nietzsche introduces the concept of revenge born from powerlessness (GM: I: 7). This must be taken as a development of moralisation first introduced by Plato, yet in the Plato / Epicurus divide, Plato was in a position of power: how then did this power become transformed? For Nietzsche, the establishment of ‘the real world’ (i.e., the world of forms) was the basis for the implementation of an inversion of values. This in turn led to the slave revolt in morals whereby; ‘The slave moves from the negative premise (“you are other and evil”) to the positive judgement (“therefore I am good”), the master works from the positive differentiation of self (“I am good”) to the negative corollary (“you are other and bad”)’ (Schrift, 1990, p. 83). This new mode of evaluation begins from the reactive force of
ressentiment. Whereas the noble classes defined themselves according to themselves, the slave had to define himself in opposition to their masters. Roberts comments, ‘their [the slaves] mode of valuation begins in the reaction to the strong, determining themselves as “evil”; “good” in this scheme, is the derivative concept, used to designate the victim of evil – oneself’ (Roberts, 1998, p. 37). In this sense the slave revolt creates its own values, however because these values are essentially reactive they emerge from the life denying principle of nihilism. For Nietzsche this is the original shift from immanence to transcendence; ‘Whereas all noble morality grows out of a triumphant saying ‘yes’ to itself, slave morality says ‘no’ on the principle to everything that is ‘outside’, ‘other’, ‘non-self’: and this ‘no’ is its creative deed. This reversal of the evaluating glance – this inevitable orientation to the outside instead of back onto itself – is a feature of ressentiment: in order to come about, slave morality first has to have an opposing, external world, it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all, its action is basically a reaction’. (GM: 1, 10). Plato created the conditions (i.e., of an external world) from which the lower-type could define themselves. Ressentiment should be considered as the psychological drive from ‘inside’ to ‘outside’. Nietzsche’s genealogical method is, as Deleuze describes, one of ‘internal genesis’ (Deleuze G., 2006, p. 91). And when Nietzsche tracks the development of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ he finds that they can be employed in a number of ways, depending on which side of the noble divide they sit. Deleuze claims, ‘the words “good”, “evil” and even “therefore” have several senses. We find, once again, that the method of dramatization, which is essentially pluralist and immanent, governs the enquiry’ (Deleuze G., 2006, p. 119). Nietzsche is not seeking to create a standard or rule (i.e., a transcendental determination – see p.43) which would place the inquiry ‘outside’ of the investigation. Rather he is attempting to inquire from within; this is the essential nature of his philosophy of immanence.

11 Nietzsche believes that remnants of this conflict can also be found in the Kantian ‘intelligible character of things’ (op. cit.), which, ‘for Kant’ means, ‘a sort of quality of things about which all that the intellect can comprehend is that it is, for the intellect – completely incomprehensible’ (GM: III, 12). Yet Nietzsche recognises the significance of this process because without it, there could be no ‘perspective knowing’, which uses ‘pure reason’, ‘absolute spirituality’ and ‘knowledge as such’ in order to create the ‘difference in perspectives and affective interpretations for knowledge’ (op. cit.).

12 Henceforth this process will be classified as ‘spiritualisation’.

13 Long & Sedley, The Hellenistic philosophers: Volume 1, 1997 make the following informative annotation: ‘Soul’ (psuchē) is a term whose breadth varies sharply in Greek usage. At its widest, notably in Aristotle, it embraces the entire range of vital functions of any living thing,
plants as well as animals. At its narrowest, as in Plato’s Phaedo, it is a largely intellectual force, housed in the animal body but ultimately separable from all bodily functions and sensations. Epicurus’ conception of it falls midway between these two extremes, very much like that of the Stoics (see 53) For him the soul’s primary functions are consciousness in all its aspects – especially sensation, thought and emotion (e.g. A 2-6, B 1-2) and the transmission of impulses to the body (B 3, E). Of these, thought and emotion are localized in the ‘mind’, which in common with most ancient philosophers Epicurus argued to be in the chest, the apparent seat of emotion (B 1; cf. 65H for the Stoics) The other functions belong to the ‘spirit’, which extends throughout the body and interacts closely with the mind, although the mind retains enough independence to count as a distinct entity (B2). Thus these two parts of the soul fulfil more or less the roles which subsequent physiology has assigned to the brain and the nervous system respectively (pp. 70-1).

14 This is an allusion to the lion part of the soul that Plato presents in the Republic (589d-590a). Here we find that the lion part of the soul combined with the human and the monstrous, constitute a tension that is necessary for a balanced and just life. However, for Nietzsche, balance is the problem. Therefore the lion part of the soul (to use Plato’s simile) must destroy the monstrous part, thereby creating new possibilities of virtue.

15 See Part 3, ‘The despisers of the body’ for discussion of Nietzsche’s use of manifold.

16 See discussion of Little and Great Reason (Part 3, ‘Despisers of the Body’).

17 As we found in Part 2 ‘Nietzsche’s admiration of Democritus and Epicurus’.

18 Thus, to speak of ataraxia as the attainment of steady atomic movements contradicts the necessary condition of the body that is required for life.

19 I will introduce Nietzsche’s conception of the Ureine in ‘The Origin of Asceticism’.

20 This also confirms the primordial state of ‘The will to power not a being, not a becoming, but a pathos’ [NLN 14 (79) / WP: 635], which I introduced in Part 3, ‘Grounding Psychology in Physiology’.

21 This is a lesson that Nietzsche learned first hand. See discussion of ‘personal providence’. Part 2 ‘Book 4 of The Gay Science: A New Approach to Cheerfulness’.

22 As would be suggested if the term epiphenomenon was used instead of ‘emergent reality’.

24 In this respect the Ego has a neurotic tendency.
The first is the Ego’s ability to create ‘titles and honours for the body and the earth’ ([Z: I, 3]).

Emphasis added.

Nietzsche states that, ‘The ascetic ideal has a goal, - which is so general, that all the interests of human existence appear petty and narrow when measured against it; it inexorably interprets epochs, peoples, man, all with reference to this one goal, it permits no other interpretation, no other goal, and rejects, denies, affirms, confirms only with reference to its interpretation[...]' (GM: III, 23).

Nietzsche states that, ‘[...] science today has absolutely no faith in itself, let alone the ideal above it, - and where it is still passion, love, fire, suffering, it is not the opposite of the ascetic ideal but rather the latter’s own most recent and noble manifestation’ (GM: III, 23).

i.e., as lack of anything better. See EH; ‘Genealogy’ & GM: III, 28.

In The World as Will and Idea Schopenhauer states, ‘if now, this thing-in-itself is the will...then, regarded as such and apart from its manifestation, it lies outside time and space, and thus knows no plurality, and is consequently one’ (2010, p. 158).

Nietzsche cites the lyrical poet with the musician as Archilochus and explains that, ‘It is this Archilochus who frightens us, as he stands next to Homer, with the cry of his hate and scorn, the drunken outpouring of his desire [...] First of all the Dionysiac artist, he has been thoroughly united with the primal Oneness, its pain and contradiction, and produces the copy of the primal Oneness as music, if we can rightly call music a repetition and recast of the world’ (BT: 5).

It should also be noted that a similar idea can be found in Schopenhauer, although Nietzsche does not accept the Schopenhauer’s nihilistic conclusions. In the World as Will and Representation we find; ‘the world that stands before me simply as my representation, or the transition from it as mere representation of the knowing subject to whatever it may be besides this; could never be found if the investigator were nothing more than the purely knowing subject (a winged cherub without a body). But he himself is rooted in that world; and thus he finds himself in it as an individual, in other words his knowledge, which is the conditional supporter of the whole world as representation, is never the less given through the medium of a body, and the affections of this body are, as we have shown, the starting point for the understanding in its perception of the world’ (Schopenhauer, 2010, pp. 123-4).

Two principles that are supported by, and found in, the writings of Epicurus (see the Principal Doctrines).
De Almedia & Roberts (2007) makes this mistake by claiming that; ‘In An Attempt At Self-Criticism, Nietzsche will add that tragedy, born of the Dionysian and tragic myth, has died as a result of the “Socratic Morality,” the dialectic or the frugality and cheerfulness of the theoretical man’ (p. 16).


Little reason is ‘conscious reason known by the mind’ (Benson B. E., 2008, p. 63). Great reason is unconscious reason known by the body. Also see Part 3 ‘Despisers of the Body’.

See, Benson B. E., 2008, pp. 64-70.

We may also extend this criticism to the Epicurean. In AC: 30 Nietzsche comments; ‘Epicurus a typical decadent: the first recognised as such by me. – The fear of pain, even in the infinitely small in pain – cannot end otherwise than in a religion of love...’ Thus, like the ascetic priest, Epicurus turned his back of life in terms of overcoming just as the ascetic priest does.

Which operate on a hierarchical structure throughout all processes of the body and on a grander scale in society. And because ‘every relationship of force constitutes a body’ (Deleuze G., 2006, p. 40).


For example, see Exodus 20:5, which states: ‘For I, the Lord your God, am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers on the children to the third and fourth generations of those who hate Me.’

Chapelle (1993) describes the paradox as follows; ‘The paradox lies in the simultaneous of the old and the new. Whereas every effort of Sisyphus to push the rock up the slope is a new challenge and a unique experience, it is simultaneously a renewed commitment to an old task and to an unchanging and binding destiny. What appears most hellish in Sisyphus’s fate is the realisation that all amounts to nothing but repetition’ (Chapelle, 1993, pp. 105-6).

Adrian Del Caro states that, ‘Nietzsche does not state here what the counter is or could be [...] but in my mind there is no doubt that this counter is the Dionysian, and the fundamental
formulation of the Dionysian as the rival of the ascetic ideal is the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same’. (Del Caro, 2004, p. 178).

48 Zarathustra states; ‘I have to climb my most difficult path! Alas, I have started upon my loneliest wandering’ (Z: III, 1).

49 In Part 2 ‘Nietzsche and Greek Materialism’ we found that the distinction between euthumia and ataraxia was important for Nietzsche because the former presupposes a ‘dynamic-equilibrium’ that Nietzsche recognised as an essential characteristic of all life, whereas the latter, which proposes a state of rest, is for Nietzsche a proposition which supports decadence.

50 See Part 2 ‘Nietzsche and Greek Materialism’.


52 See Part 3, ‘Of the Three Metamorphoses’.

53 See Part 3 ‘Note of Spirit’.

54 See Part 3, ‘Asceticism and the Ascetic Ideal’.

55 See, AC: 58.

56 There are a number of interpretations concerning the disappearance of the Dwarf, Spider and Gateway. T. K. Seung (2005) discusses a number of these. For example, Seung discusses the Heideggerian thesis that the Dwarf ‘ran away’, and Lampert’s thesis the ‘dwarf is crushed by Zarathustra’s talk’. Seung critiques both on the basis that there is no textual evidence for either case. Instead Seung offers credence to Loeb’s thesis that ‘Zarathustra never sees the dwarf killed, but only wonders where he has gone. When the dwarf disappears, he proposes, it is transformed to the black snake that crawled into the shepherd’s mouth’. Loeb and Seung cites Wagner’s ‘Rheingold’ as a ‘similar transformation’, which they argue is the basis for the dwarf’s transformation in Zarathustra – a claim that I agree with.

57 This indicates that Zarathustra is the shepherd and the vision is almost a nostalgic projection of the past. However, throughout the text Zarathustra claims not to be a herdsman, as Christ the saviour would be. Rather Zarathustra’s role is to steal from the herd those capable of hearing his message.

58 This should be contrasted the mockery of the laughing crowd which in ‘Of the Three Metamorphosis’ did not represent an outright rejection of Zarathustra’s message but their
inability to digest his message; their laughter is a variant reaction to the horror of Zarathustra’s message.

59 In Z: Prologue, 3 Zarathustra cries, ‘Behold, I teach you the Superman: he is this lightening, he is this madness!’.

60 For example, Robert Gooding-Williams (2001) claims, ‘in “The Convalescent,” we learn that Zarathustra’s interpretation of his vision was in fact an accurate revelation and intimation of his own destiny’ (Gooding-Williams, 2001, p. 229).

61 In Part 2 we found that the ‘problem of incorporation’ became manifest as a direct result of the incorporation of the Socratic formula; ‘reason = virtue = happiness’ (TI: Socrates, 4). This meant that the pursuit of knowledge became man’s dominant drive (above instinctual drives). However, with the event of the death of God, which occurred as a direct result of the will to truth became conscious of itself; the system of values that dominated Western society was destroyed. In its wake, Nietzsche believed that humanity would face a complete lack of purpose and meaning, and European nihilism would ensue. To combat this, Nietzsche proposed the experiment; ‘to what extent can truth endure incorporation?’ (GS: 110). In response, we found that incorporation is a matter of consumption and digestion. However, this meant that one’s capacity to undergo incorporation, particularly ‘truth’ and ‘untruth’ was determined by one’s physiology. Consequently, Nietzsche excludes certain types from his proposed experiment. In Part 3, we built upon the groundwork of Part 2 by developing the problem of incorporation through ‘Nietzsche’s System of Psychology’. Here we found that the original ‘disembodiment’ (knowledge vs. instinct) transformed the spirit by effectively turning it against itself. This led to a rejection of body and earth because the spirit, in its need for mastery and due to its powerlessness to end suffering inherent to life, became reactive and rejected the body as the most immediate object of suffering. For Nietzsche, this revealed two things concerning the spirit: Firstly that it was the cause of disembodiment, and secondly that for the incorporation of truth to occur and for new values to be created, the spirit must be transformed and become active. In order for this to happen and the will to nothingness be overcome, Nietzsche insists that the will of the free spirit requires a new object – the Overman as the immanent ideal.

62 In this respect the conditions of the body, i.e. one’s physiological constitution dictate whether or not one is a free spirit.
Conclusion

The beginning of this investigation argued that immanence is the common ground from which the influence of Epicurus upon Nietzsche becomes most apparent. From this basis Epicurus’ philosophy of immanence was introduced as a counter-movement to Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophies of transcendence. This was to demonstrate that ‘immanence’ is the philosophical recourse that reunites body and spirit such that life’s inherent meaning becomes known. Part 1 began with a brief analysis of ‘Democritean Materialism’ in order to distinguish between Democritus’ and Epicurus’ materialism. Further to this, the section on Democritus also served to introduce atoms and void as the primordial state of all existence – a position that (according to Nietzsche) was maintained throughout the materialist tradition up until the mid-eighteenth century. In addition, the concept of *euthumia* was introduced as the conformist’s resolution to the problem that ‘reality merely corresponds through the conventions that are produced by the intellect’ (Part 1 ‘Democritean Materialism: Epistemology’). For Democritus, human life has meaning on the condition that *euthumia* can be achieved. This is the psychological imperative from which the individual can accept the deterministic nature of existence in such a way that life’s aesthetic meaning becomes evident. From here, it was argued that Epicurus responded to Democritus’ determinist conclusion, and Aristotle’s critique of it, on the basis the intellect should not be considered as the primary means for determining the nature of the universe. Instead, Epicurus proposed the alternative that the senses are a reliable means for gaining knowledge provided that the information they provide is consistent. In order to achieve this aim, Epicurus introduced his canonic, a threefold process, of which all the elements must be used repeatedly and consistently in order to establish and verify a true and meaningful relationship with the world. Unlike Plato, Epicurus proposed that all existence is immanent and therefore part of the cosmos and nature which meant that the transcendent realm of the Forms, in which a single and eternal truth exists, has no meaningful bearing on the world presented via the senses. By denying the existence of a transcendent realm, Epicurus’ conception of the cosmos and nature became
by implication one of immanence. His rejection of teleological purposiveness along with his rejection of divine providence meant that man could (perhaps for the first time) break free from the self-imposed dogmatism of religious belief. Accordingly, Epicurus developed an ethics of repose that created a new role for man that established a meaningful and reflective relationship with his environment. As such, within nature lay all the clues and answers to the problems that afflicted the lives of men. Man’s purpose therefore became one of self-discovery, which begins with the recognition of ‘feelings’ as the interlocutor between the atomic world and its phenomenal counterpart. In this respect, Epicurus’ concern was not with the development of strict logical proofs. The ‘proof’, as it were, lay in the individual’s adherence to nature. Upon the realisation of the state of ataraxia, this was all the ‘proof’ that the Epicurean required. This is also the reason why one has to see the whole world through the eyes of Epicurus’ thought rather than approaching it through the analytic of critical analysis. Having said this, critical analysis is a valuable tool because it teaches the individual to question the authority of any given philosopher or philosophical argument. Throughout Part 1, the problematic aspects of Epicurus’ thought, beginning with the testimonial idiosyncrasies (which, although not directly transferable to Epicurus’ teachings, are transferable to modern Epicurean scholarly practice), were detailed. This means that there will always remain an element of doubt concerning the actual meaning of Epicurus’ teachings. However, rather than taking this negatively, we must recognise this limit positively because it leaves Epicurus’ teachings open to a plethora of interpretations. The meaning of Epicurus’ teachings, therefore, remains within a local sphere whereby individual elements of his teaching can be taken in isolation (as we found with Nietzsche and the perspective of the Epicurean gods). Yet this does not exclude the possibility of viewing Epicurus’ teachings holistically, in fact, as we found in the section ‘Blessedness’, the individual elements of his system are secondary to the aim of the blessed life. Thus, the holistic approach is sometimes necessary so that Epicurus aims can be revealed.

The problems inherent to Epicurus’ system become known when we resort back to a purely logical conception of it, and in this respect we found that Epicurus’ method of inference is problematic. The nature of the problem concerns the shift from the non-
evident to the evident and the lack of a detailed explanation of how one can know the former solely from the evidence of the latter. Furthermore, we found another problem concerning Epicurus’ response to the problem of determinism. By including the swerve as an uncaused event at the atomic level, Epicurus had inadvertently introduced a paradox at the heart of his system. This meant that his philosophy of immanence required a motion that could not be accounted for from within his proposed system. Thus, the self-regulation of the universe is, for Epicurus, predicated upon and determined by a contradictory causality. Moreover, the inclusion of the swerve also meant that free will itself was determined by a cause that the agent could not control. This meant that Epicurus had effectively replaced Democritean determinism, which offered sanctity through conformism, with an alternative that reduced volition to a random and uncontrolled event that remained hidden from the world it determined. In light of such problems, we must consider Epicurus’ philosophy of immanence as a limited account, but within his account, the seeds of scientific investigation were sown such that the evidence of the senses could be recognised as a legitimate means for understanding nature and the cosmos. Furthermore, his discourse concerning the nature of the gods provided a radical alternative to ancient Greek religiosity such that mankind could turn his gaze from the heavens towards the world around him (i.e., to the earth), and in this respect his philosophy of immanence was a success.

By investigating Epicurus’ philosophy of immanence separately from Nietzsche’s, it was possible to make a number of distinctions that would have remained hidden. The most important and original of these distinctions was Nietzsche’s conception of ‘cheerfulness’ (Heiterkeit). The beginning of Part 2 claimed that within Democritean materialism, Nietzsche found a conception of soul that required conditions of duress in order to survive. From here, it was argued that Nietzsche took this concept of duress, (known in Part 3 as ‘contest’ or ‘struggle’) and combined it with the perspective of the Epicurean gods (i.e., as the unconcerned observer) in order to formulate his hybrid-concept of ‘cheerfulness’. Further to this, the section ‘Nietzsche and Greek Materialism’, found that, within Greek materialism, Nietzsche discovered that Democritus’ and Epicurus’ conceptions of Becoming were predicated on the necessity of Being. For Nietzsche, such a mistake demonstrated that within all areas
of philosophy, even those that claim to reject metaphysical propositions (i.e., Epicureanism), there is a deeply embedded psychological ‘need’ for Being. It is my contention that this realisation led Nietzsche to form a unique understanding of humanity and nature. By positing the indestructibility and indivisibility of atoms, the materialists had affectively created an infinity of Parmenidean worlds. The problem of Being exposed to Nietzsche the need within the consciousness of man to ‘create’ a world for himself that endures eternally. From this basis, Nietzsche was able to formulate an account of teleological purposiveness and divinity that no longer required a psycho-ontological response, but one that could inform humanity of its needs and desires from a psycho-physiological basis. In this respect, Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence began to take shape.

Yet, rather than immediately entering a discussion of Nietzsche’s conception of immanence, it was clear that an analysis of the various references that Nietzsche made to Epicurus was necessary. This investigation was important for two reasons. Firstly, because it revealed Nietzsche’s admiration of Epicurus. Secondly, because it served to demonstrate that, with the advent of modern science, the historical division between immanence and transcendence had run its course and a new mode of interpreting the world was required that could reunite body and spirit, thereby creating meaning for man and the earth. The section ‘Affects’ explains how Nietzsche proceeded to do this by introducing will to power as the primitive from of affect’ (WP: 688 / NLN 14[121]). The introduction of Deleuze’s analysis of Nietzsche and his conception of the body made it possible to argue that consciousness is an affect of the body and that the body is itself an affective state conditioned by a hierarchical structure which emerges from the interplay of forces. This meant that Nietzsche had overcome the problem of Being by demonstrating that it is the conscious projection of a relational system, and in this respect Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence could establish all Being on a foundation of Becoming.

From here, it was argued that the first four books of The Gay Science was the starting point of Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence. With the announcement of the death of God, Nietzsche was not merely making an anti-religious statement, but something far more profound. For Nietzsche, the death of God represents the simultaneous peak and decline of Christian values and with this decline Nietzsche sought to
expose the moral and cultural prejudices that now consumed European thought. Crucially however, Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence did not seek to raise man to a new level by effectively deifying him as Epicurus’ did. Instead Nietzsche proceeded to transform humanity from its ‘denatured’ state by ‘naturalising’ man rather than by ‘humanizing nature’, which as Del Caro suggests, is the ‘hallmark of Nietzsche’s grounded, geocentric ethos’ (Del Caro, 2004, p. 401). The discussion of ‘The development of Immanence in The Gay Science’, confirmed that whilst Nietzsche was developing his conception of immanence, Epicurus was his muse. This demonstrates that although Nietzsche never acknowledged Epicurus as a philosopher of immanence (nor himself for that matter), Epicurus’ philosophy guided Nietzsche’s thinking, particularly in respect to the ‘de-deification of nature’ (GS: 109).

In addition, Part 2 also introduced the problem of incorporation. As we found, this is the great experiment that Nietzsche believed would come to define man and ultimately provide the distinction between Christian man and the free spirit. As Ansell-Pearson observes, for Nietzsche, incorporation is a problem concerning the ‘spirit’ (Geist) and in particular the spirit’s ability to ‘appropriate what is foreign’ (BGE: 230). As a result, the ‘ultimate truth’, that is, the truth of Becoming, could not be incorporated because the problem was too great for the spirit to ingest. In respect to this problem, Epicurus, like the Christian man through his redemptive doctrines, sustained a mode of life whose success resulted in a will to nothingness. Upon this realisation Nietzsche’s affinity with Epicurus comes to an abrupt end, and with it the historical immanence/transcendence divide was abandoned because their duality was predicated on a will to truth.

Part 3 began by claiming that Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence seeks to affirm life through a new form of knowledge with the body and earth at its centre. In this respect we can appreciate how, for Nietzsche, immanence is a perspectivism that emerges through ‘internal genesis’ (Deleuze G., 2006, p. 91). This means that man must come to know himself both spiritually and physiologically through a process that reunites the body and the spirit, before he can create new values. This is why Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence must begin with an analysis of his system of psychology, because it is here that the operations of the ‘spirit’ are disclosed. Only by understanding these operations can the free spirit begin to undergo the
transformation that is required. Moreover, the transformation itself requires an understanding of consciousness. Building upon the discussion of consciousness and communication from Part 2, Part 3 ‘Nietzsche’s System of Psychology’ found that consciousness is not the operation of an autonomous agent (as the philosophical traditions supposed it to be), instead it is subordinate to the operation of the body. Thus, Nietzsche realised that human life in its appropriation of a transcendent reality (in an attempt to escape the meaningless of suffering) was characterised by its asceticism. By denying the body and the earth as the immediate realm of Becoming, humanity (defined through the ascetic ideal) had effectively (although unconsciously) deprived itself of any meaning other than that which it found in the will to nothingness. However, Nietzsche also realised that, following the event of the death of God, the will to truth (as a mode of the ascetic ideal) had become conscious of itself (GM: III, 27). As a result, the outcome of the experiment: ‘To what extent can truth endure incorporation?’ (GS: 110), would determine the future course of humanity. Implicit to the experiment, is the free spirit’s employment of the ‘cheerful’ method; a method that must be used in order that their spirit can endure the truth of the eternal Becoming. In a note from 1888, Nietzsche states the following:

My new path to ‘Yes’
My new version of pessimism: willingly to seek out the dreadful and questionable sides of existence: which made clear to me related phenomena of the past. ‘How much “truth” can a spirit endure and dare?’ - a question of its strength. The outcome of a pessimism like this could be that form of a Dionysian saying Yes to the world as it is, to the point of wishing for its absolute recurrence and eternity: which would mean a new ideal of philosophy and sensibility. (NLN: 10[3] / WP: 1041)

This note confirms a number of things concerning Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence. Firstly, ‘strength of spirit’ is determined initially by the physical constitution of the individual. Secondly, for the individual (i.e., the free spirit) to ‘endure’ the ‘phenomena of the past’, he or she must employ the ‘cheerful’ method. ‘Cheerfulness’ is more than an intellectual attitude; it is the method of self-examination proposed by the practical application of ‘gay science’. Thus, the question ‘How much “truth” can a spirit endure and dare?’ depends on the free
spirit’s ability to will the ‘absolute recurrence and eternity’ of all events. In order to do this, the free spirit’s will must have a target, yet the target cannot be the ‘willing of all events’ itself, because this does not increase its power. Rather, the will requires an object that it can change in order to express its power creatively. As Nietzsche observes, this ‘would mean a new ideal of philosophy and sensibility’ and as we have found this ideal is the Overman as the immanent ideal. This means that Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence is not merely a description of nature, nor is it merely the naturalisation of false beliefs and moral prejudices. It is the reclamation of the meaning of the earth, that is to say, immanence is man’s naturalisation through the spirit’s realignment with the will to power.

This thesis proposed that ‘immanence’ is the central concept that allows the influence of Epicurus upon Nietzsche’s thought to be revealed most appropriately. It also proposed to account for the development of ‘immanence’ within the works of Epicurus and Nietzsche in order to disclose the nature of immanence itself. The findings (which have now been detailed above) are significant to the wider landscape of Epicurus’ writings because they transform its reception within modern scholarship. Standard interpretations of Epicurus’ teachings, although valuable when reconstructing an image of his thought from the fragmentary remains, are limited because they fail to identify Epicurus as a philosopher of immanence. This is evident in two of the bedrock Epicurus accounts. For example, De Witt aimed to ‘present a new interpretation of his [Epicurus’] doctrines based upon less emended remains of his writings’ (DeWitt, 1954, Preface), and Rist aimed to ‘redefine the basic tenets of Epicurus himself’ (Rist, 1972, Preface, p. X). Consequentially, their works are limited by normative constraints imposed by standard models of historical analysis. Conversely, this thesis proposed to interpret Epicurus’ teachings through the concept of immanence by following a genealogical method and by doing so a number of significant findings have been made. The most significant of these is the proposal that the concept of immanence developed from Epicurus’ responses to Socrates’ and Aristotle’s criticisms of Democritean materialism. By introducing immanence by way of genealogy, the problematic nature of Epicurus’ immanent account became known and the limitations of his account were revealed. For example, the problematic move from the evident to the non-evident demonstrated that Epicurus
was unable to think in terms of pure becoming. Moreover, this problem further revealed that Epicurus’ conception of the cosmos and nature required a transcendent cause that severely limited his conception of immanence. Such limitations are significant because they bring about a transformation in the modern reception of Epicurus that would not have been possible by following traditional interpretations of Epicurus’ teachings, especially those presented by De Witt and Rist. Whereas standard models of historical analysis have an inclination to reduce and limit the interpretation, genealogy opens it up to a plethora of new interpretations; an advantage that revealed the emergence of immanence from within the ancient tradition. Thus, this thesis holds great relevance within the wider landscape of Epicurus reception because it uncovers the philosophical limitations of Epicurus’ teachings in a new and informed manner. Furthermore, by investigating Epicurus’ philosophy of immanence independently of Nietzsche’s, Part 1 was not restrained to Nietzsche scholarship and can therefore be read in isolation from Parts 2 and 3. However, it is indisputable that without Nietzsche’s genealogical method, the findings of Parts 1 and 2 would be impossible. Therefore, the employment of Nietzsche’s method is not only fundamental to an interpretive analysis that seeks to use history in the service of life, but as a means of historical and philosophical interpretation. Perhaps the most pertinent example of this is Nietzsche’s analysis from his late period, i.e. following the completion of the Genealogy. In Twilight, Nietzsche employed his genealogical method to remove Epicurus’ mask so as to reveal his decadence and asceticism, and by doing so, Nietzsche fundamentally changed Epicurus reception.

By analysing the development of immanence from Epicurus to Nietzsche, it has been demonstrated that immanence is not a static concept, that is, it does not transcend the conditions from which it emerged. Immanence is a fluid concept that continually develops and transforms within the history of philosophy. Immanence for Epicurus was defined as the conceptualisation of all existence within the cosmos and nature. For Nietzsche, however, such a conceptualisation of immanence reveals the operation of consciousness that attempts to reduce the multiple to the singular (becoming to being). Thus, from his reading of Epicurus, Nietzsche realised that even
when attempting to escape transcendence the inclination towards it remained powerful. This insight allowed him to develop a profound understanding of human psychology with the ascetic ideal at its centre. As we have discovered, the scope of the ascetic ideal extends to all aspects of knowledge and the opposing ideal, expressed here as the Overman and ‘immanent ideal’ (Ansell-Pearson & Large, 2006, p. 250), is possible on condition that the ‘cheerful’ method is employed by those capable of the incorporation of truth (i.e., the free spirit). The methodology of cheerfulness was realised by Nietzsche through his engagement with Democritus and Epicurus. This is significant for Nietzsche scholars because it provides a platform for a new interpretation that (similar to the analysis of Epicurus), allows Nietzsche to be situated within the history of philosophy as a philosopher of immanence. As stated in the introduction, immanence for Nietzsche is the reunion of body and spirit. Once this process is complete, Nietzsche believed that life’s inherent meaning would be revealed and ‘titles and honours for the body and the earth’ (Z: I, 3) would be created by the free spirit. Furthermore, because ‘cheerfulness’ plays a central role within Nietzsche’s work of the middle to late period, it is evident that interpreters of Nietzsche could use the finding of this thesis to re-evaluate Nietzsche’s work, primarily by identifying him as a philosopher of immanence through the employment of the genealogical method. For example, the problem of the crystallisation of language as a problem of immanence was raised in the introduction and briefly discussed at the beginning of Part 2; a problem that is clearly recognised by Acampora and Ansell-Pearson (2011, p. 211), although not fully appreciated in its magnitude and complexity because it only becomes important when seen through the lens of a genealogy of immanence. The same problem can now be mapped onto another problem that Nietzsche finds at the heart of consciousness, a problem that was introduced in Part 3 ‘Note on Spirit’ as the problem of ‘spiritualisation’, i.e. the process by which multiple wills are reduced to a homogenous one. This act of reduction not only crystallizes the objects that language is capable of disclosing, but it also explains that because language is of the herd its reach cannot extend beyond its utility. However, upon this realisation, new possibilities present themselves through the necessity of self-overcoming. Thus, language must also be capable of transformation because it is perpetuated by those who express it. For the free spirits this would mean that the incorporation of truth necessitates the development of language as a
means of communication between them, and in this, new possibilities are revealed concerning Nietzsche reception and interpretation. For example, in *Grounding the Nietzsche Rhetoric of Earth*, Adrian Del Caro addresses the problem that there is a lack of literature concerning ‘how Nietzsche’s writings argue for and promulgate new strategies for inhabiting the earth’ (Del Caro, 2004. p. XVII). Del Caro offers a reading that ‘follows the thread of Ariadne, better known to most to most readers of Nietzsche as the Dionysian’ to ‘produce a view of Nietzsche that is an overview’ (op. cit.). Although highly informative, the free spirit does not play a central role in Del Caro’s project, and given the finding presented in this thesis, it is clear that Nietzsche’s rhetoric of Earth is grounded by the possibilities embodied in the free spirit. Thus, when at the very beginning of the book Del Caro introduces Nietzschean rhetoric as a ‘special type or mode of language, a discourse if you will, such that the communicative and appealing aspects of his speech are aimed at the earth for the purpose of grounding human beings’ (Del Caro, 2004. p. 1), his failure to identify the free spirits as the natural recipients of this language means that Del Caro’s account is misguided because only the free spirits have the physiological capacity to hear Nietzsche’s message. Thus, the finding of this thesis may be used to highlight the problems within contemporary Nietzsche studies that are relevant to the wider reception of Nietzsche interpretation.

This investigation detailed the nature of Epicurus’ and Nietzsche’s philosophies of immanence with the aim of bringing to light the nature and meaning of immanence within their respective accounts. However, there are a number of topics that have not been discussed, and they remain the object of intended future research. The most pertinent of these topics concerns immanence and philosophy as a linguistic discipline. Part 2 introduced the problem of the crystallisation of meaning when it is presented in language. For Nietzsche, this meant that his fluid thoughts became static objects of knowledge once they were presented in formal language. This is a problem for immanence because language fixes meaning such that it no longer expresses the nature of Becoming. This is the reason why Nietzsche claims:

The last thing in metaphysics we’ll rid ourselves of is the oldest stock, assuming we can rid ourselves of it - that stock which has embodied itself in language and the grammatical categories and made itself so
indispensable that it almost seems we would cease being able to think if we relinquished it. (NLN: 6[13])

Man’s propensity to interpret the world metaphysically effectively blocks his ability to incorporate the ‘ultimate truth’ because language cannot unlock itself from the will to truth. Yet, in spite of these problems, Nietzsche was able to communicate the nature of Becoming. The reason for this relates to his writing style. Unlike his contemporaries, Nietzsche communicated the meaning of his thoughts through the application of rhapsodic style. This, together with his use of aphorisms meant that his ‘thoughts’ were never completely given, nor were they hidden from the reader. Nietzsche’s method was such that it provoked a reaction in the reader that forced him to suspend their conscious predisposition of Being for long enough that the world of Becoming could reveal itself. In doing so, Nietzsche demonstrated that language, although limited, could escape its propensity for Being. In this way, Nietzsche unlocked the doors for a new mode of discourse that does not allow itself to stagnate, but perpetuates itself through continual overcoming. Unfortunately, there is a lack of research concerning Nietzsche’s poetry as a means for overcoming the problem of Being in language. This is certainly one aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence that requires further investigation and there are more.

For example, research that links Stoicism (as a philosophy of immanence) to Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence is another avenue of investigation that has received little scholarly attention. The same can be said about Nietzsche and Spinoza, although one cannot disregard the work produced by Deleuze on this matter, especially in consideration of the development of immanence that Deleuze found in Spinoza’s ‘Ethics’. Within his dissertation ‘Expressionism in Philosophy’, Deleuze discusses Spinoza’s conception of ‘affects’. It is clear that Nietzsche was well aware of Spinoza’s conception of the ‘body’ and in particular the notion of ‘affects’ developed by Spinoza. Another avenue of research that would certainly benefit Nietzsche studies would be a work that investigates the relationship between Spinoza and Nietzsche’s concepts of immanence. Furthermore, Deleuze’s final work ‘Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life’, demonstrates that his thoughts on Nietzschean immanence, particularly the notion of ‘Affirmation’ in relation to ‘Life’, ‘Earth’, ‘Multiplicity’ and ‘Becoming, is another project worthy of development. In fact,
Michel Serres has undertaken such a project. In his attempts to ‘think the multiple’, we find a new area of philosophical discourse emerging that marries poetic style with modern scientific theory – a project not too distinct from Nietzsche’s project of *The Gay Science*. Although Serres is critical of Nietzsche, particularly the cosmological conception of the eternal return and his anti-religious fanaticism, they should both be considered as philosophers of immanence. A number of avenues for prospective future research are, therefore, opened up. These include: a study of ancient atomism in Nietzsche and Serres, particularly in reference to Lucretius’ poem; a critical examination of Nietzsche and eighteenth century science, through Serres analysis of Nietzsche in ‘Corruption – The Antichrist: a chemistry of sensations and ideas’ (Serres, 1986). It may also include a continuation of Duncan Large’s research which attempts to reclaim ‘the tragic age in Nietzsche’s sense’ (Large, 1999, p. 156) from Serres’ critique of Nietzsche. Furthermore, a comparative study of immanence within the work of Nietzsche and Serres would certainly lead to a more complete understanding of the meaning of immanence within contemporary philosophy.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

1 This is a reference to Nietzsche’s comments in BGE: 12 where he claims that ‘Boscovich taught us to abjure belief in the last thing of earth that ‘stood firm’, the belief in ‘substance’, in ‘matter’, in the earth-residuum and particle atom’.

2 Del Caro explains that ‘Nietzsche’s post-humanism is geocentric in the sense that his ecumenical vision requires humans to discover and inhabit the earth’ (Del Caro, 2004, p. 417).


4 See Part 2, ‘Note on Consciousness and Communication’.

5 As we found in our earlier discussion of ‘Asceticism and the Ascetic ideal’, the intervention of the acetic ideal occurred because of the will’s inability to control past events, thus it turned against itself by rejecting its most immediate object – the body.

6 For a discussion of Serres’ critique of Nietzsche see: Large, Hermes Contra Dionysus: Michel Serres’ Critique of Nietzsche, pp. 151-159.
Bibliography


Bibliography


