ON MARTIN HEIDEGGER:

POLITICS AND LIFE SEEN THROUGH THE APOLLONIAN-DIONYSIAN DUALITY

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And I must thank my wife Margaret for her patience and support through these years of study.
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Synopsis.

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CHAPTER 2: TOWARDS HEIDEGGER'S NIETZSCHE-HUSSERL DUALITY

Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy/ John Sallis' Crossings/ The Husserlian Apollonian/ Intuition and the Phenomenological Reduction/ The Breakthrough of Affectivity/ The Crossroads of Phenomenology/ The Nietzschean Dionysian/Nietzsche and Phenomenology/ The Presence of
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ABSTRACT

This study bears upon the ‘Heidegger case,’ that is, the relation of Heidegger’s philosophizing to his political involvements as Rector of the University of Freiburg 1933-4, and his subsequent silences on the subject of the Holocaust. I use the phrase ‘bears upon’ for Heidegger’s political involvement will serve as the ‘horizon’ for the study, my concern being the genesis of Heidegger’s position.

Grounded in a musical ‘intuition’ and attunement, I take up the Nietzschean cipher for understanding proposed by Heidegger himself for the self-understanding of the German people: the Apollonian-Dionysian duality, which I apply to the ‘being’ of Heidegger’s own philosophizing.

Through this approach I hope to make an original contribution to Heidegger scholarship by showing that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is overdetermined, evolving out of both the phenomenological demand for a rigorous method in establishing fundamental structures of existence and - at the same time – out of an Apollonian attempt to ‘tame’ Dionysian existence, including Heidegger’s own. Inextricably interlinked will be the argument that Heidegger’s Auseinandersetzung, his ‘confrontation,’ with Nietzsche precedes the overt engagement of his ‘Nietzsche’ lectures of the 1930s, and, further, that this more pervasive concern with Nietzsche figures in the Apollonian-Dionysian strife within Heidegger’s thinking and within his ‘being.’ Heidegger’s silences in the face of the Dionysian - as well as the Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche - will be seen to precede his ‘silence’ in the face of the actuality and history of the Third Reich. What I am proposing one might characterize as Heidegger’s Auseinandersetzung - through Nietzsche - with
Heidegger, in a disclosure of the ontic roots of Heidegger's ontology, an exercise in his own hermeneutics of facticity.

I will pursue the trace of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality: in the Western philosophical tradition which Heidegger confronts, using Husserl and Nietzsche as exemplars; in Heidegger interpretation; in the relation between his texts and his letters; and in the suppressions and intensifications within *Being and Time*. And I will propose that the fugue and the mutually generative duality of suppression and intensification within Heidegger's academic thinking were conditions of the possibility of Heidegger's ‘way’ towards political involvement.
ABBREVIATIONS

HEIDEGGER


J  Per Mortem Ad Vitam: Thoughts on Johannes Jorgensen's Lies of Life and Truth of Life.' In S below.


NW  ‘Nietzsche’s Word “God Is Dead” ’ in OBT below.


OTB  On Time And Being. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper Row,
1972.


**OWA2** 'Origin of the Work of Art.' Translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes. In *OBT*.


**HUSSERL**

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<td>EB</td>
<td>‘Phenomenology,’ <em>Encyclopaedia Britannica,</em> in Welton (below)</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>‘Phenomenology and Anthropology’. Translated by Thomas Sheehan &amp; Richard E. Palmer. [Online version]</td>
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**THOMAS MANN**

|---|---|
NIETZSCHE


CW  *The Case of Wagner.* Translated by Walter Kaufmann. In NBW below.


WLN  *Writings from the Late Notebooks.* Translated by Kate Sturge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.


TOLSTOY

HEIDEGGER’S INDICATIONS

‘Today we wish to move by way of apprehension in the field of personal experience.’

‘factual life experience…the whole active and passive pose of the human being toward the world.’

‘Every philosophy, from its starting point onwards, in some way drags factual life experience along within its problematic – even if in an entirely hidden, un-genuine and heavily theorized way.’

‘Can and must a work of poetry and consequently every great work of art be explained by the biography, or is it not rather the work, which makes possible an interpretation of the biography, that takes the good path?’

‘Dionysus is not merely a demigod among others, but the demigod par excellence.’
INTRODUCTION

“We ourselves are this underway, this transition, this ‘neither the one nor the other.’ What is this oscillating to and fro between this neither/nor? Not the one and likewise not the other, this ‘indeed, and yet not, and yet indeed.’ What is the unrest of this ‘not’? We name it finitude…our fundamental way of being” [FCM 6].

In May 1933, the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, whose thinking was dominated by the ontological question of being, became the first Nazi Rector of the University of Freiburg. However, at the same time as giving several enthusiastically ‘Nazi’ speeches, and lectures in which discussions on ‘the fundamental question of philosophy’ and ‘the essence of truth’ open out from an enthusiasm for ‘the spiritual-political mission’ of the ‘German people [which] is now passing through a moment of historical greatness’ [B&T 3], he would also be speaking of those within the movement failing the spiritual revolution [B&T 63]. Heidegger would resign within a year, in April 1934.

It is in view of Heidegger’s enthusiasm for and subsequent resignation from the Regime that, for the purposes of this study, I separate two questions. I must leave for further study Heidegger’s distancing from the regime, and concentrate on what may have taken Heidegger to an accommodation of his philosophy with the Third Reich. Thus Heidegger’s indisputable involvement in the Nazi ‘coordination’ of the German state, the Gleichschaltung, in 1933\(^1\) is the ‘horizon’ for this study. As Miguel de Beistegui sums up his resume of Heidegger’s speeches, declarations and actions as Rector of the University of Freiburg, ‘The question, then, is not of knowing
whether he had Nazi ties, but how and why his thought became mixed up with the totalitarian Reich [Beistegui 2005, 163].

Yet, the question of the nature and extent, the intensity and the duration of Heidegger's Nazi sympathies remains: even after the publication of his lectures between 1933 and 1935; even after the 'case' made by Emmanuel Faye in his book *Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy*, a call to resist the forgetting of the innermost intimacy of Heidegger's thinking with Nazism, an attempt to establish without doubt that Heidegger's thinking was, in the words of Theodor Adorno, 'fascist to the core,' and an attempt to initiate a resistance to the continuing assault of Nazism through Heidegger's enduring and expanding legacy.

Gregory Fried, whilst acknowledging the 'devastating' 'totality' of Faye's book, asks in his 'Letter to Emmanuel Faye':

> 'how do we explain the shock of students (and even colleagues) such as Emmanuel Levinas, Herbert Marcuse, and so many others, many of whom were Jewish...?' [Fried 2011, 241]

Marcuse testified that Heidegger's 'openly declared Nazism came as a complete surprise to us' [Fried 2011, 241]. And, Emmanuel Levinas, speaking in 1973 about his almost boundless admiration for Heidegger at the Davos disputation between Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer in 1929, said 'I had no idea, we could not have known, what would take place in 1933, namely, Heidegger's involvement in the Nazi Revolution' [Fried 2011, 251]. And Faye, in his presentation of Heidegger's pre-1933 Nazism, concedes that it was 'clandestine,' 'partially hidden' in *Being and Time*: 'Heidegger will never speak openly...of blood and race...until 1933.' Faye cites Karl Löwith: "The inner nihilism, the 'National Socialism' of that pure
resoluteness before nothingness, remained hidden at first.” So even for Faye, Heidegger’s political engagement in 1933 was the result of no overt political expression or agitation through the Weimar period, but the ‘culmination of an inner fecundation and evolution that goes far back’ [Faye 10, 20, 31-32].

The scope of the question of how Heidegger’s thinking developed after the Rectorate - in relation to the nature of his confrontation with the regime out of an ‘inner truth and greatness of National Socialism’ and his subsequent ‘silences’ regarding the Holocaust - demands an extended consideration, which is beyond the scope of this present study though not beyond its concern, which is with the nature of an ‘inner fecundation’ of and within his thinking. And, if 1933 was a ‘thunderbolt’ in Heidegger’s politics, what was it that was germinating? What is there in Heidegger’s thinking which may be seen as opening a way to Nazism?

Towards a Hermeneutic

In his study of Heidegger’s relation to Life-Philosophy, Daimon Life, David Krell attempts a ‘new kind of discussion concerning Heidegger’s political debacle’. In view of what he sees as Heidegger’s oscillation between resistance to life-philosophy and his ‘being thrust…back onto Lebensphilosophie again and again’ [Krell 1992, xi-xii], Krell situates his study in relation to Jacques Derrida’s Of Spirit, seeing Heidegger’s text haunted by and resistant to erotic ‘daimon life.’ And of such hauntings and resistances, Derrida had asked:

‘Could it be that [Heidegger] failed to avoid what he knew he ought to avoid?...Could it be that he forgot to avoid? Or else, as one might suspect, are things more tortuous and entangled than this?’ [Derrida 1989, 2]
In this study, I too will approach the question of Heidegger’s political involvement - his actions and his speeches - through a discussion of matters not overtly political; through a pursuit of the intensifications and repressions within his text, alerted by the relation between his philosophical texts and his letters, understanding that the issues raised, if not of an obviously political nature, will for Heidegger have political consequence. In so doing I will be as aware as Heidegger, as he opens his 1943 lecture on ‘Nietzsche’s Word: God is Dead,’ that my ‘commentary is an attempt to point in the direction,’ that it is ‘preparatory’ [NW 157-158].

At this point I wish to set out the genesis of the intuition behind this study, and establish an attunement to the reading.

From the outset I seek to locate Heidegger in a tradition other than the philosophical tradition which he destructs, and the right-wing political tradition which embeds him with National Socialism, though of course this would not be in dismissal of these connections. On first reading Heidegger’s lectures on ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ and *The Will to Power as Art* I was struck by a recognition of the relation of ‘musics’ – plural, for music does not sing with just one voice - described by Thomas Mann in his novel *Doctor Faustus*, itself concerned with the relation of the Austro-German musical tradition to the upsurge of Nazism, the relation between Wagner and Schoenberg, between tonality and atonality, between consonance and dissonance, and to reverse the alignment, between fugue and resolution. I refer minimally here to the relation between strife as ‘the actual origin of truth’ [WPA 28 on OWA] and Heidegger’s transfiguration of his own strife in the final pages of the 1936-7 lectures *Nietzsche: Will to Power as Art*:
'Art in the proper sense is art in the grand style, desirous of bringing waxing life itself to power. It is ... liberating for expansion, a clarifying to the point of transfiguration...the enhancement of [life’s] shining, that is, of what brings a thing to scintillate in such a way that life is transfigured...Art is the most genuine and profound will to semblance, namely to the scintillation of what transfigures’ [WPA 216].

In the following lectures on *The Will to Power as Knowledge and Metaphysics*, Heidegger will recognize that ‘Art is the name for every form of transfiguring and viable transposition of life to higher possibilities; [and] in this sense, philosophy too is “art”’ [WKM 123].

In this study I seek to develop a musical perspective out of that initial perception of the working of fugue and transfiguration within Heidegger’s thought paths.

Music has not been generally considered a subject of particular Heideggerian concern, and in his book *Musica Ficta (Figures of Wagner)* Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe writes in his chapter on Heidegger: ‘[M]usic has barely had any luck with philosophy’ [Lacoue-Labarthe 1994, 1]. George Steiner goes so far as to suggest that Heidegger’s sparse calling upon music is a damaging ‘oversight’ [Steiner 1987, 46 & 35]. And, indeed, the relation between Heidegger’s thinking and music has become of increasing interest to scholars.7 Heidegger’s own few remarks on music do in fact reveal a deep concern. Particularly striking is his comment on hearing Schubert’s posthumously published Sonata in B major: ‘We cannot do that with philosophy’ [Neske & Kettering 1990, 167]. I will move toward the matter of what music, not specifically Schubert, can do which can be taken into a reading of a philosophical text, of what music can indicate.
Michael Eldred in ‘The Quivering of Propriation’ seeks a way to music parallel to that of language, *parallel* from the Greek ‘next to one another,’ pointing to a ‘mysterious’ running alongside, a ‘parallelism’ [Eldred 1999, 1.2], a seeking after a way to music *through the way to language*. It might be also, in parallel, that a way to language [philosophy] may be sought *through the way of music*. As the essence of music ‘will be put into thoughtful words’ [Eldred 1999, 1.3], so the essence of words may be disclosed in the tones and tempi, the harmonics and dissonances of music. Theodor Adorno aspired to write philosophy out of the spirit of music as he wrote music out of the spirit of philosophy. He contended that both music and philosophy - having more than a merely analogical relationship - pursued the same thing in ‘different domains’ [Adorno 2006, 24].

Siegmund Freud tells us in his *Interpretation of Dreams* that for Aristotle ‘the best interpreter of dreams is he who can best group similarities’ [Freud 1997, 11]. It is then through a sense of analogy that we may ‘indicate,’ and find the hermeneutic force through a constellation of indications.

I attempt to follow a way through Heidegger’s thinking through such a coming-together of indications which emerge out of his texts and in the ‘crossings’ between his texts and his letters, and with the Austro-German musical and literary traditions. Interlinked has been the intuition that Heidegger’s ‘confrontation’ with Friedrich Nietzsche predated the overt *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche of the 1930s; that the paradigmatic Apollonian-Dionysian duality - set up by Nietzsche in *The Birth of Tragedy*, and proffered by Heidegger as a cipher for understanding in
his ‘Nietzsche’ lectures on The Will to Power as Art - can also be seen as a cipher for understanding Heidegger himself; and that this duality is fugal.

My orientation here must be phenomenological, not merely analogical; affinities noted have hermeneutic purpose. Through a phenomenological shift in attitude, the observation of likeness becomes an ‘eidetic’ seeing. For Edmund Husserl, who believed that a transcendental phenomenology would supersede the orientation of natural science, ‘Essential being’ would be perceived through a ‘pure intuition ...determined in an immediate seeing’ [PRS 110-112]. Such intuitive seeing could arise out of a ‘perception,’ a ‘recollection,’ a ‘judgement,’ but also ‘a mere - but mere - imagination’ [112].

A phenomenological (Husserlian) change of attitude can offer music not merely as analogous to Heidegger’s philosophy, but as providing an intuition into its processes. Phenomenological intuition offers the possibility of disclosing not only the simple unity, but also the manifold: internal dissonance, fugue, strife. Phenomenological logic reveals not only a lucid order, but ‘tortuous’ overdetermination.

Before clarifying the two main interrelated hermeneutic themes of this study, I call on Heidegger’s own interpretative justification. In his lectures on Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Heidegger speaks of necessary ‘violence’ in interpretation: ‘[... I]n order to wring from what the words say, what it is they want to say, every interpretation must necessarily use violence.’ However, he continues, ‘Such violence...cannot be roving arbitrariness. The power of an idea which shines forth must drive and guide the laying-out [Auslegung]. Only in the power of this idea can an interpretation risk what is always audacious, namely, entrusting itself to the
concealed inner passion of a work in order to be able, through this, to place itself within the unsaid and force it into speech’ [KPM 140-1].

In this study I use as such ideas the Apollonian-Dionysian duality and fugue in order to move into a reading of Heidegger’s thinking. And I use them in relation to two of Heidegger’s grounding orientations which enable us to ascribe a hermeneutic function to Apollonian-Dionysian duality and fugue: Heidegger’s ascription of attunement as a basic mode of being-in-the-world and his notion of ‘formal indication’ as a methodological principle. In terms of a modus operandi, formal indication and attunement are here inextricably linked, both to one another and to analogy and intuition.

**A Musical Intuition and Attunement**

I seek to establish a musical ‘attunement’ or ‘mood’ through which we may move into a study of Heidegger’s ‘pathways.’ In his lectures on the *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics,* Heidegger explains:

‘an attunement is...like an atmosphere in which we first immerse ourselves in each case and which attunes us through and through.  

‘An attunement is a way, not merely a form or a mode, but a way [Weise] - in the sense of a melody that...sets the tone for such being, i.e., attunes and determines the manner and way [Art und Wie] of his being.’

The translators William McNeill and Nicholas Walker draw attention to this double meaning of the German word *Weise* which ‘in addition to the common meaning of ‘way’ or ‘manner’ of doing something...has the more literary meaning of a ‘tune’ or ‘melody’ [FCM 67].
There is a fundamental, tectonic musical mood. And, for Heidegger, “mood” is precisely that which is decisive; everything depends upon - and phenomenological investigation must show precisely this - understanding the peculiar phenomenal complex “factual life experience”’ [PRL 95].

In *The Birth of Tragedy* Nietzsche tells us that Schiller had ‘admitted that in the preparatory state which precedes the act of writing poetry he did not have before and within him a series of images and causally organized thoughts, but rather a musical mood’ [TBT 34]. Schiller had written to Goethe: ‘In my case, the feeling lacks a definite and clear object to begin with; this only takes shape later. A certain musical and emotional mood develops and for me the poetic idea only follows subsequently’ [TBT 34]. Mood and intuition here intend toward a ‘preparatory thinking to clear a free scope’ - to draw once more on Heidegger's opening caution at the beginning of the ‘Nietzsche's Word’ essay [NW 158] - in order to read Heidegger out of a spirit of music, out of spirits of music.

‘Formal indication’

‘Philosophical concepts ...are vacillating, vague, manifold, and fluctuating...’

[PRL 3]

In his *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, out of a concern with ‘the pure cognition of the original questionability, i.e., at the same time, the pure cognition of the labyrinthine basic character of human existence’ [PIA 42], Heidegger rejects the idea that philosophy should be concerned with ‘definitions’ in favour of a “formally” indicative “way,” an “approach” [PIA 17], a ‘direction’ [PIA 27], for phenomenological analysis. A phenomenological idea is a ‘decisive departure
situation for the actualizing movement in the direction of the full appropriation of the object’ [PIA 27]. As Daniel Dahlstrom explains, although the ‘indicating as a pointing is preliminary…it is binding for the investigation, giving it direction and principles’ [Dahlstrom 1994a, 783].

Although Heidegger takes the idea as ‘point[ing] to a phenomenon in such a way that it enjoins against any preemptive or external characterization of it’ [Dahlstrom 1994a, 782], he sees that such formal indications are not presuppositionless, because ‘philosophy…stands originally within a pre-possession of the factical.’ The understanding follows ‘a fixed preconceptual orientation…every interpretation…depends on the preconception which guides it…the mode of the first approach to the interpretandum…the interpretation would not at all be an interpretation if it had no presupposition’ [PIA 46/84/98]. It is a ‘preconception,’ a ‘pre-grasping’ which ‘first discloses the objective nexuses, holds them open, and thereby clarifies and directs every step of the interpretation’[PIA 135].

Heidegger was concerned by the criticisms of Neo-Kantian Paul Natorp: that (Husserlian) phenomenology was ‘incapable of gaining immediate intuitive access to experience because…it relies on reflection that stills, reifies and therefore falsifies the stream of lived experience,’ through its reliance ‘on language, a system of symbols that must artificially break up - and so is inadequate to capture - the sensory continuum of phenomenal experience’ [Birch 3, glossing Kisiel]. In attempting to supersede this ‘artificiality,’ Heidegger's thinking would, in the words of Theodore Kisiel, be ‘a form of life on the edge of expression’ [Kisiel 1995, 59]. And Daniel Dahlstrom heads an article on Heidegger's ‘method’ of formal indication with this quote from St. Augustine: ‘To give them as much credit as
possible, words possess only sufficient efficacy to remind us in order that we may seek things, but not to exhibit the things that we know by them’ [Augustine: De Magistro quoted Dahlstrom 1994a, 775]. The dual hermeneutic of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality and fugality sets up an attunement towards interpreting Heidegger’s thinking in terms of the flux - the movement - of and within this ‘sensory continuum’.

**The Apollonian-Dionysian**

In the first paragraph of *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche establishes his understanding, his perception, his intuition [Anschauung] that the ‘evolution of art’ was and is bound up with the Apollonian-Dionysian duality. But - in line with his acknowledgement that at the same time as this work is a justification of life through art, it is also a ‘deeply personal question’ [BT2.3] - Nietzsche uses a less than categorical, personal characterization of the basis of a genealogical hermeneutic: he has ‘borrowed’ ‘Apollo’ and ‘Dionysus’ from the Greeks. Not only is there a contestation – between the Apollonian and Dionysian - at the heart of his paradigm, but Nietzsche himself is engaged in a contestation, attempting to establish a tragic vision of Greek culture against the classical ‘cheerful’ conception. Moreover, it could be seen that Nietzsche was exercising a deconstruction of the ancient tradition itself with its diverse contradictory roots within Greece and the Middle East – the Doric, the Ionic, the Mesopotamian. Luca Renzi observes: ‘the archaic epoch knew no strict opposition between Apollo and Dionysus...[but] commixture and compenetration of the two forms....Apollo’s art of
clairvoyance includes ecstatic-inebriate elements while Dionysus, for his part, was considered an oracle at Delphi even before Apollo’ [Renzi 123-124].

Borrowing, then, but in contestation with both archaic and modern traditions, Nietzsche suggests that we ‘think of’ the Apollonian image and Dionysian music as dream and intoxication. Apollo is the healing god of ‘measured limitation...freedom from wilder impulses’ providing a ‘lovely semblance’ in the face of the darkness and suffering within existence. Dionysus is the god of intoxication, of ‘ecstasy and sublimity,’ out of an ‘excess of sexual indiscipline,’ a ‘repulsive mixture of sensuality and cruelty’ [16]. And, in this ‘borrowing,’ represented as the Apollonian and the Dionysian, ‘two very different drives’ exist for the most part in a state of ‘perpetual conflict,’ for the Greeks an ‘enormous opposition.’

I ‘borrow’ after Nietzsche these two representations of life’s forces for an analysis of Heidegger’s thinking, representations which, as we shall see, Heidegger himself offers as a cipher for the self-understanding of the German people. It can also be seen to suggest a claim for a ‘fundamental ontology.’ Douglas Burnham and Martin Jesinghausen suggest that in thinking of them as ‘the two most fundamental life drives’ these representations derived from Greek mythology offer ‘principles of a fundamental (or philosophical) anthropology,’ which can be projected hermeneutically as ‘a new method of aesthetic enquiry’ [Burnham & Jesinghausen 2010: 28/29/114], an interpretative cipher for an understanding through history of the cultural expressions or products of human being, the dynamics and patterns of and within cultural expression, the ‘art-drives’ within texts’ [B&J 37/40/30]. Assessing the contemporary German culture, Nietzsche sees the Greek example
containing ‘the very same transitions and struggles in classically instructive form’ [TBT 3: 95].

My study takes this duality as a hermeneutic for a reading of Heidegger’s texts. In relation to a Dionysian facticity, the ‘work’ is seen as an ‘artistic’ semblance, indeed an Apollonian bulwark, which both distances Dionysian excess, and incorporates Dionysian ‘insights and effects’ [TBT 46].

In discussing Edmund Husserl I will use the conjunction 'Socratic-Apollonian.' This might seem to fly in the face of Nietzsche's thesis which suggests that the logical Socratic tendency was a disruption of the generative coalescence of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality, the end of transfiguration. But there is within the need for beautiful Apollonian semblance itself a potential for excess: ‘Doric art...a permanent military encampment of the Apolline...an unremitting resistance to the Titanic-barbaric nature of the Dionysiac’ [TBT 3: 28]. And Nietzsche acknowledges the potentiality of the protective function of the Apollonian 'to freeze into Egyptian stiffness and coldness,' reductively ‘confin[ing] Hellenic life’ in its struggles against ‘the flood-tide of the Dionysiac’ [TBT 3: 51]. The dual function of the Apollonian - transfiguration and protective limitation - is fractured: The Apolline tendency itself has disguised itself as logical schematism'[TBT 69], an ‘over-developed...logical nature...[Socratism]...debarred from ever looking with pleasure into the abysses of the Dionysiac’ which emerges as the real antithesis of the Dionysian, a ‘penetrating critical process, ...[a]... bold application of reason...cool, paradoxical thoughts - instead of Apollonian visions - and fiery emotions - in place of Dionysian raptures’ [TBT 2: 67/68/TBT 70].
But this Socratism itself bears the mark of fracture: this over-developed logical nature, was ‘the true eroticist’ [TBT 3: 67], aware of its lack: ‘Just occasionally that despotic logician felt there was something missing in his relation to art, an emptiness, a half-reproach...in prison, the same figure kept appearing to him in dream...“Socrates, make music!”...he composes [a hymn] to Apollo...Whatever urged these exercises on him was something similar to his warning voice; it was his Apolline insight that...in his ignorance, [he] was in danger of committing a sin against a deity’ [TBT 3: 71], in danger of sharing the fate of Pentheus in the Bacchae of Euripides, the playwright Nietzsche sees sharing the over-developed logicality of Socrates. Thus in aligning the Socratic with the Apollonian I make no aesthetic claim about Husserlian phenomenology, (though we shall see in the History of the Concept of Time [HCT 25] that Heidegger does, and David Krell in his Intimations of Morality [128] makes a similar observation about Heidegger).

Socratic logic fractures the Apollonian-Dionysian duality, even as it is itself fractured by that duality, an eroticism which ‘no longer dares to entrust himself to the terrible, icy stream of existence’ [TBT 3: 88]. And it is this recurrent sense of fracture – a fracture in being - which Nietzsche sees in the eruption, the rebirth of Dionysianism in German music, in musical dissonance, [TBT 3: 115] dissonance, ‘an aesthetic category with anthropological significance... [for] the human condition [which] is already a...Dissonance’ [Burnham & Jesinghausen 2010: 111/153]. Nietzsche asks ‘what else is man’...but dissonance: ‘If you could imagine dissonance assuming human form – and what else is man? – [TBT 3: 115]
Fugue

In this analysis of Heidegger's writings - both texts and non-texts - I wish to underscore the nature of dissonance as not only synchronous but also diachronous, just as is the Apollonian-Dionysian. Philosophizing out of the spirit of music, Nietzsche felt he could 'appeal only to those who have a direct affinity with music...who relate to things almost exclusively via unconscious musical relationships' [TBT 3: 100]. And Burnham and Jesinghausen observe that 'music...grants great metaphysical significance,' and, further, that 'the relationality of the drives is analogous to musical counterpoint,' the Dionysian being the 'metaphysical counterpoint' to the Apollonian [B&J 2010: 135/34/43]. I take the musical process of fugue to underscore the intensity of this counterpoint - the inner contention that is this dissonance - even though Nietzsche dismisses the hermeneutic potential of the 'arithmetic abacus of the fugue and the dialectic of counterpoint' [TBT 3:94], surprising, as Burnham and Jesinghausen observe, in view of the 'agon-like interplay' of the Apollonian-Dionysian, a see-sawing conflict, a fugue, for this duality is not only 'intertwined; in fact they are sequenced...a potentially endless to-ing and fro-ing between them' [B&J 2010: 11/58/ 46/60].

The musical and mental 'movement' of fugue originates from the Latin fugere, to flee. In music, fugue is a 'contrapuntal compositional technique in two or more voices': an exposition, development and possibly a recapitulation [Wikipedia 'Fugue,'1]. The second voice can be both a closely related transposition of the first subject, or its fragmented imitation [Gedalge in Wikipedia 'Fugue' 4/6]. I take the Apollonian and Dionysian as such fugal voices.
Fugue can be seen as ‘a style of composition, rather than a fixed structure’ [Wikipedia, 2]. Even in music fugue varies, evolving from the ‘academic’ to the ‘anti-scholastic’ [Messiaen: Wikipedia 19]. Not only a form ‘in itself,’ fugue may be incorporated within a greater design, from Haydn’s *The Creation* to Bruckner’s Ninth Symphony. Murray Dineen notes that ‘Pedagogical treatments of the fugue...are responsible for the impression of a form overdetermined by rules and conventions, where in truth little consensus existed in theory or in practice’ [Dineen 56].

The synchronicity of fugue and dissonance had been experienced by Beethoven in his the *Große Fuge* [“Great Fugue,” Opp.130/133]. And whilst Nietzsche dismisses the possibilities of fugue - and mere tone poems - to reveal Dionysian dissonance, Richard Strauss indeed introduces a fugue into his tone poem *Also Sprach Zarathustra*. And in the *Kyrie/Christe* of Ligeti’s *Requiem* a highly chromatic dissonance - a “dissonant counterpoint” [Wikipedia ‘Fugue’ 13] - coalesces with fugal composition, a five-part fugue, in the words of Gabriela Vlahopol, an ‘infinitesimal decalage of the overlapping voices,’ [Vlahopol 201]

It has been described thus:

‘The melodic material in this fugue is totally chromatic, with melismatic (running) parts overlaid onto skipping intervals, and use of polyrhythm (multiple simultaneous subdivisions of the measure), blurring everything both harmonically and rhythmically so as to create an aural aggregate, thus highlighting the theoretical question...whether fugue is a form or a texture.’

[W14: citation needed]
Donald Tovey in his *Essays in Musical Analysis* even states that ‘Fugue is not so much a musical form as a musical texture that can be introduced anywhere as a distinctive and recognizable technique, often to produce intensification in musical development’ [Wikipedia ‘Fugue’ 14-15]. Thus an intensification of the intensification that is music. In Ligeti’s *Requiem* - a transformation of the initial Baroque concept - ‘one cannot hear the canon or the fugue. One can only hear an impenetrable texture, the polyphonic structures are not discernible, but remain hidden...the piece is conceived as a continuum, in which the details are blurred to achieve the final result’ [Vlahopol 2012, 201, 203].

And it is this notion of such fugue, this sense of continuum in dissonance that can augment and intensify an understanding of the polemos of being, and the 'being' of Heidegger’s texts.

Musical fugue has developed as a site of contending juxtapositions and superimpositions. Such complex polyphony is suggestive of - to use Heidegger’s term ‘indicates’ - the nature of the polemos, the internal strife within his texts and between his texts and his other writings, thus his ‘factual life experience,’ a phrase which ‘designates the whole active and passive pose of the human being toward the world’ [PRL 8]. Offering a different emphasis, I use ‘oscillation’ as a variation on fugue to suggest both the continuing movement from one position to another, and at the same time a less personalised momentum to which man - as Dasein - and Heidegger’s texts are subject. In both cases - fugue and oscillation - Dasein/man finds himself a field of contending forces. The functioning of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality may be complexly fugal or more simply oscillatory. Heidegger’s
thinking - as indicative of the ‘fractured’ factual life he depicts in *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* - is the site of fugal contention.

**Synopsis**

**Chapter 1: Politics and Music**

**i. Politics**

The first chapter opens out two areas, the political question and the musical hermeneutic.

Through a brief discussion of the ‘Heidegger Case’ - the question of the relation of Heidegger’s philosophy to Nazism - I take up the question of the ‘shadows’ and ‘latencies,’ *the unsaid*, within Heidegger’s work, which offers a trajectory from a directly political orientation to a Nietzschean *Auseinandersetzung* with Heidegger. Drawing on Heidegger’s own suggestion of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality as cipher, I demonstrate that Heidegger’s *fundamental ontology* both resonates with the call for a rigorous purity of method in establishing fundamental structures of existence and - at the same time - is an Apollonian attempt to control or suppress Dionysian existence, including his own. *Not saying* in the face of the Dionysian will be seen to be built into Heidegger’s thinking, preceding the political case. Political contingency opens out the question of contingency itself, and of biographical contingency and of ‘the spiritual evolution’ of Heidegger’s thought developing out of Heidegger’s own hermeneutics of facticity, factual life characterised as the site of that strife between authenticity and inauthenticity.

Though my study is concerned with the genesis of Heidegger’s position in 1933, I give some suggestion of the manifestation of the ‘upsurge,’ through an analysis of
Heidegger’s 1933 *Rectoral Address*, which can be seen, on one level, as an *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche.

### ii. Music

I take music - in particular *fugue* - as a point of departure. The very word *fugal* points to the proximity between music and psychic state. I suggest that the ‘circle’ - a recurrent image within Heidegger's thought - is essentially fugal, and that, more than the image of the circle, that of fugue offers *a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing.*

Heidegger raises the question of what music *can* do - which can be taken into a reading of a philosophical text, of what music can suggest, can indicate. I open up the discussion of the possibilities of music as hermeneutic, a phenomenological intuition which offers the possibility of disclosing not only the simple unity, but internal dissonance, fugue, strife, overdetermination. I then set out facets of the being of music during the period of late Romanticism from which indications can be intuited.

**Chapter 2: Towards Heidegger’s Nietzsche-Husserl Duality**

In part 1, I first explain what constitutes the interpretive ‘idea’ of this study, the Apollonian-Dionysian duality, through reference to the paradigmatic text, Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy*. In moving towards a fugal interpretation of this duality I suggest a tortuous duality and call on John Sallis’ book *Crossings*, a study on and of the crossings and which permeate the text of Nietzsche’s *The Birth of*
Tragedy, and set up a paradigm of internal dialogue within a philosopher's thinking.

I next approach the possibility that an ‘internal’ schism within the philosophical tradition can also be viewed as a manifestation of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality, and Heidegger’s response too in terms of that duality. I take Edmund Husserl and Friedrich Nietzsche to represent, respectively, the tradition and counter-tradition, the Apollonian and Dionysian, the criteria for this opposition being the gulf between their respective concerns with certainty and ambiguity. I explore Heidegger’s proximity to and distantiation from both Nietzsche and Husserl.

Part 2 aligns Husserl with the Apollonian impulse, at the same time showing that even within Husserl’s aspiration to a reductive, apodictive certainty there is a breakthrough of affectivity.

Part 3 aligns Nietzsche with the Dionysian. Drawing on the secondary literature, the main focus in this section is on seeing a developing Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche, in particular Heidegger’s concern with human finitude in relation to Zarathustra’s call to ‘remain true to the earth,’ and his evasion of demonic life.

**Chapter 3: Heidegger’s Letters**

This chapter, in introducing Heidegger’s letters into a consideration of his thought, is the pivot of the whole thesis, the reference against which the use of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality as a hermeneutic is made, in a sense, the shadow of the thought. I first contextualize Heidegger’s letters in relation to the question of Heidegger’s ‘neglect of the body’ and of sexuality, acknowledging the overtly
ontological level, whilst developing the idea of a repressed, hidden ontical. Into the question of overdetermination and repression, I introduce the oscillations in Heidegger’s attitude towards Kant. Heidegger’s letters are then considered, raising the image of another Heidegger, a Nietzschean Heidegger, and revealing the power of the Dionysian erotic in Heidegger's personal life, both repressed or reconfigured in his philosophical texts of the 1920s.

Chapter 4: Fugue, Suppression and Intensification in Heidegger's Thinking of the 1920s

In the final chapter I take the Apollonian-Dionysian duality into an analysis of Heidegger’s Being and Time in terms of fugue, and the mutually generative processes of suppression and intensification. I look at the fugal strife within the text involved in Heidegger’s approach to the darkest, most enigmatic matter of ‘being’ via methodological rigour, itself seen as manifestation both of concern and evasion of concern with Dasein in its distress, through the tranquillizations of ontologisation, a retreat from Heidegger’s own early aspiration for a phenomenology in sympathy with life. I will be particularly interested in Heidegger’s treatment of the ‘authenticity-inauthenticity’ problematic and of the importance of ‘being-toward-death.’ This analysis will be referenced against Heidegger’s Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche, particularly - in relation to the political question - the issue of ‘remaining true to the earth’: authenticity to be attained in this world. I return to Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle as a foreconception of the ‘fractures’ in Heidegger’s thinking and factual life to suggest
that the *Auseinandersetzung* is within Heidegger himself, expressed in both the revelatory and the evasive in his thinking.
CHAPTER 1

 POLARIS AND MUSIC

 i. The Heidegger Case
 ii. Heidegger's *Rectoral Address*, 1933
 iii. From Politics to Facticity
 iv. The Demonic
 v. Towards Music
 vi. From Circles to Fugues
 vii. Music, philosophy and Heidegger
 viii. From dread to tragedy
This study bears upon the ‘Heidegger case,’ that is, the relation of Heidegger's philosophizing - his thinking - to his political involvements as Rector of the University of Freiburg 1933-4, and his subsequent silences on the subject of the Holocaust. I use the phrase ‘bears upon’ for my horizon is the *genesis* of Heidegger’s position, conditions of thinking which took him to ‘1933.’

**i. The Heidegger Case**

As George Steiner observes, there is no figure in Western philosophy about whom there is such fundamental disagreement as there is with Martin Heidegger: sham-mystic of non-sense or one of the decisive Western thinkers [Steiner 1987, 11-12]. The dilemma has been compounded by the revelations of Heidegger’s political involvement in the Nazi State in 1933-4.

I will discuss only briefly the literature of the ‘Heidegger Case’ - to use the title of the collection of essays by Tom Rockmore and Joseph Margolis - and, in drawing on certain scholars, I offer no full engagement with *their* positions, their contentions and the subtle variations of their analyses. Rather, I will take up the question of the ‘shadows’ and ‘latencies’ - the unsaid - within Heidegger’s work, which offers a trajectory from a directly political orientation to a Nietzschean *Auseinandersetzung* with Heidegger, pursued through a musical ‘intuition’ and a musical attunement, carrying the analysis from fugue to the Apollonian-Dionysian duality, and viewing this duality as fugal.

A move from fugue to Apollonian-Dionysian duality was suggested by both the nature of the fugue within Heidegger's thinking, and by Heidegger himself who, in his 1937 ‘Nietzsche’ lectures on *The Will to Power as Art*, proposes the Apollonian-
Dionysian duality as a *cipher* through which the German people must understand itself in order to avoid the ‘vengeance’ of history [WPA 104].\(^1\) I will pursue the hypothesis that the Apollonian-Dionysian duality provides also a cipher through which to understand the pathways of Heidegger’s thought, and the genesis of his position in 1933. Inextricably interlinked will be the argument that Heidegger’s *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche precedes the overt engagement of his ‘Nietzsche’ lectures of the 1930s, and, further, that this more pervasive concern with Nietzsche figures within the Apollonian-Dionysian strife within Heidegger’s thinking and within his being,\(^2\) its ‘strifeful’ character underlined by the notion of fugue.

Through this approach I seek to show that Heidegger’s *fundamental ontology* both resonates with the Husserlian demand for a rigorous purity of method in establishing fundamental structures of existence and - at the same time - is an Apollonian attempt to control or suppress Dionysian existence, including his own.

The thought appears *in relation* to the unsaid. Heidegger’s silences will be seen to precede his ‘silence’ in the face of the actuality and history of the Third Reich. *Not saying* in the face of the Dionysian will be seen to be built into Heidegger’s thinking, preceding the political case.

In *Heidegger and Nazism* Victor Farias sought ‘to expose the germ of discriminatory inhumanity without which the philosophy of Heidegger is as such unthinkable’ [Farias in Rockmore & Margolis 1992, 335], a philosophy arising out of a ‘thought process nourished in traditions of authoritarianism, anti-Semitism, and ultra-nationalism’ [Farias 1989, 4]. For Richard Wolin, also locating Heidegger within the thrust of right-wing politics during the Weimar Republic, the
‘inextricable intertwaving... of philosophical and ideological components’ in *Being and Time* raises questions not only about Heidegger’s politics, but also about his philosophy. Wolin contends that a demonstration of the ‘historically contingent character of the argument of *Being and Time*’ would ‘deflate the “ontological” pretensions of fundamental ontology,’ and, further, that the ambiguity created by the ‘confusion of ontological and existential levels’ is nothing less than an inauthenticity ‘at the heart of authenticity itself,’ the very text of *Being and Time* [Wolin 1990, 20-21, 41].

Yet the commentary amongst the disputants of the ‘Heidegger Case’ is itself not free from subtleties that verge on the ambiguous, a struggle over valuations that mirrors Heidegger’s own fugue between authenticity and inauthenticity. Wolin grounds Heidegger’s ‘involvement with National Socialism’ in the very ‘innermost tendencies of his thought,’ whilst ‘rejecting any assumption that this implies a necessary growth of Nazism out of *Being and Time*’ [Wolin 1990, 66]. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe believes ‘Heidegger’s [Nazi] commitment is entirely consistent with his thought,’ yet he comments: ‘I am not putting Heidegger on trial, but his attitude was damning, unforgivable...etc.’ [Lacoue-Labarthe quoted in Janicaud 1996, 42 & 89].

Heidegger himself had explained to Karl Löwith ‘that his concept of ‘historicity’ furnished the basis for his political ‘service’ to National Socialism’ [Ott 1993, 133]. Even so, Joseph Kockelmans believes that ‘the view that there is an intrinsic link between...Nazism and the ideas proposed in *Being and Time* is simply mistaken’ [Dallmayr in Rockmore & Margolis 287]. And Dominique Janicaud sees it as ‘silly’ to attempt to, even ‘to wish to find’ Nazism within Heidegger’s work of the
twenties [Janicaud 1996, 20]. He takes the reaction of the Nazi ideologist Ernst Krieck - who would come to describe Heidegger as a 'Jewish...enzyme of decomposition and dissolution for the German people' [Safranski 1998, 322 & 341] - to support his position: ‘There is nothing in [Being and Time] [states Krieck] that speaks of the people and the State, of race and of all the values characterizing our National Socialist worldview’ [Janicaud 1996, 32]. Janicaud polarizes the respective values of Heidegger and Nazism: he contends that the National Socialist Weltanschauung - its accord with the Fuhrerprinzip, its racism, particularly its anti-Semitism, and its imperialistic nationalism, what Janicaud terms its ‘iron triangle’ - is as absent from Heidegger’s thinking as ‘Sorge (Care), Gewissen (conscience), Schuld (guilt), and the comprehension of ecstatic temporality and historicity’ are absent from Mein Kampf [20 & 33]. Yet he accepts that the ‘philosophical imbroglio of 1933-34 is...the unfolding and the admission of a tension that was already present, but latent, in Being and Time’ [47]. For Janicaud, fundamental ontology itself was a condition of possibility of Heidegger’s political mistakes, for Heidegger’s aspiration to an ““ontological politics”...is untenable because politics is principally ontic’ [48], the genesis of Heidegger’s political engagement with the Third Reich ‘understood only with respect to the thought that literally exposed itself to erring’ [47].

There are tensions and latencies other than the political which also suggest a genetic condition of possibility, an exposure to erring that has its roots in the Apollonian-Dionysian duality in Being. With a view ahead to 1933, and to the question of a relation between Heidegger’s earlier thinking and his political misjudgements in the Third Reich, I will pursue the hypothesis that Heidegger’s
error, his fall, his hubris was overdetermined in the manner of thought depicted by Thomas Mann in *The Magic Mountain*: thought is not ‘pure’ but related to ulterior drives, as life itself was the attempt to give form to its own Dionysian genesis [MM 2, 270-281]. I intend to demonstrate that the concern of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology to establish the formal structures of human Dasein - human being-in-the-world - was infused with a suppression of the Dionysian.³ As will be shown, by the standards of his own conception of resoluteness, Heidegger, in his writings and lectures, did not confront but evaded - suppressed - his own facticity.⁴⁵⁶. Heidegger would foreconceive - perhaps out of a knowing unknowingness, perhaps knowing more than he realized he knew, to appropriate his characterizations of Nietzsche, who himself had felt that men of knowledge were unknown to themselves [NBW 451] - the fate into which he would be thrown: ‘Once one has grasped the finitude of one’s existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one - those of comfortableness, shirking and taking things lightly - and brings Dasein into the simplicity of it fate’ [BT 1, 435]. Except that fate was to be no simplicity. Miguel de Beistegui comments, underlining the demonic potential: ‘Snatched back from its fascination for a world that distracts it from its ownmost call, that dulls it and lulls it by way of a never ending production of cheap fantasies, petty satisfactions and good conscience, Dasein comes face to face with its own finitude, with its fatal outcome’ [Beistegui 1998, 16]. But, in 1933, the fatal outcome was to be ‘thrown’ into a historical situation in which - by the criteria of his own thinking - the inauthentic ‘fascination for a world that distracts’ became inseparable from Heidegger’s ‘ownmost call.’ This study attempts to demonstrate the relation of this
collision of authenticity and inauthenticity within the fugal strife of Heidegger’s thinking.

I will end my study as a *beginning* – preparatory to a more extended study of Heidegger’s thinking - as Heidegger descends into the political abyss. I should perhaps, however, give some suggestion of the manifestation of this descensional ‘upsurge’ by considering here his ‘Rectoral Address’ of 1933.

### ii. Heidegger’s *Rectoral Address, 1933*

At an election rally in Leipzig on November 11th 1933, Heidegger speaks the language of Nietzsche’s apolitical man and ‘dangerous maybes,’ calling for ‘the courage to question, to experience the abysses of existence and to endure the abysses of existence, [which] is in itself a *higher* answer than any of the all-too-cheap answers afforded by artificial systems of thought.’ And this questioning means: ‘not closing oneself off to the terror of the untamed and to the confusion of darkness’ [Beistegui 1998, 53]. This taming is what the development of his fundamental ontology had actually achieved.

The *Rectoral Address*, ‘The Self-Assertion of the German University’ delivered at Freiburg on 27th May 1933, itself is indeed, on one level, an address of Nietzsche over the ‘inner strength and greatness’ of the German University: a recovery of the university from, in Nietzsche’s estimation, the forgetting of itself which contributed to his departure from academia, relocating self-assertion *in* the university, still, through a Nietzschean evaluation of the current state of academia.89.
Heidegger attempts to remain true to the ‘beginning’ of thinking in the questioning of the Greeks, but speaks of the ‘will to essence’ out of a will to power, his address expressive of the bond between the *spiritual* and the militaristic which he now promotes, yet, amidst the robust language of ‘battle,’ too many questionings for politics, at the same time, the concern with *knowing oneself* and *realizing oneself*, made political - made ‘communal’- leading to the questionable.

Heidegger’s political gravitation can be seen in terms of the idea of *gathering* - of bringing things together - which becomes of increasing importance to Heidegger in his thinking and in his being, manifest also in his later attempts to bring his wife and Hannah Arendt together. Here in the *Rectoral Address* he amalgamates philosophical questioning with national destiny.

This ‘gathering’ is a Faustian pact. Spirit is ‘the primordially attuned, knowing restlessness toward the essence of Being,’ with both aspiration and error, a questionable ‘dangerous maybe.’ Made political ‘this will to essence will create for our people its world of innermost and most extreme danger, i.e. its truly *spiritual* world,’ which ‘alone can guarantee the people greatness,’ preserving its ‘earth - and blood-bound strengths.’ In itself, this ‘gathering’ of ontological questioning and national realization is an ‘innermost and most extreme danger.’ Yet Heidegger’s call to German students to march and ‘stand their ground’ in the face of the ‘most extreme distress...[of] German destiny’ is made in the name of ‘a will to the essence of the university.’ His call for the German people to ‘continually fight[ ] for its spiritual world’ is the ‘fighting’ of Nietzsche for whom warriors are distinguished from soldiers, and it is the *free spirit* who is the ‘warrior’ [Z 74 and TI 92], though in Heidegger a ‘free spirit’ in being-with-others, rather than a Nietzschean
detachment. Nietzsche’s fighting is not politico-militaristic, yet there is much in his expression which lent itself to appropriation by the Nazis. And there is much in Heidegger’s *Rectoral Address* which would refuse appropriation by the Nazis.

For Heidegger ‘this knowledge is...the most severe endangerment of existence in the midst of the overwhelming power of what is. The very questionableness of Being forces the people to work and fight and forces it into its state, to which the professions belong.’ Heidegger too finds himself in a ‘state...in the midst of the overwhelming power of what is.’ The Nietzschean pursuit of the very essential ‘questionableness of Being’ takes one to the very questionableness in the being of Heidegger’s pursuit of the Greek primordial essence of the university, a recovery of the question of Being in *Being and Time* now bonded to the military.

In the release of spirit Heidegger opens himself to the questionableness of spirit and thought, its heights and abysses, forgets in the face of the overwhelming power of the warnings of Nietzsche and Thomas Mann’s *The Magic Mountain*, which he had read with Hannah Arendt in the period leading up to *Being and Time*, itself a manifestation and taming of the Dionysian, and an urgency fuelled by Dionysian charge, which may have been the nature of Heidegger’s externalization: his massive output, his succumbing to the ‘overwhelming power’ of the German existence out of an authentic aspiration which found itself fallen into the inauthentic. Spiritual mission is aligned to the destiny of the state, aspiring to a questioning made ‘essential and simple’ even as it demands that teachers and students and ‘must become seized.’

Yet the destiny of the state was aligned to a questioning spiritual mission which was to be heightened through an ‘internal’ *kampf*: ‘wills of both teachers and
students must confront one another, ready for battle.’ We can question whether it is out of an unknowing blindness or a knowing challenge out of the inner greatness of the movement - higher than actuality - or both, that Heidegger could take up a position in the totalitarian *Gleichschaltung* with the following words in his *Rectoral Address*: ‘All leadership must allow following to have its own strength. Every following, however, carries resistance within it. This essential opposition between leading and following must neither be covered over nor, indeed, obliterated altogether.’

Miguel de Beistegui emphasizes that for Heidegger here ‘the true and most fruitful relation between teacher and student is one that Heidegger characterizes as “struggle” (*Kampf*)’ [Beistegui 1998, 60]. *Kampf* for Heidegger is ontological. De Beistegui, agreeing with Derrida ‘who sees in Heidegger’s reference to the *Kampf* an anticipation of the later developments around the notion of *polemos* as ontological strife,’ asks: ‘Is *polemos* not another word for being itself?’ [Beistegui 1998, 168 & 61] - a question that takes us to the relation between fundamental ontology and the Apollonian-Dionysian duality, whether the Apollonian-Dionysian *cipher* can be seen as fundamental.

A phenomenological task, this study stands before a terrifying abyss that separates the possibility from the actuality of Auschwitz, Birkenau, Treblinka, Sobibor... De Beistegui expresses a deep concern: ‘In 1944-5, one might be surprised, if not utterly shocked, to see Heidegger so concerned with the destruction of the *essence* of man, when millions of men and women were *actually* being annihilated’ [Beistegui 1998, 177]. Such concern arises in the reading of Heidegger’s writing at any point after 1933. It was perhaps out of a sense of foreboding that in this
address Heidegger quotes Aeschylus’ *Prometheus*: ‘knowledge is far weaker than necessity.’ Nietzsche had written when Prussia declared war on Austria: ‘One can learn a lot in such times...Above all...one notices how slight the power of thought is’ [Krell 1997, 42].

Following his discoveries of Heidegger's political ‘behaviour,’ Hugo Ott wished to ‘understand Heidegger from the inside’ [Ott 1993, 6], and sees Heidegger as never having broken free from his religious background, ‘living all his life in the shadow of this conflict’ [6]. In 1935 Heidegger himself saw his religious affiliation as one of the two ‘thorns in the flesh’- the other being his political career - he had to live with. However, Ott sees that the ‘years from 1923 to the summer of 1928 were something of an interlude in Heidegger's life’ [6 & 5]. This ‘interlude’, however, comprised the very years leading up to the publication of *Being and Time* and his secret and secretive affair with Hannah Arendt. His silences about the demonic within his life would precede the Third Reich.

In his ‘Contribution to a Critique of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right,*’ Karl Marx questioned whether the philosopher who compromises with political authority might ‘himself...not be aware of the possibility that the apparent compromise with authority is grounded in the deepest deficiency...of his own doctrine’ [Wolin 1990, ix]. Heidegger's deficiency lay in what Dominique Janicaud terms ‘The Shadow of that Thought,’ the title of his book, Janicaud taking the word *shadow* from the 1966 questioning of Heidegger by *Der Spiegel*. Janicaud suggests that the ‘question of Heidegger’ may be the subject of some future work: ‘the great Bildungsroman that will relive from the inside the spiritual evolution of the “king” of thought - now Martin the Accursed’ [Janicaud 1996, 4]. Yet this is a path - biographical and moral
- which Janicaud declines to follow, even though it may be conducted with ‘the utmost seriousness,’ for it is a dangerous path which ‘leaves in the offing an uneliminable and cruelly frustrating gap between conditions of thought and thought itself,’ for, in the words of Jean-Francois Lyotard, ‘thought exceeds its contexts’ [Lyotard 1997, 59]. The ‘happening’ of the work, the density and vibrations, its being, its ‘whatness,’ call for a phenomenology of those vibrations, the dynamics, the voices within the text. The unapproached Bildungsroman hovers beyond the horizon as Janicaud approaches the ‘uneliminable,’ just as Zeitblom – a man of reason and harmony - approaches the demonic of dangerous, transgressive creativity in Thomas Mann’s Doctor Faustus, a lament for a lost purity: ‘the crossing of ontological questioning and a monstrous specter, which should never have met’ [Janicaud 1996, 8]. For Janicaud, it was the ‘irrealization’ in Heidegger’s thought, of Being and Time, which took him towards and exposed him to the ‘pathless wastes’ of ‘political errancy’ [8] - Heidegger’s own ‘overreaching’ [NP 143-144]. Even as he attempts to remain true to the segregation of thought from context, the uneliminable does not go away: whilst contending that thinking ‘exceeds the personality of the author,’ (which it may very well do) Janicaud reveals his own ‘shadow’ - that his concern actually be the ‘spiritual evolution’ of the thinker. In parenthesis he qualifies: thought exceeds the personality of the author ‘because the author transcended himself while thinking’ [Janicaud 1996, 18 - my italics]. Wagner and Nietzsche may say that one part of himself transcended another. For Janicaud, any overdeterminations are philosophical [35]. He recognizes that ‘the tensions immanent within the philosophical horizon of Being and Time...[are] for the most part...maintained in the “Rectorial Address”’...[neither] subjectivity nor the will are
really “deconstructed”’ [47]. Indeed, they are suppressed. Overdeterminations exist on the ontical side of the ontological threshold, by which I mean that they are grounded in the ontical, although it could be suggested that overdetermination is an ontological structure. In his *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* Heidegger acknowledges the ‘existentiell’ component to phenomenological destruction [PIA 25]. This opens up a reading of Heidegger which accepts the importance for his thinking of his whole factic life, a reading which merely subscribes to Heidegger’s proposal in *Being and Time* of the ‘ultimately existentiell…ontic priority of the question of being’ [BT2 12]. Not only philosophical, nor even political, overdeterminations can have an ontological dimension and be of philosophical import.

Janicaud cites Heidegger’s statement in *Introduction to Metaphysics*: ‘No one can leap over his own shadow’ [IM 214], making the citation emphatically in relation to the ‘philosophical’ question of Heidegger’s failed attempt to overthrow metaphysics. 'Metaphysics does not let go of its own so easily!' [Janicaud 1996, 84]

I suggest that Heidegger was taken over by the very magnitude of his project of destruction of the metaphysical tradition, with which he - unlike both Nietzsche and Husserl - felt compelled to undertake an intense *Auseinandersetzung*. But, especially in view of the intent of fundamental ontology, the horizon of which is an apolitical fundament, *Being and Time* itself, I suggest that it is arbitrary to limit its latencies, its overdeterminations to the political or to the ‘purely’ philosophical. Shadows of the spiritual evolution of thought can have philosophical importance, just as shadows *political*. And the shadows in Heidegger’s thinking - in fundamental ontology - will ‘explode’ politically, as if a Bacchic upsurge, albeit
coalescent with a higher intellectual aspiration for the University and for resolute authenticity.

Janicaud - even as he asks: ‘What right do we have to cast God’s eyes upon a life’ [Janicaud 1996, 4] - accepts that Heidegger’s spiritual evolution is crucial: ‘The return to the texts is an operation with two sides, one philosophical and the other spiritual’ [114]. As with Zeitblom in Doctor Faustus who wonders ‘whether a clear and certain line can be drawn between the noble and pedagogic world of the mind and the world of spirit which one approaches only at one’s peril’ [DF 9], Janicaud is concerned about the relation between the philosophical and the spiritual, which is not removed from the existential: he contends that ‘we cannot maintain an airtight partition between existential and philosophical singularities...[which] interacted at a very intense and secretive location to which we hardly have access and which Heidegger himself sealed by his silence’ [Janicaud 1996, 109].

iii. From Politics to Facticity

Janicaud’s reserve in the face of the perilous question of the relation between Heidegger’s thought and its motivations and contexts is not shared by Theodore Kisiel, who is more exercised by the demand of ‘would-be purist Heideggerians to insist on a rigid separation between Heidegger’s thought and Heidegger’s life, his philosophy and his biography,’ which Kisiel sees as an ‘ideological coverup, a thinly veiled attempt to insulate the purity of the thought from the “impure” events that are being dredged up from its vital infrastructure’ [Kisiel 1992, 19]. Indeed, in his book The Genesis of Being Time, Kisiel contends that ‘biographical infrastructure is in fact fraught with philosophical (or, more precisely here, ‘metaphilosophical’)}
significance’ [Kisiel 1995, 5]. Guided by Plato's *Apology*, ‘a story in which autobiography itself becomes philosophy’ [Kisiel 1992, 13], Kisiel, in his essay ‘Heidegger’s Apology,’ sees such a position as ignoring the application of Heidegger’s own ‘hermeneutics of facticity’ to the thinker himself, and of phenomenology to disclose, to uncover the impurity within the purity of analysis [12].

Speaking in 1959 to Heinrich Petzet, Heidegger calls his readers to concern themselves not with ‘biographical tidbits’ but with ‘the matter…to which I have devoted 40 years of long labor. *My life is totally uninteresting*’ [19]. Yet, in a letter to Karl Löwith on August 19th 1921, he had explained the ‘basis’ of what would become his fundamental ontology: ‘I work concretely and factically out of my “I am,” out of my intellectual and wholly factic origin, milieu, life-contexts, and whatever is available to me from these as a vital experience in which I live…And I am all this in the life-context of the university’ [24].

Kisiel sees this letter as ‘an application of Heidegger’s own philosophical ‘hermeneutics of facticity’ to himself and so testimony to Heidegger’s own sense of the intrinsic importance, rooted in his own philosophy, of the biographical element of the autochthonous “hermeneutic situation” out of which a philosopher speaks’ [Kisiel 1995, 7], and he emphasises the need to apply Heidegger’s ‘hermeneutics of facticity’ to Heidegger’s own philosophical stance: ‘Heidegger himself tells us here that his thoughts stem directly from the deepest motivation of his own factic situation, in short, that his thought stems from his life and that one can therefore not divorce the ontological [his philosophy] from the ontic [his biography]’ [79]. And yet in Heidegger’s philosophy there is attempted such a divorce, even as there
is, at the same time, a conflation of the ‘content’ of the categories, ontic-ontological.\(^{14}\).

The letter to Löwith explains the term ‘factic’ already introduced. It is a indeed a personalisation of the thinking Heidegger was working through between his 1919 War Semester lectures and *Being and Time*, his development of an ‘Ontology’ out of a ‘hermeneutics of facticity,’ the sub-title of his 1923 lectures. In his earlier *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* (1921-22), whilst attempting to overcome the ‘theoretical’ through a method aiming at a primordial interpretation of Being, Heidegger locates philosophy within man’s ‘own mode of Being’ in ‘one’s own concrete life’ [PIA 126 & 128], ‘the way we ourselves are, namely in and out of our factual existence...in our past and future’ [57 & 127]. Philosophy in its attempts to interpret the being of man becomes, rather, is a self-encounter: ‘I encounter myself in the world, in that which I live and in that which engages me, in my successes and failures. I encounter myself in a world which acquires and takes its determinate meaningfulness from my own self’ [2]. And as a self-encounter of factual life, phenomenological interpretation is ‘derived[...out of the facticity of life itself’ [66]. It is an encounter with latency: the whole thrust of philosophy as phenomenology is, as he will say in his 1925 lectures on the *History of The Concept of Time*, to reveal what remains hidden to the positivist sciences, indeed ‘concealed’ by them, ‘laying open and letting be seen...the dismantling of concealments’ [HCT 86].

Phenomenology pursues factual life even as it emerges from it. Rather than in attempting to establish a ‘universally valid, secure definition’ [PIA 12] of what factual life is, Heidegger is concerned with the ‘factual life experience...[as] the
point of departure of the path to philosophy,’ as he had stated clearly the previous year in his lectures on *The Phenomenology of Religious Life* [PRL 8]. Now, in these lectures on Aristotle, he is characterising facticity - factual life - as the site of that strife between authenticity and inauthenticity, which will underpin *Being and Time*. Now, in 1921, Heidegger uses the terms ruinance (inauthenticity) and the possibility of counter-ruinance (authenticity). Phenomenology itself is counter-ruinant (authentic) in its attempt to recover a primordial understanding, overcoming superficial, scholastic concern with ‘dogma,’ the ‘de-vivified’ ontological tradition and concern with mere ‘external sequences of schools and trends’ [PIA 13/7/8]. Phenomenology sees ‘logical schemata’ fall before the manifestation of ‘life com[ing] to itself’ [66]. Indeed, formal logic - ‘ordering and totalizing,’ and ‘orientated toward a material region of objects’ - had itself ‘repress[e]d the radical problematic of...genuine logic’ [17-18]. Phenomenology, as the true revelation of factical life, seeks to recover ‘genuine logic' with ‘passion’ as a matter of ‘conscience’ [20/11]. Thus the ontological task is infused with an *existentiell* ‘composition’ [25]. The seeing of ‘the object’s own proper “what” [and] “how” ’ is attained through a philosophy which - in its relatedness to beings, in a ‘co-determin[ing]...nexus of facticity of the life-situation’ - is a ‘*mode of self-comportment,*’ through which the “I myself”...is *thereby experienced*’ and ‘reflect[ed] back on’ the interpreter [19/48/38/79/89].

Heidegger’s concern is with what factical life *is*. The factic life of the “I myself”... exists in the form of its world, its surrounding world, its shared world, its own world.’ In its *inclination* it ‘abandons itself to a certain pressure exerted by its world.’ [79 & 76] Heidegger raises the importance of - only to defer consideration
of - the question whether ‘this occurs explicitly or not, freely or in a culpable entanglement’ [76]. Heidegger will find his address of this question held up by the struggle within factical life, for ‘equiprimordial’ is the proclivity of life to be, on the one hand, ‘dispersed in the world...in ruinance’ and, on the other, to call to its own authentic “’before” oneself.’ But, in lapsed ruinance, this authentic “’before” oneself’ is ‘suppressed’ [77]. Life lives inauthentically, it ‘mis-measures itself; it does not grasp itself in the measure appropriate to it’ [77]. Life is distanced from itself by the ‘solicitations’ of its world. Life loses itself - mistakes itself and opens itself up to committing mistakes - in the ‘possibilities’ of the world [80]. Life settles for ‘the easy,’ thereby ‘elud[ing]’ itself [77]. In a constellation of negative terms Heidegger sees life ‘sequestering’ itself off from itself, finding itself only in ‘disguise’ - larvance - culminating in life putting out its own eyes [77], in a ‘nullification’ of its authentic self. This is the ‘very structure of facticity’ [110]. Life ‘comes up short’ in the face of a suppression of a dangerous authenticity, even as it is, equiprimordially, through phenomenological interpretation, a ‘counter-movedness’ against ‘seductive’ life, the very ‘ruinance’ (ruina –collapse) which ‘co-constitutes’ factical life [99-104]. The understanding of the oscillatory character of factical life demands a thinking which - against the ‘error’ of thinking of matters of fact and ‘free[d]...from the determinations of “formal” logic’ - embraces ‘genuine questionability’[22 & 112].

In the next chapter I will be looking at Heidegger’s reception of the thinking of Husserl and Nietzsche in terms of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality. In these ‘Aristotle’ lectures, Heidegger, having taken a position against Nietzsche’s ‘resentment-laden’ repudiation of the University, then privileges a Nietzschean
position over a Husserlian. Phenomenology should aim at disclosure rather than apodictic clarification, for “life” is not a momentarily clarified thing’ [112], but an experience of ‘questionableness,’ unsatisfied with ‘our rummaging about in some purified content’ [3], through some idealized ‘eidetic,’ universal seeing: ‘The question cannot be pursued in a doctrinaire way and with methodological purity, which is but a dream and does not perceive the ground (facticity)’ [31]. An authentic philosophy ‘encounter[s] the absolute questionability and possesses this questionability in full awareness’ [29]. And Heidegger makes questioning that by which Dasein defines itself: ‘It is precisely in questioning that factical life attains its genuinely developed self-givenness’ [113], for the ‘fractures’ of factical life put a question-mark against the aspiration toward ‘ontological purity and serene uniformity’ [115].

Nietzsche had asked how one could stand in the midst ‘of this whole marvellous uncertainty and rich ambiguity of existence without questioning, without trembling with the craving and rapture of such questioning,’ indeed contending that ‘one should not wish to divest existence of its rich ambiguity’ [GS 2, 373]. Without Nietzsche’s raptures before the marvellous, in an instance of Heidegger’s making Nietzsche true to the earth, Zarathustra’s call in Thus Spake Zarathustra [Z 42], Heidegger endorsed the pursuit of questionability: ‘The authentic [eigentliche] foundation of philosophy is a radical, existentiell grasp of and maturation of questionableness [Fraglichkeit]...’[PIA 28]. In a formulation resonant of Nietzsche’s imagery in Daybreak, Heidegger explains: ‘The situation in question does not correspond to a safe harbour but to a leap into a drifting boat, and it all depends on getting the mainsheet in hand and looking to the wind...[C]larification...[of] the
difficulties...discloses the proper horizon toward factual life’ [29]. And it is as if in pursuit of a Nietzschean - yet raptureless - abysmal mountain ‘traverse’ [NBW, 457] that Heidegger - as does Nietzsche - sees, in the face of the questionable, the ‘tendency to certainty and safety...the wish to be reassured...[as] inappropriate....instances of weakness and indolence’ [PIA 15/32].

Engaged in an Auseinandersetzung with both Nietzsche and Husserl, Heidegger's aim is not an Husserlian ‘presuppositionless’ philosophy, because ‘philosophy...stands originally within a pre-possession of the factual’ [4]. As Heidegger sees the problems of factual life ‘pressing toward resolution’ [48], he effects an overcoming of the Nietzschean-Husserlian positions as he calls for ‘the pure cognition of the original questionability, i.e., at the same time, the pure cognition of the labyrinthine basic character of human existence’ [42]. His own interpretation reflects back upon himself as an analysis of the ‘labyrinthine basic character of human existence’ arises in a philosophy which, as an ‘existentiell phenomenon (the pre-eminent one...is [a] constant struggle...against its own factual ruinance,’ and this a characteristic of ‘the process of the actualization of philosophizing’ [42 &114].

Even as ‘the tendency of factual life is to “be” in the mode of bringing-itself-to-possession’[129], it is also in the mode of being ‘relucent toward the collapse which is approaching in itself” [126]. In contending that ‘the issue is the motivated direction of interest’ [32], Heidegger raises in his own categorizations the possibility that he himself may be relucent in a motivated suppression of interest.
iv. The Demonic

Elżbieta Ettinger, writing on Heidegger's relationship with Hannah Arendt, suggests a link between Heidegger's political life and his more ‘personal’ - even erotic - life: ‘His romantic predisposition seems to have led him both to a passionate attachment to Hannah Arendt and to a fascination with the Nazi vision of the rebirth of Germany. It may well be that scholars should look for the origins of Heidegger's involvement with Nazism not only in his philosophy but also in the specific needs of his emotional life' [Ettinger 1995, 8]. There may indeed be a relation between the two, a ‘common denominator,’ Dionysos. And, after the Rectorate, Heidegger's multifaceted changes in ‘formulation and presentation’ of his thinking, indeed, its very nature may also be connected with the power of eros and its sublimation, that is, in the recovery of the Dionysian, extracted from political alignment, now incorporated within his philosophical exposition, as the music of Hagen infuses that of Siegfried in Richard Wagner's Götterdämmerung.

The contiguity between Heidegger's politics and his emotional life are suggested by the recurrence of the resort to the ‘demonic’ as explanation. As Heidegger wrote of his ‘demonic’ fall for Arendt [HA 6], so Arendt would seek an explanation for Heidegger's political behaviour in the irrational: in March 1951 she assured Karl Jaspers that Heidegger ‘really does not know and is hardly in a position to find out what devil had then possessed him’ [Ettinger 45]. Indeed, Heidegger himself later said of 1933 that some ‘devil’ had possessed him [71].

His work in part provided a sanctuary. Walter Kaufmann, in his book From Shakespeare to Existentialism, opens his chapter ‘Heidegger's Castle': “‘Language is the house of Being,” says Heidegger; but in truth his language is the house in which
he hides, and his Gothic terminology is like a row of towers that frightens us away while it gives him the feeling of security’ [Kaufmann 1960, 339]. In a letter to Jaspers in 1928, Heidegger claimed ‘that I no longer “hide” in my philosophical work’ [Ott 53]. Yet Heidegger’s escape from ‘hiding’ would be short lived. Arendt wrote to Jaspers in 1949 of Heidegger’s philosophical life in Todtnauberg: ‘this railing against civilization, and writing Sein with a y is in reality a kind of mouse hole into which he withdrew’ [Ettinger 67]. Not only with a y; ‘Being’ would later appear crossed out. The notion of a philosopher hiding had struck Heidegger in these early lectures on Aristotle, in which he writes of Hegel: ‘it is only the critical rigour of a method that has taken refuge in its own autonomy’ [PIA 112]. Heidegger speaks ahead to his own autonomy of thought, at the same time as the idea of foreconception becomes important for him. However, his acknowledgement of hiding in his own work bore not only on the ‘political’ existence to come, but the personal issues which fractured his factual existence.

I seek to show that Heidegger’s thinking is at the same time an attempt at an overcoming of Western metaphysics and an attempt at self-overcoming, an overcoming and transformation of the whole erotic-auratic constellation of his own factual existence, his own being-in-the-world, transformed into his own mantras, their compulsion to repeat both evasive and cathartic. As Heidegger will discuss in his 1943 Parmenides lectures, truth is conflictual, and the conflictual is an essence of his own philosophy, both within his texts and in the relation between his texts and his erasures, no ‘pure’ phenomenological bracketing.

The use of his work in part as a bulwark against the world after 1934 may be suggestive towards his earlier texts, his destruction of the ontological tradition a
bulwark against himself, his own Dionysian self, as Janicaud might say, a transcendence of himself through thought. Fred Dallmayr sees Heidegger's work after 1933 'as a prolonged struggle to expel or subdue the virus' [Rockmore & Margolis 285]. Equally, it could be seen that his work of the twenties incorporated a struggle to expel or subdue another virus: the erotic, the demonic, the Dionysian. Janicaud was correct in thinking that the address of the questions of the spiritual evolution of Heidegger's thinking was the stuff of Bildungsroman. And the discourse on Heidegger's Nazism is as labyrinthine as the philosophical disputations Thomas Mann locates in his Bildungsroman The Magic Mountain. The 'Heidegger Case' is not only a concern with a 'scandal' of philosophy. It is a debate over the 'inner strength and greatness' of Heidegger himself. And - on the question of the 'spiritual' - Heidegger himself, in his Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, expresses his 'first and exclusive concern...[that] we seek to understand and appropriate the spiritual situation in which we find ourselves' [PIA 20]. I approach that spiritual evolution of Heidegger himself.

v. Towards Music

Much thought has rightly been given to the question of a political trace in Heidegger's early work, particularly in Being and Time. However, I wish here to pursue an investigation into other shadows and latencies which lends itself to David Krell's call for a 'new kind of discussion concerning Heidegger's political debacle' [Krell 1992, xii]. As his 'point of departure' [xii], Krell takes the daimonic - Heidegger's thinking in relation to the question of Life. In pursuance of another view on the demonic, I take music - in particular fugue - as a point of departure,
music itself, in the words of Thomas Mann a ‘daemonic realm’ which can embrace extreme opposites, ‘the most calculated order and chaotic antireason at once’ [Mann in Egon Holthusen 1964, 126]. The very word *fugal* points to the proximity between music and psychic state, and to Heidegger's own post-Rectorate ideas in *The Origin of the Work of Art* and *The Will to Power as Art* on fugal strife as the happening within the work of art, and philosophy itself - through its ‘transfigurations’ and ‘transformations’ - as art.

But this I intend to pursue through the questioning posed to Heidegger's philosophical texts by his letters which suggest a deep *unsaying* in Heidegger's thinking of fundamental ontology, an unsaying which could be seen as a phenomenological ‘bracketing’ towards a ‘purely' fundamental, yet which seems at variance with his criticisms of Husserlian phenomenology in the name of a ‘hermeneutics of facticity.’ An attempt will be made here to disclose the being of Heidegger's philosophizing, the being of the questioning, the *behaviour* of the questioner. As Heidegger says in *Being and Time*: ‘As an attitude adopted by a being, the questioner, the questioning has its own character of being’ [BT2 4]. The text itself will be revealed as overdetermined, a coalescence of the manifest and latent, of the said and unsaid, of the spoken and suppressed, thus a psychic phenomenon. This I hope to show phenomenologically through evidence and erasures, thus ontologically as the ‘whatness’, the being of the text. In a letter to Jean-Michel Palmier, Heidegger himself asks: ‘Can and must a work of poetry and consequently every great work of art be explained by the biography, or is it not rather the work, which makes possible an interpretation of the biography, that takes the good path?’ [Janicaud 1996, 18]
It will be shown that absences are conspicuous, erasures embedded in fundamental ontology, rendering the texts, the thinking, with a pervasive otherness, present through the conspicuousness of a transforming absence, in a process akin to Theodore Adorno’s depiction of music:

‘music represents at once the immediate manifestation of impulse and the locus of its taming. It stirs up the dance of the Maenads and sounds from Pan’s bewitching flute, but it also rings out from the Orphic Lyre, around which the visions of violence range themselves pacified.’

[Adorno 2002, 288]

The text is ‘at once a manifestation of impulse and the locus of its taming.’ In their very appearance in the thought, ‘untranquil’ agitations like anxiety, guilt, conscience and death struggle against their own tranquillization, a denial of Heidegger’s own ‘ontic foundation.’ In the taming of the impulse in and through the text it becomes a question of ‘to what degree?’ Heidegger seeks a heightened degree of taming of the agitation, of countermovements. Fugue, as the musical form - a forward movement and counterpoint - is structured [fugt cf. Nowell-Smith 2012]. Fugue is both strifeful movement and the structuring of that movement. Heidegger will resolve the tension between fugue as strife and fugue as structure in the proposition of an ‘agitated stillness’ of the artwork [Nowell-Smith 2012, 46]. Oscillations, tensions, countermovements are ‘structured’ in a ‘continually self-surpassing gathering’ [OWA 2, 27]. Fugue takes place within a fugue as fugue structures fugue [Nowell-Smith 2012], indeed a manifestation and a taming of impulse. The silences will speak of the taming of the Dionysian - a silence out of repression.
To speak of ‘repression’ introduces the application of psychological insight into this interpretation of Heidegger, which should not - in spite of his phenomenological opposition to psychologism - be considered foreign to Heidegger’s own early volition. In his lectures on *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, Heidegger observes that ‘In Augustine, not everything breaks through clearly!’ this just after he makes a deeply religious, and deeply psychological observation: ‘Anxiety before one’s ownmost deceiver within oneself’ [PRL 192]. This is not the psychology of psychologism. I will examine the question of Heidegger’s (and Husserl’s) position with regard to psychology in the next chapter. Suffice it here to draw on two quotations, the first from *Phenomenology of Religious Life*: ‘This self-experience is the only possible point of departure for a philosophical psychology’ [PIA 10], and the second from *The Will to Power as Art*: ‘The equation of Being and life is not some sort of unjustified expansion of the biological, although it often seems that way, but a transformed interpretation of the biological on the basis of Being, grasped in a superior way’ [WPA 219]. Heidegger’s thinking is, on one level, a transformation of the psychological on the basis of Being grasped in a superior way. To think Heidegger in terms of metapsychology, I am minded by Freud’s idea of the return of the repressed, of Jung’s interpretation of the Dionysian as extraversion, the Apollonian as introversion; and by the mythical metapsychology of Euripides’ dramatization of the Bacchic revenge against the repudiation of the god Dionysus.

The main body of this study will close with Heidegger’s Dionysian break-out into the political world, having, in his fundamental ontology, suppressed his own demonic. This raises questions about Heidegger’s thinking, but - in relation to the
'Heidegger Case'- higher than these actualities stands the possibility that the erasures within his overt thought - the self-imposed limitations - may offer illumination. In *What is called Thinking?* Heidegger writes: 'What is unthought in a thinker’s thought is not a lack inherent in his thought....The Unthought is the highest gift that a thought can give' [WCT 76]. But erasures – suppressions - suggest that there is a lack inherent in his thought - the ‘unthought’ may be the thought repressed. However, there may be a relation between the ‘lack’ and the ‘gift’: deficiency may enlighten the problem of the thought itself.

**vi. From Circles to Fugues**

‘We cannot do that with philosophy’

Heidegger on hearing Schubert’s posthumously published Sonata in B major:

[Neske & Kettering 1990, 167].

As a partial response to Heidegger's comment on Schubert, I will explore what it is that music can do as a hermeneutic for the reading of a philosophical text, for philosophical understanding.

I would like first to draw attention to the importance of the ‘circle’ in Heidegger’s thinking, and to suggest that within his thought ‘circularity’ is essentially fugal. In his ‘Nietzsche’ lectures on ‘The Eternal Recurrence of the Same’ delivered in the summer of 1937, both the notion and the image of the circle recurs, symbolic formations and waymarks to the wider horizon of the eternal recurrence; singular, microcosmic condensations resonating with the whole [ERS 147]. The circle is, indeed, a recurrent happening within Heidegger’s thought from the very
Beginnings of his search for a ‘methodological way.’ In his 1919 lectures on ‘The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview’ in which Heidegger seeks a ‘genuinely primordial’ pre-theoretical circularity, circularity is seen as ‘the essence of philosophy’ [TDP 81 & 14]. Out of this genesis Heidegger develops the unavoidable creative dilemma of his fundamental ontology - the ‘hermeneutic circle’: the pursuit of the question of Being, as distinguished both from a superior being and from beings in general, is accessed through a privileged being ‘which we ourselves are’ and which ‘we call Dasein’ [HCT 148]. The question of Being is pursued through ‘the being of the questioning of the questioner himself’ [146], and the circularity of understanding is the ‘expression of the existential fore-structure of Dasein itself…In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing’ [BT1, 195]. Being, whilst being no being, is pursued through a being. Heidegger acknowledges the dilemma the hermeneutic circle poses: ‘Everything here is spinning in a circle’ [ERS 105].

That everything is spinning in circles points to affinities with the music of the Second Viennese School, of Schoenberg, Berg and Webern. In Wozzeck, Alban Berg uses the phrase ‘Circular lines’ [Adorno 1998a, 196]. His String Quartet Op.3, which, in the words of Adorno, has ‘whole sections…in permanent dissolution’ [185], begins with circular motifs against which any sense of progress must contend.

But if the circle connects Heidegger with the music of the Second Viennese School, an exploration of his circles will reveal within an essential circularity a similar essential strife. The eternal recurrence within Heidegger’s circles is strife, fugue.
And this must not be avoided for, as Heidegger says in lectures of 1936-7 on ‘The Origin of the Work of Art,’ ‘truth’s shining’ is fugue [OWA 1, 189].

The circle is to be reconfigured as fugue. The hermeneutic process is an out of, a ‘forward’ movedness, the ‘way’ towards understanding ‘traversed ‘backward’ [PIA 17]. Yet the thrust of this fugal ‘circularity’ is still towards a resolution through an Auseinandersetzung, the strife of setting apart and bringing together, resolved ultimately in momentary coalescences. Resolution occurs beyond the fugue, a transcendence, akin to Jungian individuation. Paradigmatic of such fugueing is Nietzsche's Apollonian-Dionysian duality in The Birth of Tragedy in which the ‘perpetual strife’ of the Dionysian-Apollonian duality is transcended only in ‘periodically intervening reconciliations’ [NBW 33]. This manifestation of fugue - the Apollonian-Dionysian duality - will prove to be of particular hermeneutic value in this study of Heidegger's thinking. As the circle is revealed as fugal, so is the existential fore-structure of Dasein, the questioner himself. Fugue offers a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing.

vii. Music, philosophy and Heidegger

The setting apart and a bringing together of Heidegger's Auseinandersetzung is reflected in his use of fug as both strife and jointure, a tension between the Latin fugere (flight) and the Greek fug (bringing together). It is the fuguing of fugue, the strife between strife and jointure.

Michael Eldred sees the ‘unity of the essencing of music’ in fugue which he defines as ‘a musical composition in which several themes, which in their difference flee [L. fugere] from each other, are nonetheless held together by means of the laws of
contrapuntal harmony’ [Eldred 1999, 3.3]. In fugue, then, there is a conjunction between flight and harmony - in its resolutions, perhaps a flight to harmony. And, indeed, Iain Thomson, investigating this duality in fugue – in both movement and structuring of that movement – draws attention to what Heidegger calls “the hidden inter-resonating” within the ‘fugal structure’ of Heidegger’s *Beitrage*, within the unification of its six counterpointed fuguings. In Thomson’s assessment ‘the structure organizing the *Beitrage* is more Bachian than Bacchanalian. So, instead of mistaking the *Beitrage* for a series of Nietzschean aphorisms, we need to take seriously Heidegger’s implication that his text is joined together according to the musical model of the fugue.’ In his notes, as does Heidegger in his own work, Thomson points to the more equivocal regions which fugue inhabits, concluding that ‘Fugal writing thus tends to experiment with the limits of legibility...sustained fugal writing will adopt the form of the fugue conceptually rather than literally’ [Thomson 2003, 60-61].

The leap - in fact the heading of one of the *Fugungen* of the Heidegger’s ‘secret’ *Beitrage* of the late thirties - from musical to philosophical fugue is associated with a further meaning of fugue as a psychological state: recognising that fugue goes back to the Latin word for *flight*, a ‘fugue state’ designates ‘a flight from one’s own identity, often involving travel to some unconsciously desired locality’. The Heideggerian individuation takes Dasein out of fugue through to ‘the *rapprochement* between human beings and Being’ [Thomson 2003 61].

Thomson suggests that ‘Taken together, these musical and psychological senses of fugue (which both go back to the Latin word for flight) would provide a provocative dual avenue of approach to the *Beitrage*, both in terms of their
organization and something of their psychological motivations (perhaps revealing another side of the motivations for writing this strange and incredibly ambitious text.’ [Thomson 2003, 70-71] And indeed this dual perspective of organization and motivation, indeed the relation between the structure and the psychological substructure can be extended beyond the Beitrag to the totality of Heidegger’s oeuvre.

Within the polymorphous transformations of his thinking in the mid-1930s, Heidegger, in whose writing music plays a minor role, engages in an extended Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche for whom ‘life...without music...would be an error’ [Safranski 2003, 19]. Nietzsche speaks to us through his writings, but his inmost being yearned in music: ‘Compared with music all communication by words is shameless; words dilute and brutalise; words depersonalise; words make the uncommon common’ [WP 428]. Indeed, ‘one becomes more of a philosopher the more one becomes a musician!’ [NBW 614] And as Nietzsche would have looked back on his early work and felt ‘this soul should have sung,’ Gustav Mahler felt that both he and Richard Strauss ‘as musicians sensed what I might call the latent music in Nietzsche’s mighty work [Thus Spake Zarathustra]’ [Blaukopf 1984, 121]. Nietzsche himself wrote: ‘the tempo of these speeches [of Zarathustra] is a tender adagio’ [NBW, 675], but towards a questioning and an oscillation - a fugue - between the mountain and the market place, between authenticity and inauthenticity, between Being and beings. Strauss ends his tone poem Also Sprach Zarathustra with a dual-key ambivalence, a questionmark. Just as Nietzsche’s ‘Yes-Saying’ could not escape that questioning ‘Or?’ with which Daybreak ends, so
Strauss’s heroic affirmations in his *Zarathustra* ended with the ambivalent questioning of dual-tonality.

Thus, music in this late Austro-German tradition offers the possibilities of synchronous duality, as a heightened hermeneutic of the tensions within the philosophical texts. Alex Ross in *The Rest Is Noise* sees in modern music, within Strauss’s *Salome and Elektra*, within Alban Berg’s *Wozzeck* and *Lulu* - no longer the tonality of Schubert - the ‘latent tonalities’ within atonal chromaticism: ten-note dissonances are dissected to reveal the superimposition of harmonic, tonal chords, which Ross likens to Freud’s idea of the ‘return of the repressed’ [Ross 2009, 74-75]. It may be that it is the dissonant that is repressed. And, for Adorno, dissonance is more perceptive, more knowing, more rational, more truthful than consonance, more revelatory of the ‘contradiction within the thing itself,’ alerting us to the dissonances within the philosophical text, including that between the said and the unsaid which, for Heidegger, was the true source of understanding the said [Adorno 2004, 59; 1994 31].

For Schoenberg ‘the wonderful thing about music is that one can say everything in it, so that he who knows understands everything; and yet one hasn’t given away one’s secrets - the things one doesn’t even admit to oneself’ [MacDonald 1987, 115]. Its saying can be both a saying and a non-saying. With Alban Berg there are meanings hidden, encoded in his music of the twenties: ‘double layered’, it conceals but presents a ‘disquieting subtext…allud[ing] to the latest twists in the composer’s always complex emotional life’ [Ross 226-9].23
Their music was allied to thoughts of dread, the dangers in *saying*, the danger *of language* of which Heidegger became increasingly aware under the Third Reich: ‘language...is the danger of all dangers, because it creates initially the possibility of dangers...the threat to existence’ [HEP 298]. Still, for Heidegger ‘it is only language that affords the very possibility of standing in the openness of the existent’ [299].

Whilst Nietzsche believed that he ‘should have sung, this “new soul” - and not spoken!’ [Safranski 2003, 20] his own highest *musical* expression was not his written compositions but his improvisation, the nearest he came to Wagnerian ‘unending melody’ [21]. And yet Keith Jarrett, in and through whom Western ‘improvisation’ has perhaps ventured most closely towards Wagnerian unending melody, looks beyond music. Opposed to the idea that music comes from music, Jarrett contends that ‘music is the result of a process that has nothing to do with music...a [spiritual] process the musician is going through especially if he is creating it on the spot.’ [Jarrett 2004]. His aim in free improvisation is ‘to open the door to a process not present an object’ [Jarrett 2005].

The idea that ‘doors can be opened’ *across* genres - across forms of human expression - was endorsed by Mahler, for whom his own music was not merely the ‘logical *development* of the inner idea, but also... *the genuine opposition of contrasting motives*’ [Martner 1997, 182]. Mahler asked Arnold Schoenberg: ‘Have your pupils read Dostoevsky, that is more important than counterpoint’ [Reich 1970, 220]. And he recognised an affinity with Richard Strauss, below the surface of their differing attitudes towards ‘programmes’ for their music: ‘Schopenhauer,’ wrote Mahler, ‘used the image of two miners, each digging his
tunnel from opposite sides of the mountain, who finally meet underground. This seems to me to describe perfectly well my relationship to Strauss’ [Grange 1974, 358]. Heidegger himself recalls that Dilthey, in a letter to Husserl, had ‘compared their work to boring into a mountain from opposite sides until they break through to meet each other’ [HCT 24].

This image can be applied to the question of the relation between philosophy (words) and music. In Doctor Faustus, Thomas Mann’s composer Adrian Leverkuhn believed that ‘Music and speech...belonged together, they were at bottom one, language was music, music a language; separate, one always appealed to the other, imitated the other, used the other’s tools, always the one gave itself to be understood as a substitute of the other’ [DF, 163]. Both philosophy and music can be seen as attempts to access Being. For, as Heidegger concedes, ‘we are not able to lay hold of the Being of beings directly and expressly, neither by way of beings, nor in beings - nor anywhere else at all’ [IM, 35]. Eldred perceives that ‘music may provide an access, an opening’ to Being, that ‘All musicking is originally a listening to the quivering’ of Being [Eldred 1999, sections 3.2 & 5.3], and this music can alert us to the ‘quivering’ within the philosophical text, something Adorno attempts in his Hegel - Three Studies. For Adorno, Hegel’s texts are a murmuring, reverberating becoming [Adorno 1994, 89/119], a ‘permanent status nascendi,’ [121] their content is process, their form is process, a dynamic dialectic generated out of irreconcilable contradiction, [75] originating not in some ‘mere conceptual schema... [but] from the experience of an antagonistic society’ [75/82]. It could also be generated out of being-in-the-world itself.
Whilst privileging language as the ‘house of Being,’ the whole thrust of Heidegger's thinking is to the limit of linguistic expression, to transcend the limitation of ordinary language with hyphenated combinations, neologisms, for he perceives that ‘the possibilities of disclosure belonging to cognition fall far short of the primordial disclosure of moods [of attunement] in which Dasein is brought before its being as the there’ [BT 2, 131]. Kisiel contends that, for Heidegger, even in his phenomenological beginnings, ‘philosophy is more a form of life on the edge of expression rather than a science’ [Kisiel 1995, 59].

In his *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, Heidegger refers to Socrates’ claim in the *Phaedo* that his philosophy was ‘already’ music, since ‘the highest music was philosophy’ and cites the ‘musical philosophy’ of the *Sophist* in which a ‘rhythmical “formation” adheres to an inner order and is actualized in it’ [38]. Heidegger suggests that ‘there is between “philosophize” and “poetize”, as we say, an “analogy”’ [37]. And indeed Richard Rojcewicz, the translator of these lectures, informs us that the German word Heidegger actually ‘offers as analogous to *philosophieren* is *musizieren*’ [36]. The word missing from the English language is ‘musicize.’ For our emphasis we will let ‘musicize’ stand. And, as Nietzsche had questioned whether he should have sung, Heidegger is drawn, as is Nietzsche in *The Birth of Tragedy*, to, though does not quote fully, that section in which Socrates relates the visitation of the ‘dream-figure’ ‘bidding [him] to compose’ music: ‘Socrates, be diligent and make music.’ Socrates continues:

‘I was to “make music” in the sense in which I was already doing so: the highest music was philosophy, and philosophy was my business. But now that my trial was over, and the festival of Apollo prevented my
being put to death, it occurred to me that possibly the injunction of the
dream might be to compose music in the commonly accepted sense...my
first work was in honour of the god whose feast was being kept.’ [Plato
1995, *Phaedo* 61 a-b]

This, then, was the music of Apollo, Apollonian music, not the Dionysian music of
Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy*. Against fugal oscillation Heidegger conducts his own
‘therapeutic’ expositions, an Apollonian ‘stilling.’ It may be hazarded that music
may (after Schopenhauer and Nietzsche) be a Heideggerian ‘primal’ experience, or,
to borrow from Adorno, [Adorno 2002, 288] that music is both manifestation and
taming of primal experience, its fugues and transfigurations, its harmonics and
dissonances, its resolutions, mirroring ‘the nexus of facticity of the life-
situation...which...press[es] toward resolution’ [PIA 48], resolution from
irresolution, strife, fugue. Aiming at the 'highest passion,' the occasional purple
phrase of passion emerges out of the ‘arid’ methodological explication, of these
early lectures. Heidegger translates from Plato’s *Republic* [521c 5-8]: ‘What we
properly call philosophy, the ascent up to Being as such... is the conversion of the
soul from a day that resembles night to the genuine day’ [PIA 37].

It is the musicizing process within Wagner’s *Ring of the Nibelungs*, this
transfiguration out of the mundane, the prosaic, dynamic out of static. But as the
prosaic in Wagner is still music, even Heidegger’s ‘arid’, repetitive terminologies -
‘appropriation of the idea of definition,’ ‘a determinate situation of understanding,’
‘the idea of definition,’ ‘the actualization of the interpretation,’ ‘principle’
‘comportment’- have musical resonance, as mantra. Heidegger ‘builds’ sentences -
whole sentences a catalogue, a building of phrases and concepts. So it is ironic that
he writes: ‘nowhere is it easier for the dangers of a groundless word-mysticism to spread than in philosophical explication, and these dangers can never be entirely circumvented’ [93]. On one particular page [94] sentences are held together by seventy mantra-like repeated words: ‘movedness,’ ‘caring,’ ‘factual,’ ‘inclination,’ ‘categories,’ ‘sequestration,’ ‘relucence,’ ‘prestruction’ [94].

Could it be that we have here one aspect of the auratic hold of the ‘magician of Messkirch’ - then as now - the how of the saying? It transcends from the ‘means’ of such phrases, to the ‘ends’ of philosophy, to ‘the pure cognition of the original questionability, i.e., at the same time, the pure cognition of the labyrinthine basic character of human existence’ [42]. Philosophy itself is transcendence: as cognition it ‘aims at something ultimate and universal, the highest’ [43]. And we can see in the mantra-like quality of the repetition of words and phrases in philosophy a mode of life bringing itself back to some degree of equilibrium from gazing into - from experiencing - the abysses of existence, an Apollonian containment of or counterpoise to Dionysian content. It is life reasserting itself against itself. Indeed philosophical categories are ‘alive in life itself…They…are precisely the pre-eminent way in which life comes to itself’ [66]. Philosophy is transcendence, is resolution. And, musical forms provide a formal indication of this life coming to itself in transcendence, in resolution. Mantra provides an Apollonian healing, a stilling of Dionysian, fugal experience. It is ‘transformative’ [Feuerstein 2003].

In *Being and Time* Heidegger will perceive a musicality in the ‘existential-ontological foundation of language [which] is discourse or talk’ [BT 1, 203]. In language, in ‘the way of speaking,’ there is an ‘intonation,’ a ‘modulation’ and a
‘tempo’ which indicate the state of mind of ‘being-in’ [205]. The inherent musicality of language as speech is enhanced in poetry which comes to be privileged by Heidegger. Andrew Love sees that ‘Poetic language discloses Being in a special way, beyond that of ordinary language...Everything points to Heidegger’s interest in poetry not just as poetic meaning but as poetic sound’ [Love 2003, 103-5]. Eldred endorses the perception of the musicality of poetic sound: ‘A way of speaking always accompanies what is spoken which makes all speaking musical in the broadest sense of a mode of bodying attuned with quivering in one way or the other...There is always music in poetry, and poetry is song. Reading and writing too are not without their music. *What* is said in writing is always accompanied by *how* it is said’ [Eldred 1999, 5.3].

It could be seen that the very musicality of utterance carries meaning. And, if Heidegger writes little on music as music, he is concerned to go beyond denuded words, to recover the ‘naming force of language and words,’ Greek words such as *phusis* having been deformed - ‘abused’ - by Latin translation [IM 14, 15 & 53]. For Heidegger language is a music: it ‘is not an agglomeration of words used to designate sundry familiar things but the original resonance of the truth of a world’ [ERS 105]. In his etymology of the word ‘Being,’ Heidegger’s analysis reveals the meaning of Greek word for ‘noun’ - *onoma* - in the ‘wider sense...a revelation by means of sound in relation to and in the sphere of the Being of beings’ [IM 61]. And in *On The Way to Language* he writes:

‘let no one suppose that we mean to belittle vocal sounds as physical phenomena, the merely sensuous side of language, in favour of what is called the meaning of the sense-content of what was said and is
esteemed as being of the spirit, the spirit of language... We are instead referred to melody and rhythm in language and thus to the kinship between song and speech... It is just as much a property of language to sound and ring and vibrate, to hover and to tremble, as it is for the spoken words of language to carry a meaning.' [OWL 98]

For Heidegger it was the very absence of musical resonance which was a fundamental problematic for philosophy. His Contributions to Philosophy would speak of a new language for a new beginning out of which a ‘wholly other song of be-ing sounds’ [CP 3/7]. Thus ‘musicking’ would be a recovery of those earlier mantras of the ‘magician of Messkirch.

If music can provide access to Being and if there is a musicality to Heidegger's philosophy, music may help disclose a hidden process, the happening, within Heidegger's thinking.

viii. From dread to tragedy

In his lectures on The Will to Power as Art, Heidegger’s concern with the ‘raging discordance between art and truth’ addresses a note which Nietzsche wrote in 1888: 'Very early in my life I took the question of the relation of art to truth seriously: and even now I stand in holy dread in the face of this discordance’ [WPA 42]. It is not ‘merely’ a discordance, but one that arouses dread [WPA 42].

Wagner, through his artistic creations, sought - as Nietzsche perceived to be fundamental to Greek tragedy - to ‘tame the horrible,’ to overcome his own existential dread. He viewed the creation of the opening scene of
*Götterdämmerung* as an overcoming of his own terrors,\(^29\) also an overcoming of his own dissonances. *Das Rheingold* he described as ‘a morass of horrors and - sublimities’ [Spencer & Millington 1987, 299].\(^30\) the sublime overcoming the terror. And - in spite of his own ambivalence towards Wagner, perhaps because of it - Nietzsche perceived the flux within Wagner's music: of the prelude to *Die Meistersinger*, he wrote: ‘what flavours and forces, what seasons and climes are not mixed here’ [BGE 173], and on hearing the *Parsifal* prelude he perceived ‘a synthesis of spiritual states which many, including so-called superior minds, will consider irreconcilable’\(^31\) [Taylor 1979, 225]. Thomas Mann saw that Wagner's ‘drive for purity, spirituality and knowledge was just as strong as the dark compulsive drive’ [PCW 123].\(^32\) Wagner himself felt split between a ‘profound seriousness … [and] the disrespectful fancy for unbridled sensuality’ [Sabor 1989, 76]. Reverential sanctity is juxtaposed to the orgiastic, most obviously in the Pilgrim-Venusberg prelude to *Tannhäuser*, an Apollonian struggle with the Dionysian, pilgrims with bacchantes. Wagner yearned for both ecstasy and redemption. In *Parsifal* both the 'holy' world of the Grail, and the demonic world of Klingsor’s temptations exist on the same mountain, and both within Wagner. He once apologised for his prose writings such as *Judaism in Music* being a poison that he needed to get out of his system: [Donington 1984, 32] music was his means of ‘rising above myself’ [Spencer 1988, 120].\(^32\)

Through the affirmative music of the concluding scenes of *Die Walküre* and *Götterdämmerung*, Wagner climbs above his own darkest moods. His music evolved into the meaning ‘above’ the verbal meanings of the dramatic poem: 'I have now come to realise again how much there is, owing to the whole nature of
my poetic aim, that only becomes clear through the music. I now simply cannot look at the uncomposed poem any more’ [Cooke 1979, 2]. Overcoming Schopenhauer’s pessimism, Wagner’s transcendent music takes us towards hope and redemption. Heidegger’s language of transfiguration in the final ‘act’ of his *Will to Power as Art* transcends his own circles and fugues. This is what music can do, and, as heightened experience, also what it can indicate ‘grant[ing]… metaphysical significance,’ [Burnham & Jesinghausen 2010: 135].

We are told that after a performance of Sophocles’ *Antigone* in Hölderlin’s translation with music by Carl Orff, the composer ‘saw a man approaching…[T]his stranger suddenly grabbed Orff’s hands and, touched with emotion, said to him, “Thank you for bringing ancient tragedy back to life. My name is Heidegger” ’ [Petzet in Love 2003, 107-8]. 34 Out of the spirit of music, tragedy is one of the new focuses of Heidegger’s thinking after his erroneous allegiance to the Third Reich. Richard Strauss had experienced the dread of what was to come. In and through *Elektra*, a musical dwelling in that world of the Sophoclean catastrophic, Strauss experienced the abyss into which Western Civilization was collapsing, and envisioned the terrifying approach of Evil. Strauss’s thickly-textured chromaticism grows out of, erupts from within the total Sophoclean psychic situation, the collision of authenticities.

The bitonal structure of Strauss’s music is expressive of this conflict. The harmony might seem to be resolved in the final chord of C major, yet, far from suggesting Strauss’s retreat from the harmonic abyss, the final lines, with the repeated flux from C major to E flat minor, symbolize the ambivalence of the human spirit. The final C major cannot shake off the effect of that preceding E flat minor. It is an
uncertain major chord which ends the work. The final scene of Salome had even aligned questioning and dissonance: as Salome kisses the severed head of John the Baptist, the music fluxes between a cacophonous dissonance - itself a superimposition of tonalities, as Alex Ross describes in The Rest Is Noise - and a sublime ecstasy, the oscillation underpinned by a long-sustained pedal bass.

Both Heidegger and Strauss through Sophoclean heroines had ventured the abysmal question of stance in relation to political oppression. Both Strauss in his compositional dwelling in the approach of political terror (Clytemnestra) and Heidegger in his analytic description of the ‘they’ in Being and Time uttered a pre-echo of ‘dark times’. For Heidegger dread was no ‘mere’ psychological state but an existential condition of Dasein. Dread is of ‘nothing definite’ but ‘being-in-the-world as such’ [HCT 290]. He draws us to the etymological connection between fugue and dread, translating the medieval fuga as fear. Fugere to flee, flight out of fear [HCT 283]. Heidegger himself is attuned to fugue, to fear and dread. In Being and Time he argues that ‘Only something which is the attunement of fearing, or fearlessness, can discover things at hand in the surrounding world as being threatening’ for ‘Only a being which is concerned in its being about being that can be afraid….Dasein as being-in-the-world is “fear/ful”…[though]…[t]his “fearfulness” must not be understood in the ontic sense of a factual, “isolated” tendency, but rather as the existential possibility of the essential attunement of Dasein in general’ [BT 2, 134,137 & 138].

Heidegger dwells on fear. In his lectures Logic: The Question of Truth written prior to the frightful vision of the ‘they’ that would come in Being and Time he wrote ‘Even real philosophers often…do not talk about the despair that haunts them’ [L,
Akin to the terrifying approach of Clytemnestra in Strauss’s *Elektra*, Heidegger sees ‘something detrimental...an evil...something historical, something definite breaking into the familiar world of concerned preoccupation...something not yet on hand, but just coming, an ‘impending onslaught.’ Out of the bursting-in of the threatening, Dasein’s fear becomes ‘fright’, and an increasing intensification in ‘horror’ and ‘terror’ [HCT 286-8]. Heidegger himself will experience this intensification as he finds that the ‘onslaught’ can come from something very definite in the world and stand in holy dread in the face of his own discordances.35
CHAPTER 2

TOWARDS HEIDEGGER’S NIETZSCHE-HUSserl DUALITY

Part 1

i. Nietzsche: The Birth of Tragedy

ii. John Sallis: Crossings

Part 2

i. The Husserlian Apollonian

ii. Intuition and the Phenomenological Reduction

iii. The Breakthrough of Affectivity

iv. The Crossroads of Phenomenology

Part 3

i. Nietzsche and Phenomenology

ii. The Presence of Nietzsche in Heidegger Literature

iii. Heidegger’s ‘early’ Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche

iv. Remaining true to the earth and finitude:

Intimations of a Demonic Life
Part 1

In his ‘Nietzsche’ lectures on *The Will to Power as Art*, Heidegger sees the function of Nietzsche's Apollonian-Dionysian duality as a *cipher* through which the German people must understand itself to avoid the ‘vengeance’ of history:

‘The opposition...the variously named conflict of the Dionysian and the Apollonian, of holy passion and sober representation...is a hidden stylistic law of the historical determination of the German people...By recognizing this antagonism Hölderlin and Nietzsche early on placed a question mark after the task of the German people to find their essence historically. Will we understand this cipher? One thing is certain: history will wreak vengeance on us if we do not.’ [WPA 104]

The study of ciphers plays an important role in the work of Heidegger's estranged colleague Karl Jaspers, who, in his book *Philosophical Faith & Revelation*, wrote: ‘Ciphers light the root of things....They open areas of Being. They illuminate my decisions. They enhance or dampen my awareness of being, and of myself’ [Jaspers 1967, 92]. I will pursue the hypothesis that the Apollonian-Dionysian duality provides also a cipher through which to understand the pathways of Heidegger’s thought, the genesis of his position, and his own essence, opening areas of *his* being. Heidegger himself, in his lectures on *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), would see the necessity of a driving interpretative idea to ‘entrust[] itself to the concealed inner passion of a work in order to be able, through this, to place itself within the unsaid and force it into speech.’ The idea thus has the ‘power to illuminate...’¹
i. Nietzsche: *The Birth of Tragedy*

I must now explain that which constitutes the interpretive ‘idea’ of this study, the Apollonian-Dionysian duality, through reference to the paradigmatic text, Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy*.

On a plane much higher and much deeper, he believes, than mere logic, Nietzsche perceives ‘with the immediate certainty of vision’ [NBW 33] that true art is the magical coalescence of two normally unreconciled, opposing tendencies in human nature - the Dionysian and the Apollonian. As *rapture* and *dream* they are ‘immediate art-states of nature’ [38]. It is the transgressive ecstasies of the Dionysian state, obliterating the constraints of everyday, routinised existence, which take men towards the ‘eternal nature of things’ [60], reconciling them - alienated as they are from the natural order - once again to Mother Earth, redeeming them by a ‘mystic feeling of oneness’ [38]. Through rhythm and revelry, that ‘mysterious primordial unity’ is approached and ‘everything subjective vanishes into complete self-forgetfulness’ [36]. The Dionysian experience approaches the very abyss: its ecstasies and fears ill befit us for a return to the everyday world. A transforming image, the Apollonian vision, comes, as do dreams, to soothe, to heal, and to re-adjust - a redeeming vision, an ‘artistic taming of the horrible’ [60]. Only through the Dionysian experience are we able to really see. But only through the Apollonian illusion are we able to endure what we see.

Heidegger’s call for the use of Apollonian-Dionysian duality as a cipher echoes Nietzsche’s own ‘Foreword’ to *The Birth of Tragedy*: ‘what a serious German problem is being dealt with here, one which we place right in the centre of German hopes, as the point around which they twist and turn’ [TBT 17]. Not only is the
Apollonian-Dionysian duality a hermeneutic cipher, the whole text of Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy* and its subsequent critique - 'Attempt at a Self-Criticism' - offers itself as such an opening into a commentary on the thinking of Martin Heidegger. Looking back from the advanced vantage-point of 1886 on his breakthrough work of 1872, *The Birth of Tragedy: Out of the Spirit of Music*, Nietzsche recognises that his perception of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality was the expression of 'a deeply personal question' [TBT 3], itself tied to a 'difficult psychological question' [4], that of Greek tragedy. Nietzsche asks whether Greek tragedy arose out of 'an intellectual preference for the hard, horrific, evil, problematic aspects of existence, which stems from well-being, from overflowing health, from an *abundance* of existence' [3], a Dionysian 'pessimism of strength' [NBW 17], which was then vitiated by the emergence of over-logical, Socratic 'theoretical man' [18]. Nietzsche questions whether a surfeit of the theoretical 'denied the pleasure of looking into the Dionysian abyss' [89], and thus 'a sign of decline' in the face of suffering man, an evasion, a 'self-defence against -the *truth*?' [18]

And, as a 'deeply personal question,' Nietzsche later regrets that at the time of the first publication of *The Birth of Tragedy* 'I lacked sufficient courage...to allow myself to express such personal and risky views throughout in my own personal language - that instead I laboured to express in the terms of Schopenhauer and Kant new and unfamiliar evaluations, which ran absolutely counter to the spirit, as well as the taste, of Schopenhauer and Kant!...Oh, how far removed I was at that time from precisely this whole attitude of [Schopenhauerian] resignation' [TBT 10]. Nietzsche laments that, in *The Birth of Tragedy*, his was a soul that was 'almost uncertain whether to communicate or conceal itself. It should have sung, this 'new
soul’ - rather than spoken! What a pity that I did not dare to say what I had to say then as a poet’ [6].

The Apollonian work is the mask of, and the containment of, the taming of the ‘Dionysian arousal’ [51] which makes sight possible. Through images ‘simple, transparent, and beautiful,’ the Apollonian ‘mask’ saves the individual from ‘the sight of the terrible darkness’ [53], a ‘projected image which healing nature holds before us after a glance into the abyss’ [54]. In and through ‘shining’ appearance, the Apollonian drive continually seeks redemption from the ‘eternal suffering and contradiction’ [30]. But - reciprocally, fugally - the Apollonian drive for a ‘redeeming vision’ is ‘driven’ by ‘the whole world of torment’ [31].

The drive behind that drivenness was - for the Greeks - self-protective: ‘the Apollonian Greek...was obliged to sense [that] his whole existence, with all its beauty and moderation, rested on a hidden substratum of suffering and knowledge, which was once again revealed to him by the Dionysian. And look! Apollo was unable to live without Dionysus!’ [32] It was a ‘relationship of reciprocal stimulation and intensification’ [33]. And reciprocal warning of the excesses of both Apollonian and Dionysian. In excess they were both the ‘danger of dangers’ [9].

Nietzsche's thoughts on Greek tragedy speak to the future of Heidegger's fundamental ontology: Socratic Apollonianism as phenomenological reduction, phenomenological reduction as Socratic Apollonianism. It is through ‘the daemonic Socrates...[that] the Apollonian tendency has disguised itself in logical schematism’ [78]. Nietzsche continues: ‘Socrates...reminds us of the related nature of the Euripidean hero, who must defend his actions by argument and counter-
argument,’ the optimistic Euripidean spirit having ‘drive[n] music out of tragedy with the whip of its syllogisms’ [78-9]. But there ‘came,’ writes Nietzsche, ‘the same recurring dream phenomenon, which always said the same thing: ‘Socrates, make music!’ [80. Phaedo 60e]. Socrates, like Nietzsche, should have sung: ‘It was something resembling a daemonic warning voice which forced’ Socrates to make music in prison out of ‘his Apollonian insight that he...was failing to understand a noble image of a god and was, through his failure to understand, in danger of sinning against its deity...an apprehension...about the limits of the logical nature...Perhaps there is a domain of wisdom which excludes the logician?’ [TBT 80] Dionysus would be judge [107]. Repressed Dionysus would return. And this is indeed the warning of Euripides’ Bacchae. ‘The most radiant clarity of the [Apollonian] image was not enough for us: for this appeared to conceal as much as it revealed’ [126-7]. Ultimately Dionysian insight, ‘penetrat[ing]...[beyond] the surface of things’ to ‘the surging of the will, the conflict of motives, the rising torrent of the passions...forces the Apollonian drama itself into a sphere where it begins to speak with Dionysian wisdom, negating itself...Dionysus speaks the language of Apollo, and Apollo finally speaks the language of Dionysus’ [117-8].

Late in the text - as will Heidegger in Being and Time - Nietzsche turns to the issue of the necessity of myth in culture, which for Nietzsche was indeed the recovery of myth, annihilated by Socratic excess, lost in the proliferation of cultures, And late in the text - as will Heidegger in Being and Time - Nietzsche turns to the ‘people,’ to the recovery of ‘the noble core of our character as a people’ [123]. The loss of German character is aligned with the Socratic ‘tearing asunder’ of the coalescence of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality.
To appropriate Thomas Mann's concern ‘whether a clear and certain line can be drawn between the noble and pedagogic world of the mind and the world of spirit which one approaches only at one's peril’ [DF 9], we can question whether ‘a clear and certain line’ can be drawn within the Apollonian-Dionysian duality. In later Nietzsche, the Dionysian bringer of primordial insight will incorporate the Apollonian. In myth, Apollo this soothsaying god of light and healing, of music and poetry, lived his own Dionysian experiences: in Euripides’ Ion Creusa laments Apollo's rape of her. In pursuing this Apollonian-Dionysian hermeneutic we are aware of both the distinction between and the ambiguity of these symbolic representations.

Understanding the cipher, then, is no simple matter. The questions over failures in understanding are perhaps related to such entanglements. In relation to the question of spirit, Jacques Derrida asks: ‘Could it be that he [Heidegger] failed to avoid what he knew he ought to avoid? ...Or... are things more tortuous than this?’ [Derrida 1989, 2] And so with the Apollonian-Dionysian duality.

**ii. John Sallis: Crossings**

The question of tortuous entanglement is underlined by John Sallis in Crossings, a book on and of the crossings which permeate the text of Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy, the crossings between Nietzsche and his main philosophical references - Schopenhauer and Plato/Socrates - and between Nietzsche’s own texts, the idea of ‘crossing’ referenced upon Nietzsche’s own term Kreuzung - used in his ‘Untimely Meditation’ on Richard Wagner, the main addressee of The Birth of Tragedy - which Sallis applies to the Apollonian-Dionysian relation. Sallis notes that in discussing
the dithyrambic artist, Nietzsche writes: ‘the creative moments in his art are produced by the tension occasioned by this crossing of sensations’ [Sallis 19].

Nietzsche continues: ‘[in] seeking to hide itself, nature reveals the essence of its opposites’ [Sa 19-20].

The relation between *The Birth of Tragedy* and Nietzsche’s formulations on the way to his break-out work set up a paradigm of internal dialogue within a philosopher’s thinking, within Nietzsche’s writings, and also those of Heidegger.

Sallis’ analysis of *The Birth of Tragedy* is a reading that can be ‘assembled around the figure of crossing,’ making ‘reinscri[ptions]’ from text to text within his oeuvre [Sa 5]. For Sallis, such a reading questions that which ‘seems secure’ in the text published [7]. Through reinscriptions and erasures, Sallis’ is a reading which adds to the text a ‘saying [of] the unsaying that what is said requires’ in a ‘crossing of saying and unsaying’ [8 & 56]. The philosophical text is haunted [8], in the case of *The Birth of Tragedy*, by the very figure who ‘can have no direct image,’ Dionysus [42]. We will see that such a reinscription from Heidegger’s ‘non-texts’ - his letters - will similarly highlight the haunting non-appearance of Dionysus in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of the 1920s, the god Heidegger will recognize after the ‘Rectorate’ [Janicaud 100].

Sallis’ analysis suggests a commentary that discloses the shadow of that thought. The Apollonian-Dionysian duality both ‘structures’ the text and at the same time ‘perpetually threaten[s it] from within’ [Sa 13], a strife between formal theoretical discourse and its ‘tragic’ content [15]. Sallis’ analysis of Nietzsche’s text as ‘prone to dislocation by the operation of its own dynamics’ [15] offers itself as a paradigm for the interpretation of other texts.
Heidegger's remarks in a lecture on Aristotle have been frequently observed: ‘The only thing of interest regarding the person of a philosopher is this: He was born on such and such a date, he worked, and he died.’ And yet Heidegger will in his overt Auseinandersetzung be drawn to Nietzsche's personal situation, not surprisingly in view of the emphasis on facticity within his fundamental ontology. It is clear from Sallis' account that Heidegger sees the impending dissolution in the relation between Nietzsche's philosophical texts and his letters, thus his personal experience. Heidegger draws on a letter in which Nietzsche writes: ‘the desert surrounding me is monstrous,’ and then concludes: ‘Here already are early signs of the last year of his thinking, the year in which everything about him radiates in excessive brilliance and in which therefore at the same time the boundless advances out of the distance’ [Sa 3]. Heidegger makes his judgement on the basis of this relation between philosophical thought and factual existence. At the time of his own overt Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche, and his recognition of the fundamental significance of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality, Heidegger will open his thinking with this relation between Nietzsche's personal letters and his philosophical texts. Sallis underlines Heidegger's observation of the proximity of Nietzsche's ‘twisting free’ of Platonism and his collapse into madness; and, in suggesting that Nietzsche was engaged in the attempt to break free of Platonism, raises the spectre of the relation of the philosophical drive to overthrow that logical Socratism to madness, to danger, the dangers of Dionysian excess. But Nietzsche himself had raised the question of whether, in being constrained by an excessively logical, Socratic nature, one is ‘denied the pleasure of gazing
into abysses...loses, as it were, his openness to the dark, night-side of life’ [126].

From Nietzsche’s artistic taming of the horrible, Sallis sees that the Apollonian drive - as the moderation of a state or potentiality of excess - ‘requires self-knowledge.’ Nietzsche sees the Apollonian function as an ethical mode, Apollo an ‘ethical deity’ [28]. However, the overcoming of excess brings - through exclusion - its own excess. Repressed, the Dionysian returns. In Euripides’ Bacchae we see the return, rather the revenge of the repressed: in the words of Sallis, Dionysus can ‘no longer be excluded.’ The Bacchae witnesses ‘the moment of the return of the repressed in all its power’ [43]. Pentheus, rationalistic repudiator of Dionysus, is destroyed in forced recognition of the god, ‘is driven not merely to recognize the identity of the god but to embody, to enact, that identity to the point of his own destruction’ [46].

I have not made a through-commentary in this presentation of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality. However, I reinscribe Nietzsche’s text into an interpretation of Heidegger: that the Apollonian-Dionysian duality is rooted in what Nietzsche calls in Zarathustra his ‘own burnings,’ for The Birth of Tragedy is manifestation of both ‘a serious German problem’ and a ‘deeply personal’ and ‘difficult psychological problem.’ And that the Dionysian is vitiated by a Socratic excess of the Apollonian, Heidegger’s break-away from the ontological tradition held by its very ‘destructive’ concern with that tradition, as Nietzsche was ‘held’ by Kantian-Schopenhauerian formulation when he should have ‘sung.’

In his study The Young Heidegger, John van Buren observes that ‘Heidegger also looked unfavourably on the fact that his youthful thought-paths involved,’ as
Heidegger writes in his letter to Richardson, ‘byways and errant ways through the history of western philosophy’ [Buren 1994, 7].

In the 1920s Heidegger engaged in what he termed a destruction of the Western ontological tradition. In some cases this took the form of an overt confrontation with Aristotle, Descartes, Kant and Husserl; in other cases more tangential references and allusions to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.\(^{10}\)

Here I wish to investigate the philosophical tradition which Heidegger confronted in terms of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality. It is a tradition which Gary Madison [1977] characterizes as bifurcated, the philosophical ‘tradition’ containing its own antithesis, its other, a counter-tradition. As far as it bears upon the thinking of Heidegger, I will make an initial approach to the possibility that this ‘internal’ schism within philosophy can be viewed as a manifestation of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality, and that Heidegger’s response too may be understood in terms of that duality. I take Edmund Husserl and Friedrich Nietzsche to represent, respectively, the tradition and counter-tradition, the Apollonian and Dionysian, the criteria for this opposition being the gulf between their respective concerns with certainty and ambiguity.

**Part 2**

i. The Husserlian Apollonian

In his essay ‘Modernism, Husserl, And Mann,’ Gary Overvold sees Husserl engaged in an Apollonian defence against the nihilistic ‘temptation of Dionysus’ inherent in the relativism of ‘Historicism and Weltanschauung philosophy’ [Overvold 4]. This
idea of the Husserlian Apollonian played into the flux of thinking on fugue and the Apollonian-Dionysian duality as a hermeneutic cipher in the understanding of Heidegger, and the tradition he confronted.

In *Ideas* [1913] and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article [1927], Husserl, expressed his vision as an ‘all-encompassing eidetic ontology…directed toward the invariant essential forms’ attained by ‘abstract[ing]…everything psychophysical’ [W, 333 & 326]. It would be a ‘pure’ philosophy, a ‘pure’ phenomenology, a rigorously ‘pure’ science of ‘pure phenomena’ [PP, 1], with provenance in both Kantian transcendental philosophy and ‘pure’ logic, with which Husserl’s initial stance against psychologism in volume one of his *Logical Investigations* was referenced.¹¹

In his transcendental philosophy, Immanuel Kant sought to establish ‘pure’ reason, beyond empiricism and rationalism, beyond historical and cultural contingencies, and ‘in advance’ of any psychological or physiological compulsion [Pippin 1999, 46, & Burnham 2000, 2 & 23]: for Kant knowledge of sensible reality is possible only by means of *a priori* faculties of cognition, an endowment of innate, universal mental categories which organise our experience and make knowledge and social communication possible [Russell 1970]. For Kant ‘the word “transcendental”…never means a reference of our knowledge to things, but only to the cognitive faculty’ [Kant 1993, xxx1]. No longer about the ‘nature of things,’ this philosophy of ‘pure’ reason, sought to establish the ‘conditions for finding the nature of things’ [Pippin 1999, 52]. And, through the intentionality of human consciousness and the powers of the *a priori* categories, transcendental philosophy ‘imposes its order on nature’ [Solomon 1988, 33].
But this ‘pure’ reason, in removing itself from all externality and contingency, exposed itself to, in the words of Talcott Parsons, a ‘radical dualism.’ For Kant, man was a ruptured being, on the one hand a physical body determined by mechanistic laws of the phenomenal, sensible natural world; on the other a spiritual, moral being of the noumenal, supersensible realm [Parsons 1968, 474]. And Husserl’s transcendental philosophy - seeking a ‘pure’ ground of consciousness - would also, through its phenomenological ‘reductions,’ establish its own ‘radical dualism’: between what it could and could not, should and should not be concerned with. But, at the same time, Husserl would seek to relocate the things in themselves back in the sensible world, as Nietzsche’s Zarathustra called on man to remain true to the earth, repudiating the supersensible world, though in so doing Nietzsche was also relocating a supersensibility.

In his 1911 polemic *Philosophy as Rigorous Science* and his magnum opus of 1913, *Ideas*, Husserl was particularly concerned to establish, in phenomenology, a new ‘rigorous science’ elevated above the deficiencies of the naturalistic psychology of the modern positivist sciences. Indeed, his ground was a refutation of psychologism, [La 3] in an attempt to attain ‘a science of essential Being’ [I 44]. Phenomenology would provide a ‘knowledge of essences’ [I 44]. Even as he contends that he does not ‘doubt the objective truth or objectively grounded probability of the wonderful theories of mathematics and the natural sciences’ [PRS 74], and, at the same time as he expresses no wish to devalue the work of experimental scientists of ‘distinction’, Husserl criticises their ‘radical defects of method’ which must be removed [I 41]. Methodology, indeed, expresses a way of ‘seeing’ and natural science is limited by the ‘natural attitude’ of seeing the spatio-
temporal world merely in terms of causality, a mode which must be transcended through ‘a new way of looking at things’ [43] - and Heidegger would heighten that call for a new way of seeing. On ‘grounds of principle’ Husserl ‘forbid[s]’ the counting of phenomenology as psychology’ [41], that is the psychology of psychologism, for the laws of logic cannot be derived from causal psychophysiological processes’ [Biemel 287].

But the repudiation of psychologism is made in the name of psychology. It was Husserl’s aim, in and through phenomenology, to raise ‘psychology to a higher scientific level’ [I 41]. There are indeed different psychologies. His phenomenological philosophy is bound up with its psychological concern with consciousness: psychology - the higher phenomenological ‘pure’ psychology Husserl intends - must therefore ‘in its destiny remain most intimately bound up with philosophy’ [PRS 92]. In his later Cartesian Meditations, Husserl saw this task as releasing and realising the hidden transcendental dimension of naturalistic psychology [CM 147].

For Husserl, phenomenology was ‘a method by which I want to establish, against mysticism and irrationalism, a kind of super-rationalism which transcends the old rationalism as inadequate and yet vindicates its inmost objectives’ [Madison 248]. 12. This could be said of his concern with the natural sciences, psychology in particular: Husserl wishes to establish a higher ‘pure psychology’ [W 323].

Heidegger would say in his Nietzsche lectures on The Will to Power as Art: ‘The equation of Being and life is not some sort of unjustified expansion of the biological, although it often seems that way, but a transformed interpretation of the biological on the basis of Being, grasped in a superior way’ [WPA 219]. Both
Husserl and Heidegger saw the phenomenological attitude as a superior grasping of the psychological. Whilst Husserl rejects the ‘old-psychologism of the all-too-natural world,’ ‘pure’ psychology would ‘still be concerned with the revelation, the disclosure of ‘our own psychical being’ [W 32]. I incline to Jacques Derrida’s view that ‘there is a difference which in fact does not distinguish anything...Transcendental consciousness is nothing more and nothing other than psychological consciousness.’

ii. Intuition and the Phenomenological Reduction

Against the psychologism of the natural sciences, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology would achieve a ‘purification’ of experience [W 331], grasping ‘essential being’ [PRS 112] through a ‘pure intuition’ [I 124: PRS 93] of essence, ‘determined in an immediate seeing’ [PRS, 110], arising out of a ‘perception,’ a ‘recollection,’ a ‘judgement,’ but also ‘mere - but mere - imagination’ [112]. Paul Ricoeur suggests that ‘Husserl would be understood if the intentionality which culminates in seeing were recognized to be a creative vision’ [Ricoeur 1987, 147]. This intuition of seeing is indicative of a change in attitude which makes the phenomenological sensibility possible. It is an ‘intentional’ seeing which ‘goes out towards’ the objects of our consciousness, which themselves are ‘intentional’: consciousness is always a consciousness-of [W 323]. Our very experiences are ‘intentional’. Our intentionalities disclose the intentionalities of the other. And - as rigorous discipline - phenomenological psychology and transcendental philosophy intends ‘to investigate systematically the [multiple] elementary intentionalities...to [unfold] the typical forms of intentional processes... their structural composition;’
to offer an advanced description of ‘the totality of…purely mental processes,’ as we ‘stand[] within an extremely variegated intentional life-process, "our" life’ [W 324, 325, 331].

But, using rigorously the Apollonian-Dionysian duality as an ‘intuition’, phenomenological seeing can disclose not only lucid order, but also offers the possibility of disclosing internal dissonance, fugue, strife, an overdetermination within its own texts. Phenomenology, like music for Thomas Mann, could disclose both ‘calculated order’ and ‘chaotic anti-reason’ [Holthusen in Hatfield 1964, 126], both the Apollonian and the Dionysian. In the overcoming of the limitations of the natural viewpoint, phenomenology can, in an Apollonian elucidation, open us to a Dionysian insight. Pure reductive seeing can reveal the impure.

Indeed, as Husserl sees that it is intuition which provides evidence, he acknowledges, in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* article, that ‘this being-for-us of the world as only subjectively having come to acceptance and only subjectively brought…acquires a dimension of…questionableness’ [W 328]. And, as Rudiger Bubner comments, ‘The transition from satisfied imagination to the evidence of the thing is certainly hard to determine’ [Bubner 1990, 18]. And, further to Thomas Mann’s recognition of the problematic of clear and certain lines, whilst Husserl broaches a Nietzschean tolerance for the questionable, his ‘certainty’ recalls Nietzsche’s ‘immediate certainty of vision’ - out of the spirit of music [NBW 33].

Husserl too aligns the visual with the acoustic: ‘just as immediately as one can hear a sound, so one can intuit an “essence”…and in the intuition one can make an essential judgement’ [PRS 115]. Judgement - that cerebral process of words - is realised through non-verbal intuition of sound and vision, of hearing and seeing.
Such phenomenological consciousness is attained only through an intuition integrated with the ‘foundational method of...phenomenological reduction’ [W 325] which effects a ‘radical purification of the phenomenological field of consciousness’ through an exclusion of and detachment from ‘every type of external experience,’ from ‘objective actualities,’ and from all that is ‘given’ in the natural attitude [PP 3/4]. Through this *epoché*, ‘pure’ reason is clarified as ‘reduced,’ ‘pure’ for Husserl meaning ‘kept free from everything psychophysical’ [CM 144]. This methodology thus holds within itself the problem that it may exclude the essential even as it seeks it, as well as the possibility for revealing the essential.

The difference between naturalistic and phenomenological psychology is 'graphically' portrayed by R.D. Laing in *The Divided Self*, in the disjunction between the classical clinical psychiatric attitude of Emil Kraepelin who demonstrates the ‘signs’ of a patient’s catatonic excitement in front of a lecture-audience of students against Laing’s ‘existential-phenomenological’ intuitive inference about the person’s behaviour as expressive of his existence [Laing 29-31].

Out of an anti-psychologism, ‘psychology’ generates its own heightening, its *Steigerung*. The reductive method, a more intense segregated concentration on the ‘object,’ may be ‘transferred’ from self-experience to the mental life of others, through a corresponding bracketing and description of its ‘subjective “How” of its appearance’ [W 325]. The objects of natural sciences, and forms of cultural expression all ‘remain’ but are now perceived by the reductive intuitive consciousness, ‘as they are absolutely in themselves’ [PP 4]. In the transcendental, phenomenological eidetic attitude, objects are now viewed, intuited, by a phenomenological reflection out of consciousness ‘within the internality of our
own perceiving, imagining, thinking, valuing life-process’ [W 328]. Not only mere ‘objects,’ but history, ‘art, religion, morals, etc. can be intuitively investigated’ [PRS 123]. The objects of the natural sciences are not eschewed: indeed, ‘it is the phenomenological theory of essence alone that is capable of providing a foundation for a philosophy of the spirit’ [PRS 129].

Phenomenological reduction and intuition can thus be applied to the philosophical text. But the exclusions and obtrusions point to an overdetermined imperative behind the reduction: ‘we have absolutely forbidden [my italics] ourselves to treat Nature and the corporeal in all its actualities’ [PP 4], an Apollonian forbidding of the Dionysian.

iii. The Breakthrough of Affectivity

Husserl’s rigorous science itself was a dream not immune to the breakthrough of religious affectivity, an implosion of ‘reformational’ [W 322] intent into ‘pure’ science. Indeed, Husserl believed that engagement in and with phenomenology - the shift from the ‘natural’ attitude - was ‘analogous to a religious conversion’ [Smith viii],15 and that the impulse that finally led him from mathematics to philosophy ‘lay in overwhelming religious experiences’ [Smith x].16

As mentioned, Gary Overvold sees Husserl engaged in a defence against the Dionysian implosions and excesses of modern culture, ‘an ultramontane version of the Apollonian ideal’ through a return to absolute standards, a bulwark against the ‘temptation of Dionysus’ inherent in the relativism of Historicism and Weltanschauung philosophy [Overvold 4]. He sees Husserl’s 1911 article
‘Philosophy as Rigorous Science’ and Thomas Mann’s novella *Death In Venice* of the same year both addressing the ‘cultural crisis,’ the Apollonian-Dionysian dynamic operative in both works. In Mann’s later work, *Doctor Faustus*, the narrator Serenus Zeitblom, as he struggles with the very question of the existence of a distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ genius as he sets out on his biography of the composer Adrian Leverkuhn - with the Nietzschean resonance of ‘living dangerously’ - expresses his trepidation: ‘the daemonic, little as I presume to deny its influence upon human life, I have at all times found utterly foreign to my nature. Instinctively I have rejected it from my picture of the cosmos and never felt the slightest inclination rashly to open the door to the powers of darkness’ [MM1, 356].

Phenomenological reduction can be seen as an Apollonian defence against the Dionysian [5], against tarrying with the darkness, as Mann tarried with the Dionysian, in associating with Plato’s *Phaedrus* and the dangers of passion in *Death In Venice* and the demonic collapse of his Faustus-figure. Husserl attempts to bracket out the disturbances of the crisis which afflicts him, a veiled confrontation. Mann in *Faustus* descends into the cacophonous pit [DF 378], with the colouration, the dissonance of one who faces the ‘irreconcilability of the reconcilable’ [SL 63]. Husserl too confronts the ‘unbearable...spiritual need of our time’ in the face of a disintegrative scepticism, and a potential ‘ineradicable evil’ [PRS 140, 141, 145]. But he seeks to ‘eliminate’ the tribulations by ‘harmoniz[ing] the disharmonies in our attitude to reality’ even at the expense of losing ‘the exaltation and consolation
old and new philosophies offer us’ [141]. Its purity that will attempt to bracket out the world is, like all ethico-religious aspiration, a reaction to that world. There was a prevailing anxiety, a sense of the danger of demonic excess. Romain Rolland saw the culture symptomised in the music of his friend Richard Strauss - whose music of Zarathustra had been ‘the flood of overflowing life, the fever of joy, which makes these worlds whirl around’ - be overtaken by an ‘ominous excess…a morbid over-excitement, a lack of balance which will-power holds in check but which disturbs the music, and the musician,’ demonic flights of the genius which portended a national loss of ‘equilibrium’ [Myers 1968, 187, 112]. It was an era which saw the emergence of a philosophy which would seek ‘pure’ reflection against the external world yet, at the same time, be in continued ‘untimely meditation’ with the fragmented culture, and thus in its own historicity, entangled in the ‘impurity’ of that world. Pure reason could not fully extricate itself from contingency. Phenomenology - in its aspiration to a pure cognition - would from the start be - as Heidegger would move to - a ‘being-historical thinking,’ thus susceptible to that Apollonian-Dionysian dynamic and the degree of its ‘artistic taming of the horrible’ [NBW 60]. And contingencies would not exclude one’s ownmost being.

Husserl’s ‘phenomenology’ would be an essentialisation of the psychic experience [W 322]. Yet, he asks: ‘how far, in parallel with the pure science of nature, a pure psychology is possible?’ - ‘pure’ being ‘kept free from everything psychophysical’ [CM 144]. His answer - to use a reference to that very natural, spatio-temporal world – is symptomatic: ‘It is by no means clear’ [323]. Perhaps this lack of clarity in a philosophy striving for clarity was indicative of the difficulties Husserl would
face. In his *Crisis of European Sciences*, in the face of the ‘apostasy’ of his disciples, particularly Heidegger,\(^\text{18}\) he writes: ‘Philosophy as science, as serious, rigorous, indeed apodictically rigorous, science, is a dream from which we have now awoken’ [Bubner 1990, 32].

The dream which would be over, for Husserl, in 1931 was of phenomenology addressing the ‘*Ultimate and Highest Problems*’ through a ‘transcendental spirituality...striving towards the universal ideal of absolute perfection’ in the pursuit of ‘a genuine human life’ [W 334-335]. It is suggestive that Husserl should write: ‘The easiest place to begin is with Descartes' *Meditations*. Let us be guided by their form alone and what breaks through in them’ [PA 4]. He cites Gilson and Koyre noting ‘how much scholasticism lies hidden, as unclarified prejudice, in Descartes' *Meditation*’ [CM 24]. Sartre argues in *The Transcendence of the Ego* that the phenomenological reduction can never be ‘pure,’ and Francis Seeburger that ‘reasons and motives will always colour and distort any phenomenological descriptions. Therefore, the reduction, as a motivated action, can never be pure’ [Seeburger 217].\(^\text{19}\) Such, in the words of Andrew Haas, is ‘the impurity or impossible purity of phenomenology's phenomenology’ [Haas 73].

Exploring the possibilities of the breakthrough of Husserl’s own affectivity, Jeffrey Jackson,\(^\text{20}\) points to Husserl’s use of words - for instance, ‘ominously dominating’ and ‘degenerate’ – which, he argues, ‘betrays the affective force of social crisis’ [Jackson 257/8]. And this affectivity - breaking through the rigorous science in ‘moments’ wherein Husserl reveals a latent psychological dimension - breaks through not only in words but in the complicated, ambivalent position Husserl takes towards psychology. Jackson observes: ‘the force of the crisis leaves its mark
within Husserl’s text. If Freud is correct, crisis makes itself felt in spite of, and along with, our conceptualizations’ [260]. The philosopher’s concern with truth - and his text - is in Freudian terms overdetermined. Jackson views Husserl’s ‘suffering’ in the face of the cultural crisis as ‘the motivational force for [his] phenomenological philosophy’ [Jackson 256]. The critique is overdetermined. But crisis is not merely ‘cultural’: it speaks also of one’s ownmost personal affectivity and its suppression.

And indeed the suppression of the affectivity is the suppression of the psychological before ‘logic.’ In Ideas Husserl writes: ‘The thinking of the psychologist is itself something psychological, the thinking of the logician something logical’ [I 190]. This is very neat, ‘pure.’ But, Jackson observes later in the Crisis a ‘deeper’ Husserl ‘argu[ing] that phenomenological analysis ultimately leads to the unveiling of deeper levels of consciousness at which the unconscious affectivity unmasked by contemporary “depth psychology” of Freud and Jung would function’ [Jackson 237]. Indeed, continues Jackson, Husserl aims to establish a ‘phenomenological critique of consciousness…over [superior to] an empirically-based interpretive inquiry into the objective content of affectively-charged phenomena, such as resentments, trauma, mourning, guilt, libidinal ties, etc.’ but ‘with the same concern’ [Jackson 259].

Joseph Kockelmans draws attention to this rift within Husserl’s thinking: ‘In Ideas and Cartesian Meditations Husserl understands his work as an attempt to radicalize the Cartesian demand for an absolutely certain basis for philosophy as a strict science. One finds, however, that many of his detailed and unpublished analyses are quite often at odds with this quest. In them the attempt radically to
comprehend the modern subject-problem turns out to be forever in vain’ [K 222]. Not surprisingly, in view of Husserl’s reformational intent, affectivity surfaces particularly in the religious resonance: ‘the great belief [that] an autonomous philosophy and science’ would ‘illuminate[]’ the modern world, replacing ‘lifeless’ religious belief [CM 4-5]. Indeed, an ‘apodictically grounded and grounding science ... arises now as the necessarily highest function of mankind’ [Madison 248].

The attainment of ‘pure rational origins’ satisfying the ‘loftiest theoretical needs’ established by ‘ethico-religious’ criteria [PRS 71] will, indeed, ‘make [man] “blessed” ’ [Madison 248]. In the *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl’s writing echoes the Christian humility before God: ‘If I have decided to live with this as my aim...I have thereby chosen to begin in absolute poverty, with an absolute lack of knowledge’ [CM 2].

For Walter Biemel, Husserl’s ‘philosophical argumentation’ is underpinned by ‘a confession of faith...Husserl says what phenomenology should be without investigating sufficiently whether it is in a position to become that. Actually, Husserl left only a few manuscripts on this problem of the final definition of phenomenology...and they have more of a prophetic than a “rigorous scientific” tone’ [Biemel 299]. Overworked, Husserl writes to Heidegger: ‘we declare our faith in the good in the only way we can - actively: by standing our ground and putting our small powers (which, in the overall reckoning, also count) at the service of the good. Each must do his part as if the salvation of the world depended upon it’ [Sheehan 1997, 16]. In an unpublished note Nietzsche exclaims: ‘Kant remarkable - knowledge and faith!’ [UW 24]
Daniel Dahlstrom, discussing Husserl's ideas on transcendence, observes that 'even the durational spread of a sound (the elapsing and imminent tones as well as resonances, reverberations, and echoes) transcends the momentary consciousness of the sound' [Dahlstrom 2005, 31]. And, indeed, there are resonances, reverberations, and echoes within Husserl's search for apodictic purity of consciousness. The Apollonian remedy is overdetermined, contingent upon a repression, inspite of 'situating' his philosophy in the 'spiritual life,' the 'cultural,' the 'historical,' in 'an epoché of staggering happenings' [PP 1]. A Freudian overdetermination, the reduction was not only an epoché of the inessential, but of the infections of an evil world. In his Inaugural Lecture at Freiburg - 'Pure Phenomenology, Its Method and Its Field of Investigation' - Husserl sought to sustain a cognitive 'purity,' a bracketing out of the face of an evil which bore upon him too closely: his son Wolfgang had died at Verdun in March 1916, his son Gerhart badly wounded in April 1917 [Jackson 2006, 261]. He prepared the Crisis within days of the Nuremberg race laws September 1935 [Jackson 2006, 261]. On Sept. 19th: his wife wrote to their daughter in a mode which was perhaps indicative of Husserl's long-term 'reductive' modus:

‘how deeply I was hurt by this shameful turn in the life of Germany...how our existence...ha[s] fallen into an abyss and one sees oneself and the entire human race covered with shame and disgrace...Papa of course has also endured this, but he must still think about his lectures, and because of this has the monstrosities out of his head for many hours of the day and as he has [therefore] generally been
able to sleep...the most extravagant fantasy cannot think up a more
diabolical situation.’ [Jackson 2006, 261]

Jackson sees ‘the signs of Husserl’s suffering mark[ing] the text’ [Jackson 262]. There is indeed a desperation: ‘I have been through enough torments from lack of clarity and from doubt that wavers back and forth...Only one need absorbs me: I must win clarity, else I cannot live; I cannot bear life unless I can believe that I shall achieve it’ [Madison 265]. On January 17th 1919, he acknowledged to Fritz Kaufmann a function of and the overdetermination in his work: ‘You can imagine how I, like everyone, with patriotic sentiments, suffered and still suffer at the frightful collapse of our great and noble nation. I sought to save myself by plunging deeply into philosophical work - just as I waged the struggle for spiritual self-preservation throughout the war years’ [Sheehan 1997, 17].

Essences were disclosed through phenomenological reduction, but the world remained. For Merleau-Ponty this continuing relation only serves to underline the relation between ‘Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis:’ ‘it is by what phenomenology implies or unveils as its limits - by its latent content or its unconscious - that it is in consonance with psychoanalysis...[they] are not parallel; much better they are both aiming toward the same latency’ [Jackson 267].

Husserl himself would come to speak of “‘unconscious’ intentionalities...This would be the place for those repressed emotions of love, of humiliation, of ressentiments...disclosed by recent ‘depth psychology’” [Crisis 237 in Jackson 267].

In Freudian terms intentionality is overdetermined.

Reduction in relation to Husserl indeed has two faces: the aletheic, enlightening, methodological reduction in the name of the seeing of ‘essential being’ and the
casting into oblivion of the Dionysian world, less extremely, the bracketing of the emotional world. Yet the ‘future philosophical “system” ’ for which Husserl wishes to ‘prepare the ground’ as ‘rigorous science’ is indeed something ‘for which we yearn’ and which ‘is supposed to gleam as an ideal before us in the lowlands where we are doing our investigative work’ [PRS 75]. The cold grey meticulous [Foucault 1991, 76] investigatory and analytical work develops out of and intends towards a more vital coloration of life. And yet this coloration will be repressed in the pursuit of the purity of absolute certainty which denounces the ‘absurd consequences of a naturalism built on strict empirical science’ [PRS 78]. In Ideas [I 123] Husserl explained his use of the word ‘absurdity’: ‘In this work absurdity is a logical term, connoting no extra-logical emotional evaluation. Even the greatest savants have at one time or another been guilty of absurdity, and if it is our scientific duty to bring this out, our respect for them is thereby in no way diminished’ [I 123 in PRS 78]. But Husserl is one of these ‘savants,’ and affected by extra-logical emotional evaluation.

Husserl denies his own denial of emotional valuation through the emotive words of his reduced, repressed texts. In his opposition to the natural sciences - even as he does not ‘doubt the objective truth or objectively grounded probability of the wonderful theories of mathematics and the natural sciences’ [PRS 74] - Husserl refers to ‘experimental fanatics’ and asks ‘Is the phenomenological analyst to be branded Scholastic?’ [PRS 95] The breakthrough of affectivity in the pursuit of the ‘pure’ is again suggested as ‘the supposedly realistic objectivism sins by its failure to understand transcendental constitution’ [W 335]. In Ideas, Husserl writes: ‘I avoid as far as possible the expressions a priori and a posteriori, partly on account
of the confusing obscurities and ambiguities which infect their ordinary use, but also because of the notorious philosophical theories which as an evil heritage from the past are interwoven with them' [Ideas 1:46]. And in 1931, in the face of Heidegger's 'apostasy,' he says: 'I cannot help branding all philosophies that call themselves phenomenological as aberrations which cannot attain the level of authentic philosophy. The same holds for every objectivism of whatever kind, for every turning to the object instead of turning back to transcendental subjectivity' [PA 10-11].

After reading Husserl's words 'fanatics' and 'branded,' 'infect' and 'evil,' we are struck by his comment: 'In the epoché of vigorous reaction against Scholasticism the war cry was: 'Away with empty word analyses! We must question things themselves. Back to experience, to seeing, which alone can give to our words sense and rational justification' [PRS 96]. And, regarding Husserl's use of the word 'empathetic' – *Einfühlenden* - Quentin Lauer observes: 'Husserl has taken over this term but has stripped it of much of its emotional content. It seeks to penetrate to some extent the mystery whereby one subject can somehow enter into the experience of another. It constitutes on Husserl's part a somewhat reluctant concession to the non-rational, but his rationalistic predispositions render his explanations of it hopelessly involved' [Lauer in PRS 97]. Lauer here captures the essential problematic of Husserl's texts, and points to issues within Heidegger's: 'Words' may be the very 'things' to get back to. Heidegger will draw attention to 'the fact that human Dasein...*in so far as it is itself* [my italics] is steered directly toward whatever is named in...basic words' [WPA 143]. And Husserl's words stand witness to the breakthrough of affectivity.
Against his concern to develop a pure psychology above psychologism, through a higher psychical consciousness-of which would reveal the ‘experience of others.’ Husserl does indeed question whether phenomenological experience ‘really provides us with a kind of closed-off field of being, out of which a science can grow...completely free of everything psychophysical’ [W 325, 324], whether there can be a ‘pure’ separation. In Husserl’s formulation what starts off as the rigorous certainty of fact is not merely clarified but transmuted: ‘my actual current mental processes of pure perception, fantasy, and so forth, are, in the attitude of positivity, psychological givens [or data] of psychological inner experience. They are transmuted into my transcendental mental processes if through a radical epoché I posit as mere phenomena the world, including my own human existence’ [W 331]. The resonance of the alchemical – of transmutations and purifications - points beyond natural science to the more questionable realms which Thomas Mann explores in The Magic Mountain and Doctor Faustus, and which Husserl, through apodictic certainty, seeks to establish a bulwark against the Dionysian, Mann’s ‘demonic’ realm.

The ease with which Husserl posits the shift from the natural attitude to the transcendental attitude - though it ‘goes so completely beyond all previous experiencing’ [W 332] - elides the travails and burnings, the ‘dangerous tension,’ the ‘ever more dangerous curiosity,’ and the ‘devastating’ ‘shock’ of Nietzsche’s ‘great separation.’ Nietzsche’s ‘difference of viewpoint’ is a ‘burden’ to which the true thinker is ‘condemned’ [HAH 4-6].
For Husserl teleological progress is made an easy ‘Phenomenological Resolution of All Philosophical Antitheses’ in an ascensionist progress from ‘intuitively given [concrete] data to heights of abstraction’ [W 335]. An ‘intentional unity...[arises] out of transcendental bestowal of sense, of harmonious confirmation’ [W 332]. Through phenomenological method ‘the old traditional ambiguous antitheses of the philosophical standpoint are resolved...oppositions such as between rationalism (Platonism) and empiricism, relativism and absolutism, subjectivism and objectivism, ontologism and transcendentalism, psychology and anti-psychologism, positivism and metaphysics, or the teleological versus the causal interpretation of the world’ [W 335]. Dualities are transcended through intensification: subjectivism through ‘the most all-embracing and consistent [transcendental] subjectivism’ which is, indeed, ‘at the same time [of a deeper sort]’ of objectivism; ‘Relativism...through the most all-embracing relativism, that of transcendental phenomenology’; Empiricism...[through] the most universal and consistent empiricism...[with a] necessarily broadened concept of experience [inclusive] of intuition which offers original data; dogmatic rationalism and naturalism ‘through the most universal [eidetic] rationalism of inquiry into essences’ and ‘the revelation of associations as intentional phenomena...which is related uniformly [through intuition] to transcendental subjectivity, to the I, consciousness, and conscious objectivity’ [W 335].

For Husserl, as evidenced in his language, the current state - the crisis of modernism - is a wound which he attempts to overcome, ‘dreams’ of overcoming, through an intensification of method. Husserl’s methodological heightening - his
‘ascensionism’ - brackets out Heidegger’s Dasein, a ‘distressed object within history.’ It carries both the possibility of ‘essential’ seeing, and a self-wounding through an excess of purification.

In his lecture of 1931 ‘Phenomenology and Anthropology,’ Husserl expresses his concern with the gravitation of German philosophers ‘with ever increasing speed toward philosophical anthropology….even the so-called “phenomenological movement” has got caught up in this new trend, which alleges that the true foundation of philosophy lies in human being alone, and more specifically in a doctrine of the essence of human being’s concrete worldly Dasein’ [PA 1]. His agitation is marked in the phrases ‘increasing speed,’ ‘so-called,’ ‘caught up,’ ‘alleges’ - until he arrives at his main concern: Heidegger who, through the foundational Dasein has completely reversed phenomenology, reverting to the rejected anthropologism or psychologism, for transcendental phenomenology ‘denies to any science of human being, whatever its form, a share in laying the foundations for philosophy’ [PA 1]. Husserl ‘came to the conclusion that I cannot admit [Heidegger’s] work within the framework of my phenomenology and unfortunately that I also must reject it entirely as regards its method, and in the essentials as regards its content’ [Sheehan 1997, 37].

He dismisses the nothing of Heidegger, and his ‘being of the world,’ in the name of the ‘I as this apodictic ego,’ the transcendental purity of which ‘remains unaffected by whatever status the validity of the world’s being...only as this ego can I ultimately account for the being of the world.’ It is this transcendental position which for Husserl makes possible
the ‘question[ing] regarding [the world’s] entire being’ [PA 6]. It is through the ‘bracketing-out’ of the world, that the world’s essence is intuited and disclosed.28

‘The renunciation of the world, the “bracketing of the world,” did not mean that henceforth the world was no longer a focus at all, but that the world had to become our focus in a new way, at a whole level deeper. What we have renounced, then, is only the naivete by which we allow the common experience of the world to be already given to us...[B]y virtue of the transcendental reduction, I become aware of myself as this kind of Ego, I assume a position above all worldly being, above my own human being and human living.’ [Through this] ‘absolute position above everything... I now recognize the world itself...according to its essential nature: as transcendental phenomenon...being in its absolute form can pertain only to transcendental subjectivity’ [PA 7/8].

This, for Heidegger, put him at the methodological cross-roads in philosophy [TDP 53].

During the attempted collaboration between Husserl and Heidegger on the Encyclopaedia Britannica article of 1927, Heidegger questioned the status of Husserl’s constituting transcendental consciousness, asking ‘What is the mode of being of this absolute ego - in what sense is it the same as the factual I and in what sense is it not the same?’ [Biemel 297] He then writes to Husserl justifying the status of his own constituting transcendental being: ‘what is the kind of being of the entity in which the “world” is constituted? That is the central problem of Being and Time – i.e., a fundamental ontology of Dasein. It is a matter of showing that the kind of being of human Dasein is totally different from that of all other entities, and
that the kind of being, which it is, shelters right within it the possibility of transcendental constitution' [Biemel 300].

A decade before Husserl will attack Heidegger for betraying phenomenology, Heidegger, whilst endorsing a phenomenological methodology [TDP 3], had engaged in a confrontation with Husserl's phenomenology: ‘We find ourselves at a methodological crossroads, where it will be decided whether philosophy shall live or die’ [Sheehan 1997, 18]. From these very first ‘War Emergency’ Lectures of 1919 he attacks Husserl for the un-phenomenological attribution of ‘primacy to theory over lived experience’ [Sheehan 1997, 18]. Heidegger felt Husserl's strictly rigorous science was ‘absolutely without world, world-alien, a sphere where the breath is knocked out of you, and you cannot live’ [Sheehan 1997, 19]. Projecting a more Dionysian philosophy, Heidegger repudiates Husserl's transcendental ego: ‘When you live in a first-hand world [Umwelt], everything comes at you loaded with meaning, all over the place and all the time, everything is enworlded, ‘world happens.’ No mere world-observing ego, we are ‘the act of experientially “living out into something” which has “absolutely nothing to do with an ego”’ [Sheehan 1997, 19], a ‘phenomenological living’ out of an ‘absolute sympathy with life’ [Sheehan 1997, 20].

The idea that there are multiple intentionalities within the text - which we shall pursue in Heidegger’s thinking - was ‘utilized’ in Heidegger's own declaration of June 21, 1919, ‘apparently... in Husserl's presence that the pure ego of Husserlian phenomenology was (in the words of a participant in the discussion) merely “derived from the ‘historical ego’ by way of repressing all historicity and quality” [Sheehan 1997, 20]. But if Husserl's repressions point to a psychological
overdetermination then Heidegger too reveals a human-all-too-human, unconcealing of his own affectivity: ‘In the final hours of the seminar [WS 1922-23], I publicly burned and destroyed the Ideas to such an extent that I dare say that the essential foundations for the whole [of my work] are now cleanly laid out. Looking back from this vantage to the Logical Investigations, I am now convinced that Husserl was never a philosopher, not even for one second in his life. He becomes ever more ludicrous’ [Sheehan 1997, 21]. Through 1923, Heidegger repeatedly, with ad hominem vitriol, ‘strikes the main blows against phenomenology…And after I have published…The old man will realize that I am wringing his neck’ [Sheehan 1997, 21].

Within a general critique of the primacy of the theoretical, in his lecture courses of the early twenties, Heidegger attacks a whole constellation of Husserl’s ideas: of constitution, of certitude, evidence and absolute knowledge founded on the model of mathematical rigor and the epistemological emphasis; also of consciousness and his neglect of the question of Being, of phenomenological reduction and of intentionality [Sheehan 1997, 23]. Heidegger criticised Husserl for failing to recognise what is essentially historical in Being, and for remaining within the error of metaphysics, Husserl confusing Being with beings, insofar as he clings to the assumption that the structures of Being (Sein) must be grounded in transcendental subjectivity, which remains, after all, a being. And Heidegger pursued the question of Being, which was no being.

Their relationship became one of ‘indirection.’ On Husserl’s 67th birthday (8th April 1926) Heidegger presented him - at Todtnauberg - with the dedicatory inscription from Being and Time, but, in view of Husserl’s elision of the question of Being,
perhaps Heidegger’s opening quote from the *Sophist* is overdetermined: ‘for clearly you have long understood what you mean when you use the word “being,” whereas we used to think we knew, but now we are at a loss!’ He wrote to Jaspers on December 26th 1926: ‘If the treatise has been written ‘against’ anyone, then it has been written against Husserl; he saw it right away, but from the start he has remained focussed on the positive. What I write against - only with indirection, to be sure - is sham philosophy’ [Sheehan 1997, 28]. Husserl had promoted a ‘pure’ philosophy against the intellectual and cultural dangers of his time, but now it was his expected disciple who ‘represented “the greatest danger” to his own philosophy’ [Sheehan 1997, 38].

The collaboration on the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article failed. For Heidegger the problem lay in part with the fact that Husserl attributed the function of constitution to the transcendental ego, whereas Heidegger saw it embedded in ‘factual Dasein.’ Husserl - in his 1929 Epilogue to *Ideas* - ‘reasserted his own doctrine against philosophers like Heidegger who set aside the phenomenological reduction as a philosophically irrelevant eccentricity (whereby, to be sure, they destroy the whole meaning of the work and my phenomenology), and leave nothing remaining but a priori psychology’ [Sheehan 1997, 38].

Not only is there a ‘crossroads’ within phenomenology, there are crossings within the thinking of the phenomenologists. Biemel supports the idea that in Heidegger ‘the reduction is totally missing’ [Biemel, 301]. But Heidegger - even as he opposes Husserl’s transcendental Ego - shares with Husserl a transcendental remove from the ‘natural’ spatio-temporal attitude. And the intuitions of Husserl’s transcendental consciousness are disclosive of the intentional structure within
Heidegger's texts. We may ask, using the words of Nietzsche, do they not offer a supplementary rationality, [D 9] a supplementary phenomenology?

Steven Crowell asks whether ‘Heidegger’s ‘phenomenological ontology’ does altogether reject Husserl’s ‘transcendental’ phenomenology - with its doctrines of ‘transcendental-phenomenological reduction’ and ‘transcendental constitution.’ He posits that Heidegger’s conception of phenomenology as a transcendental ontology ‘emerg[ing] from the common basis of the… phenomenology of evidence’ is ‘not so much a rejection of the doctrine of constitution as a “deepening” of it’ [Crowell 1990, 503]. For Crowell what is at issue is the foundation of the ‘transcendental’ rather than ‘phenomenology’ per se, the question not between transcendental philosophy or ontology as a mode of phenomenology, but between epistemology or ontology as a mode of ‘transcendental phenomenology,’ the issue of ‘how this field of transcendental subjectivity, or “transcendental life” as Husserl calls it…is to be interpreted’: epistemologically (Husserl) or ontologically (Heidegger) [Crowell 1990, 507, 503].

For Crowell, Heidegger like Husserl accepts the “‘legitimacy” of the reduction…so far as it places into question the ontological presuppositions of the natural attitude,’ endorsing the necessity of phenomenological reduction for true seeing, [Crowell 1990, 515, 505]. Gary Madison concurs: ‘Heidegger, far from rejecting the reduction, can be said to presuppose it’ [Madison 267]. And for Francis Seeberger what is at issue is the ‘meaning of the reduction,’ and the relationship of ‘transcendental consciousness’ to ‘the world’: he views the phenomenological reduction of Husserl as ‘a philosophical technique which makes possible the disclosure of a pure, absolute transcendental consciousness’ stepped away from
the everyday connection to the world, whilst for Heidegger meaning is provided out of man’s *being-in-the-world* [Seeburger 1975, 213-215]. For both Husserl and Heidegger, the phenomenologist must distance himself from the world in order to disclose it. However, as Seeburger observes, ‘such disengagement…remains motivated by the phenomenologist’s own involvement in the world,’ his own ‘worldly motivations’ [Seeburger 1975, 217]. Dasein is concerned about its *being* in its very being.

Emmanuel Levinas sees Heidegger’s *Being and Time* as ‘the fruition and flowering of Husserlian phenomenology,’ Crowell seeing it is a ‘deepening’ of phenomenological insight [Crowell 1990, 502 - 503]. But, for Heidegger, ‘man’s concernful preoccupation with his everyday affairs must somehow be broken,’ in order to be open to phenomenological seeing, which by Seeburger’s explanation ‘can be elicited only if some basic change in man’s prephenomenological being in the world has already announced itself…the phenomenological technique of reduction is itself a response to and in effect, at the service of, an already emergent change in man’s relationship to the world…a…change in man’s being in the world…[which] elicits such application in order to work itself out through phenomenology’ [Seeberger 1975, 218 & 219]. It is a distantiation akin to Nietzsche’s ‘separation’, [loslosung] no mere shift in attitude but consequent upon an overcoming - through rupture - of the focus of the everyday.

In the preface to *Human All Too Human*, Nietzsche had spoken of the ‘free spirit’ whose genetic experience is a ‘great separation’;32
“the great separation comes suddenly, like the shock of an earthquake: all at once the young soul is devastated, torn loose, torn out - it itself does not know what is happening. An urge, a pressure governs it, mastering the soul like a command: the will and wish awaken to go away, anywhere, at any cost: a violent dangerous curiosity for an undiscovered world flames up and flickers in all the senses. ‘Better to die than live here,’ so sounds the imperious and seductive voice. And this ‘here,’ this ‘at home’ is everything which it had loved until then!”

[HAH 6]

But Nietzsche understood only too well that the great ‘liberation’ was attained by the individual at some cost: a ‘dangerous tension of his pride...Behind his ranging activity...stands the question mark of an ever more dangerous curiosity...thoughts lead and mislead him’ [HAH 7].

Seeburger infuses Husserl’s shift in attitude with a Nietzschean sense of rupture: ‘Some event within such everyday involvement in the world must bring man up short, casting him out of the familiar context of his concerns...some event within the circuit of man's contemporary involvement in the world - an involvement inseparable from the always more or less explicit background provided in large part by philosophy itself - must break that circuit, again casting man into an unfamiliar context’ [Seeburger 218].

For Heidegger, grasping man in his totality requires not epistemology but a fundamental ontology, through an existential analytic of Dasein, which raises the question of the being of the sum [BT2, 45], a question unposed by Husserl. The
ontological concern is, to use Nietzsche’s words, Heidegger’s ‘metaphysical string’ [HAH 106].

And, indeed, Husserl recognized that there was another force contending within Heidegger, one which preceded his own influence. In 1916 he had been concerned about Heidegger’s Catholicism, and would see Heidegger’s future role as a phenomenologist of religion. Heidegger acknowledged that ‘this facticity of mine belongs to what I briefly call the fact that I am a ‘Christian theologian’ [Kisiel 1995, 7]. And in 1931, as Heidegger placed Husserl back towards the naturalism he attacked, so Husserl put Heidegger back beyond the rigorous advances of phenomenology into the unclear realms of ‘mysticism.’

And the religious tradition of ‘distressed Dasein’ [PRL 36] is expressed in Heidegger’s counter to Husserl’s transcendental ego: Dasein is no pure constituting but a being whose very being is an issue for it [BT1, 117]. Husserl’s concern was ‘purity,’ Heidegger’s concern was concern itself. And between epistemology and ontology there are differences in tonality, in resonance, in music.

Between and within phenomenologies, it is clear that Husserl was correct to see the apodictic certainty of his project as a dream, but his vision lent itself to a pseudomorphosis, to a perception, an intuition of the existential concerns of Heidegger. We can indeed, on one level, look for rapprochement. In fugal contention with the necessity of the phenomenological reduction is, in the words of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘the impossibility of a complete reduction, for the reduction reveals the “unmotivated upsurge of the world”; it makes us intensely aware of the world as something forever “strange and paradoxical” [Merleau-Ponty in Madison, 257]. To invert Nietzsche’s Apollonian-Dionysian duality whereby
the Dionysian enables us to really see, the Apollonian to enable us to endure what we see, the intuition of Apollonian Husserlian phenomenology clarifies the Dionysian experiences of Dasein’s ‘being-in-the-world.’

Part 3

The Nietzschean Dionysian

‘I am a disciple of the philosopher Dionysus’ [Nietzsche Ecce Homo 33].

i. Nietzsche and Phenomenology

Husserl’s cultural critique - as Heidegger’s - echoes Nietzsche’s untimely meditation:

‘Instead of a unitary living philosophy, we have a philosophical literature growing beyond all bounds and almost without coherence. Instead of a serious discussion among conflicting theories that, in their very conflict, demonstrate the intimacy with which they belong together, the commonness of their underlying convictions, and an unswerving belief in a true philosophy, we have a pseudo-reporting and a pseudo-criticizing, a mere semblance of philosophizing seriously.’ [CM 5]

Nietzsche had written his Untimely Meditations in confrontation with what he saw as a philistinic ‘chaotic jumble of styles’ [UM 6]. And Husserl's transcendentalism can bear closely on what Keith Ansell-Pearson terms ‘Nietzsche’s transcendental naturalism’ [Ansell Pearson 63]:
‘Every genuine beginning of philosophy springs from meditation, from the experience of solitary self-reflection...Only in solitude and meditation does one become a philosopher; only in this way is philosophy born in us, emerging of necessity from within us.’ [PA 4]

But Nietzsche’s was a philosophy of the body: ‘Sit as little as possible; give no credence to any thought that was not born outdoors, while one moved about freely - in which the muscles are not celebrating a feast too’ [EH 54]. ‘The body is inspired; let us keep the “soul” out of it -’ [EH 104]. ‘Our most sacred convictions...are judgements of our muscles’ [WP 314]. ‘Only ideas won by walking have any value’ [TI, 26].

Nietzsche had written that impersonal thinking, supposedly the result of ‘cold, curious thought,’ is in fact ‘most often a desire of the heart that has been filtered and made abstract’ [GS 345]. His tonality is Dionysian: philosophy comes out of one’s ‘own burning’ [Z 116], the problems reflective of a thinker’s ‘distress [and] ...torment’ [GS 345]. (Heidegger, in his lectures on The Phenomenology of Religious Life, will analyse Dasein as a ‘concerned,’ ‘distressed’ ‘object within history’ [PRL 36].)

In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Gilles Deleuze writes: ‘A phenomenon is not an appearance or even an apparition, but a sign, a symptom...the whole of philosophy is a symptomatology, a semiology’ [Deleuze 2002, 3]; and Nietzsche himself had written: ‘All movement as a sign of an internal event: i.e., by far the majority of all internal events are given to us only as signs.’40 That we can treat a philosophical text as a ‘symptom’ underlines the impurity that ‘pure’ consciousness reveals. Against the Husserlian belief in ‘consciousness’ as ‘a self-validating source or origin
of truth (conceived as manifestation or the being of showing)’ - which as disclosive is itself a symptomatology - consciousness for Nietzsche is, in the words of Keith Ansell-Pearson, ‘implicated in error and the realm of the superficial…it cannot be regarded as the most important domain of life’ [Ansell-Pearson 73]. Indeed, as ‘only one state of our spiritual and psychic world,’ it may become - in excess - a ‘pathological state’ [GS 305]. For Nietzsche, consciousness is neither foundational nor ‘pure.’ Nor, in its search for essence, is it adequate to ‘so polyphonic an essence’ [D 133]. The realm of supposed pure thought is rather the surface projection: ‘events which are actually connected are played out below our consciousness….Below every thought lies an affect’ [WLN 60]. In the words of Ansell-Pearson, ‘thought is rooted in a complex assemblage of affects and drives’ [Ansell-Pearson 2007, 76]. For Nietzsche: ‘Man as a multiplicity of “wills to power”: each one with a multiplicity of means of expression and forms’ [WLN 60]. It is mere error-producing ‘illusion…to conceive of a “single plane of consciousness” and to subjugate everything to it’ [WLN 128]. To speak anachronistically, against Husserl’s transcendental ‘purification,’ Nietzsche stands for a naturalistic ‘purification’ [Ansell-Pearson 61] against the excesses of epistemological rationalism, proposing that ‘we make the body and physiology the starting-point’ [78] and not human consciousness, for ‘the whole phenomenon “body” is…superior to our consciousness, our “mind”…There are thus in man as many “consciousnesses” as - at every moment of his existence - there are beings which constitute his body’ [WLN 29-30].

Foucault distances Nietzsche from phenomenology: ‘the phenomenologist’s experience is basically a way of organizing examination of any aspect of daily, lived
experience in its transitory form, in order to grasp its meaning. Nietzsche, Bataille, and Blanchot, on the contrary, try through experience to reach that point of life which lies as close as possible to the impossibility of living, which lies at the limit or the extreme. They attempt to gather the maximum amount of intensity at the same time.”

In his breakthrough to independence from Wagner, Nietzsche might deplore a life-denying sickness behind the moral ecstasies of romanticism, yet, in *Ecce Homo* he holds that *Tristan and Isolde* is ‘emphatically Wagner’s non plus ultra... The world is poor for anyone who has never been sick enough for this “voluptuousness of hell’” [BGE 75].

And for Paul Ricoeur it is Nietzsche who is genuinely phenomenologically disclosive: ‘The *Genealogy of Morals*... is a genuine phenomenology’. Against the power-laden interpretations of the will to power, Ricoeur sees Nietzsche undermining the hubristic pretensions of transcendent rationalism by revealing the ‘genesis of the spirit of humility from the will to power.’ Even in the Dionysian proximity of the demonic with the saintly - *Dionysus v. the crucified* [EH 134] - Ricoeur sees Nietzsche’s ‘frightening... phenomenology... [as] noticeably more inclusive than the phenomenology of cognition to which the greatest part of Husserl’s work had to be limited.' Husserl brackets out the Nietzschean - and Heideggerian - existential concerns, which, in the words of Gary Madison, ‘find no proper place in Husserl’s intuitionist, idealist philosophy... [Indeed] the root metaphors of Heidegger are utterly un-Husserlian... Heidegger speaks to us of death, nothing, meaninglessness, fate, absence, abysses, untruth, mystery, etc.’ [Madison 259].
But, if the content is un-Husserlian, the same cannot be said of the form, the setting-out of the analytic, in *Being and Time*. And Husserl’s ‘breakthrough’ phenomenology of intuitive seeing is indeed disclosive of the reality of existential strife.

Nietzsche opens *Daybreak* with an assertion, a question but nevertheless an assertion: ‘does not almost every precise history of an origination impress our feelings as paradoxical and wantonly offensive?’ Further: ‘Does the good historian not, at bottom, constantly contradict?’ This aphorism is entitled ‘*Supplemental rationality.*’ The very first sentence of *Daybreak* speaks of the different levels of Being: ‘All things that live long are gradually so saturated with reason that their origin in unreason thereby becomes improbable’ [D 9]. Within an oeuvre which valorises the questionable, Nietzsche’s *Daybreak* - with its opening towards the paradoxical and the human-all-too-human unreason, with its questioning of precision - is at the same time a book full of self-warnings. He concludes *Daybreak* with an aphorism beginning in seeming glorification of the courage of ‘free spirits’:

*We aeronauts of the spirit!* But, as the aphorism - the thought - unfolds, Nietzsche moves away from exclamation to questioning:

‘Whither does this mighty longing draw us, this longing that is worth more to us than any pleasure? Why just in this direction, thither where all the suns of humanity have hitherto *gone down*? Will it perhaps be said of us one day that we too, *steering westward, hoped to reach an India* - but that it was our fate to be wrecked against infinity? Or, my brothers. Or?’ [D 229]
Nietzsche’s own dangers and warnings provide an interpretative viewpoint into the opening ‘moment’ in which I locate this interpretation of Heidegger’s thinking: 1910 - with his review ‘Per Mortem Ad Vitem: Thoughts on Johannes Jorgensen’s Lies of Life and Truth of Life’ - though, even in calling on the precision of a date, I give that ‘moment’ a duration which locates that date in its times, the breakthrough of dissonance in Strauss and Schoenberg and the question of how much truth – which as we have seen for Theodore Adorno was at the same time a question of musical dissonance - the philosopher or artist could bear: Strauss, just a few years before Heidegger’s review, had retreated, having plumbed the depths of the Salome-Elektra abyss, a terrifying vision of Heidegger’s demonic ‘they’ that would come.

Heidegger’s ‘Thoughts on Johannes Jorgensen’s Lies of Life and Truth of Life’ were written whilst studying for the priesthood at the Department of Theology at the University of Freiburg, and having read at least The Genealogy of Morals and Zarathustra the previous year [McNeill 2009], and also, as Heidegger recollected, during ‘the exciting years between 1910 and 1914 [which] cannot be adequately expressed,’ he had begun studying Nietzsche’s Will to Power [Buren 1994, 63]. His Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche’s Dionysian philosophy and expression had begun. The review mirrors the title: from death to life, from confrontation to eulogy. Jorgensen’s ‘thin book about conversion provides an interesting contribution to the psychology of the free thinker’ [J 37]. It is a matter with religio-psychological resonance: conversion, in a text loaded with Nietzschean expression.
Heidegger confronts the excessive individualism in the cult of ‘personality’ of the times: the ‘dandy’ Oscar Wilde, the ‘brilliant drunkard’ Paul Verlaine and ‘the Overman Nietzsche,’ the lives of whom are ‘interesting’ but founded on ‘a perverted and deceitful philosophy’: redemption is achieved for such ‘personality’ through ‘an hour of grace’ in which they ‘become conscious of the great lie of his gypsy’s life, smashes the altars of false gods, and becomes a Christian.’ Jorgensen is ‘driven’ through a ‘powerful struggle…[a] tireless searching and building, the ultimate step to the summit of truth’ [35].

Other than Nietzsche, Augustine is the only ‘philosopher’ mentioned in this short review: and at the beginning of the analytic of Dasein in Being and Time [BT2, 42] it will be Augustine who will be called on to speak out of the distress of Dasein [PRL 35], in juxtaposition to Heidegger’s formal speaking out of the very Western rational philosophical tradition he is seeking to overcome through phenomenological destruction. One could simply mirror the ascensionism in Heidegger’s analysis. But at the same time - a superimposition of harmony and dissonance - we can deconstruct the progress: there had been a warning in the against-which Jorgensen converted. Jorgensen is initially one of these personalities, aligned with the excesses, the wild intoxications of Nietzsche: the spirit of ‘all-powerful’ atheism which Heidegger aligns with Nietzsche is at the same time ‘too weak for life and not sick enough for death… [he] dragged himself through his wretched existence.’ The questionable is indeed the ‘purest Cesara Borgia enthusiasm of a Nietzsche.’ Heidegger quotes Jacobsen: ‘What is wild I find beautiful, untamed and untamable nature, the ardent, never-satisfied passion of men of the Renaissance.’ Their excess is demonic: ‘They
praise to the skies the graven images of horror and sin.’ Their intoxications carried
them ‘downward to the point where they loved death and despair and “called
decay holy.”’ But for Jorgensen there was a call away from the tortured ‘mad
frenzy.’ The call of truth: ‘Depart from truth, and it will punish you for your
violation. And yet who had more rigorously sought truth, who had indeed thrown
all prejudices overboard, smashed all chains, who had indeed created their
convictions with the “spiritual and moral sovereignty of the ego”? [36]
Singing a song different from that of fundamental ontology, Heidegger here in 1910
writes with a passion he otherwise confines to his intimate letters. The ““great
‘personalities,”’ he writes, found no happiness:

‘No, [they found] despair and death. See that line of witnesses as though
they had gone astray and held a revolver to their heads. So none of
them had the truth. So individualism is the false standard of life.
Therefore banish the will of the flesh, the teachings of the world, of
paganism’ [37].

Heidegger has been warned against individualism which pursues false gods. It is
the pursuit of truth, which ‘leads to happiness.’ Heidegger warns against ‘deceit
[which leads] to destruction’ [36], as Nietzsche had warned himself against
madness. Whilst he pursued a destruction of the Western ontological tradition to
open thinking up to a primordial disclosure, the oscillations of Heidegger’s own
Apollonian-Dionysian duality would lead him to a ‘destruction,’ in political and
personal life, and, as it impinged on his concealments and evasions, on his
fundamental ontology.
The concern with false gods, the will of the flesh, and deceit, in 1910 were the concerns of a theology student. Heidegger writes of Jorgensen: ‘If you want to live spiritually, to gain your salvation, then die, kill the baseness in yourself, work with supernatural grace, and you will be resurrected. And thus he rests now in the shadow of the cross, this strong-willed, joyously hopeful poet-philosopher: a modern Augustine.’

The year before Husserl’s Philosophy as Rigorous Science, Heidegger writes in this short review: ‘The composition of [Jorgensen’s] works lacks rigour. But they are all the more deeper on account of this. Moodful dreaminess, muted impressionism, seriousness, stateliness, restrained summoning, and admonition is entirely his style, just as generally the writings of those from the northern countries...show something ponderous, quiet, fabulous’ [37]. This ‘converted’ Dionysianism lacks rigor, it is also ‘deeper.’ And, with suggestive juxtaposition, the theme of disclosure is announced, presented as bringing forth a true historical sense: Jorgensen ‘uncovers again and again our great indestructible connection to the past’ [37].

But it is the dangerous depths of Dionysianism to which Heidegger is attuned. Heidegger observes approvingly that: ‘With the mystics of the Middle Ages he gladly tarries’ [37]. His own poetic impulse is revealed in his eulogy: ‘For the Povorello, his peace-filled poet's heart glows. Let us love this frank Dane, let us immerse ourselves and live in his lovely books’ [37]. And Nietzsche - who spoke of another questionable Dane (Hamlet) in The Birth of Tragedy - was ambivalent about these mystics: he believed them to be more honest than thinkers who ‘pose as if they had discovered and reached their real opinions through the self-development of a cold, pure, divinely unconcerned dialectic,’ whereas mystics
speak merely of ‘inspiration’ [BGE 12]. But he also warned against their association with madness! And Heidegger in 1910 is - out of his religious calling - attuned to this warning voice. In Nietzsche’s writings there are many portents of his own fate: in *Thus Spake Zarathustra* he writes - ‘I love him who wants to create beyond himself, and thus perishes’ [Z 91]. Nietzsche saw the thinker facing the ‘frightful abysses’ [UM 35] of his own ‘distress’ [GS 345]. And Heidegger was called by primal Christianity to the existentiale of Dasein as a ‘concerned’, ‘distressed’ ‘object within history’ [PRL 36]. Husserl’s ‘Apollonian’ rigorous science would be seen as an insufficiency for a being for whom *being* was an issue [BT1 117], yet this issue of being was fraught with ‘Dionysian’ danger. The *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche has begun. The work not only discloses the biographical, it also foreconceives it.

**ii. The Presence of Nietzsche in Heidegger Literature**

In *Being and Time* Heidegger characterizes Dasein - human ‘being-there’ - as that being which ‘in its being...is concerned about its very being’ [BT2, 11]. Writing on ‘Heidegger’s *Polemos,*’ Gregory Fried underlines the strife of this concernful existence: ‘we are polemically; our Dasein is polemos’ [Fried 2000, 17]. Here I offer the perspective that, as fugue, the Apollonian-Dionysian duality is constantly at issue, a *polemos.*

In his lectures on *Hölderlin’s Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und ‘Der Rhein,’* written during the winter of 1934-5, thus shortly after his direct political involvement with the Third Reich, Heidegger says that ‘struggle...is...the strife of the great opposition between the essential powers of Being,’ more prosaically that it is ‘Only in the back
and forth movement of struggle [that] beings have their being’ [Fried 31]. And, in his 1937 lecture ‘Paths to Discussion,’ Heidegger does indeed make the transition from ‘the German people’ to individual Dasein: ‘Self-understanding is...a struggle of a reciprocal putting-oneself-into-question. Only Auseinandersetzung sets each one of us in each case into what is most his own’ [Fried 18]. It is in and through polemos - through an Auseinandersetzung - that beings are.

These manifestations of Heidegger’s logos in the 1930s gives sight to a view on his path of thinking in the 1920s. In her book Postmodern Platos, Catherine Zuckert observes that ‘The Being of the beings can be disclosed in and through logos because logos has the same structure as Being itself’ [Zuckert 42]. As a manifestation of, a disclosure of ownmost Dasein, the philosophical text is revealed as both an overt and a covert polemos. The Apollonian-Dionysian tension is generative of ‘hidden’ tensions within the ‘unity’ of Heidegger’s work, the pathways of which manifest more the inner strife, the fugue of tensions rather than unified fusion, a belief perhaps endorsed by Heidegger himself who believed in ‘Ways - not works,’ and who ended his ‘magnum opus’ Being and Time with a question-mark.

In the second of his ‘Geschlecht’ essays, ‘Heidegger’s Hand,’ Jacques Derrida sees in Heidegger’s thinking a gesture of duality: two gestures, ‘two texts, two hands, two visions, two ways of listening. Together simultaneously and separately’47 [Derrida in van Buren 10]. I intend to demonstrate that Heidegger is, indeed, engaged in an Husserlian - an Apollonian - epoché of the Dionysian, and that Heidegger’s writing and thinking is overdetermined, a philosophical discourse, yet infused with presences and absences, in an Apollonian polemos with the Dionysian, an artistic
taming of the terrible. And that this Apollonian-Dionysian fugue will provide – to use a Heideggerianism- an *out of which* upon which to ground the political case of Heidegger.

That Dasein’s state of self-concern may be viewed, and importantly, in terms of the relation of - and self-threatenings - of ‘different selves’ is emphasized by Jean Grondin in his discussion of Heidegger’s 1923 *Ontology* lectures:

‘...our Dasein is constituted by something like an “inner dialogue” with itself, since it knows or can always know how things stand with its own self, that is, what possibilities of existence are being offered to oneself. Our “self” is nothing but this ongoing tacit discussion on what we should, could, or must be....Dasein is a self-dialogue in a state of permanent confrontation with its own self and thus with others (who can very well dwell within us.)’

Grondin continues:

‘According to Heidegger, Dasein already finds itself immersed in possibilities of understanding, that is, in more or less conscious projects whose function it is to forestall a potentially threatening course of events’ [Kisiel and van Buren 1994, 348-9].

Heidegger speaks of the ‘self-encounter’ that is philosophy, through which Dasein exercises a ‘radical vigilance toward itself’ [Kisiel and van Buren 1994 351], in the face of a ‘fundamental questionableness’ in the very nature of facticity itself. [PIA 28]^{49}

Pages in these lectures, in which Heidegger discusses *understanding* as a hermeneutic ‘mode of access,’ are impregnated with the reformational language of
Dasein’s ‘hunting down the alienation from itself with which it is smitten’ [O 11], and reference to Christ’s resurrection [O 13]. Phenomenology is taken beyond Husserl, for ‘such an extreme of evidence as “intuition of essences” would be a misunderstanding of what it can and should do’ [O 12]. It is not a ‘mere taking cognizance of’ but a ‘primordial self-interpretation’ through which ‘Dasein is ruthlessly dragged back to itself and relentlessly thrown back upon itself’ [O 14].

Until the *Auseinandersetzung* of his ‘Nietzsche’ lectures which begins in 1937, Heidegger makes only occasional overt reference to Nietzsche. But, in view of the manifest concern with Nietzsche in his Jorgensen review of 1910 we can, as is Jacques Taminiaux in his *Heidegger and the project of fundamental ontology*, be guided by a quote from Heidegger’s own 1924 *Sophist* lectures:

> ‘It is in any case a dubious thing to rely on what an author himself has brought to the forefront. The important thing is rather to give attention to those things he left shrouded in silence.’

Taminiaux, as do I, redirects Heidegger’s own caution about textual content back onto Heidegger himself and his fundamental ontology, surmising and contending that in *Being and Time* ‘the thinkers he mentioned least often in his publications and in his lecture courses, Nietzsche in particular, may well have been those he had most in mind,’ and, further, that, ‘when Heidegger talked about a thesis and its proponent, he was perhaps aiming his remarks at someone else. For example, while talking about Kant on Being, he was in fact talking about Husserl’ [Taminiaux 1991, xvi].

For Taminiaux, within Heidegger’s concernful ‘deconstructions’ in the history of philosophy, ‘what had remained unsaid accompanied what had been said’
In Being and Time Heidegger writes: ‘The beginning of his Untimely Meditations makes us suspect that he [Nietzsche] understood more than he made known’ [BT2, 376]. Nietzsche opens his ‘polemic’ On the Genealogy of Morals: ‘We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge’ [NBW 451]. Was Heidegger free from this unknowing? His own thought offers itself to such questioning.

And for Taminiaux, Heidegger’s interpretations, his selections and omissions were ‘meaningful’ [Taminiaux 1991, xix], revealing ‘a paradox...at the very core of fundamental ontology’: the ‘most sobering and unrelenting’ concern with the finitude of human existence is not free of ‘the absolute pretensions of metaphysics’ [xix]. Nietzsche’s recognition that ‘even in a free spirit who has rid himself of everything metaphysical, the highest effects of art easily produce a reverberation of a long-silenced, or even broken metaphysical string’ [HAH 106] applies to both Nietzsche himself and to Heidegger. Taminiaux detects a further duality, an overdetermination: ‘overtly’ fundamental ontology is a ‘critical thematization’, ‘covertly’ it is a ‘transformation and a reappropriation’ [Taminiaux xix]. This paradox is manifest as a ‘strife’ between a ‘letting be disclosed’ and a mastering. And this strife between the said and unsaid unfolds in Heidegger’s orientation to Nietzsche.

Taminiaux relates Heidegger’s late exclamation to Gadamer: ‘Nietzsche destroyed me.’ However, Taminiaux’s exploration of The Presence of Nietzsche in Sein und Zeit pursues not this ‘destruction,’ this kaputt, resonant of the impact of the danger Heidegger had confronted in and through that 1910 Sorgensen review.
Rather, in the words of Babette Babich, Taminiaux traces a ‘connivance’ and ‘concinnity’ in Heidegger’s appropriation of Nietzsche, seeing the sparse references to Nietzsche - in section 53 in *Being and Time* on the ‘Existential Projection of an Authentic Being-towards-death,’ and in section 76 on *The Existential Origin of Historiography from the Historicity of Dasein* - as revealing Heidegger’s alignment of Nietzsche’s thinking with his own. Taminiaux contends that no attempt is made to ‘demarcate Nietzsche’s teaching from the analytic of Dasein,’ and views Heidegger quoting Nietzsche as a ‘companion in thinking,’ with no ‘distanciation from Nietzsche’s thought’ [175]. He considers that the ‘six words of Nietzsche….“becoming too old for its victories” coming from first part of *Zarathustra* ‘On Free Death’ ‘are quoted in such a way as to complement Heidegger’s own analysis…of Being-authentic precisely with the possibility *not-to-be-outstripped* of death…perfectly’ [Taminiaux 1991, 175 & 177]. Indeed, Taminiaux ‘discover[s] many indications of a profound affinity’: ‘the Heideggerian analysis of human finitude ‘converges’ with the injunction of Zarathustra...”Die at the right time!”’ [Taminiaux 1991, 180] There are indeed affinities: ‘Nietzsche opposes two types of relationship to death, one consisting of dying too late and the other in dying too soon’ [Taminiaux 1991, 182], just as Heidegger will oppose an authentic being-towards-death to the inauthentic flight from death.

Taminiaux sees Nietzsche’s denunciation of the inferior ‘inauthentic’ ‘dying too soon’ allied to his call for a *gaya scienza*, a joyful science, a call for ‘faithfulness to life, against the Christian weariness and longing for another world’ [Taminiaux 1991 183], and he notes Heidegger’s reference in the *History of the Concept of Time*: ‘Philosophical research is and remains atheism...Precisely in this atheism
philosophy becomes what a great man called the “joyful science.”’ We may ask: why the *distanced* ‘great man,’ why not *name* ‘Nietzsche’? And - for both Nietzsche and Heidegger - the ‘gay science’ had both external and internal contention: for Nietzsche it was an excess of Apollonian taming of the horrible, in and through which that very Apollonianism becomes its antithesis, a Dionysian dithyramb. I suggest that for Nietzsche, the ‘gay science’ existed to the same extent as his ‘free spirits’ which he acknowledged he invented to counter the abyss. Out of a proximity, could it be that Heidegger’s ontologisations of guilt, conscience, anxiety, and his espousal of a ‘gay science’ as a radicalisation of Husserlian phenomenology were a radicalisation of that defence against the threatening? Taminiaux sees Heidegger’s engagement with Nietzsche, out of a ‘profound agreement,’ not having that ‘distanciation’ which marks his ‘deconstructions’ of other thinkers [Taminiaux 1991, 188]. But he ‘surmise[s] that, precisely because it is acknowledged without reservation at two decisive points, this proximity to Nietzsche also inspires many other moments in the project’ [188]. It may be, however, that these other moments will also reveal a distanciation, a *said* in the *unsaid*.

What is unsaid in Heidegger’s ‘appropriation’ of Nietzsche/Zarathustra’s freedom toward death? I will pursue the surmise that it may be that a distanciation is in the unsaid, that the *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche is already integral to Heidegger’s thinking of fundamental ontology, and that this too was overdetermined: a destruction in both senses, the ‘overt’ *Auseinandersetzung*, and the ‘covert’ resistance to the threat of the Nietzschean destruction. And, further, that there is an *unsaid* in Heidegger’s use of Nietzsche in these two ‘decisive’ instances, that there are shadows behind these appropriations and apparent
subsumptions of Nietzsche’s ideas on death and time, that there is an
*Auseinandersetzung* in *Being and Time* with what Heidegger leaves out of what he
apparently takes, highlighted in the final chapter of this study in Heidegger’s
reference to Tolstoy, a mere brief note to his discussion of authentic being-toward-
death.53

There are seeming absences. Taminiaux notes the seeming absence of Nietzsche
with regard to the attempted fundamental grounding of *being* in *time*. Plato,
Aristotle, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Bergson, Husserl are mentioned only to be relegated
to the ‘ordinary’ concept of time. But Nietzsche is not cited in relation to ‘time,’
Taminiaux suggests, ‘because ecstatic-horizonal temporality includes an existential
reappropriation of the eternal return?’ [188] But, *at the same time*, the nature - the
language - of Heidegger’s analysis of temporality may suggest both a proximity and
a distanciation, both a rejection of and a reconfiguration of the rapture of the
ecstatic in the ek-static.54

Drawing on the work of Michel Haar, Taminiaux links his analysis of the presence
of Nietzsche in *Being and Time* to Heidegger’s later ‘confrontation’ with Nietzsche:

‘Heidegger jotted down in a remark to himself that this confrontation is
sustained by a “most intimate affinity.” By the same token it may
prompt us to view this *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche as part and
parcel of a debate of Heidegger with himself.’ [189]

The shadow-side of this possibility is the question of whether indeed this
proximity was unambiguous, or whether an unsaid *Auseinandersetzung* with
Nietzsche reveals a distanciation, a qualification, and whether there was also a
covert, unacknowledged address of Nietzsche before the overt *Auseinandersetzung*. 

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The tragic picture of a benumbed Nietzsche, walrus moustache out of control – or controlled by some other, his sister – may be seen in Heidegger's ontological analysis of being-toward-death in *Being and Time*: ‘if Dasein “exists” in such a way that there is absolutely nothing more outstanding for it, it has also already thus become no-longer-being-there...Eliminating what is outstanding in its being is equivalent to annihilating its being’ [BT2, 227]. As Heidegger attempts, through emphasizing the ‘finitude’ of human existence, to remain truer to the earth [Z 42] than Nietzsche in view of his Alpinist ecstasy and Dionysian rapture, it may be seen that Heidegger here is contending with Nietzsche who through Dionysian excess did not die at the right time, existing but no longer having an 'outstanding,' no-longer-being-there, annihilated in his being. And yet, if one cannot die at the right time, may be one can leave at the right time. Nietzsche composes *Ecce Home* ‘as if’ his work was completed, writing in a late letter: ‘Everything is completed’ [FS 137].

In a letter to M. Komorell, cited by Taminiaux, Heidegger said that the publication of *Sein und Zeit* was a ‘disaster’ [Taminiaux 1991, xxii]. *Being and Time* was his Kantian reduction, his reversal, his retreat, in the face of Nietzsche. And this Nietzsche was not only the writings of this philosopher Nietzsche, but what he portended. The unsaid of Nietzsche's demonic possession proves to be not only Nietzsche's, but also Heidegger's. The covert distantiation from Nietzsche is at the same time a covert self-address, a self-overcoming, through a distantiation from himself.
iii. Remaining true to the earth and finitude: Intimations of a Demonic Life

‘I entreat you, my brothers, remain true to the earth, and do not believe those who speak to you of superterrestrial hopes!’ Nietzsche: Thus spake Zarathustra. [Z 42]

Thomas Sheehan informed Hans-Georg Gadamer that Heidegger had written in the margin of Husserl's Philosophy as a Rigorous Science regarding Husserl’s first principle ‘To the things themselves!’ - ‘We want to take Husserl at his word’ [Gadamer 171]. I hope to make plausible56 the suggestion that Heidegger could have made a similar remark in his copy of Thus Spake Zarathustra regarding Nietzsche’s call to ‘remain true to the earth.’ And, indeed, in his 1925 essay on Wilhelm Dilthey, Heidegger writes ‘positively’ that ‘Dilthey took up in a positive way from [positivism]... its critique of metaphysics and its stress on things here below’ [S 152].[My italics.]

I wish now to explore this notion of ‘remaining true to the earth’ - the call of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra - in relation to Heidegger’s stress on human ‘finitude,’ in part through reference to two books by David Krell - Intimations Of Mortality and Daimon Life. The very title Intimations Of Mortality - distanced from the immortal, the supersensuous - bears upon the consequences of Zarathustra’s exhortation to ‘remain true to the earth’ in the wake of the ‘death of God.’ But Nietzsche had recognized that ‘even in a free spirit who has rid himself of everything metaphysical, the highest effects of art easily produce a reverberation of a long-silenced, or even broken metaphysical string’ [HAH 106]. And the metaphysical string reverberated in Nietzsche’s own thinking to the end, the title of his last completed book referencing Christ: ‘Ecce Homo’. Nietzsche-Zarathustra also
beseeches men to ‘Keep holy your highest hope!’ [Z 71] Nietzsche still wished to ‘bring light to the earth, to be “the light of the earth”!’ [GS 236] Phenomenology would aspire to reconfigure this ‘dream.’

Heidegger himself was not free of this metaphysical string. For Hans-Georg Gadamer ‘Heidegger’s principal preoccupation throughout his long career was the question of the divine’ [McGrath 2008, 121]. Karl Löwith, another of Heidegger’s students, associates this religious string with the unsaid in Heidegger’s thinking: ‘The basis that serves as the background for everything said by Heidegger, and that permits many to take notice and listen attentively, is something unsaid: the religious motive, which has surely detached itself from Christian faith, but which precisely on account of its dogmatically unattached indeterminacy appeals more to those who are no longer faithful Christians but who nonetheless would like to be religious’ [McGrath 2008 102]. Jacques Derrida sees Heidegger in Being and Time, “repeating on an ontological level Christian themes and texts that have been ‘de-Christianized’” [McGrath 112]. And Robert J. Dostal in his essay Time and phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger sees that in Heidegger ‘the Christian view that “we are in the world, but not of the world” is transformed’ and that ‘Heidegger’s story of Dasein [in everyday inauthenticity] is, in this regard, not so unlike the Christian story of fallen human nature...While the present has priority for the inauthentic, the future has priority for the authentic life.’

At the same time, in an attempt to remain truer to the earth (and to Nietzsche) than Nietzsche himself, Heidegger attempted to develop an ‘atheistic’ philosophy which is rooted in ‘finite human existence,’ out of, in the words of Krell, a thinking ‘on the descent, a descensional reflection determined to keep its feet on the earth’
[Krell 1986, 1]. Nietzsche’s own ‘descensional’ thinking still reverberated with ‘ascensional’ aspiration. But, then, neither was Heidegger free of an ‘ascensional’ impulse. There are specific images of ‘ascent’, for instance, as he approaches the ‘summit’ of his 1943 Parmenides lectures. [PA 143] But in a less specific mode, the descensional-ascensional problematic is also tied to the oscillation between inauthenticity and authenticity, and, in the context of the finitude of remaining true to the earth, raising the possibility of an address of the relation of spiritual aspiration to earthly existence, through an Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche’s own Zarathustrian oscillation between mountain and marketplace.

Such oscillation can be seen as relating to the question of the transformations in form and content of Heidegger’s thinking in the 1930s, which will be viewed in terms of a fugal Apollonian-Dionysian duality. In his Intimations, David Krell suggests that Heidegger ‘was always caught up’ in an oscillation between a descensional thinking rooted in human finitude and, what Krell characterizes as the ‘eschatology of Being’ [Krell 1986 4]. Krell sees Nietzsche and Heidegger ‘converging in the descending arc of the history of Being as eschatology’ [Krell 1986, 6]. But if Nietzsche called men to remain true to the earth out of his own eschatology of the raptures and ecstasies of being in a philosophy of ‘ice and high mountains’ [EH 34], then Heidegger adverted to a fundamental ontology the fundament of which proves to be a descensionally ecstatic finitude [Krell 1986, 8]. Krell sees that ‘ontology recoils incessantly upon its point of departure’ [40]. Heidegger’s attempt to escape the dangers of Nietzschean rapture in the name of finite existence is not free from such recoil. In Spurs, Jacques Derrida writes that ‘The thesis of Heidegger’s grand livre [that is, his Nietzsche] is much less simple
than people have generally tended to say.’ Krell sees this observation ‘appl[y]ing
to all of Heidegger’s texts on Nietzsche’ [126]. This remark will also be seen to
apply further to the ‘hidden Nietzsche’ within Heidegger’s texts.\(^{62}\)

We have seen in the Heidegger’s ‘Jorgensen Review’ of 1910 that Heidegger had
sensed the ‘dangers’ in Nietzsche. Heidegger’s letters to his wife and to Hannah
Arendt, which I will discuss below, suggest that the danger perceived externally
was also related to the dangers within Heidegger’s own being-in-the-world.

In *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, Jurgen Habermas perceives in the
*Nietzsche* lectures of the late 1930s and early 1940s how Heidegger ‘absorbs
Dionysian messianism’ [Habermas 1987, 131]. In Heidegger’s work of the 1920s,
that Nietzschean Dionysianism is suppressed, perhaps more correctly, comes to be
suppressed. Krell too is talking of the later ‘Nietzsche’ lectures when he writes:

‘The tempestuous encounter with Nietzsche prevents Heidegger from becoming…
a bloodless shade of Hegel’ [Krell 1986, 127]. It is Nietzsche, this soul who should
himself have sung, ‘who must fashion for the philosopher a new lyre’ [127]. It is
the suppression of Nietzsche - more properly the Dionysian - in the 1920’s that left
the ontology in denial of the ‘blood.’ In the very taming is an effective resonance, a
presence in absence.

Krell discerns the inner contention within the phenomenological lectures of the
1920s: ‘in the midst of an otherwise dry-as-dust, utterly sober phenomenological
account of Husserlian intentionality, categorical intuition, and the a priori,\(^{63}\) which
Heidegger had proffered in his 1925 lecture course ‘The Concept of Time,’ we find
the following remarkable avowal’ [128]:
Philosophical research is and remains atheism: for that reason it can afford “the arrogance of thought.” Not only will it afford such arrogance, but this is the inner necessity and proper force of philosophy, and precisely in such atheism philosophy becomes - as one of the greats once said - “the gay science.”’ [HCT 109-10]

But this ‘great’ also rendered Heidegger ‘kapputt.’ (We might suggest that, to the same extent, Husserl rendered Heidegger ‘kapputt’- although for him both were also seminal.) The influence itself is ambivalent, pointing to an inner disjunction. Krell suggests that Nietzsche ‘implants doubts and eradicates convictions, whispers Heidegger’s own second thoughts to him, illuminates and confounds at once,’ and that Heidegger ‘never shakes free of him, because Nietzsche never releases his grip on Heidegger’ [Krell 1986, 126]. And for Nietzsche - here read also ‘Dionysus.’ Heidegger never breaks free of Dionysus. Dionysus never releases its grip on Heidegger, as we shall see in the next chapter. Krell informs us that Heidegger, in his Habilitation thesis of 1915-16, revealed the influence of Nietzsche, seeing philosophy existing ‘in tension with the living personality’ of the philosopher, ‘drawing its content and value from the depths and the abundance of life in that personality’ [127]. That Nietzschean ‘tension’ of personality would be both tamed and effective in the movements within Heidegger's philosophy during the twenties, Heidegger's descensional thinking contending with suppressed Nietzschean laceration: Angst, conscience, being-toward-death - a ‘gay science.’ The Dionysian is both tamed and manifest in Being and Time, an oscillation, a disjunction between the methodological concern with access, and the eruption of the demonic in the ‘they.’
David Krell’s chapter title ‘The Raptures of Ontology and the Finitude of Time’ encapsulates the struggle between the ascensional and the descensional within Heidegger’s thinking, and also an unacknowledged Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche, which is also an Auseinandersetzung with himself: reconfigurations of ecstasy and finitude.

Oskar Becker, who began attending Heidegger’s courses in 1919, maintained that ‘Sein und Zeit is no longer the original Heidegger, but rather repeats his original breakthrough only in a scholastically hardened form’ [van Buren 1994 4]. Yet this is not without ambivalence. Krell, discussing Heidegger’s 1925 lecture course History of the Concept of Time, notes that ‘nothing at all of the analysis of ecstatic temporality appears there, not even the word Ekstase: missing are ‘the raptures of finite temporality, the raptures of ontology, which only burst through in Being and Time’ [Krell 1986 48-49]. The ecstatic language of his application of ecstases to time will oscillate with the repressions within that ‘scholastically hardened form’ which Heidegger had early dismissed as inadequate to the task of developing a ‘transition to a new [primordial] attitude of consciousness’ [TDP 3], an overdetermined reconfiguration of that which is repressed: another descensional attempt to break the connection of the metaphysical string, and Nietzschean ecstatic rapture whilst still infusing his descensional thinking with a heightened tonality.

In her essay ‘The question of being: Heidegger’s project,’ Dorothea Frede contends that there is ‘nothing “ecstatic” about the ekstasis of time’ [Guignon 1995 64]. It is true that one could speak without ecstasy of the generative interrelation of past, present and future, and of how, as Heidegger says, in his lectures on The
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, ‘Time...has some relation...to the understanding-of-being as such,’ indeed, ‘possesses our very selves in a metaphysical sense’ [MFL 199]. Frede explains that the ekstases of temporality simply mean that ‘we are already “extended” outward in temporal dimensions and so are never contained in a “punctual” here and now’ [Guignon 1995, 64]. Yet I will draw on the phenomenological methodology Heidegger sets out in his earlier lectures on the *Phenomenology of Religious Life* in which he emphasizes the ‘how’ of St. Paul’s letters to the Galatians and to the Thessalonians as proclamations. Later, in his *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger will say - in continuity with the ‘how’ of discourse as ‘enactment’ - that ‘language is the house of being’ [PRL 239]. And this discourse - ‘Transcendence and Temporality’ in *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, on the ecstases of time - is itself ecstatic, a heightening, a Steigerung, a transcendence, out of the character of Dasein itself which is ‘being-richer-than, of outstripping’ [MFL 211].

The centrality of the ecstases of time to Heidegger’s thinking is infused with a heightened tonality: temporality, the traverse in and through time, is itself a raptus, and, through the futural ecstatic rapture of ‘stepping out of itself,’ Dasein ‘approach[es] oneself in advance, from one’s own possibility’ [206]. For Heidegger ‘the unity of the ecstases is itself ecstatic’ [207].

And Dasein’s relation to each of these ecstasies - as past, present and future - is itself ecstatic, a ‘stepping out [that] itself is to some extent a raptus [rapture], calling on Dasein’s ability to ‘stretch itself’ into the ‘then,’ the ‘now,’ and the ‘future,’ a stretching in time ‘toward-oneself,’ understood out of ‘one’s own capacity-for-being,’ a ‘transcending being-toward-oneself... in the mode of for-the-
sake-of-itself.’ One comes towards oneself, in the primary futural ecstasy. Heidegger sees the being of temporalization as ‘free ecstatic momentum,’ as ‘ecstatic unitary oscillation.’ The making-present is temporalized out of ‘the ecstatic unity of future and having-been-ness’ [204-208].

In his In memoriam Max Scheler which he incorporates into these lectures on The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Heidegger understands that, for Scheler, ‘Augustine and Pascal acquired new meaning - new as answers to and against Nietzsche’ [51]. In the penultimate section of these lectures on Transcendence and Temporality he writes ‘Perhaps the true happening in the history of philosophy is always but a temporalization [Zeitigung] of such “moments” in distant intervals and strokes’ [211]. Answers for and against Nietzsche are indeed subterranean oscillations within the temporalization of Heidegger’s own questioning. Nietzsche - in his second Untimely Meditation on ‘The uses and disadvantages of history for life’ in which he deals with his own triad, monumental, antiquarian and critical history - had written: ‘That the great moments in the struggle of the human individual constitute a chain, that this chain unites mankind across the millennia like a range of mountain peaks, that the summit of such a long-ago moment shall be for me still living, bright and great…the greatness that once existed was in any event once possible and may thus be possible again’ [UM 68].

Jacques Taminiaux argues that ‘when Heidegger talked about a thesis and its proponent, he was perhaps aiming his remarks at someone else’ [Taminiaux 1991, xviii]. Here, in these lectures of 1928, his eulogy of Max Scheler speaks also of Heidegger’s continuing latent address of Nietzsche. He writes on one level of Scheler: ‘The human being is not primarily the nay-sayer (as Scheler said in one of
his last writings), but just as little is the human being a yea-sayer. The human is rather the why-questioner. But only because man is in this way, can he and must he, in each case say, not only yes or no, but essentially yes and no' [MFL 216]. But the concern with being a ‘yea-sayer’ had also been Nietzsche’s. In The Gay Science he had written: ‘some day I wish to be only a Yes-sayer’ [GS 276]. And in Twilight of the Idols it becomes a recurrent theme: saying yes to ‘all that is questionable and terrible in existence...is Dionysian,’ a ‘transformative,’ ‘triumphant Yes to life beyond death and change,’ yet is so out of an orgiastic ‘excess of energy’ [TI 39/73/108/ 109].

Heidegger was saying both ‘yes and no’ to a very Nietzschean creative destruction in which ‘denial and destruction is a condition of affirmation’ [EH 128], yet which tends to a questionable excess of expression: ‘to realise in oneself the eternal joy of becoming - the joy which also encompasses joy in destruction’ [TI 110]. This ‘essentially yes and no’ encapsulates Heidegger’s Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche, here a modulation of the Dionysian, both present and absent, both manifest and repressed. In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology - a lecture course delivered between Being and Time and The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic - Heidegger had spoken of the Dasein’s characteristic modes of ‘repressing, suppressing’ [BPP 265]. And in Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche depicts the emergence of Socratic philosophy as a ‘counter-tyrant’ mastering the excessive drives of the ‘monstrum in animo’ [TI 33]. Heidegger’s thinking too is an encounter with this monstrum in animo, the dangers of Nietzschean expression which as we shall see in his letters bore closely on Heidegger’s own life.65
I suggest that this *In memoriam Max Scheler* is on one level a projection of Heidegger himself. ‘Standing in the midst of the whole of beings, he [Scheler] had an unusual sensitivity for all the new possibilities and forces opening up...He clearly perceived the new possibilities of phenomenology’ [MFL 51, 50]. For Heidegger himself, fundamental ontology was - here in 1928 - a continual working at ‘factual possibilities,’ ‘a hunting for real possibilities,’ ‘a breaking open of horizons,’ an opening into a transformation stifled through the history of philosophy by ‘fixed ways of questioning and discussing things,’ an opening towards the ‘possibility of new originations’ [MFL 156, 158, 157]. Fundamental ontology would be a transformation of ontology [157]. And this constellatory temporality - against the common notions of objective time - would be the opening into this transformation: ‘This understanding-of-being and its essential basic modes is the disclosure that resides in the ecstatic unity of temporality, in the temporalizing breaking-open of horizons’ [217].

This yes and no of the latent address of Nietzsche impinges on Heidegger’s own expressive discourse on temporality. It is - within the transformative potential of phenomenology - also a transformation of Nietzschean rapture and ecstasy, thus a transformation of the Dionysian. It would be an immediate manifestation and a taming of ecstasy. And it would be not only Scheler’s ‘to and against Nietzsche’ but Heidegger’s as this ecstasy remains true to the earth, for the ‘ecstematic unity of the horizon of temporality is nothing other than the temporal condition for the possibility of world and of world’s essential belonging to *transcendence*’ [208]. And ‘to transcend is to be-in-the-world’ [212] for ‘beings are, in the first instance and at length, concealed [not *in-the-world*]...Beings must first of all be torn from
concealment’ [217]. And it is ‘temporalizing temporality [which] provides the occasion for world-entry,’ which effects transcendence into the world’ [217] - against the spiritual transcendence out of and against the world. Heidegger’s reference to ancient philosophy, which provides ‘early [manifestation]’ of that which fundamental ontology will repeat, is to Heraclitus, the philosopher of flux [155 & 123]: the being in itself and its essence loves to conceal itself and remain in concealment. And indeed transcendental temporality is, in its experiential constellation, oscillatory:

‘For transcendence has its possibility in the unity of ecstatic momentum. This oscillation of the self-temporalizing ecstases is, as such, the upswing, regarded as [swinging] toward all possible beings that can factically enter there into a world. The ecstematic temporalizes itself, oscillating as a worlding [Welten]. World entry happens only insofar as something like ecstatic oscillation temporalizes itself as a particular temporality’ [MFL 208-209].

Through the temporalizations of temporality, fundamental ontology is taken to the cipher of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality. Phenomenologically, the Apollonian-Dionysian duality emerges as a transformed ‘possibility’ of fundamental ontology. And Heidegger’s text is oscillatory: he does not end with transcendent temporality. As if with that Nietzschean ‘Or?’ [D 229] - a question mark against transcendence, a reminder of the finitude of Dasein, his remaining true to the earth, a descensional qualification of the ascensional - Heidegger concludes these lectures not with truth disclosive transcendental temporality [MFL 217] but with the labyrinthine pursuit
of ‘ground’: ‘all basic ground statements are grounded in the statement of ground’ [219].

In the 1920s, in pursuit of a descensional thinking of a finitude that remains true to the earth, Heidegger will build a dwelling for his thinking out of fugue-masking fusion of the scholastic and the ecstatic. It is a mode of Apollonian-Dionysian oscillation. It is also a self-showing. The transformation is both Heidegger's revelation and the revelation of Heidegger. He says, in these 1928 lectures: ‘The important thing is that...in philosophizing we always transform each and every thing in ourselves and to ourselves’ [221].

But this very possibility of illumination is not free from recoil. ‘Since philosophizing is essentially an affair of finitude, every concretion of factical philosophy must in its turn fall victim to this facticity’ [156]. And indeed this section - Transcendence and temporality - is not only an illumination and a heightening. It speaks of Heidegger's own temporalization, his own thrust toward unconcealment through an eruption into the world out of his own temporal ecstatic oscillation into ‘World entry’ [209]. Transcendence itself is subject to oscillation: transcendence is a surpassing in the poetic tonality of its illumination - the understanding-of-being itself a transcendence [217] - yet, in a remaining true to the earth, transcendence becomes the characteristic of all 'ontic comportment to beings' [MFL 196].

iv. The epoché-evasion of 'life'

Through his book Daimon Life, David Krell ‘wants to initiate a new kind of discussion concerning Heidegger’s political debacle, a discussion that takes the
daimonic as its point of departure’ [Krell 1992, xii]. I extrapolate, from the idea that the political can be approached through the daimonic, the idea that there is a substructure below the movements of factual life, beneath political inclination, beneath overt inclination as such. Krell’s thesis is that ‘however much Heidegger inveighs against life-philosophy his own fundamental ontology and poetics of being thrust him back onto Lebensphilosophie again and again; and, finally, that the most powerfully ‘gathering’ figure of his thinking during the years 1928-1944 is that of the daimon- daimon life’[xi].

The corollary to Heidegger ‘returning’ to daimon life is that this gathering is ‘most powerfully’ out of Heidegger’s exclusions of daimon life. In this present study, itself an attempt to pursue this new focus on a substructural dimension to Heidegger’s political imbroglio, I consider Elzbietta Ettinger’s suggestion that there was a relation between Heidegger’s political and emotional lives. I configure Krell’s idea of life as daimonic in terms of the demonic, the Dionysian within human existence. In a section of Daimon Life entitled ‘Some body is alive,’ Krell addresses Hans Castorp’s repeated question during his researches in Thomas Mann’s Magic Mountain: ‘What was life?’ In the process of Castorp’s study, life itself is seen as the attempt to give form to its own Dionysian genesis [MM2, 270-281].

Krell asks the question which follows from Heidegger’s seeing the Apollonian-Dionysian duality as a cipher for understanding: ‘What if the unified realm of essence...the field of phusis were daimon life rather than what Heidegger prefers to call Ek-sistenz or Dasein? What if the clearing and granting of being had to do with neither “man” nor “Dasein” but with all the life that lives and dies on Earth?’ [Krell 1992, 17] We may continue by asking: what if the field of phusis were to be
revealed not in the structures of Heidegger's fundamental ontology, but in the substructural Apollonian-Dionysian strife, the very cipher Heidegger himself would proffer for the understanding of the German people in 1937? The ‘actuality’ of the repressed ‘actual’ fundamental ontology of *Being and Time* offers its own possibilities of self-transformation in the analytic of human Dasein. The Apollonian-Dionysian duality would indeed be a cipher which, in the words of Karl Jaspers, illuminate the ‘root of things...open[ing] areas of Being’ [Jaspers 1967, 92], for this ‘cipher’ was indeed a manifestation of that very ground.

Krelllocates Heidegger’s exclusions in the very prioritisations of Heidegger in *Being and Time*: the ontic and ontological priority of the [human] being that is *Dasein* over all other beings that are not Dasein, indeed, an ‘abyss of separation’ [Krell 1992, 5]. I suggest also a focus on Heidegger's exclusions - and reconfigurations - in the methodological suppressions, evasions and tranquilizations in that ontologisation.

Heidegger’s own lectures of 1921-22 on *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* project the tendency of his own ‘magnum opus’ *Being and Time*, written at a time when Heidegger was - overtly - principally concerned with Kant: in Krell’s formulation ’What gets lost is life itself...In hyperbolic pursuit of significance, life avoids itself, evades itself, allows itself to get side-tracked....As a result of repression, life gains an illusory self-assurance. In a kind of evasion life preoccupies itself with itself in order to forget itself’ [45]. Even more suggestively, Krell continues his analysis of these lectures: ‘Life...craving security... is inclined to flee, to make things easy for itself...it tempts itself, it falls, and invariably rescues itself for yet another temptation’ [46]. Krell wonders whether the section 'What Do
Ascetic Ideals Signify?” in Nietzsche’s *Genealogy of Morals* can explain the ‘masquerade and ruinous self-deception’ in Heidegger’s texts, the ‘recoil’ in the analysis of factual life, for ‘genealogy is always genealogy of the genealogist’ [46]. And he asks too whether, ‘when [Heidegger] invokes the masquerade of pretending to “make life hard” for oneself while fleeing constantly to one’s own *securitas* - whether it be security in sanctity or security in a priori phenomenological science - is [Heidegger] really thinking of himself and his own project?’ [46] Heidegger’s fundamental ontology at the same time as it opens the path to a phenomenological breakthrough into the seeing of being-in-the-world provides an evasion of that very being-in-the-world. And the phenomenological breakthrough allows us to see the evasion of that which is concealed. Heidegger’s concern with the *hidden* and the *concealed* is, if not an actual ‘return of the repressed,’ indicative of the ulterior side of Heidegger’s project. In his essay *Heidegger and the hermeneutic turn*, David Couzens Hoy writes: ‘Dasein’s understanding of its world…is at the same time an interpretation of itself. This self-interpretation thus does not discover facts about the properties of a mental substance or a noumenal self, but discloses how Dasein has dealt with the question or “issue” of its own existence’ [Guignon 1995, 177].

But this dealing with one’s existence is a constant dealing such that it is never finally dealt with. Hoy recalls Heidegger’s allusion to Nietzsche in *Being and Time* - ‘Become what you are’ - but notes Heidegger’s assertion that not only can Dasein become what it is, it can also fail to become what it is [Guignon 178: BT2 140, 141]. Nietzsche had indeed said both ‘become what you are’ *and* ‘we are unknown to ourselves’ [EH & GM]. We both know and do not know ourselves. Our becoming
what we are is guided beforehand by some primordial knowingness which is not ‘known.’ One becomes what one really primordially knows what one is disclosed through choices, gravitations, a functioning Apollonian-Dionysian duality.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger writes:

‘If, when one is engaged in a particular concrete kind of interpretation, in the sense of exact textual interpretation, one likes to appeal to what ‘stands there,’ then one finds that what ‘stands there’ in the first instance is nothing other than the obvious (*selbstverstandliche*), undiscussed assumption (*Vormeinung*) of the interpreter, which necessarily lies in every interpretive approach as that which has already been ‘taken for granted’ in interpretation as such, that is, as that which is pre-given through the fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception.’ [BT1, 192]

In *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche had written in a section ‘On The Prejudices Of Philosophers’:

‘philosophers...all pose as if they had discovered and reached their real opinions through the self-development of a cold, pure, divinely unconcerned dialectic (as opposed to the mystics of every rank, who are more honest and doltish - and talk of ‘inspiration’); while at bottom it is an assumption, a hunch, indeed a kind of ‘inspiration’ - most often a desire of the heart that has been filtered and made abstract - that they defend with reasons they had sought after the fact. They are all advocates who resent the name...’ [BGE 5]
Heidegger makes ‘serious’ this ‘hunch’ as primordial understanding, yet, in the words of Hoy, Heidegger’s ‘account of understanding as projection suggests that explicit interpretations always arise from implicit needs’ [Guignon 1995, 190]. At the same time, Heidegger’s phenomenological hermeneutics enables the reader to uncover the implicit, ulterior needs, the presuppositions and prejudices of the philosopher. Turning Heidegger’s criticisms of, amongst others, Kant and Nietzsche, back on Heidegger himself, Krell suggests, that Heidegger intentionally ‘prevents [his own] discoveries from coming home’ [Krell 1992, 46].

Addressing Derrida’s Question of Spirit, Krell sees Being and Time as a book ‘Haunted not by spirit but by a daimon. Daimon life’ [63]. ‘Pure’ phenomenological seeing is haunted by life as demonic. It is haunted also by the demonic in life. I parallel Krell’s view of the taming of ‘wild being’ in Being and Time with the view of Heidegger’s Apollonian taming of the Dionysian within his text [68]. For Krell, it should be living ‘life’ and not Dasein which should be the ‘ground of ontological analysis’ [71-72]. This study suggests the possibility of Heidegger’s notion of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality as a cipher for understanding be taken as a grounding for a fundamental ontology.

Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is enmeshed in the suppression of that which is excised. But the daimon will not be ‘at rest’: in Heidegger’s phenomenology the daimonic tonality of the tragic - conscience, death, anxiety - oscillates with, in the words of Krell, a ‘bloodless... privation’ [80], having no interest in Thomas Mann’s question ‘What was life?’ Krell observes: ‘It is as though Dasein in its elevation beyond mere life had lost its life forever in order to make the distinction between it and other forms of life sharper’ [87]. It is also as though Dasein were evading its
own life. The phenomenological reduction, the artistic taming of the horrible, the repression of the demonic possibility of life had taken life out of the analysis of human Existenz, a defence against the Bacchic. Yet, in a return of the repressed, Heidegger parallels Thomas Mann’s transformative attitude to death against the dangers of being lost to life in the *Magic Mountain* with an existential-ontological analysis of ‘being-toward-death’ as the affirmation of ‘life’.

But to end this section on this note would be to evade the collisions and interfusions between the explicit and the implicit, between the strength and weakness of Dasein for whom his existence is a constant issue. Krell asks: for *das Man* ‘are not the “proper” and the “inappropriate”...inextricably intermixed?’ [44]

In the epilogue to *The Case of Wagner*, Nietzsche acknowledges that ‘Biologically, modern man represents a contradiction of values...he says Yes and No in the same breath...[A]ll of us have, unconsciously, involuntarily in our bodies values, words, formulas, moralities of opposite descent...’ [CW 648]. The ambivalence is indeed profound: in notes made in the Winter of 1887-1888, Nietzsche wrote: ‘mankind is not a whole: it is an inextricable multiplicity of ascending and descending life-processes’ [WP 184] to which man is constantly subject.
CHAPTER 3

HEIDEGGER’S LETTERS

‘Philosophy – an ultimate pronouncement and interlocution on the part of man that constantly permeates him in his entirety. [FCM 5]

‘What is lost inwardly must be won outwardly.’

i. Introduction - A Contextualisation: The body, sexuality and repression.

ii. Letters to his wife, Elfride

iii. Letters to Hannah Arendt

iv. Strife & Transformation
I am pursuing the Apollonian-Dionysian duality as it manifests itself in Heidegger’s thinking, a questioning after the shadows of the ‘the spiritual evolution’ of the thinker. But the ‘Heidegger Case’ - in opening up the possibilities of political contingency - opens itself to the possibilities of contingency itself. In this chapter I situate a presentation of the ‘other Heidegger’ revealed in his letters within questions of the body, sexuality, repression and oscillation.

At the beginning of this study I make the claim that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology resonates with both the call for a rigorous purity of method in establishing fundamental structures of existence and - at the same time - is an Apollonian attempt to control or suppress Dionysian existence, including his own. The possibility that Heidegger’s thinking may be overdetermined is particularly highlighted in what has been seen as Heidegger’s ‘neglect of the body’ and sexuality in his fundamental ontology. Kevin Aho summarizes this criticism of Heidegger: 'In Being and Time there is little acknowledgement of the “lived-body” (Leib) that prereflectively negotiates its way through the world’ [Aho2]. Sartre, in the words of Medard Boss, ‘wondered why [Heidegger] only wrote six lines on the body in the whole of Being and Time’ [ZS 231], and Michel Haar questioned whether ‘one [can] phenomenologically and ontologically justify’ the minimal reference to the body in an ‘existential analytic’ [The Song of the Earth, 34. Aho 151].

For Heidegger, writes Aho, 'Sartre’s conception of the body is still caught within Cartesian/Newtonian tradition, regarding the body as an objective material thing
with measurable properties...Heidegger wants to make it clear that the body, understood phenomenologically, is not a bounded corporeal thing that is "present-at-hand" (vorhanden); rather, it is already stretching beyond its own skin, actively directed toward and interwoven with the world. Heidegger [in the Zollikon Seminars] refers to the intentionality of our bodily nature as the "'bodying forth' (leiben) of the body" [Aho 37/ZS 86].

Heidegger follows Husserl's phenomenological exclusions: psychologism, biologism and anthropologism, which is also an exclusion of Nietzsche's thinking on the body, justified ontologically, as Aho explains, because, in Being and Time, 'the "body," "life," and "consciousness,"...[are] rendered intelligible only on the basis of Dasein'[Aho 4: BT 143, 75, 151].

In his paper ‘Heidegger and dasein's 'bodily nature': What is the hidden problematic?’ David Cerbone argues that since Heidegger is doing a transcendental investigation of our being he is right to avoid using it within this context, for embodiment is too contingent to be a part of Dasein's essence, part of the existential analytic. 2 Indeed, in his 1928-29 lectures Introduction to Philosophy Heidegger says that 'sexual relation is only possible because Dasein is already determined in its metaphysical neutrality through the with-one-another. If each Dasein, which is factically in each case male or female, were not essentially with-one-another, then the sexual relation as something human would be absolutely impossible' [Schalow 2006, 40]. Heidegger acknowledges that 'the results of the [existential] analysis show the peculiar formality and emptiness of any ontological determination' [Being and Time 292].
In *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* of 1929 Heidegger posited a metontology, a ‘metaphysical ontics,’ a ‘metontological-existentiell questioning’...where ontology expressly runs back into the metaphysical ontic’ [MFL 157] which would take up those areas neglected in the ‘first level’ of the metaphysics of Dasein [KPM 162-3 in Aho 49-50], to Frank Schalow enabling the pursuit of ‘a deeper level of ontological inquiry’ concerned with ‘the individuality of the self...And it is in the emphasis on individuation...that sexuality can be addressed within this wider topography of questioning’[Schalow 41].

Indeed, the opening up of the possibilities of metontology is accompanied by an opening up of expression. Schalow writes:

‘While Heidegger may not construe sexuality as “essential,” the openness distinguishing the authentic self takes on a connotation that is associated with the rapture of the sexual act, namely “ecstasy”...When reinscribed in terms of the idiom[s] of embodiment, finite transcendence reemerges as an erotic striving to reset the boundaries of the possible, to transgress the limits of what is acceptable and forbidden...In his lectures on Plato in the early 1930s, Heidegger explicitly identifies eros as an ecstatic movement into the openness of possibilities, as embodying the trajectory of transcendence as a surpassing outward and beyond’ [Schalow 46/59/61: see GA 34, 147-55].

For Schalow, *philosophy is inherently erotic, if by that we understand the quest to test limits whose enactment spawns a wider expanse of possibilities.* Indeed, ‘as Plato realized, and Heidegger reaffirms, the self-questioning of philosophy is as
much a form of eros as it is sexual love, to the extent that both originate within the open and accent the play of possibility as such’ [Schalow 61].

It is in *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* that Heidegger inserts a marginal note: ‘It remains for us to consider being and the daimonic; or perhaps understanding-of-being and the daimonic” [MFL 211]. David Krell makes the observation that the *daimonion* is introduced ‘at the place where [Heidegger] is discussing finite transcendence and the overpowering, *das Ubermachtige*, which is his initial way of designating divinity and the holy...In the end, Heidegger spurns daimon life, which is the only thing that ever captivated him’ [Krell 1992, 26].

Heidegger had not yet considered the daimonic in his philosophical texts, though as we shall see in his letters, he was captivated by the ‘demonic.’ The incorporation of the body into his ontology remained both a ‘problematic’ and problematic for Heidegger. Inspite of the necessity of the ontological ground for the manifestation of the ontic, he was, in the words of Aho, ‘genuinely troubled by his own inability to address the body problem.’ As late as his Heraclitus seminars of 1966-67, Heidegger acknowledged that ‘the bodily [*das Leibliche*] is the most difficult [problem to understand] and I was unable to say more at the time’ of *Being and Time* in which he comments, in section 23 on *The Spatiality of Being-in-the-World*: “This ‘bodily nature’ hides a whole problematic of its own, though we shall not treat it here’[ ZS 231/Aho 4; BT 1: 143].

In his book, ‘Heidegger’s Neglect of the Body,’ Aho seeks ‘to address the question of why Heidegger may have bypassed an analysis of the body in the first place and where such an analysis might fit within the overall context of the project’ [3]. The overt ontological reason - the establishment of an ontological ground - has been set
out. But Schalow's question - 'Could Heidegger...be the phenomenologist of sex par excellence?' [Schalow 40] - suggests possibilities not only of phenomenological promise and ontological ground but of an ontical repression which bears on that ontological grounding. In *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* Heidegger says: 'Dasein harbours the intrinsic possibility for being factically dispersed into bodiliness and thus into sexuality' [MFL 137]. And indeed his letters, written in a mode of language more Nietzschean than Heideggerian, reveal a life of the body.

The ambiguous nature of Heidegger's thinking - its phenomenological possibilities and its marginalisations - arising out of an overdetermined intent is perceived by Carol Bigwood who writes: '[By] denying Eros, Heidegger remains bound to the body-denying, animal-denying, and elemental-denying tradition of Western metaphysics, despite his groundbreaking efforts to release ontological thinking from the tradition.'

The idea that Heidegger 'denies' and that his thinking is overdetermined - both the logic of fundamental grounding and evasion of the ontic - is itself grounded on ideas of repression and suppression, the notion of which was not unfamiliar to Heidegger, who indeed saw its action in others. Thomas Sheehan informs us: 'In the middle of June [1919] in one of the Saturday morning discussions that Husserl used to hold at his Freiburg home with his close associates, Heidegger told Husserl publicly that the much vaunted pure ego of Husserlian phenomenology was 'derived' from the historical ego by the 'repression' of historicity and concretion, and that the pure ego was limited to the role of being the 'subject' only of 'theoretical acts' [Guignon 1995, 80]. And, in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger spoke of Dasein's characteristic modes of 'repressing,
suppressing’ [BPP 265]. Perhaps before his own repressions, Heidegger’s ‘original’ intention in - the aspiration of - his 1919 lectures Toward the Definition of Philosophy had been the overthrow of bloodless schematic philosophy. Sheehan writes: ‘For Heidegger the theoretical orientation of the pure ego of Husserlian phenomenology sucks the blood out of the richly textured Umwelt, the firsthand world of lived experience [Erleben] in which one primarily exists and carries out practical tasks’ [Guignon 1995, 78]. The terminology and the tonality of the War Semester Lectures of 1919 carry the effect of a new beginning for phenomenology, an eruptive event like the opening of Mahler's Third Symphony: es weltet- ‘it worlds,’ and Ereignis - an ‘event of appropriation’ [TDP 61-63], which John van Buren sees carrying strong overtones of the mysterium tremendum in the mystical tradition [van Buren 1994, 121]. In 1911, in his ‘Contributions to Der Akademiker,’ Heidegger had written of ‘the mystical element that from time to time breaks forth…a breakthrough to the true actuality and the actual truth’ [van Buren 1994, 113]. Writing to his wife-to-be Elfride in March 1916 Heidegger's states that ‘The Kantian question... fails to capture the problem [of living philosophy]; this is much richer & deeper’ [LW 17]. In the following year he still felt that Life’s wholeness in its ‘uniqueness’ is not attained through ‘static[...schemata...]’ but ‘must have an inner relation to the history of spirit and soul’ [31]. Not only Kant's schematism but ‘Husserl’s phenomenology...in its approach and accordingly in its goal...is too narrow and bloodless’ [32]. Yet, in the words of Frank Schalow, in his essay ‘The Kantian Schema of Heidegger’s Late Marburg Period,’ Heidegger, in 1925-26, ‘began... to recognize the
significance of retrieving Kant’s doctrine of schematism’ [Kisiel and van Buren 1994, 309]. Now, in his *Phenomenological Interpretations of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason* of the winter semester 1927-8, Heidegger said: ‘When I began to study Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* a few years ago and read it...against the background of Husserl’s phenomenology, it was as if the blinders fell from my eyes, and Kant became for me the correctness of the way for which I was searching’ [Kisiel and van Buren, 309]. Having previously considered schematism a de-vivifying repression, he now, around the period of *Being and Time*, endorsed that repression, [which he would later, reject.] For Schalow:

‘What remains somewhat of a mystery, however, is...how does the earlier concern for being, world, and truth get refracted through the lens of Kantian thought and thereby recast in light of the adjacent problem of temporality?’ [309]

Schalow raises the question of the motivation behind Heidegger’s change of position: ‘Just as in *Being and Time* Heidegger criticized Kant for dogmatically taking over Descartes’ position, so there remains a sense in which Heidegger in the late 1920s overzealously attempts to reconcile his hermeneutic phenomenology with the transcendental character of Kant’s approach’ [322]. I suggest that, viewed in relation to the ‘other’ Heidegger disclosed in his letters, this retrieval is determined by the oscillations, the fugues of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality.

Between 1910 and 1914 - and in line with the mode of writing in which he wrote his letters to his wife and Hannah Arendt, and continued to write poetry - Heidegger published five poems in the Romantic genre that were titled ‘Dying Splendour,’ ‘Hours on the Mount of Olives,’ ‘We Will Wait,’ ‘On Still Paths,’ and
‘Consolation’ expressing, in the words of van Buren, ‘his existential restlessness and depression’ and ‘his religious sense of the mysterium tremendum...evident in the 1916 poem ‘Nightfall on Reichenau’ [62]. Van Buren sees that Heidegger’s ‘phenomenological suspension (Ausschalten) of the flux of spatiotemporal reality was also a suppression of his own philosophical impulses’ [88]. And perhaps more than philosophical. Van Buren explains: ‘Ausschalten ordinarily means “turning off” something’ [88]. In his 1916 conclusion to his dissertation on ‘The Theory of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus,’ Heidegger writes in the face of ‘the impression of a certain deathly emptiness...[of] the systems of categories [that] it is now the appropriate place to allow the hitherto suppressed spiritual restlessness a chance to speak’ [S 62]. Again, in his early thinking on the problem of categories, Heidegger writes: ‘An ultimate clarification of [the question of being] will not be gained by staying put within the logical sphere of sense and its structure. Logic and its problems are not at all able to be seen in a true light if the context out of which they are interpretively read does not become a translogical one’ [89]. Philosophy must ‘draw[] its content...out of the depths and fullness of personality’ [94]. The Apollonian intent of phenomenological reduction will be haunted by the mysterium tremendum of Dionysus, the overcoming of which involved not only its repression but also a reconfiguration of its raptures. Heidegger’s own methodological concern in Being and Time would itself demand its own break-out, its own breakthrough to the true actuality and the actual truth, which was also a ‘break-out’ of the suppressed, tranquillized Dionysian.

In 1916, Heidegger remarked to Heinrich Ochsner: ‘The immanent structure of philosophy is a back-and-forth between sense and being. In this duality lies the...
tragedy of the philosopher’ [121]. The oscillation describes for van Buren the shifts from Heidegger's Ekhartian pronouncements in 1919 through the Kantian *Being and Time* to the post-1930 transformations ‘made possible by a return to and creative reinscription of his youthful thought’ [136-7].

In his 1962 ‘Letter to Father Richardson’ Heidegger acknowledged that the ‘draft’ that was *Being and Time* itself ‘carried with it inadequate readings of my own intention’ [Heidegger in van Buren 1994 366]. And, in the margin of his Kant-book, Heidegger wrote: ‘Relapsed totally into the standpoint of transcendental questioning’ [366]. Van Buren, as does Krell, sees the 1928 lectures on the *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* as indicative of a return to the terminology of his earlier lectures:

[Heidegger] ‘no longer used the Kantian term “schema,” but in fact set about reinscribing the notion of “temporality” back into the very quasi-mystical terminology of [the 1919] lectures on *The Idea and the Problem of Woldviews*, and thereby freeing the suppressed subtext of *[Being and Time]*. He explained that the “ecstatic” temporalizing of transcience is a “primal source,” an originary nothing, an “abyss,” a “concealment,” a “not-yet of factical dissemination,” out of which factical worlds “spring forth.”’ [367]

Heidegger writes: ‘The ecstatic temporalizes itself, oscillating and resonating, as a worlding...Time...is essentially a self-opening and expanding into a world’ [367]. But in this ‘return,’ Heidegger is already quoting Heraclitus’s fragment that ‘*physis* loves to hide,’ in order, in the words of Van Buren, ‘to get at the “concealment” of the primal source out of which worlding happens’ [368]. Perhaps there was also a
more personalist concealment and awareness of concealment, existential repression aligned to philosophical suspension. In the 1928 Logic lectures Heidegger’s ‘way’ is thus revealed: ‘philosophizing...transforms everything in us...an oscillating and resonating in the upswing’ [369].

Heidegger’s thought-way is full of turnings, oscillations. During the summer semester of 1929 he writes to Karl Jaspers: ‘I am lecturing for the first time on Fichte, Hegel, Schelling - and a world is dawning for me again’ [371]. In September, 1929, he writes to Elizabeth Blochmann: ‘In the matins [at Beuron monastery] there is still the primal mythical and metaphysical force of the night, which we must constantly break through in order to exist truthfully. For the good is only the good of evil’ [372]. Heidegger continues, emphasizing the need to develop ‘daily readiness for [the Night],’ since ‘[the essential] flourishes only when we completely, i.e., in the face of night and evil, live according to our hearts. This primally powerful negative is decisive’ [372]. In his essay On the Essence of Human Freedom, Schelling had written: ‘All birth is out of darkness into light,’ and thus ‘the good must be brought out of darkness’ [372-3]. Or the darkness suppressed? In the 1929-30 lectures on The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Individuation, Heidegger writes: ‘The mystery is lacking in our Dasein, and thereby the inner terror that every mystery carries with it and that gives Dasein its greatness remains absent’ [FCM 163-4]. But the metabole from transcendental reduction to the realisation in the 1930s of his Nietzschean Dionysianism, the breaking of the shackles of epoché, looses its own demons.

Heidegger’s texts do lead a ‘double life;’ they are not ‘pure’ but ‘impregnated’ with exclusions [McGrath 2008, ix]. They are also infused, on perhaps a more primordial
level, with an impurity suppressed, a phenomenological taming of the Dionysian, a taming that is never entirely successful, breaking out especially in the analysis of the demonic ‘theyness’ of ‘das man’ in *Being and Time*. Sean McGrath sees Heidegger’s ‘phenomenological ontology’ as ‘the most vital philosophical development of the early twentieth century, an upsurge of philosophical eros in an era of bland positivism and dreary, inhuman reductionism’ [McGrath 2008, 1]. Indeed, Heidegger’s own intention fitted this idea of upsurge. And for one who apparently dismissed the biographical, (though, as Van Buren reveals, Heidegger’s work is full of autobiographical statement) [van Buren 1994, 3-27], Heidegger seems to have cultivated a persona. Karl Löwith writes: ‘We gave Heidegger the nickname “the little magician from Messkirch”…He was a small dark man who knew how to cast a spell insofar as he could make disappear what he had a moment before presented. His lecture technique consisted in building up an edifice of ideas which he then proceeded to tear down, presenting the spellbound listeners with a riddle and then leaving them empty-handed. This ability to cast a spell at times had very considerable consequences: it attracted more or less pathological personality types, and, after three years of guessing at riddles, one student took her own life’ [Wolin 2003, 34-35].

The promised upsurge out of ‘eros’ of the historical zeitgeist stops before the threatening raptures and ruptures. Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology becomes, like music, in the words of Theodor Adorno: ‘at once the immediate manifestation of impulse and the locus of its taming’ [Adorno 1991, 26], a taming both of personal factual existence, and the Dionysian-erotic Zeitgeist.
In *Being and Time*, Heidegger speaks of Dasein as being-in-the-untrue: ‘Because it essentially falls prey to the world, Dasein is in ‘untruth’ in accordance with its constitution of being’ [BT2, 213]. McGrath sees here the resonance of the ‘Christian mystical ideal [which] envisions an intensely realized subjectivity, an abyssal inner life fraught with hidden struggles and gnawing doubts - dramatized as “temptations of the devil”...[and which] with eyes set on eternity and feet firmly planted on the earth...fears nothing more than [one’s] own capacity for self-deception’ [McGrath 2008, 87]. And he reminds us that ‘Freud tells us that we repress things that threaten the ego’ [65], believing that Heidegger’s work calls out for a ‘hermeneutics of suspicion,‘ particularly in view of Freud’s ‘exposure of the libidinous id operating behind our most civilised pursuits...the hidden motives holding his illusion together’ [4], indeed, the very hermeneutics of dis-concealment, uncovering which Heidegger himself could be seen as promising.

Heidegger’s own history of philosophy through its destructions and deconstructions aims to uncover the concealed in the thinkers of the Western tradition, disclosing what these thinkers had not been able to articulate. The surpassing of ‘literal’ interpretation offered an *Auseinandersetzung* with his own texts, disclosing his own concealments. The Christian mystical ideal would be both suppressed and effective.

In his postdoctoral dissertation on ‘The Theory of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus,’ Heidegger writes that Scotus’s *haecceitus* – the whatness, the essence of a thing - shows a keen sensitivity ‘to real life, to its manifoldness and possible tensions’ [McGrath 2008, 15]. Heidegger focuses on those dimensions of experience that elude the theoretical attitude [32]. And yet he too would be
haunted by the concern with ‘error of method’. He would be ‘[p]erplexed by Husserl’s failure to remain true to “the things themselves” ’ [32-33] - as he may have been perplexed by Nietzsche’s failure out of Dionysian excess to remain true to the earth. But if Nietzsche had not remained sufficiently true to the earth through Dionysian excess, that very excess - through a Dionysian seeing - proved an openness to life’s ‘rich ambiguity,’ to a seeing unavailable to the traditional ‘philosophical gaze’ which echoed, in McGrath’s words, the tendency of facticity ‘to avoid or lose itself: something difficult, burdensome, and strenuous about existence thrusts us into a repressive flight from our being-in-the-world’ [33]. Heidegger’s own ‘upsurge’ against Husserlian ‘apodicticity’ towards a phenomenology of ‘real life, [with] its manifoldness and possible tensions’ [15] fugue in Being and Time with his concern for method and ‘access’ in an approach ‘toward a neo-Kantian style of transcendental methodology’ [36].

In Heidegger’s descensional emphasis on human finitude something is lost along the ‘way’- and something in Heidegger was lost. The organic world is excluded - as is Heidegger’s own living, his own ‘facticity’ - at the time leading into the composition of Being and Time, the very time he reads, with Hannah Arendt, The Magic Mountain, Thomas Mann’s own ‘Todtnauberg’ (‘mountain of death), and magnum opus on time and death, in which the questions are asked: at what point does the inorganic becomes organic, become life; and whether a life can be lived that is ‘lost to life’ [MM1, 198]. Dasein may be said to be lost to life. Krell writes: ‘in Heidegger’s Being and Time “life” proves to be both essential to existential analysis and utterly elusive for it, quite beyond its grasp...[it] remains outside it..what [fundamental ontology] is unable to determine is whether such a being [as
Dasein] is ever properly alive, or what such “life” might mean’ [Krell 1992, 34]. Life as the ‘living’ of Dasein is both sought and evaded, both evaded and sought in fundamental ontology. Being alive is validated through an authentic being-toward-death.

Krell asks: ‘Is fundamental ontology a system, and is it written in order to suppress a disturbing premonition about life?’ That it is daimon life. [41/42] Heidegger reads - with Hannah Arendt - of the bacchic ‘blood sacrifice’ behind human existence in The Magic Mountain. His letters to both Arendt and to his wife will speak of Dionysian experience; they will reveal that it was more than a premonition about life, but that the disturbances were very much in Heidegger’s factic existence, his life. His life is ‘artistically,’ that is ‘phenomenologically,’ sublated in an Apollonian taming of the Dionysian.

Heidegger opens Being and Time with a quotation from Plato’s Sophist, a choice which can be read on several levels, a ‘purely’ metaphysical question, a ‘confrontation’ with Husserl, both a manifestation and an evasion of the Dionysian:

‘For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression ‘being’. We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed.’

In his preface to the second edition of his book Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism, Karl Löwith also selects a quote from the Sophist but with a very different emphasis:

Stranger: ‘Let us then examine one who seems to imitate the truth as we examine a piece of iron, when we see if it is a seamless whole or if instead it has a flaw in it’ [Löwith 1995, 31].
Löwith will be ‘perplexed’ by the ‘flaws’ in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. In a letter of 1925 Heidegger writes to Hannah Arendt: ‘The demonic struck me. The silent prayer of your beloved hands and your shining brow enveloped it in womanly transfiguration. Nothing like it has happened to me’ [HA, 6]. A year after the publication of Being and Time, Hannah Arendt wrote her thesis on Love and Saint Augustine in which she aims to develop a dimension of ‘world’ that Heidegger has neglected in his magnum opus: ‘the world conceived as the lovers of the world [view it]’ [Wolin 2003, 42]. Heidegger’s letters reveal that the exclusion is also of Heidegger himself.

Heidegger’s existential-phenomenological, transcendental reduction perpetuates the motivation of Husserl: ‘purification,’ an attempt, as Jean Grondin characterizes it, to ‘decontaminate’ the world [Kisiel and van Buren 1994, 335], an Apollonian overcoming of the Dionysian. It is also a decontamination of Heidegger’s world. Heidegger’s fundamental ontology was a ‘purely’ phenomenological search for disclosure and the revelation of truth - aletheia - in contention with an ‘impure’ contingency. In December 1919 Heidegger’s son Hermann - conceived of another father - was born. I suggest that, like Pentheus in Euripides’ Bacchae, Heidegger would pay the price for this human-all-too-human evasion, this ‘purification’ of existence.

Jacques Taminiaux in his Heidegger and the project of fundamental ontology is guided by a quote from Heidegger’s own 1924 Sophist lectures:

‘It is in any case a dubious thing to rely on what an author himself has brought to the forefront. The important thing is rather to give attention to those things he left shrouded in silence.’
These lectures of the winter semester of 1924-5, through the very first seeing of Hannah Arendt in his audience, were the site of a Dionysian arousal (Heidegger’s own word is ‘demonic’) which in his official writings and lectures was ‘shrouded in silence’ in a ‘phenomenological’ reduction. In a later letter to her on May 4th 1950, Heidegger would write, in reference to a photograph Hannah Arendt had recently sent him: ‘your loving picture looks straight into my heart. You do not realize that it is the Same gaze that leaped toward me on the lectern - oh it was and is and will remain eternity, from afar into intimacy’ [HA 78 & 222].

Between these two dates - 1924 and 1950 - Heidegger's letters to both his wife and Hannah Arendt stand as an opening into some of those things left shrouded in silence, and manifestation of that Apollonian ‘struggle against the Titanic-barbarian essence of the Dionysian’ [TBT 33].

Jacques Derrida opens his essay *Geschlecht: sexual difference, ontological difference* thus:

‘Of sex, one can readily remark, yes, Heidegger speaks as little as possible, perhaps he has never spoken of it. Perhaps he has never said anything by that name or the names under which we recognize it, of the “sexual relation,” “sexual-difference,” or indeed of “man and woman.”’ [Derrida 1983, 65]

Later, he writes, Heidegger has ‘silenced sex.’ And yet...Derrida comments on Heidegger’s recurring ‘And yet’s’. I will pose - out of an and-yet – a variant on the question with which Nietzsche opens *Beyond Good and Evil*: ‘Supposing truth is a woman- what then?’ [BGE 2] Supposing the power of the erotic is related to the
‘ways’ of Heidegger’s thinking. Perhaps not a supposing: Heidegger acknowledges as much in his letters.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger characterizes Dasein as that being which ‘in its being ... is concerned about its very being’ [BT2 11] and, earlier, in his lectures on the *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, as that ‘concerned’, ‘distressed’ ‘object within history’ [PRL 36]. His letters to his wife Elfride and to Hannah Arendt indeed reveal a ‘concerned’, ‘distressed’ ‘object’ concerned ‘in its being...about its very being.’ And yet not concerned as he attempts to gather together his antinomial existence around the figure of Eros. Heidegger’s own letters reveal Eros as a figure in the truths and untruths of his philosophical texts and lectures.

In his 1920 ‘Comments on Karl Jaspers’ *Psychology of Worldviews*’ Heidegger seeks to ‘orient’ himself to ‘the immanent intentions of Jaspers’ work,’ a psychology which attempts to ‘provide a clear and comprehensive horizon for our psychical life’ [S 71]. But Heidegger believes that Jaspers’ psychology is flawed because he ‘fails to see that “general psychology” and the “psychology of worldviews” cannot be separated...from fundamental problems in philosophy’ [102], and that ‘the concrete tendency of Jaspers’ work - its concern with the whole of psychology, with acquiring the fundamental domain of psychology, should in fact already be seen as “philosophical”’ [72]. Heidegger’s own philosophical concern will lead, in his *Nietzsche* lectures, to an acknowledgement that his thinking on Being was ‘a transformed interpretation of the biological on the basis of Being, grasped in a superior way’ [WPA 219]. It is also a transformed interpretation of the psychological seen already as ‘philosophical.’
This present interpretation of Heidegger follows his own approach to Jaspers. He expands on his initial statement:

‘The basic approach of this review lies in its attempt to free up the real tendencies of Jaspers’ work. In doing so, it seeks to bring into sharper focus both the primary direction in which Jaspers’ problems tend and the basic motivations for this direction. Here we will determine to what extent Jaspers’ approach to his tasks, his choice of methods, and his way of employing these methodological means to carry out his tasks are really in keeping with the underlying tendencies of his inquiry and the directions in which these tendencies discernibly point us.’ [S 72]

The assumption in this freeing-up of intention is that the real, underlying intentions are not free, but contained, constrained, restrained, suppressed, repressed. The methodological means may be at odds with the real intention, and complicit with that repression. Heidegger’s own methodological over-concern with ‘access’ in Being and Time is at odds with his early aspiration to overcome bloodless schematism through ‘a nonschematic sense of worry’ [94], in the name of the worlding of the world and the disclosure of Being. In 1945 he wrote to his wife: ‘Valuable though my earlier teaching was, it never really let the authentic heart of my thinking become properly free - the merely scholastic & scholarly would suddenly intrude & prevent or warp the simple and essential’ [LW 200].

Heidegger’s own intent and an unknowing foreconception in the very comments his own philosophy could elicit coalesce: “Philosophy of life” will be called into question by analyzing it to show that the basic philosophical motive coming to expression in it does so in a hidden manner, is hardly able to be grasped with the
meagre inventory of concepts available to philosophy of life, and in fact manifests itself in a degenerate form’ [73-4].

Heidegger’s own philosophical motives - in his pursuit of Being - themselves are both manifest and hidden, thus overdetermined. The phrase ‘anticipatory foreconception’ is self-revelatory: ‘It might just be the case that even the directions of inquiry in which we could find access to the things themselves of philosophy lie covered over for us, and what is thus necessary is a radical deconstruction and reconstruction, i.e., a genuine confrontation with the history we ourselves “are”’ [S 74]. Heidegger continues with an anticipatory foreconception of a future critique of his own philosophizing: ‘The “intuition” grounding the author’s approach is interrogated in a critical fashion regarding its primordiality, its motivation, its tendencies, and the extent to which it is genuinely actualized and seen through to the end’ [75]. Jaspers had observed ‘psychologically’ that the ‘Dasein of our mental life, i.e., its “being-there,” arises through antinomies,’ and that the goal of the psychology of worldviews is ‘to give clarifications and possibilities which can serve as means to self-reflection’ [76]. Heidegger perhaps - as he will say of Nietzsche - knows more than he realises:

‘If genuine psychology is supposed to allow us to see “what the human being is,” then the initial manner in which it actually formulates the problem must from the start harbour within it certain foreconceptions about the sense of being belonging to this whole of the psychical Dasein of our mental life, and then again foreconceptions about the possible “how” in accordance with which this life, having now been clarified, is supposed to be lived, i.e., foreconceptions about the basic sense of that
in which such things as “possibilities” can in any sense be brought to light.’ [76-78]

What Heidegger will say of Nietzsche and Kant, he says at this early stage of Jaspers: a critique needs to be ‘aware of what is demanded by the very sense of [the author’s] foreconceptions, even though the author himself may not have actually understood these demands in an explicit manner’ [77]. We are both known and unknown to ourselves. Unknown to oneself, one can project one’s self-understanding onto others, understanding in others what one knows: Heidegger acknowledges that ‘foreconceptions “are” at work “everywhere” in the factical experience of life (and therefore also in the sciences and in philosophizing), but then, in relation to that ‘authentic heart’ of his thinking, he exposes one of his own antinomial demands: ‘All problems of foreconception are ones of “method”’ [77]. And yet Heidegger’s fusions are grounded on fugue, as Jaspers had written that ‘it is from our experience of antinomy that there arises in us a vital will to unity’ [79]. Heidegger out of a will to unity privileges the primordiality of the whole, the fusion over the fugue [79-80]. And it is out of the ‘flowing stream of life as a whole’ that Heidegger conceives of the dangers of duality: ‘Antinomies destroy and bifurcate’ [80]. It is against the dangers of strife that Heidegger’s will to unity concerns itself with the ‘whole.’ His letters to his wife and to Hannah Arendt are a dissonance of antinomies and the will to unity, to the harmonization of bifurcations within the soul, Heidegger’s. The ontological tendency arises out of ontical imperatives.

Heidegger’s concern with method counters the demonic threat he confronted in his Jorgensen review of 1910, openly stated in a letter to his wife in 1939:
‘Nietzsche] is even made responsible for those who misinterpret him. But in a certain way this danger comes from Nietzsche himself & the manner of his analysis, if one takes this to be the only & essential thing, whereas to follow N’s apt but perhaps unbridled will it should only be a necessary foreground & thoroughfare’ [LW 160].

This is, indeed, a concise statement of the position from which Heidegger engages in his *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche.

In 1919 he sees the same threat in the psychology of Jaspers who ‘always describes this “splitting asunder” precisely as the *primal phenomenon of psychical life*’ [S 86]. The overcoming of this splitting asunder is the very process behind Heidegger’s philosophical intentions, as we shall see in relating his ‘philosophical’ writings to his personal life disclosed in his letters, themselves indicative of an oppositional philosophical expression. The writing of this review on Jaspers just preceded the birth of Hermann - Heidegger’s son by another. Heidegger’s factical, ‘psychic situation‘- living an open marriage - through these early years of the 1920s will be seen to give a tinge of personal anti-moralism - whilst foreconceiving a later resignation - to his critique of Jaspers, whose ‘worldview could just as well be an essentially moral one, supposing that such hackneyed philosophical coinage still means anything’ [88]. Yet his letters show that open marriage was not without its antinomial dangers.

Heidegger sees Jaspers’ psychology of worldviews as ‘a syncreticism in which the Kantian doctrine of antinomies and its guiding concept of infinity are combined with Kierkegaard’s concept of the Absolute, which has been “cleansed” of its specifically Lutheran religious sense...transplanted into that vagueness arising
from the concept of life’ [90]. Such syncreticism - out of a willing to unity -
Heidegger himself will attempt in Being and Time: critique becomes practice.

Heidegger summarizes: ‘the full sense of Jaspers’ foreconception...the attitude of
looking ultimately upon this whole, harmony, unity of life...and remaining all the
while unworried about the self-world...actually runs counter to this intention’ [96-
8]. Heidegger’s own willing to unity, itself an overcoming of his own antinomial
concerns, attempts to remove himself beyond the worries about the self-world, or,
perhaps, to remain unworried about the self-world. Indeed, Dasein as the being
which in its very being is concerned about its being is antinomial. Heidegger
discloses his own counter-intentions when he asks: ‘To what extent does...the
basic phenomenological attitude...explicitly preserve the decisive direction of
worry that essentially pervades all problems?’ [97] Heidegger demands of Jaspers
that ‘his method of mere observation must evolve into an “infinite process” of
radical questioning that always includes itself in its questions and preserves itself
in them’ [102]. But in Heidegger’s thinking the relation between method and
radical questioning is not a matter of mere evolution from one to the other, but an
antinomial fugue, which is both within the text and also - as the text - against
something other.

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'Now, we intellectuals are certainly conceited - some more than others, and philosophers above all. They often make this impression because they don't talk about the despair that haunts them' [L 81].

Heidegger spoke these words in a lecture during his Logic course 1925-26: his letters to his wife and to Hannah Arendt speak of that 'not talking' in his texts, of the haunting demonic of factical existence. They speak out of the counter-tradition, that which is resisted in his 'thinking,' resisted because - if not despair - it is some constraint against the burning demonic, in a 'phenomenological' bracketing of the haunting despair, and a resistance, for better and worse, towards Nietzsche, both individual philosopher and tendency. But Heidegger's own letters speak of that other voice, as if a voice spoke against the warning voice of phenomenogical anti-Dionysianism, as if called upon to make another music, a non-Apollonic music, a Dionysian music.

Elizbieta Ettinger suggests that Heidegger, depicted as 'an austere and abstract thinker,' became involved with both Hannah Arendt and Nazism out of the 'specific needs of his emotional life' [Ettinger 1995, 8]. I attempt here - through an analysis of Heidegger's letters - to elaborate on the idea of an intentional structure in the relation between Heidegger's factical existence and his writings - both 'texts' and 'non-texts'- which indeed constituted part of his factical existence, and which suggest that there may be more than one dimension to Heidegger's ontological 'neglect of the body.'
In his essay ‘What Is an Author?’ Michel Foucault asks: ‘When undertaking the publication of Nietzsche’s works, for example, where should one stop? Surely everything must be published, but what is “everything”?’ [Foucault 1991, 103]

Heidegger himself, in his lectures on the *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, attempted an interpretation of the letters of St. Paul as ‘guidance for phenomenological understanding’ [PRL 47]. In *Being and Time*, he uses Count Yorck’s letters to Wilhelm Dilthey in his discussion of temporality.

Heidegger’s own letters can be viewed in terms of his analysis of *Dasein* as a ‘concerned’, ‘distressed’ ‘object’ within history, an analytic of Heidegger’s *Dasein*. Revealing the demonic within, Heidegger’s letters point to his phenomenology as an address not only of the philosophical issues of the Western philosophical tradition: the forces of his own Dionysian self were very much a ‘concern’ as he ‘thought.’

In April 1919, he wrote to his wife: ‘I’ve learnt one thing: to immerse myself in concrete problems...let the connections emerge from the analysis itself’ [LW 61]. In this study I attempt to ‘let the connections emerge.’

**ii. Heidegger’s letters to his wife**

In December 1915, Heidegger writes to his wife-to-be, Elfride Petri: ‘if we provoke disquiet in one another then it is of the sort that words remain powerless to capture’ [LW 3]. Disquiet is acknowledged only to be left beyond the ken of words. It is repressed, in the name of ‘repose’ and inspiration. The letters depict Heidegger’s ‘philosophy’ arising from the Romantic inspirations and creative
demands akin to those of Wagner, Nietzsche and Mahler, existing at some remove from phenomenological ontology:

‘last night I worked till almost 1 o’clock - on a completely new problem that suddenly flashed through my mind - I suddenly felt secret powers grow within me & entered that state of creativity which I hadn’t felt since the war began...& now it came all of a sudden, like a revelation, the elemental force of creativity, you know, Dearest Soul, whoever’s spirit is seized by this will experience something unutterable...my thoughts soared on within your attentive soul...That you serve me by imposing silence upon yourself’ [LW 8 & 3].

It was this quality which Hannah Arendt saw as Heidegger’s proximity to Nietzsche, Heidegger’s Nietzscheanism. Amongst the five poems Heidegger sent to Hannah Arendt in 1939, one ‘Untitled’ [HA 62] contains the lines:

In rare abruptness, Being’s flash of light
We peer, protect - turn toward the sight.

In Jähen, raren, blitzt uns Seyn.
Wir spähen, wahren - schwingen ein. 8

Ursula Ludz informs us that this couplet ‘In rare abruptness, Being’s flash of light’ was later quoted and discussed by Hannah Arendt in her Denktagebuch in September 1951, in connection with a Nietzsche quotation from The Gay Science. “The truth,” she wrote, “can be ‘rare’, ‘abrupt’, like ‘lightning.’ This is the real
connection between Heidegger and Nietzsche” [HA 235]. And this inspiration -
heightened out of happiness - generates a higher happiness:

‘My great happiness weighs me to the ground - in the end, it is above all
those of a philosophical nature who experience such uncommon
happiness in all its fullness. The philosopher sees the ultimate in all
things, experiences the deepest foundations of all existence, thrills in
this god-born wondrous happiness- ’ [LW 4].

But his fundamental ontology will itself attempt a supersession of those deepest
foundations, the foundations of his own Dasein: ‘I am human & as such hurled into
the antagonism of the sensual and the spiritual; but with you it is given to me to
experience what is beyond the antagonism, where all tensions are resolved where
everything is only sacred & all darkness is banished’ [4-5]. This is the language and
self-recognition of Nietzsche, Mann and Jung not of his fundamental ontology. It is
the language of Heidegger’s own 1910 review of Jorgensen, and it speaks to that
future perception of the Apollonian-Dionysian cipher, the acknowledgement of the
strife of antagonism in human existence.

His philosophical attempts to remain true to the earth fractured the Zarathustrian
duality, the oscillation of mountain and market-place, remaining true to
Nietzschean ascensionism in his letters: ‘my Dearest Soul scatters the roses on the
steep mountain path up to the towering peaks of pure knowledge & most blissful
experience,’ his words grounded in the orientation to the ‘holy’ and to the
‘goodness’: ‘these two creatures...will build themselves a happiness in which spirit,
purity, goodness rush together and, overflowing, pour forth into the languishing
souls of those who thirst-’ [6]. And if he talks of ‘spirit’ he talks too of ‘flame’9: ‘take
my soul... and let the flames and glowing heat come together and as they flare up consume one another in the longing for “the divine itself in its unchangeable beauty”: ‘the Good in itself descends & shines from the depths of your eyes’ [5, 6, 11]. Out of his love pours the imagery of Zarathustra.

And yet within this inspiration born of love, Nietzsche, the holy, and mountains, the whole constellation of Romantic rapture - a soul which should have sung - there is the ‘call’ of its ‘other,’ the elision of antagonism in Being: ‘feeling & a trembling sensitivity is an unlosable possession of the soul, but - it only has a really deep & unlosable substance if it is saturated, as it were, with ultimate and certain insights that lie beyond any change & becoming, embody the pure being of the idea’ [10].

Expressive of that antagonism, the Heidegger of his letters is not without relation to his philosophical texts. The ontical and ontological prioritisation of Dasein in Being and Time is pre-echoed, foreshadowed early in his thoughts on nature, not only the ecstatic rapture, but the ecstatic ‘transcendence’ of nature by man: ‘You will one day view your experience of nature in a quite different light & be surprised that you could see it as something ultimate. No, Dearest Soul, there are things still much deeper - & man is so utterly separated from everything natural that he in himself represents a value of his own - the very fact that he has the power to spiritualize his own nature, which is not bad in itself, raises him above everything natural -’ [10]. As with Nietzsche before him, 10 remaining true to the earth still spoke with the ascensionist tones of man’s ‘spirit’: ‘If everything were but bondage to nature & natural soul, would there then really be happiness, this profoundly innermost experience? - would it then ever make sense for us to
experience our love as something divine?- if it were not the creation, the free and conscious creation & exaltation of our spirit.' [10]. Man's love is 'something infinitely higher, deeper, altogether heavenly that makes our heart quiver in the most blissful embrace rather than the animal's rut...[Were it not]...then I'd rather be swallowed up by Nothingness today.'[11]. Here, in 1916, Nothingness for Heidegger was experienced as a black-hole of lovelessness, unheavenly.

Though a phenomenologist contra psychologism, Heidegger has not broken with psychology: 'we are guided by...our ownmost consciousness, which finds expression in veneration & devotion; these are experiences that give man his unique position among everything else that is real.'[11]. But, not only does man have dominion over all other beings, he also has dominion over himself too, over that very 'animal nature:' 'we know of the ultimate values & are far beyond merely physical urges - & these physical urges are blind & lead as such to...outrageous excesses' [11]. 'Passion is a danger' - the Dionysian made demonic - control the exercise of philosophy: 'the task of somehow bringing experience & knowledge into harmony with one another' [11]. This harmonisation is the supersession of the Dionysian-Apollonian: 'the intertwining & interpenetration of...mystic...[and] rational man...is the ideal...each with an urge towards the other' [12]. This very 'animal nature' of 'outrageous excess' was indeed Heidegger's ownmost danger. Passion is somehow outside a fundamental ontology of Dasein's being-in-the-world, the body 'problematic.'

These are the dangers of the counter-tradition, the worlds of eschatology and of the Faustian artistic-nature, that part of Heidegger's spirit he warned himself against as Nietzsche and Mann had warned. The concern with the issue that was
his ownmost being locates Heidegger not only in the Western ontological and mystical traditions but also with the travails of the Central European musical and literary traditions. For Thomas Mann ‘All art which deserves the name testifies to [a] determination to reach the ultimate, [a] resolve to go to the limits.’ But it ‘bears the sign, the scar of the utmost’ [GN 127]. He believed the task of the creative artist to be in the order of ‘reconciling…the irreconcilable’ [SL, 63], which was living out consciously the strife between the eternal antithetical polarities: ‘glorification of…the…Dionysian’ spirit of lyricism, whose outpouring is irresponsible and individualistic, and the Apollonian, objectively controlled, morally and socially responsible…spirit of…dry humanitarian rationalism.’

Mann ‘suffered in [his] own person’ [SL 62] the battle between the demonism and inwardness of German Romanticism and the apparent scientific clarity of Western Rationalism. And he suffered from the dangers of passion: the ‘stripping of dignity’ [ML 94].

There is much in Heidegger’s letters which speaks of the attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable out of the strife of the Apollonian-Dionysian polarity.

Heidegger did not wish to ‘encroach upon the mystical’ in Elfride, whilst his own ‘path is the opposite one - knowledge, ultimate clear comprehension & interpretation of the meaning, this is what the urge tirelessly pursues - & this urge itself is an innermost experience, which can just detect within itself the refinement & irrational way of the mystical, but always finds it too much of a disruption to pure knowledge, too much of a darkening - this harsh antagonism extends & reaches right into the deepest realms of my spiritual life’ [LW 12]. The will to overcome this disruption, this darkening, rises out of the deepest realms of Heidegger’s ‘spiritual life’ against ‘what, as the ultimate, I should like to see &
experience in glorious luminosity & mystical darkness’ [12]. It is out of his self-experience of ‘conflict & disunity’ that Heidegger ‘first become[s] deeply aware of the coincidentia oppositorum’ [12]. Carl Jung took the issue of contradiction in duality to be the basis of being: ‘we have to acknowledge that the self is a complexio oppositorium precisely because there can be no reality without polarity’ [Jung 1979, 267]. Such is a ‘knowledge’ which Heidegger lives out of, yet, against his early impulse towards developing a phenomenology out of a sympathy with life, a ‘knowledge’ which by his own admission is emptied out of his fundamental ontology.

Even as Heidegger thanks God, he echoes Nietzsche’s tragic pessimism of strength: ‘Let us thank God that we are people who find life hard to bear - this is no pessimism – but everything great & deep has something of the tragic about it...a life of great pain is always a great life & anything that wants to grasp life & reality & the sun must pass through the pain’ [LW 12]. Indeed, Heidegger echoes the Nietzsche of ‘ice and high mountains’: 14

‘Spiritual creation always requires a dying, a gradual dying [of] everything that betokens light & sound & joy & love & happiness & rest-it is always a painful, excruciating loneliness, a casting off of everything changeable; yet this ascent is only ever successful when one has fortified oneself spiritually & knows that wandering over those bleak heights where the air is thin will not wear us out, but there is always a descent back into the fullness of life, to which one may bring the treasures from the heights.’ [LW 12]
Even as he declares that ‘the deepest experience is what you give to me, in which all antagonism is resolved,’ the antagonism is not still: ‘I’ve taken you by the hand to lead you along the mountain paths of pure knowledge - we shall yearn all our lives and wander’ [12-13], and yet real life lay ‘thousands’ of feet below, again Heidegger sharing the language and imagery of Nietzsche [Zarathustra] and Thomas Mann [The Magic Mountain].

Heidegger sought ‘rest in your divine nature.’ Indeed, Elfride was not only his inspiration but also his homecoming, his sanctuary: the ‘powers’ she had awakened in him and ‘a resting place when I return from the distant land of the great questions...in your care...I'll gather new strength for the ascent & each time I'll bring you back treasures from my wanderings.’ It is an experience privileging the authentic. Against ‘the petty trivialities...day-to-day routine...I only wish to live for moments-’ [14-15]. The strife between Eros and purity, between untruth and truth flux in one sentence to Elfride: ‘when I really feel your spiritual closeness, I...grow rampant for the finding of truth’ [14]. Heidegger acknowledges that ‘we always live within antagonisms’ [15].

Heidegger’s aim to revivify philosophy precedes by three years his War Emergency lectures of 1919 on the ‘definition of philosophy.’ He writes in March 1916: ‘I have a living philosophy to be lived...today I know that there can be a philosophy of vibrant life...that I can declare war on rationalism...without falling victim to the anathema of unscientific thought’ [LW 17]. His aim to produce philosophy ‘as living truth & as a creation of the personality valuably & powerfully’ is not aided by ‘The Kantian question... [which, he says,] fails to capture the problem; this is much richer & deeper’ [17]. The ‘heroes’ returning from the war deserve ‘not unreal &
dead categories, not shadowy forms & bloodless compartments in which to keep a life ground down by rationalism neat and tidy and let it moulder away-’ [17]. The philosopher who does aid Heidegger [as evidenced throughout these letters] is Nietzsche: Heidegger writes: ‘The philosopher always suffers from life, because the questionableness of life is real in him - but when he takes pleasure in something, this pleasure is richer & more overflowing than anywhere else, because it draws its fullness & fineness from the ultimate depths of one’s interpretation of life’ [17]. Yet he looks into the face of the discontinuities within his factual existence: Heidegger sees that it is ‘perhaps the bane that I have a philosophical gift which when activated makes everything else sink away... disconnected’ [21/22]. He finds in Elfride ‘the peace and unity’ he seeks, for not only is he ‘full of contradictions’ [22], all is contradiction: ‘even from the furthest & most abstract heights - for all ascending to the heights is distance, separation, antagonism...all living in the ‘concept’ is at the expense of the rich immediacy of innermost experience tangible now...all contact is already the beginning of destruction - of inner contradiction’ [22-23]. His work has an aim, a need out of an undoing: ‘The ‘conclusion’...still lacks that classical serenity - but I’ll probably never attain that because I keep on seeing the other side of things’ [25]. In this struggle Heidegger admits that ‘I’ve returned to the position I had in mind in my earliest semesters - but which I repressed because everything was still too unclear in my mind & without the conceptual means in full sharpness’ [25]. Out of a profound sense of the coincidentia oppositorum, Heidegger calls for unity, the ‘uniqueness’ of which is not attained through ‘static[ ]...schemata’ but through an ‘inner relation to the history of spirit & soul ’ [31]. Not only Kant’s schematism
but ‘Husserl’s phenomenology’...in its approach & accordingly in its goal...is too narrow & bloodless...Anyone who is only a logician is thus confronted with a fundamental absurdity’ [33]. The contending voice speaks a Nietzschean language suppressed in his ‘texts’: ‘I can’t find a way up into my mountains; I only have the “point of approach”...the highest activity of feeling one’s way...a process that comes to me largely out of the darkness & leads on into the darkness...historical man came to me in a flash this winter....I now possess with great assurance the soaring ranges of the soul’ [32-34]. The relative presence and absence of Nietzsche speaks of and out of a coincidentia oppositorium.

Shortly after their wedding, Heidegger wrote to Elfride: ‘A marriage based on bourgeois infatuation must be an abomination’ [34]. Their relationship would be a higher union: ‘The fact that we’re both drawn from within towards theology again & again is surely hardly a coincidence - but on the contrary an immediate guarantee that one day we’ll succeed in building up an elemental religious life of our own within our family, one which radiates its powers of influence over all personal work, over our circles of friends & fellow human beings’ [39]. Their relationship will overcome, transcend, all antagonism: ‘we bear within us the certainty of growth into the whole’ [40]; and this ‘personal coexistence’ will be the ground for his developing ‘the true philosophy of religion & philosophizing in general’ [41].

Such ‘idealism’ was confronted by socio-historical reality during the First World War. In July 1918, Heidegger, based at Charlottenburg, visits Berlin. The man of bergs and the provinces, of Tonnies’ Gemeinschaft, who would later write ‘Why I Remain in the Provinces’ and who would turn down philosophical chairs at Berlin,
now in 1918 was to experience his own version of the demonic event used by
Thomas Mann in *Dr Faustus* out of the life of Nietzsche, who experienced traumatic
‘discovery’ in a Cologne brothel. Heidegger writes to Elfride:

‘Yesterday evening we did something special, travelled to Berlin & had a
look at the bustle on Friedrichstrasse - we didn’t have the courage to go
into the bar - at ½ past 11 we came home again, both of us disgusted to
the marrow - I presume we only saw the surface - but it is wilder than I
could have ever imagined. I’d never have believed such an atmosphere
of artificially cultivated, most vulgar & sophisticated sexuality was
possible, but now I do understand Berlin better - the character of
Friedrichstrasse has rubbed off on the whole city - & in such a milieu
there can be no true intellectual culture...it lacks what is simply Great
and Divine. When I think of Freibg. & its Minster & the outlines of the
Black Forest Mountains-!...The people there [in Berlin] have lost their
soul...there’s no staying this decadence now - perhaps the ‘spirit’ of
Berlin can be overcome by a home-grown culture at the provincial
universities - at any rate our youth will only be restored to health from
this quarter - *if it’s still possible at all.*’ [LW 45]

Against ‘demonic’ love Heidegger writes of ‘the daimon of love...the knowledge of
the coexistence of this love with one’s most sacred life’s work - of the mutual
interpenetration of the two’ [49]. And to draw his two modes together, Heidegger
believes that this ‘whole configuration of moods & emphases will specifically
influence my own work,’ a constellation which includes his orientation to
Dostoevski’s *Brothers Karamazov* [48] and Hölderlin, quoting the poet: ‘He who
has thought what is deepest, loves what is most alive’ [49]. This the philosopher whose ‘hermeneutics of factual life’ speak not of ‘the categories of the heart,’ who distances ontology from ‘daimon life.’

These ‘moods and emphases’ come out of personal experience which indeed will influence his work. Out of ‘the primitiveness of existence issues of ultimate significance approach one another with due immediacy, strength & clarity’ [50]. Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity would evolve out his own facticity. He would recognize that ‘what I received from my parental home & my home town has passed into my work’ [108], and indeed his characterization of his family upbringing points ahead to the ‘they’ in Being and Time:

‘All my earlier insecurity, untruthfulness & casuistry are the simple consequence of an ultra-Catholic education, which on the other hand I always sought to break out of with inadequate means...ultimately everything is down to the Catholic system’s inner lack of freedom- & the pious-acting despotism of conscience....Because [my family] are unacquainted with such a thing as the possibility of a free inner decision & such a thing as the corresponding will to bear responsibility, they regard any deviation from their own will (itself unfree) as disobedience. And at the same time this is then the measure of my ingratitude & neglect of duty...[The only way out of this ‘tragic’ situation is through] incessantly seeking & following the direction of one’s ownmost personal development’ [50].

The incipient relation between inauthenticity (theyness) and futural authenticity arises out of Heidegger’s own moods and experiences. The development of his
ontological thinking is related to his personal historical existence, a ‘metaphysical-historical element of our life’s unity’ [30]. And in seeking life’s unity, he depicts a metaphysics out of love: ‘the ‘security’ of our own unitary metaphysical reality is not abstractly teleological, but spiritually historical...in the aliveness of deed & experience, i.e., life in wholeness, depth, goodness, love’ [30]. And from his station behind the front, he writes, at one o’clock in the morning, that philosophy ‘can only be won from the innermost unfolding of the spirit itself’ [53]. And it is this ‘spirit’ which will be ‘politically’ transformative: ‘Spirit finds whomsoever it is meant to find & from those found one wave after another sweeps forth, rousing, agitating & keeping in agitation, into the many who are lethargic & massive in quality & number. This innate vehemence of spirit renders superfluous everything which as a practical philosophy of life abuses the term philosophy’ [53].

Heidegger had spoken against Husserl’s phenomenology, yet the next day he ‘acts’ out of this emphatic mood. Gertrud, Heidegger’s granddaughter, writes: ‘Right at the outset of the war the Husserls had lost one son, and now their son Gerhard received a serious head wound...As soon as he learnt of this, Martin set out for Sedan, where he looked for him in the military hospitals. Informed that Gerhard had already been transported home, Martin returned to his post without having achieved anything’ [54-55]. After the catastrophe of the Holocaust, Paul Celan visited Heidegger at Todtnauberg wishing for a word from Heidegger that never came: something must have happened to Heidegger’s ‘ownmost’! A pre-echo of the words he will use in the 1966 Spiegel interview he writes in 1918: ‘Only the young will save us now - & creatively allow a New Spirit to be made flesh in the world’
Out of the tragic mood he looks forward to ‘the hour of the birth of spirit’ – ahead again to the inner truth and greatness of Germany, for:

‘people have been systematically nauseated by pan-German pipe dreams...they labour under a sense not of national belonging based on true love & helplessness - but of being deceived & abused for the selfish purposes of spiritually misguided or indeed completely unspiritual, backward power groups...we've not taken enough care - if any at all - of the inner human being in ourselves & in others. Values such as soul & spirit have been lacking...our wretched politics has on its conscience...[the] ever-pointless sacrifice of human lives.’ [55-58]

The future is of the Nietzschean free spirit and overman: ‘The only thing that can help is the appearance of new human beings who harbour an elemental affinity with spirit & its demands, & I myself recognize ever more urgently the necessity for leaders...only through this quite radical purification will there be anything to hope for - & only through radicalism - complete commitment of the human being as a whole - will we ourselves advance as real revolutionaries of the spirit’ [55-58].

Heidegger is speaking against an arid philosophizing and a loveless politics.

At two o’clock in the morning of 27th October 1918, Heidegger writes of how the ‘soul’ of his infant son Jorg will be ‘infused with the family home, childhood happiness, sunshine & peace – as well as with life’s clarity & prophetic certitudes & true religiousness.’ He looks forward to their future together ‘all the purer & more lasting...[and] a consecration for a heightened return of our togetherness’ [56]. It is out of his thoughts of heightened togetherness that he foreconceives his thinking on time: ‘every present is only ever the precious aliveness of past & future life’
Ecstatic temporality emerges through an ecstasy of love in absentia ‘in the field.’ Heidegger’s ec-static is no ecstasy, but then is indicated by the conjunction of thoughts:

‘The whole problem of the ego leads not to a pure, empty ego but to one that is filled out & primordially alive...this takes us back to the essence of personal spirit, which I conceive as a ‘calling’- only thus can the eternal possessions of spirit & its absolute confusions be conceived...I’d like to lay particular emphasis on bringing the problem of the sacred into these new considerations of principle.’ [LW 57]

Dostoevski and the ‘problem of piety’ return to his mind [58]. Home at Freiburg he writes: ‘There’s such pure & utter joy in me that I constantly want to sit quite quietly at little Jorg’s basket and thank you. A wholly new element of experience has entered our love, one so strange that I cannot yet grasp its primordial character at all...It’s as though we’d received a new consecration’ [60]. Yet the ‘consecration’ was not one of bliss - an open relationship was fraught with turmoil, more so it seems for Elfride. Heidegger writes to her: ‘I don’t understand your ‘inner conflict’, nor do I ever want to be presented with any psychological demonstrations in the matter - not out of indifference - but because I want to have you directly the way I can have you, and that Friedel loves you I’ve known for a long time - I’ve been surprised you didn’t tell me sooner...I’ve sought & still seek to be good to him & encourage him’ [64]. Friedel Caesar, a friend of Elfride's youth, a doctor in the University Hospital in Freiburg would be the father of Heidegger's second son, Hermann. But Heidegger still felt ‘eternally bound’ to Elfride: ‘now that you know yourself assured of my understanding trust...let’s leave everything to the
greater course of our marriage...expend our whole selves in goodness.' And immediately in the same letter of January 1919, after his letters from ‘the front’, Heidegger turns to his calling: ‘The great calling to a timeless task is always necessarily a condemnation to solitude’ [65]. He speaks of Friedel and characterizes bourgeois love as a sham: ‘It’s a wholly mistaken conception of love to believe that it’s nurtured & fostered by shared contents & objects - the way of bourgeois love...though their whole life may never experience a genuine eruption of love...’ It is the ‘moments’ of ‘having-found-one-another [which] is absolutely valuable in itself - the duration is immaterial...’ 

Heidegger continues:

‘I feel that after recent months of clarification the two of us are about to ascend to a new level in life - & to become Absolute & come closer to God is the meaning of existence...time & duration has its true, valuable function at the stage of expecting and hoping - of trusting being-prepared for the recurring unification...my constant, steady growth-which grows out of the deep interconnection of my life with you...we'll make things quite wonderful for ourselves & open anew a rich source of our love which will nourish us with its sacred waters through the busy months ahead’ [LW 66-68].

In December 1919 Heidegger’s second son Hermann is conceived by Friedel. In January Heidegger writes to Elfride: ‘We’re on the way to achieving a genuine, simple & more elemental grasp of life - the creation of a new style - not according to programmes, but to motives awakening from the innermost self’ [70]. But there is, in Heidegger, acceptance of his ‘domestic’ situation: ‘our marriage represents something very rich & strong even if it does perhaps lack that love which I cannot
really picture anyway’ [71]. The ‘new style’ seems not to include that love of which he had spoken. He writes from his home town Messkirch with a tone of resignation: ‘gradually I feel what it means to have one’s roots in the soil- in fact this only fully struck me through Dostoevski & I find a very great contrast with people...who live only in relationships’ [72]. Still, he wrote to Elfride, ‘I keep feeling within myself that you’ve come even closer to me’ [75]. In the next sentence he writes that ‘Husserl recently told me he had lived in constant uncertainty’ but that Heidegger had told him that he was ‘certain’ of their ‘philosophical achievement & human task’ in which one must ‘keep oneself open to developments & protect oneself from premature conclusions & dogmatic paralysis...to keep up...with the living tendencies that his own creations must necessarily still harbour within them...’ One must protect himself from ‘the way... one undermines oneself - & the strange thing is that what one discovers then is never unfamiliar - but laid down in advance’ [75-76]. One must protect oneself: on August 20\textsuperscript{th} 1920 Hermann was born. Heidegger is at Messkirch with Jorg during Elfride’s ‘confinement’. ‘I’m glad now I know where you are & how you are. I can come to you often now & share in your great joy’ [77]. Out of the ‘sacred waters of love’ it was ‘your great joy.’ He asks his wife: ‘Tell me, was Friedl still there when it started? And what does the ‘little man’ look like?...With deepest love and a thousand kisses, my Dearest Soul’ [78]. We can only ponder what the happening meant to Heidegger. He continues with his vision of a new, higher love: ‘what I give you...in the way of real love, is yours. And one becomes strong oneself in such a love...how pale, untrue & sentimental everything is that is usually said about marriage. And whether we aren’t giving shape to a new form of it in our life...by
just letting genuineness come through everywhere’ [77]. He had begun what would become a long-standing relationship with Elfride’s friend Elizabeth Blochmann in 1918. Greater, perhaps, than the mystery of life is the mystery of love. Heidegger would still write of ‘genuine, human - marriage [as] a ‘haven’ for the idle, who close their eyes to themselves & invent one illusion after another, who eschew their marriage & always replace it with something to live for with some prospects of success & gain (children that have turned out well, a role in society, income & a livelihood - the picture of the ‘happy marriage’ [84]. To what extent was this ‘genuine’ ideology or was the ‘ideology’ itself an illusion offering some prospects of success and gain? During a skiing weekend in Todtnauberg in February 1922, Elfride hit upon the idea of building a cabin there. In 1925, Heidegger will report to Elfride from Marburg of taking Hermann for a walk: ‘he was very proud &: suddenly said to me: You have married a lovely Mother, haven’t you -?’ [101-102]

Within weeks of Hermann’s birth, Heidegger writes, still from Messkirch, of his work that he is ‘at least partially out of the woods...& now the path is free for further ascent... these are wonderful years that lie ahead of me now...[but] I’m now working - in a quite different intellectual position, admittedly, one of assurance... [I]owe it to no one but you...but that which is unsettling has its effect in secret,’ an odd, perhaps telling, phrase in view of his ideology of marriage, especially as in that same letter of September 1920, he talks of Hauptmann who ‘impressed me myself with his psychological analysis & also in dramatic terms - never before have I found such a portrayal of the elemental power of nature’ [77-79]. And he himself speaks out of a psychological vocabulary: ‘productive work takes high tension,
from which phenomenologl. intuition can as it were discharge....[though] in terms of time one is virtually incapable of capturing, detaining, systematically turning the torrent to account,' and though he was ‘not anxious about the continuity & steadiness of my own developmt. - [for] these forces work & grow in strangely unconscious ways’ [61-66]. Acknowledging the secret effect of the unsettling, philosophical terms emerge out of life experience: ‘I feel your love most deeply - because - strong as it is - it comes towards me factically of its own accord - because it ‘is there’ more than aesthetically as a possibility of pleasure' [84]. Through that one word- factically - he connects the public and private worlds. What, then, is his philosophy a ‘public face?’ But then were there different ‘faces’ within his private world? And of faces he writes: ‘J. [Jaspers] also has the other great work on death masks...Marianne [Weber] has a mask...it’s a dreadful countenance - the severity of the suffering of this existence & at the same time the force of the energy - here one could speak of the demonic’ [107]. And his ‘calling’: ‘After the excessive pressure of the ‘publication’ came a rest period...the Demon has already started harassing and badgering me again in its rather uncanny way’ [112-113]. This was 1928. But the demonic must be controlled: ‘the inner harassment by the problems must also spring from a more manly calm & distance’ [116]. And the demonic was also out there in the world: Now in 1928 there is foreboding in Heidegger’s sense that the promotion of physical culture is lacking in ‘primordiality,’ and that ‘what is taking place here [in Marburg] is the onset of a new barbarism’ [113].
iii. Letters to Hannah Arendt

Dasein is being-in-the-world, but that being-in-the-world includes inner-being. The socio-political world was become ‘barbaric,’ but the ‘demonic’ had erupted within Heidegger’s personal life, an unsettlement having unconscious effect: in letters of 1919 he writes of discharges [LW 61], forces [62], torrents [66], not the language of ‘pure’ phenomenology. At the same time, Heidegger suggests an Husserlian need and attempt to create a philosophical bulwark against Dionysian forces: in his early letters to Hannah Arendt he wrote of ‘keeping instincts under control’ though, soon, he felt ‘my longing for you is becoming less and less controllable’ [HA 17 & 22].

As he lectures on Plato’s *Sophist* in the winter of 1924-25, Heidegger is struck by the gaze of Hannah Arendt. When he reminisces in 1950, her ‘gaze’ is associated with the ‘lectern’ at which he stood, ‘lectern’ which seemingly has such simple, material, ‘merely’ thing-like presence in his lectures. The married father of Catholic upbringing wishes that ‘Everything should be simple and clear and pure between us. Only then will we be worthy of having been allowed to meet’ [3]. But, as he infuses his love with clarity and purity, he infuses his thought with the very opposite: academic research ‘only man can endure - and then only when he has been given the burden, as well as the frenzy, of being productive’ [3]. Hannah’s finding her ‘innermost, purest feminine essence’ through their love was a ‘decisive step back from the path toward the terrible solitude of academic research’ [3]. Apollonian clarity and purity and Dionysian frenzy interpenetrate. In his ‘thinking’ he makes a ‘decisive step back’ from the path toward the terrible afflictions of passion. The idealistic gloss is reconfigured: ‘We have been allowed to meet: we
must hold that as a gift in our innermost being and avoid deforming it through self-

deception about the purity of living. We must not think of ourselves as soul mates,
something no one ever experiences’ [4].

Still, it is a love which is ‘rich beyond all other possible human experiences,’ a
richness that is ‘a sweet burden to those seized.’ It is a ‘revelation’. ‘The other’s
presence suddenly breaks into our life - no soul can come to terms with that. A
human fate gives itself over to another human fate’ [4-5]. And of that duality of
giving and receiving - being appropriated - he asks ‘what can we do but only - open
ourselves - and allow what is to be’…? [19]  Love is this giving oneself up at the
same time as an active determination: ‘I can take care that nothing in you shatters;
that any burden and pain you have had in the past is purified,’ and yet Heidegger
had just cautioned against ‘self-deception about the purity of living’ [4 & 5]. He
calls on the ‘feminine’ as the antidote to male striving, and as a foreconception of
his inner demand: ‘May masculine inquiry learn what respect is from simple
devotion; may one-sided activity learn breadth from the original unity of womanly
Being’ [5]. Maleness seems to be the characterisation of the academic community
against which he retreated to his hutte, as did Mahler.  This maleness is Nietzsche’s
cultural philistinism: ‘Curiosity, gossip, and scholarly vanity cannot be eradicated;
only woman can lend nobility to free intellectual life through the way she is’ [5].
The eternal feminine.  Heidegger wrote that: ‘What was unpleasant about the
Husserl evenings was the striving to top each other’ [HA, 8]. It is philosophizing in
fallenness. A Nietzschean seeking falls into an inauthentic ‘striving.’ Authenticity is
the male incorporation of the feminine, as Greek tragedy was the incorporation of
the Dionysian within the Apollonian, a sublimation and transcendence - through
art and philosophy - of the eternal strife, which Nietzsche likens to the procreative struggle of the sexes.\textsuperscript{18}

Heidegger’s writing in his letters reveals affinity not with the Western philosophical tradition he wishes to ‘destruct’, but with the poems and letters of Wagner, and Mahler, with the writing of Nietzsche: ‘And soon, on a solitary climb, I will greet the mountains whose rocky stillness will meet you someday, and in its lines what I have kept of your essence will return. And I will visit the alpine lake, and look down from the steepness of the precipice into its silent depths’ [6]. But, as with Wagner, the demonic is not very far away from the eternal feminine: ‘The demonic struck me. The silent prayer of your beloved hands and your shining brow enveloped it in womanly transfiguration.’ Heidegger writes of this ‘event’: ‘Nothing like it has happened to me’ [6], begging the question of whether, indeed, such an ‘event’ had never before occurred. Could it be that this ‘shattering’ of Catholic conscience undermined Heidegger’s moral stability, undermined even his destruction of the Western tradition, and was a motivating force behind what is seen as \textit{Being and Time} presenting no ‘obvious’ ethics? Both ‘Arendt’ and ‘Nazism’ function as the return of the repressed, indeed as Dionysian expression demanding repression, harmonization, tranquillization. Heidegger’s political Dionysianism - his aspiration for \textit{the university} brought into line with the Nazi \textit{Gleichschaltung} - is infused with a repressed erotic. But repression would, like an Apollonian taming of the Dionysian, be a continual imperative.

I am thrown forward by this issue of repression and truth to Heidegger’s dealing with his student Max Mueller, one of Heidegger’s ‘favourite pupils,’ and after 1946
professor of philosophy at Freiburg. Elzbieta Ettinger relates the story of Heidegger’s concern with truth:

‘In 1937 [Mueller] was denounced to the authorities because of his affiliation with a Catholic student group. The vice rector, Theodor Maunz, warned Mueller that Heidegger, when requested to submit his opinion on Mueller’s political convictions, praised him as a scholar and educator but criticised Mueller’s negative attitude toward Nazi Germany. Maunz encouraged Mueller to ask Heidegger to delete the one phrase that hurt Mueller’s chances to obtain a university position. Heidegger refused. He told the desperate young scholar that he wrote “the only answer that corresponds with the truth”..Mueller pleaded with his teacher to reconsider and remove the incriminating sentence. Heidegger answered, not without sarcasm: “As a Catholic, you should know that one must tell the truth. Therefore I cannot delete the sentence...There is nothing I can do. Do not hold it against me.” “My last words”, Mueller recalled, were, ‘The point is not that I might hold it against you. The point is that my very existence depends on it.’ Subsequently, he was informed that for “ideological and political reasons” he was unacceptable to Berlin University.’ [Ettinger 1995, 53-54]

With a sense of contradictory voices, I return to Heidegger’s ‘romanticism.’ From Todtnauberg he writes to Hannah Arendt: ‘Often I hope you are as wonderfully calm as I am up here. The solitude of the mountains, the quiet routine of the mountain people, the elemental closeness of sun, storm, and sky, the simplicity of a
trail on a wide slope covered in deep snow - all of this keeps the soul at a further remove from all the Being that has been dissected and analyzed to pieces’ [HA 7]. Akin to Nietzsche's Engadine ‘spawning ground’ [FS 74], Heidegger writes of ‘my beloved mountains,’ his ‘homeland of pure joy. Here there is no need for anything “interesting,” and the work takes on the rhythm of a man chopping wood in the distant forest...the real work will always take place in solitary inquiry anyhow’ [HA 22, 8, 7]. And like Mahler’s ‘one is composed,’ [Alma Mahler 1990, 39] Heidegger's ‘work was a matter of being swept along’ [HA 8].

Work shares with love this being-swept-along. The Apollonian work and the Dionysian love interpenetrate. Out of this coalescence of need thoughts emerge overdetermined: letters speak ahead to Being and Time, to the proximity of Dasein to the ontical and the ontological: ‘being close is a matter of being at the greatest distance from the other’ [HA 5] (In Being and Time, ‘Dasein is ontically "nearest" to itself, ontologically furthest away; but pre-ontologically certainly not foreign to itself [BT 15]). Yet, out of love, a different ‘being’ emerges: ‘After the concert, I was so moved by being near you that I could not bear it any longer - and left, when I would much rather have wandered through the May night with you - walking silently beside you and sensing your dear hand and your great gaze - not asking what for and why but just “being”’ [19].

Being - that which dominates Heidegger’s questioning - is here that sense of personal being and its consequences in personal giving: ‘We have an effect only insofar as we are capable of giving...all kindness to others and every unforced, authentic act is our life....we have only as much right to exist as we are able to care about. For we can give only what we ask of ourselves. And it is the depth with
which I can seek my own Being that determines the nature of my Being toward others’ [26]. His ideal love speaks of that which is bracketed, ontologised out of the very philosophy that seeks to re-vivify the analysis of human existence: ‘Ours. That can never be lost - but can only become richer, clearer - more certain, so as to develop into a great passion for existence’ [20]. In view of his own repressions, it is ironic that Heidegger should warn against repression in the name of Being: ‘all compromises, techniques, moralizing, escapism, and closing off one’s growth can only inhibit and distort the providence of Being’ [25]. As he is working toward Being and Time, Heidegger asks Hannah ‘Do you know that this is the most difficult thing a human is given to endure? For anything else, there are methods, aids, limits, and understanding - here alone everything means: to be in one’s love = to be forced into one’s innermost existence’ [21]. And in his letters he is compelled to speak of his ‘innermost existence.’

During the summer semester of 1925, as he lectures on the History of the Concept of Time, midst what David Krell characterizes as ‘an otherwise dry-as-dust, utterly sober phenomenological account of Husserlian intentionality, categorical intuition, and the a priori’ [Krell 1991, 127], Heidegger himself, speaking of Husserl’s concern with ‘arid problems - with object, concept, truth, proposition, fact, law’ in his Logical Investigations [HCT 25], inflicts his own repression in the name of Being.

In the same year, Heidegger writes to Hannah in language reflective of his reading of the Magic Mountain, Thomas Mann’s delving into questions of time and death [HA 29]: ‘Someday, anyone with any blood and passion left inside will necessarily get sick of...an infection of “earnestness”- and then will also avoid the equally
contorted opposite extreme of weary ironizing - now that really is futility’ [30]. And from his own ‘magic mountain’ of Todtnauberg he writes in the Nietzschean mode: ‘There is heavy fog in the mountains now - after the glorious sunshine yesterday. The entire chain of the Alps was visible, from the Bernese Oberland to Mont Blanc’ [32]. And again: ‘Right now, the entire chain of the Alps from Mont Blanc to the Bernese Oberland stands silhouetted by the evening sun....I am now in glorious climbing shape again, and it will seem strange to trudge around the plains’ [36]. The Nietzschean affinity extends to philosophy being generated in and by the landscape, and ‘being’ - which is the moving of the body: ‘Here I am once more with nature and native soil, and I seem to feel even the ideas growing, as it were. Roaming amid the firs is wonderful meditation...I know every firebreak or little spring, or deer run - or grouse site. In such an environment, the work has a different texture than when one is surrounded by squabbling, conniving professors’ [32]. Life - defended against in his phenomenology - speaks in and through his letters: ‘during the Christmas break I read Wayfarers. Hamsun is a philosopher, but in such a way that his art is unburdened. And the glorious closeness to the earth, to landscape, to instincts, to the elemental - the unbroken wholeness of life that is always present in his work’ [47]. Appropriately, Heidegger finishes reading The Magic Mountain at Todtnauberg, and concludes a letter to Hannah Arendt in similar vein to his comment on his Sophist lectures: ‘the story of Madame Chauchat is brilliantly developed - because it is open-ended, and so I can imagine that, when Hans Castorp was in the field later, lying in the wet trench with his gun, he had to “think” of her, and that somewhere - she would “think” of him, and that they go on doing so today. What remains unsaid in the whole work is
really the most positive thing about it’ [32]. What is most important is its unsaid what-would-be, the eternal Eros. And what is unsaid in Heidegger’s philosophical tracts is spoken of in his letters, the unsaid, the what-would-be, the eternal Eros.

His experience at Todtnauberg [September 14th 1925] recalls the Zarathustra oscillation, indicative of the extent to which an *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche had been formative for Heidegger from the start:

‘I have already forgotten what the “world” looks like, and I will feel like a mountain-man going down to the city for the first time. But in such solitude, which can yield unsuspected powers, even human experiences become simpler and stronger, and they will lose what is portentious about them - their everyday quality. We must bring ourselves to the point where everything is as new as on the first day - and productive work, by creating isolation, leads there.

‘Often, when I am completely caught up in the work, I race up the closest mountain and let the storm ring in my years. I need such closeness to nature. And often, I look down into the quiet of the valley when I am finished working, around 2 o’clock at night, and feel how close the starry sky is - then I am nothing but effect and life...

‘You must sense it in every line, beloved, that there is a storm in me - I just have to see to it that I come to grips with it in the right way.’ [HA 34-5]

The impact of Heidegger’s experience of Thomas Mann’s *The Magic Mountain* resonates in his own *Zauberberg*: ‘Dear H. I came down to the “flatlanders” again and will stay with Husserl for two more days...The last few weeks on the
mountains were indescribably beautiful!’ [36] When he visits the ‘magic mountain’ of Davos in 1929, he writes to Elfride: ‘It’s wonderful, the wealth of scenery, the views that change completely every 50m’ [LW 119], recalling Mann’s geophysical description: ‘vistas appeared and disappeared with each new winding of the path’ [MM1, 5].

Yet, Heidegger’s ‘works’ of the 1920s would be in denial of the Zauberberg, even as his depiction of the creative process recalls that of Mahler. He confesses to Arendt:

‘I forgot you… because I had to forget and will forget you whenever I withdraw into the final stages of my work. That is not a matter of hours or days, but a process that develops over weeks and months and then subsides...And this “withdrawal” from everything human and breaking of all connections is, with regard to creative work, the most magnificent experience I know - with regard to concrete situations, it is the most repugnant thing one can encounter. One’s heart is ripped from one’s body...one cannot just make allowances for abandoning human relationships.’ [HA 40]

The ‘repugnant’ rupture between his own concrete facticity and the hermeneutics of facticity is acknowledged.

In Being and Time the ‘magic’ of the Dionysian auratic constellation of love, mountain and Nietzsche is dispelled. Even the ‘Romantic concept of nature...is ontologically comprehensible only in terms of the concept of world; that is, in terms of an analytic of Dasein’ [BT2, 65]. And that is in terms of ‘usability’: “Nature” is also discovered in the use of useful things, “nature” in the light of products of nature....The forest is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock,
the river is water power, the wind is wind “in the sails.”’ Yet, he adds, ‘in this kind of discovery of nature, nature as what “stirs and strives,” what overcomes us, entrances us as landscape, remains hidden’ [BT 2, 70]. In his magnum opus, Heidegger removes himself from his own entrancement with nature, the elemental is hidden. Is he fleeing in the face of the elemental, as in Being and Time he accuses Kant of fleeing before time? [BT2, 22]. What is hidden - that which stirs and strives - is the antithesis of machination, of the instrumental thinking. The world of nature is brought down to the earth, made ‘accessible,’ the object of man’s circumspection: ‘the farmer’s circumspection first discovers the south wind in its being by taking the lay of the land into account’ [BT2, 75].

That which overcomes is itself overcome. Nietzsche too. The very storm puts itself out. His work was the putting out of the very storm which produced it. And in the face of Nietzschean danger. In The Gay Science Nietzsche had written: ‘Storms are my danger. Will I have my storm of which I will perish…? Or will I go out like a light that no wind blows out but that becomes tired and sated with itself - a burned-out light? Or finally: will I blow myself out lest I burn out?’ [GS 250]17

Heidegger confronts the Zarathustrian oscillation:

‘the most vital human relationships become a spring again and provide the forces that drive one into isolation once more. So everything turns back into ruthlessness and violence, most of all toward those who are dearest and closest - such a life then becomes wholly a matter of exigencies that have no justification. Coming to terms with this in a positive way…is what it means to be a philosopher.’ [HA 41]
In this context, Heidegger bemoans the loss of meaning in the word ‘Tragedy...a word that, for our positive consciousness of existence - that is, in which a rupture is understood as real power - has lost all meaning’ [41], ‘tragedy’ a word that will return to Heidegger’s own consciousness of existence after his ‘fall’ in the Rectorship.

iv. Strife & Transformation

Ettinger’s suggestion of the close relationship between Heidegger’s involvement in the politics of Nazism and his emotional propensities could apply to Heidegger’s concern with Greek tragedy, for his personal life - seen from the perspective of his wife - was a tragedy. The concern with methodological order and access which he exercised in his work was antipodal to his own personal (and self-espoused) beyond-morality. The innermost antagonism within Heidegger’s ‘spiritual evolution’ intensified through the years. His wife Elfride had, in the understanding of his granddaughter Gertrud, ‘good reason to suspect that Martin was regularly maintaining relationships with other women’ [LW 127]. Not that they were entirely a secret from her, though it was not until 1950 that he told her of his relationship with Hannah Arendt. Indeed, his letters to Elfride are often quite open about his meetings with other women: from ‘Lisi’ Blochmann in 1930 [122] to Andrea von Harbou in the late 1950s.²⁰ He who had written of resoluteness, stance, authenticity, his magnum opus Being and Time addressed to the forgetting of Being in the Western philosophical tradition could and would write to Elfride, confessing to ‘fall[ing]victim to admiration & that sort of thing,’ and to ‘forgetting [my italics]...
to be hard towards myself & really bear & assume the burden of what is difficult in me...[for] I know that deep down that I belong to you & that you alone can help me build my life anew’ [127]. Heidegger recognizes that he had brought Elfride ‘such great inner suffering’ [128].

Heidegger draws attention to a function of his work, to the relationship of his work to his personal propensity to such forgetting: his ‘daily work I do to improve myself’ [HA 128]. This letter was merely the template of his letters throughout his married life, thus not merely a template to letters, but a recurrent problematic in his existence, whether we call it ‘demonic’ or ‘Dionysian,’ a prevailing shadow behind the hermeneutics of facticity.

Heidegger’s criticisms of Jaspers are indicative of his ‘moral’ position, his ‘psychic situation’- living an open marriage - through the early years of the 1920s giving a tinge of personal anti-moralism: ‘[Jaspers’] worldview could just as well be an essentially moral one, supposing that such hackneyed philosophical coinage still means anything’ [S 88]. As Heidegger approaches his political ‘fall’ in 1933, he writes to Elfride: ‘I find it unsettling how this man [Jaspers] sees our destiny & tasks in a thoroughly German way & with the most genuine instinct & the highest demands & yet is tied down by his wife-’ [LW, 141]. In view of their long-standing relationship, it may be unsettling that he should refer to Jaspers as ‘this man,’ pointing to a certain emotional dissociation which was extended to his family, and their relationship to his thinking, as we shall see below.

The antagonisms Heidegger discusses with Elfride in the early years of their marriage are revealed more particularly after 1933 when Heidegger’s Dionysianism - both repressed and released - takes on different manifestations in
both work and life, in which Heidegger's being hurled – thrown - into antagonism is most particularly manifest. The tensions are not resolved but exacerbated, the banishment of darkness in Heidegger’s life is nowhere any nearer than in the external world which he thoughtfully addresses. That he recognizes the dust upon which the flames are based applies to both his thinking and his feeling, both external and internal worlds.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger sees the task of philosophy ‘to preserve the force of the most elemental words* in which Dasein expresses itself’ [BT1, 262]. It is symbolic that - in the lecture on ‘The Raging Discordance between Truth and Art,’ in his lectures on *The Will to Power as Art* - Heidegger draws attention to ‘the fact that human Dasein...in so far as it is itself* [my italics] is steered directly toward whatever is named in...basic words’ [WPA 143]. He cites ‘being’, ‘freedom’, ‘truth’. But as Heidegger is steering us towards words - as he steers us to the notion that we are steered towards such words - we must be steered to Heidegger’s own words and their *in-so-far*. Towards the ‘driving force’ [of the] concealed, towards covert and hidden meaning [WPA 19, 102 & 104]. Such words he relates to Nietzsche’s seeing it a necessity for philosophers to ‘don masks’ [Nietzsche in WPA, 29], and to the function of Nietzsche’s Apollonian-Dionysian duality as a *cipher* which the German people must understand to avoid the ‘vengeance’ of history [WPA 104]. Words are indicative, disclosive. In a letter to Elfride in 1945 Heidegger writes: ‘A great deal from Hölderlin has only now become clear to me; but it’s only through certain key words & hardly sentences that I can get a hold on these insights’ [LW 185]. So indicative, so powerful, so ‘gathering’ as are words that ‘language will awake as the abode for a new dwelling.’ [185].
But his own words reveal an antinomial existence which is no ‘dwellingness.’ His own words bear on both the ‘spoken’ and the ‘unspoken.’ In a letter in February 1945 he writes of the ‘modern age’: ‘man has lost the proper relationship to the unnecessary, indeed perhaps never attained it’ [LW 187]. And in April 1945:

‘in spite of everything I trust in the higher future of our essence, though at times it looks as though all the Powers of Darkness have been unleashed even from within ourselves in order to block the path that leads there. [...] I often feel as though despite its dimensions this monstrosity suddenly ought to collapse in upon itself like an evil spirit because of its emptiness and vacuity.’ [188]

The *modern age* bears a distinct resemblance to his own antinomial factual life, with its failure to establish proper relationships out of ‘Powers of Darkness … unleashed even from within ourselves’ [188]. There is both a dissociation and association, both blindness and insight, both saying and refusal of saying where Heidegger talks of misery and pain here in 1945:

‘Perhaps even now, in spite of the unspeakable misery, there is little pain in the world because everything is only hardened by power of the will. What is now taking place over the entire planet is of such a kind that an essential event must be concealed within, even if we cannot yet see it & cannot yet speak of it. For this reason, however, we must always remain close, in our thinking, to what is concealed, without wanting to force anything. But there are times when this steadfastness exceeds the capacity of any human being....together in enduring & remembering we try to live up to everything that is dearest & most
worthy to us. Over everything there now lies a rubble of incongruity and strangeness, which is all the more disconcerting because it was heaped by one’s own people over the hidden striving of its own essence to grope its way to its truth’ [LW 186].

And heaped by himself. His depiction of the external world reflects his own internal demonic.  

Arendt, before her reconciliation with Heidegger after 1950, saw Heidegger using philosophy as a protection. In 1949, she wrote to Jaspers:

‘What you call impurity, I’d call lack of character, but in the sense that he has literally none, certainly not an especially bad one...That life in Todtnauberg, this railing against civilization, and writing Sein with a y is in reality a kind of mouse hole into which he withdrew, assuming with good reason that the only people he will have to see are pilgrims filled with admiration for him; no one is likely to climb 1200 metres just to make a scene. And even if someone did just that, then he will lie through his teeth and hope to God that nobody will call him a liar to his face. He certainly believed that by using this stratagem he could buy off the whole world at the lowest possible price and cheat his way out of everything that is embarrassing to him, and then do nothing but philosophize’ [Ettinger 67].

Walter Kaufmann would characterize Heidegger’s philosophy as his ‘Castle’ [Kaufmann 1960, 339].

In 1972 Heidegger writes to Hannah with incongruous phrases: ‘My niece...went hiking in the Black Forest with her husband and two children, where her husband
was run over by a gravel truck (*they are paid by the load*) [My italics] and was killed immediately’ [HA 202].

Against this personal demonic Heidegger’s letters reveal also his ‘attempts’ to counter that demonic, which here is through an inclusion rather than an excision, a bringing and a gathering together, which he strives for in his work, and in existence, out of a great need to bring together the facets of his life, his needs.

‘I’m now in the process of tuning the instrument of thinking to its fundamental pitch & gathering all its essential relationships...’ [LW 193].

‘In front of me is the picture of the Parthenon & underneath the little pictures of Jorg & Hermann & the house. It belongs together after all’ [192].

Yet within his letters he writes on two levels, with two hands as Derrida might say. Gertrud tells us that in 1946 ‘he had to make a decision between Elfride and his mistress Margot von Sachsen-Meiningen’ [191]. His letter to Elfride - in the context of her concerns and the family situation, his sons Jorg and Hermann having gone missing in Russia and Czechoslovakia - is pervaded by dislocation and incongruous juxtapositions:

‘My D[earest.]S[oul].

...

‘One thing clear to me is that in no way shall I live together with M[argent]. If I decide on Messkirch or my own home area, I’d like you to be there *with me*. It is also clear to me that I must get away from the
university atmosphere entirely, so my thinking & evolving work retains its clear style and grounding.’

Heidegger continues:

[Working in Messkirch] ‘would become a ‘natural thing’ & the work would be part of the growth of the native soil precisely because it is growing into what is universal & is becoming something that could creatively incorporate ‘the East’ within its mysterious essence beyond the immediate apparent ‘political’ conflict. I often think it can be no accident that Jorg & Hermann are in Russia – a mysterious exhortation is concealed therein, a pain that leads into the open & permits both of them to share in the task assigned to me…

‘my freedom towards myself has emerged anew…

‘Fondly thinking of you, your Martin.’ [LW 195-196]

Heidegger’s work would provide not only an ontological insight – but coming out of a Dionysian burning - an Apollonian healing:

‘We’ve long since ceased to exist in order to produce ‘philosophy’ & ‘culture’- but rather to find the site where the dwelling human being is again touched by Being as what is whole and healing, & disaster does not lapse into a mere meaninglessness to be ignored ‘once the war is over’ ’[197].

Elfride was to provide the same wholeness and healing from lapses into meaninglessness:
'I thank you for helping & ensuring that we now help ourselves into the open in unison, each of us giving the other what is one's own & receiving it from the other.' [198]

The burning wound and healing gathered together:

‘And so I trust [that] the depth of your and M's hearts, each in its underlying tone, will help the saying & release it anew & joyfully tend it.’ [198]

For Heidegger the ‘will to unity’ pervades his intimate relationships. It was at the beginning of 1950, only shortly after informing Elfride of his love-affair with Hannah Arendt, beginning over twenty years earlier, that he could, against his feeling of ‘guilt,’ write to Hannah, after her visit to the Heidegger's: ‘the discussion between my wife and you grew from misunderstanding and scrutiny to the harmony of troubled hearts’ [HA 58]. His wish - his desire - is that there develops a ‘pure element of conscious trust among us three,’ that ‘a lively harmony develop as genuine mutual understanding’ [58]. He explains Elfride’s position in the most desirable terms:

‘In no way did my wife want to infringe on the fate of our love. All she wanted to do was free this gift of the taint that had necessarily marked it because of my silence. This silence was not simply an abuse of her trust. In fact, it was because I knew that my wife would not just understand but also affirm the joyousness and the richness of our love as a gift of fate that I pushed her trust aside.’

And he sees the recovery of their long-absented relationship:
'It will be the most beautiful thing of all, for now both the early and late have been brought purely into the open. I know that you, too, are rejoicing in this purity, and that you belong to us.'

Heidegger ends: ‘My wife sends her best.’ [58/59]

In his letter a week later he 'harmonizes' the ontical with the ontological, writing of goodness and salvation interfused with his ‘unification’ of the triadic relationship between himself, Elfride and Hannah:

‘The good needs the heart's kindness, which sees because it has already foreseen everything for man's salvation into his essence...a merely moral attitude is not enough,22 - no more than is free-floating erudition...One must experience the innermost hinge of Being so as to arrive at a point where one understands that justice is not a function of power but rather the ray of goodness that is one’s salvation...The peoples of the world must first devote their own strengths to the infinite intention of redeeming goodness if humanity, in historical dignity, is to rise to the call of Being, and save itself in it...The spontaneous harmony between my wife and you is something that will last...We have to catch up, Hannah, on a quarter century of our lives; I would like to hear more about your current direction and work, too, so that one gratifying harmony can be accompanied by another, here and there in the distance, becoming one voice, and so that the language you talked about so beautifully and positively can reduce the distance between us.

...
‘My wife sends you her best...

Freiburg 15 Feb 1950 [HA 64-65]

At the same time as he wishes a harmonization which will include his wife and
Hannah’s husband he writes: ‘The way you stand with your coat blowing in the sea
breeze speaks to me in language as pure as the birth of Aphrodite’ [HA 93].
Yet Elfride is to be Heidegger’s Apollo: ‘something indescribable prevails and
endures between us. Time & again it has been seriously jeopardized by my
behaviour all these years. But time & again you’ve saved it, and each time I’ve been
brought back into the constancy of this painful happiness’ [LW 212]. And the
relationship between his work and his life: ‘how much everything you do forms
part of our shared life & of my thinking...essentially...your constant and
accompanying presence [Mitdasein], leaves a lasting mark on whatever may be
lasting about this thinking’[212].
And that against which this healing is required Heidegger acknowledges to be Eros.
Eros as Dionysus is inseparable from Apollo. Elfride is - as his work is - Heidegger’s
recurrent means through which he subdues himself, an Apollonian-Dionysian
polemos. He provides a cipher for the German people out of his own self:

‘The other thing, inseparable in a different way from my love for you &
from my thinking, is difficult to say. I call it Eros...The best of that god’s
wings moves me every time I take a substantial step in my thinking and
venture onto untrodden paths. It moves me perhaps more powerfully &
uncannily than others when something long intuited is to be led across
into the realm of the sayable & when what has been said must after all
be left in solitude for a long time to come. To live up to this purely and yet retain what is ours, to follow the flight and yet return home safely, to accomplish both things as equally essential and pertinent, this is where I fail too easily & then either stray into pure sensuality or try to force the unforceable through sheer work' [LW 213].

And this Erotic, Dionysian falling, ‘erring,’ fills Heidegger with an ‘oppressive guilt...about the great pain I’ve inflicted on you time & again’ [222]. He acknowledges that he fails ‘to bring the human dimension and the thinking into proper harmony with one another’ [223]. His hope for ‘reconciliation belongs with “atonement,’” and for Heidegger, tellingly, “to atone” really means: to still - to bring one another into the stillness of essential belonging’ [225-226]. Thinking grows out of emotional needs. Whilst Heidegger tells Elfride that ‘primordially my sense of belonging to you remains intact within me through all confusion & failure’ [225], he speaks to her of his relationship with Sophie Dorothee von Podewils, stating that ‘for me it’s decisive that all desolation of discord is kept at bay’ [226], that is with both Sophie and Elfride, for whom his love was ‘indestructible’ [231]: ‘What I’ve tried to give S[oephie] D[orothee] takes nothing away from you & was never intended to impinge upon what is ours, let alone forsake it. Yet he continues to meet Sophie, and thanks Elfride for the ‘openness’ that has now emerged, sending Elfride Sophie’s ‘regards’ [230-231]. This ‘openness,’ always an assumption on Heidegger's part, - though often kept hidden - increased. Having apologised for his ‘failure to talk’ and taking the ‘blame’ he attempts a harmonization of discord: ‘how your ever willing heart is opening itself up to S.D. again too, even though your character & hers are quite different’ [237-8]. His
protestations of ‘friendship’ obviously do not assuage the situation with Elfride -
do not effect that harmonization - for he writes to her:

‘I could never leave you...even though it may seem as though I am
wholly withdrawn from you in utter forgetfulness. This was the case
from time to time with M[argot]. I thank you for telling me again &
again of your deep distress - it is no less painful for me than it is for you
to endure & tell me of it....On S.D.s part & mine there's a real &
understanding endeavour - a restraint that grows ever more pleasant &
securely in strength...

‘to you I can above all say everything freely & with trusting openness –
for no longer is there the oppressiveness of secrecy, but only the pain of
your bitterness.

We will shortly see what this ‘only’ meant for Elfride. But first we note that
Heidegger calls on the power of Eros as a creative necessity for his thinking, his
work:

‘my character is more contradictory than yours; and I cannot prove to
you by any arguments that I have to live in Eros in order to give at least
a preliminary & imperfect form to the creativity I still feel within me as
something unresolved and ultimate.

‘I’m not yet capable of the unbroken & free awareness &
transformation of Eros either; & I know I’ve abused your trust too much
for you to be able to feel calm & assured about giving me free rein here’
[LW 246].

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In spite of his ruses of reconciliation and harmonization he knows ‘how far I am from winning back your trust’ [247]. It is telling - if not conditioned - that he should discuss Leibniz with her: “Nothing is without a sufficient reason”; the principle is at the same time the basis of causality’ [251]. Heidegger is now having a relationship with art historian Marielene Putscher about which Elfride is not happy. Heidegger writes: ‘Trust is strength in the affirmation of what is concealed & what we leave unspoken in its hiddenness’ [251-252].

In *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche speaks of war as a ‘grand sagacity’ [TI, 21], a ‘ruse’ [TI2, 3] of the spirit grown too inward. Heidegger’s ‘thinking’ too develops, on one level, as a ruse - a grand sagacity - to evade the all too human emotional turmoil in which he lived. It is a grand declaration of war against the self, an inner Apollonian-Dionysian antithesis. He wishes to save both Margot and Hannah:

‘the fact that you immediately felt a sort of elective affinity with M. is a pledge that my love for you, irreplaceable & enduring as it is, can incorporate my fatedly other love for M. Once I’m released from the burden of what is unfree I have powers of love which cannot let your heart turn to stone & are capable of ensuring that M. continues to grow and does not waste away.’ [LW, 253]

The need to incorporate, to gather, to *still* struggles against the ‘demon’ which he recognizes as ‘weakness,’ yet, he declares to his wife: ‘If my existence is without passion, my voice falls silent & the source does not spring forth. You rightly say: what is this, if so much untruth is involved? I do believe though - without wanting to make excuses - that the question of truth & untruth isn’t that simple.’ [254]
Heidegger’s perceived harmonizations, incorporations and affinities were not shared by Elfride, who, as his niece Gertrud tells us, ‘suffered greatly as Heidegger continued to get involved with younger women and work with them’ [254]. There were letters to Heidegger that Elfride did not send:

‘yes, you have your work, which is the centre of your entire life, - but then what happens on the sidelines anyway! This is how you cannot understand how - through you - I’ve been cast out from my centre.

‘In your first letter there were words from a quite shallow sphere, ‘weakness’ & ‘excuse’, oh no - that just won’t do. For I know of what you do, of the inspiration you need, & even now I’ve striven once more to see what makes you happy & her as the one who can give it. But that all this should be bound up not only with ‘lies’- no, with the most inhuman abuse of my trust, this fills me with despair.

‘And I’m supposed to be able to endure it – not once- but again & again throughout 4 decades?...Time & again you say & write that you’re bound to me - what is the bond? It isn’t love, it isn’t trust, you look for ‘home’ in other women - oh Martin - what is happening to me - this icy loneliness.

‘Have you ever thought about what empty words are - hollow words?

What is lacking in such words?’ [255]

Elfride put this letter with an undated transcript of a birthday letter Heidegger had sent to her for her birthday in 1918, entitled ‘In the Thou to God’ [255]. Heidegger’s words highlight the nature of the emotional event that he experienced, required for his being, his thinking. These words predated and connected to his later letters, his later experiences. Heidegger had written:
‘The state of things was broken by the primordial...The state of things was bypassed as if it did not exist, & the self was struck with elemental force on a new & originary path. The ‘Thou’ of your loving soul had struck me.

‘The experience of being stricken was the beginning of the break-out of my ownmost self. My direct and unmediated belonging to your ‘Thou’ gave me to myself as a possession....The fundamental experience of the ‘Thou’ then became a totality flooding through existence...The fundamental experience of living love & real trust made my being blossom intensify. It has had a creative effect in the sense that the basic patterns of my inner working, which initially yearned only for a return to the soul’s primordiality, have broken out from the primordial origin.’

[256]

Elfride noted on the back: ‘the model for all his love letters to his many ‘loves’ [LW 256]. His reply merely confirms Elfride in her feelings of being excluded from Heidegger’s concerns. And yet...he writes in 1956:

‘my letter is filled with pondering on what I’ve done to you. And I’d like to avoid the grand words you- rightly - fear and simply offer my silent thanks to you for having always lovingly been there, and being there still & helping me merely through this.

‘A lot of time in our life has gone by and even so I ask you once more, give me time to find the path and regain my inner peace and composure.
‘And what is indestructible about our love, which has come to fulfilment in our shared life & activity, even though some things have militated against it, will again sustain you & keep you open for the many beautiful things that are still in store for us....

‘Keep your free nature - I beg you - & I'll help you & get things straight with myself. Otherwise this will prove a great hindrance to the work as well.

‘With fondest wishes, I'm still there-

Yours Martin’ [LW 256-257]

Elfride would be still there at the end. Heidegger visited Frau Leiner. Again he writes to Elfride: ‘I do now see everything in a different light & from the point of view of responsibility’ [258]. The following year he stays with Dory Vietta in Aix-en-Provence at the same hotel he had stayed at with Elfride the previous year, talking openly about her in his letters to his wife. Again he writes: ‘Stay here & help me, now that - more knowing and resolute - I’d like to come out into the open & into responsibility’ [266]. Another relationship, Andrea von Harbou [265]. But recognizing that ‘there’s nothing sustaining or really significant about these encounters....will also make me quite free again for you for the important years we may yet have on store...it will be a good, purified time for me with you....Frau Vietta & Frau Feick send you their best regards’ [266-7]. Eros is necessary: ‘Your loyalty & quiet help has never been so clear to me as it is now...And that I’ve been granted the collaboration of D[ory]. and Frau F[jeck]. is both an alleviation and an inspiration which gives me heart to put the essential into words. So let this greeting be a deep thank you’ [270]. The following year: ‘I’m becoming ever more
clearly and enduringly aware of what my ‘works’ owe to your closeness and foresight...every day and the hours awake at night I’m sad about myself & what I’ve done to you’[278 & 311].

It is difficult to offer a ‘purified’ narrative free of any psychological or moral evaluation. To repeat: I attempt to offer this as a phenomenological presentation of the Dionysian excess - the ‘demonic,’ - within Heidegger’s factual life, rather than depth psychology. Earlier I drew on Joseph Heller to suggest something happened within Heidegger’s factual existence, his life: the birth of his ‘son’ Hermann, conceived by another. Gertrud’s anthology of Heidegger’s letters to Elfride gives Hermann the opportunity to express the impact of this ‘happening’ on him: at the age of 14 he had been told by his mother that it was his godfather who was, in fact, his ‘natural’ father:

‘Now I am grateful to my niece for allowing me to make this declaration,
in so doing freeing myself from a burden that has weighed upon and tormented me for 71 years and confessing the historical truth.’ [317]

We can only speculate on the question of whether the burden and torments were a prevailing factor in the Dionysian and demonic demands within Heidegger’s factual life. For our purposes it is sufficient to see these demands as something which Heidegger embraced as his needs - which he claimed were essential for his creativity, at the same time as he ‘stilled’ their presence within that work.

The ‘words’, the ‘key words & hardly sentences’ [113] in the poems he writes to Hannah after their recovered friendship in 1950, give us insight into the process of one who will later write to her that ‘the field of paths is guided by an invisible hand’ [HA 207]. The poem ‘The Light’ includes the phrase: ‘the wild being shot into the
In ‘The Second Look’ the theme of thought shot through - interfused - with love, with Eros is presented:

‘When into thought love climbs,
to it Being has inclined.

‘When thought with love illuminates,
grace has given it what radiates’ [HA 87].

In the poem ‘On a Drawing by Henri Matisse,’ Heidegger speaks of ‘muted rift’ and redemption:

Enriddled
how into traits
of path, from pure
flight, so sure,

one muted rift
weaves you, so swift.

It spied
what’s distant nigh.

It redeemed.’ [HA 106]

Heidegger acknowledges the disjunction between the order of his intellectual endeavours and the chaos of his emotional life: ‘the rift between man’s most essential efforts and his immediate ineffectuality is becoming increasingly uncanny’ [113]. What he cannot bring together in his psychic, emotional life, Heidegger seeks to unify in his work: ‘I am now in the process of putting together in a single volume the lectures and essays that have appeared separately in the past few years, but in such a way that their inner unity fully comes to light’ [116].
And returning to the language of his lectures on the *Phenomenology of Religious Life* he concludes: ‘This *retractatio* is quite salutary’ [116].23 The *retractatio* appears in his poem CEZANNE:

Rescued, the urgently doubled duplicity

of what is “present,”

transformed in the work to simplicity.

[184]24

There is a sense in which his philosophical tracts of the 1920s can be understood as *wild being shot into the mild*, the work a transformation, a *muted rift*.

In 1924, Heidegger had, in a poem entitled ‘Magic,’ written of the ‘indescribable mutation...in art: flames come from dust’ [LW 248]. And out of the dust - out of the burnings of Eros - comes the flame of insight. Heidegger’s fundamental ontology both evades out of the conflict between the Apollonian and the Dionysian, and, yet, is a very ‘possibility’ of perceiving the ontological status of this duality.
CHAPTER 4

FUGUE, SUPPRESSION AND INTENSIFICATION IN
HEIDEGGER’S THINKING OF THE 1920S

i. Introduction

ii. Tradition and Counter-Tradition

iii. Fugue & Oscillation

iv. Inauthenticity & Authenticity

v. Suppression & Intensification/ epoché & Steigerung:
   Being-toward-death.

vi. Authenticity and Heidegger’s ‘great separation.’

vii. A return to the Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle.
'But if human language is in the word, only then is it in order. If it is in order, there is a chance of access to the hidden sources.'

[May 2005, 1]

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i. Introduction

With a mind to the ‘political case’ ahead, though not addressing it directly, I have sought to uncover a trace of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality as a cipher for understanding Heidegger’s thinking during the 1920s, as propadeutic to the question of Heidegger’s political actions and silences during and after the Third Reich. Following the ‘failure’ of his attempt to engage directly in the politics of the Third Reich, Heidegger, in his 1934 lectures on Hölderlin, openly acknowledged the pervasive presence of the god Dionysus: ‘Dionysus is not merely a demigod among others, but the demigod par excellence’ [Jancaud 1996, 100], as he acknowledged in his letters the eruption of the power of Eros, suppressed and intensified in his fundamental ontology, which both resonates with the call for a rigorous purity of method in establishing fundamental structures of existence and at the same time is an Apollonian attempt to suppress Dionysian existence, including his own. The thought appears in relation to the unsaid. Heidegger’s silences in the face of the Dionysian preceded his ‘silence’ in the face of the actuality and history of the Third Reich. Not saying will be seen to be built into Heidegger's thinking. There are other tensions and latencies which disclose a genetic condition of possibility.

The possibility that the ‘matter’ of his thinking may take one on different ‘ways’, opening up different perspectives, was apparent to Heidegger himself as he
pursued his confrontation with 'Nietzsche' in his lectures on *The Will to Power as Art* [WPA, xl], and, as Christopher Fynsk observes in his book *Language and Relation*, 'it is not uncommon for Heidegger to offer the means for an entirely different reading of his argument from the one his text seems to favour by its rhetorical movements...Heidegger's text...points to different paths of inquiry' [Fynsk 1996, 29]. As we have seen, in those same lectures on Nietzsche, Heidegger profferred the Apollonian-Dionysian duality as a *cipher* for understanding. And, indeed, what has emerged in my study was the hermeneutic value of this very duality in an understanding of Heidegger's thinking, the *being* of his thinking.

The question of the relation between philosophy and biography is a sensitive question. But we have seen that, whilst on occasion Heidegger holds a 'purist' repudiation of the philosophical need for the biographical, at other times - as is the logic of the inextricable relation within his fundamental ontology between the ontical and the ontological - he endorses the disclosive potential of philosophy for the biographical [Janicaud 1996, 18]. And disclosive have been the direct expressions of Heidegger's personal life - his letters. No merely unphilosophical communication, these ask questions of Heidegger's philosophical exposition, at the same time suggesting a potential within fundamental ontology, as phenomenology. Thus the orientation of fundamental ontology towards the revelation of that which is concealed opens out the possibilities of self-deconstruction, an *Auseinandersetzung* within itself.

It is my contention that the suppressions of the ontic and intensifications of the ontological within Heidegger's public thinking were, at one level, conditions of the possibility of Heidegger's 'way' towards political *involvement* (I italicize this word
for the nature and degree of this post-Rectoral involvement is itself a question),
just as his way out of political engagement involved a reconfiguration of those
suppressions and intensifications, of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality.

In this final chapter I attempt an interpretation of Heidegger's magnum opus, Being
and Time, in terms of fugue and the mutually generative duality of suppression and
intensification. The attempt here is not to see a politics 'in' Being and Time, but to
indicate a condition of possibility of Heidegger's way into politics.

ii. Tradition and Counter-tradition

Zarathustra: 'Truly, it is more when one's teaching comes out of
one's own burning!' [Z 116]

"Have become a (heavy) burden to myself...I have become a
question to myself"...out of the "wounds" of a 'devilish being-torn-apart'
[Augustine in PRL 154].

I now offer an analysis of the text of Being and Time in terms of the two traditions,
or rather the tradition and counter tradition discussed in my second chapter; and,
in view of the two quotes above, which talk of 'burning' and 'wounds,' with a view
to the relation between the matter of Heidegger's letters to the matter of his 'texts,'
thus the 'being' of Heidegger's philosophizing, the 'behaviour' of the questioner
[BT1, 24]. In his lectures of 1921-22 on the Phenomenological Interpretations of
Aristotle, Heidegger calls for the clarification of 'the Being of philosophizing in
relation to the historiological and to history....graspable only as existence
and...accessible only out of purely factical life' [PIA 3]; and in Being and Time he
writes: ‘Being is always the being of a being,’ only fully brought to light when the question of being is ‘sufficiently delineated with regard to its function, intention, and motives’ [BT2, 8]. And Heidegger’s texts, these are beings. The text is Heidegger-as-Dasein’s own behaviour.

Almost an Alpine nook from which Nietzsche ‘wrote down his thoughts about the Greeks’ [NBW 17], it was at his mountain retreat at Todtnauberg in the Black Forest 6 that Heidegger, in 1926, dedicated Being and Time to his mentor Edmund Husserl, whose name is thus conspicuous by its late appearance in Heidegger’s ‘Introduction’ which nevertheless echoes Husserl’s claim: ‘From its earliest beginnings philosophy has claimed to be rigorous science,’ meeting the ‘loftiest theoretical needs’ [PRS 71]. In resignation, Husserl had come to feel that this was no more than a dream. His call to a reformation ended with lament.

Heidegger opens Being and Time with a similar call for the recovery of the unattained, a lament that ‘the Question of Being...has today been forgotten’ [BT2, 1]. Being and Time arises out of a mission to retrieve the awareness of the question of Being from forgottenness. But the ‘forgetful’ would include Husserl. There is an ironic overdetermination in Heidegger’s following his dedication to Husserl with that prefatory quote from Plato’s Sophist: “For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression ‘being’. We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed” [BT2, xxix]. Husserl had eschewed the uncertainties of the ontological question in favour of the certainties of Cartesian epistemology. Heidegger had asked of the being of Husserl’s transcendental ego. He wants to restore that which the ancient philosophers found continually disturbing.
But that recalling of disturbance is in the name of its taming, as - ambiguously - the abrogation of God will maintain the privileging of Dasein over all other beings, whilst filling His supersensuous space with the reinvocation of the perplexity of Being. As Husserl attempts to create a ‘genuine science...to transform...chaos...into a simple, completely clear, lucid order’ [PRS 144], Heidegger seeks to bring order to the most obscure question, to bring into the open, into the light, the darkest question of all - the question of Being - to which we ‘in our time’ have no answer, the question itself - Being - the ‘most obscure of all’ concepts [BT2, 2]. His call to the question of Being - echoing Husserl’s call for an apodictic rigorous science - seeks to pull the reader out of prevailing thinking into a recovered primordial essential thinking into the meaning of Being. Heidegger wishes to bring order to the obscure, yet, dwelling within the question, concerned that to do so invites the accusation of ‘error of method’. Heidegger seeks an obscurity, a Nietzschean ‘rich ambiguity’ through certainty, an approach to the clarification of ‘the darkest of all questions’ through an Husserlian Apollonian apodicticity of proper method. There are, as Derrida observes, two gestures within Heidegger's thinking: “two texts, two hands, two visions, two ways of listening. Together simultaneously and separately” [van Buren 1994, 10]. And together simultaneously and separately, the Apollonian-Dionysian duality will inhabit Heidegger’s text.

The being of the text of *Being and Time* is manifestation of the tension, the strife, the fugue between establishing ‘essential structures’ of everydayness and the promise of the tonality of developing and decaying, being and becoming, an attempted fusion of Husserl with Nietzsche, an *Auseinandersetzung* with both in a fugue of method and content. This strife between ‘essential structure’ and
perception of movement is the essence of understanding, a fugal synthesising, an
Auseinandersetzung. Heidegger's pursuit of a primordial fundamental ontology is
both impulse and taming, both darkness and structure, both tradition and counter-
tradition in contention, a fugal strife.

The section entitled Formal Structure of the Question of Being is indeed symbolic, a
fugue between the scientific and mystical traditions: The questioning of the
darkest, most obscure questions moves by neither an intuitive seeing [Husserl] nor
an 'immediate certainty of vision' [Nietzsche] but advances through a 'formal
structure.' It is the meeting of the two philosophical traditions, a fusion that is a
fugal contention. And, indeed, Heidegger alerts us to Aristotle's 'radical view' that
'every logos is [synthesis] and [separation] at the same time... equiprimordially,' a
relation which is 'closely bound up with the actual state of the fundamental
ontological problematic' [BT2, 153-154]. It is closely bound too to the emergence
in Heidegger's thinking of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality as a cipher for
understanding, and thus raising the question of the fundamental ontological
import of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality.

Against - but within the formal - Heidegger's formulations inhere with the counter-
formulaic, the mystical and psychological, that there is a functioning that is pre-
cognitive, an intuitive sensing: the seeking that is every questioning 'gets guided
beforehand by what is sought' [BT1, 24]. His pathways will point to a Nietzschean
privileging of seeking over finding. At the same time the immediate thrust of his
thinking is 'descensional,' to bring the mystical down to an everyday experience:
that 'prior' guidance of questioning - into the meaning of Being - by 'what it
seeks....must...already be available in a certain way' [BT2, 4]. Yet, our everyday
‘conduct’ [BT1, 25] and involvements are ‘already’ guided by an understanding of Being. The everyday indeed lay in close proximity to that most obscure question. We are guided by our pre-conceptual understanding towards an ontological understanding, the understanding of Being, but made through an ‘interrogation’ of the ‘being of beings’ for ‘Being is always the being of a being’ [BT2, 8]. Heidegger suggests that this process is circular: being-in-the-world has the ‘ontological structure of the circle.’ [BT2, 148-9] Yet, the apparently circular reasoning is in fact a ‘relatedness backward and forward’ [BT2, 7]. The ontological structure of the hermeneutic circle of understanding is fugal.

Heidegger sees the ‘Being’ question as the most obscure yet contends against this ‘darkest question’ with a Husserlian impulse to attain ‘explicit formulation’ and ‘complete clarity.’ [BT2, 6] The darkness must be tamed, fundamental ontology the phenomenological will to the ‘taming’ of the ‘darkness’. Against the mystical will to retrieve the obscure, the will to mastery concerns itself with the establishment of the ‘genuine mode of access’ to ‘the right choice of the exemplary being...which we ourselves in each case are’ [BT2, 6]. Heidegger’s fundamental ontology will privilege Dasein over all other beings, as disclosive of Being: ‘Beings are discovered only when Dasein is, and only as long as Dasein is are they disclosed....Before there was any Dasein, there was no truth; nor will there be any after Dasein is no more’ [BT2, 217].

The meaning of Being, then, is disclosed through a privileged being - prior to all other beings - the highest ‘privilege’ of ‘the being we inquirers ourselves in each case are’ [BT2, 6]. But the certainties of method through the certainties of privileged being disclose also the deconstruction of that privileged being: the one
who questions is to be made ‘transparent’ in its being. Beneath the certainties of privilege that which is not transparent is to be revealed. The privileged being is not transparent: it requires phenomenological intuition to open up its concealments. Its privilege lay in its ability to exercise phenomenological intuition in order to open up its own concealments.

Heidegger names this being Dasein, no longer the certain ‘ego’ but a ‘being-there’ in the world, a being-in-the-world, an opening-into, yet a being which must be questioned ‘initially and for the most part’ in its average everydayness. Heidegger’s own questioning suggests his own text as a mode of everyday being, even as it is a transcendence of that being. His ‘destructions’ contain a self-projection: ‘All ontology...remains fundamentally blind and perverts its innermost intent if it has not previously clarified the meaning of being sufficiently and grasped this clarification as its fundamental task’ [BT2, 10]. Yet his own text may be antinomial: both reflecting and suppressing his own fundamental mood. At the same time, Dasein’s ontical priority reflects the dualistic tradition of philosophy: the formalistic tendency to explicitness and clarification both expresses and fugues with the ontical distinction of Dasein, that ‘in its being this being is concerned about its very being’ [BT2, 11], for the methodological may be both an expression of and an evasion of ‘concern.’ The philosophical dissonance is indeed reflective of a dissonance in the constitution of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, ‘its possibility to be itself or not to be itself’ [BT2, 11].

The Dasein of the earlier lectures on the Phenomenology of Religious Life, that ‘concerned’, ‘distressed’ ‘object within history’ [PRL 36], is now, in Being and Time, both evaded and heightened through a deprivation of the ontic, in the
characterization that the ontic ‘fact’ of Dasein is that ‘it is ontological’ [BT2, 11]. In
the being of his text, Heidegger ontologises away the distress of this distress, no
manifest Nietzschean philosophizing out of one's own burning. Heidegger’s own
burning (the Dionysian excesses), manifest in his letters, are tranquillized. As
Dasein is always in each case ‘mine,’ Heidegger’s text is his own mineness and, yet,
not entirely.

Heidegger’s relation to that ‘distress,’ like his relation with Husserl, will be one of
indirection. The themes of a distressed object in history - concern, conscience,
angst, authenticity, death - remain Heidegger’s concern, but they are reconfigured.
There is a recurrence of the fugue of approach and withdrawal: the concern, out of
its very being, contends with the ‘elaboration of the question,’ and the dwelling in
the need to ‘pinpoint the particular being that is to function as the primary being to
be interrogated,’ the need for ‘an explicit appropriation and securing of correct
access to this being’ [BT2, 15]. Throughout Being and Time, in this repeated
tendency to need to secure ‘access’ through establishing the priority of Dasein,
Heidegger retreats from that very tonality of the ‘darkest,’ most obscure question,
vitiating the move towards securing the matter of the thing itself. The tendency to
formalism - to the structuring and the containing of excess - both mirrors that
against which it contends,7 and generates its own excess of method, through which
the very revolution in Heidegger’s thinking - the stripping away from this
privileged being of the Cartesian ego or Husserl’s transcendental ego to reveal
Dasein as no isolated being, but a being-in-the-world - is in danger of being lost.

Oskar Becker writes that ‘Sein und Zeit is no longer the original Heidegger, but
rather repeats [the] original breakthrough [of his earlier lectures] in a
scholastically hardened form’ [van Buren 1994, 4]. To get to the being-in-the-world of Dasein ‘about which this being is concerned,’ to see ‘Care as the being of Dasein’, we must continually tread the path of formalism: ‘PART ONE: DIVISION ONE,’ ‘The Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein,’ ‘The Theme of the Analytic of Dasein,’ etc - which punctures the realisation of the ‘whatness,’ the essentia, the existence of this being, which is no mere objective presence [BT2, 41] but the potential of possibility-within-its-world. The formalism of the objective presence of Heidegger’s ‘presentation’ continually disrupts the ‘way’ of his real concern, which is the disclosure of the ‘being which this being is concerned about’ in its being [which] is always my own’ and the privileging of the realisation of possibility over objective presence [BT2, 42]. In 1945 Heidegger wrote to his wife: ‘Valuable though my earlier teaching was, it never really let the authentic heart of my thinking become properly free - the merely scholastic & scholarly would suddenly intrude & prevent or warp the simple and essential’ [LW 190].

As in each case mine, fundamental ontology reflects back upon the interpretation of Heidegger, for ‘the way the world is understood is ontologically reflected back upon the interpretation of Dasein’ [BT2, 16]. Indeed the very intention of fundamental ontology is that ‘this being [Dasein] can show itself to itself on its own’ [BT2, 16]. And this is no uniform movement, for Dasein’s understanding of Being, indeed Dasein-as-understanding-of-being, ‘develops or decays according to the manner of being of Dasein at any given time’ [BT2, 16]. Nietzsche offers a more dynamic formulation: ‘mankind is not a whole: it is an inextricable multiplicity of ascending and descending life-processes’ [WP 184], as Heidegger’s letters reveal.
The formal structure aims at ‘the most primordial interpretation of being,’ primordiality that very Nietzschean concern in the search for the origins of tragedy. But, here, in *Being and Time*, the ‘tragic’ is acknowledged, though – characteristically - parenthetically as a brief quote from Augustine: ‘Assuredly I labour here and I labour within myself: I have become to myself a land of trouble and inordinate sweat’ [BT2, 43]. An acknowledgement of the human-all-too-human is veiled in the repudiation of psychology, but in the name of personalization, seeing the ‘psychological…comprehension of acts as something psychical…identical with…objectification…with…depersonalization’ [BT2, 47]. The rejection of the psychic is in the name of - what in average everydayness - would be considered to be psychological: personalization. The psychic, the psychological, the personalization is reconfigured, disappearing only to reappear, a strife against its occlusion from the ontological.

Heidegger’s fundamental ontology aims at the ‘ontologically more transparent purification of what has been ontically discovered’ [BT2, 50]. But, in striving for a new vision, free from the depersonalizations of the philosophies and sciences of objective presence, something is lost in this purification. In the ontological orientation of Dasein as care, the facticity of facticity, the being-in-the-world of being-in-the-world, is both heightened and reduced: the average experiences of “distress,” “melancholy,” or “the cares of life”...are ontically possible only because Dasein, ontologically understood, is care’ [BT2, 57]. The project itself seems split, dissonant, in its depersonalized attempt to go beyond the depersonalizations of the philosophies and sciences of objective presence. And as Heidegger says of Dasein: ‘With its facticity, the being-in-the-world of Dasein has already dispersed itself in
The text of *Being and Time* is indeed as ontical expression of this ontological perception, an *Auseinandersetzung* within.

### iii. Fugue and Oscillation

I have raised the question of the fundamental ontological import of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality. Nietzsche had written of this duality ‘out of the spirit of music.’ And, in his *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, Heidegger introduces the notion of the analogy between *philosophizing* and *musicizing* [PIA 36]. I now look at Heidegger’s texts as expressive of a musical (and psychological) process indicatively interpreted as ‘fugue’, the very word pointing both to the synchronous diachronocity of Heidegger’s ecstatic temporality - a temporalization from past and future into the present - and to the proximity between musical process and psychic state. And it is in its fugal nature that the text exhibits that disjunction between, on the one hand, the impulse to attain ‘explicit formulation’ and ‘complete clarity’ [BT2, 6], and, on the other, the questionabilities in pursuing that most obscure, ‘darkest question’ of Being, exhibiting too the fugal nature of Being as it is manifest in the struggles of Heidegger himself. The fugal nature of the ‘matter’ in the pursuit of the question of Being pervades Heidegger's thinking, disclosive of Being, and of Heidegger. I wish now to pursue the fugal nature of Heidegger’s thinking in relation to the problematics of authenticity and being-toward-death, and in relation to the developing *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche. I take these themes to indicate the strifeful concerns - matters - in contention with the controlling methodological impulse; the Nietzschean ambiguities against the Husserlian
demand for certainty; the Dionysian agitation against the Apollonian ‘taming’ of the terrible. In this next section I set out to reveal the fugality within Heidegger’s treatment of the authenticity-inauthenticity polarity, an analytic of Heidegger, which discloses the strife in Being.

**iv. Inauthenticity-Authenticity**

In a letter to Elizabeth Blockmann in 1919 Heidegger had set out his goal:

’It is a rationalist misunderstanding of the nature of the personal flow of life to believe, and demand, that it should vibrate in those same broad and sonorous amplitudes which well up in inspired moments. Such demands arise from a lack of inner humility before the mystery and grace of all life. We should be able to wait for high-tension intensities of meaningful life - and must live in continuity with those moments - not so much enjoying them as fitting them into our lives, taking them along in the passage of life, and including them in the rhythm of all future life’ [Safranski 1998, 87].

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger pursues the authenticity-inauthenticity problematic. He says on several occasions that he intends no relative judgement on these positions, thus suggesting two authenticities, inauthenticity being an ‘authentic’ mode of everyday being in ‘theyness.’ I intend to demonstrate that what emerges is a double fugue: that between the notions of inauthenticity and a higher authenticity, and that between these assumptions and Heidegger’s attempt to expunge this duality of any privileging of authenticity, an attempt to fulfill

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Nietzsche’s aspiration to ‘remain true to the earth,’ whilst acknowledging, in disputation with Ernst Cassirer at Davos in 1929, that ‘Man exists at the peak of his own possibilities only at very few moments’ [Safranski 1998, 166].

It is against the notion of authentic existence as the ‘resoluteness’ of Dasein out of ‘its own most peculiar can-be’ [BPP 287] - which can be aligned with this comment at Davos - that Heidegger views ‘everyday actuality’ in which ‘Dasein does not constantly exist as resolute but is usually irresolute, closed off to itself in its own most peculiar ability to be’ [BPP 288-9]. This sounds like a “lesser” being or a “lower” degree of being,’ what Heidegger terms a ‘deficient mode of being’ but he argues that ‘inauthenticity can determine Dasein even in its fullest concretion, when it is busy, excited, interested, and capable of pleasure’ [BT2, 42].

Even so, there is a deficiency in everyday life which calls for the ‘modification’ of Dasein into authentic mode. It is the question of ‘resoluteness’ - what characterizes resoluteness, Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-of-being [BT2, 286] - which is at the heart of the relation between authenticity and ‘remaining true to the earth.’ For the authenticity attained in Dasein’s resolute projection is realized not in a solipsist individuation, but in an altered mode of being-in-the-world:

‘As authentic being a self, resoluteness does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it as free floating ego. How could it, if resoluteness as authentic disclosedness is, after all, nothing other than authentically being-in-the-world? Resoluteness brings the self right into its being together with things at hand, actually taking care of them, and pushes it toward concerned being-with the others’ [BT2, 285].
And this concerned being with others is no mere talkative fraternizing in the they. The relation of authenticity to inauthenticity, of authentic Dasein to everydayness amongst the ‘they’ resonates with the voice of religious calling, for Dasein is called out of its inauthenticity by ‘conscience,’ and in attaining authenticity may become the ‘conscience’ of Dasein in everydayness. And, with equal religious resonance, the call of conscience - the call to a resolute ownmost of being - is perpetually engaged in the summons to irresolute theyness.

It is in the context of this fugue that there is a clear upsurge of a darker tonality away from the clearly methodological. Heidegger’s approach to the demonic evolves out of his shift from the question of the ‘what’ to the question of the ‘Who’ that is this Dasein in its everyday being-with-in-the-world, what he calls its ‘theyness.’ He finds that Dasein for the most part is ‘World benumbed,’ ‘benumbed by its world’ [BT2, 111]. Integrated within an existentiale of being-with [Mitsein] and Dasein-with [Mitdasein], this ‘with-ness’ which grounds the self, roots the ‘subject’ of everydayness in ‘the they [das Man]’ to the extent that it ‘could be the case that the who of everyday Dasein is precisely not I myself’ [BT2, 111-112]. (In relation to question of what is ‘precisely I myself,’ we are again struck by the disjunction between Heidegger’s texts and his letters.) And this not-being-I is a ‘definite mode of being of the “I” itself; for example, having lost itself’ [BT2, 113]. The ‘I’ is lost to itself: ‘I am not in the sense of my own self, but I am the others in the mode of the ‘they’’ [BT2, 125]. But for Heidegger this not-being-oneself was no simple condition, but fugal: both his and Dasein’s fugue over valuations of authentic and inauthentic modes of being. And functioning within this ontic and
ontological strife is the Apollonian-Dionysian duality and Heidegger’s *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche.

Reflective of that *Angst* revealed in his letters, the anxiety of that distressed Dasein he had analyzed in his lectures on the *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, Heidegger’s valuation of the authenticity of inauthenticity finds expression in *Being and Time* in his analysis of what he considers a ‘fundamental attunement’ of Dasein: an anxiety driven by Dasein’s recognition of and confrontation with its own ‘authentic potentiality-for-being-in-the-world’ [BT2, 182]. *Angst* emerges out of the discrepancy, the disjunction between authentic potentiality and inauthentic denial-amongst-the-they, ‘fetch[ing] Da-sein back out of its entangled absorption in the *everyday* “world’’ [BT2, 182]. It ‘brings one back to the sheer That of one’s ownmost,’ freeing Dasein through a ‘future of resoluteness’ for authentic possibility’ [BT2, 328-329]. But the fugue of Being is unrelenting: Dasein can be free for authentic possibilities because it ‘is constantly “more” than it factually is,’ but ‘Dasein is never more than it factically is, for to its facticity its potentiality-for-Being belongs essentially’ [BT2, 141]. A desire for a moral-free valuation of the everyday imperative of inauthenticity fugues in continual strife with the ownmost possibilities of resolute authenticity, even as Heidegger - out of the attempt to remain true to facticity - attempts to reinstall, through resoluteness, authenticity into everyday being.

Yet, from at least the 1921-22 lectures on a *Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle*, the presentation of the mode of being-in-the-world, its publicness, attracts a host of negative characterisations: for instance, fallenness, ruinance, sequestration. Yet, again, both out of a Nietzschean aspiration to remain true to the
earth and as a symptom of his own ‘entanglement,’ Heidegger attempts to refrain from a moral interpretation of falling, as he characterizes the inauthentic mode of everyday existence, to the extent that he distances it from anything ‘to do with morality and ethics or the like’ [HCT 283]. But the fugue continues in his analysis of the deficiencies of everyday ‘idle talk’ [HCT 270-273]. Heidegger insists that idle talk is ‘not to be used here in a disparaging sense…[but] a positive phenomenon which constitutes the mode of being of the understanding and interpretation of everyday Dasein’ [BT2, 161-162]. Nevertheless, it ‘deprive[s] the superlative possibilities of being-with-one-another of the ground from which they could take root and grow’ [HCT 280], the superlative possibilities of one’s resolute ownmost. The disjunction between everyday idleness and extraordinary primordiality, between inauthenticity and authenticity is expressed in terms of tempo, a musicality. Idle talk ‘lives at a faster rate’ than the ‘essentially slower time’ of authenticity [BT1, 218]. And Heidegger’s own style - seeking authenticity - it slows down.

For Heidegger the publicness of Dasein becomes diabolic in spite of his wish not to disparage a theyness which is both ‘artificial and mendacious’; man is ‘always already cajoled by others’ [HCT 29]. Heidegger’s analysis of ‘the they’ in Being and Time will generate its own heightened tenor of dread which sees the ontic affair bursting through the ontological reduction, an echo and pre-echo of socio-political reality in which ‘average’ everyday reality was far from the ascribed ‘ontological’ indifference. In the being-with of theyness exists the possibility that ‘domination [may be] a tacit one and remain[] hidden’ [BT2, 119]. There also exists the existential possibility that at times, say 1933, that domination might be
terroristically unconcealed. Whilst evading the obvious address of his historical time, the tonality of Heidegger's analysis of the 'they' will be attuned to that averageness which is all-too-humanly one of Angst. Indeed, he recognizes that the 'extent to which its dominance becomes penetrating and explicit may change historically' [BT2, 125]. The demos may become demonic.

The 'theyness' itself assumes a nightmarish quality which prefigures life in a totalitarian state. 'Being-with' others 'means...being 'in bondage' to the others...'obeying' them' [HCT 266]. And if words like 'bondage' and 'obeying' carry an embodied physical, political association, Heidegger's vision connotes an even more debilitating, disembodied absorption. 'Initially and for the most part, Dasein is taken in by its world...absorbed' [BT2, 114]. Not only does 'Dasein stand[] in subservience to the others...the others have taken its being away from it' [BT2, 122]. Not only is 'one's own Dasein' dissolved into the Mitdasein, but this Mitdasein is the very dissolution of all Daseins who, in an 'insidious way,' are unable to 'come to an original relationship of being in being with one another' [HCT 278-9]. It is a premonition of gestapo society in which 'everyone keeps an eye on the other...Being-with-one-another in the Anyone is...a...state...in which we intensely watch and furtively listen in on one another' [HCT 280]. And it is in the very dissolution of responsibility, its 'inconspicuousness and unascertainability...[that] the they unfolds its true dictatorship' [BT2, 123]. Threateningly, being-with-one-another 'prescribes what can and may be ventured, watches over every exception which thrusts itself to the fore. Every priority is noiselessly squashed... [in a] levelling down of all possibilities of being' [BT2, 123].
Heidegger might argue that ‘these others are not definite others’ [BT2, 123], but they very well may well be. Heidegger’s ‘they’ is already totalitarian.

In its very attunement to this everyday being-in-the-world, Dasein somehow evades its very self: it is ‘delivered over,’ ‘entangled’ in the ‘everyone’ in an ‘evasive turning away’ [BT2, 131, 135, 133]. In accommodating itself to the ‘they,’ Dasein is disburdened through its ‘tendency to take things easily and make them easy’ [BT2, 124]. Indeed, the ‘absorption of Dasein in the they...reveals something like a flight of Dasein from itself as an authentic potentiality for being itself’ [BT2, 178]. It is a ‘covering up,’ a deviation, a ‘falling’ [HCT 274].

Again Heidegger protests that the ‘term “falling” designates a movement of the being of the happening of Dasein and once again should not be taken as a value judgement’ for ‘falling refers to a constitutive structure of the being of Dasein’ [HCT 274]. It nevertheless ‘loses itself’ [HCT 274]: ‘As an authentic potentiality for being a self, Dasein has initially already fallen away from itself and fallen prey to the “world” ’ [BT2, 169]. Heidegger calls this a ‘plunge. Dasein plunges out of itself into itself, into the groundlessness and nothingness of inauthentic everydayness’ [BT2, 171-2]. The attempted revaluation of facticity struggles against the very terminology.

Distinguished against the they-self in which the self is lost, dispersed in the they, the authentic self is such only in finding itself. At least, it would seem to be a distinguished-against, but Heidegger contends that ‘Authentic being a self is not based on an exceptional state of the subject, detached from the they, but is an existentiell modification of the they as an essential existential’ [BT2, 126]. Later, however, he inverts, converts, this: ‘The they-self is an existentiell modification of
the authentic self’ [BT2, 303]. This would seem to be the underlying position in his analysis of ‘theyness’ where Dasein in ‘itself, in its everyday kind of being, is what initially misses itself and covers itself over’ [BT2, 126], and the ‘disclosing of Dasein always comes about by clearing away coverings and obscurities, by breaking up the disguises with which Dasein cuts itself off from itself’ [BT2, 125]. From our awareness of the ‘other Heidegger’ manifest in his letters, it could be said that, in his ontological heightening, Heidegger cuts himself off from himself, that a part of Heidegger cuts part of himself off from another part. And, in so doing, his texts echo that authenticity-inauthenticity strife, both a manifestation of and an overcoming of inauthenticity. Yet the very cutting himself off from himself is disclosive: ‘For the most part Dasein evades the being that is disclosed in moods in an ontic and existentiell way. Ontologically and existentially this means that, even in that to which such a mood pays no attention, Dasein is unveiled in its being delivered over to the there. In the evasion itself the there is something disclosed’ [BT2, 131]. Evasion is disclosive. As Heidegger recognised, the philosophical work - with its evasions - speaks of the biographical [Janicaud, 1996, 18]. Yet, mirroring the hermeneutic circle, it is through the biographical - and through our knowledge of the other philosophers he ‘destructs’ - that we are aware of such evasion. The revelation of the ‘evaded’ asks questions of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of being-in-the-world. The evasion and the disclosure are inextricably interfused. The thought both evades and explains - through its discourse on factic falleness - the elided ‘unthought.’ The thinking explains its own evasions.

The fugal nature of Heidegger’s contention between authenticity and inauthenticity - indeed an ontological contention within Dasein which Heidegger
discloses - suggests, further, a ‘covered over’ Auseinandersetzung with both Nietzsche and himself: the repudiation of the exceptional ubermensch in a remaining true to the earth which recognizes the internal strife over the valuations and existences of authenticities and inauthenticities. These privilegings - like Zarathustra’s oscillations - may never be resolved. That this is the case suggests an instability, a split even, within the nature of Dasein which Heidegger identifies in the final sentence of his analysis of das man: ‘the sameness of the authentically existing self is separated ontologically by a gap from the identity of the I maintaining itself in the multiplicity of its experiences’ [BT2, 126]. This speaks of that disjunction – gap - we have observed in considering the relation between Heidegger’s ontological texts and the letters speaking directly out of his existence.

The dissonant possibilities of being-in-the–they are harmonized according to his ‘aim...to bring into relief phenomenally the unitary primordial structure of the being of Dasein by which its possibilities and ways “to be” are ontologically determined’ [BT2, 127]: ‘guarding against any disruption and fragmentation of the unitary phenomenon’ [BT2, 127], guarding against those ‘mixed forms’ [BT2, 119] which Heidegger has decided exceed the limits of the analytic of the existence of Dasein, indeed, guarding against the very strife disclosed within the text and in its relation to his own facticity, his own being-in-the-world, evading this dissonance, which for Adorno would reveal a greater truth than does harmony: ‘The dissonant chord, by comparison with consonance, is not only the more differentiated and progressive, but furthermore, it sounds as if it had not been completely subdued by the ordering principle of civilization - in a certain respect, as if it were older than tonality itself’ [Adorno 2004, 40]. Fundamental ontology, as structured in Being
and Time in its exclusions, ‘guards against’ fragmentation: dissonance is both disclosed and evaded, manifest and tamed.

Yet, as he closes off dissonance, Heidegger opens up further possibilities of seeing, through a reconfiguration of Nietzschean tonality and valuation. In his analysis of attunement/mood, Heidegger both echoes and reconfigures Nietzsche’s aphorism *The things people call love* from *The Gay Science*: ‘Gradually we become tired of the old, and what we safely possess, and we stretch out our hands again.’ But, Nietzsche continues, ‘To become tired of some possession…any lust for what is new…means tiring of ourselves’ [GS 88].

Nietzsche’s concern with flux and becoming, the very multiplicity of moods, is reduced by Heidegger: ‘The fact that moods can be spoiled and change only means that Dasein is always in a mood’ [BT2, 131]. This seems a facile reduction for a thinker who believes that Being can develop or decay historically, and, therefore, should be concerned with the change of moods, a thinker whose concern only a few years earlier in his lectures on the *Phenomenology of Religious Life* had been with ‘distressed’ Dasein. There is a transformation in the transition, for the recognition of shifting moods only underscores for Heidegger not ‘mood’ but a primordial mood, the unspoken ‘tragic.’ Heidegger speaks not of Nietzsche overtly, but echoes his phrases from the *Gay Science* - ‘tired of itself’ and ‘elevated moods’¹⁰ - suggesting that for Heidegger, writing these pages on ‘Dasein as Attunement,’ Nietzsche, for whom music provided a fundamental attunement, was much in his mind:

‘Dasein becomes tired of itself. The being of the there...becomes manifest as a burden. One does not know why. And Dasein cannot know
why because the possibilities of disclosure belonging to cognition fall far short of the primordial disclosure of moods in which Dasein is brought before its being as the there. Furthermore, an elevated mood can alleviate the manifest burden of being. But the possibility of this mood, too, discloses the burdensome character of Dasein even when it alleviates that burden’ [BT2, 131].

A note underlines the proximity of burden to tragedy, not only recollection of his past lectures on the *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, but a pre-echo of his increasing interest in Greek tragedy: ‘Burden’: what bears [das Zu-tragende]; human being is delivered to Dasein, appropriated by it. To bear [Tragen] to take over something from out of belonging to being itself [BT2, 131]. To suffer.

Yet, Heidegger recognizes that ‘for the most part, mood does not turn itself toward the burdensome character of Dasein manifest in it, it does this least of all in an elevated mood in which this burden is lifted’ [BT2, 132]. For both Nietzsche and Heidegger ‘elevation’ may be merely an escape. But for Nietzsche it was also a source of Dionysian insight, seeing. And, for Heidegger, this rejected Dionysian is suppressed - for we have seen how Nietzschean Heidegger ‘could be’ in his letters. But, the suppression of ‘burden’ effects its own heightening, a *Steigerung*.

The question of ‘suppression’ appears in Heidegger’s text in these sections (31-34) on attunement, which Heidegger sees as ‘one of the existential structures’ in Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Initially: ‘Attunement always has its understanding even if only by suppressing it’ [BT2, 138]. And as he approaches the question of language for the first time in section 54, Heidegger acknowledges that this matter had up to that point been ‘suppressed...in the thematic analysis’ [BT2, 155].
Suppressed too is the presence of Nietzsche whose shadow continues to ‘haunt’ Heidegger’s text. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche - whose own text (and being) was haunted by the ‘abyss’- had warned: ‘And when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you’ [BGE 89]. Here Heidegger sees that ‘moods bring Dasein before the that of its there, which stares at it with the inexorability of an enigma’ [BT2, 132]. The enigmatic haunts the concrete, is the shadow behind methodological concern: ‘Existentially and ontologically there is not the slightest justification for minimizing the “evidence” of attunement by measuring it against the apodictic certainty of the theoretical cognition of something merely objectively present’ [BT2, 132]. For Heidegger, Husserlian apodictic *epoché* is indeed a reduction.

In danger of mirroring the ‘uniformity’ and ‘flattening’ which Heidegger ascribes to mere ‘theoretical looking’ [BT2, 134] and of being ‘lost’ in ontological grounding, (and which Heidegger himself will later see as failing to meet his own intentions) the text of *Being and Time* frees itself from Apollonian control of ‘necessary’ structure through the analysis of the disclosive power of an attunement *in extremis* - fear - through the analysis of which, Dionysian experience breaks into the text, away from the methodological access. Dionysian experience is, after all, a mode of insight.

And through the analysis of fear, the human-all-too-human reveals itself, after Nietzsche, in man’s concern for others, and the ulterior self-concern, both the altruistic and the veiled egoistic. As ‘being-with, Dasein “is” essentially for the sake of others’[BT2, 120], but this is not without ambiguity for there is an inauthentic and an authentic being-towards-others: against a ‘leaping in for’ the other, there is
‘the possibility of a concern which...leap[s] ahead of him in his existentiell potentiality-of-being, not in order to take “care” away from him, but rather to authentically give it back as such’; the former inauthentically ‘does someone’s job for him and dominates him,’ the latter authentically ‘frees him’ [BT2, 118-119].

As Franco Volpi asks whether *Being and Time* is ‘Translation’ of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* [Kisiel and van Buren 1994, 195-211], increasingly we may ask whether it is also a translation of Nietzsche’s thinking on the ‘human all too human’ - and a translation of Heidegger’s own human-all-too-human, Heidegger’s analysis of being-towards-others translating Nietzsche’s pronouncements on pity.

As he approached his *monstrous éclat*, [Krell 1997, 211] Nietzsche characterized himself, beheld himself in *Ecce Homo* as ‘Dionysus versus the Crucified.’ [EH, 134]. And, in *Beyond Good and Evil*, this man - who repudiated Christian pity, and who would collapse in a pity of self-recognition - saw that there could be a ‘pity versus pity’ [BGE 154]. Nietzsche dis-valued pity as a self-destructive, degenerative, degenerating ‘weakness,’ a ‘tendency hostile to life’ [D 134, 137/ GM 7/ TI 119]. But this seemingly dogmatic position is revealed as dichotomous: there is both a noble and a slavish pity [BGE 260/293]. As with art and philosophy, it depends on whether pity is underpinned by over-fullness or impoverishment of life [GS 328], in Heideggerian terms, whether it gives authentically or takes inauthentically.

In *Being and Time*, as Heidegger analyses the Dionysian experience of fearing, the human-all-too-human breaks through the ontological ‘reduction.’ Fearing ‘about’, Heidegger writes, ‘can also involve others...We are afraid for the other most of all precisely when he is not afraid and blunders recklessly into what is threatening’ [BT2, 137]: the parent’s fear for the safety of his or her child. And like Nietzsche he
sees that the altruistic may include the egoistic: ‘fearing for...is, after all, being afraid oneself. What is “feared” here is the being-with the other who could be snatched away from us’ [BT2, 138]. How close here the proximity of ontology to its ontical foundation, which he lauded in the work of Max Scheler: ‘with every change he remained loyal to this inner direction of his nature in always new approaches and endeavours. And this loyalty must have been the source from which the childlike kindness he showed on occasion’ [MFL 51].

Nietzsche had seen the egoistic as the ‘ground’ for the altruistic, and Heidegger quickly reasserts the ontological ground of the seemingly ‘caring’: ‘When something threatening itself suddenly bursts into heedful being-in-the-world in its character of “not right now, but at any moment,” fear becomes alarm...becomes horror...becomes terror’ [BT2, 138]. Dasein becomes the timid creature espied by Nietzsche in Daybreak [D 142]: ‘All modifications of fear [timidity, shyness, nervousness, misgiving] as possibilities of attunement point to the fact that Dasein as being-in-the-world is “fearful” ’ [BT2, 138]. Yet, again, Heidegger is at pains to save such statements from the misunderstanding they evidently provoke: ‘This “fearfulness” must not be understood in the ontic sense of a factical,’ ‘isolated’ tendency, but rather as the existential possibility of the essential attunement of Dasein in general, which is, of course, not the only one’ [BT2, 138]. Heidegger retreats from the disclosures of ‘pity’, evading the factical possibilities of the ‘many mixed forms whose description and classification lie outside of the limits of this investigation’ [BT2, 119].

The fugue continues into the discussion of authenticity in relation to understanding, continuing an Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche. Dasein,
“know[ing]” what...its potentiality of being is,’ projects possibilities ahead of itself out of a recognition of itself, which is ‘constantly “more” than it actually is...’ But, Heidegger attempts to follow Zarathustra’s invocation to remain true to the earth: Dasein ‘is never more than it factically is because its potentiality of being belongs essentially to its facticity’ [BT2, 141]. It is thus a possibility that within Dasein there is a constant strife between this ‘more than’ and ‘facticity,’ and, for Heidegger, between this ‘never more than’ in facticity and the contention that Dasein ‘is existentially that which it is not yet in its potentiality of being’ [BT2, 141]. Facticity is indeed this strife. 13 Heidegger’s ‘desire’ to locate this ‘more than,’ ‘this not yet,’ in facticity, not in some metaphysical beyond, is the fulfilment of Zarathustra’s ‘remaining true to the earth,’ and the repudiation of ‘super-terrestrial hopes’:

‘And when we ask about the meaning of being, our inquiry does not become profound and does not brood on anything which stands behind being, but questions being itself in so far as it stands within the intelligibility of Dasein’ [BT2, 147].

Heidegger reconfigures Nietzsche’s philosophy of ‘ice and high mountains’ [EH, 34] and the inability to remain true to the earth with its rejective evaluation of non-being in everyday life, emphasizing that inauthenticity ‘constitutes...the...most everyday and stubborn “reality”...of Dasein’ [BT2, 164]. The obvious Nietzschean reference emerges in the call to ‘become what you are!’ [BT2, 141] In his Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche, Heidegger reconfigures his own Nietzscheanism expressed in his letters.

Heidegger remains in an address of the mystery of Being, and of this being that is Dasein: ‘We must first let the full mysteriousness of this being emerge, if only to be
able to fail in a more genuine way in its “solution” and to raise the question anew of the being of thrown-projecting being-in-the-world’ [BT2, 143]. And this mysteriousness is Nietzsche's ‘rich ambiguity’ [GS 76]. An oscillatory Dasein, Heidegger's remaining true to the earth, like Zarathustra's, can never be ultimately stabilized, resolved. Dasein’s task is encapsulated in Thomas Mann's recognition that his artistic task was ‘reconciling…the irreconcilable’ [SL 63].

Heidegger's note to the quotation 'become what you are!' is itself expressively Nietzschean: 'But who are “you”? The one who lets go- and becomes,' for the possibility exists that one 'does not become’ [BT2, 141]. Entangled being-in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquillizing, but also alienating. Dasein is alienated from its 'ownmost' potentiality, which now is ‘concealed;' its ‘authenticity and possibility [are] close[d] off to Dasein, [now] force[d]...into its inauthenticity' [BT2, 171]. It is a self-alienation:

'Dasein plunges out of itself, into the groundlessness and nothingness of inauthentic everydayness. But this plunge remains concealed from it by the way things have been publicly interpreted so that it is interpreted as “getting ahead” and “living concretely”' [BT2, 171-172].

The self-dissection heightens, a tearing and a dragging:

'The kind of movement of plunging into and within the groundlessness of inauthentic being in the they constantly tears understanding away from projecting authentic possibilities, and drags it into the tranquillized supposition of possessing or attaining everything. Since the understanding is thus constantly torn away from authenticity and dragged into the they (although always with a sham of authenticity), the
movement of falling prey is characterized by turbulence...thowness [is] not a “finished fact”...[it] remains tossed about and sucked into the turbulence of the they's inauthenticity.' [BT2, 172]

The text itself is such a constant attempt to tear itself away from a concern with methodological access and tranquillization. '[T]angled up in itself’ [BT2, 171]

Dasein is a veritable Nietzschean contention of different forces of the turbulent self. The ‘tearing’ and ‘dragging’ recalls Strauss's Elektra which calls on the superimposition of tonalities as Strauss too wrestles with the question of authenticity, recalling too the terrifying approach of Clytemnestra and Heidegger's fundamental attunement of Dasein's turbulent self in extremis, fear. The Apollonian structuring ‘merely’ tames but does not prevent the manifestation of Dionysian experience. Through ontologisation Dionysus is reconfigured.

The Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche, which finally takes over Heidegger's thinking in the late 1930s, is there ‘from the start.’ Within a few pages of the direct, though unacknowledged, reference to Nietzsche, Heidegger writes:

’When a specific instance of interpretation (in the sense of a precise textual interpretation) appeals to what “is there,” then that which initially “is there” is nothing other than the self-evident, undiscussed prejudice of the interpreter which necessarily lies in every interpretive approach as that which is already “posited” with interpretation in general, namely, that which is pre-given in fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception....never a presuppositionless grasping’ [BT2, 146].

This statement flies in the face of what Theodore Kisiel views as the 'tendency among would-be purist Heideggerians to insist on a rigid separation between
Heidegger’s thought and Heidegger’s life, his philosophy and his biography, and to dismiss the biographical element as fortuitous and irrelevant’ ['Rockmore & Margolis 1992, 19]. At the same time it highlights the presence of Nietzsche in Heidegger’s thinking before his overt Auseinandersetzung, for Nietzsche, in the section ‘On The Prejudices Of Philosophers’ in Beyond Good and Evil, had written of philosophers:

‘They all pose as if they had discovered and reached their real opinions through the self-development of a cold, pure, divinely unconcerned dialectic (as opposed to the mystics of every rank, who are more honest and doltish - and talk of ‘inspiration’); while at bottom it is an assumption, a hunch, indeed a kind of ‘inspiration’ - most often a desire of the heart that has been filtered and made abstract - that they defend with reasons they had sought after the fact. They are all advocates who resent the name...’ [BGE 12].

In Heidegger: Thought and Historicity, Christopher Fynsk suggests that ‘Being and Time might in fact be described as the site of Heidegger’s encounter with Nietzsche...’ [Fynsk 55]. And that Heidegger’s ‘undiscussed prejudice of the interpreter’ had prior connection with Nietzsche is evidenced in Heidegger’s introduction to his Habilitationsschrift of 1915:

‘Philosophy lives at the same time in tension with the living personality; it draws from its depths and plenitude of life content and claim to value. And for this reason there lies in general at the bottom of every philosophical conception a personal taking of position of the philosopher concerned. Nietzsche in fact captured this fact of
philosophy’s determination by the subject in his implacably severe manner of thinking and in the capability of plasticity in representation with the well-known phrase ‘the drive that philosophizes’ [Fynsk 52]

Heidegger acknowledges that even the ‘purest theory does not abandon all moods’ [BT2, 134]. Like Dasein, the text ‘is always ambiguously “there”’ [BT2, 168], and striving, like Dasein, to hold its centre against falling apart, its centripetal force contending against its own centrifugality.  

In 1959 Heidegger wrote to Heinrich Petzet, perhaps more out of hope than expectation: ‘it is finally time to charge the reader less with interesting biographical tidbits than to have him concern himself finally with the matter and to ponder that to which I have devoted 40 years of long labor. My life is totally uninteresting’ [Rockmore & Margolis 1992, 19]. I hope to have demonstrated that the relation of Heidegger’s life to his thinking is indeed far from uninteresting and insignificant. And this is not without provenance in Heidegger's thinking. In his paper ‘To Think As Mortals,’ David Webb underlines the ‘inextricable...link between philosophy and the existence of Dasein,’ for 'by virtue of its ontic foundation philosophy needs the existence of the individual’ [Webb 2001, 211/221]. Thus, as Heidegger will say in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, ‘before we discuss the basic ontological problem, the existential analytic of the Dasein needs to be developed’ [BPP 227]. I attempt here to develop an existential analytic of Heidegger, for his fundamental ontology both evades and reconfigures the very facticity out of which it is born, as revealed in his letters.
v. Suppression and Intensification: Being-toward-death

‘In the broadest sense, death is a phenomenon of life’ [BT2, 237].

‘Our view is too short-sighted if we make “life” a problem and then occasionally take death into account too’ [BT2, 302].

I wish now to pursue duality into a reading of Heidegger’s thoughts on being-toward-death in Being and Time as a generative fugal-fusion of suppression and intensification, of taming and manifestation, of Apollo and Dionysus. Discussion of this idea holds a central position in Being and Time, central too in the fundamental futural horizon of the authentic being of Dasein, which, in the words of John Haugeland, is ‘the fulcrum of Heidegger’s entire ontology’ [Thomson 2009, 38].

Beyond the Nietzsche-Husserl Auseinandersetzung, my reference points have been not out of the philosophical tradition which Heidegger ‘destructs,’ nor the right-wing political tradition which embeds him with National Socialism, but from the Austro-German musico-literary tradition, and this, as we shall see, is not without proximity to Heidegger’s treatment of death in 1925-26.

We have seen that Heidegger read Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain with Hannah Arendt. This book on time and death - on love and death - was read in close proximity to that powerful erotic charge within Heidegger’s own life. Mann himself through his literature went through ‘death as a way of achieving its antithesis, life’ [ML 21]. Recurrently, in his works, affirmation is attained - against the presence of death. In The Magic Mountain Mann expressed ‘the romanticism of death plus affirmation of life...A sense of reaffirmation’ [Mann
This Bildungsroman sees Hans Castorp develop a healthier attitude towards death, inclined as he was from childhood to see death as a thing apart from life [MM1, 200], death as ‘positively sublime’ [MM1, 109].

As he consummates his love for Claudia Chauchat on ‘Walpurgis-Night’ - Mardi Gras - Castorp’s thoughts entwine love and death: ‘The body, love, death, are simply one and the same. Because the body is sickness and depravity, it is what produces death, yes, both of them, love and death, are carnal, and that is the source of their terror and great magic!’ [MM2, 336-7] It is a veritable liebestod, the love-death, an ecstasy not in death but in the being-toward-death. Through music in the form of the lied this world is transformed into the lovely, the glorious, into Love. Hans’ ‘fascination with death becomes subordinated to the fascination of life’ [Weigand 1933, 21]. It is ‘for the sake of goodness and love, man shall grant death no dominion over his thoughts’ [MM2, 487].

The reading of Mann’s magnum opus was inextricably related to Heidegger’s own magnum opus. Krokowski’s discussions on the relation between love and death were read by Heidegger with Arendt, Heidegger having been struck by Arendt’s gaze as he lectures on Plato’s Sophist in the winter of 1924-25.

Appropriately, Heidegger finishes reading The Magic Mountain at Todtnauberg, and concludes a letter to Hannah Arendt in similar vein to his comment on the unsaid in his Sophist lectures: ‘the story of Madame Chauchat is brilliantly developed - because it is open-ended, and so I can imagine that, when Hans Castorp was in the field later, lying in the wet trench with his gun, he had to “think” of her, and that somewhere - she would “think” of him, and that they go on doing so today. What remains unsaid in the whole work is really the most positive thing
about it’ [HA 32]. What is most important is its unsaid *what-would-be*: as he confessed in his letters, Heidegger would always be in the thrall of the eternal Eros. His treatment of death would be similarly infused with the life-affirmation of futural authentic projection.

But Heidegger’s treatment of death in *Being and Time*, as affirmation of life, is infused also with the unsaid. What he does not say resonates with significance. And the unsaid is related to the said. I wish now to offer an analysis of Heidegger’s treatment of death in terms of suppression (the unsaid) and intensification (the said). I will take first the unsaid as a questionmark against his saying, an Apollonian taming through omission of the horrors of the Dionysian.

In his analysis of the common, everyday attitudes to death, Heidegger makes merely the briefest reference - as a note - to the story ‘The Death of Ivan Ilyich’ by Tolstoy [BT 2, 244]. Its reduced, suppressed significance for Heidegger is highlighted in proximity - in relation to - the more rarified language of *Being and Time*: ‘if Dasein “exists” in such a way that there is absolutely nothing more outstanding for it, it has also already thus become no-longer-being-there… Eliminating what is outstanding in its being is equivalent to annihilating its being’ [BT2, 227]. Again, in view of Heidegger’s sometimes indirect *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche, it may be suggested that Heidegger’s ontological analysis calls up the tragic picture of the benumbed philosopher, walrus moustache out of control – (though controlled by some other - his sister). And was this not the concern of the being that was Heidegger - the control of the uncontrolled, of the Dionysian, of the demonic? That Heidegger felt man to be fundamentally uncanny was only a dilution of the real anxiety in the face of the demonic, the Dionysian - that which
revealed and was the end of all revealing, the affirmative seed of its own
dissolution, the destruction of creativity out of creative destruction. 23 And
something closer to home: Supposing truth to be woman [BGE 2], supposing truth
to be demonic, supposing truth to be the Dionysian - that which enables us to
really see, yet that which we cannot truly bear even as we are drawn to it.
Supposing truth to be this very Apollonian-Dionysian duality, strife, fugue, which
Heidegger would see as the cipher for Germany's self-understanding.
Heidegger's reduction of Tolstoy's story to a mere note could be seen as
exemplifying the comments of Theodor Adorno, hostile to the grounds of
Heidegger's ontology: 'As long as philosophy was in line with its own nature, it also
had content. However, in retreating to the ideal of its pure nature, philosophy
cancels itself out' [Adorno 2003, xvii]. It is through the pursuit of the ideal nature
of philosophy through method that philosophy cancels life out. The concern with
the error of method itself becomes error. *The Death of Ivan Ilyich* can itself be seen
as a commentary on Heidegger and on *Being and Time*.

And so to Heidegger's note: 'L.N. Tolstoi in his story “The Death of Ivan Ilyich” has
portrayed the phenomenon of the disruption and collapse of this “one dies”’ [BT2,
244]. But Heidegger, in discussing the tranquilizing modes of theyness towards
death, performs his own tranquillization: he includes in his text Tolstoy's negative
picture of the inconvenience felt by others at the death of another, if not their relief
that it is not each other who has died. However, the very disruption and collapse,
the dying, is avoided. What Heidegger leaves out is, I suggest, telling, and can be
interpreted as a commentary on Heidegger himself.
Ivan Ilyich’s existence, his life *modus operandi*, had been a ‘reduction,’ a containment of the demonic forces of existence, and, where they broke through, a densenstization, an accommodation. Self-loathing over early ‘actions which had struck him beforehand as great vileness’ was overcome through seeing ‘good’ men commit similar actions, so that he ‘was never mortified by recollections of them’ [DI 87]. In his ‘work’ on judicial procedure Ivan Ilyich was able to ‘reduc[e] every case, however complex, to that form in which it could in a purely external fashion be put on paper, completely excluding his personal view of the matter, and what was of paramount importance, observing all the necessary formalities’ [89].

Ilyich experienced his marriage as ‘not invariably conducive to the pleasures and proprieties of life; but, on the contrary, often destructive of them, and that it was therefore essential to erect some barrier to protect himself from these disturbances. And Ivan Ilyich began to look out for such means of protecting himself.’ He used his ‘work’ to protect himself, ‘to fence off his own independent world apart’ from his wife. And not only his wife: ‘where the official relation [with people] ended, there everything else stopped too.’ For Tolstoy ‘work’ is ‘apart’ from ‘real’ life. And ‘through long practice and natural aptitude, [Ivan Ilyich] had brought it to such a pitch of perfection that he even permitted himself at times…to let human and official relations mingle...just because he felt he had the power at any moment if he wished to take up the purely official line again and to drop the human relation’ [98].

But something happened physical, of the body: ‘something terrible, new...was taking place in him,’ poisoning him and ‘the life of others,’ poisoning ‘his whole existence.’ Having set up his own selfish protective barriers of self-convenience, he
now had to live in the *mineness* of his affliction, ‘without one man who would understand and feel for him’ [104-106].

Ilyich looks past the diagnoses of problems of the kidney or appendix: it is a ‘question...of life and...death. Yes, life has been and now it's going, going away, and I cannot stop it...There was light, and now there is darkness...awful horror!’ [108-109] Now that he was in the grip of being ‘no more,’ the hitherto modes of ‘screening off,’ ‘covering up’ and ‘obliteration’ of the thought of death dissolved [111]. The thought ‘death’ had indeed come: ‘It came and stood confronting him and looked at him, and he felt turned to stone, and the light died away in his eyes...’ There is a breaking through, out of, concealments: ‘his judicial labours could not as of old hide from him what he wanted to hide; that he could not by means of his official work escape from *It,*’ could not ease the suffering [111-112]. The very ‘reductions,’ by which he had formerly enjoyed life, now were the source of his heightened isolation. The modus which had secured him in his existence had also ‘enslaved’ him. (Heidegger too in dominating thought with 'Being' would also be dominated by it.24)

It is only the ‘basic’ Gerasim who *understood* Ivan Ilyich, like Frau Schweigestill understands Adrian Leverkuhn in Mann’s *Faustus.* Perhaps too the simple humanity of Heidegger’s ‘provinces’? Gerasim ‘was taking trouble for a dying man, and he hoped that for him too someone would be willing to take the same trouble when his time came’ [116]. Heidegger would share - as expressed in his essay ‘Why I stay in the Provinces’ - ‘Tolstoy’s enduring belief that the peasantry’s uncomplicated faith and stoical acceptance of whatever life inflicted on them were vastly preferable to the sophisticated insincerities, decadent materialism and
‘perfected proprieties’ of the society into which he had been born,’ to use the words of T. C. B. Cook [DI, Xv111]. Heidegger rejected the call of Berlin. But rejected too the ‘song’ of humanity.

And Ilyich, who had perfected his ‘proprieties’ now felt that ‘the greatest misery...was that no one felt for him as he would have liked them to feel for him;’ having set up barriers against the ‘encroachments’ of others, he now ‘longed to be petted, kissed, and wept over, as children are petted and comforted’ [DI, 116]. As he asked the doctor whether there was any ‘chance of recovery’ his ‘eyes [shone] with [piteous] hope’ [120] Looking back over his life, Ilyich found that his life had been an illusion, indeed a delusion, ‘as though I had been going steadily downhill, imagining that I was going uphill...’ And then comes the moral question throwing him back to its glossing over in his earlier life: ‘Can it be that I have not lived as one ought? What for, why all this horror?’ But, whenever the question of whether ‘I have not lived as one ought? struck him, he thought of all the correctness of his life and dismissed this strange idea’ [124]. He looked back on his life and saw that ‘the further back the more life there had been. There had been both more that was good in life and more of life itself’ [125]. He had reduced life in his own existence through his reductions, his protections and his proprieties.

Out of an existential feeling of increasing downward ‘falling,’ Ilyich thought that “‘It could be explained if one were to say that I hadn’t lived as I ought. But that can’t be alleged,” he said to himself, thinking of all the regularity, correctness, and propriety of his life’ [126]. But then, a more questioning thought: “What if in reality all my life, my conscious life, has been not the right thing?...that he had spent his life not as he ought, might be the truth.....And [that] his official work, and his ordering of his
daily life and of his family, and these social and official interests, - all these might not be the right thing’ [127]. He grasped the ‘horrible, vast deception that concealed both life and death’ and that he had not done the ‘right thing’: ‘All that in which you lived and are living is lying, deceit, hiding life and death away from you’ [127-8].

‘From that moment there began the scream that never ceased for three days, and was so awful that... one could not hear it without horror...he grasped that he had fallen, that there was no return, that the end had come...’[127-8]

It is through the tears and kisses of his schoolboy son that he saw ‘how the familial world he has spurned in favour of public success might have offered him the love which could alleviate his pain and loneliness’ [DI, xv111 (Cook)]. It ‘was revealed to him that his life had not been what it ought to have been, but that could still be set right’ by setting his family free of his agonies [DI, 129]. In so doing he would himself be released: ‘He looked for his old accustomed terror of death, and did not find it....In the place of death was light....''Death is over,” he said to himself. “It's no more”’ [130]. Martin Heidegger reports to his wife that the young Hermann ‘very proud ...suddenly said to me: You have married a lovely Mother, haven't you-’ [101-102]. Was the reader of Being and Time ‘meant’ to follow up Heidegger's note and actually read Tolstoy's story? So much more seems relevant to an analytic of distressed Dasein than that minimally indicated by the ‘note.’

What does Heidegger put in and leave out? Heidegger's own fundamental ontology would venture similar exclusions, a tranquillization of horror. Heidegger both flees the horror and promotes potentiality-of-being as authentic attitude toward death,
thus as life. Through reductions life is reduced. The question too: 'What if in reality all my life, my conscious life, has been not the right thing?...that he had spent his life not as he ought, might be the truth....And [that] his official work, and his ordering of his daily life and of his family, and these social and official interests, - all these might not be the right thing.' But out of, and at the same time, this evasion is a heightening, energised by the suppression.

Communing, then, with Hannah Arendt, Heidegger reads Thomas Mann’s *Magic Mountain* which expressed ‘the romanticism of death plus affirmation of life…A sense of reaffirmation’ [Mann 1984, 4]. In *Being and Time* Heidegger views being-toward-death as the utmost, the way to wholeness, to totality, the way to one’s potentiality-for-being-whole, the overcoming of the everyday flight in the face of death. Haunted by death - yet in evading the face of the horrors of Ivan Ilyich’s dying - Heidegger’s characterization of being-toward-death is the affirmation of the utmost potentialities and possibilities of ‘life.’ As for Mann, death - being-toward-death - is a way of achieving life. This being-toward-death is indeed a *being-toward-life*, ‘an eminent potentiality-of-being that belongs to its own self’ [BT2, 242].

Heidegger converts Nietzsche’s valuation of non-being in the ‘herd’ into a being which is ‘less than whole,’ constantly ‘not yet’ [BT2, 223]. Right up to its very end ‘something is always still outstanding in Dasein which has not yet become...’ Dasein never attains ‘wholeness,’ never realizes the potentiality-of-its-being [BT2, 227-8].

In thoughts on death, the tonality of Heidegger’s language is heightened as he underlines the tragedy of ‘no-longer-being-their,’ a ‘non-being-their,’ the ultimate benumbent and mental ‘death’ - and implicitly underlines the danger of Dionysian
excess which is countered through the heightening of its own language. De-
distancing death, Heidegger is attempting to master death, an ontological taming of
the horrible, a return in and through heightening, an intensification of the
suppressed.

In his Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger contends that whilst ‘Art is the name for every
form of transfiguring and viable transposition of life to higher possibilities; [so] in
this sense, philosophy too is “art”’ [WPK 123]. We can therefore take Maurice
Blanchot’s essay ‘Literature and the Right to Death’ as suggestive not only for
literature but also for philosophy. Blanchot perceives that Literature is moved by
that which is hidden within it: ‘a force in the secrecy of works [which is] loath to
emerge into broad daylight’ [Blanchot 1995, 301]. Yet, though it is engaged in an
‘insane effort to bury itself in itself,’ in denial of the ‘substance of what it
represents,’ through its movement towards hiding, ‘whatever disappears keeps
appearing’ [Blanchot 1995, 310 & 329]. The work remains ambiguous: in its
suppressions it ‘is precisely myself become other.’ Yet the work remains ‘the
accomplice of whatever it neglects’ [Blanchot 1995, 314]. A Nietzschean creative
destruction [NBW, 784], the author creates through negation [Blanchot 1995,
318].

But the breakthrough of intensification is again accompanied by a
disruption, a distancing within the text: the flow - the adagio - of the gravity of
madness and death, of annihilation and elimination - no mere entanglements of de-
distancing - is broken up by a paragraph of six successive questions, disrupting, a
formal methodological incursion into the gravitas of ‘no-longer-being-there’ and
‘loss of being-in-the-world’- even an emphatic ‘absolute’ loss, a disruption of the
tragic tonality with discussions of debt, unripe fruit, roads, rain and bread [BT
section 48]. And below this ontical text is there an ontological withdrawal, a
retreat, a halting before the spectres, questioning 'whether “death” has been
“sufficiently and securely defined at all?” [BT2, 228] Yet, at the same time,
Heidegger’s being-toward-death overarches such disruptive incursions as he sets
out to install an authentic attitude to death [BT2, 233-4]. Heidegger offers a most
telling formulation: ‘Dasein always already exists in such a way that its not-yet
belongs to it.’ It is forever being in its not-yet [BT2, 233-4]. (Although this futurity
is mediated by its having-been, being-toward-death mediated by a being-towards-the past.)
The explication of The Possibility of Experiencing the Death of Others and the
Possibility of Grasping Dasein as a Whole witnesses the dissonance between
Heidegger’s suppressed human sensitivity and his alienation from that humanity.
‘The transition to no-longer-Dasein lifts Dasein right out of the possibility of
experiencing this transition and of understanding it as something experienced’
[BT2, 229]. ‘Annihilation’ is converted into ‘transition….The “deceased,” as distinct
from the dead body, has been torn away from “those remaining behind” ’ who ‘in
mourning and commemorating’ can remain with him [BT2, 229-230]. The
sensitivity and alienation create an amalgamic formulation: ‘being-with always
means being-with-one-another in the same world. The deceased has abandoned
our “world” and left it behind. Nonetheless, it is in terms of this world that those
remaining can still be with him’ [BT2, 230]. Heidegger sees the actual experience of
being-with the deceased as alienating from the experience of death as one’s dying,
for those remaining cannot experience ‘the real having-come-to-an-end of the
deceased.’ Our experience is not of the loss of the other’s being in terms of
‘potentiality-of-being of his being...[but] about the way of being-with and the still-being-there of the deceased with those left behind’ [BT2, 230]. Heidegger seems not to consider the possibility that, to some extent, another can project into one’s death and experience the loss of another’s potentiality-of-being just as one may experience the loss of being-with. As we have seen, Heidegger’s letters reveal a strange disconnectedness from normal human consideration of others. Yet, as if also a self-overcoming, his depiction of ‘no-longer-being-there’ in Being and Time suggests a ‘potential’ of a ‘mourning’ and ‘commemorating’ which experiences the death of others phenomenologically. It is the potentiality of a phenomenological-empathetic, existential phenomenological attitude realised in The Divided Self by R. D. Laing.

Heidegger’s analysis of being-toward-death is an intensification of that unacknowledged being-toward-life. It also mirrors the tranquillization and evasion of death which covers over and dominates everydayness so stubbornly that it estranges Dasein from its ‘ownmost nonrelational potentiality-of-being’ [BT2, 241]. Heidegger, like Leverkuhn in Doctor Faustus, generates another estrangement, perhaps another ‘flight from death,’ for is his next move not an evasive, moving away? He asks: ‘How does it stand with this “certainty of death”?’ [BT2, 245] And there is both sophistry and estrangement in his claim that ‘Death is probable to the highest degree for every human being, yet it is not “unconditionally” certain. Strictly speaking, “only” an empirical certainty may be attributed to death. Such certainty falls short of the highest certainty, the apodictical one’ [BT2, 247]. Heidegger relates this question to Dasein’s entangled, everyday flight ‘from ...[the] definiteness [of death]...by interposing before it those manageable urgencies and
possibilities of the everyday matters nearest to us' [BT2, 248]. However, this seems not to be a necessary relation, and could be seen as a theoretical alienation against *just living!* Heidegger too evades, (whilst exerting power over) the horror of death through the intensification of living through being-toward-death.

**vi. Authenticity & Heidegger’s ‘great separation’**

Out of a futural temporality, the peak constituent in Dasein’s being-toward-death - an authentic living - is *anticipation*: ‘becoming free for one's own death in anticipation liberates one from one's lostness in chance possibilities.’ But - like Nietzsche’s ‘great liberation’ in his preface to *Human All Too Human*, which is also a great *separation* - this liberation of Dasein is also a being ‘torn’ away from the they’ [BT2, 252]. That Heidegger is thinking of Nietzsche through this analysis of being-toward-death announces itself: ‘Anticipation...guards against “becoming too old for its victories” (Nietzsche)’ [BT2, 253].²⁸ Heidegger, as we have noted, has already seen the possibility of Dasein existing in such a way that it is no-longer-being-there [BT2, 227], the very face of Nietzsche fallen into madness. Nietzsche's *anticipatory warnings* about madness had not guarded against his own existing in such a way that he is no longer there, gone beyond his ‘ripeness’ [BT2, 235].

Heidegger’s next ‘methodological’ stage is ‘The Attestation of Dasein of an Authentic Potentiality-of-Being and Resoluteness.’ And yet the very word *Bezeugung* attests, testifies, bears witness or testimony against the very methodological process. Heidegger will soon use the word ‘trial’ in this section in a context resonating with the silence of Jesus before Pilate, resonating too with the concerns of Nietzsche in *The Genealogy of Morals* in which Nietzsche dissected not
the ontological fallen world of ‘theyness’ but the domestication of man, the subjugation of man by man. And, as with Nietzsche, Heidegger’s ‘subjugation’ in the everydayness of Dasein is related to ‘conscience’: he effects his own subjugation of the demonic process which Nietzsche tears open in his *Genealogy of Morals*.29

Nietzsche saw man - an animal - ‘lacerated…rub[bing itself] raw against the bars of its cage…deprived…racked with homesickness for the wild, who had to turn himself into an adventure, a torture chamber, an uncertain and dangerous wilderness creating - out of man’s suffering of himself,’ out of instinctual denial - creating ‘bad conscience’ [NBW 521].

On this terrible process, Heidegger performs an ontological taming of the horrible, which is not free from the fugal oscillations we have already discussed. The intensification of Dasein’s responsibility in conscience ‘becoming responsible to others’ is ‘separated from the relationship to an ought and a law such that by failing to comply with it one burdens oneself with guilt’ [BT2, 271-272]. It seems a responsibility removed from ethics.

And yet, applying the phenomenological understanding of Christian life Heidegger exercised in his lectures on *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, this section resonates with a phenomenological situation not only of Christian life, but of Christ’s life, rather his being-toward-death: ‘Conscience speaks solely and constantly in the mode of silence,’ that which is the highest form of condemnation ‘the call…does not even come to words…it forces the Dasein…into the reticence of itself’ [BT2, 263] The resolute call to ‘action’ is ‘so broadly conceived that activity also encompasses the passivity of resistance,’ the figuration of the silent passive resistance of Jesus before Pilate, Heidegger’s own - perhaps unknowing -
attestation, his bearing witness to himself. He prefigures the limitation of his own
resoluteness: a silent passive resistance [BT 2, 288].

At the same time, Heidegger’s ‘call of conscience’ both resembles and re-assembles
Nietzsche’s ‘great separation’: the call of conscience is experienced as a ‘jolt,’ ‘an
abrupt arousal’ [BT2, 261]. And as Nietzsche would lament that ‘this soul should
have sung,’ Heidegger’s ontological structures ‘disclose,’ in consequence of the call
of conscience, the poetic ‘ought’: ‘The call calls from afar to afar. It reaches one who
wants to be brought back.’ The two selves both so near and yet so far, Dasein’s
inner disjunction. And, in a footnote, Heidegger lays the responsibility not with ‘the
they’ but with each and every Dasein ‘who has distanced himself from his own self’
[BT2, 261].

Heidegger’s ‘call of conscience’ is an inversion of the process of the formation of
the conscience in Nietzsche’s analysis: rather than a reactive creation of a ‘they’-
the subjugated - it is an oppositional call in contradiction to the ‘they.’ Through the
‘calling,’ the ‘they-self’ - theyness- supposedly a non-negative inauthenticity - is
‘passed over’ [BT2, 263], the internal ‘they “collapses”...the self brought to itself by
the call’ [BT2, 263]. The distancing from Nietzsche continues in his assertion - his
bearing witness - that this ontological ‘self’ is ‘not the self that unrestrainedly
dissects its “inner life” with excited curiosity, and not the self that stares
“analytically” at states of the soul and their backgrounds’ [BT2, 263]. But
Heidegger empties the ‘self’ of content, denying it the very oppositional function he
has claimed for it: ‘The call does not say anything, does not give any information
about events of the world, has nothing to tell. Least of all does it strive to open a
“conversation with itself” in the self which has been summoned’ [BT2, 263]. But
this ‘conversation with itself’ is exactly what Heidegger is engaged upon. Auseinandersetzung - with both himself and with Nietzsche - is this conversation, Auseinandersetzung, like conscience, like Dasein, ‘always ambiguously “there”’ [BT2, 168]. And in this Auseinandersetzung arises the question of ethics in Heidegger’s thinking, as it arises in a reading of Heidegger’s letters.30

Conscience is indeed ‘always ambiguously “there,”’ calling Dasein to the utmost, authentic potentiality-for-being. Heidegger - through ‘conscience’ - underscores the difference, the disjunction between this utmost, authentic potentiality-for-being from average everydayness: there is ‘not the slightest possibility of making the call familiar for an understanding of Dasein with a “worldly” orientation…the caller is definable by nothing “worldly,” it is ‘an alien voice,’ oppositional to the world-they, oppositional in the mode of Jesus: ‘The call speaks in the uncanny mode of silence’ [BT2, 264-6]. Dasein ‘calls [himself] back from…the public idle chatter of the they…to the reticence of his existent potentiality-of-being ’ [BT2, 266] to his ownmost self, a strife with the demonic ‘they’ which indeed ‘sunders’ Dasein from his utmost.

Conscience is both reticent and oppositional. It speaks not to everyday worldly belonging, which here has no suggestion of its emanating from a supersensuous being. The savagery of the Nietzschean and Freudian genealogies of conscience - indeed of the Christian - is overcome in the deeper ontological ‘care’. Yet, in the disburdening of critical conscience and guilt as understood in everyday ‘vulgar’ thinking, Heidegger heightens their presence: the question of conscience is deeper than simply reprimanding and warning in response to ‘failures and omissions’ [BT2, 268]. Indeed, Daseins are primordially guilty ‘in the ground of their being'
Yet this making guilt ontologically primordial, serves to make the existentially “morally” good and evil (one wonders at Heidegger’s use of the inverted commas), merely derivative of an ‘essential-existential authentic being-guilty’ [BT2, 274]. Yet, an immediate manifestation and a taming of ferocious conscience and guilt, it is all the more pervasive.

And all the more tied to the strife between authentic and inauthentic modes of Being. As Dasein exists ‘equiprimordially in truth and untruth’ [BT2, 286], the ‘certainty of the resolution means keeping oneself free for the possibility of taking it back, a possibility that is always factically necessary’ [BT2, 294]. Resoluteness and irresoluteness are ‘co-certain’ [BT2, 295]. Even in anticipatory resoluteness, ‘Dasein holds itself open for its constant lostness in the irresoluteness of the they - a lostness which is possible from the very ground of its own being’ [BT2, 295].

Heidegger makes ‘the distinction between a conscience that points ahead and warns, and one that points back and reprimands’ [BT2, 280]. There is both an authentic and an inauthentic conscience, (as we found there was with pity), which speak out of the Nietzschean distinction between overfulness and impoverishment.

In The Gay Science, Nietzsche had written: ‘there are two kinds of sufferers: first, those who suffer from the over-fullness of life - they want a Dionysian art and likewise a tragic view of life, a tragic insight - and then those who suffer from the impoverishment of life and seek rest, stillness, calm seas, redemption of themselves through art and knowledge, or intoxication, convulsions, anaesthesia, and madness’ [GS, 328]. Nietzsche thus, here, equates the Apollonian-Dionysian duality with that between impoverishment and overfullness [GS 328].
For Heidegger, in resolute being-in-the-world, the self pushes itself ‘toward being-with the others,’ not an inauthentic averageness but a being-with that has the ‘possibility of letting others who are with it “be” in their ownmost potentiality-of-being.’ In resoluteness Dasein attains a ‘concern which leaps ahead and frees,’ and becomes ‘the “conscience” of others’ [BT2, 285]. Still such ‘resolutions are dependent upon the they and its world’ [BT2, 286]. The relation between authenticity and inauthenticity is unseverable, the authentic call remains true to the earth: resoluteness in calling against the world, can only be realised in the world. Dasein’s resolute ‘ownmost potentiality-of-being’ must grasp ‘factual possibility’ [BT2, 283-4]. It is ‘call[ed] forth to the situation’ [BT2, 287]. Its ownmost potentiality-for-being is not ruptured in a detached ‘flee[ing] from the world,’ not ‘led into remote, distinct regions of Dasein…soaring above existence and its possibilities’ but is realised out of the ‘basic factual possibilities of Dasein’ [BT2, 296]. 31 This is no Nietzschean philosophy of ‘ice and high mountains’ [EH 34].

Heidegger strives to fulfil the descensional demand of Zarathustra to remain true to the earth. Yet, rejecting ‘expectations soaring above existence,’ he retains the language of Nietzsche’s gay science: ‘Together with the sober anxiety that brings us before our individualized potentiality-of-being, goes the unshakable joy in this possibility’ [BT2, 296]. And, as if out of self-knowledge, Heidegger writes: ‘Self-interpretation belongs to the being of Dasein’ [BT2, 298], and, further, ‘all research itself is a kind of being of disclosive Dasein’ [BT2, 301], for ‘One is, after all, what one takes care of’ [BT2, 307]. And he asks ‘what if the being that is thematic for the
existential analytic conceals the being which belongs to it and does so in its very way of being?’ [BT2, 298] The work - this work - is a very Auseinandersetzung.

For all Heidegger’s concern with methodological preparation and finding ‘entry point[s]’ [BT2, 360], section 72 on The Existential & Ontological Exposition of the Problem of History suggests the question: Where did it come from?32

It - this section- like Nietzsche’s discussion of ‘the people’ in The Birth of Tragedy, seems a leap from anything prior. The ‘they’ is transfigured as temporality moves from ‘everydayness’ to ‘historicity.’ History - event, ereignis - marches into the ontology of Dasein, which as being-in-the-world is historical: all beings ‘have their “fates”...even nature is historical...as areas that have been inhabited or exploited, as battlefields and cultic sites’ [BT2, 369-370]. (One may add that even Being and Time is ‘world-historical.’) The strife between authenticity and inauthenticity is sublated, as the calling conscience of the authentic potentiality-for-being uplifts the fate of the ‘they’: ‘The fateful destiny of Dasein in and with its “generation” constitutes the complete authentic, occurrence of Dasein.’ Authenticity and the fate of generations, futurality and unknowing foreconception constellate. The ‘Moment’ of vision is no longer an affair of individual Dasein: ‘Only a being that is essentially futural in its being...free for death and shattering itself on it, that is, only a being that, as futural, is equiprimordially having-been, can hand down to itself its inherited possibility, take over its own throwness and be in the Moment for “its time” ’ [BT2, 366].

But if we can see the future dangers in ‘the they,’ Heidegger, like Nietzsche did not halt before the ‘warning voice,’ the prospect of ‘the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero - is grounded existentially in anticipatory resoluteness’ [BT2, 367].
When Heidegger finally lets in life it points to the questionable-to-come. It will require a further transformation to retrieve a saving power from this danger, the recovery of the tragic - poetic in the later 1930s: Nietzsche, Sophocles and Hölderlin: ‘But where danger threatens/ grows the saving power also.’ The incorporation of the Dionysian poetic will fall away to stillness in his 1950s lectures On the Way to Language. Perhaps Heidegger knew more than he knowingly knew. He would be drawn to Oedipus and blindness.

Outstanding in the late section on history in Being and Time is Heidegger’s drawing on the ‘theses’ of Count Paul Yorck von Wartenburg, expressed not in philosophical tracts but ‘scattered throughout his letters to [Wilhelm] Dilthey.’ Heidegger quotes Yorck at some length. ‘Your [that is, Dilthey's] concept of history is, after all, that of a nexus of forces, unities of force, to which the category of form should be applied only in a symbolic sense’ [BT2, 379-380]. Heidegger’s own tendency is indeed a nexus of forces, a tranquillization and intensification, his own decaying and developing of being an Apollonian-Dionysian duality. Heidegger’s selection from Yorck’s letters continues to be self-disclosive: ‘With history, what creates a spectacle and catches the eye is not the main thing. The nerves are invisible, as is the essential in general’ [BT2, 381].

Having leaped to the destiny, the fate of Dasein’s ‘generation,’ Heidegger makes a ‘retreat’ to an analysis of Temporality and Within-Timeness as the Origin of the Vulgar Concept of Time, before returning to secure ground in asking ‘can ontology be grounded ontologically or does it also need for this an ontic foundation, and which being must take over the function of this foundation?’ [BT2, 414]. But, having set out on an ‘interpretation of Dasein on the basis of temporality and the
explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of being’ [BT2, 37], Heidegger ends the whole text with the question: ‘Does time itself reveal itself as the horizon of being?’ [BT2, 415] More pervasive was the question whether ‘Dasein [can] be understood still more primordially than in the project of its authentic existence’ [BT2, 355] – and by extension, with its struggle with inauthenticity.

Indeed, ‘Existence can be questionable’ [BT2, 321], and that questionability includes Nietzsche’s thought that ‘we remain unknown to ourselves,’ [GM, 3] which is indeed, as we have seen, a leitmotif in Heidegger’s thinking of others - they know not what they really know - even if contending with that unknowingness is the authenticity of a futural resoluteness calling Dasein to its ‘ownmost potentiality-of-being’ [BT2, 324].

And yet we are brought back to inauthentic ‘heedful being together with the “world,” with its working ‘relevances’ and ‘contexts’ of ‘everyday need’ [BT2, 335-336]. The peak experience of Nietzsche (and Jaspers) has been reconfigured in an authenticity which is a calling out of inauthentic theyness, whilst remaining true to the world. It remains true to the tradition of conflict with the prevailing order: ‘existence can also master the everyday in the Moment, and of course often only “for the moment,” but it can never extinguish it’ [BT2, 353]. Yet, ‘the ontological possibility of an existentiell, authentic being...means nothing as long as the corresponding ontic potentiality-of-being has not been shown in terms of Dasein itself’ [BT2, 255]. Authenticity is to be attained in this world - but as the ‘conscience’ of the world. Heidegger's rootedness in factual existence struggles against any attempt at ecstatic existential transcendence. But the rejection of the
‘exceptional’ state fails to erase the ascensional: authenticity ‘is’ exceptional:
‘Resolute, Dasein has brought itself back out of fallenness in order to be all the
more authentically “there” for the disclosed situation in the “Moment,” the
authentic present [“Augenblick”][BT2, 313].
The question will soon raise itself: what if the inner truth of authenticity becomes
more than a ‘moment,’ if transcendence becomes political? The suppressions and
intensifications, the calling of authenticity back from the mountains to the market-
place, in attempting to overcome the dangers of Dionysian excess, may unloose its
own demonic, hitherto contained.

vii. A return to the Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle.

Even as he rejects the lure of propheticism and the prophetic leader, in these
lectures propadeutic to a study of Aristotle, Heidegger foreconceives his own fall.
He categorizes his own situation ahead of its time, in the ‘the character of distance’
through which ‘life mis-measures itself in its care for meaningful things’ [PIA 77].
Care is not merely a positive tendency: in tentatio, it is a proclivity of life to fall into
‘dispersion,’ a temptation which does not come from outside but is a tendency
within life toward inner-dispersion, self-distancing in its succumbing to the ‘pull’ of
the world. Potentialities of both authenticity and inauthenticity - falling - are
inextricably interlinked, sometimes an overdetermination. In the Rectorate
Heidegger falls into his own distance.
Heidegger’s analysis of facticity elicits a constellation of negative terms: the
‘hyperbolic’ search for new experience, ‘transported by the meaningful things of
the world’ is a ‘sequestration,’ a biblical fall in an ‘expulsion of distance’ in which
‘the “before” is lost’ [PIA 80]. The process is full of ambiguity: in the face of the ‘infinite abundance...[of possibilities]’ factual life can ‘develop[] ever new possibilities of meaningfulness...[yet] this very multiplicity of possibilities...always implies an increase in the possibilities of mistaking oneself in ever new ways.’ Life ‘blinds itself... puts out its own eyes’ [PIA 80]. Diverted from thinking into the worldly in the Rectorate, Heidegger will put out his own eyes, afterwards drawn to the myth of Oedipus. But perhaps he had blinded himself before 1933, before ‘the political.’

Nietzsche opens On the Genealogy ofMorals: ‘We are unknown to ourselves’ [GM, 3]. Yet also known. Out of the basic categorical structure of intentionality, there is an intentionality of prestruction, a prestruction in intentionality. ‘Life establishes itself following the sense of its projection and of its appropriated pre-possession’ [PIA 89]. The experience, the situation foreconceived is distanced, unrecognised to itself, even as it is indicated out of itself. And as care is not necessarily a positive experience, the becoming who you are may be a Faustian demonic process, like Nietzsche, whose early thinking is full of self-warnings. But the losing of oneself may be no pursuit of living dangerously, for factual life as depicted by Heidegger is ‘inclin[ed] toward making things easy for oneself...inclin[ed] toward flight...[and thus] toward possible mistakes as such, mistakability, decline, making things easy, fooling oneself, fanaticism, and exuberance’ [81]. Factual life can experience the demonic in both maintaining itself and in losing itself.

The ontological imperative ‘intended’ toward a sympathy with life veers towards the danger of being lost to life, a pre-structuring, a proclivity, which culminates in the question of Heidegger’s ‘silence’ on the Holocaust. And of other silences
Ruinant collapse and resolute ‘against-which’ are a self-propelling fugue: towards the ‘highest-attained level of the interpretation’ [100], towards a factical clarification of life, mirroring and mirrored by a strife between the concern with ‘methodological access’ and the promised tonalities of a primordial, ‘transforming intervention in the immediate consciousness of life’ [TDP 3]. The movedness within Heidegger’s thinking - the fugue, the ambiguity - is only momentarily resolved. Philosophy seeks ‘the most radical clarification’ at the same time as it recognizes the ‘genuine questionability’ in factical life [PIA, 112]. This duality, ambivalence, dichotomy, a ‘dialogue’ that is struggle, schism, strife, this being-inquestion ruptures ‘a breach in the coherence of immediate life. Thereby “life” is not a momentarily clarified thing’ [112]. And philosophy - as a dwelling in ‘questionability,’ a rejection of the demand of the world for clarification at the expense of questioning - is ‘counter-ruinant movedness,’ the locus of the ‘constant struggle of factical, philosophical interpretation against its own factical ruinance’ [114]. Against the ruinant worldly clamour for clarification, it ‘is precisely in questioning that factical life attains its genuinely developed self-givenness’ [113].

It is in questioning that the lack in ruinant facticity is disclosed, that resistance stands against the approaching collapse [115].

Seemingly at a position of privileging philosophical questioning as counter-ruinant, Heidegger ends these lectures of 1920-1 appropriately, logically questioning, but thus endorsing this very questionability. He asks:

‘has philosophy somehow received a written legacy guaranteeing it the permanent assurance that the objective and ontological sense of its
object...possesses in each case the character of ontological purity and serene uniformity?’

‘Or is not the objective and ontological sense of factical life...precisely non-uniform in its categorical structure?’ [PIA, 115]

And foreshadowing Being and Time he ends these lectures on Aristotle with a question-mark. He asks out of the 'Permanence of restlessness' [134]:

‘is this sense not, as such, fractured?’ [115]

And fractured indeed is relation both within his texts and between his 'texts' and his other writings, his poems and his letters. Fractured therefore in his own factical life, in his own tonalities, his own human-all-too-human.

I have pursued the hypothesis that Heidegger’s error, his fall, his hubris was overdetermined in the manner of thought depicted by Thomas Mann in The Magic Mountain: thought is not ‘pure’ but related to ulterior drives.

Heidegger’s thinking leading up to and including Being and Time is at the same time an attempt at an overcoming of Western metaphysics and a self-overcoming, an overcoming and transformation of the whole erotic-auristic constellation of his own factical existence, his own being-in-the-world. We can wonder after Zeitblom in Doctor Faustus ‘whether a clear and certain line can be drawn between the noble and pedagogic world of the mind and the world of spirit which one approaches only at one’s peril’ [DF 9].

Between an auratic, transcendental notion of temporality and a dwelling in the abysses of everyday reality; between Apollonian, Husserlian clarity and certainty and the Dionysian, Nietzschean enigmatic ambiguities - as between words and music - there is a recurrent mutual calling. This very calling is a gathering of the
Apollonian-Dionysian strife which inhabits both Heidegger's texts and his being prior to his ‘descent’ from Todtnauberg in 1933, when he breaks out of the suppression of the Dionysian in his public texts, and ‘falls’ into misjudgement out of a vengeance of Dionysus. The Apollonian-Dionysian duality emerges as a cipher for understanding, a possibility of and for fundamental ontology. Heidegger's concern to establish the formal structures of human Dasein - human being-in-the-world - was infused with a refusal, a tranquillization of the Dionysian, and with a repression, and a reconfiguration, a transcendence of that which is repressed, his own facticity. In evading the very facticity out of which it is born, Heidegger's fundamental ontology discloses its own ontic foundation.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger writes: ‘When Dasein has itself in view ontically, it fails to see itself in relation to the kind of being of the being that it itself is’ [BT2, 307]. Heidegger himself veiled his investigation of the meaning of the being of Dasein as a distressed being. In *The Genesis of Heidegger's 'Being and Time,‘* Theodor Kisiel observes: ‘factic life experience, which is to be the starting point of philosophizing, is also the starting point of that which hinders philosophizing...[Factic life experience]...is at once the origin and repression of the philosophical impulse [both its motive and countermovement, as Heidegger will soon say]’ [Kisiel 1995, 156]. The veiling was at the same time an intensification, a heightening, and, as veiling, the possibility of an intensification, a heightening of a different order, a return of the philosophically repressed. Heidegger's letters have revealed that he lived the Dionysian. Shadows of the spiritual evolution of thought can have philosophical importance, just as shadows overtly political. And the shadows in Heidegger's thinking - coalescent with a higher philosophical
aspiration for the University - will meet its monstrous éclat politically in a Bacchic upsurge, his own released, extroverted Dionysianism. He would be brought down by an overdetermined passion.

Towards the end of Being and Time, Heidegger writes of Nietzsche: ‘The beginning of his Untimely Meditations makes us suspect that he understood more than he made known’ [BT2, 376]. David Krell ends his introduction to the Nietzsche lectures: ‘none of these writers...Bataille, Deleuze, Klossowski, and Derrida...can readily separate the names Nietzsche/Heidegger....As though one of the crucial confrontations for thinkers today were what one might call heidegger's nietzsche, nietzsche's heidegger’ [Nietzsche 1991a xxvii]. And of what one might call also Heidegger's Heidegger, Heidegger's Auseinandersetzung with Heidegger:

‘Celebration...is self-restraint, is attentiveness, is questioning, is meditating, is awaiting, is the step over into the more wakeful glimpse of the wonder - the wonder that a world is worlding around us at all, that there are beings rather than nothing, that things are and we ourselves are in their midst, that we ourselves are and yet barely know who we are, and barely know that we do not know all this.’ 37

The two Heidegger's - the revelatory and the suppressed - exist contiguously within life, within the text.
CONCLUSION

This study set out to explore the potential of using the Apollonian-Dionysian duality - viewed as a relation of fugal strife - as a hermeneutic for the understanding of Heidegger's thinking. It follows what may be seen as an attempt to trace the 'spiritual evolution' of Heidegger's thinking, an attempt at understanding the 'being' of Heidegger's philosophizing in relation to the problematic question of Heidegger's endorsement of the Hitler regime in 1933.

Grounded in Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy*, the Apollonian-Dionysian relation has been used here in terms of an indicative musical attunement, adopting the processes of and within musical form - fugue, dissonance, bitonality, juxtaposition and superimposition - to uncover in Heidegger's texts the shifts in tonality and the oscillations from methodological concern to 'ecstatic' analyses of temporality and depictions of the demonic condition of everyday living in 'theyness;' the fugal *polemos* in the characterisations and explications of authenticity and inauthenticity, of the ontical and the ontological; and an overdetermination, exemplified in his treatment 'the body,' both an ontological task and a repression of Heidegger's own being-in-the-world. Viewed in terms of fugal tension and dissonance, the intuitions out of music draw out the complexities - the *Auseinandersetzung* - within the text, the relation between the said and the unsaid.

As an intimation of the 'crossings' within his texts, Heidegger's letters to his wife Elfride and to Hannah Arendt have proved to be the fulcrum of the interpretation, a call out of his own being-in-the-world, outside the phenomenological reductions and ontological destructurations Heidegger attempted in his philosophical texts. Yet
they do so in relation to those phenomenological ‘reductions.’ Heidegger’s letters - dominated by erotic tension and including Nietzschean raptures before ascensionist landscape - call attention to that which is excluded from his fundamental ontology. Heidegger lived some of the very issues which he found difficulty in confronting in his fundamental ontology, that which may be categorised as Dionysian life.

As befits their subject matter, these letters reveal a totally other mode of expression, of writing, a Nietzschean expression which reveals another Heidegger who had always been involved in an Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche in his texts. This study has indeed supported the hypothesis that Heidegger’s Auseinandersetzung, his ‘confrontation,’ with Nietzsche precedes the overt engagement of his ‘Nietzsche’ lectures of the 1930s, and, further, that this more pervasive concern with Nietzsche is inextricably bound up in the Apollonian-Dionysian strife within Heidegger’s thinking, underlining the complex nature of that relation.

Not only has this study been an exercise in Heidegger’s own hermeneutics of facticity, it has been an uncovering of his own inner Auseinandersetzung, polemos, strife, fugue - through Nietzsche. In relation to his political alignment in 1933, particularly important is Heidegger’s concern to bring back philosophical and cultural aspiration from some metaphysical or geophysical ‘beyond’ to the ‘earth,’ on a cultural level to the university, and on an ontological level, ‘ethical’ in any other context, to align authenticity with Zarathustra’s call to remain true to the earth. Whilst he thus attempted to remain truer to the earth than Nietzsche’s ascensionist enraptured authenticity, it would be the very infusion of the
suppressed Dionysian into his aspiration for the university - into an *actual* university - which was a condition of that enthusiasm which led Heidegger into the Nazi regime as Rector. In contention with Nietzsche's potential for Dionysian excess, and in an ontology partly conditioned by repression, Heidegger was not able to escape the vengeance of history as the aspiration for cultural renewal was infused by that very excess in his inner aspiration of remaining true to the earth and by the very surrounding world.

The initial attempt of phenomenology to establish a rigorous science opens up the seeing of essence as constituted by strife and dissonance. Heidegger's phenomenological intent itself provides the very hermeneutical orientation which uncovers the concealments, reveals the dissonances and repressions in his own texts.

What has emerged in following the particular hermeneutic used here is another dimension to several of Heidegger's engagements and choices: Nietzsche, death, authenticity and inauthenticity, the ontological difference, and the phenomenological reduction. The text has emerged as overdetermined. Heidegger becomes, like Dasein, a 'privileged being' through whom questions of human being may be considered, as we indeed have been considering here how the philosopher who set out to establish a phenomenology in sympathy with life is swept up in the collective upsurge that installed a regime which became the very antithesis of such sympathy.

From this hermeneutics out of the ambiguities of the Apollonian-Dionysian fugal strife, and the opening up of the 'Rectoral Address' in terms of the long developing *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche, I intend in future study to move on to a
reading of Heidegger's most problematic lectures during his Rectorship (1933-34), in which he speaks of the ‘tremendous moment into which National Socialism is being driven today [as] the coming to be of a new spirit of the entire earth’ [B&T 3 & 116], of the people’s ‘eros for the state,’ \(^1\) and of the ‘annihilation’ of the ‘enemy [which] can have attached itself to the innermost roots of the Dasein of a people’[B&T 73]. Indeed Heidegger himself in his Rectoral lectures turns to the significance of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality. In the lectures On The Essence of Truth (WS 1933-34), in the space between the struggles for the realisation of Germany's spiritual mission and the struggles in the pursuit the ‘essence of truth’ [198], Heidegger calls upon Nietzsche’s Apollonian-Dionysian duality as ‘opposing powers’ in a struggle that is ‘in beings themselves…the innermost necessity of beings as a whole’ [B&T 74]. The Apollonian-Dionysian duality has revealed itself as a struggle in the innermost necessity of Heidegger.

Behind this study is a constellation of references not out of the Western philosophical tradition, but out of the Austro-German musical and literary tradition(s), Nietzsche standing on the ground between these traditions. Through the totality of its indications, it has shown Heidegger’s philosophical articulations to be affected by ‘shadows’ which were not overtly political, but bear, as the shadows political, upon the power of extroverting Dionysian force.

In a return to the original source of the intuition out of music in Heidegger’s lectures on the Origin of the Work of Art and The Will to Power as Art, the same hermeneutic suggests possibilities in developing the hypothesis that, through the reconfiguration of the suppressions and intensifications of the Apollonian-
Dionysian duality identified here, Dionysianism will be recovered from political involvement to infuse Heidegger’s textual exposition.

The cipher proffered by Heidegger himself has, indeed, been seen to offer not only the possibility of German self-understanding, but also the means of opening up Heidegger’s own innermost strife. Both his thinking (as illumination and repression) and his political ‘breakout’ (as cultural aspiration infused with Dionysian force) are - through the Apollonian-Dionysian duality - pursued through an indicative phenomenological hermeneutics, and revealed in their ‘tortuous’ overdetermination.
NOTES

HEIDEGGER'S INDICATIONS

2. PRL, 8.
3. PIE, 27.

INTRODUCTION

1. E.g. Ott (1993), Faye (2009), and de Beistegui (2005), Chapter 6.
3. Faye wishes to remove Heidegger's 'philosophical' texts from the Philosophy shelves in libraries and bookstores, displacing their continued existence into sections on the history of Nazism. His fight against the enduring legacy of Heidegger belongs to his fight against continuing forces of Nazism. Yet - on this matter - it could be that the very location of the Heidegger case within philosophy will keep that memory alive. The study of Heidegger 'the philosopher' will forever carry with it the memory of that very issue; his philosophy will always carry signs of the wound. From Heidegger's lament over the forgetting of being, he will, by default, aid the remembrance of things past. His philosophy will always carry a 'lest we forget.'
6. In Thomas Mann's The Magic Mountain Hans Castorp is dislodged from his 'magic mountain' by the Great War down below. Heidegger is called from his engagement with the Pre-Socratics on his own magic mountain at Todtnauberg.
8. Letter to Thomas Mann 5.7.1948.
9. In Thus Spake Zarathustra, Friedrich Nietzsche writes: 'Whenever your spirit wants to speak in images, pay heed; for that is when your virtue has its origin and beginning' [Z, 101].
10. Here I both traverse and remain on the threshold of Heidegger's ontological distinction between ontological attunement and ontical mood [BT 2, 130], in attempting an orientation towards his thinking through a constellatory
calling upon the meanings of Befindlichkeit, stimmen and Stimmung as disposition, attunement and mood, relating the fundamental ontological attunement of Heidegger to the Nietzschean imperative of ‘eine musikalische Stimmung’ and Schiller’s personal necessity of ‘Eine gewisse musikalische Gemuststimmung geht vorher;’ ‘a musical atmosphere of moods’ which precedes the development of an idea [TBT 34]. The traverse of the ‘ontological difference’ is formulated well by Charles Guignon: ‘we are attuned to the world through our affective orientation’ [Polt 2005, 78].

11. Letter to Goethe 18.3.1796.
12. Cassandra recoiled in the embrace by Apollo, who thereupon caused her accurate prophecies, mostly, it seems, of catastrophes (including her own death) never to be believed. [Cf Aeschylus Agamemnon 1200ff, Baldock 29].

CHAPTER 1: POLITICS AND MUSIC

1. Suggestive also was Gary Overvold’s essay ‘Modernism, Husserl, And Mann,’ [Overvold 1996] which I will discuss in the next chapter.
2. Through Heidegger scholarship the translation of Sein into English remains open: being or Being. When I have quoted either a translation of Heidegger or a work of commentary I have used whichever choice has been made by the translator or commentator. I will myself compromise, using ‘being’ when it precedes the preposition ‘of’ and ‘Being’ when it follows the preposition, e.g. the ‘being of Heidegger’s thinking’ and ‘the question of Being.’
3. Derrida speaks of Being and Time being ‘magnetised’ by that which it avoided [Derrida 1989].
4. ‘Facticity’ will be discussed below.
5. …as Derrida sees the ‘sudden inflammation and inflation of Geist’ in the ‘Rectoral Address’ of 1933, after the ‘tortuous prudence’ and containment of ‘spirit’ by quotation marks in Being and Time [Derrida 1989, 32]. There seems to be no such inhibition of the word ‘spiritual’ in the lectures on Aristotle [PIA 1921-22], in which Heidegger took the ‘understand[ing] and appropriate[ion] of the spiritual situation in which we find ourselves…[as] our first and exclusive concern’ [PIA, 87]- so perhaps a ‘released’ spirit which would become suppressed.
6. As a result of this study, it is suggested that Heidegger’s thinking would, in 1933, be ‘blinded’ by a coalescence of his own intellectual aspiration and released, extroverted Dionysianism. Heidegger was brought down by an overdetermined passion.
7. In this section, all quotations are from the ‘Rectoral Address’ unless referenced otherwise.
8. Obviously this characterisation of ‘forgetting itself’ is a transposition of Heidegger’s concern with the forgetting of Being. Early in his 1929/30 lectures on The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger speaks of ‘the barrenness and waywardness of…the business of the university. Has something perhaps already shattered at the heart of the machinery? Is it now held together only by the obtrusiveness and banality of organization
and convention? Is there a falseness and a hidden despair somewhere in all this activity? What if it were a prejudice that metaphysics is a fixed and secure discipline of philosophy, and an illusion that philosophy is a science that can be taught and learned? [FCM 1]

A full analysis of the question of Nietzsche's resignation from his professorship at Basel on May 2nd 1879 would indeed call upon the fate and destiny in the relationship between his thinking and his existence - Nietzsche having written of the pre-Platonic philosophers that 'Between their ideas and their character a firm necessity holds sway' ['Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks' in Hayman 160] - particularly the illnesses which developed from childhood and the traumatic premature death of his father which haunted his own experience of illness.

Acutely, immediately, it was his deteriorating health - sickness, headaches, debilities, and deteriorating eyesight which finally made teaching impossible for Nietzsche and precipitated his resignation. But in his essay 'On Moods' [1864] Nietzsche had written: 'When I eavesdrop on my own thoughts and feelings, it is often as if I heard the noisy battle of wild parties...' [54] And, indeed, Nietzsche's resignation was the culmination of a constellation of tensions beginning in childhood: philosophical seeking and philology; music and words; Wagner and the university; spiritual-intellectual aspiration and health, and where and how he could actually be 'healthy,' and whether his re-evaluating cultural contribution would really be achieved out of illness and existential instability as opposed to the regular securities of an academic profession.

Unsurprisingly, Nietzsche himself was convinced that all the physical symptoms 'were deeply intertwined with spiritual crises, so that I have no idea how medicine and diet could ever be enough to restore my heath' [To Malwida von Meysenburg 11.8.1875: Hayman 181]. Prior to his resignation, he had already broken with Wagner - although Nietzsche's disengagement from Wagner never came to completion, his ambivalence encapsulated in his last completed book Ecce Homo where Nietzsche writes of Wagner's Tristan und Isolde: 'The world is poor for anyone who has never been sick enough for this “voluptuousness of hell”'[Nietzsche 1992, 706] - whose earlier championing and perceived affinity with had, through The Birth of Tragedy, brought Nietzsche's 'philology' into disrepute. Nietzsche's lack of ultimate identity with a profession and position which was indeed the very culmination of a precocious application and talent predated the publication of his first book which was both a breakthrough and a breakaway. As a student at Leipzig he wrote to his friend Erwin Rohde 20/11/1868: 'the philological brood...its mole-like activities...their indifference to the true and urgent problems of life' [J.P. Stern Nietzsche: Fontana Modern Masters p.29 London: Fontana Press 1985]. To another friend, Paul Deussen, he wrote 'I regard Philology as the misbegotten child of the goddess Philosophy, spawned by a cretin or an idiot' [Deussen October 1868 in Hayman 96]. And indeed it has be seen that in his first book 'Nietzsche is practically writing his own letter of resignation as professor of philology' [Burnham & Jesinghausen 2010, 131].
Nietzsche had written:

‘Precisely in those circles whose dignity could consist in drawing inexhaustibly from the Greek stream to the benefit of German education, precisely the teachers in our institutions of higher education, have learned better than most how to reach a quick and comfortable accommodation with the Greeks, even to the extent of abandoning skeptically the Hellenic ideal and completely perverting the true aim of classical studies...There is no other period in art in which so-called education and true art have confronted each other with such feelings of estrangement and aversion as the one we now see before our very eyes. We understand why such debilitated education hates true art, for it fears it will be destroyed by it.’ [TBT 2, 96]

Even though Nietzsche continued as Professor of Philology at Basel, in his first Untimely Meditation on David Friedrich Strauss, influenced by Wagner [Letter to Wagner April 1873; see Hayman 160-1], he attacks the contemporary ‘cultural philistine’ [UM 7], who is a ‘finder’ not a ‘seeker’ [UM 9]. For Nietzsche, this philistine spirit permeates ‘all public institutions, schools and cultural and artistic bodies...’ [UM 7]. It is ‘established’, and is given its most articulate expression precisely where one would hope to find intellectual conscience - the disseminators of education, the scholars, who have ‘no heart for the ... distress’ of the true thinker [UM 174]. They avoid such ‘frightful abysses’ [UM 35]. Yet Nietzsche had not arrived at such a revaluation of his own academic intension and intensity without ‘devastation.’ In his 1886 preface to Human All Too Human - the work compiled through the spiritual and physiological travails leading up to his resignation - he writes of the ‘free spirit,’ of his fate and destiny, and of his ‘loss’:

“the great separation comes suddenly, like the shock of an earthquake: all at once the young soul is devastated, torn loose, torn out - it itself does not know what is happening. An urge, a pressure governs it, mastering the soul like a command: the will and wish awaken to go away, anywhere, at any cost: a violent dangerous curiosity for an undiscovered world flames up and flickers in all the senses. ‘Better to die than live here,’ so sounds the imperious and seductive voice. And this ‘here,’ this ‘at home’ is everything which it had loved until then!’ [HAH, Preface p.6 ]

His wish to overcome ‘the conventional distinction between creative and critical natures’ [unpublished note winter 1869/70-spring 1871 in Hayman 122], was manifestation of the dissonance within his own nature between a feeling of boundless wonder at Wagner’s music and the scholarly demand for academic rigour worthy of Friedrich Wilhelm Ritschl [Hayman 123] who had recommended Nietzsche for the position at Basel, and then found in the pro-Wagnerian Birth of Tragedy an ‘Ingenious vertigo’ [Hayman 146]. Nietzsche’s real task ‘to which I would have if necessary to sacrifice any
career’ was his philosophy, and his campaign for cultural renewal [Hayman 137] out of belief in Wagner’s music: ‘I think that if only a few hundred people get from this music what I get from it, then we will have a completely new culture’ [Letter to Rohde after 21st Dec. 1871: Hayman 145]. To Wagner he wrote: ‘you must be eternally right with your art...God have mercy on my philologists if they refuse to learn anything now’ [Letter to Wagner 2nd Jan 1872: Hayman 146], regarding both Wagner’s music and his own Birth of Tragedy which elicited praise from the Wagner’s and criticism from philologists [Hayman 146].

Events of the Franco-Prussian War - particularly the destructions of the Paris Commune - exacerbated Nietzsche’s pessimism about any attempts at cultural renewal for: ‘What use is an intellectual faced with such a cultural earthquake? One feels like an atom! One uses one’s whole life and the greatest part of one’s strength to come to a better understanding of one cultural period, and to expound it. How is this profession to be regarded when in a single day the most precious documents of such periods are burned to ashes?’ [Letter to Wilhelm-Vischer-Bifinger 27th May 1871: Hayman 141].

Nietzsche ‘wanted to be militant’ [Hayman 141], praising his friend von Gersdorff for leading as ‘vigorous cultural life as if you were still fundamentally a soldier, and striving to transpose your military attitude into the realm of philosophy and art. And that is correct: only as fighters can we, in our time, have a right to exist, as fighters in the vanguard for a new spirit’ [Nov. 18.1871 in Hayman 142]. In the war context the words ‘soldier’ and ‘warrior’ have not the ‘spiritualisation’ they later acquired for Nietzsche (see main text below).

Yet he would be undermined. In November 1871, Nietzsche had entered Mannheim with Wagner, the composer feted by crowds. Yet when Wagner left Tribschen for Bayreuth, Nietzsche had 10 students for lectures on pre-Platonic philosophers, six for lectures on The Choephorae: ‘It’s delorable!’ [Letter to Rohde 12th May 1872: Hayman 151]. His own attempt at musical creation - a ‘Manfred Meditation’ - was dismissed by von Bulow as a ‘crime’ [July 1872, Hayman 155]. After two months Nietzsche finally replied to von Bulow: ‘Just consider that until now, from my earliest youth, I have lived under the most absurd illusion and had a very great deal of joy from my music!’ [Letter to von Bulow 1.10.72 : Hayman 155]

While Wagner prepared for a production of the Ring, Nietzsche found that no students had enrolled in his classes on ‘Homer,’ only two for ‘Greek and Roman rhetoric.’ His book which set up Wagner as the spirit of cultural renewal had damaged his own career. His relationship with Wagner was becoming ambivalent, suppressing his own hostility to Wagner's ‘absolutism’ [Letter to Reinhardt von Seydlitz 7th April 1879: Hayman 212], expressed in the notes for his fourth Untimely Meditation but suppressed in the published work. His attendance at performance of Der Ring destroyed his belief in Wagner as a cultural redeemer, as Nietzsche ‘found himself participating in a philistine festival’ [Hayman 188].
In 1874, Nietzsche was coming to feel his professorship had lasted long enough [Letter to mother 1.2.74: Hayman 169]. His scepticism - ‘Truths are illusions whose illusoriness is overlooked’ [in ‘On Truth and Falsehood in an Extra-Moral Sense,’ Hayman 164] - was putting him outside the academic fraternity to which he felt only one in a hundred belonged [We Philologists, Hayman 178]. In Ecce Homo he ‘noted a total aberration of my instincts of which particular blunders, whether Wagner or the professorship at Basel, were mere symptoms’ [NBW 74 2]. Yet as he was attempting to not lose himself to his profession and to Wagner, Nietzsche, in the opinions of Rohde, Overbeck and Cosima Wagner was now losing himself to the influence of Paul Ree. [Hayman 204].

In the constellation of ‘separations’ and illnesses, Basel had become ‘abominable, noxious’ [Letter to mother and sister 12.4.79], a ‘badly depressing atmosphere, conducive to headaches’ [Letter to Overbeck 11.4.79, Hayman 212]. He was ‘shattered’ and ‘exhausted’ [Letter to mother and sister 18.1.79] by ‘one attack after another’ which lasted days [Letter to mother and sister 27.12.78, Hayman 210]. Overtly it was his deteriorating health which made his resignation almost inevitable. Yet how inextricably related were the spiritual-intellectual and the physiological!

9. On the question of the ‘University,’ already raised in his 1919 lectures, Heidegger addresses Nietzsche directly, at the same time as foreconceiving his own situation in 1933. Out of a demand for a ‘radical…actualization of philosophy’ [PIA 51], Heidegger contends that philosophizing ‘can be determined only in the direction of the factical nexus of life we designate with the title, university’ [PIA 48]. The university offers itself as Heidegger’s stand for a ‘remaining true the earth.’ [Zarathustra]. With a certain degree of animus, Heidegger writes: ‘it is not at all necessary to lend an ear to the famous, resentment-laden, and often cheap invectives of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche…It is easy to run away from the university. But the university does not thereby change, and we ourselves, along with our affairs, are then - Nietzsche is a typical example - sacrificed on the altar of literature. In other words, what then develops is an intellectually unhealthy atmosphere’ [PIA 50]. There is manifestation of his early concern with Nietzsche also in his lectures on The Phenomenology of Religious Life: ‘The connections Paul [makes] should not be ethically understood. That is why it is a misperception when Nietzsche accuses Paul of reßentiment. Ressentiment in no way belongs to this realm; in this context one cannot speak at all of reßentiment. If one enters this kind of talk, one shows only that one has understood nothing’ [PRL 86]…although, in the Aristotle lectures [PIA], Heidegger makes a characteristic qualification: ‘For these two [i.e. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche] have perhaps misunderstood what they were really trying to accomplish’ [PIA 50]. Radical philosophizing should uplift the university. Against the prevailing ‘university philosophy,’ it is a ‘radically relevant and free’ university that ‘not only permits but absolutely compels the unconditionally most radical possibility of actualizing philosophy’ [50-1]. And, though Heidegger opposes the invectives - the excesses - of Nietzsche, he sustains the untimely critical
meditation against the prevailing dominant cultural philistinism, with its 'uproarious haste' and 'fleeing from the issues' [53]. For Heidegger the university is already, in 1921, 'the concrete situation of the actualization of philosophizing...carried out in the manner of a destruction. The way in which a situation becomes relevant is in itself polemical' [51]. Emerging out of a foreconceptual interpretation, it is ironic, in view of his 'situation' in 1933, that, as he makes a radical investment in the 'university'- and against the current philosophical trends which he believes suffer from a 'blindness to one's own spiritual situation' [30] - Heidegger claims that 'the task is to see philosophically the genuine situation, without recourse to propheticism and the allure of a prophetic leader. (People today are writing about the leader-problem!)[52]!

10. The evidence of this is in Heidegger's own factual existence, his 'being,' which will be presented in Chapter 3.

11. On 'fate' (Schicksal) and 'destiny' (Geschick):

Having being concerned with individual Dasein in Division 1 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger moves in sections 72-77 from Dasein's fate (Schicksal) to the destiny (Geschick) of the people to which it is 'essentially bound' [Fynsk 45]:

'But if fateful Dasein essentially exists as being-in-the-world in being-with others, then its occurrence is an occurrence-with and is determined as destiny. With this term, we designate the occurrence of the community, of a people...The fateful destiny of Dasein in and with its “generation” constitutes the complete authentic, occurrence of Dasein' [BT 2: 366].

Thus Heidegger sees the existential analytic completed in the move from individual fate to communal destiny.

The move can be seen as the logic of Heidegger's fundamental ontology with its supersession of the Cartesian ego through its emphasis on Dasein’s 'being-with' - its Mitdasein, its being-in-the-world - overcoming the metaphysics of subjectivity: 'being-with others belongs to the being of Dasein, with which it is concerned in its very being' [BT 2, 120].

For John Caputo, Heidegger 'has all along been building up to the historicity of Dasein...for there can be no question of an isolated existential individual' [Caputo 1998: 87, 89]. Miguel de Beistegui sees that the National Socialist revolution for Heidegger was 'a way of bringing about this state of 'authenticity' and 'resolute disclosedness'...at the level of the German people as a whole [NH169], but doubts that the translation from individual to collective can be made within the terms of Heidegger's criterion for authentic existence in a resolute being-toward-death and in view of the inauthenticity which for Heidegger marks character of everyday being-with-others.

In this study I will pursue Heidegger's *Auseinandersetzung* with both Nietzsche and Husserl. Heidegger's move in *Being and Time* from the fate of individual Dasein to the destiny of the community can be seen one level as a shift from the Husserlian demand for a phenomenology purified of all anthropological and psychological contingencies to the Nietzschean demand for cultural renewal. But the aspiration towards cultural renewal
through the ‘self-determination’ of the university - in dialogue with Nietzsche - is present in Heidegger’s *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* (discussed below).

It would seem, then, that when Heidegger agreed with Karl Löwith - “without reservations...that his concept of ‘historicity’ was the basis for his political engagement” [Beistegui 11] - this engagement was also based upon a longer standing aspiration for cultural renewal out of a transformation of the university. The contentions between phenomenology and cultural aspiration could be seen as representing a radical dualism. The ontological difference is blurred. In his ‘Nietzsche’ lectures on *The Will to Power as Art*, Heidegger sees that the ‘name for essence [the ontological] glides unobtrusively into the naming of things that participate in that essence [the ontical]’ [Heidegger 1991(1), 146]. And for Heidegger the move from phenomenology to cultural politics is such a recurrent ‘gliding,’ an oscillation in his expositions.

Heidegger’s move from individual fate (*Schicksal*) to collective destiny (*Geschick*) carries a volitional load beyond a pure theoretical logic that takes phenomenology to cultural politics. De Beistegui sees that ‘from the very start’ in Heidegger’s thinking ‘the historical is attached to the power of the ontological...’ [26], the weight of the *Kampf* between ‘the giants on the question of being...[which] is historical and destiny from the start.’ The ontological ‘carries the political in its wake’ [30]. It carries too the ontical, the existentiell. And also its aspiration towards an ‘inner truth and greatness’ took the notion of National Socialism in its wake - except that in the hard reality of the Third Reich it was his ontology which was left in the wake of politics. *Gleichschaltung* incorporated philosophy, transgressive philosophy was incorporated. There is perhaps more than one level in his concluding his Rectoral Address with words from Plato’s *Republic*: “All that is great stands in the storm” [497d9].

Heidegger’s attempt to take the ontological into authentic politics would find that the ‘revolution’ only intensified the ‘theyness’ he had depicted as the very dictatorship of communal being-in-the-world.

12. Amongst the unpublished notes to be found in *The Will To Power* is a vision: “the possibility has been established for the production of international racial unions whose task will be to rear a master race, the future ‘masters of the earth’- a new, tremendous aristocracy, based on the severest self-legislation, in which the will of the philosophical men of power and artist-tyrants will be made to endure for millennia - a higher kind of man who, thanks to their superiority in will, knowledge, riches, and influence, employ democratic Europe as their most pliant and supple instrument for getting hold of the destinies of the earth, so as to work as artists upon ‘man’ himself” [WP 504].

It is easy to see how such aspiration could be appropriated by the Nazis who had their own notion of a ‘master race.’ And, particularly in the light of twentieth century history, there is much to find questionable in Nietzsche’s published expression: if he was prophetic in seeing ‘a succession of a few warlike centuries that have no parallel in history,’ we can only think that he
has gone wrong to refer to it as 'the classical age of war' and that ‘All coming centuries will look back on it with envy and awe for its perfection’ [GS 318].

Against this, the potential for despotism instilled within Nietzsche a distrust of ‘all accumulations of state power’ [HAH 227]. He believed that the growth of political power was made at the expense of spiritual being [HAH 233], and that ‘Culture and state...are antagonists...that which is great in the cultural sense has been unpolitical even anti-political’ [TI 63]. And, says Nietzsche, against the stream of Völkisch ideology, it is the Germans who have corrupted culture with ‘political and national lunacy’ [D 190]. Indeed, in Ecce Homo, writing on The Case of Wagner: ‘It is part of my ambition to be considered a despiser of the Germans par excellence’ [NBW 778-9]. Nietzsche struggled with the uncertain divide between the political and the unpolitical. He who stood ‘in loftiness of soul...[above] the wretched ephemeral chatter of politics and national egoism...’ [TI, 114 the foreword to The Antichrist], he who could call on all nations to ‘shatter the sword’, his Twilight of the Idols was itself a ‘grand declaration of war’ [TI 22].

For a thinker so prophetic of the totalitarian excesses of the twentieth century and who bemoaned the misunderstandings of previous philosophy [GS 35], it is surprising that he could not see the dangers of his own writing: 'Preparatory human beings.- I welcome all signs that a more virile, warlike age is about to begin, which will restore honour to courage above all. For this age shall prepare the way for one yet higher, and it shall gather the strength that this higher age will require some day – the age that will carry heroism into the search for knowledge and that will wage wars for the sake of ideas and their consequences...Live at war with your peers and yourselves...you seekers of knowledge! Soon the age will be past when you could be content to live hidden in forests like shy deer. At long last the search for knowledge will reach out for its due; it will want to rule and possess, and you with it!' [GS 228-9]

In the last resort, we may ask whether it is possible to ‘wage wars fore the sake of ideas’ without waging wars, to 'rule and possess' without ruling and possessing. But, for all of his formulations, Nietzsche is not presenting a proto-Nazi treatise:

'We who are homeless are too manifold and mixed racially in our descent, being 'modern men’, and consequently do not feel tempted to participate in the mendacious racial self-admiration and racial indecency that parades in Germany today...[a] politics...desolating the German spirit by making it vain...[a] petty politics...We are...good Europeans...’ [GS 339-340].

But in his ‘fight with the lies of millennia’ in Ecce Home he foresaw ‘calamity...we shall have upheavals, a convulsion of earthquakes, a moving of mountains and valleys, the like of which has never been dreamed of. The concept of politics will have merged entirely with a war of spirits; all power structures of the old society will have been exploded - all of them are based on lies: there will be wars the like of which have never yet been seen on earth. It is only with me that the earth knows great politics’ [NBW 783].
We are left to ponder how politics can merge ‘entirely with a war of spirits’ [NBW 783]. Without an otherworldly heaven Nietzsche, like Zarathustra, is left - still - with only another vision: ‘There where the state ceases – look, there, my brothers. Do you not see it: the rainbow and the bridges to the Superman?’ [Z 78]

In his final sane weeks at Turin, Nietzsche’s thoughts, perhaps drawing on his experiences during the Franco-Prussian War, were concerned, amongst other tribulations, with the coming wars:

‘To take such a select crop of youth and energy and power and then put it in front of canons - that is madness…If we could dissuade from wars, so much the better. I would know how to find better use of the twelve billion that it costs Europe each year to preserve its armed peace; there are other means of honouring physiology than through army hospitals’ [Krell, The Good European, 213]. Just as he had ended Ecce Homo, in the chapter entitled ‘Why I Am A Destiny: ‘Dionysus versus the Crucified-’ [NBW 791], it could be said that Nietzsche was a dissonance on Wars versus Wars.

13. Nor was Heidegger’s temporal horizon one of immediate political expectation: ‘But if the Greeks needed three centuries just to put the question of what knowledge is onto the right ground and on a secure track, we have no right to assume that the elucidation and unfolding of the essence of the German university will occur in the current or coming semester.’

14. It is hard not to see, in the words of Sean McGrath, ‘the untenability of a methodological distinction between the ontological and the ontic’ [McGrath 2008 ix]. Later in his ‘(very) critical introduction to Heidegger,’ McGrath insists that it ‘is curious to note that Heidegger, having insisted on the careful observation of the distinction between being and beings, so freely traverses the line separating the ontological and the ontic’ [61]. The ontological difference itself is blurred. Heidegger in his ‘Nietzsche’ lectures on The Will to Power as Art will himself admit that the ‘name for essence glides unobtrusively into the naming of things that participate in that essence’ [WPA 146].

15. In 1919 Heidegger had called for an ‘eidetic genealogy of primary motivations’ [Kisiel 1995, 41].

16. I use here the word ‘movement’ rather than ‘turn’ or ‘Kehre’. Whilst such changes in Heidegger’s thinking in the 1930s have been construed as representing a Kehre in Heidegger’s thinking, this idea, writes Laurence Paul Hemming* ‘is distinct from Heidegger’s own understanding’ [Hemming 394]. Thomas Sheehan** writes: ‘Interpretations of Heidegger often fail to distinguish between two very matters – on the one hand “the turn” (die Kehre) and on the other “the change in Heidegger’s thinking” die Wendung im Denken) that is, the shift in the way Heidegger formulated and presented his philosophy beginning in the 1930s...the Kehre is emphatically not an alteration in Heidegger’s thinking.’ Heidegger*** discusses the matter in his ‘Letter to Father William J. Richardson. I must limit myself to a note on this matter, and the question of the relationship between the two understandings of Kehre.'
17. After Nietzsche’s question in *Ecce Homo*: ‘How much truth can a spirit bear, how much truth can a spirit dare?’ [EH, 34]

18. In his book *Heidegger: Thought And Historicity*, Christopher Fynsk makes this observation: ‘to describe how the circle in which Heidegger situates the questioning of Dasein in a project of Being is to be thought not in a circular fashion but rather in terms of a double movement...Thinking in terms of a circular movement, we tend to think in a linear fashion - we move from one point in the circle and return to that point via a linear, temporal movement...We need to think this circular movement, on the contrary, as a simultaneous, open-ended movement in two/ opposing directions – not in terms of a circle but in terms of a paradoxical structure of simultaneous approach and withdrawal, of a casting forth that casts back’ [Fynsk 19/ 40-41].

19. Indeed, Medard Boss, Heidegger’s psychologist, claimed, in the words of Iain Thomson, that ‘the epiphany of *Ereignis* [would] hit Heidegger with the force of a psychoanalytic cure’ [Thomson 2003, 71].

20. The paradigmatic possibilities of the musical process of fugue have been explored by Murray Dineen who looks beyond actual realization to the ‘potential...for other realizations’ [Dineen 2004, 39]. Timothy Smith sees that ‘The concept of fugue is rich in its possibilities for intertextual comparisons,’ observing in Dante’s *Divine Comedy* the link between fugue and chasing [Purgatorio Canto 13: 118-119], concluding that, in the 13th century, Dante ‘seems to have predicted the fugue’s canonic precursor, where one voice literally chases another’ [TS2]. Smith notes that Milton uses ‘fugue to illumine Paradise (lost),’ uses the idea of fugue - ‘Fled and pursu’d transverse the resonant fugue’ - metaphorically in relation to the consequences of Adam’s disobedience. (Book xi). Smith argues that Milton ‘intended to reference what...his audience...knew about music in order to reveal something else’ [Smith, T.A. 2003, 3].

21. Indeed, Fugue - a musical ‘form’ or structure - has come to gain increasing association with psychological and psychiatric conditions e.g. dissociative-fugue, indeed ‘a great separation’ [Nietzsche] - a flight - from a life hitherto lived, used as early as 1894 by Pierre Janet in his book on *The Mental State of Hystericals* [alert ‘The Grammarphobia’ Blog 24th Feb 2011]. Michael Lewis, Margaret Wolan Sullivan and Linda Michalson at Rutgers Medical School chose the title “The Cognitive-Emotional Fugue” to stress the fact that ‘cognition and emotion are neither separate nor independent aspects of behaviour. Rather, both are elements of the same theme interwoven into a single composition. Both parts are continually chasing each other, like the parts of a fugue...linear models that fail to
capture this interplay are less satisfactory descriptions of the process than the model suggested by the fugue.’ [Hokkaido University: http://hdl.handle.net/2115/25199]

22. Heidegger ends Being and Time with a question-mark of a different kind, questioning the very horizon outlined on his first page.

23. Coded references to his affair with Hanna Fuchs-Robertin through the use of the notes B & F [H & F in German notation] found throughout his later works, particularly the Lyric Suite [Ross 226].


25. In the History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger criticizes Husserl for dealing, in his Logical Investigations, with ‘very special and arid problems: with object, concept, truth, proposition, fact, law.’ Krell, in Intimations of Mortality [128], makes a similar judgement on Heidegger’s History of the Concept of Time.


27. Blanchot writes in his essay on Literature and the Right to Death: ‘The word acts not as an ideal force but as an obscure power, as an incantation that coerces things, makes them really present outside of themselves...[the] physical weight [of words] is present as the stifling density of an accumulation of syllables that has lost all meaning’ [328 & 331]. Blanchot asks: ‘Where in a work lies the beginning of the moment when the words become stronger than their meaning...?...Could it be that the meaning of a word introduces something else into the word along with it, something...which is capable of completely modifying the meaning and modifying the material value of the word?’ [335/343]


29. ‘...from my own terror I wove the rope of the Norns.’ Wagner to Ludwig 2nd Bavaria 5/5/1870, in Sabor 239.

30. Wagner to Liszt 15/1/1854.


33. Wagner to Karl Gaillard 5.6.1845 in Spencer 1988, 120.

34. On November 3rd 1952, after attending a performance of Orff’s Oedipus the Tyrant at Darmstadt, Heidegger wrote to his wife Elfride: ‘The essential stimuli do come from people who - though not philosophers - are themselves creative. The bare hour at the breakfast table with Orff moved me most powerfully’ [LW, 227].

35. It may be through some ‘elective affinity’ that we may attempt a hermeneutics through music - Thomas Mann’s demonic realm - for, as highlighted by Andres Urs Sommer, versucher means both ‘attempt,’ and ‘temptation’ [Warwick University, 23.3.2012].
CHAPTER 2: TOWARDS HEIDEGGER’S NIETZSCHE-HUSSERL DUALITY


2. In this section on *The Birth of Tragedy* translations used are those by Douglas Smith [TBT], Walter Kaufmann [NBW], and Ronald Speirs [TBT2].

3. I am here concerned with how *The Birth of Tragedy*, as Nietzsche’s ‘personal question,’ offers a hermeneutic for understanding Heidegger, and not with the question of Nietzsche’s judgements on Greek tragedy. However, I do agree with Martha Nussbaum who writes: ‘Nietzsche is wrong about Euripides…usually so skeptical of received scholarly views, [he] takes over completely uncritically the notion, current in his day, that Euripides is a “rationalist” and a precursor of Socratic intellectualism’ [Nussbaum 2002, 36]. The question is raised: was this ‘error’ part of Nietzsche’s own self-defence?- a question for another time.

4. To which Heidegger refers - PIA 38, discussed previously.

5. Afterwards in references Sallis = Sa.

6. Sallis calls on ‘The Dionysian Worldview,’ ‘Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks,’ ‘On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,’ Nietzsche’s lectures on Pre-Platonic philosophy, and other notebooks and lectures, as well as the ‘Attempt At Self-Criticism.’

7. GA 18:5 e.g. Bret Davis *Martin Heidegger: Key Concepts* [2010,2] and Rudiger Safranski *Martin Heidegger* [1998,1].

8. The crossings within the text underscore the fugal strife which is the founding perception of Nietzsche’s first book: the fugal Apollonian-Dionysian duality which Nietzsche both describes and ‘enacts’ is indeed a foreconception of the dissonance which will bring about his personal dissolution.

9. The question of the relation between Nietzsche’s madness and his thinking is perhaps less of an issue than the question of the relation between Heidegger’s ‘biography’ and his ‘thinking,’ perhaps as a consequence of their respective positions regarding the ‘presence’ of personality in philosophy, and the importance of the question in relation to Heidegger’s political involvement 1933-34. Nietzsche’s madness has been diagnosed ‘medically,’ as the result of a syphilitic condition contracted in an encounter with a prostitute. In his fictional version of this encounter in *Doctor Faustus*, Thomas Mann suggests that this was a ‘driven’ tarrying with the possibility of such an outcome. It could also be that Nietzsche suffered from a genetic predisposition, his father dying from ‘softening of the brain.’ In his essay ‘Nietzsche’s Philosophy in the Light of Recent History’ [Last Essays 143-144], Thomas Mann constellates Nietzsche’s ‘disease’ with his ‘genius.’ And Nietzsche himself, in his late book *Twilight of the Idols*, dissected thought - particularly decadent thinking - to expose a physiological condition. In his writings there are many portents of Nietzsche’s own fate. In *Zarathustra* he writes -‘I love him who wants to create beyond himself, and thus perishes’ [Z 90-91], thus the fatality of the demand for the ‘ultimate,’ ‘the fatality of the heights, our fatality’ [GS 371].

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Daybreak is full of self-warnings and - could it be? - self-prophecies: ‘All superior men who were irresistibly drawn to throw off the yoke of any kind of morality and to frame new laws had, if they were not actually mad, no alternative but to make themselves or pretend to be made’ [D, 14]. And in Zarathustra’s first speech we read: ‘everybody wants the same thing, everyone is the same: whoever thinks otherwise goes voluntarily into a madhouse’ [Z, 46]. Nietzsche spent the last ten years of his life helpless and insane, having written against the parasitism of the ill: ‘The invalid is a parasite on society. In a certain state it is indecent to go on living.’ Nietzsche’s advocation: ‘To die proudly when it is no longer possible to live proudly…From love of life…’ Nietzsche berates physicians for sustaining ‘degenerating life,’ and does not countenance the possibility that through medication ‘ascending life’ can be preserved or restored [TI, 88]. Franz Overbeck, on his last visit to his insane friend, saw Nietzsche, with almost five more years to live, ‘a noble but mortally wounded animal, cowering in some corner, pondering only how it might perish’ [Krell 1997, 52]. Perhaps he recalled a letter from Nietzsche who felt himself to be ‘staggering about mortally wounded’ by the soundless silence with which his Zarathustra was met [Krell 1997, 140]. Another friend, Peter Gast, commented: ‘it seemed – horrible though this is – as if Nietzsche were merely feigning madness, as if he were glad for it to have ended this way’ [Hayman 1995, 341].

10. This is not to dismiss the many other thinkers and writers from both religious and secular traditions with whom Heidegger engaged himself sometimes ‘hidden’ but still genetic. For example Heidegger’s Hidden Sources, [May 1996].

11. On May 1st 1924 Husserl delivered a lecture at the University of Freiburg entitled ‘Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy’ in which he acknowledged the ‘obvious essential relationship’ between his own ‘pure or transcendental phenomenology and the transcendental philosophy of Kant.’ [Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, Fall 1974]. Regarding ‘pure logic’ see sections 17-20 & 41-51 of the Logical Investigations [Welton 1999, 5-21].


14. Laing’s existential phenomenology ‘attempts to characterize the nature of a person’s experience of his world and himself…his whole being-in-the-world.’ Laing transposes Heidegger’s philosophical ‘ontology’ to an ‘empirical sense because it appears to be the best adverbial or adjectival derivative of “being.”’ Laing encapsulates the awareness of the being-in-the-world of the other in his description of a lecture given by the German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926), which, for Laing, exemplifies, in the words of van den Berg, the ‘vocabulary of denigration,’ indeed, a denigrating perception, in which the patient’s behaviour is evaluated in terms of objective ‘signs.’ Laing steps back to observe the patient’s words, not as signs of disease, but as expressive of his existence. For Laing, the task
of existential phenomenology is to 'enlist all the powers of every aspect of ourselves in the act of comprehension' [Laing 1976: 17, 39, 27-32]. Heidegger recognizes this endowment as 'belong[ing] indisputably to the possibilities-of-being-with-one-another in the world' [BT 2:230].

15. From Husserl's *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* 140, in Smith 2003 viii.


17. See L. L. Farrar (1981), an interpretation of the foreign policy of Imperial Germany in terms of an 'anxiety-arrogance syndrome.'


24. In his *Parmenides* lectures of 1943 Heidegger would similarly be concerned with salvation [PA 127].


27. Letter to Ingarden Dec. 2nd 1929.

28. Heidegger would make the same claim for Dasein, as being-in-the-world.


30. In the *Crisis*, section 9, Husserl would criticise the 'mathematization of sensibility.'


32. Marion Faber's translation of 'grosen Loslosung' as 'great separation,' is resonant with loss and rupture [HAH, 6]. Richard Hollingdale [HAH 2, 6] and Gary Handwerk [HAH 3, 7] translate it as 'great liberation', quite a different emphasis.


38. Merleau-Ponty: *Phenomenology of Perception* viii in Madison 257.

39. Gary Madison (1977) offers a suggestive perspective upon the fugal nature of Heidegger's reception of Husserlian phenomenology. Utilizing the mineralogical process of ‘pseudomorphosis’ wherein ‘the formation of a new crystalline substance in the hollow cleft in a rock by crystals which had in the meantime disappeared; the new crystal is forced to take shape in the alien mould and thereby assume a form incongruous with its inner structure.’ Gary Madison sees in *Being and Time* an attempt by Heidegger
‘to pour his existential preoccupations into a Husserlian mould,’ as Husserl will later attempt to incorporate ‘certain “Heideggerian”, existential themes.’ Madison views the Heidegger-Husserl pseudomorphosis as paralleling the pseudomorphosis of the Greek optimistic reason with the Christian tragedy of the Cross [Madison 1977, 259-260]. That there was within the Greek outlook a tragic counterpoise to the rationalistic optimism, and that Nietzsche saw Greek optimism as a ‘decline’ from a tragic pessimism of strength need not here complicate the Husserlian-Heideggerian dichotomy, Husserl coming to philosophy from mathematics and logic, Heidegger from theology. ‘It is the Christian experience of man’s thrownness, his radical finitude, alienage, and his being a stranger in the world, as well as the insignificance of the world itself (and all worldly science) which are articulated in Heidegger’s “existentialism” ’ [Madison 1977, 260]. In terms of pseudomorphosis, it is this tragic concern which will fugue with the methodology of Husserlian phenomenology. Heidegger would later turn to Greek tragedy.

42. Ricoeur 1967, 207-8 in Ansell-Pearson 89.
43. This would, indeed, be indicative: Heidegger speaks of Jorgensen’s ‘powerful struggle to free himself from a perverted and deceitful philosophy, tireless searching and building, the ultimate step to the summit of truth’ [J 35], foreconceiving traits Heidegger expressed elsewhere, for instance, in his Parmenides lectures of 1943 where Heidegger feels ‘we need only take a few more steps’ in his approach to the summit of the explication of the essence of truth [PA 144].
44. In 1943 the question of salvation will weigh heavily on Heidegger in his Parmenides lectures [PA 127], perhaps an attempt to overcome his own baseness, and, if not for resurrection, perhaps, after Nietzsche, to be born posthumously, as a modern Augustine?
49. As discussed in chapter 1 of this study.
51. Babette Babich notes Nietzsche’s observation that ‘we explain everything with reference to ourselves and our own motivational intentionality’ [Babich 2003, 347].

53. See Chapter 4.

54. To be developed below.


56. As Franco Volpi seeks to make ‘plausible’ an interpretation of Being and Time as a ‘“Translation” of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics’ [Kisiel and van Buren 1994, 195-211].


61. Exemplified in the section on ‘Transcendence and Temporality’ in his lectures on The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, discussed later in this chapter. In his ‘Nietzsche' lectures on The Will to Power as Art he attains a Wagnerian ‘scintillation' [WPA, 216]. [see note 43 above].

62. Krell notes Heidegger's early reading of Nietzsche at least from the publication of the ‘second, expanded edition of the Nachlass material published as The Will To Power’ (1906)' [Krell 1986 127]. See also Krell’s 'Analysis' to his translation of Heidegger's Nietzsche volume 1.

63. In the History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger himself speaks of Husserl's concern with ‘arid problems: with object, concept, truth, proposition, fact, law’ in his Logical Investigations. [HCT 25]

64. John Van Buren 4, drawing on Otto Pöggeler's Martin Heidegger's Thought Path. Heidegger would later write to his wife: 'Valuable though my earlier teaching was, it never really let the authentic heart of my thinking become properly free - the merely scholastic & scholarly would suddenly intrude & prevent or warp the simple and essential' [LW 200: 6.14.1945].

65. The tendency of this study is to view Heidegger's thinking in relation to this monstrum in animo.


CHAPTER 3: HEIDEGGER'S LETTERS


3. I will take up the issue of Heidegger’s ecstatic language on the temporal ecstases in Chapter 4.
4. ‘Sappho: The She-Greek Heidegger Forgot’ in *Feminist Interpretations of Martin Heidegger* 170 quoted in Aho p.158, n.27.

5. The evasion of ‘love’ in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology has indeed been the subject of much condemnation in the secondary analyses. Sean McGrath sees *Being and Time* ‘having no place [for] Christianity understood as *agape* [love], self-forgetful love...[that] self-sacrificial love [that] is key to the mystical overcoming of the sinful ego...Authentic Dasein does not carry the burdens of others’ [McGrath 2008, 88]. And John Caputo is damning in his essay ‘Sorge and Kardia: The Hermeneutics of Factual Life and the Categories of the Heart’ [Kisiel and van Buren 1994, 327-343], for Heidegger had, in his fundamental ontology, lost what he had found - the ‘*kardia of the heart*’: ‘Heidegger [had] found in the New Testament narratives a wholly different set of (pre)philosophical paradigms: not of neutrality and the *epoché*, not of the disinterested, objectifying thinking of Greek metaphysics, but rather paradigms of concernful struggle, of fear and trembling, of passion and resolve.’ Caputo finds it ‘hard to come away from these early Freiburg lecture courses without the feeling that something important was missing from this *hermeneia*, that some sort of new “reduction” or exclusion was being enforced’ [329]. Laying the blame at the door of Aristotle’s concern with the *phronesis* of cognition, ‘silencing the terms of mercy and *kardia,*’ Caputo sees in Heidegger’s “essentializing” tendency...a new, higher, and still more abstract and austere reduction...that transcends the concrete and suffering subjects of actual history...flatly contradict[ing]...the original project of the first Freiburg period, namely, to return philosophy to the concreteness of “factual life”’ [341]. McGrath underscores the sense that this criticism is based on Heidegger’s reneging on his own promise: the suppressions within the texts themselves, thus within fundamental ontology ‘obstruct the task [Heidegger] sets for himself in his most fertile period of philosophical work, his early lectures and writings’ [McGrath 2008, 1-2]. Having spoken of ‘the empty schematism of transcendental philosophy’ in his course on *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression* in the summer of 1920, [van Buren 1994, 366], Heidegger, in Caputo’s view, indeed becomes entirely concerned with ‘the phenomenological question of the “constitution” of the “world”, [and] with *techne* and *phronesis* as kinds of practical knowing... In Heidegger’s factual lifeworld there are...plenty of tables, chairs, houses, tools, and instruments of all sorts... My complaint here is only that [Heidegger’s] conception of ‘factual life’ is not factual or perhaps praxical enough...It ignores...the *praxis* of afflicted flesh’ [Kisiel and van Buren 1994 332]. Caputo sees Heidegger’s fundamental ontology as having ‘shut[] down, exclude[d], or neutralize[d] the whole dimension of being...afflicted...[a] new and more subtle *epoché*...enforced a new and different neutralization of factual life...The full measure of facticity is suppressed... Heidegger had quietly closed down the operations of the flesh, the whole “economy” or “world” of bodily diminishement, distress, and vulnerability...’ [334].
6. Suggestive also is Heidegger’s having a line from Luther’s translation of the Old Testament [Proverbs 4: 23] engraved in wood above the door of his house in Zähringen: ‘Shelter your heart; for from it life goes forth’ [John van Buren in Kisiel & van Buren 1994, 159], and a photograph of Dostoevsky on his work desk [Heinrich Walter Petzet referenced in Schmid 2011; also Guignon 1993 ix]. Ulrich Schmid notes - referencing George Pattison, The Later Heidegger - that in ‘a memoir from 1958 [Heidegger] includes Dostoevsky in a short list of authors whom he avidly read in the 1910s’ [Schmid 2011, 37]. Schmid traces a political affinity between Heidegger and Dostoevsky. Yet there is also a significant relation between these choices, between the Luther quote and Dostoevsky whose novels are populated by the ‘insulted and injured,’ the psychological world of he who was ‘the only psychologist...from whom [Nietzsche] had anything to learn’ [TI, 99], (though Nietzsche tells us this in a questionable assessment of ‘the criminal’). And, in January 1889, Nietzsche, whilst walking in Turin, collapsed into madness witnessing the flogging of a horse, a nightmarish scene almost out of Dostoevsky’s Crime And Punishment. Nietzsche, this man against pity, ran to the horse, put his arms around its neck and fell out of sanity. We can only wonder whether there was indeed an element of self-recognition, an identification with the plight of the suffering animal. Nietzsche’s yea-saying Dionysianism was indeed associated with demonic tragedy. Perhaps Heidegger too had learned from Dostoevsky’s psychological realm.

7. Heidegger uses the ampersand in his letters to his wife and to Arendt. Underlinings in these selections from Heidegger’s letters are his own.

8. German provided by translator Andrew Shields in his blog http://andrewjshields.blogspot.co.uk/2008/01/heideggerian.html


10. Though his Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics will reveal an attitude to animals fundamentally at odds with Zarathustra’s world of animals - ‘me, my eagle, my serpent’ [Z,39] - not of one who would collapse at the Dostoevskian sight of cruelty to an animal. ‘Nietzsche refers to man as ‘the animal species “Man” ‘[‘das Tier “Mensch”’]’ [Reed 159]. For Heidegger ‘the animal is poor in world’ relative to man who is ‘world-forming’[FCM 192].

11. Heidegger sees Husserl’s misunderstanding as his putting forward in his Logical Investigation ‘the completely mistaken interpretation of phenomenology as a better kind of psychology’ [S 162]. Yet in WPA Heidegger contends that ‘The equation of Being and life is not some sort of unjustified expansion of the biological, although it often seems that way, but a transformed interpretation of the biological on the basis of Being, grasped in a superior way’ [WPA 219].


14. EH, 34.
In a reversal of Nietzsche: ‘Not the intensity but the duration of high feelings makes high men’ [BGE, 80]. One would perhaps expect their positions to be reversed.

Reference to Strauss/Hofmannstahl/Wilde Salome.

Heidegger’s letters to his wife during 1932 give an indication of his political thinking. Whilst giving expression to the widespread fear of the dangers of Communism, he believed that its foundational ‘systematic dialectic founded upon Hegel… is still superior in comparison with all the vague & seething stuff of the Nazis’ [LW, 134]. And further that the ‘standard’ of the V[olkischer] B[eobachter], is again beneath contempt at the moment - if the movement didn’t otherwise have its mission, it’d be enough to fill one with horror’ [LW, 136]. But against this: ‘More essential is that we again find a great aim for our German existence [Dasein] & above all that this is well founded, clear & worked out to the last detail’ [LW, 135]. But then - another but: ‘as I’ve written before - however much of an effort the Nazis require of one, it’s still better than the insidious poisoning to which we’ve been exposed in recent decades under the catchwords of “culture” [Kultur] & spirit’ [LW, 137]. Disillusioned with ‘the inner failure of the university [to function] as a unified world capable of exerting an influence’ [LW, 141], Heidegger, at his hutte in Todtnauberg, has his ‘work & live[s] with the woods & mountains, the meadows & brooks - which give me what I need. Quite away from all contingency - in profound indifference to the non-necessary’ [LW, 138]. Heidegger saw his own work as a ‘true creative task’ requiring ‘most characteristic spiritual form’ and, following Nietzsche, believes in this winter of 1932 up at Todtnauber that ‘on great matters one must keep silence as long as possible’ [LW, 142] and not allow ‘a type of action that is ‘political’ in the narrow sense to become the yardstick for philosophical action. The appearance of being on the outside will stay & yet only in this way will it be possible for the metaphysics of German existence [Dasein] to become an effectual work in its original affinity with the Greeks’ [LW, 142].

For all his jaundiced comments about women, marriage and fatherhood, Nietzsche would write that ‘procreation is the real achievement of the individual’ [WP, 360]. The imagery of his Zarathustra - which he later described as a ‘sudden birth’ following a ‘pregnancy’ [EH, 99] is telling: ‘My wild Wisdom became pregnant upon lonely mountains: upon rough rocks she bore her young, her youngest’ [Z 109]. Of course, procreation can be sublimated. Nietzsche compares ‘the artist’s love for his work’ with ‘mother love,’ the artist’s ‘spiritual pregnancy produc[ing] the character of the contemplative type, which is closely related to the feminine character: it consists of male mothers’ [GS 129]. Nor can the artist be spared the struggles of biological mothers: ‘we have to give birth out of our pain and, like mothers, endow them with all we have of blood, heart, fire, pleasure, passion, agony, conscience, fate and catastrophe’ [GS 35-36]. Nietzsche portended Mahler when he writes: ‘Making music is another way of making children’ [WP 421].
For Mahler, his creative self was realised in a process of gestation: the artwork came into being as a birth. Writing about his *Eighth Symphony* in a letter to his wife Alma, Mahler contrasts ‘the eternal feminine - that is to say, the resting place, the goal, in opposition to the striving and struggling towards the goal (the eternal masculine)’ [Alma Mahler 1990, 321]. Mahler’s symphonies were, natural father though he became, his progeny: ‘I announce the happy birth of a healthy and vigorous last movement for the Second. Father and child both doing as well as could be expected - the latter not yet out of danger’ [Martner 1979, 155: Mahler to Lohr, 23.6.1896]. He welcomed the completion of the *Ninth Symphony* as ‘a very satisfactory addition to my little family’ [Martner 1979 341: Mahler to Bruno Walter, August 1909]. He would envy women their pregnancies. He had been unable to complete his *Fourth Symphony* in the summer of 1901 - he must wait until the following year: ‘How fortunate mothers are - they cannot be forced to interrupt their birth-pangs.’ [Martner 1979, 255: Mahler to Henriette Mankiewicz, 21.8.1901]. The self-suppression of his real self, the frustrating damming-up of this true ‘bearing’ of creation: ‘In this way spiritual conception is very much like physical birth. What struggles, what agony, what terrors accompany it - but what rejoicing when the child turns out to be fit and strong’ [Bauer-Lechner 1980, 38]. He worked through ‘veritable labour pains’ [de la Grange 1974, 358]. Of course he knew the difference: the ‘creator can interrupt his labour without injuring his child and resume it at an opportune moment’ [de la Grange 1974, 632]. The association between procreation and meaning is highlighted in the consummation of the process: creation. Whilst Mahler suffered the terrors of protracted labour, he suffered, perhaps as women from the emptiness after parturition: ‘Even less could he bear to lose the constant companionship of something that had filled his life with meaning for so long’ [Bauer-Lechner 1980, 67].

19. Letter to Karl von Gersdorff, Sils Maria, 28.6.1883 [FS, 74].
20. I do not intend to offer a detailed chronology.
21. As he attempts in his personal life, a whole constellation *gathers* in Heidegger’s post-rectorate thinking on *Ereignis* and the ‘mirroring’ in the unity of the ‘Fourfold,’ i.e. earth and sky, divinities and mortals. In ‘The Thing’ Heidegger writes: ‘Mirroring in this appropriating-lightening way, each of the four plays to each of the others. The appropriative mirroring sets each of the four free into its own, but it binds these free ones into the simplicity of their essential being toward one another’ [PLT, 177]. I offer this quotation merely suggestively, recognizing that this sets Heidegger’s letters synchronously with his thinking, an area beyond the scope of this particular study. Rather, in the last section of this chapter, I use Heidegger’s later letters as indicative of a heightening of a propensity, in relation to Heidegger’s having-been. The philosophers with whom he corresponded most - were Jaspers and Arendt. Admittedly speaking here of his political silence regarding Nazism and the Holocaust, Jaspers spoke of Heidegger’s ‘incapability of grasping the depth of his failure as a human being’ [Ettinger’s gloss on Jaspers’ *Philosophical Fragments*: Ettinger 1995, 64].
CHAPTER 4

FUGUE, SUPPRESSION AND INTENSIFICATION IN HEIDEGGER’S THINKING OF THE 1920S


2. Hölderlin’s Hymns, ‘Germania’ and ‘Lower Rhine,’ [GS 39, 189. in Janicaud 100].

3. ‘The only thing of interest regarding the person of a philosopher is this: He was born on such and such date, he worked, and he died’ [Ga 18: 5 in Davis 2010, 2]. Kisiel (1995) warns against the use of this quotation as a rejection of the biographical for ‘it occurs at a point when Heidegger is beginning to draw the conclusions regarding the nature of a philosophy drawn from the hermeneutics of facticity. The interdependence between beings and their being, the interplay of the ontic and the ontological…is underscored in the very first of the ground concepts…οὐσία…[being]. The central thrust of the course…early falls back upon a biographical facticity’ [Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy (1924) in Kisiel 1995, 287].

4. I believe that the factual-psychological process has mythic provenance in the Bacchae of Euripides, in which the repudiated Dionysus exacts his revenge. Heidegger’s evasions of the human-all-too-human blinded him to the, well, to the human-all-too-human, ‘blindedness’ as we shall see a theme which Heidegger opens up in Being and Time, and develops during the 1930s (the tragedy of Oedipus becoming a concern for him after the Rectorate). The human-all-too-human is both marginalized and reconfigured; it is almost ‘hidden,’ for as we shall see it appears in unexpected places.

5. I hope in a further study to pursue Heidegger’s thinking from 1933 and its relation to his ‘political silence’ in terms of a reconfiguration of the Apollonian-Dionysian forces, particularly the incorporation of the Dionysian within his overt philosophical exposition, as Wagner incorporated the demonic textures of Hagen’s music into the transcendences following Siegfried’s death in Götterdämmerung.

6. Heidegger would also retreat to this ‘nook’ in the winter of 1932-33 to consider a Greek.


8. In his essay ‘Literature and The Right to Death’ (1995), Maurice Blanchot, writing of literature, asks: ‘At what moment, in this labyrinth of order, in this maze of clarity, did meaning stray from the path?’ He suggests that ‘something else was continuing, progressing in its place…something reason thought it recognized as itself, until the moment it woke up and discovered this other that had taken its place?’ [335]
9. I will later draw attention to Heidegger’s own recognition of the fragmentation of ‘fractured life’ in his lectures *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*.

10. In GS (p.86) Nietzsche talks of ‘elevated feelings’ and ‘higher moods.’

11. Elevated moods about which Nietzsche himself distinguished between those of hunger and those of superabundance [GS, 329].

12. ‘Contents’ pages of *Being and Time*.

13. As discussed in Chapter 1.


15. Ref: W.B. Yeats ‘The Second Coming’: ‘Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold.’


17. In the *History of the Concept of Time* Heidegger positions his treatment of ‘being-toward-death’ at the culmination of the lecture course, as he would say of the ‘way’ of his *Parmenides* lecture course in 1941, approaching the summit. In *Being and Time*, as we have it, being-toward-death is located earlier in the text, but still an approach to authenticity. Heidegger’s letters reveal his love of the mountains, the home of his creative ‘hutte’. And for mountaineers the approach to the summit is often felt to be tied to a feeling of the attainment of an authenticity lost in the inauthenticity of everyday regularity. I draw upon the following books: Walter Bonatti *On The Heights and Great Days*; Gaston Rebuffat: *Between Heaven And Earth, Freedom To Climb*; Lionel Terray: *Conquistadores Of The Useless*; and Reinhold Messner: *The Seventh Grade: Most Extreme Climbing and Big Walls*. This, however, is the tradition of ‘ice and high mountains,’ the world of Heidegger’s ‘letters’ suppressed, or overcome, in Heidegger’s ontologisation.

18. Centrally located in the received text of *Being and Time*, which, as underlined by James Luchte in his book *Heidegger’s Early Philosophy* [Continuum 2008], was ‘the published fragment’[3], Heidegger’s *magnum opus* is not a complete, completed work. It is an unfinished body of work to which he would never exactly return, but he would turn back to his 1919 lectures, the blueprint against which Heidegger would himself later judge *Being and Time*. In *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being & Time*, Theodore Kisiel suggests that ‘when Heidegger first realizes that BT was a failed project, he then re-turns to earlier insights left unpursued in order to begin again.’ He then asks: ‘Could it be that the hermeneutic breakthrough of 1919 already contains *in ovo*
everything essential that came to light in the later Heidegger’s thought?’ (Genesis, 458)

19. I speak of this as a tradition in view of the continuous cross fertilization of words and music in the philosophy, literature and musical compositions of German cultural history. Suffice it to mention here Schopenhauer, Wagner, Nietzsche, Mann, Adorno and Schoenberg. Maurice Blanchot, in his essay ‘Literature and the Right to Death,’ argues that ‘each work...begins at a certain moment in time and that that moment in time is part of the work’ [Blanchot 1995, 305].


22. Settembrini, one of his pedagogical mentors, warns Castorp: ‘the only religious way to think of death is as part and parcel of life; to regard it, with the understanding and with emotions, as the inviolable condition of life...Severed from life, it becomes a spectre, a distortion, and worse. For death, as an independent power, is a lustful power, whose vicious attraction is strong indeed; to feel drawn to it, to feel sympathy with it, is without doubt at all the most ghastly aberration to which the spirit of man is prone’ [MM1, 200].

As we are concerned here with Heidegger’s reading of the Magic Mountain, it is worth noting also that Castorp associates death with ‘history and nobility and piety,’ and that the chapter Walpurgis Night is immediately followed by the question ‘What is time?’ [MM2, 339], a concern which distinguishes astronomical time from the way time is experienced.

23. In his characterization of ‘anxiety’ Heidegger avoids Kierkegaard’s genesis of anxiety out of sin and Freud’s aetiology of sex.

24. Fabio Ciaramelli on Levinas at Staffordshire University June 28-30, 2012: “The true life is absent. But we are in the world:” Levinas and the Search for Meaning beyond Being.’


26. See note 7, Chapter 2.

27. Reference to the preface to Human All Too human in which Nietzsche describes the experience of the free-spirit. See Chapter 2, Note 26.

28. Zarathustra Book 1 ‘On Free Death.’

29. ...although Heidegger does not totally overthrow the language of the genealogies of laceration: ‘Anticipatory resoluteness lets the potentiality-for-being-guilty, as its ownmost nonrelational possibility, completely drive into its conscience.’[BT 2, 294]

30. This I will only suggest, rather than pursue.
But then this is a judgement on what constitutes a \textit{factual possibility}. Peak experiences are factual possibilities, though of a kind in which you cannot remain. For those driven to peak experience it is average everydayness which is unsustainable. But, again, this is a valuation Heidegger is striving to overcome. See previous note on mountaineers.

See Note 11, Chapter 1 on 'Fate & Destiny.'

\textit{Hölderlin's 'Patmos.'}

Thomas Mann, quoted in chapter 1: 'Music and speech...belonged together, they were at bottom one, language was music, music a language; separate, one always appealed to the other, imitated the other, used the other's tools, always the one gave itself to be understood as a substitute of the other' [\textit{DF}, 237].

Towards a physics of polarisation and gravitation.

Jacques Derrida uses the word 'magnetised.' [Derrida 1989, 3].

Richard Polt opens his introduction to Heidegger [1] with this quote from Heidegger's lectures on Hölderlin's Hymne “Andenken,” GA 52, 64.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

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