IMAGE AND PATHOS IN NIETZSCHE’S AESTHETICS

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the expression and communication in Nietzsche’s texts of an emotion he identifies as rare and noble, and which is implicated in his demand that existence be aesthetically justified. In seeking to understand its communication in the use he makes of imagery of height and distance, I identify a number of key ideas and issues, as follows: (i) it depends upon a specifically symbolic use of figurative language, in contrast to broadly allegorical uses of metaphor and parable and their interpretation in other terms; (ii) the symbolic character of figurative language consists in a symbol being what it purports to sign, and which allows rarer feeling is communicable as an identity of pathos and image; (iii) the distinction between symbol and allegory has a basis in the work of Friedrich Creuzer and influenced Nietzsche’s thinking; (iv) the symbolism of height and distance is a necessary condition of aesthetic feeling tied to Dionysian creativity and its formal expression in music and plastic art, in myth and ritual activity, and in language; (v) Nietzsche’s regard for the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson was grounded in their shared understanding of a Dionysian art, enabled as immersion in a symbolism; (vi) the role of imagery of height and distance in Nietzsche’s texts allows rejection of the claim that he lacked a visual attunement; (vii) evidence of Nietzsche’s concern with the expression and communication of rarer states is found in arguments he makes for its symbolic character and the illustrative examples he gives; (viii) the symbolic use of metaphor and parable is itself a feature of the case Nietzsche makes for it, notably in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, I (22), On the Bestowing Virtue; (ix) the early influence of Emerson’s life-affirming Dionysianism shows that Nietzsche advocated a sensuous Anschauung in opposition to Schopenhauer’s notion of disinterested contemplation; (x) the symbolic character of a Dionysian art informs and sustains Nietzsche’s expectations of an art of the future, initially identified as the ‘mythological’ thinking in Wagner’s music drama. In addressing these issues, I consider broader implications of admitting an identity of symbol and ‘object’ at the level of appearances for Nietzsche’s philosophy of language, for the will to power and Overman, for his epistemological and metaphysical naturalism, and for the contrasting roles he accords intuition and reason.
Introduction

1) 'rarer' states

In this thesis, I address the use that Nietzsche makes of imagery of height and distance in connection with the feelings or emotions he distinguishes as rare and noble. In its variety centred on hierarchical relations between things, the imagery is so frequently employed by Nietzsche that some particular intention is easily suspected. In section (257) of Beyond Good and Evil height and distance are marked in a political context as an 'order of rank', but these relations are familiarly a feature also of poetic and other kinds of artistic expression, of religious discourse and other kinds of ritual practices. My interest is in Nietzsche’s views concerning artistic inspiration and its creative expression. Focusing on his use of figurative language, I examine how he seeks to communicate the experiential character of the so-called rare or noble feelings he identifies in (257). In the context of his own encounter with the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, I argue it is key to Nietzsche’s interest in these rarer states that he relies on a specific understanding of a use of symbolic language, in which the symbol is what it purports to sign. An example from Foucault’s account of this characteristic use of symbolism is an eagle’s gaze, symbolic of regal bearing (1989, p.40). Taken as a symbol, the image of the eagle is what it signs because its gaze is identical already with regal bearing. I take this as a way into understanding Nietzsche’s regard for Emerson’s writing, together with the use made by Nietzsche of imagery of height and distance centred on the expression and communication of rarer states.

There is an extended use of metaphor and simile in allegory and parable, but it is the specifically symbolic use of imagery and figurative language which I argue is important in approaching Nietzsche’s texts. In particular, this symbolic character of language contrasts with settling the ‘meaning’ of a sign in conceptual terms. Nietzsche declares in The Birth of Tragedy that ‘only as an aesthetic phenomenon is existence and the world eternally justified’ (1999, p.33). Taking this aestheticism to be an enduring concern in his philosophy, I argue it is constituted as an experience of higher feelings given in symbolic use of figurative language, in an identity of pathos and image. This use is distinguished from the broadly allegorical sense of metaphor and parable in which something is indicated in other perhaps more familiarly understood terms by analogy with something else. Fundamentally, an allegorical understanding of a text or piece of social behaviour is drawn on decoding it. An example here is Freudian analyses in which one thing ‘stands for’ another. In the account I give of Nietzsche’s figurative language of height and distance tied to ‘rarer’ states, I rely on this distinction as being between symbol and allegory. The origins of the distinction are traced to writings of Friedrich Creuzer, and of Schelling, and I show how these are an influence on Nietzsche in the context of his own appreciation of Emerson’s work, and of Wagner’s music drama.

In (257), Nietzsche declares a pathos of distance is a necessary condition of experiencing the further category of feelings he regards as integral to human progress:
Without the *pathos of distance* as it grows out of the ingrained differences between stations, out of the way the ruling caste maintains an overview and keeps looking down on subservient types and tools, and out of this caste’s equally continuous exercise in obeying and commanding, in keeping away and below – without *this* pathos, that *other* more mysterious pathos could not have grown at all, that demand for new expansions of distance within the soul itself, the development of states that are increasingly high, rare, distant, tautly drawn and comprehensive, and in short, the enhancement of the type ‘man,’ the constant ‘self-overcoming of man’ ... (2002, p.151)

I shall examine how this connection between *pathos of distance* and the ‘rarer’ *pathos* is grounded in the symbolic character of imagery drawn on hierarchical relations. It is carried in the figurative language Nietzsche uses here, of ‘looking down’, but it is a feature generally of cultural forms and practices in which kinds of social ordering are expressed and communicated. It is also a key feature of images employed in art and sculpture. The rarer states are those Nietzsche identifies elsewhere as ‘elevated’ or ‘higher’ feelings, for example in section (86) of *The Gay Science*. Being uncommon or rare, they are unavailable to what Nietzsche calls ‘herd’ consciousness, and I explain how this follows from the account he gives of the origins and character of human language and of self-conscious thought. But it is the imagery of height and distance which is important. Taking it symbolically in the sense already indicated, it is not a matter of its ‘standing’, as it were, for something else. Such a conceptual unpacking of its context and broader significance is detrimental to communication of the ‘rarer’ experience, because undertaken in ‘common’ terms.

It is not simply feelings of superiority at issue here. In *On Reading and Writing* (2005(b), p.36), for example, Nietzsche’s injunction is to look down, not up. Is looking down mistaken for ‘higher’ feeling? It is clear in *Beyond Good and Evil* (257) that Nietzsche distinguishes a ‘more mysterious’ pathos, though it depends upon situations in which we may experience simpler feelings of superiority. Agreement on the character of higher feeling and the circumstances under which it is experienced may be difficult, but it is loosely familiar as an ‘elevated’ mood distinguishable from other feelings of ecstasy or euphoria, from other kinds of vaguely mystical experience, and from feelings of superiority. While Nietzsche frequently resorts to examples drawn on bluntly hierarchical relations, as he does, for example, throughout part 9 of *Beyond Good and Evil*, it is not a matter only of celebrating distinctions in rank. In any case, it can be granted Nietzsche tests the reader’s ‘ear’ on what is at stake here.

Luke (1978) is a useful survey of imagery of height and distance in Nietzsche’s texts. Identifying an image ‘cluster’ around talk of high mountains, climbing, flying and dancing, and of wide seas and distant views, and so on, Luke notes that the associations Nietzsche makes between these metaphors are inseparably entangled, with Nietzsche seemingly interested in the imagery for its own sake, not just as illustrating certain ideas. Arguing for a progression in the texts, Luke finds its use is increasingly ‘poetic’, being used, for example, to generate expanded scenes and events throughout *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, and which seem to be developed out of interest simply in the imagery. Luke draws attention to Nietzsche’s description of elevated moods (*hohes Gefühl*) in *The Gay Science* as ‘a perpetual movement between high and low ... a continual feeling that one is climbing stairs or resting on clouds’ (1974, p.231). The intimate connection here between this imagery and
a category of feelings is notable, but Luke addresses only a psychological question of Nietzsche’s state of mind, proceeding straightaway to identify ‘higher’ feelings with the exhilaration and euphoria of what he takes to be a manic depressive temperament in Nietzsche. Along Freudian lines, he goes on to suggest as well that Nietzsche had naively failed to recognise the sublimated sexuality in all this imagery of height and climbing, allowing will to power is substituted by libido.

But in making it a matter only of Nietzsche’s character or temperament, Luke’s argument is narrowly ad hominem (Crowley, 1980). It also depends upon reading symbols in a way which I contend is specifically rejected by Nietzsche. The Freudian supposition that dreams of climbing or flying, for example, have a sexual ‘meaning’, requires that symbols stand to be ‘de-coded’. That is to say, they would be talking about something in some other terms, where these are perhaps more familiar, or less unsettling. The core of the distinction which I draw between competing theoretical approaches to symbolic use of language and imagery, is between the kind of interpretation grounded in a relation of sign and object signed, and an approach in which the symbol is, in a specific sense, identical with what it ‘signs’. The latter approach accommodates a ‘pre-linguistic’, pre-conceptual understanding of symbolic imagery. I grant that Nietzsche does allow that temperament is implicated in the value and significance he accords to particular forms and examples of cultural expression. But while allowing so much is involved in having a particular sensibility towards symbolism and figurative language, I contend it is the character of that symbolism itself, under the approach Nietzsche favours, which is operative in sustaining that sensibility. Accordingly, my own approach is in contrast to the kind of psychological reductionism which would only relativise Nietzsche’s thinking to his own subjective temperament or attitude.

It remains that a seemingly pre-conscious habit or character of mind may have a creative role in shaping what we see. But this shaping must be something which is recognisably a feature in experience, identified in imagery and in its symbolic character. In Beyond Good and Evil (193), Nietzsche writes:

> What we experience in dreams, provided that we experience it often, belongs in the end just as much to the total economy of our soul as anything that we ‘really’ experienced. Such experiences make us richer or poorer, we have one need more or less, and finally, in the bright light of day and even in the clearest moments when minds are wide awake, we are coddled a little by the habits of our dreams. (2002, p.82)

He goes on in this passage, precisely in the vein of elevated feeling, that an accustomed levity, as an adopted frame of mind, will colour any experience, even the mundane, and can exceed comparison with the ‘soaring inspiration’ described by poets, which is too earthly, too ‘heavy’, compared to this ‘flying’. It is not a matter of this ‘habit’ being something which is wholly instinctive. With an elevated mood informing the aesthetic justification Nietzsche demands of existence, I take this as depending on a certain feature or stimulus in experience, encountered at the level of a use of language or imagery. The levity which Nietzsche is addressing here is ‘world-creating’ in the sense of transfiguring. And this is tied to a particular aspect or feature of things already integral to levity and elevated feeling.
Nietzsche talks as well of tonality, and of tempo, tied to a certain sense of renewal. In early unpublished lecture notes (Blair, 1983), he argued against the importance generally ascribed to metre in Greek verse. There was, in the ancient tragedies, he says, an unbroken ‘natural link’ between language and tone which cannot be uncovered solely on the basis of surviving texts. Their vocal sound is lost to us. It does not have to follow that Nietzsche must be taken as denying this tonality can ever be reinstated or ‘heard’ again. There may not be a return through the kind of scholarly distortions he addresses in the lectures on Greek metre, but this does not determine that there cannot be new and creative opportunities for the rediscovery of the tonality in question. Indeed, in the broader context of imagery and language, there must be opportunities for ‘reactivating’ metaphor where it has been overtaken by conceptual interpretation tied to a way of life and a shared language (Burnham and Jesinghausen, 2010(b), p.111), and which allows it is a matter of reconnecting language with a particular tonality. Nietzsche came to lose the confidence he put in Wagner’s music. But the tonality can be expressible in other presentations, in visual art and music.

Crucially, the point applies as much to Nietzsche’s own texts. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche writes about his art of style:

> To communicate a state, an inner tension of pathos, with signs, including the tempo of these signs – that is the meaning of every style ... (2005(a), p.104).

As tempo or tonality, style is experienced as a particular mood or feeling. It is an identity of pathos and image at stake here, and I shall argue that the experience of elevated feeling in visual and sound images depends upon taking them symbolically in this way, in contrast to meaning sought in broadly allegorical terms. The tonality in question must be identified on the evidence of Nietzsche’s own use of symbolism, drawn on a feature which is accessible in different kinds of creative art, and where this feature is a condition of its being ‘heard’.

This ‘hearing’ will be taken in Nietzsche’s sense of pathos, which is to say as something simply experienced, or suffered (Burnham, 2007, p.194). While political and social interests can be drawn on the kind of rational judgements which inform appeals to freedom or to equal rights, and so on, Nietzsche prioritises a sense of suffering which, it will be seen, he treats as being integral to man as both creation and creator. It is drawn on distinctions of rank, and in section (257) of Beyond Good and Evil is implicated in the ‘enhancement’ of humanity. My focus on a symbolic communication of feelings has implications for how this talk of enhancement is taken, and I return to this below. I take it to be primarily a descriptive claim that Nietzsche makes about a category of ‘higher’ feelings dependent on a pathos of distance, experienced by individuals. It is how these distinctions are, as it were, felt, or suffered, which is important. We suffer them both as their object and their creator, so it is, Nietzsche says, a ‘self-inflicted’ cruelty. Individuals may ‘hear’ differently, because rarer states are a ‘further’ experience in contexts involving an order of rank and are inhibited or obscured by attention only to the simpler feelings of rank and superiority.

I address in chapters 3 and 4, how Nietzsche treats their obscurity as following on the development of language and consciousness. My aim in this thesis is to clarify how Nietzsche envisages the possibility of (re-)experiencing these so-called ‘rarer’ states through
the symbolic expression and communication of images drawn on an order of rank. As such, I am concerned with the specifically figurative language Nietzsche uses, together with examples of paintings and sculpture and other kinds of image he discusses, taking these in relation to a position on the symbolic use of language which is discernible in claims Nietzsche makes, for example, in On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense (1999), and in Zarathustra. It is not the case that Nietzsche’s talk of rarer states is ‘only’ metaphor or rhetoric. His symbolic use of imagery exemplifies an artistic unity of creation and creator, expressing the feelings in which its inspiration consists.

In Ecce Homo, in section (3) of the chapter on Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche recalls an interest in his earliest writings on the relation of sound and visual imagery to an originating impulse. He talks of ‘something suddenly becoming visible and audible … something that throws you down and leaves you deeply shaken’ (2005(a), p.126). It is the imagery which concerns him here, and his remarks are consistent with the account given in On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense, where the original impulse is a ‘mysterious “X”’ (1999, p.145).

In Ecce Homo, he cites Zarathustra’s words from The Return Home:

all being wants to become a word here, all becoming wants to learn to speak from you (2005a p.127).

I will show how Nietzsche intends the return of language to the nature of imagery will undo the conceptualisation which occurs as a further development in language. Specifically, this return is through the role and operation of symbolic imagery of height and distance. In this way, the pathos marked in Beyond Good and Evil (257) is the basis of a renewed experience of elevation or ‘higher’ feeling. As pathos, it marks a pre-linguistic or pre-conceptual experience of its expression in sound or visual imagery.

2) methodology and questions around Nietzsche’s ‘sources’

With the supposition that Nietzsche in some way favours a ‘symbolic’ way of thinking, it can be supposed this governs what he takes from his own reading. There is a difficulty here for investigating his ‘sources’. It cannot be a matter of selecting those that favour a particular position, to reinforce it being held by Nietzsche. But their influence can be drawn on evidence of Nietzsche’s own use of figurative language as much as on identifying positions he advances in the texts. I trace sources in connection with Nietzsche’s view on symbolic language, and I shall argue the work of Ralph Waldo Emerson is a primary influence. Given that Nietzsche is known to have maintained an enduring regard for Emerson’s writings, I show that they provide a basis both for identifying a consistency in Nietzsche’s views, and for understanding how his thought developed in relation to other influences, such as Schopenhauer and Wagner.

There is useful discussion of methodological concerns around an appropriate sense of ‘influence’ in Del Caro’s (2013) contribution to The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche. There, Del Caro addresses the influence of a broadly defined romanticism on Nietzsche, through Hölderlin, Goethe, and Wagner. In pointing out the danger of being too reductive, he cites
(fn.11, p.123) the example of connections made between Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra* and Wagner’s *Ring* cycle by Gooding-Williams (2001). These are drawn on identifying correlations. For example: around the figure of the dwarf and between Zarathustra and Wagner’s Wotan. In contrast to this, Del Caro’s emphasis is on marking out a ‘space’ in which Nietzsche is engaging with other authors as a kind of ‘sparring’. Such sparring is not a point-for-point challenge and answer, he says. Rather, it is a way of recognising and making room for Nietzsche’s own ‘creative engagement’ with other writers and artists, while also granting that his own concerns are broader and independent of, say, Wagner’s own, even if specific aspects of Wagner’s work were taken and addressed in opposition. In the specific case of Hölderlin, Del Caro recalls his own earlier claims for an ‘imprint’ of Hölderlin’s style of expression on Nietzsche, and for anticipations in Hölderlin of key Nietzschean themes around *amor fati*, the *Dionysian* and eternal return. Now, he treats these not so much as ‘borrowings’, but in terms of Nietzsche engaging with Hölderlin. So, for example, citing Gaier (1993), Del Caro points to Nietzsche’s difference from Hölderlin on the role of the poet, and he takes this as indicating Nietzsche’s turn from Hölderlin on breaking with Wagner, breaking with a romanticism characterised in association with art and poetry and nationalistic sentiment, and turning to philosophy over poetry.

Away from the specific details of Del Caro’s account, his remarks on assessing influences on Nietzsche may readily be granted. In this thesis, I seek to mark out such a ‘space’, in which Nietzsche was seeking to articulate a particular understanding of a ‘symbolic’ use of language and its application. I contend that it characterises his encounter with Emerson’s writings, not least because it informs Emerson’s own interests and concerns. I argue that the ‘feeling’ for life he identifies in talk of so-called ‘rarer’ states is to be taken in terms of his own response to Emerson’s writings, and that his original attraction to Wagner’s art and subsequent disillusionment can be fitted to an understanding of symbolism drawn on the work of Friedrich Creuzer, and which also underpins his regard for Emerson. These ‘influences’ stand to be identified in the use Nietzsche makes of figurative language, notably in *Zarathustra*, as well as in the remarks and commentaries he gives on issues around its usage. The wider range of influences and sources which Nietzsche drew upon then mark a ‘space’ through which he sought both to understand and communicate what he found in reading Emerson, and which stands then to be found in reading Nietzsche, too.

Integral to this is the particular distinction between symbol and allegory. It is outlined by Gadamer in *Truth and Method* (1993, pp.72-29) in the following terms:

> a symbol is not related by its meaning to another meaning, but its own sensory existence has ‘meaning’. As something shown, it enables one to recognise something else ... (1993, p.72)

In the case of allegory, something is meant in other more familiar terms. By contrast, a symbol marks a ‘coincidence’ between an otherwise ‘invisible’ experience and its expression (as an image). Crucially, Gadamer cites section (30) of Creuzer’s *Symbolik und Mythologie*, volume 1, on the suitability of symbols to religious practices. At stake is how in priestly ceremonies an ‘original connection’ between gods and men is recovered. A symbol then is suited to expressing the priest’s ‘higher knowledge’ not by uniting two kinds of thing, but by reinstating an original and subsequently fractured unity. Creuzer uses a metaphor of the
Sun’s light fractured into a rainbow spectrum by obscuring clouds (1819, pp.58-59). His claim is that the symbol’s fractured complexity accommodates a plurality of expressive meanings. In this complexity it is thought-provoking, and fitted to the priest’s task of turning us away from everyday concerns. The symbol’s religious function thrives on the tension between a unitary meaning and its fractured and obscure, but thought-provoking expression. This tension arises with the supposition that the symbol reconciles ‘two’ realms, human and divine. But fundamentally, it is a sacralisation which is tied to corporeal, sensual imagery.

With this characterisation of symbolic imagery and language, I offer evidence that Nietzsche relied upon it. I also provide a detailed account of its history and of why it should be taken as integral to Nietzsche’s approach, centred on his concern with ‘higher’ feelings. Creuzer’s theory of symbolism is examined in more detail below in Part 2, in a wider context of the role of mythic symbolism and, not least, of Nietzsche’s regard for Wagner’s art. Gadamer treats a symbol as pointing in some sense beyond its sensible form because it is a unity of form and what he marks as ‘essence’. But the key issue here is that a symbol does not simply sign an object, or represent it. It unifies what is seemingly ‘two’ realms. And, in that respect, I propose it unifies a form or relation and the ‘feelings’ we have towards things so related. For now, I emphasise Gadamer’s point that the kind of unity at issue here does not happen in allegory because allegorical meaning is already drawn on other meanings. Adhering to the distinction between symbol and allegory, I show in chapter 5 how Nietzsche explains a misuse of allegory and parable (Gleichnis). The distinction is traceable to the legacy of Jacob Boehme’s writings in those of Schelling and Coleridge, Goethe, Schopenhauer and others. The extent to which Boehme was an influence on Hegel is debated in the secondary literature, though Hegel was critical of what he called his ‘picture-thinking’. In this thesis, it is particularly a matter of symbolic imagery which I take to be at stake in Nietzsche’s communication of ‘rarer’ states tied to an order of rank.

3) Implications of this thesis

My findings have implications for a number of key issues in Nietzsche’s wider philosophy. First, I assign the possibility of experiencing rarer states to individuals who are, as it were, in the present. That is to say, I begin in chapter 1 with a sense of present ‘lived’ experience, taken as characterising what Nietzsche marks as a ‘higher soul’. It is also the case that Nietzsche says this higher soul is a matter of breeding and cultivation, of something inherited in opposition to a common culture. Examples here are section (213) of Beyond Good and Evil, where he says a philosopher’s virtues are acquired over generations and passed on, and section (257) addressing the type ‘man’ and the ‘self-overcoming of man’. Also, in section (3) of The Anti-Christ, Nietzsche asks what human should be bred, as a type ‘more certain of a future’, in opposition to mankind as herd animal. These remarks may be taken in connection with Zarathustra’s claim to teach the Übermensch, but I shall focus more particularly on a characteristic experience of higher feelings as constituting a present and individual self-overcoming.
Bernd Magnus (1983) provides an overview of how the secondary literature is divided on the significance of Nietzsche’s talk of self-overcoming. On one hand, the overhuman has been taken as a future achievement of some ideal type of humanity, as the enhancement or perfectibility indicated in Nietzsche’s talk of ‘breeding’ and the cultivation of certain virtues or dispositions. In relation to this, Magnus points to Nietzsche’s complaint in Ecce Homo against those who identify the overman with some ideal type, ‘half “saint”, half “genius”’, or with heroic exemplars (2005(a), p.101). Laurence Lampert (1986, p.20) also rejects the supposition that Nietzsche envisages an individual's transformation as representative of some ideal future type, though for Lampert, Nietzsche’s talk of the overhuman is implicated in a historic project of changing cultural and political values. On the other hand, Magnus identifies a differing approach whereby it is much more a matter of what the overhuman is like. He allows the difference may not be precisely drawn, but marks the contrast here as being tied to a sense in which the overhuman could be presently attainable by individuals. This distinguishes individuals without supposing the elitism of a future type, and Magnus goes on to treat their Übermenschlichkeit as consisting in an attitude of affirmation towards life. He also links this to the notion of eternal return, identifying the life-affirming attitude with living in a way in which one must wish to live again (Magnus, 1983, p.647). And while conceding this is vague, he also considers kinds of worthwhile epiphany which might warrant repeated experience (p.650).

Useful here as well is the emphasis Walter Kaufmann puts on Nietzsche’s talk of self-becoming in section (3) of the commentary on The Untimely Meditations in Ecce Homo (2005(a), pp.114-115), as ‘breeding’ given to oneself in a self-realisation achieved through reflection on one’s ‘educators’ (Kaufmann, 1974, pp.306-308). It is notable that Nietzsche resorts to imagery of height and distance in making the point in Ecce Homo. Kaufmann also explains how self-realisation is implicated in Nietzsche’s remarks in section (143) of The Gay Science contrasting free-spirited polytheistic creativity and adherence to the notion of a unitary eternal law. Allowing Emerson is another ‘educator’, I shall focus on the account Emerson gives of the symbolic character of images, and how this is taken up by Nietzsche. In particular, I draw the character of Übermenschlichkeit by comparison with the notion of a ‘higher self-possession’ in Emerson, with which Nietzsche would have been familiar. Accordingly, I find a basis in Emerson’s writings for an affirmation of life expressed in imagery of height and distance which informs the ‘lived’ experience Nietzsche talks of in section (213) of Beyond Good and Evil, and supplies the aesthetic justification of existence in symbolic terms.

In this respect, I engage with the difficulty Jill Marsden (2005) identifies, of how Übermenschlichkeit should be attainable given Nietzsche’s insistence on its unprecedented character and under the constraint of beginning from our common humanity. Marsden proposes a shift of focus onto how ‘we could be approached by it’ (p.106), which is to say by the Übermenschlich as an experience. Rejecting conceptualisations grounded in seeking to understand it, the question is drawn on how we might ‘sense’ something which eludes determination (p.107). Marsden argues for attention to the ‘tone’ of Nietzsche’s language. Its sublimity is tied to communicating something which is difficult to conceptualise, and Marsden finds this in a kind of ‘surrender’ to sensations, where these are not something belonging to a subject so much as that the subject is itself formed through those experiences (pp.111-
112). I shall build on Marsden’s account by identifying the role of imagery of height and distance in a distinctively symbolic communication, whereby we are, as it were, approached by the Übemenschlich.

Second, I examine further how this sublimity is constituted. Ansell-Pearson has noted little has been written on Nietzsche’s understanding of the sublime. Focusing primarily on Dawn, he explains how Nietzsche anticipates new possibilities of experience which would revivify the received understanding of what we mark as sublime. As such, it is a kind of ‘return’ to human feelings (Ansell-Pearson, 2010). By comparison, Marsden (2005) focuses more sharply on Nietzsche’s remark in Ecce Homo about communication of an ‘inner tension of pathos’ (2005(a), p.104). Again, I build on this by examining what Nietzsche marks as his lizard moments (p.121), arguing that the allusion here to Praxiteles’ Apollo Sauroctonos is drawn on taking the imagery symbolically, whereby it operates to bring about the transformation in the subject which Marsden identifies as Übemenschlich.

It is here that the distinction between symbol and allegory is important. As symbol, an image escapes translation in other terms. Again, I follow Gadamer (1986, 1993) in the supposition that its immunity to translation lies with it being itself a presentation, not a representation of an object. An expectation of hidden meanings then encourages the sense of something outside the subject, but it remains something disclosed in the image itself, as an immediate and unsettling experience. In this way, the subject is immersed in the experience, and I take this to be the connection Nietzsche draws between imagery of height and distance and ‘rarer’ states. The anticipation of undisclosed meaning captures a sense of being approached by something Übemenschlich, as something complete and, as it were, ‘outside’ us. This notion is itself symbolised in Creuzer’s metaphor of the fractured rainbow colouring of a cloud-obscured Sun (Creuzer, 1819). In (5.4) below, I draw a connection with the use that Nietzsche makes of imagery of golden lustre in On the Bestowing Virtue, in Zarathustra, in a symbolic communication of feelings towards existence, drawing a comparison, too, with Wagner’s image of sunlit gold in water at the opening of the Ring Cycle.

Third, my thesis has implications for the significance of Nietzsche’s understanding of life as will to power. Key claims here are in section (36) of Beyond Good and Evil, where will to power is taken to be the basic form of all our human drives, and in section (12) of Book II of Zarathustra, where life is said to be a continual self-overcoming for the sake of power itself. Also, in section (6) of The Anti-Christ, life is claimed to be the ‘accumulation of force, for power’. I examine Nietzsche’s talk of ‘drives’ and instincts in chapter 6, but these are aside from the more reductive position taken up in these passages and which is marked in Zarathustra as Life’s ‘secret’. Loeb (2015) addresses a division in the secondary literature between exoteric and esoteric readings of (36) in assessing Nietzsche’s commitment to his own conclusion in that section, that the world in its ‘intelligible character’ would be nothing other than ‘will to power’. Loeb’s view is that Nietzsche is engaged in undermining inclinations to humanise the universe, holding to the notion of ‘a radically inhuman cosmos of inexorable power’ (2015, p.59). But away from the complexities of approaches to (36) in the critical literature, I propose the issues here around force and power are incidental to an interest Nietzsche takes in certain feelings arising in particular circumstances, however much these circumstances betray the workings of a fundamental force.
Indeed, such talk of force and power may be a substitute for the inspiration Nietzsche identifies in *Ecce Homo* (2005(a), p.125), saying he was overpowered (überfielt) by his own Zarathustra as a type (als Typus). Again, the ‘type’ at issue here can be identified by feelings towards life. And it is clear in section (257) of *Beyond Good and Evil* that Nietzsche distinguishes rarer feelings from those tied simply to an exercise of power. The rarer pathos is drawn on this tension, that higher states are nevertheless tied to contexts involving simple hierarchies and the brute exercise of power. My focus is on the symbolic expression of this particular tension, in art and language, and in Nietzsche’s texts. In so far as the operation of a hierarchical will to mastery is taken as a necessary condition of higher feeling, the claims made for its particular status and operation in itself are important, not least because Nietzsche challenges the reader on what to conclude from the ‘truth’ of will to power. But I proceed on the basis that its ‘truth’ is not directly relevant to the feelings which attach to a certain distance on it. In this respect, it is not a difficulty for my thesis that Zarathustra declares in II (12) that the ‘secret’ of his teaching is life as overcoming. There, Zarathustra engages with the ‘wisest’, to challenge them with his own account of Life’s secret, and in section (36) of *Beyond Good and Evil* it is ‘his truth’. But it is the tension tied to this ‘truth’ which is important, not its truth as such, or, indeed, the question around Nietzsche’s commitment to its truth.

Fourth, the emphasis I put on Nietzsche’s regard for Emerson suggests a reassessment of the influence of Schopenhauer’s philosophy on Nietzsche, particularly in relation to Schopenhauer’s pessimism, the role he accords intuition (Anschauung), and the priority he gives to music. The use of the term *Anschauung* has a history in other writers aside from Schopenhauer, and I argue Nietzsche’s meaning is tied more closely to a sensual experience, influenced by the emphasis Emerson puts on engagement in nature. In this respect, it need not be supposed that Nietzsche made a philosophical ‘journey’ away from Schopenhauer’s pessimistic turn from life. I address the issues here in the context of Emerson’s writings, particularly with regard to his view on the symbolic use of language and the emphasis he puts on giving voice to nature ‘humanised’, as it were, in language. I make a case for Nietzsche having followed Emerson in declaring a life-affirming Dionysianism, in advance and independently of his encounter with Schopenhauer’s work.

Fifth, the connection between *pathos* and a class of imagery allows a greater emphasis on the visual character of things, with visual and sound-images accorded equal status as expressions of a ‘musical’ mood’ (1999, p.29). It will be seen how Nietzsche treats the development of conceptual language out of common interests and concerns as being broadly detrimental because leading to ‘nobler’ feelings being overlooked, as concepts are abstracted from visual images. This prompts the question how an original, non-linguistic imagery can be the basis of a return to higher feeling. Nietzsche says in *Ecce Homo* that Zarathustra is ‘the soul that has the longest ladder and can go down the furthest’. In the image of Zarathustra, he says, we come to know ‘what height, what depth really is’ (2005a pp.129-130). In this imagery of height and depth, both in his explication in *Ecce Homo* and in the text of *Zarathustra* itself, Nietzsche is clearly concerned with the communication of something which is intimately bound to the figurative language used to express it. It will be seen the demands this makes on a theory of symbolism fitted to that communication, and how this must allow the plastic arts stand on a level with music in enabling ‘rarer’ feelings.
Sixth, there are implications for recent approaches to Nietzsche as a ‘proto-phenomenologist’ engaged in discoveries at the periphery of consciousness. In the commentary in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche says of Zarathustra that it is the ‘highest deed’, an act of passion and height, living in an ‘azure solitude’. He goes on to say how Zarathustra’s speeches tremble with passion. Zarathustra feels himself to be the highest type of everything that exists. These feelings warrant Nietzsche’s injunction to return to the nature of imagery. But they indicate a sense of something discoverable. Again, I approach this on the basis of the operation of a symbolic use of language. It may be drawn on an order of rank between things, but it is the symbolic character of this ordering which informs the sense in which it is a lived experience, lived, as it were, at a ‘higher’ level of feeling. The value is at the level of the symbolic imagery itself, in which the subject, as it were, participates, and at stake is the subject’s unity with the world, in a creative activity. If this admits a ‘phenomenological method’, then it stands to be directed on a particular phenomenal feature of things identifying a feeling or emotion.

Finally, the expression and communication of ‘inner’ states in imagery taken symbolically does not require that ‘higher’ feeling must be founded as mysticism or on the assertion of a primitive ineffability. It is a transfiguring experience, but Nietzsche approaches it philosophically through an account of the development of language out of images, and of how the ‘common’ language underpinning our thinking inhibits a certain way of experiencing things. He is ultimately concerned with a form of expression outside language, in the forms we typically associate with art. In Ecce Homo it is characterised as a ‘return of language to the nature of imagery’ (2005(a), p.130). This may be ‘primitive’ in the sense of claiming independence from cultural and social influences, but I take the transformative role of a symbolic use of figurative language in line with the way in which Marsden (2005) allows a subject is, as it were, created by the Übermenschlich. I argue that the mechanism of this transformation is the operation of an imagery of height and distance tied to the rarer pathos as an identity of image and pathos in a Dionysian art.

4) outline

Central to my argument is the contrast between symbol and allegory. This distinction has a history, which I set out, and I explain its importance in the operation of Nietzsche's imagery of height and rank in the expression and communication of an ‘elevated’ feeling or emotion which I take as being among his foremost concerns. Finding the distinction is fundamental to Nietzsche’s use of symbolism and figurative language in an aesthetic of elevated feeling, I examine how these concerns are fitted to his interest in contemporary science and anthropology, and to the influence of Schopenhauer and Wagner, and others. In particular, I emphasise the impression made on Nietzsche by the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson. My contention is that this impression was precisely through the role Emerson accords to symbolic language and the use he made of it, and which Nietzsche took up. In addressing what is at stake here, my inquiry is divided into two parts. The first is directed on marking out key terms and some particular issues, including the nature of Nietzsche’s regard for Emerson’s writings and its implications. In the second part, I address in detail Nietzsche’s philosophy of language and his account of the origins of self-conscious thinking, before
turning to evidence in his texts that he treated the expression and communication of rarer states as being drawn on a symbolic imagery. Some implications for the basis of the intuition on which this communication depends, and for its ‘object’, are addressed in the final chapter as involving broadly metaphysical concerns.

In part 1, I begin by outlining the character of ‘rarer’ states tied to imagery of height, and with a preliminary account of the distinction I mark between symbol and allegory I treat the experience of these states as consisting in immersion in a symbolism. This is fitted to Gadamer’s remarks on feelings towards existence and underpins the revaluation Nietzsche demands as an aesthetic justification of life. I find an illustration of what is at stake here in Nietzsche’s talk of ‘divine lizards’, in Praxiteles’ Apollo Sauroctonos, though this will depend already upon taking it symbolically. The example informs the claims I make for Nietzsche’s Dionysianism, and its basis in a visual sensibility is then the link to Nietzsche’s regard for Emerson’s writings similarly drawn on symbolic imagery. All of this depends upon establishing Nietzsche did not lack a certain visual ‘attunement’, and chapter 2 begins by arguing he did not. In advance of this, I address implications for assessing the influence on Nietzsche of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, particularly in relation to the Schopenhauerian notion of intuition (Anschauung). On the basis of the earlier influence of Emerson, I argue Nietzsche approves the operation of a characteristically sensual intuition, or perception, tied to a use of imagery. This has implications as well for how Nietzsche understood the role of a mythic symbolism, and his regard for Wagner’s music drama.

With the case I make for Nietzsche’s visual sensibility at the beginning of chapter 2, I turn to how this is fitted with the ‘musical mood’ he talks of in The Birth of Tragedy. There are issues here around syntactic features of Nietzsche’s language, as matters of style. But I seek a unitary account which can accommodate the musicality, for example, of the Apollo Sauroctonos. So much is offered by an identity of image and pathos in symbolic uses of language and in plastic art. I turn then to the character of Dionysian inspiration as ‘delight in existence’, and to issues around the subject’s distance on his or her own conscious sense of self or ego. In 2.5, I introduce a notion of metaphoric transference which has its basis in Emerson, in a ‘humanisation’ of nature. I am mostly concerned here with claims made by George Stack (1992), but it is seen in more detail in Part 2 how transference (Übertragung) has been taken as the basis of Nietzsche’s ‘theory’ of language. In both respects, I am concerned to emphasise the symbolic character of a use of metaphor or parable, in contrast to a seeming assumption generally in the secondary literature that Nietzsche does not depart from a sign-object semantics. I end in Part 1 by returning to the issues around Anschauung, where it is again a matter of allowing a semantics appropriate to a subject’s immersion in a symbolism, as an identity of pathos and image. The point at issue is that in a symbolic use of imagery, the image already is what it purports to sign. An imagery of height and distance then expresses and communicates the rarer states in which the aesthetic justification of existence consists.

In part 2, I examine two key studies, by Crawford (1988) and by Emden (2005), of Nietzsche’s theory of the origins of language. At stake is how the notion of transference is to be approached. The tacit assumption of a sign-object semantics in these studies is at odds with what I take to be Nietzsche’s recommendation of an original symbolic expression.
Accordingly, I turn to an account of this symbolic use, starting from its basis in the work of Friedrich Creuzer, in his *Symbolik und Mythologie der Alten Völker* (1819). In comparison with imagery in Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra*, I also draw on Roger Beck’s (2006) discussion of the Mithras cult, where Beck addresses two approaches to the symbolic structure of the Mithraeum. This symbolism stands to be decoded, say, in astrological terms. But immersion in the symbolism can identify the character of a cult member’s experience without being linguistically informed by de-coded ‘meanings’ of the images and practices, and without it having to be taken only as ineffable or mysterious.

In chapter 4, I address Nietzsche’s account of the origins of our ‘common’ language and how this obstructs the discovery of rarer states at the periphery of conscious. In chapter 5, I return to issues around the symbolic use of language, examining the imagery in *Zarathustra* of the child with the mirror, and the staff which Zarathustra is given by his disciples. I draw comparisons with imagery in Emerson and in the work of Jacob Boehme. At stake is the activity of a creative impulse expressed in a primordial ‘language’ of images and sounds, and I find Nietzsche warns against taking images allegorically. A further comparison is the non-linguistic vocal sounds and imagery of sunlight through water which begin Wagner’s *Ring Cycle*. I also return in chapter 5 to the question of the kind of intuition involved in taking images symbolically, to argue for its sensuous character. I go on to consider further influences on Nietzsche, of the writings of Hölderlin and Heinse. Finally, in chapter 6, I address two key issues around the identity of a symbol and its ‘object’. First, the object is located at the level of appearances, in the formal features of a Dionysian art. By way of illustration, I discuss the expression and communication of movement in paintings by Cy Twombly. I also argue against a supposition that ‘rarer’ feelings might be taken ultimately in physiological terms. Again, my emphasis is on immersion in a symbolism, in an identity of image and pathos.
Part 1

Key issues, and influences on Nietzsche’s thinking in relation to the aesthetic justification of existence

Chapter 1: Dionysian art

1.1) Erlebnis

Pathos of distance is integral to Nietzsche’s argument in On the Genealogy of Morals I (2), where it is treated as marking a sense of entitlement in asserting new values. Nietzsche is clear that it has no basis at all in utility. It is a heated outpouring of feeling in the making and breaking of hierarchies (1996, pp.12-13). In II (16) he explains how this is inhibited by the emergence of a settled social order, and comes to be internalised as the development of a ‘bad conscience’ whereby individuals are compelled to ‘tame’ an instinct for change and destruction. At the same time, this institutes an expansive and visionary self-regard, in which something higher is felt to be at stake (pp.64-66), and which informs the feeling that our humanity is something to be ‘overcome’. They are to be kept apart. The healthy are outnumbered, but the pathos of distance will operate in maintaining the social division. Implicitly, it is the ‘enhancement’ of mankind which is at risk (pp.100-104). Taken with the remarks in Beyond Good and Evil (257), Nietzsche is clear that this depends upon a ‘distance’ integral to social hierarchies (Burnham, 2007, p.195).

In terms of its social and political implications, it is unsurprising that this pathos can be tied to the workings of a tyrannising will to power in the institutional forms and social discourse which comprise an ordered society, reflected also in the literary and artistic forms in which these come to be presented. These forms stand to be experienced under varying degrees of emotional intensity, but it is particularly a higher self-regard at stake here. The sense in which Nietzsche speaks of pathos as an emotional intensity or heightened mood is noted by Silk & Stern (1981, p.234). The authors suggest his use of the term is aimed at Aristotle’s discussion of tragedy in the Poetics, to emphasise pathos in place of action (praxis) and catharsis. Evidence is found in remarks Nietzsche makes along these lines in The Birth of Tragedy. And they remark this emphasis on pathos is not uncharacteristic of German drama generally, as being ‘curiously undramatic’. The comment has a broader basis in an example offered by Tracy B. Strong (2010, p.55) in relation to the nature of pathos, where he says it would be missing the sense of tragedy in Othello to demand that Othello might have discussed matters more directly with Desdemona.

Strong’s essay is focused on the way in which tragedy is envisaged by Nietzsche as informing a transformative or transfiguring experience in a spectator. Also noting the opposition to Aristotle’s account of tragedy as catharsis, Strong quotes from section (8) of
The Birth of Tragedy where Nietzsche talks of the spectator seeing himself on stage, transformed before himself. The theatre’s architecture is implicated in bringing about this transformation. Looking down at the stage, identifying with the players, the spectator sees himself (on stage) transformed before himself (as seated spectator). Strong calls it a kind of ‘ecstatic doubleness’ and emphasises its character as a kind of receptive mood or ‘attunement’ (Stimmung). The example of Othello can also be taken as suggesting how Shakespearian characters may be taken symbolically, and it will be seen below in chapter 3 (section 1) how Nietzsche does so in section (98) of The Gay Science.

Nietzsche allows certain kinds of pathos have a distinctive phenomenal character. In The Gay Science (317), for example, he says a few musical chords brought back the feeling of a house in winter and his solitary time there. He says this pathos is fleeting because it is tied to our temporal experience. As such, it is not transcendent. The way is open then to recognising a lived experience of an order of rank, suffered under its particular character, and on which the rarer states informing an individual’s transfiguration depend. Parkes (1994, pp. 42–45) draws attention to the sense in which Stimmung, as mood, can be characterised in terms of re-attunement, given that its etymological root is in being correct, or ‘in tune’. I propose to develop an account of this attunement along the lines of it being tied to a particular feature of experience, of things related in an order of rank, as, for example, in the context of the theatre’s architecture, where the spectator is engaged in looking down.

I contend it is a kind of participation in the symbolism which is involved here. It is implicit in Nietzsche’s complaint in sections (37) and (31) of the Anti-Christ regarding the ‘progressively cruder misunderstanding of an original symbolism’, where the contemporary reception of a symbolic figure, Christ, was fitted to its cultural context and subverted by base interests:

[this cultural context] would have coarsened the type; the first disciples in particular: when faced with a being awash in symbols and incomprehensibilities, they had to translate it into their own crudeness in order to make head or tail of it, - the type did not exist for them until they had reduced it to familiar forms ... (2005(a), p. 28).

Under the forms, for example, of judge and moral teacher, or of miracle worker, the original symbolism was misunderstood. That is only to say, more generally, that a symbolism is conditioned by the conventional reception of its formal features, as suggested, too, in Creuzer’s metaphor of the fractured rainbow colouring of a cloud-obscured sun. In section (9) of The Case of Wagner, Nietzsche decries the amenability of Wagner’s art to ‘vague presentiments’, and in the following section it is Wagner’s ‘genius in building clouds’ which encourages his Hegelian ‘disciples’. In a telling footnote, Nietzsche writes:

Classical drama had scenes of great pathos in mind – it specifically excluded the plot [...] The most ancient drama presented the local legends, the ‘sacred story’ that the grounding of the cult was based on ( - which is to say not a doing but rather a happening: in Doric, dran has absolutely no connotations of ‘doing’ [...] (2005(a), p. 249).

In its symbolic aspect, the ‘story’ does not have a meaning so much as it stands to be experienced under a certain emotional intensity.
An original symbolism may be misunderstood, but its import stands to be regained. In terms of style and technique, the ‘musicality’ of Nietzsche’s writing is implicated in the kind of re-attunement he pursues. I address specific claims made, for example, by Parkes, and by Strong, below. Here, I note that while this transformation is approachable in terms of emotional intensity, it is tied to the sense in which an artwork, for example, is ‘world-creating’, where our response is determined in the way that Nietzsche indicates in *Beyond Good and Evil* (193), by ‘the total economy of our soul’ as much as by anything we ‘really’ experience. Taking *pathos* in the sense of *suffering* experience (Burnham, 2007, p.194), I start from the position that it is a fundamental emotional sensibility at stake here. It informs the demands Nietzsche makes on the virtues of a philosopher in *Beyond Good and Evil* (213), where he distinguishes the philosopher from other ‘types’, as taking things ‘lightly’. Free-spirited and creative, the philosopher will stand as an example against traditional forms of living. This characteristic is seemingly innate, or instinctive in a special sense of ‘breeding’. The philosopher’s thought is raised then above the slow, self-conscious deliberation of others, who happen simply to experience thinking in that way: ‘So allein haben sie es “erlebt”’. That is to say, they are unable to see things differently than they do. The quotation marks on *erleben* indicate Nietzsche’s irony, that these others’ *living* falls short in some respect. Again, I start from the position that Nietzsche is emphasising a life of ‘feeling’ in contrast to the ‘serious’ and weighty deliberation which would characterise reasoning in, say, moral contexts.

The etymology and usage of *erleben* and its derivative *Erlebnis* is marked by Gadamer (1993, pp.72-73). He explains how it came into common use in the 1870s as indicating a sense of the immediacy of ‘inner’ experience, of something given prior to interpretation. Dilthey had used *Erlebnis* along these lines in an essay on Goethe from the 1870s, where Dilthey discusses Rousseau’s writings drawn on inner experiences, and the usage was picked up then by others, notably Schleiermacher. In the twentieth century it was fitted to Husserl’s philosophy. Gadamer emphasises its importance as marking something which is immediately given, something grasped without resort to other already familiar terms. I shall argue for Nietzsche favouring a category of ‘inner’ feelings which are ‘given’ in the sense of being delivered through a sensibility which is, as it were, ‘untainted’ in its operation. That is to say, untainted by the kinds of interpretation to which feelings are subjected. My focus is on how this sensibility is tied to a symbolic use of language drawn on a unity of the symbol and its ‘object’. A feeling towards experience is at stake here, but the starting point is in the role of imagery and language in serving a (re-)sacralisation of experience. And I take this to be the basis of a further explication of Nietzsche’s declaration that life stands in need of an aesthetic justification.

The relevant sense of symbol enables the kind of ‘lived’ experience (*Erlebnis*) which consists in a creative revaluation or re-sacralising of experience, and I follow Gadamer in the supposition that this is not fitted to traditional forms of allegory (pp.77-80). With *erlebnis* indicating the ‘inner’ feel of experience, and with ‘good will’ towards appearances, Nietzsche focuses on the qualitative character of experience, at the level of phenomena. I shall examine claims that he anticipates key tenets of phenomenology (Safranski, 2002). However these claims are decided, it remains a question whether some particular feature of experience, in its phenomenal character, was a special concern in Nietzsche’s ‘good will’
towards appearances. In *The Gay Science*, he talks of ‘higher’ feelings. If these have a distinctive, qualitative character, given in the immediacy of experience, then they stand to be experienced through the symbolism in which they are expressed and communicated. In the next section, I consider a specific example in which Nietzsche is directly concerned with moments of emotional intensity, in a ‘heightened’ living tied to a distinctively symbolic imagery.

1.2) ‘divine lizards’

In *Ecce Homo*, reflecting on his writings, Nietzsche says of *Dawn* that it succeeded in expressing the kind of fleeting experiences he describes as things ‘that are light, that slip by without a sound’, the moments (*Augenblicke*) which he calls his ‘divine lizards’ (2005(a), p.121). Remembering a time in Genoa, he likens the book, and himself, to ‘a sea creature sunning itself between rocks’. He says the happy mood was pinned in the writing, without killing it; with a pen, not an arrow. Noted in Duncan Large’s translation (2007, fn.61, p.111), the allusion here is to a statue by Praxiteles, the *Apollo Sauroctonos*, or lizard-killer. It depicts Apollo poised to skewer a lizard which is climbing a tree branch, beneath his raised left arm. This image is also to be found in *The Poet’s Call* in *The Gay Science*, in the appendix of songs. The concern in this poem is with capturing the kind of fleeting experience Nietzsche indicates in *Ecce Homo*. In the woods, the poem’s protagonist writes how he was compelled by the sound of a woodpecker to write in jingling ‘tick-tock’ rhymes. His dissatisfaction is voiced in the device of the mocking woodpecker. The *Apollo Sauroctonos* is alluded to in the fourth verse:

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Rhymes are deadly little arrows.
See the tremor, see the quiver
When they pierce the vital marrows
Of the lizard, or his liver!
You are dying, and you know it,
Or reel like a lunatic.
– ‘Yes, my friend, you are a poet,’
Mocks the pecker with a flick.
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With Nietzsche making use of the latin genus name (*lacerta*), there is a further play on the notion of artistic form, given that Praxiteles’ statue survives only in Roman copies.

The origin of poetry was taken up by Nietzsche in *The Gay Science* (84), where the target is again its ‘rhythmic tick-tock’. His verdict is that no idea is made truer just by having a metrical form. The seemingly divine ‘skip and jump’ has its basis in forcing the listener’s compliance. He is bound to join in. It is in this way, Nietzsche says, that people supposed the gods’ assistance was to be sought through rhythmic spells and prayers, extracting their compliance. He decries the utilitarian motive in these rhymed entreaties. Nietzsche is concerned with capturing the moments he describes as ‘divine lizards’. But, still, it is a matter of artistry, just as, in *Ecce Homo*, he declares his own ‘considerable artistry’ in pinning down such moments. It is the figurative character of the expression, ‘divine lizard’, which carries Nietzsche’s meaning here, given that lizards are quick, elusive creatures, and so on. There
is perhaps some irony in Nietzsche’s choice of imagery, given there are statues which depict Apollo about to skewer other animals than lizards, and which serve a utilitarian function in appealing for protection from various kinds of animal vermin. But it remains that in his reference to Praxiteles’ lizard-killer, Nietzsche indicates that the image is symbolising the tension between artistic form and a vital inspiration. As itself a pinned artistic form, the statue is, in Creuzer’s metaphor, a cloud-obscured sun.

In the poem, Nietzsche indicates the insufficiency of conventional, linguistic forms. The poet’s difficulty is consequent on words being secondary to images. Inspiration takes visual and acoustic form, but words and their associated concepts are a further development. In his university career, Nietzsche had criticised established scholarly emphasis on metre in Greek Tragedy, in relation to its emotional power. The theoretical underpinning of Nietzsche’s complaint is discernible in his account in On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense of an originating impulse translated first into visual and sound-images, and subsequently into words, the secondary signs which refer to concepts or ideas (2005(a), p.145). In this respect, it is the pre-linguistic imagery which is closer to an artist’s inspiration. And this supplies the contrast with taking imagery allegorically, where meaning is unpacked in other terms. As visual imagery, the Apollo Sauroctonos may be taken in the sense of symbol advanced by Creuzer (1819).

Taken allegorically, the sculpture sustains an interpretation suited to the point Nietzsche seeks to make in The Poet’s Call. But if, as a symbol, it ‘succeeds’ in expressing a fleeting emotional intensity, then it is the visual form which is primary in communicating that experience. In this success, it must be closer to expressing the originating stimulus or inspiration which is, in the first instance, the artist’s own feeling for the kind of ‘lived’ experience marked by Nietzsche’s use of erleben. It enables a ‘renewal’ or re-sacralising of experience through the intimate connection between the formal artistry of an image and the intensity of our emotional response. It is in this way that the Apollo Sauroctonos operates symbolically in the poem, as well as in Nietzsche’s remarks in Ecce Homo around ‘divine lizards’. Implicitly, the image of Apollo poised in skewering the lizard exceeds the poet’s efforts at describing it in rhyme. Ultimately at stake is Nietzsche’s susceptibility, and our own, to the affective power of Praxiteles’ sculpted image. In Nietzsche’s formula from the Birth of Tragedy, it is through such artistry that life should receive its aesthetic justification.

The sense of ‘renewal’ here is indicated in The Gay Science (301), where Nietzsche writes that a ‘higher’ character experiences a fuller world:

... he can never shake off a delusion: He fancies that he is a spectator and listener who has been placed before the great visual and acoustic spectacle that is life; he calls his own nature contemplative and overlooks that he himself is really the poet who keeps creating this life.

He is not merely a passive spectator. Nor is he only a person of action. Rather, he exemplifies vis creativa. Nietzsche’s point here is that the ‘higher’ man is himself the author of what he sees and feels. He does not simply learn a role. It is the mark of man’s higher nature that he himself fashions the world ‘that concerns man’. This is something we may only fleetingly recognise, but it is in our own power in this way to give value to things. As such, it is a kind of sensibility. It is higher in so far as it amounts to a recognition and
exercise of creative power, which distinguishes man from lower animals. I shall argue it is tied by Nietzsche to the particular experience of an order of rank between things, where the feeling for this feature is necessary to experiencing ‘higher’ states, and is integral to their expression and communication. In section (298), Nietzsche again points to the poet’s difficulty in pinning down this ‘higher’ emotion or feeling for life. It dies in its expression. In Nietzsche’s metaphor, it is a captured bird, shaking and flapping in its captor’s hands while it struggles to fly away.

1.3) Dionysian art

In a notebook entry, Regarding ‘The Birth of Tragedy’ (Bittner, 2003, pp. 80-82), from around the time of its second edition and the Attempt at a Self-Criticism, Nietzsche reiterates the conclusion he had drawn originally in section (21) of The Birth of Tragedy, saying the affective power of tragic drama consists in a mutual dependence of Apollonian and Dionysian elements. In the note, they are two ‘fundamental psychological experiences’: the Apollonian is a becalming, rapturous absorption in a fabricated dream world; the Dionysian is an agitation to create and transform the world. Nietzsche writes:

Tragic art, rich in both experiences, is described as reconciliation of Apollo and Dionysus: appearance is given the most profound significance, through Dionysus; and yet this appearance is negated, and with pleasure. This opposes Schopenhauer’s doctrine of resignation as a tragic view of the world. (2003, p.81)

Nietzsche’s comments are consonant with what he says in The Birth of Tragedy, that the two moods depend upon each other for their effect:

[the effect] lies beyond all Apollonian artistic effects. [It] concludes with a sound which could never ring forth from the realm of Apollonian art. And in the process, the Apollonian illusion shows itself for what it is, the veiling for the duration of the tragedy of a real Dionysian effect. [The Apollonian is forced] into a sphere where it begins to speak with Dionysian wisdom, ... (2000, p.117)

In the note, Nietzsche also repeats his formula, that ‘only aesthetically can the world be justified’, which in the context there points to a Dionysian art grounded in a mutual antagonism of the ‘two experiences’ he identifies, one calm, the other raging, and in the corresponding desires on the one hand for things eternal and beautiful, and on the other for change and destruction. While Nietzsche’s subject here is tragic drama, notably in relation to Wagnerian opera, still the ‘profound significance’ in appearances which he grounds in this antagonism, is surely evident, for example, in the affective power of the Apollo Sauroctonos. In its imagery, it symbolises the Apollonian illusion through its calm portrayal of the god poised in an act of cruelty.

It is a sublimity at stake here, though Nietzsche’s declaration in section (313) of The Gay Science must be noted, where he says he wants to follow Raphael in declining to paint another image of torture:
There are enough sublime things so that one does not have to look for the sublime where it dwells in sisterly association with cruelty.

The point to be taken here is the vulgarising of a symbolism, just as in section (37) of Anti-Christ, Nietzsche charges Christianity with a progressively barbarous misunderstanding of an ‘original symbolism’ as its reach extended to the ‘greater and cruder masses of people’. In emphasising his point, Nietzsche talks of Christian hostility to the soul’s height, to ‘everything kind and candid in humanity’. Christianity is hostile to life through catering to vulgar needs, he says there.

An art which deals in ‘higher’ feelings will be continuous with certain features of our experience in everyday contexts involving an order of rank. As a kind of ‘play’ with this ordering, art enables a re-sacralising, or re-enlivening of experience. The contrast here is with the supposition that art should communicate ‘truths’ about a transcendent reality. It will be seen in more detail below how Nietzsche starts from what he calls a ‘good will’ towards appearances. It was seen in The Poet’s Call how Nietzsche envisages that an artistic form stands in need of being ‘enlivened’. In the preface to Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche employs Heraclitus’ metaphor of a tensed bow. A wooden bow is a unity of opposing forces, the tension building as the bowstring pulls against the opposing force of the bending wood. Heraclitus seemingly treats it as exemplifying the ‘unity of opposites’ and which has been taken as underpinning his cosmogony (Barnes, 1979). As metaphor, Nietzsche uses it as standing for the tension in a free-spirited opposition to moral and religious claims to knowledge. The challenge is not to undo this tension, in un-bending the bow. That it is to say, Nietzsche does not demand a ‘better’ understanding in secular moral or religious terms, as in Enlightenment thinking, for example. In his own metaphor from The Gay Science, such claims to knowledge are the ‘dam’ to a rising strength of water. Nor is this ‘tension’ to be taken, he says, as a crisis. Instead, like the increasing tension in a drawn bow string, it enables us to aim further.

This tension characterises a distinctively Dionysian art in contrast to emptily formal exercises, just because the Dionysian is destructive of comfortable illusions. Nietzsche’s notebook entry (2003, pp.80-82) concludes: ‘Dionysian happiness reaches its peak in the annihilation of even the most beautiful illusion’. In The Gay Science (15) he employs a metaphor of people who enjoy a comfortable, distant view of mountains, as enjoying a comforting set of beliefs. In opposition to these people’s easy acceptance of illusion, the Dionysian impulse will belong to the person Nietzsche marks in (285) as ‘excelsior’. In (27), he is the ‘man of renunciation’ because this is how he will be viewed by others, as having ‘renounced’ everything. Nietzsche says this is the other people’s misperception of him, but one which the excelsior may in any case be disinclined to correct. The excelsior seeks to affirm life free of moral and religious valuations on it, free of God. His refusal to ‘stop before any ultimate wisdom, ultimate goodness, ultimate power’ requires a strength which is yet to be found, Nietzsche says, but it is a strength which builds out of opposition, strengthening in the way that water builds behind a dam. It is the refusal to give in and return to the comforting beliefs which would offer reason and purpose in life. Strength is required in resisting these beliefs, but so long as mankind does not give in, does not ‘flow out’ into a god, then we may succeed, Nietzsche says, in rising higher. On these terms, it is two ‘psychologies’ at stake here. In Dionysian art, the Apollonian is forced into speaking with
Dionysian wisdom. Both psychologies come to speak each other’s language, and their antagonism is, as it were, presented whole. But, again, I emphasise it is the imagery itself which is the vehicle of these so-called psychologies. In the imagery of the Apollo Sauroctonos, it is a ‘lizard’ moment in which both psychologies are symbolically joined.

Nietzsche also indicates the Dionysian in metaphors of dancing and of floating or gliding on the surface of things. For example, in the Prelude to The Gay Science, Joke, Cunning, and Revenge, in rhyme 52, ‘Mit dem Fusses schreiben’ (1974, p.62). Nietzsche is concerned again with how the Dionysian informs its expression:

Not with my hand alone I write:
My foot wants to participate.
Firm and free and bold, my feet
Run across the field – and sheet.

The writer is impelled or carried along, not by the ‘ticking’ woodpecker beat which Nietzsche targeted in the The Poet’s Call, but by a Dionysian impulse.

In rhyme 13, Fur Tanzer (p.46), the metaphor is expertise in skating:

Smooth ice
is paradise
for those who dance with expertise.

Again, the suggestion here is of a freely moving Dionysian inspiration. The brevity of Nietzsche’s rhyme indicates the priority he puts on the image and the feeling it conveys, in contrast to its expression in language. This feeling is of unobstructed skill, and the metaphor of dancing, or skating, is suggestive of unconscious action. That is to say, a skater may fall if he is concentrating too self-consciously on the movements of his body. This idea is integral to Heinrich von Kleist’s essay, The Puppet Theatre (1997, pp.411-416). There, a dancer’s grace is treated as following on the absence of consciously willed action, with the dancer likened to a puppet unconscious of its own controlling action. Liberated by the suppression of his own free will, the dancer is the vehicle then of some ‘higher’ power. A wider significance of the essay is open. Kleist does not explain the image of the guided puppet. But there is a key point, that the puppet, just because it is unconscious, is closer to divinely informed gracefulness than the clumsily self-conscious dancer. While the hand of the puppeteer controls its centre of gravity, the puppet's limbs will follow of themselves.

It is the image of a floating centre of gravity which is key here, and it is reiterated by Nietzsche in the skater’s facility. A Dionysian impulse drives its own expression in the skater’s skill. Like Kleist’s ‘puppet’, the Dionysian artist succeeds when his originating impulse is carried through the technical artistry of its formal expression. The essay would have been known to Nietzsche. He praises Kleist, and it was first published in 1810. In Ecce Homo (2005(a), p.122), Nietzsche re-employs Kleist’s puppet metaphor in declaring humanity has been in the ‘worst hands’, only believing it is in the best, deferring to the priestly concepts of free will and God which ground moral judgement, and participating in its own degeneration, in its ‘physiological ruin’, marked as ‘the loss of a centre of gravity’, a
‘resistance to natural instincts’. Importantly, this much is conveyed simply in the imagery of the puppet and its moving centre of gravity. No scientific interest in facts of physiology is demanded. And little is gained by talk of instinct. The point is carried in Kleist’s imagery, and equally, in the imagery of grace and skill in dancing and skating.

1.4) Emerson

There are a small number of explicit references to Emerson in Nietzsche’s writings. An adapted quote is used in the title page of The Gay Science, and in section (92) he includes Emerson in a list of writers he admires. He comments on him in Skirmishes, in Twilight of the Idols (2005(a), p.198). And Emerson is praised again in some unpublished fragments and in letters Nietzsche wrote to friends. The remarks have been collected recently in Brobjjer (2008) and there is a useful source in Herman Hummel (1946). Among the claims Nietzsche makes for Emerson are his letter to Carl von Gersdorff in 1874, in which he writes of ‘the excellent Emerson’, and another to Overbeck in 1883, in which he says ‘I experience Emerson as a twin-soul’. In the notebooks, he wrote in 1881:

Emerson. I have never felt so at home, and in my home, in a book as – I cannot praise it, it stands too near.

With his praise of Emerson, and with the evidence of Nietzsche’s underlining and annotation in surviving copies of the books he owned, the influence of Emerson’s thought and style of writing also stands to be recognised in the numerous ‘echoes’ of his language and ideas which can be found in Nietzsche’s work.

Some comparable passages in their writings were identified by Hummel (1946), making use of earlier work by Simon (1937), Andler (1920), and Baumgarten (1938). Pointing out the difficulty that neither Nietzsche nor Emerson is a ‘systematic’ writer, Hummel was cautious in correlating ideas with sources in Emerson. More recently, George Stack, in Nietzsche and Emerson: An Elective Affinity (1992), has set about identifying correlations between Emerson and Nietzsche’s texts. He is bolder in treating these as indications that a number of characteristically Nietzschean themes and ideas had their origin in Emerson. But there are difficulties with identifying an influence simply on the basis of similarities in the texts. For example, in respect of arguments by Karl Jaspers (1965) and by Curt Paul Janz (1993) that two early pieces by Nietzsche from 1862, the essays Fate and History and Freedom of the Will and Fate, anticipate many of the primary themes on which he later expands, Brobjjer notes how Stack points to their similarities to Emerson’s essay, Fate, and which is overlooked by both Jaspers and Janz (Brobjer, 2008, pp.117-118). These kinds of similarity and comparison are explored more widely by Stack, but Brobjjer’s judgement (p.120) is that he is ‘overenthusiastic’ in claiming the influence of Emerson’s writings on Nietzsche. The problem is that while the evidence of the texts is strongly suggestive of some kind of connection, it falls short of being ‘proved’ so long as any more precise characterisation of Nietzsche’s interest in Emerson is lacking. Finding similarities, claimed as ‘borrowings’ or ‘influence’, is not enough. It is a matter of how these similarities should have come about. Stack is too focused on the question of ‘influence’, and Brobjjer points out, as well, that it
does not follow simply from Emerson being the first philosopher Nietzsche encountered, that he is the source of Nietzsche's own views. The question is what it was that Nietzsche found in Emerson which warranted his praise.

A further example is provided by Del Caro, in his *Grounding the Nietzsche Rhetoric of Earth* (2004, p.161), where he takes issue with a claim Stack makes concerning what he sees as a shift in Emerson's philosophy, away from transcendentalism and towards the notion of an 'immanent vital force', and which he takes as influencing Nietzsche's own 'Dionysian faith'. Del Caro is concerned to target what he takes to be the careless religious implications in Stack's talk of faith here. But the point of interest is the supposition of Emerson's *Dionysianism*. It is a claim made as well by earlier commentators. F.I. Carpenter, for example, writes that Nietzsche 'praised [Emerson] as a fellow “Dionysian”' (1953, p.247). In support, Carpenter cites Rudolf Schottlaender's *Two Dionysians: Emerson and Nietzsche* (1940). In this essay, Schottlaender finds they share a sensibility which he marks as suitably 'Dionysian'. But Schottlaender's starting point is simply Nietzsche's claim that he 'never felt so much at home in a book' reading Emerson. It is inferred he should have regarded Emerson as a 'fellow Dionysian', but this is not as certain as the title of the essay would suggest. Aside from this, Carpenter points to Emerson's poem, *Bacchus*. But he gives no supporting analysis.

More recently, in *Emerson, Romanticism, and Intuitive Reason: The Transatlantic ‘Light of All Our Day’* (2005), Patrick Keane quotes a passage from Emerson's *Poetry and Imagination*, in *Letters and Social Aims*, published in 1875, and which he suggests is particularly Nietzschean in tone:

O celestial Bacchus ! drive them mad, – this multitude of vagabonds, hungry for eloquence, hungry for poetry, starving for symbols, perishing for want of electricity to vitalize this too much pasture, and in the long delay indemnifying themselves with the false wine of alcohol, of politics, or of money.

This could as easily be Nietzsche, Keane says, ‘... crying out in *The Birth of Tragedy* for Dionysus to enter into creative fusion with the god of form, Apollo.’ Keane has disregarded the difficulty of it being published in 1875, with the German edition, *Neue Essays (Letters and Social Aims)* in Nietzsche’s personal library published in 1876, too late in relation to the *Dionysianism* of his early texts.

Still, all we might know of Nietzsche's book purchases and library borrowing cannot settle that he had no access to a particular text. Though it is stated in the preface to a revised edition of *Letters and Social Aims* (1884) that *Poetry and Imagination* had not been previously published, this collection of essays was drawn from Emerson's earlier writings and lectures, some published, for example in *The Dial*, in the 1840s. Emerson was also one of the founders in 1857 of the *Atlantic Monthly*, which often published essays and poems of his. In Nietzsche's personal library was a copy from October, 1883 which included Emerson's *Historic Notes on Life and Letters in Massachusetts*, an essay setting out his criticism of a utopian commune, Brook Farm, in the context of a broader social criticism. And though it is not recorded that Nietzsche read Emerson's poetry, an edition was published in 1847. So, even if it cannot be assumed he knew the passage from *Letters and Social Aims*,...
or that he must have read, for example, Emerson’s poem, *Bacchus*, he could have read more widely, in other issues of the *Atlantic Monthly*, for example, or have sought out Emerson’s poetry.

And it remains that Nietzsche says he recognised a ‘twin-soul’ (*Bruder-Seele*). In *Poetry and Imagination*, Emerson writes:

> ... the value of a trope is that the hearer is one; and indeed Nature itself is a vast trope, and all particular natures are tropes. As the bird alights on the bough, – then plunges into the air again, so the thoughts of God pause but for a moment in any form. (1884, p.20)

Emerson’s metaphor is itself compelling, and it marks a use of figurative language which is poetic as a way of world-creating. I contend that Nietzsche’s kinship with Emerson is to be drawn on their shared regard for this use of figurative language, for picture-thinking. This supplies the criterion for judging Emerson’s own status as a *Dionysian* artist. It also has implications with regard to Nietzsche’s ‘break’ with Wagner, and for approaches taken to *Human, All too Human*. The concern in *Poetry and Imagination* is with scientific endeavour being tied to imagination, particularly in relation to symbols regarded simply as images. The publication of the German edition in 1876 is early enough to be an ‘influence’ in this respect, contributing to Nietzsche’s understanding of the role of symbols and imagery in *Dionysian* art. With Nietzsche found to rely on a particular use of figurative language, the question of influence does not turn only on identifying sources in particular texts. That is to say, Nietzsche’s interest in Emerson is already on account of a shared ‘Dionysianism’ tied to a use of symbol.

### 1.5) Emerson’s *Dionysianism*

In his poem, *Bacchus* (Emerson, 1995, pp.330-332), Emerson’s theme is an inspiration or feeling for life which he marks as the ‘true’ wine. A useful analysis of the poem is provided by Bernard Paris (1962). In lines 12-25, Emerson writes:

> We buy ashes for bread;  
> We buy diluted wine;  
> Give me of the true, -  
> Whose ample leaves and tendrils curled  
> Among the silver hills of heaven  
> Draw everlasting dew;  
> Wine of wine,  
> Blood of the world,  
> Form of forms, and mould of statures,  
> That I intoxicated,  
> And by the draught assimilated,  
> May float at pleasure through all natures;  
> The bird-language rightly spell,  
> And that which roses say so well.
Paris points out the sense of immanent divinity or spiritual meaning in nature implied in these lines. He also notes the passage in *Poetry and Imagination*, cited above, in which Emerson calls on Bacchus, to 'drive them mad': those hungry for eloquence, poetry, symbols, for vitalising electricity. With Emerson's contrast of the 'wine of wines' to false wine, Paris pursues a broadly Platonic reading of the poem. Drawing on remarks by Emerson, he argues that the true wine is associated with a kind of remembrance of ideal forms. In lines 53-58 of *Bacchus*:

Vine for vine be antidote,  
And the grape require the lote!  
Haste to cure the old despair, -  
Reason in Nature's lotus drenched,  
The memory of ages quenched;  
Give them again to shine;

The false wine is identified here with the lotus of forgetting. On Paris' interpretation, we are captive to a dulling, earthly nature, which is also the starting point of a 'spiritual' ascent. Paris notes a reference in Emerson's *Journals* to memory being exercised on 'relics of a foreworld', and he cites a line from 'Memory', in *The Natural History of the Intellect*, where Emerson (following Niebuhr) writes, 'He who calls what is vanished back again into being enjoys a bliss like that of creating'. Emerson wrote as well in *May-Day*:

For thou, O Spring! canst renovate  
All that high God did first create  
Be still his arm and architect,  
Rebuild the ruin, mend defect;  
Chemist to vamp old worlds with new.

The inspired poet is, here, a creator. Paris also explains how Emerson employs the story of the lost Pleiad as metaphor for a kind of anamnesis. In the story, there were (are) seven stars in that constellation, but we see only six. In the ending lines 63-67 of *Bacchus*:

Recut the aged prints,  
And write my old adventures with the pen  
Which on the first day drew,  
Upon the tablets blue,  
The dancing Pleiads and eternal men.

As Paris explains, the poet enjoys an intoxicated unity with the 'blood of the world', his inspiration. He sees again the lost Pleiad. Notably, it *shines* again.

There are evident similarities and parallels in imagery and theme in Emerson's poem which might be traced to Nietzsche; the language of birds, for example. In the account he gives in *Ecce Homo* of his inspiration for *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche writes how things approached him, offering themselves as metaphors, and he cites Zarathustra’s words that in this intoxicated state of inspiration all being wanted to become word, wanted to learn from him, to speak. There is a seeming echo here of lines 43-44 of Emerson's *Bacchus*:
Quickened so, will I unlock
Every crypt of every rock

It is, in any case, Emerson’s view in *The Poet*, that a poet will express his experience in the picture-language of nature. Again, things in nature may be used as symbols, because nature is a symbol, he writes. Carpenter treats this as amounting to a kind of symbolic suggestion, and he points to Emerson’s own employment of it in *Bacchus*, where wine, as symbol, suggests the unity of an earthly nature and a ‘spiritual’ intoxication (1953, p.95, p.85). While this may be drawn on a kind of anamnesis, it need not be taken in the strictest Platonic sense of there being a separate reality from experience. Carpenter notes Emerson’s wide reading in the Neo-Platonists. A quote from Plotinus had headed the essay, *Nature*, in its first edition. And Proclus is a source of the view which would, in contrast to Plato, exalt the poet and symbolic thought as divinely inspired (p.216). Carpenter allows that Emerson did not give in to a simple, unworldly mysticism. Nor did he suppose a valued ‘spiritual’ state is unattainable in this world. Rather, it is itself a natural experience (pp.115-116). A key description of what we may suppose ‘intoxication’ is like is offered by Emerson in *Nature*, in which he writes:

Standing on the bare ground, - my head bathed by the blithe air and uplifted into infinite space, - all mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eyeball; I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part or parcel of God. (1982, p.39)

The central question which I seek to address in this thesis concerns this connection between Nietzsche’s avowed *Dionysianism* and his reception of a broadly Neo-Platonistic influence, through Emerson, or perhaps as much through sources available to them both. Implicitly, it is a question of Nietzsche’s commitment to a symbolic use of language, along the lines both advocated and employed by Emerson.

Again, it cannot be a matter only of finding correlations with, or ‘echoes’ of Emerson’s writings. Stack, for example, describes Nietzsche’s *Dionysianism* in terms of an embrace of the world as ‘sacred’, as ‘pervaded by a spiritual dynamism’, citing in a footnote the Schottlaender essay (1940) and remarking that Emerson ‘celebrated Dionysian ecstasy in his poetry’. Stack quotes as well the line from *Poetry and Imagination*, in which Emerson calls on Bacchus, but which I have noted above, cannot be relied upon as having been available to Nietzsche, even supposing it was influential (p.16, p.65 n17). In addition, Stack quotes R.A. Yoder’s (1978) claim that in *Bacchus*, Emerson hails ‘the reborn Dionysus-Phanes, symbolising the participation of all things in the whole’ (Stack, p.222). The general difficulty in Stack’s strategy has been noted already, namely his overstatement of ‘influence’ and some problems around the range and context of similarities he identifies (van Leer, 1994; Crummett, 1994; Makarushka, 1994). Still, the correlations he finds are suggestive, even if his further development of them and their implications are questionable.

Notably, he identifies the correlation between the passage in Emerson’s *Nature* in which he talks of a ‘transparent eye’, and remarks made by Nietzsche in Spring 1866, in a letter to Carl von Gersdorff:
Sometimes there comes those quiet meditative moments in which one stands above one’s life with mixed feelings of joy and sadness, like those lovely summer days which spread themselves expansively and comfortably across the hills, as Emerson excellently describes them. Then nature becomes perfect, as he says, and we ourselves too; then we are set free from the spell of the ever-watchful will; then we are pure, contemplative, impartial eye.

In making the comparison, Stack insists on Nietzsche being ‘under the spell’ of what he loosely characterises here as Emerson’s ‘romantic nature-mysticism’, though he does not make it clear how this is fitted to speculation around Emerson’s *Dionysianism*. Stack argues for a shift in Nietzsche’s thinking around 1876, away from Schopenhauer’s pessimism. This is not inconsistent with Nietzsche’s despair of egotism in the letter to von Gersdorff, but in 1866, the letter is much earlier. It does not follow that an Emersonian ‘solution’ to pessimism is to be discounted, but there remains a question how its basis in Emerson should be understood.

Stack proposes Nietzsche follows Emerson in seeking to ‘restore’ nature to man, taking up a positive regard for striving nature and its cruelties and suffering, against a Schopenhauerian pessimism. Emerson is characterised as recommending what was best in mankind, with man having lost ‘his heartiness, his health, his natural toughness (pp.160-161). This is not to celebrate nature’s savagery, Stack says, but to envisage man’s own nature as ‘an antagonism of forces, each checking and balancing the excesses of the others’. In contrast to Stack’s approach, I suggest an emphasis be put instead on Emerson’s use of imagery. In *Nature*, Emerson writes that when he stands in fields and woods he feels an ‘occult relation between man and the vegetable’. It may seem here that only a simple kind of nature worship is at stake. Emerson is figured in William James Stillman’s painting, *The Philosopher’s Camp in the Adirondacks*, gazing into the trees. And he does say as well that in the woods man finds himself again. But it is this use of imagery which can be the basis of ‘restoring’ nature to man, as where Emerson writes of tree boughs waving in a storm and likens this to ‘a higher thought’, or ‘better emotion’.

The relation of Nietzsche’s thought to his reading of Schopenhauer is addressed in the next section. Stack is largely concerned with Nietzsche having drawn on Emerson in relation to issues around purpose in nature. In seeking to establish Emerson’s influence he could be overstating what is more a matter of their shared temperament, particularly in respect of the poetic expression they both favour (Crummett, 1994). It is notable as well that in the comparison with Emerson’s ‘transparent eye’, Stack gives a shortened quote, ending on ‘transparent eyeball’ and so omitting the claim ‘I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part or parcel of God’. His remarks comparing the passages are briefly limited to the claim about romanticism, and perhaps to the role of the philosopher (pp.47-48). Nor does Stack reconcile Emerson’s suspected nature-mysticism with the earlier supposition of his *Dionysianism*. But crucially, he overlooks the feelings and emotions that are tied to a symbolic use of imagery fitted to talk of immanent divinity as a re-sacralisation of experience.
1.6) Schopenhauer

With his appreciation of Emerson tied to the affectivity of imagery and figurative language he uses, Nietzsche cannot be taken simply as holding art and music are a comfort or relief from life. The question here is of consistency with the interest Nietzsche took in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, and a reply will need to settle the significance he accords Schopenhauer’s notion of ‘disinterested contemplation’ (Anschauung). In so far as it marks an experience detached from personal interest or desire it is taken by Schopenhauer as a kind of will-less perception. But it could as well be fitted to Emerson’s metaphor, in Nature, of a ‘transparent eyeball’, as a contemplation of nature in which ‘all mean egotism vanishes’. I am arguing such a transformation is realised in the operation of symbolic imagery of height and distance as a ‘rarer’ state, and that this characterises a distinctively Emersonian Dionysianism. It remains that Nietzsche invested his hope of a return to Dionysian art in Wagner’s music drama. Issues around disinterested contemplation are raised in section (5) of The Birth of Tragedy, where Nietzsche addresses a specific question how art may be about subjective feelings when it is generally demanded that it has to be impersonally ‘objective’.

His example of the satirical poetry of Archilochus is informative here. Jacob Burckhardt (1998, p.207) had cited Archilochus’ ‘impartial abuse of friend or foe’ and characterised his iambic verses as a kind of stylised enmity. They gained him an individuality which Burckhardt associated with the emergence of celebrity in Greek culture. In section (5) of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche quotes Schopenhauer’s ‘solution’ to the problem of reconciling an artistic objectivity with the personal subject matter of human affairs, but goes on to contrast it with his own position. In the excerpted passage, Schopenhauer proposes that the artist’s state of mind consists in recognising the interplay between his own passionate feelings and a serenely blissful contemplation of the world. In this serenity, he experiences a briefly momentary freedom from his own willed desires. The artist’s ‘song’ is then a copy of this ‘mingled and divided’ state of mind, in which these two states interact and colour each other. But it is important that Nietzsche explicitly rejects this account.

Instead, he appeals to Schiller’s notion of a ‘musical mood’. This is a feeling which is initially unformed in the senses because not yet directed on a particular object. That is to say, it precedes its expression in imagery or ideas. Nietzsche says that in this condition, the Dionysian artist is receptive to a kind of un-individuated feeling, marked here as the ‘pain and contradiction’ of the Ur-Eine. This notion of a primal, un-individuated existence has its place in Schopenhauer’s philosophy of Will as ultimate reality. But it also has a longer tradition, ultimately traceable to Boehme, and which I examine in chapter 5. The question of the influence on Nietzsche of Schopenhauer’s philosophy must be set against this broader context. If it were found that Nietzsche was not fully committed to a Schopenhauerian metaphysics of Will, even around the time of writing The Birth of Tragedy, it can remain that the Schopenhauerian terminology is a way of articulating what is at stake, just as Nietzsche makes use of the more ‘scientific’ example of Chladni figures in On Truth and Lying, in which an original impulse takes form in sound and visual imagery.
In any case, Nietzsche frames his own account in section (5) of *The Birth of Tragedy* in terms of primal feelings copied first into music and then, under the Apollonian drive, into a 'single symbolic likeness (*Gleichnis*). In this, the artist will have given up his subjectivity, he says, in a symbolic dream-scene. This has a sensuous character, but not because it would, in the example, portray Archilochus’ feelings as such. Rather it portrays him. Nietzsche speaks here of the poet unified with the ‘genius of the world’, as its ‘moving centre’, and, crucially, as catching sight of his familiar, worldly passionate self as the expression of that genius. In this state, he is a poet; not in his worldly passions and concerns, but in this distancing unity with the *Ur-Eine*, which Nietzsche variously marks as the genius of the world, a musical mood, the ‘pain’ of primal being and its urge to semblance. It is the Dionysian impulse to artistic ‘self’-expression.

Nietzsche’s own dream-scene is notable. He conjures an image of Archilochus ‘sunk in sleep’ on a high alpine meadow, in the mid-day sun, musically enchanted, then touched to pour out ‘sparkling images’ (2000, p.35). An important point here is that such imagery would range over musical and visual forms, with both, as it were, a formal architecture. The immediate sensuous experience is one of intoxication, or enchantment, and it is this which Nietzsche says at the end of the section, is the original *aesthetic phenomenon*, which justifies the world. The Dionysian artist is, in that condition, one with the ‘artist of the world’. This can stand just as easily with Emerson’s talk of ‘transparency’, in which ‘all mean egotism vanishes’. Nature, Emerson says, is ‘not always tricked in holiday attire’ but always wears the ‘colours of the spirit’. It is its separation from ‘mean egotism’ which is crucial here. In section (5), Nietzsche uses two metaphors, and to different purposes. As painted soldiers in a canvas, the suggestion is that individuals are unconsciously actors in so far as they are simply part of nature. But in the fairy-tale imagery of a self-inspecting eye, Nietzsche seeks to convey the sense in which the Dionysian artist is engaged in a distinctively distancing kind of self-inspection.

It will be seen below how the Apollo-Dionysus distinction has a longer tradition, prior to the use made of it by Nietzsche. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, he joins it with a seemingly Schopenhauerian metaphysics. But this metaphysics is not all that is at stake. Nietzsche draws Archilochus’ sleep on that described in Euripides’ *Bacchae*. But this sleep in high alpine meadows is emblematic or poetic in Emerson’s sense. Nietzsche is responsive to the imagery as a matter of his own temperament, or ‘spirit’. But the impetus to his own form of expression is tied to that figurative use of language which is notably employed as well by Emerson. Wagner had sought to understand his own art against the background of ideas in Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche’s later criticism is centred on Wagner having exploited these ideas in the service of his own self-aggrandisement. It is the psychological character of Wagner and its expression in his art which comes to be the particular focus of Nietzsche’s attack. At stake is the character of an impulse to Dionysian art, and which informs its expression. Some ‘art’ will be disqualified.

Because Nietzsche talks in terms of ‘primal pain’ in section (5), he seems to echo Schopenhauer’s pessimism, that life is an ultimately futile experience of misery and suffering. Schopenhauer’s metaphysics is drawn on Plato and Kant, with the Kantian Thing-in-Itself taken to be an undivided Will, expressed through the desires and interest of
individuated willing subjects. The phenomenal world of individual striving is then a veil which masks this reality. Schopenhauer likens the individual, the principium individuationis, to a boatman at sea, driven and buffeted by the waves (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.352). Each individual’s will is opposed and frustrated by the will of others pursuing their own interests. This is a miserable condition, but the subject typically seeks to escape it only on the same terms as give rise to it, namely through the same egoistic striving against others. This is the subject’s understanding at the level of consciousness restricted to relations between his self and other objects. Individuals do not recognise themselves as expressions of a single, driving Will. And the fact of pain and suffering in the actual world then prompts the question whether it is better not to exist.

The will-less character of ‘disinterested contemplation’ liberates the individual from relations of things and other people to himself. Schopenhauer treats music as having the highest value because, free of imagery, it provides a closer experience of the World-Will. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche remarks that the sculptor and painter are bound by the nature of their skills to begin from imagery:

The sculptor, and also the related figure of the epic poet, is absorbed in the pure contemplation of images. Bereft of images, the Dionysian is himself wholly and exclusively original pain and original echo of it. The lyric genius feels a new world of images and allegories grow forth from that state of mystical self-abandonment and unity, a world which is completely different in colouring, causality, and tempo from that of the sculptor and epic poet. (2000, pp.35-36)

The context of the passage is the particular role of imagery in ‘beautifying’ the world. In Nietzsche’s example, a portrait of Achilles will represent his anger, and this anger can be contemplated then in a way which is, as it were, remotely safe, or protective. It is, Nietzsche says, only a mirror of Achilles’ anger. His concern is with a particular kind of ‘art’ as being more or less defective because starting simply from considerations of form. This will not apply to Archilochus, whose poetry is not a representation only of his own emotions, though they are ‘closest to him’. Rather, Archilochus’s art communicates the musical mood which was the impetus to the dream-scenery of Archilochus himself. As such, it does not follow that a stylised figurative language or plastic imagery cannot be the means to experiencing Dionysian ‘music’. That is to say, it is not the case that in this passage, Nietzsche is condemning all sculpture. It can then be allowed that Praxiteles’ Apollo Sauroctonos is ‘musical’.

The issue here is important. Does Nietzsche accord a more or less ‘secondary’ status to visual imagery, in contrast to music? The supposition that he prioritises music over plastic art supports emphatically Schopenhauerian readings of The Birth of Tragedy. A primary example is Julian Young’s (1992) argument, that Nietzsche sought to fill out a Schopenhauerian aesthetic, in which art was to provide a ‘metaphysical solace’ to the horrors of existence. It would be meant then as a ‘solution’ to the problem of pessimism. In his analysis, Young addresses Apollonian and Dionysian ‘solutions’ in turn. At stake, he says, is how to accommodate the ‘Dionysian knowledge’ that life is ultimately futile, so that an individual continues to strive, not give up, as, for example, Hamlet does. Nietzsche says that Hamlet’s flaw is not hesitation. It is his recognition of the futility of life which nullifies all action
(Nietzsche, 2000, p.46). This, for Young, is the challenge Nietzsche addresses, to say how life is bearable.

Young identifies an Apollonian ‘solution’ which he says is rejected by Nietzsche. This is drawn on Nietzsche’s criticism of a ‘beautifying’ role ascribed to art, but Young seems to take this as directed generally against Apollonian form. It is rejected for failing to address the actuality of pain and suffering, because it only ‘beautifies’ the world. Young outlines the sense in which he takes the Apollonian as ‘veiling’ suffering, as focused on the way things are represented. Beauty triumphs because attention is directed on the portrayal of suffering, not on its actual character. Young cites Nietzsche’s metaphor of painted soldiers as indicating this, and offers his own example of cowboy films to make the point that they are representations which are insensitive to reality. But while Nietzsche says this in relation to representations of Achilles’ anger, his reference to painted soldiers serves a different purpose than simply exemplifying a sanitised battle scene. He is comparing the figures in it to people ‘lost’ in appearances, which is to say they do not experience the ‘distance’ which characterises the affectivity of a peculiarly Dionysian art. Young is focused instead on a negative judgement concerning the ‘cognitive’ value of a plastic, visual art, as a delight in ‘beautiful forms’ directed not on confronting the pessimistic ‘truth’, but only on holding on to illusion.

Young turns to a ‘Dionysian solution’. Examining Nietzsche’s treatment of a kind of enjoyment which is taken in the destruction of a heroic figure, such as Wagner’s Siegfried, Young takes him as filling out a fundamentally Schopenhauerian view, that in witnessing the ‘tragic catastrophe’ we are freed from the phenomena in a briefly momentary unity with primal being. Young identifies it with Schopenhauer’s ‘feeling of the sublime’. The horror is artistically ‘tamed’. The spectator is granted redemption from suffering through the hero’s own preparation for a higher pleasure in his own destruction. The spectator is drawn into a Dionysian self-denial, Young says, in oneness with the hero’s sacrifice in an act of violence. Young writes that ‘a joy which appears to rest on cruelty ... is in reality, an exuberant celebration of one’s supra-individual identity that resembles the burning of bank-notes as an expression of sudden accession to great wealth’. But it is not made clear how this example is fitted to what may be at stake here.

In section (16) of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche specifically addresses the status of myth as a Dionysian art form, being concerned, of course, to validate Wagner’s music-drama. Schopenhauer is cited. Again, it is not a matter of imagery simply representing human passions. The status Young accords the Apollonian is marked here by Nietzsche. In the case of beautifying art, Nietzsche allows ‘a lie is told which causes pain to disappear from the features in nature’. And it is by contrast that we take delight in the destruction of a mythic hero, because he is, ‘after all, mere appearance’. That is to say, allowing Nietzsche makes free use of a Schopenhauerian terminology, the spectator is enabled to step back from the spectacle. It does not follow that the cruelty is removed from it. Nor that the spectator is liberated from appearances. Nietzsche had talked in terms of the spectator ‘ambushing’ himself. Nietzsche declares the eternal life of the Will is unaffected by the hero’s annihilation, but, again, against Young’s view that Nietzsche is building on Schopenhauer, it is the Schopenhauerian language which perhaps obscures Nietzsche’s view here, where it is the
creative impulse, the ‘lust for being’ which he seeks to prioritise, though it is tied to destructive change at the level of appearances. It remains that ‘music’, as the true Dionysian wisdom, has a symbolic expression in imagery, in the tragic hero. And this is the contrast with a beautifying, ultimately defective art, tied only to relief from suffering.

Young’s analysis starts from forcing an admission that life is futile, in order to demand of Nietzsche an answer that does not lead to a Schopenhauerian resignation and denial of life. If everything seemed futile to them, how could the Greeks have succeeded in acting, as they did, for example, against Persia? Young gives what he says is Nietzsche’s answer, that the Apollonian steps in to veil the Dionysian insight. In celebrating the hero’s individuality, we affirm the veiling illusion of the Apollonian. But because it ‘lies’, this Apollonian intervention already admits the truth of pessimism. In which case, if Nietzsche seeks to affirm life, then, Young argues, he has to favour the ‘Dionysian solution’. But this too is delusive. It is seductive, intoxicating. And from the perspective of Nietzsche’s later ‘anti-Christianity’, The Birth of Tragedy is a life-denying work, Young says, because of its ‘religious character’. He concludes that art was taken by Nietzsche only as ‘filling a void’ and providing ‘metaphysical solace’. Then in the face of rational, secular, culture, Nietzsche looked to a return to myth.

Young’s account is unconvincing. Nietzsche characterises the spirit of music as an eruption from nature itself, as a lust for existence, a lifting of the veil of maya to reveal the Ur-Eine, as enchantment and a loss of individuality in a primal unity. In the first section of The Birth of Tragedy it is the mood of Beethoven’s Hymn to Joy. In (17) Nietzsche writes that we,

... feel its unbridled craving for existence and joy in existence; the struggle, the agony, the annihilation of phenomena now seem necessary to us ... we are pierced by the raging thorn of these agonies in the same moment we have become one as it were with the immeasurable, original joy in existence and as we sense the indestructibility and eternity of this pleasure in Dionysian rapture. (2000, p.91).

And by contrast, the Apollonian supplies a calm, measured, conscious awareness of the forms of lived experience. But, with all that Nietzsche distinguishes their character, the Dionysian and Apollonian are bound to operate in combination. It is important that the Dionysian ecstasy Nietzsche talks of is exampled in Archilochus’ art, which is to say, in the unity of a creative, primal ‘craving for existence’ with its ‘creation’ - human life. The Dionysian is a disruptive, dis-individuating drive, a ‘blissful ecstasy’, breaking down the principium individuationis. As mere intoxicated release (Rausch), it is enabled by narcotics, and also in music and dance. But as something we are able to experience, rather than simply obliterating, it must be tied to its formal expression, as in tragic drama. It is crucial here that this involves a stepping back from egoistic passions, from appearances. And this admits a sense of destructive tearing away of the veil, of ‘lie’ or illusion. But it remains that form is instrumental in this. Again, I take it as exampled in the Apollo Sauroctonos. And it is not a turning away from life, or from its cruelties.

It is integral to the sense of disinterested contemplation in Schopenhauer that it determines an object is no longer desirable, or terrifying, etc. Schopenhauer says this is attainable as well through actual experiences of extreme suffering. In Book IV, he gives an account of how
someone may rise above the pain and suffering of existence and achieve a denial of the will, a ‘complete resignation’. Mere knowledge of others’ suffering is seldom enough, he says:

Even in the case of the individual who approaches this point [of seeing through the *principium individuation*], the tolerable condition of his own person, the flattery of the moment, the allurement of hope, and the satisfaction of the will offering itself again and again, ie the satisfaction of desire, are almost invariably a constant obstacle to the denial of the will, and a constant temptation to a renewed affirmation of it. For this reason, all those allurements have in this respect been personified as the devil. Therefore in most cases the will must be broken by the greatest personal suffering before its self-denial appears. (1969, p.392)

Then, it is revealed, Schopenhauer continues, that suffering and hatred, tormentor and victim, are expressions of a single will to live, objectifying itself through the plurality of striving individuals. Extreme suffering provides that a subject may arrive at an ascetic denial of the *principium individuationis*. At this point, Schopenhauer offers gruesome anecdotal evidence. For example, he recounts how Abbe de Rance, on letting himself into the house of his mistress, the duchess of Montabazon, discovered she was dead. The undertakers had removed her head because the coffin was too short for the body. His will is broken in this juxtaposition of desire and loss and he retreats into a life of silent contemplation, founding the order of Trappist monks.

Not long after the publication of *The Birth of Tragedy*, in *Schopenhauer as Educator*, Nietzsche addresses Schopenhauer’s pessimism in terms of strength of character, as strength in accepting, rather than retreating from life. He sees a duality in Schopenhauer’s character. Schopenhauer is half settled in his pessimism, but half ‘tumultuous yearning’ for a holiness which would be a ‘realm of peace and negated will ... the other shore of which the Hindus speak’. The duality is evident, Nietzsche says, in the report that Schopenhauer turned with pained expression from a portrait of Abbe de Rance, saying ‘That is a matter of grace’ (1995, p.191). Nietzsche’s judgement here is that, unlike Rance, Schopenhauer did not break. He did not yield to holiness. ‘His nature was not destroyed by this yearning,’ he says. That is, Schopenhauer’s remark reveals he cannot follow Rance’s asceticism. For Nietzsche, it is strength not to give in to it. It is Schopenhauer’s own character which is at issue here. He did not give in to the resignation implicit in the image in the painting, in which Rance is lost in contemplation and silent study.

This judgement is important in relation to later remarks in *The Gay Science* (370), where Nietzsche revises his opinion of Schopenhauer’s ‘strength’. His focus is still on Schopenhauer’s character, not, as such, on his philosophy. Nor does Nietzsche consider the use he made of that philosophy. Rather, his concern in (370) is with being mistaken that Schopenhauer had not given in to holiness. Nietzsche explains that he made the mistake because he read Schopenhauer from his own (ie Nietzsche’s) perspective. Saying that in reaching his earlier judgement on Schopenhauer (and on Wagner) he had made an inference from the work, he means from his own reading of it, influenced by his own character to the benefit of theirs. Clarity on this issue is important because Young appeals to *The Gay Science* (370) to defend his claim that Nietzsche followed Schopenhauer in seeking release from suffering, and advanced a *Dionysian* ‘solution’ to the problem of pessimism which he only later came to disown. Young reads (370) as Nietzsche’s coming to reject a
Schopenhauerian influence on him. And he cites as well the preface to *Human, All Too Human*. Both passages are taken by Young as Nietzsche’s rejection of his own formerly world-negating stance. But it is the case in the preface as well, that Nietzsche asserts his own consistency, explaining he had fitted Schopenhauer and Wagner to his own needs (2004, pp.4-5).

It is clear that Nietzsche had already recognised the danger of an ‘escape into holiness’. It is his praise for Schopenhauer’s character in *Schopenhauer as Educator* which is being re-addressed. In which case, his account in *The Gay Science* (370) is not a retrospective self-criticism of having advocated a Schopenhauerian solution to pessimism. Nietzsche is clear as well, in his preface to the second edition of *The Birth of Tragedy*, how alien a philosophy of resignation would have been to him at the time of writing that book. That is to say Nietzsche was already resilient to ‘a yearning for holiness’, to what in (370) is marked as a ‘romantic pessimism’. His reassessment in (370) is directed at how he was mistaken in supposing Schopenhauer had not given in to a redemptive holiness. This takes away the basis of Young’s argument that Nietzsche’s aesthetic justification of life in *The Birth of Tragedy* amounts to a flight from humanity, in the self-forgetting (*Selbstverleugnung*) of a Schopenhauerian *Anschauung*.

The ‘self’ to be forgotten is the same ‘mean egotism’ which is marked by Emerson. But, again, this does not have to consist in a retreat from life in the way of Abbe de Rance. Nietzsche’s discovery of Schopenhauer was preceded by his interest in Emerson’s writings. Emerson is not a pessimist. He does not denigrate appearances in the sense of turning away. It is feelings and emotions at stake here. Notably, the feelings Nietzsche described in his letter to Carl von Gersdorff, Spring 1866, in which he echoes Emerson’s imagery in *Nature*, where he writes of a transparent eye. Given Nietzsche’s discovery of Schopenhauer in October 1865, it might be supposed that the feeling Nietzsche describes is tied to freedom from the limitations and frustration of our own willed desires. But it is much more the sense of immersion in lived experience which indicates and sustains the case for Emerson’s influence over Schopenhauer’s, and for supposing Nietzsche was already resilient to the pessimistic judgement that life is irredeemable and better never lived at all. This much is evident in what he says of Archilochus’ art.

It is also recently argued in Jensen (2013(b)) that while Nietzsche was initially influenced by Schopenhauer’s notion of ‘disinterested contemplation’ (*Anschauung*) delivering knowledge of the forms of things free of their relations to us (as desirable, terrifying, etc), Nietzsche later came to reject it as mysticism, just because such a faculty would be entirely divorced from conditions of our own subjectivity. But while this faculty is marked in Schopenhauer by his use of *Anschauung*, the term has a history of its use by other writers and in different contexts. That is only to say its meaning is not univocal. Notably, Breazeale (1979, p.41, fn.82) has suggested Nietzsche could have meant it simply in the sense of intuition as perceiving through the senses. It was a readily useable word and does not have to indicate a particular technical notion. It is also to be expected Nietzsche can have made his own use of it. Crucially, a different usage will be drawn according to whether intuition is taken as delivering knowledge of a ‘reality’ beyond the familiar world, or alternatively, as ‘sensuous’ in
character in the sense of being directed on physical experience. The word had this latter use in Jakob Wilhelm Heinse’s writings, which I address in chapter 5 (section 5) below.

Jensen (2013) has argued Nietzsche broke from a broadly Schopenhauerian understanding of intuition in making room for a subjectivity drawn in terms of drives and instincts, in ‘a stream of drive-processes’ having an ultimately physiological basis. Starting from Nietzsche’s doubts in The Gay Science (99) about Schopenhauer’s ‘magical’ faculty of intuition, Jensen argues that this turn to a naturalistic account was consequent on the interest he took in contemporary scientific accounts of unconscious instinct. Von Hartmann would be the primary source. Jensen reads the list of Schopenhauer’s ‘excesses and vices’ in section (99) as evidence that Nietzsche is rejecting a former influence. Among these vices is the core of Schopenhauer’s aesthetic theory, that art has cognitive value in turning us away from the principium individuationis, to understand the reality of the world as Will. And Nietzsche goes on as well to criticise Wagner’s claimed allegiance to Schopenhauer’s philosophy.

But in (99) it is not simply a list of errors. Nietzsche also says that an artist, such as Wagner, may be forgiven ‘an occasional, perhaps very unfortunate and presumptuous masquerade’. Wagner’s own authenticity is unaffected by his ‘intellectual tempers and cramps’ because he still remains an example of self-determination. In contradiction of the lip-service Wagner gives to Schopenhauerian pity, his ‘Wagnerism’ is expressed, Nietzsche says, in his art, in the ‘innocent selfishness’ of the heroic character of Siegfried. And Nietzsche makes the point in favour of himself as well, emphasising his own passionate independence. The context is in any case, a relation between artist and disciple, following a section on Caesar and Brutus in which it is Caesar’s ‘height’ which is at stake, as it is with Schopenhauer and Wagner. Section (99) of The Gay Science cannot then be taken simply in terms of Nietzsche recanting previously held doctrine. Rather, Nietzsche’s target in (99) is language. It is Schopenhauer’s language which is seductive, as Schopenhauer himself was seduced by the language of human willing. It is language, after all, which is the vehicle for Schopenhauer’s ‘mystical embarrassments and subterfuges’, and Nietzsche’s concern then is with a strength and independence not to be seduced by language. Again, Nietzsche points to the mistake he made concerning Schopenhauer’s strength. He does not say he was seduced. His concern is with language. And he can have framed his own seductions in a Schopenhauerian terminology.

Nietzsche revisits his misunderstanding of Schopenhauer and Wagner in The Gay Science (370), where they are charged with an impoverished view of life. This impoverishment consists in seeking redemption from oneself through art and knowledge, or in an obliterating intoxication. The poorest, Nietzsche says, need peacefulness and goodness, a healer and saviour. All of this is condemned as romanticism. And in its pessimistic form, in Schopenhauer and Wagner, it is a kind of revenge, whereby the sufferer imposes on the world the image of his own suffering. Nietzsche distinguishes this from the ‘suffering’ which characterises the Dionysian artist. His is a tragic insight which is able to affirm a world of change and destruction. And he distinguishes a Dionysian pessimism. Nietzsche labels it ‘classical’, to mark it as his own. It eschews revenge. In terms of character or temperament, it will consist in the strength which he finds now was lacking in Schopenhauer and Wagner.
This is the strength which Nietzsche characterised by reference to an engraving by Dürer, *Knight, Death and Devil.* In Dürer's image, a knight proceeds steadfastly ahead in the company of Death and the Devil. Near the end of *The Birth of Tragedy*, in the context of a discussion of myth, Nietzsche writes:

... there were signs that the German spirit might nevertheless remain intact, dreaming peacefully in an inaccessible abyss, in magnificent health, depth, and Dionysian strength, like a knight sunk in sleep: and from this abyss the Dionysian song rises from this abyss, telling us that even now this German knight still dreams his ancient and original Dionysian myth in blissful-serious visions. (2000, p.129)

There is continuity in Nietzsche's thinking here. In section (370) of *The Gay Science*, he can be taken as building on these earlier remarks in *The Birth of Tragedy*. His hope for renewal of the German spirit had lain in Wagner's opera, and while he may have come to change his view of Wagner, it does not follow that he lost hope, or that his understanding of pessimism and responses to it had fundamentally changed. The task of renewal fell to Nietzsche himself and requires the strength not to yield to mysticism and holiness. As such, his classical pessimism is rooted in joy and suffering in life itself. This is not a departure from his understanding of the German spirit in *The Birth of Tragedy*. My contention is that this focus on strength is continuous in Nietzsche's approach to the problem of pessimism, and is a requirement of the aesthetic justification of life.

The mood of 'cross, death and crypt' which Nietzsche said in a letter to Rohde, in 1869, that he enjoyed in reading Schopenhauer, is noted by Safranski (2002). He suggests it could have stood for Nietzsche as a test of his own affirmation of life, a test of how much he could bear (p.46). Life is struggle and frustrated desire, without hope of satisfaction, extinguished ultimately in death. But it is then a test of strength. Again, the 'mystical seductions' Nietzsche lists in *The Gay Science* (99) are not to be taken as a retrospective disavowal of Schopenhauer. Rather, they indicate criteria in testing this strength and affirmation of life. The point of emphasis is on independence, not escape from life, but the issues here around strength are overlooked in focusing only on identifying the formalities of a strictly Schopenhauerian aesthetics in Nietzsche's early texts, as, for example, Young does.

1.7) mythic symbolism

The argument of the previous section allows that Nietzsche was less concerned with a 'solution' to the so-called 'problem of pessimism', of how existence might be justified in the face of suffering, than with the value of a certain kind of temperament, or sensibility. This can be treated in terms of a valued way of life. But with a declaration of the death of God, it stands to be framed as a question how life can be meaningful following a collapse of belief in 'real', objective values. The role accorded to art has been taken then in the context of Nietzsche having sought to address what Came (2014) has characterised as 'practical-existential' problems, to settle what an exemplary life consists in by comparison with great artists and other agents of change and creativity. Gemes & Sykes (2014) argue that Nietzsche was not concerned to answer the problem of suffering. Instead, they treat the claims he makes about the 'necessity' of illusions as being directed on how life is
meaningful, and they argue that Nietzsche turns to ‘myth’ to settle this ‘existential malaise’ of a loss of meaning. In contrast to this, my focus is on the phenomenal character of a transfiguring experience, drawn as a ‘higher’ mood. Mythic symbolism may inform an opportunity to experience such a mood. But in such emotive terms, it cannot be a matter of the meaning or significance of a particular mythic narrative. Scrutiny of Gemes & Sykes’ argument will enable me to clarify what I believe is at stake here.

They take Nietzsche as providing an account of the need for myth along with his own mythic narrative centred on the role of genius, whereby existence is given meaning in the cultural achievements of great men. The meaning is illusory in the sense that existence is devoid of value or significance, but the ‘metaphysical’ solace it provides will ensure a return to life. The exemplar was initially Wagner. Subsequently, Nietzsche offers his own myth, of eternal return. In presenting this account, Gemes & Sykes rely heavily on section (23) of The Birth of Tragedy, which they cite as Nietzsche’s own acknowledgement of a ‘conviction’ that life must be informed by metaphysical notions. They take it in support of their emphasis on Nietzsche’s remarks in that section about the role of exemplary artists and great men in supplying this ‘need’ for metaphysics, and this is the role they ascribe to Nietzsche’s own mythic narrative. Their claims here can be challenged. Primarily, Nietzsche addresses in that section the demise of myth, as it comes to be supplanted by the worldly rationalism of a Socratic demand for knowledge, or lost to a ‘pandemonium of myths and superstitions’. While it may be granted Nietzsche says a ‘metaphysical drive’ is operative in seeking unity and order, and in the integration of a people’s character and institutions, his concern is not with myth as a solution to the dissatisfaction which follows on its loss or absence. A need for ‘solace’ may be consequent on the demise of myth, but it does not follow that the role of myth is only in resistance to a kind of ‘existential malaise’.

That is to say, I diverge from Gemes &Sykes’ account on this issue of why a return to myth must be necessary. ‘Mythic’ narratives may afford experiences of a ‘return to life’, along with other forms of belief, or art. Nietzsche begins section (23) by inviting responses to what is presented in art, where each of us responds according to our own feelings. He talks of the ‘aesthetic listener’. At stake is what is understood through myth, and lost with its demise. What is operative in this respect is not a metaphysical drive. Rather, it is what Nietzsche marks as hidden now to abstract, modern man: a ‘magnificent, inwardly healthy, ancient strength’. The demise of myth has followed from the separation of Apollonian and Dionysian artistic drives. Nietzsche addresses the demise of a tragic sense of life along with myth in Ancient Greece. But the crucial point is that he starts from the character of what is lost.

Taking Nietzsche’s talk of the Dionysian in section (5) of The Birth of Tragedy in terms of merger with the primal unity, Gemes & Sykes ask why Nietzsche should not have claimed the Dionysian has a cognitive value in making contact with the reality of existence beyond the Apollonian veil of appearances. With the assumption of a consoling ‘metaphysical drive’, their answer is that immersion in the primal unity could not be consoling. And they go on to cite section (18) in arguing that Nietzsche treats the Dionysian as another form of illusion anyway, on a level with the Socratic illusion which values knowledge and the pursuit of truth, or with the Apollonian illusion whereby beauty veils the horrors of existence. This would allow that Nietzsche is concerned with it as a phenomenon, but Gemes &Sykes do not
consider whether this should have significance in relation to the meaningfulness of existence, even as a kind of 'feeling' for life. They take the Dionysian only in a restricted sense of orgiastic intoxication (p. 92). By treating the Dionysian in this way, they strengthen their argument for the role of myth in providing 'necessary' illusions.

Again, it is clear from section (23) that Nietzsche is not concerned with consolation so much as with the notion of strength, marking a quality at risk of being lost to modern man. It is in this respect that Nietzsche looks to the 'mutual interaction and intensification' of the two primal artistic drives in expressing an impulse which is at once both creative and disruptive. Against Gemes & Sykes, the relevant exemplar is not the 'supra-individual', but the feeling which informs his 'strength'. If it is a feeling which is expressed and communicated in the imagery which informs, for example, the Apollo Sauroctonos, then it need not be supposed this is consoling. Rather, it exhibits a tension which Nietzsche is marking in The Birth of Tragedy in the terms he uses there, of Apollonian and Dionysian drives. It is the origin of myth which is at stake, as an originating impulse or feeling.

1.8) 'good will' towards appearances

My contention is that in addressing questions around the 'problem' of pessimism or a collapse in belief in absolutes, Nietzsche's optimism must be located in the experience of the 'rarer' state he describes, for example, in Beyond Good and Evil. This is not a turn away from life. It depends upon a particular feature given in phenomena, both in lived experience and in art, drawn as an order of rank between things. It is implicit in an imagery of height and distance. As pathos of distance, it stands to be experienced independently of moral judgements on its context. As such, it may stand to be experienced in contexts in which an order of rank determines inequalities. Nietzsche talks of a 'musical mood', which is expressible in sound and visual imagery. In sound, it may be characterised as the 'tension' in a musical dissonance, or in the kind of suspended resolution which characterises Wagner's Tristan chord. But a corresponding tension may be no less integral to a piece of visual art, or to stylised uses of language. It will be seen in chapter 5 how Hölderlin articulates a sense in which a feeling for life emerges from the oppositions and dissonances given in experience. It is this category of feeling which I claim is designated in Nietzsche's talk of rarer states, 'emerging', as it were, out of feelings towards a category of image drawn on order of rank.

These experiences might be given a 'scientific' explanation in the way that a science of colour perception would underlie an artist's technique. For example, the Divisionist technique of Symbolist painter Giovanni Segantini has a basis in Helmholtz's scientific studies of perception. And in the case of Nietzsche's use of language, it will be seen in chapter 2 (section 2) how stylistic features have been addressed, for example, by Strong (Nietzsche, 1997, pp.xiv-xx). My emphasis on height and distance is seemingly reductive in so far as it points to a core feature in experience, transmuted in a range of phenomena which are unified by this central concern with hierarchical orderings, high to low. Higher feelings are then the 'object' of Nietzsche's figurative language drawn on an order of rank. But the analysis of how these are expressed and communicated is entirely at the level of this imagery, taken as phenomena.
I have argued against Nietzsche’s aesthetics being framed by the influence of Schopenhauer in the early writings. It is at least much clearer by the time of The Gay Science that Nietzsche repudiates any philosophy which denies life, even with its attendant suffering and horrors. That is to say, Nietzsche does not seek a ‘solution’ which would seek to accommodate suffering. I treat the renewal in question here as being a return of what is spoken of in the earlier texts as Dionysian inspiration. In Ecce Homo, in section (3) of his commentary on Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche talks of his own experience of poetic inspiration:

A thought lights up in a flash, with necessity, without hesitation as to its form, ... a perfect state of being outside yourself, with the most distinct consciousness of a host of subtle shudders and shiverings ... a profound joy where the bleakest and most painful things do not have the character of opposites, but instead act as its conditions ... [the force of this inspiration is measured] by a rhythm that spans wide distances ... something to balance out its pressure and tension (2005(a), pp.126-127)

Nietzsche concludes by declaring that the imagery and words will force themselves upon the poet. The poet gives voice to existence, to appearances, but the appearances already offer themselves to him, speaking, as it were, his own impulse to life.

In The Gay Science (107), Nietzsche talks of ‘good will’ towards appearances. Again, it is a rejection of the kind of pessimism which would follow on dismissal of the world as illusory, or on the supposition that it stands in need of explanation and justification by something apart from it. The Gay Science begins with an account of how we live in a ‘heroic’ age of moral and religious teachers and leaders of humanity, all at war with each other in seeking to identify something higher, ‘behind’ life:

Life shall be loved, because - ! Man shall advance himself and his neighbour, because - !

(1974, p.74)

They demand that life be justified, that existence not be taken ‘lightly’. We are obliged then to pursue reasons for existence, to identify moral or religious principles at which it is ‘forbidden to laugh’. Nietzsche allows this is a part of life: it must be necessary to the endurance of the species given the fact that mankind has, after all, survived. And he goes on to argue that these principles are, in any case, only a mask, beneath which operate the same cruel, dominating instincts which moralists seek to deny or try to justify. Again, the species has survived. Nevertheless, there is a future, Nietzsche says, in which existence is taken not so seriously. In (107), though we are ‘weights’, pulled down by moralising, grave inclinations towards truth and justification, we may gain a ‘freedom above things’ through art. Art will ‘round off’ imperfection and lets us indulge in godly ideals, but to do so lightly. ‘Exuberant, floating, dancing, mocking, childish and blissful’, art enables us to stand above ourselves, to resist being pulled down by an ‘irritable honesty’. As ‘gay science’, it is then a return to lived existence and to health.

Nietzsche draws a contrast here with what passes as ‘higher’ culture. For example: contemporary theatre. ‘What are the Fausts and Manfreds of the theatre to anyone who is somewhat like Faust and Manfred?’ Nietzsche asks in section (86), seemingly without irony
in inviting the comparison, of himself or his readers in their own self-reflection. He says a Faust or Manfred could perhaps take interest in these theatrics in so far as they are, after all, another phenomenon. But otherwise, the dramatic storylines and theatrical effects are only mere intoxication, a relief from life. This ‘higher’ culture only apes the ‘high tide of the soul’. The authentically ‘higher’ mood cannot simply be handed down, as if, Nietzsche says, a mole could be given wings. It is not a property of ‘everyday souls’ inclined only to edifying lessons. Nietzsche had argued in The Gay Science (57) that the character of any experience is determined by the subject himself. The passion even for a sober realism is as much the product of the realist’s character and influences on him.

1.9) summary

I began this chapter by taking the experience Nietzsche marks as pathos of distance as an emotional intensity delivered as a certain attunement to things. As a kind of heightened ‘living’ (erlebnis), it informs a re-sacralisation of experience. The Apollo Sauroctonos was an example in how this depends upon a symbolic communication. In this respect, the image of Apollo, poised in skewering a fleeting livelihood, is not to be taken in terms of standing for something else, in the way of metaphor or allegory. My discussion here was centred on Nietzsche’s ‘lizard moments’ tied to a distinctively Dionysian art in imagery of height and distance, and enabled in a subject’s dislocation from egoistic concerns and interests. The impetus to creativity is expressed and communicated in a Dionysian art just in so far as it enlivens an artistic form and technique. A number of strands make up Nietzsche’s thinking on these broadly aesthetic concerns. I highlighted the importance of Emerson’s writings as the primary and enduring model for Nietzsche’s interest in the symbolic ground of a fully ‘lived’ experience. I examined the evidence of Nietzsche’s regard for Emerson, and for Emerson’s writings being a ‘source’ of some positions he took, but I was critical of the approach which has been taken by George Stack, which depends upon identifying certain ‘correlations’. Instead, I began by characterising an Emersonian Dionysianism along the lines of a Dionysian poet dealing, as he says, in the picture language of nature.

With the priority given to Emerson, I turned in section 6 to the influence on Nietzsche of Schopenhauer. The important issue here is around Nietzsche’s regard for the Schopenhauerian notion of Anschauung, conceived as a ‘disinterested contemplation’, and which mitigates despair in the suffering and frustrated desire of everyday life. I contend that in his encounter with Schopenhauer’s philosophy, Nietzsche was guided by what he already found in Emerson. It was seen how in The Birth of Tragedy, the poet Archilochus is said to have ‘dreamed’ a world in which he is included as subject, while distanced from himself. I made a case for Nietzsche holding closely here to Emerson’s metaphor of the ‘transparent eyeball’. In its expression and communication of what is at stake, Emerson’s imagery is itself symbolic. Crucially, the intuition here is drawn as a sensuous engagement with the world. It is an identity with Protean nature, with the artist characterised as ‘genius of the world’ and pouring out its ‘sparkling images’ in a ‘dream-scenery’. It does not consist in a disinterested withdrawal from the world.
It is in this respect that I argue Nietzsche accords equal status to visual images and music, where both can express a Dionysian 'musicality'. It is a mistake to suppose that Nietzsche held a plastic Apollonian art can only beautify a world of pain and suffering, while the Dionysian provides ecstatic release. The mistake is drawn on supposing he looked to art for the 'solution' to a characteristically Schopenhauerian pessimism. I addressed the issues here in opposition to the account provided by Julian Young. Acknowledging the Dionysian and Apollonian must operate in combination, the Apollo Sauroctonos is itself symbolic of life-affirming Dionysian 'music' communicated in Apollonian form. It is the elusive 'lizard moment', on the cusp of being skewered in a formal, straightforwardly plastic art. As such, it can be granted Nietzsche employs a Schopenhauerian terminology, but in seeking to articulate more formally the fundamental insights he already recognised in Emerson's writings.

Further, I went on to argue against the view that Nietzsche broke from an initially Schopenhauerian position on Anschauung. I argued that he came to re-assess a judgement he had made about Schopenhauer's 'strength', not that he rejected an earlier acceptance of a need for metaphysical solace in music and art. In section 7, I pointed out that the concern with strength, not consolation, also allows that Nietzsche did not look to a mythic symbolism for solace. In section 8, I take what Nietzsche came to characterise as a 'good will' towards appearances as admitting higher feelings towards life are grounded in the nature of experience itself, in its dissonances and tensions. In this respect, I made a case for Hölderlin's influence, again in contrast to Schopenhauer’s pessimism. In Part 2, I examine in further detail how an Emersonian Dionysianism is taken up in the use Nietzsche makes of a figurative language of height and distance.
Chapter 2: metaphor and intuition

2.1) visual sensibility

The central claim of this thesis is that Nietzsche held to a distinctively symbolic use of metaphor and parable, whereby its visual ‘content’ enables an identity of form and ‘rarer’ feeling. The experience is transformative in enabling the subject’s realignment to emotions of a ‘higher’ self. My contention is that the figurative language of height and distance, already implicit, for example, in this talk of a ‘higher’ self, can be operative in bringing about this realignment. In a symbolic communication, the affectivity of the image will be tied to this key feature of height and distance. It is the formal counterpart to a Dionysian creativity, experienced together in a dissonance or tension at the level of appearances. This is in contrast to an intellectual regard for imagery, in terms of what it may, as metaphor and parable, be taken as meaning or standing for. It is crucial here that it admits an equal status to visual imagery and music, accommodating and explaining Nietzsche’s regard for Emerson’s writings. Away from the emphasis put on music by Schopenhauer, this allows the ‘musicality’ of Nietzsche’s texts can be drawn on the symbolic import of their figurative language, as much as on the rhythm and tempo of syntactical features.

In making the case for a particular emphasis on visual imagery in Nietzsche’s texts, it must be questioned at the outset whether Nietzsche lacked a visual sensibility. It has been argued Nietzsche was indeed deficient in this respect. In his Nietzsche: Attempt at a Mythology, published in 1918, Bertram put the question in terms of Nietzsche’s ‘visual attunement’, by which he meant a straightforward noticing of the way things look, and an interest in paintings and sculpture (Bertram, 2009). Nietzsche does refer to particular artists and their work. But Bertram claims these references are only to illustrate philosophical points and arguments, and that Nietzsche rarely resorts to this kind of example anyway. He concludes that Nietzsche attached only secondary importance to visual phenomena. I shall consider Bertram’s argument in more detail below. I have already made a case for the affectivity of Praxiteles’ Apollo Sauroctonos and its significance for Nietzsche. Bertram is certainly unconvincing when, for example, he points to Nietzsche having neglected to record in a letter or notebook entry any visual description of the cathedral on visiting Cologne.

Bertram does address Nietzsche’s declared admiration for the paintings of Claude Lorrain. And he examines the ‘theory’ of metaphor discernible in Nietzsche’s remarks in Truth and Lying and in Music and Words along with the use Nietzsche makes of Raphael’s The Ecstasy of St Cecilia in that context. I examine Nietzsche’s views on metaphor in the early unpublished works in detail below. Nietzsche addresses the relative significance of sound and visual imagery in relation to language, and in relation to what he treats as an originating stimulus. But it need not be supposed that theoretical concerns in those works have to constrain a judgement on the question of Nietzsche’s own visual sensibility. After all, it can just be a matter of the use Nietzsche makes of imagery and figurative language in his writings. Similarly, the examples of painting and sculpture stand to be taken on the use Nietzsche makes of them. That is to say, the theory may be drawn as much from the example, as from explicit statements it is assumed the examples illustrate. It is then a question of fact, on the evidence of the texts, whether Nietzsche was visually ‘attuned’.
There has been little commentary on this issue. The other work I shall consider is Shapiro’s investigation in *Archaeologies of Vision* (2003). Shapiro argues that a language of ‘seeing’ in Nietzsche’s texts operates allegorically for a sense of *knowing*. He focuses on Nietzsche’s discussions of particular artists and paintings as well as generally on his use of metaphor drawn on vision, which Shapiro labels ‘ocular metaphor’. Only in a footnote (p.399, n.14) does he mention Bertram’s book, and only briefly, also noting that the significance of Nietzsche’s use of visual imagery and language has received little examination in the secondary literature. In my own examination of the issues here, I draw on Shapiro’s evidence and findings, though my emphasis is on Nietzsche’s relying upon a visual imagery of height and distance in seeking to communicate the ‘rarer’ state which constitutes ‘noble’ feeling. As such, my interest is in the question raised by Bertram, though I dispute his conclusion. I also acknowledge Shapiro’s judgement that it cannot be expected Nietzsche provides any systematic treatment of the role and significance generally of our visual sense, as such, though I take Nietzsche as admitting a perception or intuition (*Anschauung*) which is sensuous in character, directed on sound and visual images taken pre-linguistically.

Shapiro does not follow Bertram in questioning Nietzsche’s own sensibility. He starts from the frequent use Nietzsche makes of metaphors of vision and ‘seeing’ in *The Birth of Tragedy* and in other early texts in which Nietzsche talks in terms of an *Apollonian* ‘transfigured world of the eye’, or in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in which an ocular imagery is deployed throughout by Nietzsche, and from remarks Nietzsche makes about particular works of art. Importantly, he also draws attention to the chapter *From the Soul of Artists and Writers* in Part 1 of *Human All Too Human*, anticipating that Nietzsche would have taken a descriptive approach, in line with the ‘positivism’ which is said to characterise his middle period philosophy. I address Nietzsche’s account there in chapter 5 (section 7). Shapiro’s concerns are generally with the metaphorical import of Nietzsche’s talk of ‘seeing’ in addressing epistemological and metaphysical concerns around knowledge and scepticism. For example, he highlights the use of visual language in the later preface to *Human, All Too Human*, where Nietzsche is taken as indicating the scepticism which guided his approach in that text. Primarily, Shapiro treats Nietzsche’s use of visual metaphor in opposition to the ‘oculocentrism’ which would characterise a more Platonistic, objective standpoint. I do not do justice to the range and detail of Shapiro’s analysis here, but will address some particular findings.

He asks, for example, why Nietzsche should have been so approving of the paintings of Claude Lorrain. In answering, Shapiro points to how the views to distant horizons in Claude’s landscapes suggest a silent stillness remarked upon by Nietzsche, and which Shapiro suggests has its echo in the talk of stillness in *Zarathustra*. Finding Nietzsche had the opportunity to visit the art gallery in Dresden, Shapiro focuses on one of the two Claudes there, a landscape scene with figures, titled *Acis and Galatea*. He notes its elements of a mythic, golden Arcadia, and how this is referenced by Dostoyevsky in *The Possessed* in the character Stavrogin’s admiration of it as a visionary dream image, in contrast to ‘civilised’ life. Shapiro draws attention to the figure of the Cyclops, Polyphemus, who is observing the couple from a position on the rocks. The visual contrast between the skyscape’s radiant sun eye and the enviously ‘evil’ eye of Polyphemus, is taken by Shapiro as having been a
‘reminder’ for Nietzsche of **possibilities** of vision, as beneficent or degenerate. He suggests in later years its stillness would have figured Nietzsche’s own visionary longing.

Shapiro also notes the reference in *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, where Nietzsche talks of music coming to fulfil a culture’s highest achievements only as that culture is about to pass. It is this sense of fragility and loss of a momentary experience, Shapiro says, which informs the Nietzschean **Augenblick**. Citing *The Tomb Song*, where ‘glances of love’ or ‘divine moments of vision’ stand to be recalled only as ‘dead friends’, Shapiro goes so far as to say that the thought of eternal return may have its starting point in Nietzsche’s appreciation of Claude Lorrain’s work:

> Claude’s painting becomes a figure of beauty, the beauty that we would madly wish to transform into a permanent possession; when we see that this is impossible, we can do nothing but lament its ephemeral quality (p.54).

The context is Nietzsche’s ‘raptures and tears’ over nature, when he writes down these feelings in St Moritz, in 1879. As such, Claude’s painted landscapes example a ‘transfigured world of the eye’.

In his note on Bertram’s work, Shapiro draws attention only to the exception Bertram makes for Nietzsche’s enduring interest in Dürrer’s *Knight, Death, and Devil*. Bertram takes it under his own broader interest in placing Nietzsche in the service of a resurgent German nationalism, and which Bertram articulates in terms of strength and perseverance. Shapiro overlooks the argument Bertram brings for denying Nietzsche was typically sensitive to visual imagery. For example, in the case of Nietzsche’s interest in Claude Lorrain, Bertram says it was likely to be prompted by Goethe’s approval of him as ‘a perfect human being’, given Nietzsche’s familiarity with Goethe’s writings. It is likely, too, that he was familiar with Burckhardt’s appreciation of the paintings, given their friendship. Bertram also addresses Nietzsche’s descriptions of his feelings, the ‘raptures and tears’ which he refers to Claude’s landscapes. Bertram ties them to a primarily allegorical use of such scenery, like the use Holderlin made of an idealised Greek antiquity in a not untypically German yearning for the South, for a dangerously happy, feverish and fatalistic, ‘yearning ... toward the abyss’ (p.215). Bertram charts the development of this feeling in Nietzsche, in his encounter with Bizet’s *Carmen*, and in *Beyond Good and Evil*, where Nietzsche’s ‘super-European’ eye for the south ‘becomes seemingly transparent and lets something like a deeper south shimmer through ... a secret, inner Orient’, Bertram drawing as well here on a notebook entry from 1885, 34[149]. KSA 11, 471 (Bertram, p.220). Bertram acknowledges the perspectival character of Nietzsche’s experience but is concerned to emphasise its constitution as a kind of homesickness for the north. The point he makes against a ‘visual sensibility’ in Nietzsche, is that the regard for Claude’s paintings is still primarily intellectual, as Nietzsche raises the ‘sensual present’ to the level of allegory (p.222).

In comparing these claims by Shapiro and Bertram, it is clear that their interpretations are differently focused. As such, there is room to find them equally legitimate. Bertram turns for firmer evidence to the unpublished text, *Music and Words*, where Nietzsche asks:
How could the Apollonian world of the ego, absorbed in visual contemplation, be able to
generate a tone which after all symbolises a sphere that is excluded and overcome by the
Apollonian abandonment to mere appearances?

For Bertram, this is clear support for his view that Nietzsche generally attaches only a
secondary importance to visual imagery. But is it so clear? It has been seen already how a
Dionysian art is tied to visual form, as in Praxiteles’ statue. It does not follow from the
passage excerpted here, that Nietzsche did not have a visual sensibility or ‘attunement’
which informed his own use of figurative language, in the service of his own Dionysian art.

Shapiro (pp.76-85) also considers the claim Nietzsche makes in Music and Words, that there
is a ‘one-way’ translation of music into imagery, and in respect of which Nietzsche uses a
painting by Raphael, The Ecstasy of St Cecilia, as illustration. Shapiro explains the point,
that if we imagine St Cecilia listening to an angelic choir, as the artist has done, then no
music would be heard. If, miraculously, an unearthly sound was heard, then it could not have
been delivered through the conjured image. Accordingly, Raphael’s own imagery can only
be mute. Some qualification of this claim is advanced by Shapiro, pointing to the later Birth
of Tragedy, and to Nietzsche’s own retrospective judgement on that text as well, that it was
‘image-mad and image-confused’. But it is a specific question here whether Nietzsche
envisages a role for visual imagery in promoting the kind of renewal or revaluation he argued
for in The Birth of Tragedy. Again, the proper qualification might be that Nietzsche is
targeting the kind of ‘Apollonian abandonment’ which characterises a particular category of
visual artist, namely those who focus on form in seeking only to ‘beautify’ appearances. This
more or less defective art is not ‘musical’. The appeal to The Ecstasy of St. Cecilia may be
allegorically illustrative. But it does not determine a judgement on Raphael’s own artistry,
that it cannot be ‘musical’.

I have addressed the question of Schopenhauer’s influence on Nietzsche’s early texts and
whether Nietzsche put music over visual art forms in agreement with Schopenhauer.
Support for this might be taken, for example, from Nietzsche’s remarks in section (4) of The
Birth of Tragedy, where he turns to Raphael’s Transfiguration as illustration in discussing
how a secondary level of semblance, in art, provides a calming vision of the world of conflict
and suffering. Figures in the lower half of the painting are suffering as individuals in a world
which is a world of phenomena, or semblance, a world in which the primal unity expresses
itself in a plurality of striving individuals. It is then a higher symbolism in art which beautifies
this world, Nietzsche says, even as it reveals ‘the ground on which it rests, that terrible
wisdom of Silenus’. The language here is markedly Schopenhauerian.

[Raphael] shows us with sublime gestures how the whole world of torment is necessary in
order to force the individual to produce the redeeming vision and then to sit in calm
contemplation of it as his small boat is tossed by the surrounding sea. (2000, p.31)

It was seen above how Young (1992) approaches Nietzsche as filling out a
Schopenhauerian aesthetic of release from frustrated effort. Still, there is an important
qualification in Nietzsche’s identifying Raphael as a ‘naive artist’, and the painting as naively
symbolising the role of art itself in providing a beautified semblance of the phenomenal
world. It has been granted already that the beautifying role of art allows visual imagery can
be at some remove, as it were, from the *Dionysian* inspiration which informs a distinctively creative activity. In section (4), Nietzsche is clear that the *Transfiguration* symbolises, in its two halves, the way in which a visual art can wholly deal in an *Apollonian* world of forms and provide a calming, redemptive vision. This is the ‘solution’ to pessimism which Young recognises is already rejected by Nietzsche. It is symbolised in the painting in the contrasting halves; in the artistically conceived portrayal of suffering in the lower half, and, no less naively, in the world-redeeming figure of Jesus.

Shapiro (p.98) makes an important point, suggesting Nietzsche could have admired the painting for the way in which its hovering figure may be seen ‘not merely [as] a luminous apparition but as the principle of apparition itself’. More widely, Shapiro goes on to consider the long history of art criticism and philosophical commentary directed on the painting’s composition and theme, not least in relation to the Gospel story. Its ‘unity’ in two halves was already a focus of early commentators on whether the painting could be judged ‘successful’. Shapiro’s survey extends even to a medical interpretation (p.96), in which a doctor had argued the boy in the lower half exhibits symptoms of *recovery* from an epileptic seizure, so Jesus floats above his healing work. Whichever way the painting’s division into halves is treated, there is, in any case, a ‘tension’ or ‘dissonance’ between the two scenes. It is likely Nietzsche would have been familiar with earlier discussions and interpretations of the painting. In using it to illustrate remarks about a purely *Apollonian* art, he takes it at this level of discussion, in terms of composition and themes. As such, he disregards the tension in its compositional division and the various disparities of dream-scenery in the two parts. But it does not follow from the illustrative use he makes of it, or from the Schopenhauerian terminology, that Nietzsche attached no importance to this dissonance. I have emphasised a dissonant unity of impulse and form in *Dionysian* art, experienced in visual attunement to its expression and communication in plastic art. It remains, in any case, that the illustrative use Nietzsche makes of the *Transfiguration* does not determine that he lacked a visual sensibility. He explains the role art has in ‘beautifying’ the world, but this does not imply he thought all visual art is beautifying in that way or that art must always be consoling.

The Dürer engraving, *Knight, Death and Devil*, to which Nietzsche several times makes reference, is treated by Bertram as an exception to the general visual deficiency he attributes to Nietzsche. Copies of it were variously presented by Nietzsche to Wagner, his own sister and others. Again, the knight is seated on a horse, and looks determinedly ahead. Death stands to the side, and the Devil follows. Bertram (p.38) cites a letter to Malwida von Meysenbug, sent in March, 1875, in which Nietzsche writes that he rarely derives pleasure from a pictorial representation, but identifies with Dürer’s image of the knight. In *The Birth of Tragedy* (20) the engraving is marked as symbolising dissatisfaction with the ‘sterility and exhaustion of present day culture’, and where this dissatisfaction is felt by anyone who still retains a profound sense of character and independence. Nietzsche’s example here is Schopenhauer, and the section is directed on ‘self-cultivation’, the ‘noblest’ struggle of Goethe, Schiller, and Winckelmann, and of a German spirit inspired by Greek culture. The term Nietzsche uses is *Bildung*.

This is rooted in the word for image, *Bild*, and the link to something ‘shaped’ accommodates the sense of cultivation of character (Burnham & Jesinghausen, 2010(a), p.103). For
Bertram, the Dürer engraving straightforwardly represents a strength of character in standing alone, comparable to Luther’s ‘Here I stand, I can do no other’. He notes that Nietzsche refers again to the engraving in *On the Genealogy of Morals* III (5), where his target there is contemporary artists who slavishly follow convention, depending on some pre-established authority. Schopenhauer’s strength in standing alone is restated there by Nietzsche. It is with the knight’s ‘steely gaze’ that he had the courage to be himself, not follow others. For Bertram, the key issue is that Nietzsche emphasises Schopenhauer’s strength in terms of an ascetic ideal, a desire for truth. Bertram is primarily concerned to draw a link between truth and courage and a will to power, and he points to the preface of *Human, All Too Human*, where Nietzsche, as in *The Gay Science* (370), declares his opposition to ‘romantic pessimism’, to a pessimism drawn on renunciation and escape from life. The Dürer knight is to be taken, Bertram says, as symbolising a different, German pessimism, tied to the mood of ‘cross, death and crypt’ which Nietzsche wrote to Rohde, in October 1869, that he found in Wagner and Schopenhauer.

Burnham and Jesinghausen (2010(b), p.130) explain how *Bildung* in *The Birth of Tragedy* is tied to a ‘renewal and purification’ of the world of individuals’ experience, carried in a ‘revolutionary epiphany’ in Wagner’s music-drama. The authors point to the contrast Nietzsche draws in section (20) between Schopenhauer’s pessimism and his own hope for renewal through the ‘fire-magic of music’. As Dürer’s knight, Schopenhauer is steadfast. But in drawing attention to the illusory character of individual striving, of suffering and frustrated desire, Schopenhauer only resists immersion in this world. In this respect, I drew a contrast in chapter 1 (section 6) between the influence of Schopenhauer and that of Emerson. Nietzsche’s focus is on the promise of ‘renewal’ through the visionary, *Apollonian* world of second semblance. By contrast, Schopenhauer looked not to ‘renewal’, but to escape. It remains that Schopenhauer had claimed the ‘sovereignty’ of music, independent of other arts, and that Wagner, too, was critical of associating music with images. Nietzsche talks in *On the Genealogy of Morals* III (5) of music ‘speaking the language of the will itself’, as the ‘most authentic, most original, least derivative revelation’ of the truth of the world as fundamentally will to power, but Nietzsche is disillusioned with Wagner and the Schopenhauerian language here is only being turned against his pretensions, with Nietzsche accusing Wagner of claiming the authority of a Schopenhauerian ‘truth’ in pursuit of his own self-promotion.

As such, the point against Bertram is he is selective. His focus on the Dürer engraving serves his ‘germanic’ interpretation, and he makes an exception for it because Nietzsche associates it with Schopenhauer. And, in any case, whatever the details of Nietzsche’s relation to Schopenhauer’s philosophy, it remains that the Dürer engraving is a visual metaphor of the strength which Nietzsche values, and which is the basis on which he also comes to revise his opinions of both Wagner and Schopenhauer, saying he was mistaken about their character. Bertram cannot make an exception of the Dürer engraving, given Nietzsche seems to treat it no less allegorically than Bertram supposes he approached paintings by Raphael and Claude Lorrain in that way, as illustrating points he is making. And even if these paintings may be treated intellectually, it does not follow that Nietzsche was unaffected by their imagery. Even where Nietzsche uses imagery in drawing similes and analogies, it remains that these are particularly ‘visual’. For example, the image of the
dancing bear in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (2006, p.196) indicates a notion of unthinking obedience, but Nietzsche could have made the point as easily in plainer, straightforwardly conceptual terms.

There is a connection here with Nietzsche’s survey of rhetoric, which survives in a series of lecture notes (Blair, 1983). Nietzsche argues there that the use of imagery, as a lower form of rhetoric, risks the kind of misinterpretation which he parodies elsewhere; for example, in *Zarathustra*, where, in the town of Pied Cow, the inhabitants misunderstand Zarathustra’s use of the tightrope walker as metaphor. But again, it does not follow from Nietzsche pointing out these difficulties of interpretation that he granted imagery only a secondary importance. An image such as Dürer’s engraving can be simply, visually affective. Inevitably, it may come to ‘stand’ for a number of beliefs and commitments, just as Bertram’s own interpretation of the significance that Dürer’s knight could have for Nietzsche is drawn on a larger narrative. But it does not follow that its affectivity cannot be found to consist in a particular feature of it, taking it phenomenally, and where that feature could be a key to understanding the affectivity of a symbolic use of imagery, and language. Accordingly, the question of a visual sensibility may generally be better framed along the lines, for example, of Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of the visual phenomenon of depth (2012). I address the issue here in relation to a painting by Caspar David Friedrich, *Woman at the Window*, in chapter 4 (section 3). My point is it sidesteps questions around the influence of Schopenhauer and the ‘priority’ which Nietzsche could have accorded to music over visual imagery, and importantly, it stands apart from issues around the ‘meaning’ of an image and the ‘use’ to which it may be put.

Before this, I seek to put a positive case for Nietzsche’s visual sensibility, simply on the basis of his own use of figurative language demonstrating he was attentively oriented towards visual phenomena. It is integral to his own critical inquiries into artistic creation, and more widely to the ‘aesthetic justification’ of existence. If Nietzsche is consistent in the use he makes of figurative language and imagery, then the views advanced in the early texts and in *The Birth of Tragedy* will underpin his later works. The prospect then is of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* providing a locus of Nietzsche’s settled view of the role and significance of figurative language. I shall track its consistency with the earlier texts through his enduring regard for Emerson, and through the changing relations with Wagner. On the point of the ‘theory’ of metaphor discernible in *Music and Words* and in *On Truth and Lying*, this will be subject to a critical examination. But the ‘theory’ should not be used to prejudge issues around the phenomenal characteristics of an image or its affectivity.

Accordingly, a way of addressing Nietzsche’s ‘visual attunement’ will be to consider his sensitivity to figurative language in Emerson’s writings. Evidence is available in the underlinings and marginal annotation in the books he owned of Emerson’s essays. Looking, for example, at the marks he made in the text of Emerson’s essay, *Nature*, in the German edition of *The Essays* (1858) which he owned, Nietzsche has margin-lined this vividly descriptive paragraph:

> It seems as if the day was not wholly profane, in which we have given heed to some natural object. The fall of snowflakes in a still air, preserving to each crystal its perfect form; the blowing of sleet over a wide sheet of water, and over plains, the waving rye-field, the mimic
waving of acres of houstonia, whose innumerable florets whiten and ripple before the eye; the reflections of trees and flowers in grassy lakes; the musical, steaming odorous south wind, which converts all trees to wind-harps; the crackling and spurtling of hemlock in the flames; or of pine logs, which yield glory to the walls and faces in the sitting-room, - these are the pictures and music of the most ancient religion.

Following on from this, Nietzsche double marks where Emerson writes this ‘delicate realm’ is ‘[almost too bright] for spotted man to enter without noviciate and probation', and where he goes on to say that art is an ‘enhancement and sequel' to this original beauty, so that we are ‘over-instructed’. And it is significant that Nietzsche has then more heavily marked where Emerson, in relation to palatial gardens and villas, writes:

Indeed, it is the magical lights of the horizon, and the blue sky for the background, which save all our works of art, which were otherwise baubles.

It is easy to suppose Nietzsche could associate this with the paintings of Claude Lorrain. Also at this point, Emerson continues by celebrating the riches of an imagination which might conjure images from the sound of a military band, or magnify the echo of a hunting horn such that mountains are converted into an Aeolian harp, and whereby the receptive individual, however poor he is in material terms, is returned to a mythic vision of ‘Apollo and Diana, and all divine hunters and huntresses’. In this ‘return', the contrast is with everyday experience, and Emerson draws his argument on a point that the material ‘riches' of a wealthy estate, its buildings and gardens, stand to be enhanced by riches which are nature’s gift, so that Emerson can call it a ‘haughty favour’ conferred by nature. Nietzsche double marks the point in his copy of the text.

In Emerson’s essay this leads into him distinguishing nature described in passive terms from it being understood through man’s activity in nature, as evolving and active. Again, Nietzsche has marked the text. The focus of Nietzsche’s response here will be more closely examined in chapter 5, primarily in relation to Neo-Platonic sources of Emerson’s thinking, and to an influence which is traceable to the writings of Jacob Boehme. And I offer an account there of the role and significance Nietzsche accords to a mythic symbolism. For the present point, I am concerned only to mark the extent to which it may be granted Nietzsche is oriented towards visual phenomena. While Nietzsche addresses issues around painted and sculpted images, it remains that his own ‘art', like Emerson's, is in his use of language. Nietzsche’s declared ambition is its ‘musicality'. There is a parallel then with the challenge posed by Raphael’s St. Cecilia, of how the required ‘transformation' is possible. In the context of the painting, it would be between sound images and unearthly counterparts, or between visual and musical domains. In the case of language, it is a matter of its symbolic use.

In Emerson’s figure of a ‘transparent eye’, it is the symbolic character of this image which is initially affecting. As symbol, it is iterated in the eye of Wotan, and in that of Polyphemus. Taking it allegorically, the imagery is tied by Shapiro to wider epistemological and metaphysical concerns. But it is central to my thesis that a symbolic use of language has, as it were, its own power. It does not represent. Rather, in the formulation I expand upon in chapter 3 (section 7), it already is what it purports to sign. This determines its primary
significance. And it accords with what I take to be Nietzsche’s concern with ‘creative’ or ‘transformative’ forms of language, consisting in its symbolic use. This is examined in detail below.

Turning to Nietzsche’s own texts, a visual sensibility is evidenced, for example, in sections (280-285) of The Gay Science, and which serve to indicate as well how Nietzsche envisaged the link between strength and a phenomenology of higher feeling. He begins with imagery of expansive city spaces and quiet, high-ceilinged cloisters as productive of a sublime thoughtfulness. This mood is not sustained by the ‘rhetoric’ of existing religious and other kinds of supramundane architecture. It must not be a ‘religious’ kind of thinking.

We wish to see ourselves translated into stone and plants, we want to take walks in ourselves when we stroll around these buildings and gardens.

Next, in (281), the mountains at Portofino suggest a proud, calm, decisive ending of a melody, thought, drama or event. Then, in (282), Nietzsche talks of the ‘gait and stride’ of thoughts. The metaphor here is a stately walk contrasted with Napoleon’s quick, militaristic determination. There is a pun on metric feet directed against elaborate prose. The highest thought is conveyed in stately, measured sentences. Section (283) contains the injunction to ‘live dangerously’, to be independent of others. The metaphor here is rule and possession of others and our self. It is heroic knowledge, living on the slopes of a volcano or heading into uncharted seas. Section (285) is focused on the strength required not to yield to holiness, to a belief in higher purposes, or to a desire for escape from change and decay. The metaphor in this case is a rising lake held back by a dam, indicating the strength that might be gained from refusing to yield, from refusing to ‘flow out into a god’. This same strength can support us then in bearing life. Like the dam, it is an increase in strength and height, gained in renouncing God.

While this strength is a kind of self-possession and courage, it is primarily a ‘musical’, poetic mood. Encountered only in uncharted waters, it is not wholly given to consciousness. In indicating its character, Nietzsche has resorted to the imagery of highceilings, the fall to sea-level, the rising reservoir of water. The unifying aspect in these things is simply height. The imagery then leads into an explicit claim about the possibility of elevated moods. This elevation is described in section (288) as ‘a perpetual movement between high and low, the feeling of high and low, a continual ascent as on stairs and at the same time a resting on clouds’. The strength demanded is a matter of temperament in the sense that it also determines how a reader may respond to this imagery. His ‘interruption’ in section (286) makes this clear. Nietzsche says he can only ‘remind’ a reader, no more than that. He cannot ‘move stones … [turn] animals into men’, he says. And in (288), he anticipates elevated feeling will be possible only under certain favourable cultural conditions. So far, it has been an exceptional state, one that has made us shudder, he says. But it is clear that he is taking elevation as having a characteristic phenomenology. It is not a matter of conceptual understanding.

The prospect of renewal is a ‘hope’ in (286). As such, his pessimism is directed at the current state of affairs. But the ‘solution’ is not the romantic yearning for escape from life.
Rather, it is focused on an aspect of phenomena and the cultivation of temperament, through art, but, crucially, as here, through a symbolism. It is experienced as a pathos of distance. It is a ‘classical’ pessimism. And it is ‘musical’ in Nietzsche’s sense of a mood or tonality. Notably, the language in these sections is not at all Schopenhauerian. Not because Nietzsche has reached a belated recognition of the danger of ‘holiness’ as a response to lived existence. He is, after all, recalling what Emerson had marked as ‘the music of the most ancient religion’.

2.2) musicality

In relation to an early essay, Uber Stimmungen, Parkes (1994) addresses a notion of ‘attunement’ which he finds is implicit in Nietzsche’s talk of mood (Stimmung). The focus in the essay is on the way in which we accommodate a range of moods, and Parkes finds a parallel concern in Emerson’s Experience. He points out that the etymology of Stimmung admits a sense of being ‘in tune with’, or ‘right’ in the sense of fitted to a context, given its root in stimmen, and explains that while Nietzsche allows moods may be forced upon us in experience, he holds that we respond in ways in which we were already bound to do so. As an attunement of the will, the response is grounded in a conflict of drives or instincts in the subject. The appeal to conflicting drives or instincts is a prevalent theme in the secondary literature on Nietzsche, where he is taken as arguing for their realignment to the truth of a pervasive will to power. I address Nietzsche’s talk of ‘drives’ below, but in approaching issues around the kind of attunement at stake here, I approach it in relation simply to feelings or moods. Again, I am arguing for a particular use of symbolism having a role in enabling a transformative experience, where this experience is straightforwardly a matter of feeling and emotion, brought about as a response to figurative language in Nietzsche’s texts.

Having identified a sense of attunement, Parkes treats it in relation to the ‘musicality’ of Nietzsche’s texts, where musicality is taken literally, in terms of the syntactical construction of the texts, and to which Parkes draws attention in his introduction to Thus Spoke Zarathustra (2005(b), pp.xxviii-xxxi). That is to say, it is not a matter simply of the musical metaphors Nietzsche employs in his writings, or in his comments on them, such as when he talks of Zarathustra as his ‘symphony’, for example. Parkes points to the claims Nietzsche makes in Beyond Good and Evil (246) for the tempo of his sentences determined by their syntax, in the pattern of syllables and other components, and how it influences readers' understanding. In Zarathustra, the length of stanzas establishes a reader’s response is fitted to what Parkes, citing (247), calls a ‘mental breath’. And there are stylistic features around punctuation and repetition. Again, it is the reader’s ‘attunement’ which is at stake. Parkes (p.xxix) gives Nietzsche’s own description of what can be involved:

I read thinkers by assimilating their music to my passions and I sing their melodies after them: I know that behind all those cold words there moves a soul of desire, and I hear it singing, for my own soul sings when it’s moved.

Parkes quotes as well from the commentary in Ecce Homo, but it is notable that Nietzsche’s remarks there, on the tempo of Zarathustra’s speeches, are in much more figurative language:
From an infinite fullness of light and depth of happiness drop falls after drop, word after word.

While granting the importance of stylistic features tied more or less to the ‘sound’ of Nietzsche’s texts, it remains they have their origin in the inspiration which was marked in The Birth of Tragedy by Schiller’s talk of a ‘musical mood’, and which precedes its fashioning in sound as much as in a visual art. My contention is that this admits an equal status to visual and sound images, potentially as counterpart expressions of a Dionysian creative impulse.

Tracy Strong (Nietzsche, 1997) has also focused on the syntactical and grammatical construction of Nietzsche’s texts, to show how it is integral to challenging the reader’s convictions. Strong (pp.xiv-xx) analyses in detail a section from Twilight of the Idols, mapping the moves in Nietzsche’s argument as progressing through a series of dissonances, where each seeming resolution gives way again to further scrutiny. Again, the ‘musicality’ here is literal. Musical dissonance encourages the desire for its resolution, where Wagner’s Tristan and Isolde provides an example of its repeatedly withheld satisfaction in the listener, and which also, Strong explains, encourages the listener’s awareness of that desire. In Nietzsche’s technique, the seeming resolutions that he offers are repeatedly undermined by a tension which arises out of the very terms in which the resolution was attempted. It is a technique which Strong explains ‘relies upon the desire for consonance and at the same time induces a critical stance toward that desire’ (p.xvi). Without doing justice to the detail of Strong’s analysis in the example from section (5) of Morality as Anti-Nature, I draw a general point that Nietzsche relies on shifting perspectives and seeming solutions, to return the reader to the original problem, but having shaken his convictions.

It is important that this process does not proceed by contradiction or identifying inconsistencies as such. Strong appeals to Babich’s description of it as contrapuntal (Babich, 1994). In contrapuntal music each part is related in a whole, but pursues its own course. Strong illustrates this with the eighth aphorism in Epigrams and Arrows, where the leading title, ‘from life’s school of war’, and the claim that what doesn’t kill me makes me stronger, resonate with each other in a way which defies taking the aphorism as a straightforward assertion. Babich says it is to be read and understood ‘musically’:

Taking up the musical sense of the aphorism, one keeps both its subject matter and its development as part of a whole. Thus positions, statements at variance with one another are not simple contradictions but contrapuntal ... (1994, p.6)

This is taken up by Strong in his focus on the tension in relations of consonance and dissonance in Nietzsche’s technique:

Nietzsche’s writing [...] calls up a critical relation between what the reader wants and what the text makes available and, in fact, requires of the reader. The effect is to call into question precisely those wants which promise to give resolution and to bring consonance to the experience. This is what Nietzsche in his preface calls ‘sounding out idols’ (p.xix)
And in this way, Strong's concerns are directed on a broadly cognitive dissonance and its epistemological implications.

By contrast, my focus is on the 'musicality' of, for example, the *Apollo Sauroctonos*, and of the kind of dissonance which attaches to the operation of a *pathos* of distance. It does not follow that this musicality is merely metaphor. Rather, the point is that it is not restricted to a strictly musical context. The sculpture embodies a certain dissonance both in the tension between a *Dionysian* creativity and its formal expression, and in the symbolism itself. In any case, dissonance is not restricted to the particular stylistic forms which Strong identifies in Nietzsche's texts. It will be seen in chapter 5 how dissonance informs the work of Hölderlin. It has been noted already it is integral to Segantini's Divisionism, and I address in my concluding chapter Aschheim's (1992) view of it as little more than gimmickry. In chapter 4, I examine the affectivity of Friedrich's *Woman at a Window* as being drawn on a dissonance in its composition. In these examples, it is still a matter of dissonance as a phenomenon, ranging wider than musical contexts. In regard to feelings and emotion, the focus on purely textual constructions and the cognitive import of dissonance gives way to Nietzsche's interest in the 'unity' of nature or the world, in which, as Emerson wrote, 'all mean egoism vanishes', and where it has been seen how Nietzsche develops this along the lines he illustrates in remarks on, for example, Archilochus' poetry.

I marked above, in chapter 1, the priority Nietzsche can be taken as giving to *pathos* over dramatic action in Ancient Greek theatre. It was treated there in relation to a use of symbolism. The emphasis on *pathos* is noted by Georges Liebert specifically in association with music (2004, p.85). It is *Stimmung*, as atmosphere or mood, which is put in place of the Aristotelian emphasis on *praxis*, and it is music, Liebert says, which is especially fitted to creating this mood. While providing a detailed and comprehensive account of both Nietzsche and Wagner's views on the comparison of plastic and musical arts, including on the relation of visual imagery and music in Wagner’s music dramas, Liebert makes it clear at the outset that he follows Bertram's (2009) diagnosis, that Nietzsche was constitutionally disinclined towards visual forms. Liebert asserts a scarcity of visual metaphor in Nietzsche’s texts, compared to auditory, and he claims that Nietzsche treated beauty in the plastic arts as playing only a mediating role. ‘The priority and primacy in the creative process belongs to Dionysus, the god of intoxication and ecstatic song.’ Liebert writes (p.11). He points as well to a remark (KSA, 8:107) that Socrates’s superficiality was owing to him being the son of a sculptor, where Nietzsche says ‘if these plastic arts were able to talk, they would seem superficial’. As it stands, this carries little weight as evidence. In respect of Nietzsche’s admiration for Claude Lorrain, Liebert says Nietzsche only uses the paintings allegorically, to make a point. Again, there is room for further questions and analysis, rather than supposing this can simply be counted as ‘evidence’. I have argued in the previous section against Bertram’s judgement on the issues here, on which Liebert is relying.
2.3) ‘delight in existence’

In The Dionysian World View, Apollonian and Dionysian tendencies in art are two states of ‘delight in existence’ (Nietzsche, 1999, p.119). One is a delight in dream imagery in which ‘all forms speak to us’. This is the world of sensory phenomena. In the Schopenhauerian language Nietzsche employs here, it is the manifest expression of a universal Will. The other is an impulsive, wild, disruptive, intensity of self-oblivion, marked by Nietzsche as ‘spring fever’ and the effect of narcotic drink. These ‘states’ are joined, Nietzsche says, in art. An Apollonian art is primarily image-making. It is the semblance of a world of dreams, a play with dream imagery. In this sense, Apollonian art is calm and measured. By contrast, Dionysian art is magically transformative: ‘something supernatural now sounds out from within man’. While the Apollonian consists in man’s fashioning of images, the Dionysian is a force of nature which fashions man.

It is the core of Nietzsche’s argument here and in The Birth of Tragedy, that Ancient Greek tragedy achieved a fusion of these opposing states in a Dionysian art. They co-exist in a way which involves a distance, or stepping back from an image, to evade submersion of the self. Nietzsche characterises it here as a kind of ‘ambush’ of the self. The experience is taken to be transfiguring, by which we can suppose Nietzsche means it enables the kind of ‘rarer’ states he still talks of in the later texts. But it is not destructive in the way that had been threatened, Nietzsche says, by the arrival of the cult of Dionysus in Greece, when all social convention stood to be suspended in the animality of its orgiastic cult festivals. The Greek achievement was in revealing the sublime effects of this force of nature, through its idealisation in a measured art. As such, it is a higher emotion, or elevated mood which is expressed in this art. It is transfiguring because it sustains the ‘delight in existence’ which, Nietzsche is clear, is to be drawn as much on a darker imagery of things in life we suffer as cruelties, and where these would otherwise threaten a destructive pessimism towards existence itself, that it might be better never to have been born at all.

The same applies in music as in visual imagery, Nietzsche says, with rhythm and metre providing an architecture of sound which, again, holds at a distance the Dionysian element in music which would ‘shake us to the core’. Sustaining the intelligibility of a sublime effect, this is the superiority of a Dionysian art over a purely formal, Apollonian image-making, both in sound and visual imagery. This is the ‘transfiguring musical intoxication’ which Nietzsche says is embodied, for example, and specifically, in Praxiteles’ statues (1999, p.123). There is a straightforward implication here that in our own contemplation of the Apollo Sauroctonos, we might experience the kind of measured sublime which informs the ‘elevation’ Nietzsche marks as a ‘divine lizard’. Nietzsche distinguishes a simpler image-worship in the Greeks’ representations of their gods and in Homeric epic, in which they recognised themselves. This is the cultural expression of their own self-image, in which they would claim to know themselves. In a key phrase, Nietzsche describes the arrival of Dionysus as marking the twilight of the gods, of these images which were the Greeks’ idealised reflection of themselves.

The Dionysian is a historical event in as much as Nietzsche takes it to be a foreign import into Greece. But his concern is with the way in which Greek art and music was affected by
its arrival. The simple architectures in art and music were loosened and intensified in new forms. The Dionysian is potentially destructive because it presents the ‘terrible and absurd’ in existence. While these are transformed by a ‘healing’ Apollonian image-making, it does not follow that Nietzsche is concerned only with a beautifying art. I have argued above in section 6 of chapter 1, that Nietzsche need not be taken as following Schopenhauer in seeking a ‘solution’ to the problem of pessimism on these terms. The transformation is a step beyond the simple image-making of an Apollonian realm of beautiful semblance. Dionysian art is said to occupy a position between beauty and truth. Its expression in Ancient Greece was in tragic drama. Again, at this time, Nietzsche is writing optimistically of an art of the future, promised in Wagner’s work. And he expands on how in Dionysian art, the disruptive ‘truth’ is now symbolised. It makes use of semblance. That is to say, in the case of singing or dancing, it is not just a matter of being overtaken by an intoxicating, unconscious instinct or drive. At stake is a mood in which we can ‘believe in wonders’, in which we see things as having been ‘enchanted’.

In Twilight of The Idols, in section (10) of Skirmishes (2005(a), pp.196-197), Nietzsche marks the Apollonian as ‘above all’ a visual intoxication, making visionaries of painters, sculptors and epic poets. He characterises the Dionysian as discharged in all forms of expression at the same time, crucially transfiguring in the sense that it is the subject which discharges this stimulus in a kind of participation or performance. The same distinction is drawn in the earlier text. Nietzsche notes as well in section (10), that the Dionysian stimulus is carried in music, for example, in the way that rhythm stimulates our muscles. But in making it a distinct art form, he says, a number of our senses must be disabled, so that we do not act out the feelings we stand to experience through it. It may be granted then that Nietzsche’s understanding of an image-making art is able to accommodate both visual arts and music, in both visual and sound images. The sound ‘image’ is simply an expression in sound. It falls under a formal, Apollonian artistry. This is important in addressing the role of art in accessing feelings. It is not the case that music, in its Apollonian form, must be prioritised over other kinds of visual imagery and use of figurative language. Issues here will be explored in more detail below. It remains that the disruptive, Dionysian impulse is carried in sound. Wagner notes in his essay on Beethoven how we wake from a dream shouting, and Nietzsche talks of an intoxication of feeling in shouting: ‘how much more powerful and immediate is a shout, compared with something seen!’ (Nietzsche, 1999, p.137). But it has been seen already that Nietzsche supposes a ‘musical tone’ informing Praxiteles’ sculptures. I am arguing for the equivalence of visual and sound imagery, allowing that a visual representation can be the opportunity to experience ‘higher’ feelings.

In the final section of The Dionysian World View, Nietzsche outlines how a category of feelings may be communicated. He begins with a gesture symbolism as the visible expression of inner feeling (Gefühl). This is the basis of a non-linguistic communication, in which visible features in facial expression and in movements of the mouth, enable an observer to experience the same feelings. These operate as symbols, and through their representation in imagery, or by immersion in an actor’s performance, we can experience the same feelings. This communication is taken as operating at the level of unconscious recognition, even if the symbolism here could be culturally relative in some respects. It is, in any case, expressive of our own human character. But Nietzsche continues with how this
gesture symbolism must be supplemented by a language of ‘musical tone’. The gesture symbolism is said to be only partial. It is limited to what is visibly represented. By contrast, music would express the ‘innermost thoughts of nature’, Nietzsche says, not just the feelings which characterise human existence. Again, it does not follow that Nietzsche is downgrading visual imagery. In its equivalence with a sound image, we can take a visual image as informed by a ‘musical tone’. Nietzsche says in *The Dionysian World View* that sound ‘symbols’ will be intensified to ‘pure musical sound’ through the intoxication of feeling (p.137). In its purely *Dionysian* aspect, music would be the sound only of a destructive self-oblivion.

Again, Nietzsche’s argument is embedded in a Schopenhauerian terminology. I take the remarks on gesture symbolism in this final section of *The Dionysian World View* as being directed on issues around language taken as a particular kind of sound imagery. It will be seen below how Nietzsche expands on this in other texts. Here, it is an outlined theory of language starting from words consisting in sounds and the accompanying facial movements, but which come to be employed, from memory, as concepts, and at which point the sound will, as it were, have fallen away. The point which concerns Nietzsche is the consequent loss of communication of feelings. An emotional intensity will depend upon the word regaining its strength through re-sounding again. As such, this sounding is a return to nature.

> When he uses gesture man remains within the limits of the species, which is to say, within the limits of the phenomenal world; when he produces musical sound, however, he dissolves the phenomenal world, as it were, into its original unity; the world of maya disappears before the magic of music (p.136).

Again, I do not take this as requiring the subordination of visual imagery to sound. Rather, it is a point about language, with Nietzsche emphasising the sounds of words, spoken and sung, as enabling a particular emotional intensity.

It is any case a concern which applies specifically to Wagner’s art. The mocking wood-bird in Nietzsche’s *The Poet’s Call* plays on a scene in Part III of the *Ring Cycle*, in which Siegfried is enabled to understand in words what the wood-bird sings, having tasted the dragon’s blood. The scene has been explained as Wagner signalling the emphasis he put on the libretto in his music (Spencer and Millington, 1993, p.368, note 108). If, in the poem, Nietzsche marks the difficulties in poetic expression, it remains that there may be an equivalence of sound and visual imagery at the pre-linguistic level. In chapter 5 (section 3), I examine a piece of visual imagery in *Zarathustra* which has a correspondence to the opening of the *Ring*, where both are focused on this equivalence at the level of a pre-linguistic symbolism. Nietzsche’s declaration that *The Birth of Tragedy* might better have been sung allows he was committed still to the theory which has been outlined here, that soundlessly reading his texts risks overlooking their musicality. Again, this is neither a judgment on the question of a visual counterpart to sound images, nor a rejection of the ‘musicality’ of a *Dionysian* art of painting and sculpture.

The point here is important in as much as I shall argue Nietzsche was originally influenced by his own reading of Emerson. If there is a musicality in Emerson’s texts it may be looked for in his use of a visual imagery. It should be expected that Nietzsche’s thinking around
questions concerning the role of figurative uses of language underwent development, not
least in relation to his expectations of Wagner’s art. I argue Nietzsche accords a role to
visual imagery which is determined in relation to a theory of symbolism. It is a matter of
Nietzsche’s own use of figurative language in implicitly endorsing a position on it, as much
as of his explicit claims. The hierarchical orderings he marks in BGE (257) are a feature in
experience, in everyday things as much as in artistic forms. It has been seen already how
Nietzsche acknowledges the affective power of Praxiteles’ Apollo Sauroctonos exemplifying
Dionysian art. It is clear that Nietzsche need not be taken as endorsing a view that painting
and sculpture are of secondary importance to music.

2.4) distance

In The Gay Science (15), Nietzsche talks of a comfortable self-deception in which people are
content with their own ‘heights’, which is to say, with the received ideas and values of a
given culture. These will consist in the kind of self-aggrandisement and complacency of a
usually bourgeois character. The value of Nietzsche’s so-called ‘rarer’ states lies in their
distancing effect. It is not a matter of rational assessment or calculated judgement. I argue it
is Nietzsche’s use of imagery which can convey what is at stake here, prompting a reader to
feel the relevant sense of dislocation. There must be a tension in this imagery, between its
Dionysian impetus and the Apollonian form of its expression, but specifically in its imagery. It
is an experience connected to our sense of self, but directed at that self which we come to
recognise as historically and culturally conditioned. It is then a transformative experience,
described as the ‘sense of resting on clouds’ (1974, p.231) and tied generally to a range of
imagery drawn on height and distance, and on rank. I claim this is what is primarily at stake
in Nietzsche’s texts, and what he seeks to communicate, namely the phenomenal character
of an elevated mood.

Nietzsche’s concerns here are evident in an early essay, The Greek Music Drama (2013), in
which he sets out an imaginative reconstruction of the spectacle of ancient Greek theatre.
Again, it is to the imagery in this reconstruction that a reader must respond, not in
conceptual terms, but in relation to experiential features it is possible to imagine through the
description. Nietzsche visualises the reception of ancient Athenian tragic drama by a
contemporary audience: in bright daylight sun, he says, a large crowd of spectators look
down at what should seem to us to be ‘superhumanly sized puppets’, moving on a narrow
stage in ‘slow, regular steps’, masked and stiffly padded, speaking and singing in unison.
The spectacle is intense and serious, and, Nietzsche says that while the costumed actors
represented an ‘elevation above the day-to-day level of human beings’, they would
themselves have experienced ‘an internal sense of uplift, in which the pathos-laden,
immensely powerful words of Aeschylus must have seemed like a natural language’. The
Athenian spectator is a participant in the drama, because:

... the soul of the Athenian who came to watch the tragedy at the great Dionysian festival still
bore within himself something of that element from which tragedy had sprung. That is, the
powerful drive of springtime when it bursts forth, a storming and raging in a mixture of
emotions that is familiar to all naive peoples and the whole of nature when spring approaches.
(2013, p.14)
Originating in these ‘deep instincts’, the drama affords an experience of transformation or enchantment, which Nietzsche describes here as a stepping outside of oneself, the expression of a ‘Dionysian life of nature’ (p.18). In this ecstatic state, the subject escaped the seeming permanence and stability of an everyday sense of selfhood. And crucially, if the example indicates a feeling of elevation, then it does so both as explication but also through the imagery of the particular circumstances it describes. It is clear that Nietzsche intends an actual experience is at stake. It is a phenomenon, a state of ‘delight in existence’, which was identified in *The Dionysian World View* as nature’s expression through man.

This expression will be tamed in image-making. Through a *Dionysian* art we can withstand the pathological loss of self which would follow on a brute intoxication, and bear the pessimitc ‘sigh’ in the sufferings of individuation. But it is not a flight from existence. The *Dionysian* ‘state of ecstasy’ may be a breaking down of cultural relations between people, of ‘the caste-like divisions which necessity and arbitrary power have established between men’ (1999, p.120). And it is an actual experience of transformation: ‘they feel themselves to have been transformed by magic, and they really have become something different’ (p.120). But it is not a flight from individual suffering humanity. The force of nature is an intoxicating ‘spring drive’, but *Dionysian* art will be a ‘play’ with this intoxication. Nietzsche is careful to mark it as simultaneously intoxication and stepping back. ‘The attendant of Dionysus’, he says, ‘must be in a state of intoxication and at the same time he must lie in ambush, observing himself from behind.’ It is simultaneously clear-mindedness and intoxication.

Similarly, in *Apollonian* art, Nietzsche says we retain a sense that it is play with semblance. The boundary in that case is a point at which we are ‘cheated’ by the appearances.

2.5) poetics

In *On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense* (1999), Nietzsche argues that words (as signs) do not mark ‘real’ features of things. We could not allow a stone is ‘really’ hard, given that its hardness is a subjective matter of sensory stimulation, he says. Similarly, the gendering of nouns in German is evidently arbitrary. It could not be expected that reality is gendered that way. As such, language is not directed at truth. Instead, words serve to designate what is of interest and concern to human beings, and this proceeds through a process of something like transformation, which Nietzsche marks as *Übertragung*.

The stimulation of a nerve is first translated (*übertragung*) into an image: first metaphor! The image is then imitated by a sound: second metaphor! And each time there is a complete leap from one sphere into the heart of another, new sphere. (1999, p.144)

Breazeale (1979, p.41, fn.83) notes the root of this term in the sense of something ’carried over, and its use in the sense of ‘transfer’ between two spheres. There are detailed and comprehensive treatments of this passage in Crawford (1988) and in Emden (2005), addressing the wider context of influences on Nietzsche’s thinking around language. I examine their accounts in chapter 3. Neither considers the possibility of Emerson being a formative influence on Nietzsche here, though it had been earlier suggested by Stack (1992) that Nietzsche draws on his not fully worked out ‘theory’ of a symbolic use of language. This can be found in a section in *Nature* (Emerson, 1982). Stack proceeds by briefly summarising
the similar claims made by Emerson and Nietzsche (pp.145-152), concluding that Emerson’s account ‘had its effect’ on Nietzsche’s analysis in On Truth and Lying.

Stack explains a sense of ‘metaphoric transfer’ identified by Emerson. Words describing physical phenomena are re-employed in marking ‘spiritual’ or moral facts, or in marking mental phenomena. So, for example, a moral wrong is ‘twisted’, and ‘supercilious’ is drawn on the physical gesture of raising eyebrows. Through language, these kinds of ‘outward phenomena’ express concerns and interests of specifically human life. Language is ‘shot through’, Stack writes, ‘with anthropomorphically coloured metaphors’. Nature is ‘humanised’ through language. In this way, nature can, as it were, discover itself through man’s own intellectual activity, nature being contained as macrocosm in microcosmic man. Stack’s emphasis is on Emerson treating man and nature as standing in mutually analogical relations. We are bound only to ‘humanise’ what we claim to know of ‘reality’, with our questions about it arising from the inclination to ‘know thyself’.

Turning to Emerson’s essay on Napoleon, Stack goes on to highlight the emphasis Emerson puts on power and strength. Napoleon provides an example of intellect subordinated to a conscienceless pursuit of power. He is, in Emerson’s words, a ruthless ‘natural agent’. Again, Stack’s approach is characteristically directed on establishing Nietzsche borrows from Emerson. The ‘imprint on Nietzsche’s philosophical consciousness’ may be found, Stack says, in Emerson’s statement that ‘the one serious and formidable thing in nature is a will’. This stands in contrast to what Nietzsche would have later read in Schopenhauer, that the will was something to be denied. Stack argues that under the influence of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche may have foregone Emerson’s more positive conception of power, but reaches back to it in coming to refuse Schopenhauer’s rejection of life and vital existence (Stack, pp.153-154).

It is a feature of Stack’s analysis in terms of issues around knowledge and moral ‘truth’, that he is primarily concerned to fit the ‘theory’ of language he finds in Nietzsche to the ‘truth’ of a fundamental will to power. Nietzsche pointed to Schopenhauer’s error in transferring human attributes of striving and desire to a ‘thing-in-itself’, conceived as an absolute, undetermined Will. Stack’s argument is that in identifying this error and still approving Emerson’s regard for strength and power, Nietzsche was led then to his own ‘humanisation’ of nature as will to power, and which gained support from his critique of realist notions of truth he outlined in On Truth and Lying. If the ‘human analogy’ which operates here is licensed by Emerson’s semiotics, Stack says little about precisely how. A ‘metaphoric transference’ between the two domains of natural fact and mental symbol allows, Stack says, that we understand nature in terms suited to our own development and self-preservation. My claim is that Nietzsche’s sense of metaphoric transference has to respect the ambition of Emerson’s own poetics, indicated in Bacchus, to ‘unlock every crypt of every rock’, and taken up in Zarathustra’s solitude, in Zarathustra III (9), The Return Home, where the ‘words and word-shrines of all Being’ spring open for him and Becoming learns to talk. In the context of Nietzsche’s wider reading, in his contemporaries and in Creuzer as well as the classical sources he would have known, the mechanism here is the symbolic use of figurative language, characterised by Emerson as emblematic.
In chapter 3, I examine how Nietzsche’s theory of language and metaphor has been treated in relation to his readings of contemporary scientific and anthropological authors. I shall draw the notion of ‘transference’ in line with Nietzsche having adopted an Emersonian poetics, and ranging over the mythic use of language and symbol. At stake is an experience which is not easily expressed in language. Given Nietzsche’s account of consciousness, as following on the acquisition of language, then neither is the experience readily present to our self-conscious awareness. I start from the position that Nietzsche’s thought on how rarer states might be expressed and communicated is anchored in the symbolic uses of language exemplified in Emerson writings, and which Emerson, like Nietzsche, connects with wider concerns and interests around social and political organisation and values. Again, useful here is the example Foucault provides in his discussion of competing theories of representation, in which he addresses the view of language advanced, for example, by Paracelsus, according to which the names of things are, as Foucault puts it, ‘lodged in the things they designate’ (1989, p.40), as ‘regality’ is lodged in the eagle’s eye.

In this way, Nietzsche’s metaphors of height and distance can be taken as a ‘signature’ in things, where the valued experience is drawn through its ‘closeness’ to the referents of the terms he uses. This will accommodate and make sense of Stack’s talk of a ‘humanised’ world of things, and underpins a reading of Nietzsche’s perspectivism. Specifically, an admission that ‘truth’ is perspectival follows on the possibility of a transformative experience of things under a ‘symbolic’ use of language. The sense of transformation here is indicated in The Gay Science (299), for example, where Nietzsche says we must ‘want to be the poets of our life’. An artist, or a poet’s technique will be inventive in creating an impression of something which is, Nietzsche says, a kind of colouring of it, giving it ‘a surface and skin that is not fully transparent’. But the artist’s powers end, he says, where life begins: ‘we want to be the poets of our life - first of all in the smallest, most everyday matters’. The poet’s elevated mood consists in its transformative power. It is not an escape from life. Rather, it is an intoxicated loss of ‘self’ in this particular kind of closeness to things. Accordingly, Nietzsche will be seeking through his own art to express and communicate the experience, through a choice of imagery and language fitted to it. Given the experience has to be reclaimed or rediscovered, its possibility is tied as well to a campaign against cultural mores. And its opacity to conceptual analysis required that Nietzsche experimented with terminology and analogies provided, in part, by his philosophical, scientific and anthropological readings. These are influences on him seeking to understand the ground and significance of the feelings at stake here, but they also stand to be taken, as it were, poetically.

Stack (1992, p.45) argues generally for Nietzsche having made ‘constructive use’ of a range of insights and assertions spread through Emerson’s essays in delivering his own judgements or describing an attitude or value, and emulating his aphoristic and prophetic, fragmentary style. In this context, Stack cites another verbal echo. Emerson declares in Circles: ‘men walk as prophecies of the next age. Step by step, we scale this mysterious ladder; the steps are actions, the new prospect is power’. In his aphorism Forward, in Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche tells his readers that they have in themselves ‘a ladder with a hundred steps’ upon which they can climb to knowledge. Again, Stack relies on finding conceptual affinities in seeking to identify an Emersonian basis for Nietzsche’s generally life-affirming stance. By contrast, I am arguing that Nietzsche is drawn by the
affectivity of an imagery of height and distance, to which he responds in Emerson, and in whom he also finds the basis of an explanatory semiotics.

2.6) Anschauung

I argued in chapter 1 (section 6) that Nietzsche’s understanding of the term Anschauung need not be taken as following Schopenhauer’s usage. It was seen how the criticism Nietzsche makes of Schopenhauer’s ‘mystical embarrassments’ in section (99) of The Gay Science is the starting point of a close analysis by Jensen (2013(b)) of Nietzsche’s talk of Anschauung. Again, as Jensen explains, in section (34) of Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation (1969) it is a release from the tragic character of our existence ‘into pure objectivity’, whereby an intuiting subject and the object intuited have ‘become one’. Our individuated will is ‘silenced’ because merged with the object in its universal character, which is to say, free of its relations to us as desirable, to be feared, etc. We ‘lose’ ourselves in the object because turning away from our willed interests and concerns. Where an object and our relations to it are spatio-temporally defined, we lose the sense of our own spatio-temporally located self when we ‘see’ the object free of those relations. It is then a kind of self-denial (Selbstverleugnung).

Jensen examines the Schopenhauerian language of an ecstatic self in The Birth of Tragedy, where it was seen above how Nietzsche talks in terms of an aesthetic distancing and suspension of our own self-individuation. He suggests Nietzsche was already doubtful of such an account, questioning for example whether pain might be a condition of existence, not something from which we should anticipate release. In place of following Schopenhauer in this mystical sense of intuition, Nietzsche treats the artist’s intuitions as much more a matter of perspective, Jensen says, drawn on the demands of an individual’s own embodied will. His argument is that Nietzsche turns to contemporary scientific writings, such as those by Lange and Gerber, in seeking to reformulate a notion of Anschauung able to accommodate a broadly naturalistic stance, in opposition to a more or less mystical faculty.

A key point in Jensen’s account is where he marks Nietzsche’s claim in On Truth and Lying, that subject and object occupy ‘two absolutely different spheres’, between which there can be no relation other than an aesthetic one. Nietzsche calls it ‘an allusive transference, a stammering translation into a quite different language’. This is taken by Jensen as marking Nietzsche’s rejection of the Schopenhauerian unity of subject and object in an act of Selbstverleugnung, given, Jensen says, it should have to consist in the identity of ‘two absolutely different spheres’. In place of enabling the subject’s merger with primordial unity in a moment of Dionysiac ecstasy, there is a falsifying mediation in art, between ‘the sensory effluvia of the external world’ and its representation in the subject. And art is grounded then in all the circumstances of the subject’s physical embodiment. Jensen concludes:

For Nietzsche, because there is never a subject-object identity there can be no single privileged intuition into the deep nature of the world and hence no truth in that respect.
Conceding the mix of terminology in *On Truth and Lying*, where the continued talk of *Anschauung* is seemingly fitted with scientific analogies and with the use Nietzsche makes of the notion of *Übertragung*, Jensen allows Nietzsche’s thought is transitional here, and that under the strain of these disparate influences he would subsequently abandon talk of *Anschauung* altogether.

But this narrow focus on a question whether Nietzsche endorses a Schopenhauerian *Anschauung* is already limiting. I argued Nietzsche does not deny Schopenhauer *himself* his resort to mysticism and nonsense. Nietzsche’s concern in *The Gay Science* (99) is only with how such ‘excesses’ happen to be the most easily taken up by readers, and his list of Schopenhauer’s vices then leads into an accusation against Wagner, that he misinterpreted the philosophy implicit in his own art. It may be that Nietzsche implicitly targets his own use of Schopenhauerian language. But the passage is directed, ultimately, on praising Wagner’s determination and independence, for being, as it were, his own interpreter. In which case, there is a clear sense in which Wagner’s own ‘stammering translation’, just as much as Schopenhauer’s, is legitimated. While others’ reception of it will be faulted, that is a matter of their own deficiency in strength and independence. My point here is only to resist the suggestion that Nietzsche should have adopted certain positions on the basis of his ‘influences’, as if a kind of philosophical journey should be traceable. I argue for his early interest in Emerson in terms of him having been already attentive to his own emotional response to Emerson’s writings and to questions then of the relation between such feelings and their expression. As such, it is from the outset a question of something translated in other forms of expression, as in art, and notably, in Wagner’s music drama.

It is important to be wary here of supposing that the sense of transformation involved is of language operating to bring about a substitution of one mental or physical state for another. This would depend on Nietzsche endorsing a straightforward semantics of sign and signified, with words tied to specific states and traceable, perhaps, to ultimately physiological conditions. In addressing this issue, Burnham (2013) explains how Nietzsche’s position on the role of art and language, or more broadly, ‘style’, in enabling the required sense of transfiguration or revaluation, through a ‘reactivation’ of metaphor, is, from the outset, more complex than such a ‘linear’ semantics would allow. In arguing against the dualism implicit in that linear semantics, Burnham accommodates the way in which Nietzsche allows the *Apollonian* is the cultural means of expression of a *Dionysian* inspiration. The alternative would be a kind of dialectical opposition of a logicising *Apollonianism to a Dionysian* irrational emotivism, and which Burnham says Nietzsche in any case overstates as having been his own position when coming subsequently to criticise his earlier work. It is then a matter of “‘speaking’ in a transformative manner of the Dionysiac”, Burnham writes, ‘where the latter is no more to be identified with a set of bodily affects than with an individual human being’ (2013, p.96). Pointing to Nietzsche’s talk of the *Apollonian* ‘being cocooned away’ in a culturally impoverished time, the expectation is of its return under appropriate conditions of reactivation, notably in the expectations Nietzsche had of Wagner’s musical drama.

I follow Burnham’s point here and contend that the kind of ‘unity’ of subject and object implicit in the ‘closeness’ of a symbol and its ‘object’ is consistent with the rejection of dualism in his account of the reactivation of metaphor. In place then of a search for meaning,
or truth, in originating states, Nietzsche is concerned with the operation of an art or style, as bringing about a transformation through language itself. Such a transformation is grounded in the reciprocal dependence of Apollonian and Dionysian drives. Burnham calls it a ‘detour’ through style, operating as the means of the re-appearance of Dionysus. Accordingly, I propose that Nietzsche’s language of ‘higher’ states be taken in this sense of transformation, tied to a reactivation of metaphor, as symbol. It will be a matter of an individual’s self-conscious experience of lived existence (erlebnis), but this consciousness is in any case dependent on the reorientation in language. Nietzsche’s sense of ‘strength’ accommodates the independence required to withstand the stultifying effects of a lip-service to dualism in the presumed opposition of Apollonian logicising and Dionysian irrationalism.

In coming to distinguish the favoured sense of Dionysian as ‘classical’, Nietzsche did so on the basis of the strength exhibited in Ancient Greece. Nietzsche revises his assessment of Schopenhauer’s own character, but in Schopenhauer as Educator, he already recognises the difficulty in attaining this strength in culturally impoverished times. Even if someone has not overvalued the times he lives in, he might still demand to be shown a ‘genuine, red-blooded, healthy life’ before turning to consider its value. His commitment would have been easier in Ancient Greece, Nietzsche says, in an age that displayed such a life. He recommends the answer given by Empedocles. In seeking to give that answer, the modern philosopher will ‘long not only for release from their own, exhausted age, but for a culture, for a transfigured physis’ (1995, p.194). If hostility to the present age would seem senseless and self-destructive, this is only because it is the subject’s own culturally conditioned self which is the target. In conquering this self, Nietzsche says, an inquirer into the value of life will come to know there are ‘higher and purer things on this earth to discover and achieve’ (p.195).

And when the questioner is asked if he affirms existence, then he must answer as Empedocles would have answered, because Empedocles lived in an age which was the highest expression of an exuberant lust for life.

In On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense, before his ‘break’ with Wagner, Nietzsche makes use of his description of Siegfried as the ‘exuberant hero’ in the context of affirming a world of lived experience, the Apollonian world of appearances (fn.12, p.152). The opposition, again, is between an Apollonian man of reason, who seeks to rationalise and understand the world in conceptual terms, seeking to account for the ‘calamities of life’, and a man of intuition, the ‘exuberant hero’ who can, at best, speak only in ‘forbidden metaphors and unheard-of combinations of concepts’. It is this ‘man of intuition’ who is creative in shaping the world, Nietzsche calling it ‘the rule of art over life’. It is the ‘man of reason’ who is unable in the end to ward off pessimism. And while Nietzsche says in On Truth and Lying that the man of intuition receives redemption and release, it is primarily something enjoyed as a ‘stream of brightness, a lightening of the spirit’, from his standing ‘in the midst of a culture’. He wields his weapons ‘mightily and victoriously’ when his intuitions are expressed in the ‘radiance of metaphorical visions’, shaping a culture, unaffected by the pessimism which marks its demise.
In this chapter, I began by defending the emphasis I put on Nietzsche’s use of visual imagery. First, it had to be established Nietzsche did not lack a visual sensibility. I addressed Bertram’s claims to the contrary. I then went on to consider, in relation to some particular examples and arguments raised by Shapiro (2003), whether Nietzsche’s deployment of a range of visual metaphors has to be taken only in the traditional sense of something indicated in other terms. Shapiro’s observations are constrained in this way, as, for example, in his key claim that Nietzsche’s language and examples are directed by way of analogy, and so on, against an ‘oculocentric’ epistemology and metaphysics. Third, there is the evidence of Nietzsche’s underlining in Emerson of visually descriptive passages and Emerson’s metaphor of a transparent eye. Finally, I offered evidence of a visual sensibility in Nietzsche’s use of imagery in sections (280-285) of The Gay Science.

My point in section 2 was that the ‘musicality’ of Nietzsche’s texts is not a matter only of certain syntactical strategies. It was seen how these are directed on unsettling a subject’s held convictions and admit a kind of cognitive dissonance, but I emphasised more broadly the dissonance of impulse and created form, like that exampled in the Apollo Sauroctonos. In section 3, I considered the character of this dissonance in its sublimity, as a transfiguring ‘delight in existence’. It is a characteristically Dionysian art which sustains this experience, which is to say that the subject does not lose himself in ecstatic self-forgetting, though neither does he simply celebrate his own cultured self-image. Crucially, it admits the ‘musical tone’ which Nietzsche says informs Praxiteles’ statues. As such, it characterises the visual imagery in Emerson’s writings and accounts for Nietzsche’s praise of Emerson.

In section 4, it was seen how Nietzsche’s description of the Athenian spectator of Ancient Greek tragedy indicates the requirement that a subject is not lost entirely to himself in the transformative experience it offered. I went on in section 5 to consider how Emerson’s understanding of the world humanised in language in relation to human interests, may be taken not so much in the sense of admitting a humanised sense of natural agency, as individual will to power, but as closer to his remarks on signing, where Emerson allows a sense of transfer between a ‘spiritual’ or mental item, such as superciliousness, and its physical, gestural expression. This is of a piece with understanding the symbolic use of language along the lines of an identity of ‘sign’ and object, as in the eagle’s gaze and its nobility. Finally, I argued for the sensuous character of Anschauung, in its being tied to the operation of a visual sensibility or attunement. I begin in Part 2 with a closer examination of claims made for the sense of transference Nietzsche relies upon in On Truth and Lying. I am critical of accounts drawn on a notion of one thing transposing another in a use of metaphor, and argue for Nietzsche’s closeness to Emerson in admitting the symbolic use of figurative language.
Part 2

Elevation: language and consciousness

Chapter 3: figurative language

3.1) introduction

I examine in this chapter the account Nietzsche gives of the origins of language in the role he accords to visual and sound imagery. A starting point here is the account in On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense (1999), where language is taken as being subsequent to a kind of figurative expressivism. It will be seen how Nietzsche disparages its further development as informing so-called ‘herd’ consciousness. With metaphor and parable being drawn on imagery, there is a progression, as it were, from the ‘content’ of an image to its cultural significance and interpretation. I am focusing on Nietzsche’s demand in Ecce Homo to return to the image, and I take this in accordance with the distinction already noted, between symbol and allegory. It was seen how Gadamer allows a symbol can mark a ‘coincidence’ between an otherwise ‘invisible’ experience and its expression in imagery. I examine in chapter 5 an example of the wholly expressive use of imagery in the opening sounds and visual imagery in the first part of Wagner’s Ring of the Nibelung. The question is how does Nietzsche envisage the expression and communication of so-called ‘rarer’ states is possible? If a use of language is implicated in the realisation of a ‘higher’ lived experience, then this experience stands to be communicated in Nietzsche’s own use of language, in Zarathustra, for example. But with the ‘common’ language of the herd tied to a self-deceiving egoism, it must be a particular understanding of the role of metaphor and symbol at stake here. So much is indicated in the commentary Nietzsche gives on Zarathustra in Ecce Homo (2007, pp.126-127), describing his inspiration. He talks of having been ‘outside’ of himself and of being no longer clear what image (Bild) and metaphor (Gleichniss) were anymore. It will be seen how this is a matter of language drawn on a unity of symbol and thing symbolised.

Nietzsche also declares things simply offered themselves up as metaphors (Gleichnisse). Again, the example in Foucault (1989, p.40) is useful here, of regal bearing or nobility symbolised in the characteristic stare of an eagle. Whereas the concept of regality, signed by the word, marks a quality of objects comprising a kind or category of thing, the eagle’s gaze operates both as sign and what is signed. I argue it is this kind of unity which Nietzsche relies upon in marking out an ‘inner’ life. It is a ‘higher’ life in so far as it is away from the ‘common’ concerns of a ‘false’ ego and escapes the kind of understanding which would draw on the conceptual resources of a developed facility in linguistic signs. Nietzsche goes on in Ecce Homo to quote Zarathustra. Again, the point is that we can be a vehicle for things expressed through us (hier kommen alle Dinge liebkosend zu deiner Rede und schmeicheln dir: denn sie wollen auf deinem Rücken reiten). Zarathustra had said of his inspiration how the ‘words and word-shrines of all being jump up for you; all being wants to learn to speak from you’ (Hier springen dir alles Seins Worte
It is a matter of being seized, as it were, to give voice to things and bring them into existence. It is the sense in which something like regal bearing is not merely a concept or ‘meaning’ of a word, marking a class of regal items. Taken symbolically, it is identical with the eagle’s own stare, with nobility already expressed or ‘voiced’ in the image of the eagle’s gaze.

I take this use of symbol as the basis of Nietzsche’s inspiration marked in terms of height and distance. It is indicated, for example, in the claims he makes in section (98) of The Gay Science concerning Shakespeare ‘as a human being’, where his spirited independence (Unabhängigkeit der Seele) is ‘something inexpressible’, to be spoken of ‘only in signs’ (nur durch Zeichen). It is invested in the character of Brutus, Nietzsche says, in the symbolism (Symbolik) of defending political freedom. But in this symbolism, it expresses the freedom and independence which belongs to great souls. There is an experiential character it has, and which stands to be conveyed through the tension in Caesar’s own greatness opposed by Brutus’s independence of soul. This is operative in bringing about certain feelings, not easily expressible:

The height at which [Shakespeare] places Caesar is the finest honour that he could bestow on Brutus: that is how he raises beyond measure Brutus’ inner problem as well as the spiritual strength that was able to cut this knot. (1974, p.150)

The section ends with the thought that Brutus exhibits integrity above what any poet has, though he is the poet’s own creation. The similar tension then is between those feelings and their formal expression in art, between inspiration and its creative expression, as was seen in Part 1, in the example of Praxiteles’ Apollo Sauroctonos.

In a number of early writings (Blair, 1983; Breazeale, 1979), unpublished in his lifetime, Nietzsche addresses issues generally around the character and origins of language. These texts include On the Origins of Language, Lecture Notes on Rhetoric, On Truth and Lying in a Non-moral Sense, On Music and Words, and The Philosopher, where Nietzsche is seemingly concerned with language having its origins in fundamentally physiological impulses. The issues here and in the context of Nietzsche’s sources have been comprehensively examined in two key studies, by Crawford (1988) and by Emden (2005). These identify influences on Nietzsche’s thinking ranging over contemporary scientific theories and discoveries, such as Helmholtz’s theory of perception, along with the writings of F.A. Lange, Eduard von Hartmann, and of Gustav Gerber. And they draw Nietzsche’s position on a notion of ‘transference’ between different spheres or domains, as between levels of physiological stimulus, sensory images, and a vocal language. I begin with an overview of findings by Crawford and Emden, focusing on the notion of ‘transference’ (Übertragung). In relation to this, it is the account in On Truth and Lying which has primary importance. In that essay, Nietzsche treats language as originating ultimately in nerve stimulation: a stimulus is ‘transferred’ into an image which is then imitated in sound. With a seeming basis in physiology, Nietzsche’s account is fundamentally naturalistic. The question for my thesis is how this is fitted to the role and operation of a symbolism, at the level of semblance, in promoting the experience of higher feeling. I start from the position that Nietzsche cannot prioritise physiological states, as such, and can be seen not to do so. After
all, greatness of soul cannot be a physiological state if it is identical with a *Symbolik* drawn on imagery of height and distance in the world of semblance.

In this respect, I diverge from the accounts provided by Crawford and Emden. In particular, I emphasise the importance of Georg Creuzer’s *Symbolik und Mythologie*. As a ‘source’, its influence on Nietzsche has been addressed in the secondary literature in connection, for example, with Nietzsche’s pairing of Apollo and Dionysus (Baeumer, 1976, Williamson, 2004). I seek especially to make a case that it informs Nietzsche’s approach to the role and operation generally of metaphor and symbol. I also focus on Nietzsche’s actual employment of imagery and symbolism as evidence of his particular approach. While Nietzsche can be found to make use of findings in contemporary science along with studies in anthropology and comparative religion in relation to the role and operation of language and a mythic symbolism, I emphasise the importance of starting from the use he actually makes of imagery and symbol. That is to say, it is not a matter only of the seemingly more theoretical claims he makes in the unpublished texts or of the influences of his own inquiries. Emerson’s writings must be significant, too, given that Nietzsche will have encountered what he says about language, for example, in *Nature* (Emerson, 1982, pp.48-55). But, again, my starting point is in Nietzsche’s response to Emerson’s use of imagery and symbol. I argue for a *Symbolik* of height and distance informing the pre-linguistic expression and communication of ‘rarer’ states in Nietzsche’s writings. Accordingly, an account of Nietzsche’s thinking on language must take note of the influence generally of Creuzer’s treatment of myth. That is to say, the influences on Nietzsche’s thinking are not confined to just the more ‘scientific’ sources identified by Crawford, and Emden.

3.2) a ‘theory’ of language

In their studies of the influences on Nietzsche’s thinking towards a ‘theory’ of language, Crawford and Emden connect his remarks in the unpublished notes and essays to sources in his wider reading, with evidence of its chronology enabling them to mark out stages in the development of his thinking on issues around the origins of language. For example, there is the influence of Gustav Gerber’s account of language, as having images as its objects, not a ‘real’ world of things. Crawford argues that Gerber’s influence consists in the confirmation it provided for a view Nietzsche had already come to hold, and which was tied to his developing critique of Schopenhauer. She argues for Nietzsche having early rejected key features of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. With his developing views on language, the Schopenhauerian Will would stand to be taken then as the product of a creative-image making, not a metaphysical reality (1988, p.74). A Nietzschean philosophy of language is constructed by Crawford from the authors he is shown to have read, with their influence marked in changing emphases in his writings. Much of this depends upon ‘unlocking’ Nietzsche’s texts, given he rarely credits sources, and on the evidence sought in his early writings, unpublished in his lifetime. Crawford suggests a construction out of certain ‘node’ points, marking key ideas. I shall follow Del Caro (2013) in the looser accommodation of influences and sources drawn upon by Nietzsche which would mark out a ‘space’ of his own interests and concerns. But I take these to be anchored still in his sustained regard for Emerson, with Nietzsche seeking to address his own particular feelings in response to
Emerson’s language. And a wider range of influences may be expected. Again, little notice has been taken in Anglophone studies of the relevance of Creuzer’s theory of symbolism.

The account in *On Truth and Lying* has been central to (re-)constructing something at least approaching a ‘theory’ of language. But it is a further question how it stands in relation to the published works, whether it provides a ‘key’ to Nietzsche’s thinking, and how it is related to other unpublished texts such as the essay *On Music and Words* and his notes for *The Philosopher*. Issues around language and meaning are inevitably tied to broader concerns, such as the relation between grammatical features of language and knowledge and truth, where notions of a subject of experience, or substance and property, are indicated in a subject-predicate grammar. These are examined by Emden and Crawford. But in contrast to their focus on theoretical issues connected with Nietzsche’s response, for example, to Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, it must be granted Nietzsche’s ‘theory’ of language is to be looked for in the particular use he makes of it, in the use he makes of metaphor and symbolism in ways which implicitly depend upon a particular understanding of their role. Nor need it be the case that there should be a unitary theory which takes in all uses of language.

I shall argue that Nietzsche recognises a use of symbol in the context of what might be marked, following Otto (1965), as a kind of ‘memorialising’ of uncommon experience. In chapter 6, I explain how this is gained in immersion in a *Symbolik*, and which allows the feelings in question do not have the self-obliterating intensity of some kinds of ecstatic experiences. In any case, the presumed ‘theoretical’ concerns are to be tested against Nietzsche’s poetic use of language. It is in this regard that I argue for the legacy of Creuzer, and of Schelling, in assessing Nietzsche’s choice and use of metaphor and symbol.

Crawford and Emden both focus on the key notion of *Übertragung*. Breazeale noted that its root meaning, ‘to carry over’, indicates a sense of transference or transmission from one sphere into another (1979, p.41, fn.83). This has been addressed by Murphy (2001), drawing on the work of Lakoff and Johnson (2003). Their ‘domains interaction’ theory of metaphor treats it in terms of understanding one thing in terms of another, ‘mapping’ from one domain into another ‘target’ domain. On this account, the metaphoric process is envisaged as encompassing all human and cultural activity, determining meaning in the target domain and establishing a thing’s characteristic identity. Taking Nietzsche’s remarks in *On Truth and Lying* as indicating such a metaphoric process, Murphy considers it as forming the basis of broadly postmodern philosophies, allowing interpretation is tied to mapping between domains, between texts, histories, or other kinds of cultural artefact. Meaning, then, will ‘depend on the connotative dimensions of the domains in play’ (2003, p.2). This supplies a sense of Nietzsche’s claim in section (354) of *The Gay Science*, that the world we are conscious of is ‘only a surface- and sign- world’ (1974, p.299). Murphy continues with an analysis of the use Nietzsche makes of Jewish history, and the details here are outside the concerns of this thesis. But the general point to be taken here is that this engagement at the ‘surface’ level of language is taken as underpinning the kinds of interpretation Nietzsche undertakes, and informs his ‘theoretical’ claims.

The ‘domains theory’ is compelling. Lakoff and Johnson base it very much on their discussion of examples. Their key example is how reason and argument are spoken of in warlike metaphors, as in winning, attacking, demolishing, or shooting down an argument.
The identity of *argument* and *war* exploits certain structural similarities in the two concepts. Lakoff and Johnson also identify what they call orientational metaphors, where, for example, happy may be understood in terms of *rising* spirits, in contrast to *falling* into a depression. They regard these kinds of ‘up’ metaphor as having a basis in physical experiences. In understanding happy is up, the identifying ‘is’ will be shorthand for ‘whatever set of experiences [the metaphor is based upon] and in terms of which we understand it’ (2003, p.20). The basis is a physical experience in as much as *falling* ill and *dropping* dead are drawn on the experience of illness forcing a person to lie down, and ‘when you’re dead, you are physically down’ (p.15). But it is primarily conceptual relations which are at stake here. The authors demonstrate that the metaphoric basis of concept creation allows concepts are not rigidly defined in relation to experience and that their range of application is not fixed (p.125). It can, then, create ‘new meaning and new realities in our lives’ (p.196). Ultimately, it has a basis in experience, though we may be ignorant of our relations to it. The question for my thesis is whether the central claim I make for the experience of a particular emotion expressed and communicated in an imagery of height and distance, can be accommodated to this domains theory of metaphor. I shall argue it cannot.

In their analysis, Lakoff and Johnson proceed entirely at the level of identifying relations between concepts. For example, if *ideas are food*, in the way that both may be devoured, or are said to be nourishing, then the identity, they say, lies in structural similarities, with ideas as objects and the mind a container. The analysis accommodates a human perspective, but these kinds of conceptual relations operate within our common language, and so cannot be suited to the kind of ‘rediscovery’ of the rarer experience which I take to be of primary concern to Nietzsche. The analysis is too accepting of the common associations which would obscure such rediscovery. It will be seen in the next chapter that Nietzsche condemns the development of ‘herd’ language supporting the kind of consciousness on which Lakoff and Johnson rely, as in their example of argument coming to be thought of in battle metaphor. This kind of ‘creativity’ at the level of language use is not informed by the creative impulse Nietzsche sought to understand and convey, as in the experience of Ancient Greek tragedy, or of Wagner’s music drama. These are not a matter of conceptual relations between cultural domains, as such, because at stake is a creative impulse, ‘translated’ into images. So much is implicit in the example I consider below, of Wagner’s opening scene in *The Ring of the Nibelung*. It will be seen, as well, how this example is fitted to Nietzsche’s remarks in *On Truth and Lying*.

Metaphoric transference is central to what Crawford treats as a ‘beginning’ theory of language in Nietzsche’s early, unpublished texts. And Emden identifies the scientific background of Nietzsche’s remarks, to argue that *Übertragung* is itself employed as an encompassing metaphor for what is at stake in the physiological origins of language. Their accounts are examined in further detail in the next section. In the early texts, Nietzsche talks of words as signs or symbols. It is part of Crawford’s argument that he turns in place of ‘sign’ to talking specifically of metaphor, to mark the origins of language in images. This change in terminology follows on his reading Gustav Gerber’s *Language as Art*, Crawford argues, while granting that the core of Nietzsche’s account of language, as originating in nervous stimulation, was already formulated by the time he came to read Gerber in 1873. In seeking to identify the key elements of a ‘proto-theory’ of language in the early, unpublished essays
and notes, Crawford looks to what Nietzsche took as well from the writings of Friedrich Lange, Eduard von Hartmann, Johann Zöllner and others, and from scientific studies such as Hermann Helmholtz’s account of perception. She identifies Nietzsche’s views on the basis of the earlier texts, the essay On the Origins of Language, and On Truth and Lying. Again, at issue is the sense of metaphor in which something is transferred into a different category of terms, as between a kind of picture thinking and conceptual language. This is the sense of transference taken up by both Crawford and Emden.

Emden (2005) also traces a chronology of Nietzsche’s reading tied to accounts in the early texts, and points out the influence of Gustav Gerber on the position taken in the lectures on rhetoric, that we do not perceive ‘real’ things, only images. Gerber’s central claim is that language is figurative in this sense of referring to sensory images, not to a ‘real’ world of things. Lange’s History of Materialism is another influence, with Nietzsche reading Lange shortly after encountering Schopenhauer’s philosophy and taking from him the view that, because we are constrained by our biological constitution, we cannot claim knowledge of ‘reality’. In relation to Schopenhauer, this would count against claims for the reality of a universal Will. Crawford notes Nietzsche’s endorsement of Lange’s claim that language must be valued then for its symbolic and figurative aspects, so it does not deal in truth (1988, p.85). Lange’s book also discusses Helmholtz’s theory of perception, which was drawn on an appeal to unconscious inferences, and Nietzsche read von Hartmann’s Philosophy of the Unconscious shortly after its publication in 1868, in which Hartmann argued that the formal features of language are grounded in unconscious processes, referencing work by the scientists Herbart, Fechner, Helmholtz and others (Crawford, p.20). Nietzsche follows Lange and Hartmann in taking up the position that language is instinctive, and Crawford says that through 1872-74 he is again studying Helmholtz, Fechner and Zöllner, all of whom describe unconscious inferences from what is given to us in sensory perception.

Crawford argues that Nietzsche finds in Gerber a model for expressing his own developed position along the lines that language is wholly figurative, originating in a creative-image making tied to nervous stimulation. She explains how Gerber supposes that a sensory image arises out of a nerve stimulus and is then re-presented in a different realm as a sound-image. These first sound-images are then grouped together in a conscious symbolisation of sensory images, as words. Accordingly, words are images of images in a ‘living language’; a form of art. We suppose a word signs something in a ‘real’, external world because we forget that it originates in an image of images of perception. This account of a metaphoric transference of sensory content between different levels is taken over by Nietzsche in The Philosopher and in On Truth and Lying, Crawford says, and it will be seen below how she supports her argument by seeking to identify the precise point at which Nietzsche’s terminology changes.

Again, the question for this thesis is how the notion of transference should be taken in accommodating what I take to be the guiding concern, of how a creative impulse is joined to a formal symbolism in the expression of a ‘rarer’ state. It can be granted Nietzsche relies on the role of sensory images in explaining the origins of conceptual language. His point is directed on the forgetting this involves, which is to say that we come to overlook these subjective origins in presuming we talk of ‘real’ features of the world. And the account of
metaphoric transfer (Übertragung) in On Truth and Lying is crucial here. I examine this in more detail in the next two sections, but I note that the charge Nietzsche brings against conceptual language is not at odds with granting images can operate symbolically in the sense of being taken pre-linguistically, at the level of phenomena, in the way, for example, that an eagle’s gaze can stand for what it is. In this example, it is a kind of regal bearing which is at stake. This is not to conceptualise it, but to identify two spheres: the impulse to that regality and its image. This ‘content’ is repeated in different spheres, just as the Chladni figures in Nietzsche’s example in On Truth and Lying indicate an identity of tone and figure. As words come to mark concepts, this symbolically figurative character of things is itself forgotten, and employed in signing. It is the looseness in Nietzsche’s talk of a metaphoric process which is problematic in making this distinction in the use of imagery. By contrast, in sections 7 and 8, below, I find evidence in the use that Nietzsche makes of imagery, drawing on what I argue is an important influence, of Creuzer’s Symbolik. In chapter 5, I provide further detailed analysis of the role Nietzsche accords to figurative language, examining key passages in Zarathustra.

3.3) instinct

In The Lectures on Rhetoric (Blair, 1983, pp.94-129), Nietzsche begins by remarking that people disapprove of rhetoric nowadays as having no regard for truth or historical accuracy, and for dealing in myth and imagery. In a survey of historical accounts of its character and operation, Nietzsche distinguishes Ancient Greek and Roman rhetoric. He says in Ancient Greece it was directed on portraying serious and dangerous matters, while the Romans were more concerned with it serving an individual’s power and dignity, persuading others to adopt ideas they did not previously hold. Nietzsche turns then to Plato on the use of myth in political strategy, and goes on to consider a number of further views on rhetoric and its purposes. It is in the third section of these lecture notes that Nietzsche makes his own more theoretically substantive claims. From our modern perspective, he says, rhetoric is seen as being contrived (p.106). We notice its artificiality, particularly in Roman rhetoric, because we are influenced by the development of rhetoric as a written style. We are readers now, Nietzsche says, not hearers. Crawford explains that Nietzsche is drawing on the supposition of an unconscious instinct, which he takes from his reading of Eduard von Hartmann’s Philosophy of the Unconscious (Philosophie des Unbewussten), published in 1869. In the first place, Nietzsche says, rhetoric was ‘active as a means of unconscious art in language and its development’, which is to say it is instinctive, not contrived. It is an art ‘already found in language’, he says, in being tied to a spoken style developed out of rhythmic speaking.

Language is ‘rhetorical’ then in the sense that it has these origins in instinct. Having a subjective basis, it conveys whatever ‘works and impresses’ in relation to an object, not the ‘reality’ of the object:

Language does not desire to instruct, but to convey to others a subjective impulse and its acceptance. Man, who forms language, does not perceive things or procedures, but impulses: he does not apprehend sensations, but merely copies of sensations. The sensation, evoked through a nerve impulse, does not take in the thing itself: this sensation is presented externally through an image. ... The full essence of things will never be grasped. Our
utterances by no means wait until our perception and experience have provided us with a many-sided, somehow respectable knowledge of things: they result immediately when the impulse is perceived. Instead of the thing, the sensation takes in only a sign. (Blair, 1983)

The claim here is that our verbal utterances are the immediate result of an originating impulse. As sound-images, our words operate as signs tied to the particular manner in which we are affected. Nietzsche calls this the pithanos, which in a sense of ‘persuasion’ indicates the affectivity at issue here (p.107). This is how language is essentially rhetorical, because grounded in how we are affected, not in things themselves. The original sound-images, ‘original whole intuitions’, come to be formulated in words which acquire meanings through synecdoche, metaphor and metonymy, etc. These rhetorical devices are all that words consist in. It is notable that Nietzsche says there is a ‘purity’ of style which is free from linguistic barbarisms, and which he takes to be the expression of a ‘high society’ (p.108). It is ‘higher’ in being faithful to unconscious ‘laws and analogies’ at the level of our instincts. If a piece of rhetoric happens to be regarded as ‘natural’, rather than contrived, then this will be because the orator has so concealed his artistry that the listener is affected in the way he was already capable of being affected. Then, so long as the artistry goes unnoticed, the orator is trusted.

Crawford shows that Nietzsche’s talk of ‘unconscious laws and analogies’ and of a developing barbarism in language, are taken from his reading of von Hartmann. And she identifies Hartmann’s influence in another of Nietzsche’s unpublished essays, On the Origins of Language, written around 1869-70, after his reading of Hartmann in 1868, and which had followed closely on reading Lange. On the Origins of Language is a brief commentary on a number of theories of the origin of language, in which Nietzsche is concerned with its formal, structural features such as the grammar of subject and predicate, where these have informed philosophical thinking and knowledge claims. Crawford (pp.44-50) explains how Nietzsche builds on what he found in Hartmann, drawing on Hartmann’s claim that ‘Language is a work of the masses – the people ...Only the instinct of masses, as exhibited in the life of the hive and the ant-hill, can have created it’. In comparison with Hartmann, Nietzsche writes

For the work of an individual [language] is too complicated, for the masses much too unified, a complete organism. It remains only to consider language as a product of instinct, as with bees – the anthill, etc. Instinct is not however the result of conscious reflection, not merely the consequence of bodily organisation, not the result of a mechanism, which lies in the brain, not the effect of a mechanism coming to the spirit from outside, which is foreign to it, but the most particular achievement of individuals or of the masses, springing from character. Instinct is one with the innermost kernel of a being. (Blair, p.209)

Hartmann talks in terms of an unconscious process which has its last step in an emergent consciousness. Crawford (p.61) explains his account of an unconscious willing, figured in consciousness and having its roots in the history of the organism, and which she treats in relation to her own argument for Nietzsche’s early rejection of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics. With his reading of Hartmann, Nietzsche is taken as turning to a philosophical foundation in the phenomenal realm of ordered nature, in contrast to a Schopenhaurian metaphysics of Will.
Nietzsche’s essay ends with a quote from Schelling:

‘Since without language no philosophical consciousness, indeed no consciousness at all, is conceivable, the foundation of language could not be laid with consciousness; and yet the deeper we penetrate into it, the more definitely we discover that its depth far exceeds that of the most conscious product. Language’s situation is like that of organic beings; we believe we see them originating blindly and yet we cannot deny the unfathomable intentionality of their formation down to every detail’

Regarding this quote, Crawford notes it is repeated from Hartmann, who was himself a student of Schelling, and that in its original context Schelling goes on to talk further of instinct. I shall make a case for the relevance of Schelling below, but with a different emphasis.

In his remarks on the further development of language in On the Origins of Language, Nietzsche anticipates its decline ‘as a result of further development of culture’. Crawford (pp.134-135) explains how he is picking up on the discussion in von Hartmann, to say that conscious language is subsequent to a language of the instincts and is detrimental to it. Our language of concepts and ideas is only one of a number of possible actualisations of this unconscious language. And it is subject to decay. Nietzsche ends his essay with a claim that Kantianism is compatible with unconscious instinct, and then the quote from Schelling, which Crawford takes as signalling again his own view of language tied to instinct as the ‘innermost kernel of our being’. Language then is a ‘complete organism’. Crawford then examines a further element Nietzsche takes from Hartmann, that the unconscious processes of this language are not temporal, whereas conscious activity takes place in time. According to Hartmann, a series of timelessly unconscious inferences involved in processing sensory experiences culminate in a conscious idea, and which occurs in time just in so far as it is given to consciousness. Crawford points to Nietzsche’s claim in other unpublished notes, in section (41) of The Philosopher, that ‘unconscious inferences (are) no doubt a process of passing from image to image. The image which is last attained then operates as a stimulus and motive’. The connection here is with an account of willing, but it is the notion of a realm of unconscious images, the signs of what Hartmann describes as ‘cerebral vibrations’, which Nietzsche takes as comprising an unconscious language of the instincts, equivalent to the ‘inner kernel of our being’. There is an important point of interest in the link to Schelling through Hartmann. Crawford goes no further into Schelling’s views, but it will be seen below how they are implicated in what I take to be the importance of Creuzer’s Symbolik in approaching Nietzsche’s particular use of metaphor.

3.4) Übertragung

Crawford focuses on Nietzsche’s turn to metaphor through his reading of Gerber. The notes for the lecture series on rhetoric were written, she argues, in the winter of 1872, just as Nietzsche was reading Gerber (p. 212). Crawford also identifies the point at which, in The Philosopher, Nietzsche adopts Gerber’s talk of metaphor, talking of tropes in section (144) in place of unconscious inferences. In section (149) Nietzsche writes:
Our senses imitate nature by copying it more and more. Imitation presupposes first the reception of an image and then a continuous translation of the received image into a thousand metaphors, all of which are efficacious (Breazeale, p.50)

Taking up the terminology of Gerber’s tropological model, the use that Nietzsche makes of it is evident in On Truth and Lying in the account of first and second metaphors there. It is notable as well, that Nietzsche says in section (148) of The Philosopher, that a stimulus is felt and 'transmitted to related nerves', and 'there, in translation, repeated, etc.', and that this translation (Übertragung) takes in the phenomenon of synaesthesia, admitting translation between senses, as when someone 'tastes' a sound. In section (149), he opposes this seemingly physiological process of imitation to knowing:

Knowing certainly does not want to admit any transference, but wishes instead to cling to the impression without metaphor and apart from the consequences. The impression is petrified for this purpose; it is captured and stamped by means of concepts. Then it is killed, skinned, mummified, and preserved as a concept. ... Knowing is nothing but working with the favourite metaphors, an imitating which is no longer felt to be an imitation. Naturally therefore, it cannot penetrate the realm of truth. (Breazeale, 1979, p.50)

These remarks concern the development of language. The nerve stimulus can have a translation in sound and visual images, and these come to be the basis of a shared, conceptual language, through which we attain a conscious self-understanding. This developed language is what Nietzsche marks as the language of the ‘herd’, while recognising that it is itself a kind of artistry or human creation.

It was noted in 2.5 that Breazeale (p.41, fn.83) offers the relevant sense of Übertragung as something ‘carried over’, which is then ambiguous as transfer, transmission, or translation. It will be seen how Emden (2004, 2005) draws on its use in scientific contexts to accommodate this talk of transfer in a physiological account, drawing on a notion of electrical flows in nervous tissue transmitted or translated into sensations, muscle movements and sounds. Emden’s focus is on the consequences for Nietzsche’s epistemology; words do not refer to things in a ‘real’ world. Here is the key passage in On Truth and Lying (Nietzsche, 1999, pp.141-153), where Nietzsche is again claiming that all language is figurative in having developed out of an originating stimulus, and where the Chladni figures might be meant as an analogy for the process of electrical activity in nerves translated into mental phenomena:

The stimulation of a nerve is first translated into an image: first metaphor! The image is then imitated by a sound: second metaphor! And each time there is a complete leap from one sphere into the heart of another, new sphere. One can conceive of a profoundly deaf human being who has never experienced sound or music; just such a person will gaze in astonishment at the Chladni sound-figures in sand, find their cause in the vibration of a string, and swear that he must now know what men call sound – this is precisely what happens to all of us with language. We believe that when we speak of trees, colours, snow, and flowers, we have knowledge of the things themselves; and yet we possess only metaphors of things which in no way correspond to the original entities. Just as the musical sound appears as a figure in the sand, so the mysterious ‘X’ of the thing-in-itself appears first
as a nervous stimulus, then as an image, and finally as an articulated sound. (1999, pp.144-145)

We are mistaken in believing our conceptual understanding is of the way things really are, because they originate in images. The deaf person cannot know how the world sounds to us, but is no less entitled to claim he knows what sound is on the basis of what he sees, because sound is only another category of image, like the vibrating strings of a musical instrument. Nietzsche treats the nerve stimulus like the imagery, as something which is only an expression of the ‘mysterious “X”’. Accordingly, we can only be, as it were, divorced from questions of the ‘truth’ of what is real.

I suggest there is a difficulty generally with taking the passage in the way that, for example, Emden does, as demonstrating a physiological basis of language. The difficulty is with setting the frame of the discussion in terms which are implicitly rejected by Nietzsche. That is to say, it cannot be the ‘truth’ of appeals to neurophysiology which should determine that we cannot make true claims about reality. In which case, the supposition that words are copies of a nerve stimulus need not be so much a starting point of a ‘theory’ of language, as rather a means of drawing attention to a notion of metaphorical transference which Nietzsche only seeks to illustrate by a corresponding scientific notion of nerve transmission, where he is deploying this, perhaps loosely, as an analogy. The analogy may be granted, but the further implications drawn from it are open to challenge.

That is not to say that epistemological issues are not at stake more generally. In section (64) of The Philosopher, Nietzsche distinguishes between simply experiencing a succession of images, as we do when we dream in sleep, and choosing among them. This ‘twofold artistic power’ is directed not on ‘real’ things but on how we stand in relation to them. And he uses the analogy with Chladni figures in saying images are related to the underlying nervous activity ‘which agitates them’. As such, they are not freely invented, he says here, and this allows that people will be creatively artistic, philosophical and scientific, to varying degrees. Again, it is not a matter of being ‘true’ to things as they are. In On Truth and Lying, Nietzsche says such a ‘thing in itself’ is ‘something quite incomprehensible to the creator of language (Sprachbildner) and something not in the least worth striving for’. With the further development of language, a word no longer serves as a reminder of the ‘unique and entirely individual original experience to which it owes its origin’. It comes to mark a concept in having to fit ‘countless other, more or less similar cases’ (1999, p.145). It is formed by abstraction from the individual differences in things we ‘see’, and from this we make a mistaken supposition of a form or species as referent of the word, signed by it.

Crawford (pp.184-188) explains that, while Nietzsche puts talk of metaphor in place of saying images are signs or symbols of an original stimulation, his position remains consistent with Hartmann on the role of unconscious processes and the decline of language in coming to be further removed from instinct. The conscious language of signs becomes progressively clearer as words acquire clear meanings through the process of selection and abstraction, and Crawford marks this as a second language drawn on symbols of symbols. The first language is that of the first symbol or image given in sensation, and is unconscious. Again, words in the second language of concepts and ideas do not truly refer to ‘real’ things:
Truths are illusions of which we have forgotten are illusions, metaphors which have become worn by frequent use and have lost all sensuous vigour, coins which, having lost their stamp, are now regarded as metal and no longer as coins (1999, p.146)

The second language of concept-formation is itself creative, the product of an artistic power. But it is a kind of forgetting, because we suppose the meaning of a word is grounded in truths about a ‘real’ object it names. We forget words are signs of other signs and are tied ultimately to unconscious sensations and feelings. Crawford goes on to identify a third language, Nietzsche’s language of ‘genius’ (pp.197-198), the Dionysian dithyramb of sections (40-41) of The Birth of Tragedy, which is a closer return to the language of first signs, to the world of appearances which is the symbol of our instincts. The language of genius is a new world of symbols which takes in gesture, dance, rhythm and music, not merely speech, and is tied to feelings and emotion.

On Gerber’s terminology, the shared conceptual language through which we self-consciously engage with the world and others is metaphor of a metaphor because it translates an originally individual and unconscious artistry. It is then ‘creative possibilities’ at the unconscious level which provide that language may subvert and transform settled conventions of a community. Nietzsche writes that ‘what is called ‘rhetorical’ as a means of conscious art, [is] active as a means of unconscious art in language and its development’ (Blair, 1983), and Crawford links this to the distinction drawn in On Truth and Lying between the man of intuition, struck dumb or forced to speak ‘only in forbidden metaphors and in unheard-of combinations of concepts’, and the reasonable man who depends on customary, conceptual understanding (Crawford, pp.x-xi). It may be emphasised here that it is not the model which is itself at stake. ‘What has Nietzsche really gained by taking on the framework of Gerber’s metaphorical model of cognition in place of or in combination with a more scientific explanation?’ Crawford asks (p.216). Just another metaphor, ‘a new figure, a new trope’ in place of a tropology of nerves, to symbolise, she says, the sceptical gap between ‘reality’ and the language in which we seek to describe it.

Still, it is evident as well that Nietzsche is seeking to ground a distinction between the sign-object language underpinning our everyday knowledge-claims, and a picture ‘language’ which we should expect is located only at the very periphery of consciousness. It will be seen in the next chapter how Nietzsche argues for this distinction. The point to emphasise here is that it does not follow that the images at this more or less pre-conscious level should have to be treated as signs in a sign-object theory. Talk of translation suggests such a theory, with one thing standing for another. And Nietzsche is bound to frame his discussion in those terms in making the sceptical point about reference to a ‘real’ world of things. The example of the deaf person only indicates the ambiguity of words taken as signs. It is the pre-conscious dream-scenery, in advance of its taken form in language, which interests Nietzsche. The epistemological problems are for the sign-object language, on which we have come to depend. It is directed on our survival as a species, which is to say, in the herd’s interest. The sign-object theory is targeted by Nietzsche in section (268) of Beyond Good and Evil, where he points to its deficiency in signing ‘inner’ states. It is directed only on what we can have in common. This is not so much an argument against the possibility of a private language without a public check on what could be meant. Rather, Nietzsche is
indicating rarer states are not communicable in a language modelled on this sign-object relation. My point here in relation to the account of metaphoric transfer, is that the critical commentary on it can rely on supposing a sign-object model of language so long as Nietzsche is talking about our shared language and its epistemological errors. It does not follow that Nietzsche is not critical of the customary way in which metaphor is taken while addressing the epistemological difficulty which follows on it.

Emden's (2004, 2005) analysis is focused on Nietzsche's 'first metaphor', which is to say, on the notion of 'transference' as a translation of content between what we can take to be electrical activity in nerve tissue and the corresponding mental phenomena. Again, Nietzsche's remarks in the notes for his lectures on rhetoric are the starting point. The claim that sensations are triggered by nervous stimuli and experienced as images is linked to Nietzsche's reading of Lange, and Emden makes the further link as well to Gerber's 

Language as Art. These images are the basis of thought and language. Language is always figurative in this sense (Emden 2004, p.93). Emden says that Nietzsche gives an uncontroversial definition of metaphor, as 'a shorter simile', only because he is directing his lectures to the classical accounts. It is, he says, a notion of transference or transposition which interests Nietzsche, and which is marked by Nietzsche claiming agreement with Cicero, that we are not bound to call things by their literal names. Emden depends upon Übertragung being taken in this sense of one thing transposing another. Turning to the account in On Truth and Lying, Emden finds it 'rephrased in physiological terms as a form of transference, translation or transmission from nerve stimuli to linguistic utterances', thereby allowing that 'the path from perception to language is a “metaphoric” process' (p.95). In emphasising its physiological basis, Emden points to the interest Nietzsche took in neurological studies, for example, Eduard Hitzig's Investigations into the Brain, published in 1874, and Alexander Bain's Mind and Body, of 1873.

Dating may be crucial here. Crawford relies on the lectures on rhetoric and The Philosopher coinciding with Nietzsche's reading of Gerber in 1873. Aside from Hitzig and Bain, Emden cites the influence of Lange, which Nietzsche read much earlier. For the purpose of his argument, it is enough that Nietzsche would have been familiar with scientific studies and examples from a number of contemporary sources, without regard to overly technical details, and Emden lists, for example, texts by Ludwig Büchner and by Rudolph Hermann Lotze from the 1850s. At issue is a sense of translation between 'electrical flows' in nerve tissue and corresponding mental phenomena. Emden explains how Galvani had argued electric flows occur as an organic phenomenon. Galvani demonstrated a frog's leg moves when voltage is applied, and although his experiment was criticised by Volta for showing only that the leg muscle conducts electricity, Galvani proposed it demonstrated the existence of an 'animal electricity'. Emden notes that Lotze was sceptical about 'organic electricity', but that he talked still in terms of a physiological 'transmission' from stimulus to mental occurrence. And in 1870, Nietzsche was reading Otto Funke's Textbook of Physiology, in which Funke talks of 'nerve fibre' as a 'conductor'. It is Lange's History of Materialism, though, which provided the key account, making the connection between the nervous system and language through the claim that nerve fibres affect the contraction of muscles in the mouth and larynx (Emden, p.99).
With metaphor taken in terms of transposition, Emden emphasises its suitability to describing transpositions involved in the passage from stimulus to language, translating one ‘domain’ or level of experience into another which is fundamentally different, notably the translation of electrical activity into images and language. This is then the basis for the account in *On Truth and Lying*, of first and second metaphors, and the ‘overleaping’ of one sphere into another. The transition is appropriately ‘metaphorical’, Emden explains, because it comprises transitions from *image* to *image*, without reference to ‘reality’ (p.101). As such, Nietzsche has built on Lange and Gerber, where Lange had neglected to draw implications for philosophy of language, and Gerber neglected the physiological aspect and its implications for our purported knowledge of ‘reality’.

Emden deals, in passing (p.95), with a criticism that this understanding of metaphor in terms of transposition is ‘too loose’, but it should be added that his own analysis relies upon it being so, running it together with notions of transference, translation or the kind of transmission involved in transfers of ‘content’ or ‘flows’ of electricity. Starting from a claim about one thing standing for another, which is, after all, definitional of a general notion of signing, both Emden and Crawford rely on filling out this definition by extrapolating from scientific accounts, to fill it out in terms of the kind of ‘transference’ implicit in talk of ‘electrical flows’ and translation between disparate realms. There is a degree of conflation, and some circularity in so far as *Übertragung* is explained by appeal to scientific examples in which *Übertragung* is already used as a metaphor in explaining the processes they involve. It is, in any case, unclear on the basis of what he says in *On Truth and Lying*, that Nietzsche should have been concerned with the ‘truth’ of a scientific basis of his own account. Emden proposes transference is a ‘meta-trope’, marking the transposition of one thing for another in the production of language out of an originating stimulus, but in metaphorical terms as transfer of content. Still, this depends on a very loose notion of transference. It may be granted that some sense of transference is at stake here, but this may be under quite a different interpretation consistent with other concerns, even in the context of the account Nietzsche gives in *On Truth and Lying*.

I contend that Nietzsche’s remarks need not be taken as requiring he is committed to this theory of metaphor, grounded in a notion of transposition. It is, after all, a feature of the language he condemns as heard language that a metaphor will be understood in other terms. It need not be expected this should govern Nietzsche’s approach to the expression and communication of ‘rarer’ states. When he asks ‘What is a word?’ and turns to it being ‘the copy of a nervous stimulation in sounds’, his primary concern is with an inference drawn from this, that a word’s meaning might report the way something ‘truly’ is. With these ‘meanings’ drawn on how we are affected by ‘things’ in relation to our survival as a species, they are open to a value judgement from outside the perspective of the herd. The focus of this thesis is on how Nietzsche supposes this is possible.

Interestingly, Emden (2005) makes a passing reference to Nietzsche reading Johann Georg Hamann’s *Schriften und Briefe* at the beginning 1873, around the time of writing the lecture notes on rhetoric and *On Truth and Lying*. Hamann was an anti-Enlightenment and Christian philosopher. He held language implements a revelatory divinity, but in a way that human and divine are mixed, comparably to the Lutheran doctrine of ‘consubstantiation’ in which the
Eucharist comprises bread and wine and the body of Christ together (Hamann, 2007, p.xiv). Emden only assumes Nietzsche’s denial of what he characterises here as Hamann’s Neoplatonism. In *On the Origins of Language* (Blair, 1983), Nietzsche rejects a divine origin of language in relation to the Biblical story of the naming of animals in the Garden of Eden. But the point would be only that invoking a language spoken by God is not explanatory at all. That is to say, as addressing a question of origins, it only pushes the question further back. Hamann’s view of language is drawn on his Christianity, on a sense of language being ‘sacramental’, the living word of God. Emden suggests it be taken only as another prompt to Nietzsche understanding language in terms generally of translation or transmission, and disregarding any sense in which it might translate a language spoken by angels. But again, Emden is running together different ways of formulating the notion of transference or transmission, and tries to accommodate influences under a general definition where they could stand to be distinguished in their detail. As such, it does not follow that the ‘metaphoric process’ has to be one of transposition, just as there are competing views on the nature of the Sacrament.

Given the looseness of Emden’s notion of transference, it does not follow that Nietzsche’s seemingly theoretical claims need be taken so precisely as dependent on findings in physiology. Similarly, the use Nietzsche makes of the Chladni figures does not, by itself, establish a particular sense of ‘transfer’ intended by him. After all, they are barely less mysterious than the relation between image and nerve-activity, and their suitability as analogy for such a process already depends on the notion of a transfer of content explaining the production of the figures themselves. Nietzsche seeks to ‘picture’ a phenomenon like the unconnected dream imagery which occurs in sleep and could have found the emergent patterning in Chladni sand-figures compelling in itself, regardless of an underlying science. As a phenomenon, they indicate an identity of impulse and its visual and sonic forms, and a parallel can be drawn with what is at stake, for example, in the affectivity of the *Apollo Sauroctonos*.

As such, Nietzsche’s talk of nerve stimulus can be taken in the context of denying ‘external’ origins of mental phenomena, but it need not be supposed he is more concerned with physiological origins than with the phenomena themselves. That is to say, his focus need not be on the process of transmission itself. This is borne out by another metaphor he uses in *On Truth and Lying*, of our hanging in dreams on the back of a tiger. It is a sense of our being carried along, immersed in a phenomenal world, which it conveys. Nietzsche allows we do not experience things simply at the level of biology, and if we should one day discover what drives us to experience the world in the ways we do, he says it will not be a virtuous inclination towards truth. It is the metaphor itself which conveys the sense of a *Dionysian* impulse, originating in us. In *Mit dem Fuss schreiben*, poem 52 in *Joke, Cunning, and Revenge*, the *Dionysian* artist is similarly carried along. His inspiration carries him along, at the level of phenomena.

In the second section of *On Truth and Lying* Nietzsche draws attention to the way an instinct for creative image-making is constrained by concepts and forms, where these have also been created but stand to be refashioned, through *myth* and *art*.
[This drive] constantly confuses the cells and the classification of concepts by setting up new translations, metaphors, metonymies; ... to shape the given world of the waking human being in ways which are just as multiform, irregular, inconsequential, incoherent, charming and ever-new, as things are in the world of dream. (1999, p.151)

Nietzsche says the refashioning is guided by intuitions. Man is ‘struck dumb when he sees them’, or he speaks ‘in forbidden metaphors’ (p.152). The old conceptual barriers are broken. It is clear that Nietzsche’s concern is at the level of metaphor and symbol. If physiological processes have a role then it is because Nietzsche is resisting the authority of received ‘truths’. Appeals to biological fact could in any case determine only another framework of belief. The key point is the claim that a person can respond creatively ‘to the impression made on him by the mighty, present intuition’. The contrast is with a defensive rationalism which tries to mitigate pessimism. There is no happiness to be gained from that kind of conceptualising, Nietzsche says, while the man of intuition, in face of suffering, gains from his intuitions ‘a constant stream of brightness, a lightening of the spirit, redemption, and release’, and a defence as well.

The intuitions at issue here are a category of feelings of which it is the central claim of my thesis to say that they can be experienced as images, as sound-images and in visual imagery, but only in so far as they have a symbolic use, in the way that this is distinguishable from the conventional use of metaphor allegory. The issues around interpretation and external reference follow on a sign-object theory of language. And it remains that our developed language of concepts and the beliefs it supports are just as much the product of a creative drive to image-making. Talk of physiology can provide a unifying account. But Nietzsche’s primary concern is with the affective power of the ‘first language’ of symbols and the role of what Crawford calls his third language, the language of the Dionysian artist, in returning us to it. The development of language along the lines of interests and concerns of the ‘herd’ is a barrier to this return. At stake is the ‘higher’ emotion, the ‘rarer’ pathos, which, I contend is Nietzsche’s focus, characterising his own experience of reading Emerson. Its connection with a symbolic use of figurative language has a source in Emerson, and, it will be seen as well, in Creuzer’s Symbolik und Mythologie der Alten Völker.

3.5) symbol and pathos

Nietzsche remarks in On Truth and Lying that conceptual language is lazy in settling on established beliefs and ideas. It was noted above that in section (268) of Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche says a ‘noble’ soul faces the difficulty of speaking for itself on the resources of a ‘common’ language. Nietzsche puns on ‘common’ in identifying the origins of a shared language in common, or base, needs which we share with others. And he treats the words in this common language as signs, in line with the account in On Truth and Lying, where words sign concepts drawn on features abstracted from sensory experience. In On Truth and Lying this was the way in which ‘snake’ and ‘worm’ sign a particular feature of these things in our relation to them, while disregarding other differences. Again, in (268), Nietzsche points out that a word, by itself, does not establish people agree on what it signs. They have to stand in the same relations to things. They have to have the same ‘experience base’, Nietzsche says,
where this base consists in a common culture grounded in needs and interests which we have in common with others.

Words are acoustic signs for concepts; concepts, though, are more or less determinate pictorial signs for sensations that occur together and recur frequently, for groups of sensations. Using the same words is not enough to get people to understand each other: they have to use the same words for the same species of inner experiences too; ultimately, people have to have the same experience base (2002, p.163)

It is ‘climate, soil, danger, necessities, work’ which are the determinants here. Still, this mutual understanding can be tested, and it may break. A friendship cannot last ‘once the discovery is made that one of the two feels, means, senses, wishes, fears something different from the other when using the same words’. Accordingly, where people easily agree then it must be simply on the basis of what is most easily shared, and in respect of qualities in which people are most alike. And this is the ‘average’ and ‘base’ concerns which inform their language.

In this respect, Nietzsche gives an explanation of the origins and character of ‘herd’ language. But he envisages the possibility that some ‘rarer’ individual is in some sense dislocated from it. The issue is how such an individual may be expected to articulate this dislocation. In (268), Nietzsche says only that ‘immense countervailing forces will have to be called upon in order to cross this natural, all-too-natural progressus in simile’, as people become increasingly similar. It must be presumed the rarer individual turns inward, to the phenomena of inner experience, to the images which Nietzsche identified in the earlier writings as ‘transferences’ from nervous stimuli, expressing the strength and character of individuals’ relations to things. This is Nietzsche’s ‘theoretical’ position. But it is a feeling or emotion which is at stake. This feeling can be an object then of Nietzsche’s philosophy, as much as it might be, say, of a religious practice. But simply saying so does not communicate it. It might be named, but this will raise the difficulties of mutual understanding Nietzsche envisages in (268). It is in any case unsuited to the resources of a common language.

Ultimately, the starting point must be in Nietzsche’s own symbolic use of language, and which can feature in contexts where he is seeking to communicate these more theoretical concerns. For example, in section (265) of Beyond Good and Evil, the noble soul is said to conduct itself in accordance with an ‘inborn, celestial mechanics that all stars know so well’. The noble soul honours itself in others, Nietzsche says. It moves in its own circle, as it were, self-assured in never looking up, and without pity. Nietzsche is expanding on the thematic imagery of Star Morals, poem 63 in Joke, Cunning, and Revenge (1974, p.69).

There might be a sublime way of letting gifts fall down upon you from above, as it were, and lapping them up like raindrops; but the noble soul has no talent for this art and conduct. Its egoism gets in the way: it does not generally like looking ‘upwards,’ – but rather ahead, horizontally and slowly, or downwards: - it knows that it is high up (2002, p.162)

The asymmetrical relation of taking without giving is alien, Nietzsche is saying, to souls of a particular strength or character. But it is the metaphor which succeeds in communicating the feelings involved, because these are already intrinsic to its ‘content’. There is then a kind of
'transference' between the visual metaphor and these feelings, but, crucially, because this symbolism already is what it is taken as signing.

The 'celestial mechanics' will be brought under a concept of Justice, Nietzsche says, as the noble soul tries to name its self-confidence

The noble soul accepts [the] fact of its egoism without any question-mark, and also without feeling any harshness, compulsion or caprice in it, but rather as something that may well be grounded in the primordial law of things. If the noble soul were to try to name this phenomenon, it would call it 'justice itself.'

In this late text, Nietzsche is implicitly acknowledging the account he gave in On Truth and Lying. He is indicating the ‘transference’ from inner state to its figurative expression in imagery, as in his own metaphor of a stately celestial mechanics and, crucially, of looking down, and then to a word which signs a concept of Justice. This Platonic form is itself a piece of artistry. But it is a pathos of an order of rank which is at stake here, communicable in an image or symbol, and implicated in ennobling those who, even if they are not fully conscious of it, exemplify this pathos. It is exemplified in the metaphor of the orbiting star, which 'lets the farthest world [its] light secure'. In figuring a pathos of distance, it does not simply represent that pathos. It 'carries' the pathos in the sense that it expresses it directly.

Coming to be signed as 'justice' is the further step. The word is ambiguous then, in the way that Nietzsche explains in section (268). If the noble type intends an inner state, it may not be a state which others recognise. Only the 'common' meaning of justice will be signed by the word, and then its application is a matter of interpretation or judgement. The sign is ambiguous, for example, between different notions of equality as just. It follows from the dominance of conventional concerns established through our shared, common language that we misinterpret certain feelings or come to overlook or suppress ways in which we may be affected in our relations to things. As such, we forget that 'justice' does not refer to anything external. In section (265), Nietzsche indicates that reminding will happen outside conventional language and culture, and is dependent on a return to pre-linguistic phenomena. The further development of language in signing concepts such as justice determines its removal from 'noble' feelings and marks its decline. If these feelings are to be signed at all, then they must in some sense participate in that signing, in the way that regality, for example, is identical with the gaze of an eagle. I shall argue for the relevance of Creuzer's Symbolik. In chapter 5 I seek to show how it is implicated in Nietzsche's own use of figurative language. In relation to the current chapter, I have argued that this understanding of the role of symbolism, to be found in Creuzer, can be accommodated to the interest Nietzsche takes towards his own contemporaries, in his reading, for example, of Lange and von Hartmann, and to a terminology which he finds in Gerber's tropological model of language.
3.6) enchantment

Challenging the language of the ‘herd’, Nietzsche asks ‘what group of sensations in a soul will be the first to wake up, start speaking, and making demands’ (2002, p.164). It would be a return to the level of sensory phenomena, to the level Crawford labels ‘first language’, but delivered as the language of ‘genius’. Someone visiting Nietzsche in the winter of 1883-84 reported him as saying he saw images when he closed his eyes, and that he said it demonstrated an active imagination, of which only a fraction came into consciousness (Middleton, 1969, p.220, fn.25). It was seen above how in section 3 of his commentary on Zarathustra, in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche describes his inspiration in terms of something ‘becoming visible and audible’, ‘a rhythm that spans wide distances’, of things approaching on their own and offering themselves up as metaphors, quoting from The Return Home: ‘that all being wants to become a word here, all becoming wants to learn to speak from you’ (2005(a) pp.126-27). These later remarks are consistent with his earlier writings.

For example, in section (8) of The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche writes that ‘for the genuine poet metaphor is no rhetorical figure, but an image which takes the place of something else, something he can really see before him as the substitute for a concept’. A poet merges with his images, unlike the rhapsode, or the painter, who sees things outside himself. And Nietzsche calls it ‘enchantment’, like that of the dithyrambic chorus, in which the spectator, in the tiered seating of the theatre, overlooking those around him, is immersed; a chorus of transformed beings, ‘who have completely forgotten their civic past and their social position’ (p.43). In the language of The Birth of Tragedy, Dionysus is objectified in an Apollonian dream-world. ‘Energies which were only felt and not yet concentrated in an image’ find expression in a Dionysian art (p.46). In the context of Nietzsche’s inspiration at the Surlej boulder, it is expressed in the imagery of that landscape and in a language of height and distance.

In the metaphor of worn coinage in On Truth and Lying, the language of artistic expression is in need of renewal. The loss occurs not in the ‘transfer’ between impulse and expression, but through the further development of language, whereby an original symbolism comes to be conceptualised and re-interpreted. Just as a false supposition arises that a word’s meaning is given by external things it signs, so with an expression’s detachment from original, symbolic phenomena, the pathos of individual experience is misinterpreted at the level of an individual’s own self-understanding. Its rediscovery is then dependent on a re-embossing of the original symbolism. With this metaphor, Nietzsche maybe recalls Creuzer’s example in Symbolik und Mythologie of symbolic imagery found on coins and other artefacts, moving easily between cultures. I examine the question of Creuzer’s influence on Nietzsche in the next section. Nietzsche’s example of Chladni figures could be fitted, as well, to the sense in which the stimulus and image are related in Dionysian art, as creative force and artistic form. Nothing need be ‘lost’ in the spectator’s fleeting experience of emotions expressed and communicated in images. The loss is through abstraction, through the further development of language as ‘herd’ language, away from a language of phenomena.
3.7) Creuzer

The influence on Nietzsche of Creuzer’s *Symbolik und Mythologie* is set out by George S. Williamson in *The Longing for Myth in Germany* (2004), largely on the basis of German scholarship. I follow Williamson’s exposition of key claims made by Creuzer, and where these are found to be reflected in *The Birth of Tragedy*. But I also make some further observations regarding the significance of Creuzer’s text for the expression and communication of a ‘higher’ emotion. It will be seen how Creuzer’s theory of the nature and origins of mythic or religious symbolism throws light on Nietzsche’s own use of symbol and metaphor. A straightforward account of the distinction between symbol and allegory in the work of Creuzer, and in Schelling’s later philosophy, is provided by Todorov (1982). Allegory is a way of signing because it is drawn on referring to a thing in other terms. By contrast, Creuzer begins from a symbol *being* the thing it signs. In section 8 below, I provide some preliminary remarks on how Nietzsche follows this use of symbolism in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. A fuller account is given in chapter 5. It will be seen that some of Nietzsche’s imagery recalls the iconography and practices of the cult of Mithras. In respect of Mithraic imagery, I rely on a study by Roger Beck (2006), in which he also addresses certain issues around its use which are significant in approaching the expression and communication of rarer states in imagery employed in *Zarathustra*.

Aside from identifying Creuzer’s influence, Williamson is concerned more widely with social and political ramifications of Creuzer’s text. In connection with this, there are questions concerning Nietzsche’s relations to the Romanticist tradition and to German idealism which are beyond the scope of this thesis. But it may be noted here that Williamson points out a feature of Wilamowitz’s attack on *The Birth of Tragedy* accusing Nietzsche of opposing an established scholarly regard for Ancient Greek culture as something original and distinctive, owing nothing to formative, external influences. Daring to suppose the serene beauty of a classical art had its origins in barbarous, cultish vulgarity and mysticism, Nietzsche was accused of perpetuating the Creuzerian heresy that Greek art and religion was only the latest expression of a universal religious symbolism. Creuzer had argued for its origins ultimately in ancient India. And Williamson explains how political tensions between Protestantism and Catholicism played a part in Creuzer’s censure fifty years before, and stood to be repeated against Nietzsche in a charge of indulging ‘crypto-Catholic mystery-mongering’.

More important here is that Nietzsche will have encountered the Apollo-Dionysus distinction in a number of earlier debates, and in Creuzer’s work. Williamson (p.133 ff) gives Creuzer’s description of Dionysus, as multiplicity:

‘He is the universe that presents itself in many forms: in air, water, earth, plants, and animals. ... Apollo ... is unity, which presides over nature in its development to protect it from complete disintegration and to secure it again unharmed to the One.’

Williamson relates how the tension between Dionysus and Apollo was taken by Creuzer to be a key dualism in Greek culture. Divided nature, such as between male and female, was symbolised in a god’s dismemberment, and the ritualistic practices in mystery cults were a symbolic purification, through the agency of Dionysus and along lines of the god’s
incarnation, suffering, and redemption. In time, the practices became customary and fitted to the requirements of political and social life. Williamson also explains how Creuzer treated epic poetry as originating in the need that people should know ‘the history of those before whom it kneeled’. In this way, myth became a form of historical explanation and justification, losing its religious significance as Symbolik. The sense of Symbolik is of a ‘coherent doctrine of faith’, not just a particular kind of symbolism. In Homer, the mythic element was lost to stories of human interest and political achievements. And Christianity then developed out of moralising interpretations of the original Symbolik, refiguring the understanding of redemption.

Baeumer (1976) surveys a number of treatments of the Apollo-Dionysus distinction which preceded Nietzsche’s own. In addition to Creuzer, there is Hölderlin, Karl Otfried Müller, Johann Georg Hamann and Schelling. Baeumer writes:

On 18th June 1871, as he was occupied with the conclusion of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche borrowed from the library, along with Creuzer’s Symbolism and Mythology, Bachofen’s Tomb Symbolism, in which he was able to find a word-for-word preview of his negative association of the Dionysian with the ‘principle of individuality’. Also from the works of his colleague and sometime friend Bachofen he was able to glean any number of different versions of the distinction between the Apollonian and Dionysian (Baeumer, p.189).

Visiting Jakob Bachofen, it is likely Nietzsche would have discussed the subject of Dionysus. And in respect of Schelling, Nietzsche’s definition of Dionysian and Apollonian as opposing creative powers is close to Schelling’s own. Although there is no evidence that Nietzsche was acquainted with the relevant texts of Schelling, or that Bachofen was either, it can be allowed all three of them had drawn on Creuzer’s work (Baeumer, pp.186-189).

Williamson follows Baeumer in granting that the personal influence of Bachofen, along with the work of Creuzer and others, is indicated in Nietzsche’s endorsement of the view that the Dionysian ‘festival’ was an import into Greece. With Creuzer, Nietzsche celebrates the barbarous character of the Dionysian, and agrees with Karl Otfried Müller in identifying Apollo with its restraint and accommodation by the Greeks. This is the ‘peace accord’ Nietzsche identifies in section (2) of The Birth of Tragedy, permitting the Dionysian’s expression in ‘festivals of redemption and transfiguration’. The cruelty of existence receives its aesthetic justification in a triumph of Apollonian illusion. Prometheus’ punishment indicates a ‘Dionysian impulse to sacrilege’ is countered by the Apollonian instinct for order. Williamson treats Nietzsche as fitting the distinction to answering the pessimism of Silenus and the suffering of individuation, approaching this in Schopenhauerian terms (Williamson, pp.241-243). In particular, Williamson emphasises the idea that a political order grounded in the suffering of slaves, no less than suffering and cruelty generally, is excused and sustained by a mythic, idealised feeling of unity and redemption through art and music.

Creuzer had focused on the Eleusinian mysteries and the symbolism of a dismembered god. Michael Allen Gillespie (1995) has argued that Fichte’s notion of an absolute ego and its progressive revelation provides a key to Creuzer’s account of the development of religion:
The world is only the absolute I, to use Fichtean terminology, and the process by which this being reveals itself to man is also the process by which it comes back to itself and reconstitutes its lost unity. The history of religion in Creuzer’s view is thus the history of the reconciliation of the absolute with itself. (p.243)

For Creuzer, whereas Dionysus is a deification of nature, bound continually to die and be reborn, religion succeeded, in the figure of Christ, in answering a longing for redemption from the suffering of the world. Accordingly, Gillespie marks two respects in which Nietzsche departs from Creuzer. First, in Nietzsche’s regard for a Dionysian aesthetic. Creuzer is unconcerned, he says, to connect Dionysus with a tragic sensibility. Second, Nietzsche rejects Creuzer’s treatment of Dionysus as giving way to Christ (pp.244-245).

While these details are relevant to establishing Nietzsche’s thinking, the importance of Creuzer’s Symbolik still lies in its theory of symbolism. Creuzer depends upon it for his argument that an ancient religion beginning in India was translated into different cultures. An image like that of a slaughtered bull, embossed as a figure on a coin, travels easily and has a ‘primitive’ significance, independent of its further meaning in a particular cultural context. In its mythic character, for example, Williamson says it can come to inform a justification of cruelties and suffering implicated in social orderings. In considering the affective power of an image, I have drawn on Nietzsche’s reference to the Apollo Sauroctonos. What is at stake in experiencing the image as a piece of higher art can be approached in terms of conflicting impulses towards sacrilege and destruction on the one hand, and order and beauty on the other, and I have argued its affectivity consists in the way in which, symbolically, it is the very experience it signifies. It is certainly to be granted that appeals to what the imagery might ‘mean’ fall short of conveying its emotional force. That is to say, its allegorical interpretation loses sight of what it symbolises.

In his study of symbolism, Tzvetan Todorov (1982, pp.216-221) outlines the positions taken by Creuzer and by Schelling in distinguishing symbol and allegory. He cites Schelling’s Philosophie der Kunst, unpublished in Schelling’s lifetime:

an image is symbolic whose object does not merely signify the idea but is that idea itself.

In Schelling’s own example, Mary Magdalen not only signifies repentance, but is ‘living repentance itself’. The symbol still signs, because, as Todorov explains, Schelling distinguishes it from the pure image, which cannot, as such, signify anything. Then, in the case of myth, Schelling holds that more is involved than simple allegory (in which some general ideas are signified by symbols). Rather,

Each figure in mythology is to be taken for what it is, for it is precisely in this way that it will be taken for what it signifies. The signifying here is at the same time the being itself, it has passed into the object, being one with it.

What is at stake in myth is not a set of ideas which might be represented. Rather, it is what the symbols ‘signify for themselves’, what a symbol is.
Todorov deals with other accounts of the use of symbol and allegory, such as Heinrich Meyer’s 1797 essay, *Über die Gegenstände der bildenden Kunst*. Meyer makes the same distinction between symbol and allegory, that ‘the symbol is, the allegory signifies; the first fuses signifier and signified, the second separates them’. Then it is seen that Wilhelm von Humboldt emphasised a ‘constant mutual exchange’ between the symbol as a representation and what it represents, contrasting this with allegory, where we can ascertain what is meant by the allegory in the way of solving a puzzle, but gain no more than ‘a cold admiration of, or a mild satisfaction with, the gracefully executed figure’. Turning to Creuzer’s *Symbolik und Mythologie*, Todorov identifies the key claim that the symbol signifies but ‘does not, for all that, cease to be’. Metaphor is included in the sense of symbol here. Creuzer compares it to a bolt of lightning that ‘in one stroke illuminates the sombre night’, which is to say that a symbol does not explain something. Rather, it allows we apprehend it ‘as a whole’, in a ‘single glance’. Todorov identifies the similar claim in Schelling:

In the lyric poem, just as in tragedy, metaphor often acts only in the manner of a bolt of lightning that suddenly illuminates a dark place, which is swallowed up again by the night. In the epic, metaphor lives in itself, and becomes in its turn a little epic.

And he points out Creuzer’s emphasis on the symbol’s instantaneousness, which is missing in allegory:

An idea is exposed in the symbol in an instant, and entirely, and it reaches all the forces of our soul. ... Allegory leads us to respect and to follow the steps taken by the thought hidden in the image. In the one, there is instantaneous totality; in the other, a progression in a series of moments.

Having drawn attention to this temporal aspect in Creuzer’s distinction between symbol and allegory, Todorov has no more to say on Creuzer.

The role Creuzer accorded to *Symbolik* is set out by Williamson (pp.127-131). A single, esoteric symbolism underpinning religions across a range of cultures, originated in ancient India in astronomical observations which came to be expressed by a priestly caste in a religious symbolism. This symbolism was then taken up in the form of mythic narratives. Crossing continents, it arrived eventually in Greece and Italy. Williamson notes that there are overtones here of a ‘secret wisdom’, belonging to a priestly elite, and in respect of which it has been noted already, Creuzer’s theory was philologically contentious for standing against the supposition of a distinctly Greek culture. For Creuzer, these cultural achievements only obscured a primal, religious experience grounded in his *Symbolik*, in a cruder kind of imagery located in the mystery cults. For example, as a popular interpretation of the original symbolism, Homer’s poetry is counted as a decline.

In line with Todorov’s account, Williamson identifies the key element in Creuzer’s theory, that because a symbol carries its own significance, it is easily transmissible between different languages. The image of a slaughtered bull, for example, has a widespread distribution, and it has been noted already that Creuzer focuses on the use of these kinds of symbol on coins and other artefacts. Williamson draws attention to the way in which Creuzer took the symbol as dramatising elements of an ancient religion, in ‘a moment that claims our entire essence,
a look into an infinite distance, from which our spirit returns enriched’ (Creuzer, 1819, I:59). The comparison is made with Schelling’s account, in which the symbol unites an inexpressible infinite and its finite realisation, but Williamson points out the difference in Creuzer having held a ‘momentary intuition’ into the unity of ideal and real, of God and nature, overwhelms the limits of its formal expression.

In this way, a symbolic imagery may operate in ‘memorialising’ an experience. For example, it accounts for the significance Nietzsche invested in the Surlej boulder. Marsden (2011) notes how Nietzsche was concerned to recapture his experience in revisiting that landscape, and she argues Nietzsche seeks to draw attention to experiences at the periphery of consciousness. Marsden’s emphasis is on a kind of psychogeography. I propose it is the symbolic terms in which Nietzsche describes his experience at the Surlej boulder which are important. If their symbolic character is a feature of Nietzsche’s own experiences, then this can be a way of approaching the symbolism he employs particularly in Zarathustra, and elsewhere in the later works, and where this can be found to depend on an imagery of height and distance.

3.8) symbolism in Zarathustra

Parkes (p.xi) identifies the opening sentence of Thus Spoke Zarathustra as being taken by Nietzsche from Friedrich von Hellwald’s The History of Culture in its Natural Development, published in 1874, in which Hellwald recounts a history of the Persian prophet, Zarathustra. In his notebook, Nietzsche wrote down a straight paraphrase of Hellward’s words, as follows:

Zarathustra, born by Lake Urmia, left his home in his thirtieth year, went to the province of Aria and wrote the Zend-Avesta during ten years of loneliness in the mountains.

Reworking this as the first sentence of Zarathustra, Nietzsche continues with his character addressing the Sun, again, associated with the historical Zarathustra. I propose another source is relevant here, with which it is likely Nietzsche was familiar. In his recent study of Mithraism, Roger Beck (2006) cites a passage from Porphyry, De antro nympharum, 6:

Similarly, the Persians call the place a cave where they introduce an initiate to the mysteries, revealing to him the path by which souls descend and go back again. For Eubulus tells us that Zoroaster was the first to dedicate a natural cave in honour of Mithras, the creator and father of all. This cave bore for him the image of the cosmos which Mithras had created, and the things which the cave contained, by their proportionate arrangement, provided him with symbols of the elements and climates of the cosmos.

Beck’s concern is with the Mithras cult symbolism, and, as here, with the structure of a Mithraic temple being meant as an image of the universe. There are some points in his discussion which, in chapter 5, I bring to bear on the symbolism Nietzsche employs around Zarathustra’s teaching and his descent to mankind. It is notable anyway that there is this connection between Zarathustra and Mithras.
That is not to say that finding correspondences by itself should settle much at all. In the introduction to his translation of Zarathustra, Hollingdale (Nietzsche, 1969) lists a number of correspondences with imagery and tenets of Christianity, suggesting Nietzsche was in some way inclined to re-present formative ideas from his pietist upbringing. It would be a matter of interpretation whether these ideas are redeployed as parody or satire, or ironically, in tension with their established meanings. This is in any case a general difficulty in seeking to interpret symbolic uses of language and ritual practices, to set about determining what is ‘meant’ in such contexts. Roger Beck seeks to make sense of the Mithras cult symbolism, and, crucially, he makes use of work by Daniel Sperber (1975), which I also examine here. There are important points which Beck makes, and which apply in making sense of Nietzsche’s use of imagery.

It is evident that Nietzsche does employ elements of a Mithraic symbolism. And it has been seen how the image of a slaughtered bull and a solar cult was argued by Creuzer to have been transmitted in a number of cultural reformulations, emanating originally from ancient India. It accommodates an astrological knowledge implicated in seasonal changes and carries a symbolism of death and renewal, sacrifice and redemption. The correspondences in Mithraism and Christianity are explainable in this way. And the sacrificial symbolism is carried also in the story of Dionysus’s dismemberment. The bull is a symbol of Dionysus, and Nietzsche’s re-employment of essential features of this iconography in addressing questions of redemption from suffering and change is unsurprising, given, as well, his familiarity with previous treatments of the Apollo-Dionysus pairing (Baeumer, 1976).

At stake here is Nietzsche’s response to Creuzer’s account of the role of symbols, as images. It was seen how the figurative model of language he found in Gerber can suggest something carried over from a stimulus, into an image. Imagery and sound express an originating impulse, but it remains that the affective power is accessible at the level of phenomena. As such, it is tied to a particular category of imagery. The question then is how a symbol can succeed in this role, in its expression and communication of a particular emotion. Theoretical claims about its origins in physiology are not enough. There has to be a theory of its role and operation which accommodates this further emphasis on its expressiveness, and where this happens outside the language of concepts and ideas. The contrast here is between the affective power of a symbol and a conceptual understanding. In so far as it ‘memorialises’ an experience, it cannot be a matter of seeking what it might be taken as meaning, in other more familiar terms.

The point is made by Daniel Sperber (1975). He starts from a supposition that linguistic meaning must depend on analyticity, which is to say that we establish the meaning of a sentence through paraphrase, substituting signs for others, where the substitutes have known, established meanings. A symbol treated linguistically in this way would be regarded simply as saying something in other terms. Sperber then points out that symbols cannot be taken analytically. The symbol’s ‘meaning’ does not admit paraphrasing, because symbols are ambiguous. Substituting signs does not preserve a ‘correct’ interpretation. As such, they cannot be ‘de-coded’. Roger Beck takes this as the starting point of his study of Mithras cult symbolism, where success in decoding the astrological symbolism in Mithraism depends upon it being a ‘language’, susceptible to reinterpretation in other terms.
Looking more generally at the problem in anthropology of making sense of other cultural practices, Sperber takes the work of Victor Turner as an example. Turner, he says, sought to establish associations between a symbol taken as a name, and the property of the object which it names. Sperber allows that symbols can be paired to the things Turner identifies, notably to other symbols and practices, but emphasises this depends upon pairing symbols with fixed interpretations. This is then too strong a characterisation of the meaningfulness of symbols, because it is in the nature of a symbol that there are no rules which can determine particular pairings. If it is supposed their meaning is open, then this will be an admission that the ‘code’ model of establishing their meaning does not work. Sperber says it is the easy use of the verb ‘to symbolise’ which disguises this problem. If we struggle to find the ‘meaning’ of the symbol on this code model, then we fall into saying its meaning has been hidden, or is unconscious, in line with Turner and Freud respectively.

Approaches to the ‘meaning’ of a symbolism are split along the lines indicated here, that is, in seeking to ‘de-code’ it, or not. This is not a split between it being meaningful or not at all. Beck shows how the Mithras cult symbolism accommodates two responses. There is the phenomenon of immersion in the symbolism, in the experience it ‘memorialises’. And there are the formal meanings in its construction. The astrological meanings and technicalities will have been known and understood by its priesthood in formal terms. As such, it is a language. But the new initiate need know nothing much of this. He can come to learn these formal meanings, but the experience itself is communicated through participation in the symbolism, in the ritual practices in the temple. The Mithras symbolism is a cosmogony. In every temple, a frieze depicted the sacrificial slaughter of a bull. In some instances, another frieze depicted a banquet, and dining was a ritual practice taking place in the Mithraeum. The bull-killing frieze has a complex iconography which is consistent in surviving examples from different temples. If the Mithraists were clearly determined always to include the same details, for example, of the dying bull’s tail turning into ears of wheat, the presence of the dog, the raven, scorpion and snake, and so on, then how, Beck asks, could this not be the basis for interpreting the religion? In answering this challenge, Beck emphasises that decoding the iconography can only tell a story. Following Sperber, we can say that, taken in that way, it cannot tell us what an initiate might have understood or experienced in the Mithraeum. This is connected with the point Beck makes, that we should need to know not what the iconography means, but how it means (Beck, pp.22-24).

Beck offers his own explanation of what is at stake. He highlights the way in which the cave provided the Mithraists with a model of the universe. In imitating the universe, it is fitted to the purpose of a ‘soul journey’ taken by initiates. The astrological symbolism is tied to a descent and return journey. And, the cave is like the universe in being an inside without an outside. Beck is concerned with the cave regarded as a self-contained model of the universe in which the bull-killing frieze includes another representation of the universe as a painted field of stars beneath the cloak of the figure of Sol Mithras, who holds the knife against the bull. Beck marks the sense of paradox here, that the contained should contain the container (p.107). But he is starting from Porphyry’s commentary as a point of entry into how the cult symbolism is meaningful. The cave is ‘an image of the universe’ because its function is ‘to realize a mystery of the descent and return of souls’ (p.17). Its symbolism is the ‘driving
mechanism' for what it accomplishes. As such, it need not be expected that initiates were fully acquainted with a doctrinal 'story'. Nor is the 'meaning' of the symbolism to be looked for only in a scholarly reconstruction of the iconography and ritual practices.

It seems a trivial point, but Nietzsche’s most extravagant resort to symbolism, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, is like the Mithraeum, susceptible to two approaches. It may be de-coded, if it is taken linguistically. Or it may be taken as inviting the reader to ‘discover’ an experience ‘memorialised’ in its Symbolik. On the first approach, we should expect to find ‘hidden’ meanings. For example, Zarathustra’s eagle and snake might be taken as ‘symbolising’ good and evil, and their reconciliation as signalling Nietzsche’s revaluation of values (Thatcher, 1977). The second approach is ‘non-linguistic’. It does not license a uniform treatment of all the use Nietzsche makes of metaphor, but is there evidence that Nietzsche ‘thought’ in the symbolic terms identified here? To say he may have done so ‘unconsciously’ is not an adequate reply. In Ecce Homo, he talks of his experience at the Surlej boulder. How should a rock, as symbol, be implicated in the experience he describes? Is it legitimate to make a comparison with the iconography of Mithras’ ‘rock-birth’, depicted as a naked figure emerging from a rock? My contention is that Nietzsche relies on imagery in the way that it was used, for example, in the Mithras cult, allowing it be taken ‘non-linguistically’ in the way that Sperber and Beck indicate, but which is tied ultimately to the distinction between symbol and allegory advanced by Creuzer.

That is to allow that images are, symbolically, a mechanism for participation in an experience. This would depend upon the sense of ‘transfer’ across different spheres or domains being grounded in an identity. Here, it is between ‘rarer’ feelings and a visual imagery drawn on height and an order of rank. In the case of hierarchies implicated in the Mithras cult symbolism, Beck concedes the possibility that creative image-making along these lines is accounted for by a human physiological disposition towards hierarchical orderings. This would admit the claims made by Crawford and Emden for Nietzsche having emphasised ‘transmission’ out of an originating nerve impulse. But my aim in this chapter has been to start from the appearances themselves, to account for the affectivity of a certain category of visual image and use of figurative language.

3.9) summary

I began in this chapter with studies by Crawford and Emden examining the naturalistic basis of Nietzsche’s account of the origins of language and focusing on something transferred or transmitted between different ‘spheres’, as between nerve impulse and sensory images. It was seen how this transference is itself admissible as metaphor, but at stake here is the priority Nietzsche accords to sensory images. A conceptual language is a further development, and is perspectival in as much as it emerges out of shared human needs and interests. I noted the approach which Lakoff and Johnson have taken to imagery in language and the creative use of metaphor, but rejected their account for being limited to conceptual associations at the level of our common language. My starting point is in the claims Nietzsche makes for return to a primordial language, as in his expectations for Wagner’s music drama.
At issue here is how an originally symbolic character of things is forgotten when images come to be employed in signing. My objection to the analyses provided by Crawford and by Emden is that they implicitly assume a sign-object semantics, to which a specifically symbolic use of imagery can stand in contrast. They also rely on identifying the role of unconscious instincts, on the basis, for example, of the influence on Nietzsche of work by von Hartmann and Lange. But if Nietzsche resorts to these terms in drawing attention to an original ‘inner kernel of our being’, it remains that this inner kernel stands to be communicated in a symbolic use of language enabling an identity of image and pathos. As such, it is not a matter of one thing transposing another. That is to say, it is not something to be understood in other terms. Rather, it is a matter of an inner state and its symbolic expression. This has a model in the work of Friedrich Creuzer. I noted the emphasis Creuzer puts on images embossed on coins as carrying their own significance in differing cultural contexts. And it has been seen how Creuzer talks in terms of a cloud-obscured sun and its fractured rainbow colouring. In section 7, I set out the case for Creuzer’s influence on Nietzsche, and its further basis in Schelling. It will be seen below, in chapter 5, how Nietzsche relies upon the symbolic role of images, to identify the pathos of rarer feeling.

I went on to make comparisons with the symbolism of the Mithras cult. Its imagery is recalled in Nietzsche’s own iconography. Again, at issue here is how images can be taken non-linguistically. I followed Roger Beck’s discussion and the appeal he makes to work by Daniel Sperber. The difficulty in treating images linguistically is that, as signs, they are ambiguous, and so cannot be simply ‘de-coded’ to arrive at an interpretation. Beck argues that the imagery and ritual in Mithraism can be taken linguistically on the basis of its astrological meanings. But he also recognises an immersion in the symbolism which identifies a cult member’s experience in the Mithraeum. The difference is between its conceptual understanding, as something known to its priests, and the feelings carried in the symbols, in which something stands to be discovered. This does not admit just a vague mysticism. It will be seen in the next chapter how discovery at the periphery of conscious is obstructed by our common language, and I am arguing these feelings are identified in imagery of height and distance. In chapter 5, I treat in more detail the key distinction here between symbol and allegory, in the context of Nietzsche’s own symbolic discourse in Zarathustra.
Chapter 4: consciousness

4.1) introduction

I am arguing for a claim that Nietzsche treats a class of ‘rarer’ states as being tied to a use of symbolism. In this chapter, I examine his treatment of how a subject comes self-consciously to experience these emotions. It was seen above how the symbolism is to be taken pre-linguistically, which is to say, not drawn on a conventional model of sign and object signed, or taken allegorically, in other terms. It will be seen how Nietzsche claims our consciousness has followed on the development of a common language, the language of the ‘herd’. By implication, a return to some more ‘noble’ state of mind depends upon escaping the constraints of this language. I approach this as a return to an original symbolism, in place of taking signs linguistically. Where Nietzsche is pessimistic, his pessimism is directed at a progressive decline through language, where an ‘inner’ life of ‘rarer’ feelings and emotion is obstructed by the utilitarian sentiments and beliefs which characterise herd thinking. I begin with Nietzsche’s account of herd consciousness, but the challenge is to explain how a ‘return’ to higher feelings is possible.

In the secondary literature, a starting point of inquiry into Nietzsche’s views on conscious thinking and experience is the claim made by Safranski (2002), that he anticipates a broadly phenomenological stance. Safranski proposes this in the sense of Nietzsche starting from the human world of ‘lived experience’, to subject to scrutiny the kinds of psychological motivation and self-deception which determine our thinking. I follow the way in which these remarks have been built upon, allowing Nietzsche focuses on what is given at the very periphery of consciousness, free of the kind of conceptual understanding which comes with the development of language. Safranski says Nietzsche is a ‘proto-phenomenologist’ in the stance he takes against the distorting influence of day to day consciousness drawn on language. Nietzsche’s ‘method’ then consists in a kind of ‘close attentiveness’ to consciousness, which Safranski identifies in, for example, Dawn, in its close analysis of people’s interests, motivations and ways of living. At stake are discoveries which lie at the periphery of consciousness.

Nietzsche’s account of the development of our own self-awareness is in section (354) of The Gay Science, where he begins by noting that all the activities of living could have occurred without that awareness, without being ‘mirrored’ in consciousness. Having raised the possibility, he goes on to say how consciousness came about. It developed, he says, ‘only under the pressure of the need for communication’. Words, as signs of communication, were needed in interaction with other humans. But while conscious thinking takes the form of words, it is, Nietzsche says, only a small part of thinking. In (354), he says that in ‘seeking to know ourselves’ we will be conscious only of what is ‘average’, not individual. That is to say, our self-understanding is directed on a socially determined ‘false ego’. In Dawn (105), it is is the ‘fog of opinions and habituations’ which haunts people like a ghost, a ‘bloodless abstraction’ which people take for a human being. Safranski calls it a kind of ‘self-evasion’ that we see ourselves in those terms, with Nietzsche seeking a revaluation which depends on revealing the origin and character of this false ego. While our unreformed ‘knowledge’ is ‘a calamitous stupidity of which we will perish’, there is in contrast to this danger another,
life-enhancing knowledge accessible outside the constraints of a herd language. Allowing Nietzsche seeks to ‘develop a language that expresses more than the usual commonplaces’, Safranski treats him as engaged in a creative, poetising activity at the surface level of signs and symbols, through which a world appears as ‘epiphany, rich and enigmatic’. And it is in this sense that Nietzsche is starting from the human world of ‘lived experience’.

Nietzsche also indicates in (354) how scientific findings support the contention that thinking ranges over more than that of which we happen to be conscious, and vindicate Leibniz’s view. The reference here is to Leibniz’s petite perceptions. Again, this suggests something is at stake which lies more or less submerged beneath consciousness, and which it may be difficult to recognise under the constraints of a prevailing ‘herd’ consciousness. Safranski points to the final aphorism of Dawn, in which birds soar out to sea in the direction of the setting sun. The metaphor of travelling west to reach the east is taken in terms of starting from existing consciousness to bring about a renewal through critical scrutiny of our own lived experience. That this anticipates a phenomenological method has been expanded upon by Ansell Pearson in his contribution to Boublil and Daigle (2013). Starting from Safranski’s remarks about the close attention to consciousness exemplified in Dawn, Ansell Pearson has argued Nietzsche indicates how consciousness is fundamentally intentional, where the account, for example, in Dawn (119), of how something is seen from a particular perspective, is consistent with the notion of intentionality.

In the case of, for example, fearing something, the intentional content of a subject’s mental state is this fearful ‘object’, having that characteristic irrespective of questions about its status as a feature in ‘reality’. Ansell Pearson takes this as underpinning Nietzsche’s commitment to new ways of thinking and feeling, figured in the metaphor at the end of the book, of heading into new seas, as a ‘return to the things themselves’ existing for us in subjective experience and better brought into view by the method of close attentiveness. Remarking on the silence Nietzsche describes at (423), Ansell Pearson takes the contrast between the sea’s ‘mute immensity’ and the noisy, social world which is represented in the ‘net of language’, as the impetus to new thinking. With the world to be learnt anew, it is ‘through new and refined practices of observation and self-observation, [that] we as human beings largely unknown to ourselves can become our own experiments’. That is to say, we can leave behind the level of conventional understanding and knowledge supported in language.

It remains that there are two distinct concerns at issue in Safranski’s notion of a close attentiveness to consciousness. First, there is the emphasis in starting from phenomena, taken broadly in the sense of life as it is experienced. Second, there is an interest in recognising something given in experience but which lies, as it were, at the periphery of consciousness, or among the petite perceptions of an unconscious life or sensibility. Both these concerns are grounded in ‘good will’ towards appearances, or phenomena. But I shall seek to build on Safranski’s remarks by identifying a particular feature of artistic representations which I argue Nietzsche came to recognise as of primary importance in its affective power. The tensions in moving between petite perceptions and their conscious realisation are then of a piece with how a Dionysian creative impulse is bound to depend on a formal artistry for its expression and communication.
It was seen how Nietzsche explores this tension through the imagery of the *Apollo Sauroctonos*. In respect of that image and the use Nietzsche makes of it, the affective power may operate at a preconscious level, though it involves no more than what is apparent in a sensuous perception (*Anschauung*). The perception will be, as it were, direct and unmediated, but founded on a ‘method’ of critical scrutiny towards the range of interpretations that are brought to the image and its experience. That is to say there are experiences of a painting or sculpture which are grounded in a certain conceptual understanding. If it is an understanding having its support in the shared concerns of a herd language, then it threatens to distract the viewer from recognising it as a creative impetus to the affirmation of a lived experience. ‘*So allein haben sie es “erlebt”*’, Nietzsche says in *Beyond Good and Evil* (213) of this deficiency in the viewer. He or she may be unable to see it differently than they do.

It is a ‘rarer’ state at issue here. If it stands to be encountered at the periphery of consciousness as a matter of subjective feeling, not easily captured with the resources of a common language, still it may be counted as an intentional object, having the character of a specific feeling tied to a feature of things given in experience. I take it to be the imagery of height and distance which supplies this ‘privileged’ perspective outside the constraints of a herd language, and is integral to the expression of a *Dionysian* impulse. I argue in chapter 6 below, that this is not to be grounded in any facts of physiology, or drawn on a metaphysic of will to power. It is an inspiration which a visual art expresses, not as its ‘truth’, but as a mood dependent on a formal feature of things. It is ‘transformative’ in as much as it dislocates the subject from egoistic, self-awareness rooted in the kind of historical, mundane causal order of events which comprise that ‘false’ ego. I have already made a case for this in relation to the imagery Emerson employs in the passage in *Nature*, in which he describes a unity of subject and world, becoming a transparent eyeball.

### 4.2) herd consciousness

In *The Gay Science* (354), Nietzsche says that consciousness follows on the development of language in communicating fundamental human needs. It is social interaction centred on everyday needs which determines the character of ‘herd’ thinking. An individual is not bound to be dependent on others, but the dependency is integral to herd consciousness:

... it seems to me as if the subtlety and strength of consciousness always were proportionate to a man’s (or animal's) capacity for communication, and as if this capacity in turn were proportionate to the need for communication. [This] is not be understood as if the individual human being who happens to be a master in communicating and making understandable his needs must also be most dependent on others in his needs. But it does seem to me as if it were that way ... where need and distress have forced men to communicate and to understand each other quickly and subtly [resulting in] an excess of this strength and art of communication – as it were, a capacity that has gradually been accumulated and now waits for an heir who might squander it. (1974, pp.297-298)

Mankind’s vulnerability had meant an individual needed the help and protection of his peers. He had to make himself understood, and for this he needed ‘consciousness’: ‘he needed to
“know” himself what distressed him, he needed to “know” how he felt, he needed to “know” what he thought.’ This thinking took the form of language because words operate as communicative signs. As more signs came to be invented, so humans became more conscious of themselves. The strength and subtlety of language now exceeds the demands of utility, and is freely spent by artists and orators.

As such, it is a kind of self-deception, occurring at the level of signs and appearances. The orator’s claim to ‘know’ the truth, for example, still has its basis in the herd language. The supposition of objective truths masks its relativity to human needs and interests. Nietzsche’s concern is with these deceptions being destructive of individual feeling.

The world of which we can become conscious is only a surface- and sign-world, a world that is made common and meaner; whatever becomes conscious becomes by the same token shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, sign, herd signal.

Nietzsche includes the notion of ‘utility’ itself as having no ‘real’ basis. It is only a ‘calamitous stupidity’ of which humanity will perish. The account is repeated in Beyond Good and Evil (268). Again, the basis of the claim seems to lie in punning on the notions of a common (shared) understanding and of common (base), everyday interests and concerns (Burnham, 2007, p.204). Emotional states such as anger, hate and fear are easily and quickly communicated and understood. But subtler, more nuanced feelings will be overlooked. The point applies as much in the case of higher feelings, given they are ‘uncommon’.

The challenge then must be to say how there may be a communication which is independent of the constraints of ‘herd’ language and the grammatical structures which Nietzsche takes as influencing philosophical reasoning and knowledge. It is clear that he treats our ‘common’ language as a system of signs. In (268), Nietzsche allows that words may sign private, mental states. His interest in the qualitative character of a certain kind of mental state is evident here, as he declares that ‘nobler’ feelings are not readily expressible with the resources only of this ‘common’ language. Negatively, he targets the limitations of herd language, in which signing mental items is suited only to values and needs we have in common. Positively, Nietzsche appeals to an inner realm of subjective experience, and calls for a ‘new means of language’. As such, it can be expected that the ‘nobler’ states of mind which Nietzsche seeks to identify and communicate through his own use of imagery, are communicated outside the constraints of the sign-object theory of meaning which characterises herd language.

How are these ‘higher’ feelings expressible? If the higher emotions stand to be communicated in sound and visual images, and in other kinds of artistic practice such as in ritualistic behaviour and uses of language, then this is not so much a ‘language’ of inner mental states. In so far as they are communicable, they occupy the periphery of consciousness and would be overlooked or obscured by the self-conscious understanding which comes with translation into a herd perspective. It does not follow that some Cartesian inner inspection must be in play here. My contention is that Nietzsche relies on the operation of a symbolism, taken in terms owed ultimately to Schelling, through the work of Creuzer. As such, I look to Nietzsche’s employment of a mythic symbolism, and his use of imagery and metaphor supply the ‘new means of language’ serving the experience of ‘higher’ states, and
which is drawn in contrast to the common sign-object language. Through the symbolic character of figurative language, the subject is returned to a state of mind located only at the periphery of self-conscious conceptual understanding. There is then a role for figurative language, but only in so far as its common interpretation is resisted.

4.3) ‘inner’ life

The distorting ‘herd’ consciousness is targeted in *Dawn*. In (33) Nietzsche focuses on a number of mental states which are familiarly described as higher kinds of feelings. He lists ‘reverence, sublime exaltation, pride, gratitude, love’ as examples and emphasises how our understanding of them is informed by judgements handed down by parents and through culture. In that way, for example, a sense of exaltation in higher feelings has come to be associated with a concept of an actual higher realm. Similarly, in (39) he says ‘spiritual’ ecstasy is commonly understood in terms of desire for release from physical embodiment. As such, the meaning and significance of terms employed in describing particular kinds of feelings is easily taken for granted, and we talk in terms of things which are, after all, only ‘imaginary’. Nietzsche’s remarks here are in line with his account of consciousness in relation to language, as part of a broader inquiry into the nature of our own self-understanding. So, for example, in (115), pointing to ‘extreme’ emotions such as anger and hate, he goes on to say that a range of more elusive feelings, the ‘milder middle degrees’, receive little recognition because we have no words for them. The point he makes is that these feelings still contribute something to our character, that ‘none of us [are] what we appear to be solely in those states for which we have consciousness and words’. We ‘misconstrue’ ourselves when seeking to understand our feelings in the terms available in language.

Safranski (p.220) notes that Nietzsche claimed to be dissatisfied with this text soon after its publication, declaring it in a letter dated August 1881 to be a ‘poor piecemeal philosophy’. The ‘inspiration’ which supplanted it came with his experience at 6,000 feet, by the Surlej Boulder, and which he describes in part III of *Ecce Homo, Why I Write Such Good Books*, in the commentary on *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. In section 3, he describes a revelatory inspiration as something forced upon him:

... the need for a rhythm that *spans wide distances* is almost the measure of the force of inspiration, something to balance out its pressure and tension […] …The most remarkable thing is the involuntary nature of the image, the metaphor; you do not know what an image, a metaphor, is any more, everything offers itself up as the closest, simplest, most fitting expression (2005a, p.127)

His inspiration for Zarathustra is tied to the visually rich description he gives of the landscape of the bay of Rapallo. In *On Truth and Lying*, Nietzsche had talked in terms of creative ‘play’ with conventional forms and concepts, to express a ‘mighty, present intuition’

No regular way leads from these intuitions into the land of the ghostly schemata and abstractions; words are not made for them; man is struck dumb when he sees them, or he will speak only in forbidden metaphors and un-heard of combinations of concepts …
In a ‘radiance of metaphorical visions’, it is then the man of intuition who redeems life. It is the same affirmative pathos which Nietzsche marks in Ecce Homo (2005(a), p.124) and which informs the inspiration he talks of. As such, there is continuity here in the character of this intuition (Anschauung) tied to imagery given in experience.

Marsden (2011) has offered an account of the role and significance of Nietzsche’s experience at the Surlej boulder, and puts it in the context again of Nietzsche’s anticipation of a broadly ‘phenomenological’ stance, emphasising its character as something given in experience, but also drawing on the influence on Nietzsche of his reading of Leibniz and the role he accorded to petite perceptions. She focuses on the kind of elusive experiences, or ‘sub-phenomena’, which escape self-conscious representation. It is not a matter of looking harder, Marsden says, or more closely, given that we already live in the obscuring glare of a phenomenal consciousness. She treats Nietzsche as dealing in a phenomenological bracketing out of consciousness, to ‘close the doors and windows of consciousness for a time’. The difficulty in attending to appearances is that our self-serving conceptual language determines what we ‘see’.

In her introduction to Nietzsche’s public lecture, The Greek Music Drama (Nietzsche, 2013), which Nietzsche delivered in 1870, at Basel Museum, Marsden emphasises it is a purely Dionysian account Nietzsche gives there of the origins of tragic drama, drawn on something brought to consciousness in celebrations around Spring festivals, in which there is a kind of release from the ‘self’. The essay pre-dates The Birth of Tragedy and The Dionysian World View, and Marsden finds that the role Nietzsche accords to the Apollonian in these texts is strikingly absent in the earlier essay (p.iii). A reply would be that Nietzsche does acknowledge the artistry in ancient theatre. It has already been seen how he imagines the spectacle:

... if one of us were to be transported back to an Athenian festival performance, he would have the impression of being at an entirely strange and barbaric spectacle. In the bright light of the daytime sun, [...] he would see an enormous open space full to bursting with people: everyone’s gaze would be directed towards a crowd of men below, wearing masks and moving in a wondrous way, and a few superhumanly sized puppets, marching up and down a long, thin stage in slow, regular steps. (2013, pp.10-12)

Pointing to differences from modern theatre in the staging of ancient tragedy, Nietzsche says the actors would have appeared as ‘living bas-reliefs’, like statues in a temple pediment brought to life (p.30). He makes the point in this lecture, that ancient theatre favoured pathos over dramatic action. In this respect, he says music was ‘a means to an end’, being more effective than conceptual language in communicating the suffering god or hero. Music immediately strikes the heart, he says. But Nietzsche is also clear it is tied to the movement and gestures of the actors. Addressing the survival of this ancient music drama, he considers a comparison to the Catholic Mass, though he finds the latter introverted and relentlessly insistent in its symbolism, in contrast to something brighter, more sunlit and beautiful (p.38).
At issue is something being brought to conscious awareness. Marsden’s focus in her introduction is on a more or less Freudian approach to unconscious drives or instincts, talking in terms of a ‘mysterious somatic power, always pulsing below the threshold of consciousness’ (p.vi). It is an emphasis on the body as locus of these drives, but Marsden follows Freud in the sense of it being a libidinal impulse, as something which Freud says ‘proliferates in the dark’. As such, it is undiminished in its suppression and seeks release in Dionysian creativity and festival. Marsden makes the point that while these unconscious ‘energies’ may not take a representational form, it does not follow that they cannot inform a kind of thoughtful activity, as when Nietzsche says something may be presented ‘to our mind’s eye in a moment of imaginative power’. Notably, in this context, Anschauung has a sensual character, as engaging the senses, not as a purely mental intuition. Marsden characterises it as the ‘momentary irruption of an unconscious perception into the bright day-lit realm of conscious awareness’ (p.ix). This can be granted, but I diverge from Marsden’s analysis in so far as it risks overlooking a role for specific features in experience which are integral to this process, and where these stand to be encountered as symbols, being what they ‘sign’.

With Safranski’s claim that Nietzsche’s ‘phenomenological project’ is focused on describing an ‘inner’ life in plain terms of people’s psychological motivations and their self-deceptions, then the ‘positivist’ texts of Nietzsche’s middle period may be plainer in this sense. But, it does not follow that he may no longer be concerned with feelings and emotions he experienced in relation to Wagner’s music drama, or to Emerson’s use of visual imagery. The link between feeling and an aspect of things given to phenomenal consciousness will be at issue in particular kinds of artistic presentation. Nietzsche’s reference in his preface to The Gay Science to its section (342), is sometimes taken on face value, as declaring his intention to parody in Zarathustra various interests and concerns, including his own (1974, p.33, fn.1). Against this, I contend that in his use of imagery and metaphor, Nietzsche is primarily concerned with bringing to consciousness an experience of elevation, and which is stifled or obscured by conceptual language. It is in part a matter of showing how conceptually-laden talk of reverence or spiritual feeling is tainted by an ‘imagined’ metaphysics, to leave room, as it were, for feelings at the periphery of consciousness. So much is evident, for example, in Dawn. And this may involve a use of parody and irony, and so on. But my contention is that Nietzsche recognises a use of figurative language or symbolism which is directly tied to the experience of elevated feeling, grounded in an imagery of height and distance. The turn to imagery and metaphor in Zarathustra noted in Ecce Homo, is to the expression and communication of this elevated mood.

A sense in which something may be operative at a visually pre-conscious level, countering the influence of a ‘herd’ consciousness, is provided by William Vaughan’s (2004, pp. 196-197) analysis of Caspar David Friedrich’s Woman at the Window. In this painting, a woman has her back to the viewer, looking through an open-shuttered window. As a painting about looking, Vaughan explains it has a subtle construction (unnoticed by other commentators, he says) whereby the vanishing point of the picture, from the painter or viewer’s perspective, does not coincide with a vanishing point drawn by the angles of the open shutter through which she is looking. The viewer looks to the left at the same time as the angles of the open shutter indicate the viewpoint of the woman. This explains the painting’s ‘poignancy’,
Vaughan says, and it is clear that it works through dislocating the ‘position’ of the viewing subject. Other commentators have noted an impression of life passing by outside the room, created by the angle of the ship’s mast beyond the window and the inclination of the woman’s body as she looks out. The viewer of the painting is encouraged then to identify with an inner life of the subject, to ‘enter into her mood’ (Harris and Zucker, 2012). But Vaughan’s analysis indicates the way in which the subject in the painting does not only, as it were, ‘stand in’ for the viewer. The viewer is a step back from her and from her viewpoint, so his own perspective is jarred by it. Nietzsche’s treatment of the spectacle of Ancient Greek theatre marked this sense of stepping back from the action at the same time as being immersed in it, and how this takes us away from the ‘self’. And Vaughan notes that what is at stake in Friedrich’s painting is in some sense a perspective on the very subjectivity of experience.

Both the effect in the viewer and the means by which the painting brings this about could be explainable in physiological terms, and Vaughan, as well as by implication Friedrich himself, could point to an artist’s skills and knowledge of technique. Nietzsche notes the artist’s ‘subtle power’ in *The Gay Science* (299). The effect in the viewer is entirely at the level of phenomena, even if it remains an indistinct experience. As such it may be missed altogether. My contention is that the considerations here apply equally as well in respect of the *pathos of distance*. As an experience, it is crucially located at the level of phenomena. It may come to be overlooked and misinterpreted, given the beliefs and values exercised in herd language. But it is integral to the use of imagery and metaphor in art and figurative language bringing consciousness of higher feeling. In this way, it is operative in how Nietzsche’s texts are ‘heard’.

4.4) phenomenology

It is Nietzsche’s starting point in appearances, in his ‘good will’ towards them, which raises the question whether this anticipates a ‘phenomenological method’. Safranski’s (2002) assertion that Nietzsche was a proto-phenomenologist has been the focus of two recent collections of essays: Rehberg (2011); Boublil and Daigle (2013). Poellner’s essay in the *Blackwell Companion to Nietzsche* (2009) also addresses the question how far Nietzsche anticipates central tenets of phenomenology in the twentieth century. In making the comparison, the first task is to be clear about key features of a phenomenological method. Poellner’s essay provides a useful and critical introduction to what is at stake, identifying several broad features of any philosophy claiming to be in that tradition. It has been seen above how Safranski put forward a seemingly looser criterion, which he describes as proceeding through a close attention to consciousness. Poellner treats it as a focus on ‘what is given, as given’ to consciousness. In either case, the supposition is that it anticipates Husserl in the suspension of what he labelled the ‘natural attitude’, to try to understand the grounds and structure of conscious experience and the relations between different aspects of it free of the kind of conceptual pre-judgements delivered through scientific and everyday theorising.
In his essay, Poellner (2009) begins by identifying some conflicting claims made by Nietzsche concerning the primacy we should want to accord to self-conscious awareness of our mental states. It has been seen how Nietzsche is critical of consciousness having its origin in a common language directed on mundane concerns. Nevertheless, Poellner emphasises that Nietzsche grants it a causal efficacy as an influencing state of mind, for example in the case of feelings of ressentiment. As a feeling or attitude towards life, ressentiment influences how a person experiences the world. Poellner includes it in a kind he labels ‘phenomenal consciousness’, by which he says he means the subjective character of our experiences of things, and more precisely, the character which we take these things as having, seen ‘from this point of view’ (p.311, fn.1). I take the implication here along the lines that something may be experienced by a subject as, say, laudable or despicable, according to his or her ‘perspective’, and that this consists in a self-conscious awareness of that thing as ‘given’ in that way, ie as laudable or despicable. Accordingly, there is a ‘content’ to this conscious experience of the thing in question, which includes the thing’s despicability or otherwise as being among its characteristics, as something which the perceiving subject self-consciously experiences. Primarily concerned with Nietzsche’s anticipation of a ‘phenomenological turn’ in the history of philosophy, Poellner takes this in a broadly Husserlian sense, to identify three basic commitments of a ‘phenomenological’ philosophy. Rehberg’s introduction (2011) similarly provides a list of commitments by which to make the comparison with a phenomenological philosophy. In the exposition which follows, I draw closely on their summaries.

First, there is a concern to describe aspects of the subject’s own relation to the world. This is the sense in which a phenomenologist starts from things as they are given in experience, ‘privileged’ the phenomena in seeking to understand consciousness directed on a world of objects. Poellner explains how the ‘content’ of a subject’s perception of, say, a tree is given in its representation as a tree, with the supposition of ‘unseen’ sides in perceiving its three-dimensionality found to depend on other ‘constitutive’ features of the subject’s experience of things, notably connected with conscious awareness of ourselves as self-moving. These features of the way in which consciousness itself is ‘directed’ on the world determine the character of an ‘intentional’ object, which is to say, of an object given to us in our conscious self-awareness of it. Poellner (p.299) notes that this intentional content is understood at a level of meaning which eschews the notion of a ‘real’ object. This is marked by what Husserl calls the suspension of our ‘natural attitude’, ie of our attitude in supposing we are talking about an object taken as existing externally to any possible perceiver. Rehberg emphasises the object’s ‘intentional inexistence’, meaning that the content of the subject’s perceptual awareness of it is still an object, distinct from the act of perceiving it, but with regard to which it is irrelevant if it should turn out, after all, to be a hallucination, or non-existent in the way that we deny, for example, the reality of unicorns. Rehberg notes Brentano’s claim that ‘in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love, loved, in hate, hated, in desire, desired, and so on’. This is the sense in which an experience is always of something, directed on an object.

Second, as a matter of methodology, this description proceeds through a focus on things just as they are given to consciousness, in their ‘phenomenal character’. Rehberg explains it will consist in trying to ‘see’ phenomena free of the kind of prior conceptions we have adopted,
for example when following ‘common sense’ or through the lens of a religious or scientific education. It is Husserl’s injunction to go ‘back to the things themselves’. Poellner raises the question how anything can be ‘given as it is given’ without some conceptual ‘theory’, that what we are seeing is, say, a hammer. Poellner calls upon a distinction Husserl makes between habituations, by which we can recognise something as a hammer, and theories, such as about its atomic constituents, from which we are free to withhold assent. Noting that at stake here is a question whether the object of a perceptual experience determines the identity of that experience, Poellner treats this as a straightforwardly metaphysical question concerning the ‘reality’ of the object and insists on the questioner having to start from things being what we take them to be, to be able in any case to raise such a question whether they may under some circumstances be different. In respect of an order of rank and the feelings tied to it, it can be granted Nietzsche is anticipating a phenomenological method in seeking to resist the influence of concepts which originate in language, taking this in Husserl’s sense of ‘bracketing’ experience. But while the phenomenologist targets theoretical presuppositions which stand to be revealed by this method, it can be expected that Nietzsche directed it as much against the so-called ‘habitualities’ which Poellner gives some immunity.

Furthering the comparison with Nietzsche, with regard more to metaphysics, Poellner recommends the phenomenological method need not be associated with identifying ‘transcendental’ conditions of the possibility of perceptual knowledge. The focus must be, he says, on what pertains to the representation of an object for beings such as us. For example, there may be creatures capable of representations of spatial relations which do not have the kind of ‘visual’ character they have for us. Our concern is with the human world, Heidegger’s Dasein. Where Poellner seeks to accommodate what might otherwise be regarded as an anthropic bias in Nietzsche, Rehberg (2011), by contrast, addresses what she takes to be a generally anthropic bias in phenomenology, at odds then with a Nietzschean repudiation of the supposition that any particular perspective might be privileged. For Rehberg, Nietzsche allows the human perspective is just another manifestation of material becoming. The process of dismantling ‘extraneous impositions’ on phenomena, to ‘see’ them as they are given to experience, is then, she says, itself a transformative process, transforming the phenomena, and not conducted on the basis that there could be a view of them free of all presuppositions. No set of phenomena are privileged, as Nietzsche indicates in the distorting influence generally of consciousness as a herd perspective. Still, Rehberg relies on an underlying ‘Nietzschean’ metaphysics of will to power, to allow that all we experience as conscious phenomena is epiphenomenal on a struggle of competing forces in a flux of material becoming.

The difficulty here of an anthropocentric bias in phenomenology is a critical one, addressed in Husserl’s own rejection of the charge of ‘psychologism’ and his injunction to ‘return to the things themselves’. For Husserl, objectivity is to be sought in transcendental conditions. But in whatever way these tensions are worked out in phenomenological philosophies, Rehberg makes the point that their tenets are not fixed, and that Nietzsche’s own explorations of the relevant issues provide the opportunity for a ‘cross-fertilisation’ of ideas. On Poellner’s overview, the problems which surround a strictly Husserlian objectivity are less pressing. With the admission of so-called ‘habitualities’ among the phenomena of human lived experience, Nietzsche’s ‘methodology’ is taken in a much looser sense, simply as
dismantling pre-conceptions. By extension, it admits what Nietzsche takes to be of interest and importance to our own lives, though it effectively concedes the ‘psychologism’ Husserl sought to avoid and which Rehberg identifies as privileging a particularly human perspective. An appropriate response here may be to allow along the simpler lines exemplified by Safranski’s (2002) reading of Dawn, that if Nietzsche demonstrated a phenomenological method, it lies in his close inspection and attentiveness to the ‘phenomena’ of consciousness, to dismantle common motivations and prejudices and elucidate a ‘rich life of the consciousness’.

So much suffices in marking Nietzsche’s anticipation of a more strictly ‘phenomenological’ method. It is the starting point in ‘lived experience’ which has prompted a stronger comparison with Husserl’s phenomenology, and developments of it by Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and so on. The comparison might be warranted in as much as later philosophers have in any case drawn on Nietzsche. It is then still a matter of interpreting Nietzsche, and it can be questioned whether, for example, Sartre’s claim that we are inescapably free to choose, is anticipated by him. The justification for approaching Nietzsche from a more recently phenomenological perspective is central to Daigle and Boubil’s (2013) collection of essays. Daigle’s own position is drawn on a piece by Boehm, from 1962, and leads the first section of their collection of readings. Boehm identifies a common starting point in Husserl and Nietzsche, notably in what is given in experience, and he positions them as opposing viewpoints on a ‘plane’ he takes in terms of a Leibnizian metaphysics, whereby Nietzsche’s talk of will to power admits a notion of mutually combative Leibnizian monads as centres of force, with every monad a subject standing in relation to another subject, and each an ‘object’ to the other through their mutual relations. This is taken then by Boehm as licensing a claim that the opposition of Husserl’s objectivist rationalism to Nietzsche’s subjectivism is only marking points of view on a Leibnizian ‘plane’, ‘on which neither one nor the other would be able to dominate in an absolute sense’, given that both acknowledge a starting point in this Leibnizian notion of a ‘subject’ and its point of view, and there is only this ‘plane’ of subjects. Daigle (2013) then relies on this accommodation of Nietzsche to Husserl to underscore the perspectivist notion of an individual subject as ‘a multifaceted and labyrinthic being that constructs itself via its intentional experience of the world’, and where this supplies the sense of ‘colouring’ the world. It is the world of ‘lived experience’, as required by Nietzsche’s one-world metaphysics in How the Real World became a Fable, but Daigle treats him as implicitly engaged in a phenomenological reduction ‘to go back to the things we have “coloured”’ (2013, p.29), ie to return to lived experience uncoloured by presuppositions.

On my understanding of the steps in Daigle’s justification for reading Nietzsche from a Husserlian perspective, she does not establish it must be privileged in the way she assumes, simply on the basis of Boehm’s supposition of a Leibnizian ‘plane’ of viewpoints. Nor does Daigle address the character of any particular phenomenon which could have concerned Nietzsche, whose subjectivism is implicit in a wider ranging account of the relation of art and life. It is in any case too constricting to approach Nietzsche only from the perspective of a particular philosophical framework. Babette Babich, in her contribution in the same volume, notes at the outset that a range of views may be classed as broadly phenomenological. For Babich, the return to ‘lived experience’ admits a critique of science and knowledge, but she highlights Nietzsche’s interest in the phenomenon of dissonance in music. It is taken as
existing in tension with the illusory musical beauty which would otherwise mask it. Dissonance then provides an example of Nietzsche’s concern with actual phenomena, and, Babich emphasises, on the basis of a practical experience of what is ‘possible’. That is to say, the experience is an emergent one, gained through its performance. It is not gained in the way Nietzsche criticised his contemporaries for seeking to understand Ancient Greek tragedy through scholarly, philological study of the texts, ignoring the significance of music for understanding tragedy as it was understood in Ancient Greece.

The issues here are relevant to the emphasis Nietzsche puts on an order of rank and the feelings tied to it. The pathos of distance is a matter of perspective, and it may be brought to consciousness through this ‘phenomenological’ method of beginning from appearances. Nietzsche claims in *The Philosopher* (Breazeale, pp.24-25) and in *Dawn* (119) that a process of selection already occurs at the unconscious level of an organism’s physiology. Various ‘drives’ compete for their expression in conscious thought and feeling. In Nietzsche’s example, we can react differently to a particular occurrence, such as someone’s laughing as we happen to walk by, according to whatever drive is uppermost in us on that occasion. In conscious thinking, we will have selected from a profusion of images, which are, he says, ‘the finest emanations of nervous activity as it is viewed on the surface’ (p.24), with this selection itself already physiologically determined. But this need not be taken as a straightforward appeal to scientific findings. I examine this in chapter 6, below, but it can be noted here that in *Dawn* (119), where Nietzsche talks of ‘drives’, he is also clear that he is speaking in images (2011, p.89). In *The Philosopher* (Breazeale, 1979, p.23), he is explicit that it is an aesthetic consideration which is decisive: ‘the knowledge drive is mastered by the imagination’. It accounts for our ascribing value to the philosophy of Heraclitus, in spite of it being poorly demonstrated, he says.

If this admits a ‘phenomenological’ method of inquiry, I take it as a matter of the feelings tied by Nietzsche to the symbolic imagery of height and distance, encountered, for example, in his reading of Emerson. It is clear that deference to the kind of conceptualisation which follows on the development of language is obstructive to the intellectual activity at issue here. But it is in both respects, a return to what is formed in the imagination which is important, both in inquiry and in settling the question of value. It acknowledges something ‘invisible’ to consciousness, but what is experienced already informs the judgment made. With regard particularly to higher feelings, these are among the states which Nietzsche refers to in *Dawn* (40) as the ‘fleeting, inchoate feelings’ lost to social rituals and prescriptions. As such, they occupy the periphery of consciousness. How, then, does Nietzsche express and communicate these states? If his texts have an effect on us, then they do so through his use of imagery, along with matters of style and tone, employed as much in his most theoretical claims, and which are dependent, then, upon the sensibilities of his readers. As such, the ‘method’ of discovery is comparable to experiencing Caspar David Friedrich’s painting of the woman at the window. But as a programmatic method of inquiry, it can be expected that such feelings will be lost again. That is only to say that a reductive approach to key features of an image may be detrimental to experiencing the feelings tied to it. It may be granted, then, in general terms, that Nietzsche is a ‘proto-phenomenologist’. After all, he is focused on actual phenomena of experience. But it is a matter of how the imagery and metaphor he uses brings to consciousness the ‘higher’ emotion which he found
in Emerson as the attainment of a higher self-possession. This is not so much a 'method' of close scrutiny of consciousness, as a direct intuition delivered through a symbolic use of figurative language.

4.5) summary

It was seen in this chapter how Nietzsche grants a peripheral experience of higher feeling is enabled in dissociating a figurative use of language from its linguistic meaning. So much is implied by his account of the origins of consciousness in a herd language which obscures these ‘rarer’ feelings. As such, it is a matter of returning to ‘pre-linguistic’ states at the very boundary of consciousness. This raises questions around a ‘method’ of their re-discovery. And my starting point here was in Safranski’s claim that Nietzsche proceeds through a close attentiveness to consciousness to undermine and unravel the presumptions of herd thinking. I took this as indicating a broadly negative scrutiny of people’s motivations and interests. By contrast, I contend there is a positive role for symbols in enabling a direct intuition (Anschauung) of these peripheral states of consciousness.

As such, I agree Marsden’s point, that it is not a matter of looking harder or more closely at things. But I also diverge from Marsden in emphasising a feature of things which is operative here. I offered an illustration in Caspar David Friedrich’s Woman at the Window. Its affective power is a petite perception, and this experience is dependent on giving less emphasis to allegorical readings of the picture. Nietzsche relies on the symbolic character of images and figurative language, and need not be taken as depending upon a phenomenological method as such. That is to say, ‘rarer’ states are not delivered through a closer scrutiny of consciousness. Rather, at stake here is a kind of ‘immersion’ in experience. I expand on this in chapter 6.
Chapter 5: symbol

5.1) introduction

In *The Over-Soul*, Emerson describes what he calls a ‘higher self-possession’ (1995, p.135). Life is experienced fragmentally in space and time, in separation from others, but there is, he says, a ‘whole’ within us. We feel ‘there is another youth and age than that which is measured from the year of our natural birth’ (p.133). It is the ‘wise silence’, mankind’s ‘pure nature’ or ‘common heart’ expressed in wisdom, virtue, power and beauty. In the company of other people we become aware of what is unifying in it. Interacting with others, we recognise containment in the *Over-Soul*, the ‘eternal One’. This recognition informs a ‘higher self-possession’, and is lost in asserting an egoistic, individual will against others. Emerson draws a comparison with justice. While we may anticipate a day on which justice will be served, and however indeterminate that day may seem to us, still our sensibility of justice is immediately present, he says. This is because justice and our sensibility of it are identical, being integral to the soul which contains us. As such, the eternal in us is something we already feel is separable from its particular, finite expression. Emerson says it shines from us. It is an evolving self-expression in a divided world of finite individuals and their interrelations.

Nietzsche could have recognised this higher self-possession, *hoheres Selbstbewusstensein* (Emerson, 1858, p.204), in his own engagement with Emerson, through Emerson’s texts. After all, Nietzsche calls him *Bruder-Seele*. In this chapter, I argue that Nietzsche envisages the character of Zarathustra as a focus of this kind of engagement, but, crucially, in the way that Zarathustra’s speech is dependent on a use of figurative language and symbol to communicate the feelings which inform higher self-possession, and which are gained, as it were, in engaging with that language. Book II of *Zarathustra* begins with Zarathustra concerned for the reception of his teaching by his friends and enemies. It is key to issues I address in this chapter that Zarathustra is in a certain sense identical with that teaching. I draw this identity in terms of the theory of symbol outlined in previous chapters. It is implicit in Nietzsche’s construction of *Zarathustra* as itself a kind of Creuzerian *Symbolik*, in which the characterisation of Zarathustra in imagery of height and descent is grounded in an identity of symbol and the feelings it signs.

The higher self-possession Emerson talks of is a kind of sublime, and the conditions under which its experience is possible and the forms of its expression in his own texts are the basis of Nietzsche’s *Dionysian* art, and of Zarathustra’s teaching. It will be seen how Zarathustra’s identity with his teaching is indicated in the dream he has, in which he sees himself reflected in a mirror held to him by a child. As the image of his ‘teaching’ (*Lehre Bildness*), Zarathustra’s reflection indicates the degree of his own self-possession. He must ‘descend’ again to mankind because its attainment depends upon engaging with others in just the way that Emerson had indicated. I shall emphasise it is the imagery and symbolism in this talk of ‘descent’ which is important, because it carries a subject’s identity with the ‘world’ he experiences. Nietzsche’s text is itself a mirror held to the reader, and the reader exercises the sensibility which would deliver the same self-possession. Crucially, it is the operation of imagery as a pre-linguistic symbolism on which that sensibility is drawn.
As such, the symbolism may be taken as a language of nature, *Natursprache*. At stake is the soul's self-realisation in activity, in creating meaning and value. It is important that Zarathustra's teaching should be drawn as a lesson on the use of language as 'parable', because the self-possession he and his 'disciples' stand to gain depends upon this return to a language of nature, in contrast to the developed language of concepts and ideas which make up our sense of an egoistic, individuated self. With Nietzsche seeking to communicate what he finds in Emerson, the account I give of Zarathustra's 'lesson' on parable in *On the Bestowing Virtue*, will emphasise the role that *Natursprache* has in enabling return to nobler feeling. This is not at odds with denying the possibility of standing as it were outside language. Gary Shapiro (1989), for example, explains how Zarathustra's seeming 'discourse' on metaphor can be taken as indicating its inescapability generally. There is no available reduction under which metaphor may be understood, say, in relation to our biological make-up and the interests and concerns tied to it, because our understanding of the body is itself already drawn on a complex of relations taken metaphorically.

Shapiro appeals to Derrida (1982), saying it is not a 'theory' or explanation of metaphor which Zarathustra offers, but that he places the concept of metaphor 'under erasure'. It is a sense in which we are bound to depend upon it, while allowing 'language and the concepts embedded in it' stand to be used 'artfully' (1989, pp.53-60). Its use then can be playful, subversive, and so on. But it also follows that the supposition of something like an instinctive inclination towards hierarchical orderings, expressed and communicated in images and language, may be similarly taken. That is to say, the notion of an 'order of rank', its integration as *Natursprache*, or the possibility of identifying a physiological ground, may all be taken equally, 'under erasure'. The issues here will be addressed in more detail in the next chapter, where they count as broadly 'metaphysical' questions.

In examining the speech Zarathustra makes to his disciples on receiving their gift of a walking-staff, Shapiro interprets the design of the staff's handle, which is made of gold and is in the form of a snake-encircled orb. While Shapiro notes its immediate status as an image, he treats it allegorically, as encoding Zarathustra's teaching. Zarathustra's claim that what we take to be names of the virtues is, after all, only metaphor, has its metaphorical expression in the design of the staff, whereby Zarathustra's 'gift' in return to his disciples is a 'glowing collection of metaphors surrounded by a wisdom which encircles or is tied to the metaphorical itself' (1989, p.59). I shall argue in place of this that Nietzsche does indeed distinguish a particular understanding of the role of figurative language. But with the distinction between a use of allegory or parable drawn on substituting meanings of terms, and a *Symbolik* taken in the way that Creuzer distinguished symbolic from allegorical meaning, I shall argue for a strong claim, that Nietzsche is attacking the use of allegory and parable wherever they lend themselves to interpretation drawn on the decayed language of contemporary culture and belief. The argument here depends upon a close reading of Zarathustra's use in this context of the key terms, *Gleichnis*, and *Abbild*.

Shapiro says it is the image of the staff which is ambiguous (1989, p.54). But, strictly, this is not so. It is its developed role as a linguistic sign which introduces the ambiguity, in its openness to interpretation. In Creuzer's own metaphor, these interpretations are the diffuse,
rainbow colouring of a cloud-obscured sun. In contrast to this, the symbol is ‘radiant’ in our direct perception of it. I address the character of this perception (Anschauung) in what follows. In the absence of linguistic meaning, it does not follow that it has to be a kind of supernatural insight or intuition. The character of Anschauung here is sensual in as much as the ‘content’ of the symbol is identical with its un-interpreted image, given in perception. Zarathustra’s speech on his staff is a lesson in ‘parable’ in which the point of focus is the lustre of the gold, not the ornamental design of the staff. It is this lustre which provides the over-arching metaphor for a radiant symbol and its perception, where this perception stands to be distinguished from knowledge framed in terms of ‘meaning’, and constitutes the soul’s self-realisation or possession.

In The Child and the Mirror, it is a Symbolik of ‘descent’ which informs the higher self-possession gained in engaging with nature and with other individuals. This engagement has a phenomenal character marked as a kind of ‘dissonance’ in perception. It will be seen how dissonance was central to the thought of Friedrich Hölderlin. It is taken up by Nietzsche, and it is a feature of his portrait of Wagner, in Richard Wagner in Bayreuth. It can be found in Emerson, too, in remarks which, in romantic terms, address the ‘dissonance’ in turning to the world to aim beyond it:

What splendid distance, what recesses of ineffable pomp and loveliness in the sunset! But who can go where they are, or lay his hand or plant his foot thereon? (1995, p.272)

Nietzsche has marked this in his edition (Emerson, 1858). And more heavily marked where Emerson, having asked rhetorically if we are betrayed and derided by nature, continues:

One look at the face of heaven and earth lays all petulance at rest, and soothes us to wiser convictions. (p.272)

It is neither a matter of looking to Emerson’s writings for an enabling key to unlock meanings in Nietzsche’s texts, or of supposing Nietzsche makes a ‘playful’ or ironic use of them. Rather, he was receptive to what Emerson marks as feelings towards the eternal. My focus is the connection this emotion has to imagery in which it is expressed and communicated in Emerson’s writings. The primary text in respect of Nietzsche’s own attempted communication is Zarathustra. Its significance lies in it comprising Nietzsche’s own Symbolik.

5.2) the child with the mirror

The second part of Zarathustra opens with Zarathustra declaring his love for mankind. He wants to return to mankind and is prompted to do so by a dream. In the dream, a child invites him to look in a mirror and Zarathustra sees the reflected image of a devil laughing at him. He goes on to interpret this as warning that his ‘teaching’ is in danger. He then experiences a blissful transformation and wants to descend again to mankind, to speak and ‘bestow’ (schenken). His speech will be creative, violently new and terrifying, he says, directed at his friends and enemies who live in the Blessed Isles. The language employed here is drawn throughout on imagery of height and descent. Zarathustra says:
I have become mouth through and through, and a brook’s bounding from high boulders. I want to plunge my speech down into the valleys (2006, p.64)

Interpreting his dream, Zarathustra says the danger to his teaching is in weeds wanting to be wheat. In the notes to his translation, Parkes takes this as referencing the parable of the weeds in Matthew 13, 24-30 (Nietzsche, 2005(b), p.297). In the Bible story, weeds are sown by an enemy amongst a farmer’s wheat. The farmer is unable to discover this until harvest time. For Christians, the ‘meaning’ of the parable may be that false religious teachings must be tolerated in advance of God’s Judgement Day. It will be seen below that Nietzsche addresses the very nature of parables and ascription of meaning. The ‘account’ voiced by Zarathustra is itself presented in imagery and metaphor, but a clear position is discernible, though its expression and communication is a matter of its affectivity.

In II (2), on reaching the Blessed Isles, Zarathustra says he is ‘a north wind to ripe figs’ and that his teachings fall to friends and enemies as ripe figs. A comparison here is with On Free Death, in Part I, where Zarathustra says we might welcome the storm which shakes down rotten and maggoty fruit, hung too long on the branch. It is notable that Emerson, in The Over-Soul, employs this imagery of ripe fruit shaken by the storm:

The things we now esteem fixed shall, one by one, detach themselves, like ripe fruit, from our experience, and fall. The wind shall blow them none knows whither. The landscape, the figures, Boston, London, are facts as fugitive as any institution past, or any whiff of mist or smoke, and so is society, and so is the world. The soul looketh steadily forwards, creating a world alway before her, and leaving worlds alway behind her. She has no dates, nor rites, nor persons, nor specialties, nor men. The soul knows only the soul. All else is idle weeds for her wearing. (1995, pp.133-134)

Emerson means ‘weeds’ in the sense of widow’s weeds, to indicate the soul is only clothed in a commonplace understanding of the world and our relations with others. In Nietzsche’s German edition of the Essays (1858), it is mistranslated: Alles andere ist Unkraut für sie. Nietzsche has margin-lined the passage, marking the point about the illusory solidity of social relations and institutions.

It need not be supposed that Nietzsche, in using the Bible parable of the weeds, was echoing Unkraut in his German Emerson. Nevertheless, it does serve to highlight a question around Zarathustra’s teaching delivered as parable (Gleichnis). The claims I make for the role Nietzsche accords to imagery depend on an understanding of images being what they sign, so it must be asked in what sense Zarathustra’s resort to speaking in parable should be taken. The answer is already implicit in Zarathustra’s ‘teaching’, but some useful points on how to approach it are made by Hillis Miller (1985) in his discussion of the account Nietzsche gives in Ecce Homo of his inspiration for Zarathustra. Hillis Miller notes that the word Gleichnis is ambiguous between metaphor and parable, and that in Nietzsche’s use it has been variously translated. He notes it was the term used by Martin Luther for the stories told by Jesus. And in marking Nietzsche’s claim in Ecce Homo that he is a mouthpiece for what was formerly invisible and inaudible, he offers a connection with Biblical language of apocalypse and revelation. It could be countered here that in talking of a sense of revelation
(Offenbarung), Nietzsche may as easily be taken as referencing Emerson’s remarks concerning the sublime self-recognition of the soul’s own nature (1995, p.137), which I examine in more detail below. But Hillis Miller’s point remains, that it is revelation through a language of metaphor. He goes on to claim it is neither the literal, nor the figurative significance of this language which is operative in Nietzsche’s inspiration, but rather the way in which things are, as it were, self-revealing. He draws the appropriate contrast with allegory and the substitution of meaning in other terms. And when Nietzsche says things come to the poet ‘to ride on his back’, and that the poet will ride on them to truth, Hillis Miller treats the sense of transport here in connection with insight and elevation.

I shall develop these points in relation to a key image in Zarathustra, of the child with the mirror (2006, p.63). Through it, Nietzsche expresses what is at stake here. A basis for his use of this image can be found in Greek mythology and also in a passage in Plotinus. In myth, Dionysus was torn apart when turning his back to look in a mirror. Represented as a child, it may be Dionysus offering the mirror to Zarathustra, but Zarathustra’s immanent descent to his friends is also a ‘dismemberment’ in descending to plurality, to the created world of individuals. In The Enneads IV (3,12), Plotinus refers to a ‘mirror’ of Dionysus in connection with the soul’s descent:

The souls of men, seeing their images in the mirror of Dionysus as it were, have entered into that realm in a leap downward from the Supreme: yet even they are not cut off from their origin, from the divine Intellect; It is not that they have come bringing the Intellectual Principle down in their fall; it is that though they have descended even to earth, yet their higher part holds for ever above the heavens. (1991, p.265)

My contention is that the image of Zarathustra’s self-reflection has symbolic import in a broadly Emersonian understanding of immanent divinity in nature. The imagery of mirror and descent is founded in the symbolism of Dionysus, as a fractured unity of self and self-image, and of creator and creation. In Nietzsche’s use, it indicates Zarathustra’s identity with his ‘teaching’, both originally and in his ‘fallen’ condition through which an original unity stands to be regained.

Zarathustra’s reflected image as a devil also recalls the imagery in section (8) of The Birth of Tragedy, where Nietzsche considers nature symbolised as bearded satyr, in contrast to conventionally pastoral imagery of fluting shepherds. Nietzsche is addressing ‘Dionysian arousal’ in Greek drama, and how, in the chorus of dancing satyrs, the spectator identifies with untamed nature, with man’s ‘strongest impulses’, away from social convention. The structure of the theatre encourages the identity. No longer one among an audience of cultured individuals, he is the ‘sole beholder’, surrendering his individuality and being transformed. The original dramatic phenomenon, Nietzsche says, is ‘to see oneself transformed before one’s very eyes […] to act as if one had really entered into another body and another character’. This is a kind of enchantment. Crucially, it consists in fusing with the image, not in the kind of detached observation typical of lesser poets. It is a communication discharged in images:
[under this enchantment] the Dionysian enthusiast sees himself as satyr, \textit{and as satyr he in turn beholds the god}, that is, transformed in this way he sees a new vision outside himself, as the Apollonian completion of his state. With this vision, the drama is complete. (2000, p.50)

This is a self-revelation of the ‘true’ man, of something sublime and divine, of the unveiled ‘handwriting’ of nature.

In Part 1, I made a case that Nietzsche was sensitive to visual imagery, particularly in relation to descriptions of natural phenomena and the use of a nature symbolism in Emerson’s writings. In Nature, Emerson declares that nature is loved by what is best in us (1995, p.264). The claim is among those underlined by Nietzsche. Emerson explains he does not mean a simple appreciation of nature conceived in its passive aspect, as creation, as \textit{natura naturata}. There is, in any case, a kind of embarrassment, he says, in praising nature in that way. We do so in relief from our own failings, as we might look at portraits of royalty on the walls of a palace, he says, for relief from the mundane activity of the palace workers. And in any case, this passive aspect of nature need not be regarded reverentially at all. It can be fitted to selfish concerns, as astronomy, for example, supported astrology.

In place of this understanding of nature, Emerson turns to \textit{natura naturans}, whereby nature is conceived as a creative, Protean force:

\begin{quote}
... its works driven before it in flocks and multitudes (as the ancient represented nature by Proteus, a shepherd) and in undescrivable variety. It publishes itself in creatures, reaching from particles and specula, through transformation on transformation to the highest symmetries ... (1995, p.265)
\end{quote}

Nietzsche has marked the passage. Emerson takes it to be a similar process of metamorphosis or transformation which is implicit in the Over-Soul’s disclosure to us, when we attain the kind of ‘higher self-possession’ in which, he says, the soul knows itself, away from the character of its everyday transactions with others. The soul’s advances are taken to be of a ‘certain \textit{total} character’, by which Emerson does not mean a linear process of betterment, but access to a kind of purity and ascension to a ‘primary and aboriginal sentiment’. It is a transformation, like that from egg to worm, and from worm to fly (1995, p.134).

Also lined is Emerson’s declaration that, while we live in succession and in parts,

\begin{quote}
within man is the soul of the whole; the wise silence, the universal beauty, to which every part and particle is equally related; the eternal ONE. (p.131)
\end{quote}

And Nietzsche has marked several sentences where Emerson talks of a unity of thought in individuals, a ‘certain wisdom of humanity’ which is not the property of any individual as such (p.135). Where Emerson says, ‘Men descend to meet’ (\textit{Die Menschen lassen sich gegenseitig zu einander herab}), Nietzsche has underlined \textit{zu einander}. He has partly marked, as well, a remark that individuals display an ‘external poverty’ while owning in reserve an inner richness identified as ‘the image of the whole soul’, but which stands to be recognised in dealings with other individuals. The case I am making here is for a collision of
imagery in Emerson and Nietzsche, centred on a ‘higher self-possession’ encountered in ‘descent’ to man, in the way that Emerson allows the soul will come to know itself.

In I (16), Zarathustra teaches ‘the creating friend who always has a complete world to bestow’ (2006, p.45). This can be taken in the way that Emerson talks of higher self-possession. Zarathustra contrasts what he marks as ‘bad love’ of ourselves, consisting in a self-deceiving need to be thought of well by others nearest us, our neighbours. It is a contrast with anticipation of the overman in love of the ‘furthest’, in love of the friend. In this respect, Zarathustra’s teaching stands to be identified in his own self-image. As the image of his teaching (Lehre Bildness), Zarathustra must be satyr, not devil. He sees a devil because, withdrawn from the world and from creating, he is unknown to himself. On descending, he would be satyr, because he identifies with surging, active nature. In another passage marked by Nietzsche, Emerson writes:

We distinguish the announcements of the soul, its manifestations of its own nature, by the term Revelation. These are always attended by the emotion of the sublime. For this communication is an influx of the Divine mind into our mind. It is an ebb of the individual rivulet, before the flowing surges of the sea of life. (1995, p.137)

Nietzsche has underlined ‘sublime’. In drawing these comparisons with Emerson, my contention is that Nietzsche found the sublimity of ‘rarer’ feeling communicated in this use of symbolism drawn on the key imagery of ‘descent’.

A comparison also stands to be made here with the writings of Jacob Boehme. In the case of Emerson, familiarity with Boehme’s work is easily granted (Wellek, 1943). In his essay on Swedenborg, Emerson (2004) offers this sketch of Boehme (Behmen):

He is tremulous with emotion and listens awe-struck, with the gentlest humanity, to the Teacher whose lessons he conveys; and when he asserts that, ’in some sort, love is greater than God,’ his heart beats so high that the thumping against his leathern coat is audible across the centuries.

The central tenet of Boehme’s theology is that God attains self-realisation through creation, in confrontation with opposition. I rely on Beach’s exposition (1994). In the beginning is an undifferentiated unity which Boehme identifies as the primordial Abyss, or Ungrund (das Nichts). God emerges in a struggle with opposition into a divisibility which consists in strife and through which he comes to know himself. Beach quotes from Von Gottlicher Beschaulichkeit:

If the Hidden God, who is but a Single Essence and Will, had not of his own will gone forth out of himself, if he had not issued out of the eternal knowing ... into a divisibility of the will, and had not the same divisibility into comprehensibility conducted to a natural and creaturely life, and were it not the case that this same divisibility in life consisted in strife – how else then could he have wanted the hidden will of God, who in himself is but One, to be revealed? How might a will within a Single Unity be a knowledge of himself?

The key point here is carried in a metaphor of mirroring. Beach puts it that God finds in finite creatures his own revelation reflected as in a mirror (p.70). Boehme calls it the ‘vegetable
mirror of nature’. Notably, it is a further feature of Boehme’s theology that he envisages the entry of the devil as ‘uncreation’.

As a timeless unity beyond human understanding, the relation God has to the fragmented world of our own limited understanding is problematic. It is original in Boehme’s approach, Beach says, that he reformulates the problem in terms of God unable to know himself without revealing himself, in creation, to himself. Beach writes:

Inasmuch as revelation consists in a kind of experience, it must require a structural subject/object polarity. Hence, it would follow that God’s self-revelation simultaneously implied the existence of a creation and creatures to whom, and through whom, the revelation would take place (1994, p.73)

If this idea is compelling, then its force is in indicating a re-sacralising of experience, familiar, say, as the kind of momentary transcendence communicated in music and art. Importantly, the force of Boehme’s own writing already depends upon its symbolic character.

As such, I contend it is the symbolism of Boehme’s ‘vegetable mirror’ which is picked up by Nietzsche. It is a revelatory experience, which Boehme sought to express through his own stylised use of language and imagery, and it cannot be avoided, that the deficiencies of conceptual language already threaten to obscure what is at stake. Emerson was alert to the kind of mysticism encouraged in the use of symbols. In The Poet, he singles out Boehme’s use of ‘morning-redness’ to stand for truth and faith, and says that Boehme mistook the subjective significance it had for him as being universal. Nietzsche has marked the text where Emerson says mysticism consists in an accidental and individual symbol being mistaken for a universal one (1995, p.197). Emerson goes on to call for universal signs in place of what he calls these ‘village’ symbols. But it is clear that he is pointing to the way in which symbols stand to be misinterpreted. That is to say, his criticism would apply equally to the interpretation of Biblical parables as allegory, and more generally.

In II (2), Zarathustra remarks how beautiful it is, from an Autumnal fullness of nature, to look out upon distant seas (Seht, welche Fülle ist um uns! Und aus dem Überflusse heraus ist er schön hinaus zu blacken auf ferne Meere). Where we might have said God, Zarathustra continues, he has taught us to say ‘overman’. Again the concern is with the sense in which divinity is to be sought in activity in nature, in mankind’s own self-possession as world-creator, not in an image of God, or of nature, as passive, everlasting, perfect.

Evil I call it and misanthropic: all this teaching of the one and the plenum and the unmoved and the sated and the everlasting! All that is everlasting – that is merely a parable! And the poets lie too much! But the best parables should speak about time and becoming: they should be praise and justification of all that is not everlasting! (2006, p.65)

In such ‘praise’, the ‘best parables’ will characterise Zarathustra’s ‘descent’. Inevitably, it is a descent into convention and society. In Emerson’s phrase, ‘Men descend to meet’. But in the book of nature, a person reads the image of the whole soul. Even while we deal in conventional, worldly terms with others, we are, Emerson says, ‘wiser than we know’, and from behind ourselves, ‘Jove nods to Jove’ (1995, p.136).
In *The Child with the Mirror*, Nietzsche is addressing an Emersonian higher self-possession and its discovery, symbolised in Zarathustra’s descent. Zarathustra’s ‘teaching’ is constituted as the very symbolism in which it is expressed, having higher self-possession as its ‘object’. In this respect, he is formed by it in the way that Marsden (2005) has argued in respect of Übermenschlichkeit. And this may be put as a unity of creator and creation, as a form of *Natursprache*. But it depends upon an understanding of a symbol being what it signs. In the next section, I find an example in the opening images of the first part of Wagner’s *Ring of the Nibelung*. Zarathustra’s higher self-possession stands, then, to be (re-)discovered as an identity of image and *pathos*, in imagery of height and distance communicating the ‘rarer’ feeling of a higher self-possession. I shall draw on this understanding of the symbolic use of language in examining the ‘lesson’ on parables in *On the Bestowing Virtue*. Zarathustra’s highest virtue will be taken as consisting in the voice he gives to the role and operation of language as *Natursprache*.

5.3) *Natursprache*

Issues around the place of Boehme’s writings in the development of German Idealist thought, and the strands in his thinking which reflect his own sources in Kabalistic and alchemical works, are outside the scope of this thesis. But it can be expected that Nietzsche was familiar with at least some aspects of Boehme’s theology, and the influence on Emerson is certainly allowable. If Emerson ‘follows’ Boehme in certain key respects, then it may be suspected Nietzsche was at least receptive to that influence through Emerson. There is a further context here in relation to Wagner’s music-drama, notably in the *Ring of the Nibelung*. The role Boehme assigns to a language of nature is apparent in Nietzsche’s assessment of Wagner’s music drama as dealing in a primordial language, through which we are returned to an original unity.

An account of Boehme’s thinking on language is provided by Weeks (1994). A divine language, identified with God’s creative activity, is written into the creation as *Natursprache*, the language of nature. In Boehme’s *Aurora*, it is spoken by Adam in his naming the animals. It has been noted already that in his survey of views on the origin of language (Blair, 1983) Nietzsche includes the Old Testament account in which God and man speak the same language and give things their names, and that he criticises this for already assuming what it seeks to explain. There would have to be an account of the origins of that language spoken by God. But this is not a point against the priority of language as such. Nietzsche goes on to cite Schelling in acknowledging language must be prior to consciousness. His criticism seems to be more simply directed against the naivety of the Old Testament story. In the essay, Nietzsche identifies the problem of reconciling the seeming purposefulness in life with its blind, unconscious origins, and takes the view that language is instinctive. In drawing the comparison with the instinctive behaviour of bees and ants, Nietzsche allows that language is expressed as the very activity of the organism. There is only the concluding quote from Schelling, and no mention of Boehme, but Nietzsche’s position in the essay is not incompatible with Boehme’s account in terms of God’s activity. It will in any case be seen
below how the notion of *Natursprache* is implicit in Wagner’s art, warranting Nietzsche’s own judgement in *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth* that he gave voice to nature (1995, p.314).

In Boehme’s primordial language, it is actual movements of the mouth, the phonetics, which Boehme treats as meaningful, because the same creative act is expressed in this embodied sound as in the created object or essential quality it names (Weeks, pp.76-77). A key example is Boehme’s analysis of *Erde* (earth), which Weeks explains. It is Boehme’s analysis of the workings of the primordial language which is important here. In the example of *Erde*, the syllables are formed as sounds made at the back of the throat, with *er*-checked by the contracting movement of the tongue making the second syllable. Thereby, Boehme says, it performs the reactive movement involved in the separation of earth out of water, and the narration in the opening sentence of the Bible then reiterates this primordial, creative act, or event.

I suggest the opening sounds of Wagner’s *Ring of the Nibelung* can be taken precisely along the lines of Boehme’s philosophy of language. Borchmeyer (2003) points out how the Rheinmaidens’ singing evolves out of the instrumental prelude, beginning only as vocal sounds, as onomatopoeia for the sound of the water they swim in:

- Weia! Waga!
- Waga, du Wella,
- Wella zur Wiege!
- Wagalaweia!
- Wallala Weiala weia!

Nietzsche talked of Wagner bringing language back to its primordial state. And it has been seen how the thesis in *On Truth and Lying* allows sound images are closer to the original creative impulse than the conceptual language which would follow. Here, speech evolves to mark abstract ideas of waves, the flow of water, and so on, in words. The key point is that out of the developing opening of the drama, Wagner’s sound images exemplify a *Natursprache*. Importantly, in this respect, the images already creatively are what they sign.

In section (7) of *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth*, Nietzsche talks of a mutual translation between ‘primal life’ and the world of visual phenomena in Wagner’s work. The spectator participates in Wagner’s own overflowing nature, both succumbing to it and empowered by it. It is a kind of distancing or self-alienation, demanding, Nietzsche says, ‘a mysterious antagonism, the antagonism of looking things in the face’, to participate through and against Wagner, to ‘view the world through many eyes’. Wagner is declared a ‘dithyrambic dramatist’ in this sense of making nature visible, and where this occurs, crucially, at a moment of tension, in a moment of joined emotions, joined between a feeling of distance or self-estrangement from the world of phenomena and a longing to return to it, out of love. There is a difficulty here in seeking to explain something which stands to be communicated only in the context of dithyrambic drama. That is to say, understanding it depends upon participation in something having the qualities of Wagner’s art. Nietzsche insists it is difficult to achieve at a level simply of speech, however much it calls upon a poetic kind of passionate phrasing. By contrast, through a joining of expression, gesture, and music, Wagner compels his audience ‘to adopt a new mode of understanding and experience, just as if suddenly their
senses had become more spiritual and their spirit more sensual ...’ (p.312). It is a participatory language of feeling. Nietzsche ends by drawing a parallel between the inhibited creativity of pre-Wagnerian composers and Wotan’s suffering under necessity, so that Wagner then is identified with the liberating, heroic Siegfried. In participation, the spectator is also liberated, from himself.

5.4) the bestowing virtue

In Zarathustra, I (22), Zarathustra is presented with a staff by his disciples. Its head is ornamented in gold, and designed as an orb encircled by a snake. But in his speech, he does not begin by addressing its design or by considering the concept of gold in connection, say, with its economic value. Zarathustra focuses only on its quality as lustrous. By comparison, in the opening to the first part of Wagner’s The Ring of the Nibelung, the Rheingold appears shining in sunlight through river water. In Bayreuth, the sunken orchestra pit provided that the audience did not see the musicians. As the stage-curtain opened, the Rheingold was a visual equivalent to the evolving sound-images of the Rheinmaidens’ singing. I noted above how Nietzsche characterised Wagner’s art as the return of ‘primal life’. Zarathustra’s emphasis on the gold’s lustre may be taken this way. Being what it signs in the symbolism of a primordial language, it expresses the primordial creative act which Zarathustra describes as movement out of oneself, as bestowal out of a state of accumulated abundance. Zarathustra declares it the highest virtue. It stands to be identified then as the impulse to Nietzsche’s own creation, Zarathustra.

In its structural detail, the serpent-encircled orb of Zarathustra’s staff is open to analyses in strictly allegorical terms as to what it may ‘symbolise’, or ‘mean’. Burnham & Jesinghausen (2010(a)) explain how in its context it is integral to the meaning Nietzsche gives to virtue and to talk of good and evil, given these are only ways of speaking. Nietzsche condemns as ‘degenerate’ those grounded in despising our natural, earthly lives. Zarathustra’s interpretation of the presented staff is taken then as symbolising the realignment of our bodily drives or instincts to a ruling drive to mastery, to bring about our transformation as achievers of the highest virtue, of ‘healthier and more powerful modes of life’. This depends upon a certain caution towards allegory or parable (Gleichniss), and the design of the staff is open to interpretation. As such, the realignment is indicated in the encircling snake, encircling the sun in an affirmation of life. Parkes (Nietzsche, 2005(b), p.296) identifies it as an analogical representation of the ring of eternal recurrence, symbolised by the snake’s coiling shape. At another level, the staff’s design provides a focus for an account of figurative language itself. In which case, it would be an allegorical treatment of the potential in allegory to unsettle conventional thought and language (Burnham & Jesinghausen, 2010(a), p.72). Zarathustra clearly seeks to unsettle the supposition that our ‘names’ of what is good and bad are expressions of objective truths, saying only a fool would seek knowledge on those terms. Speaking in ‘parable’ himself and declaring the voice of a new spring, Zarathustra only hints at where virtue must be sought.

Nevertheless, I contend there is a sense in which Zarathustra’s warning on the use of parables and similes (Gleichnisses) can be taken more strongly, as directed generally at
their use. In focusing on the lustre of the staff’s gold, in contrast to its shape and design, Zarathustra is indicating a turn away from language. It has been seen how the Rheinmaidens’ expressive singing in *The Ring of the Nibelung* is initially unshaped as words, and how this bears comparison with Boehme, as in his identification of the contracting movement in the syntax of *Erde* with the creation of earth out of water. It is the impulse to Wagner’s own creativity which has this pre-linguistic verbal and visual expression in the opening of *The Ring*. Where Boehme resorts to a syntactical juxtaposition of syllables, or Wagner joins visual and sound images as equivalent expressions of an originating musical impulse, so in Zarathustra’s first speech in I (22), his emphasis on the un-interpreted image (*Abbild*) of the lustre of gold is a primitive communication.

> Only as the image (*Abbild*) of the highest virtue did gold come to have the highest value. Goldlike gleams the gaze of the bestower.

While this can be fitted to a wider account of an original state and its evolutionary development and subsequent degeneration, Nietzsche depends upon it as an un-interpreted symbol. In Zarathustra’s starting from the image (*Abbild*) of gold, as lustre, Nietzsche indicates the role and significance of a *Natursprache*, as Wagner does at the beginning of *The Ring*. Nietzsche ‘hints’ at what is at stake in the use of such a symbolism, just as Zarathustra advises care with analogies. These can be hints in so far as they are experienced as images, but are open to detrimental interpretations when taken linguistically. Zarathustra’s ‘highest virtue’, expressed as golden lustre, *being* what it signs, lies in giving voice to nature, in the way of Nietzsche’s own expectations of Wagner’s art in the fourth Untimely Meditation.

Where Zarathustra, in his second speech in I (22), insists that meanings and interpretations be kept to bodily, human contexts, to ‘give the earth its meaning, a human meaning’ (2006, p.57), he is rejecting interpretations drawn on flight or escape from life. But the interpretation of analogies and similes is bound to be conducted in our common language. By contrast, the realisation of an art of the future will depend on sensitivity to the primordial, un-interpreted sound and visual images which are the closest expressions of the originating impulse to live and to create. The lustre of the gold, as an experience or phenomenon of watery, golden luminosity, carries its own meaning in the sense of *being what it signs*. It is not a likeness (*Gleichnis*) of something. As expressing rich, out-flowing abundance, its symbolic ‘meaning’ is given already in what it is, as a phenomenon. It is what it signs, and this is then its value, that it is immune to ambiguous interpretation. As the visual quality of gold, it is the primordial expression of an act of creative nature, of the kind of divine out-flowing from itself which Boehme articulated as God’s original creation, which Nietzsche visualises here as a gleam of gold, which Wagner joined to an evolving sound image at the outset of *The Ring*, and which Nietzsche joins to his own creation, Zarathustra, as Zarathustra’s sun-eye. It gives meaning to the earth because the created world of phenomena begins in the highest quality of the creator, in the creator’s out-flowing abundance or bestowing.

As creation, it is a descent to mankind, but in which there is an opportunity of self-realisation, of gaining the higher self-possession marked by Emerson as recognition of the Over-Soul, and which informs the sense of Zarathustra’s gift of the Overman. Such talk is drawn already
on an imagery of height and descent, on which feelings towards a higher self-possession depend for their expression and communication. In part 1, section (7), Zarathustra declares a hatred of ‘reading idlers’, who do not understand what is written in blood:

Whoever writes in blood and proverbs (Blut und Sprüchen) does not want to be read, but to be learned by heart (2006, p.28)

He goes on to talk of living at a height, of looking down where others look up. The happiness he declares is a higher feeling. And when he saw his devil, he says, it was the spirit of gravity through whom all things fall. The fallen here would be the reading idlers, like those in I (16) whose love of their neighbour is only their own bad love of themselves.

Zarathustra ‘flies’ and sees himself beneath him (p.29). Again, the imagery recalls the sense in which Nietzsche talked in The Birth of Tragedy of the spectator in Greek theatre overlooking the stage and taken up in a Dionysian excitement:

Involuntarily [the spectator] transferred the whole image of the god which trembles magically before his soul to [the masked figure on stage] and as it were dissolved its reality in a ghostly unreality. This is the Apollonian dream-state […] clearer, more intelligible, more gripping […] and yet more shadowy, in constant flux […] (2000, p.52)

The Dionysian stimulus is carried in Nietzsche’s use of imagery, in the language of elevation, flight and dancing, in I (7) for example. And it may be supposed that Nietzsche encountered just this feeling of elevation in reading Emerson. The sense of the eternal which is marked in Emerson’s talk of the over-soul stands to be encountered in relation to others, through which we recognise the best in us. As such, the feelings at stake have their basis in an intuition which is sensual, which is to say, in contrast to an insight into truth and value taken as occupying a world somehow beyond the natural world of our own experience.

5.5) sensualism

It has been seen how Zarathustra speaks against a traditionally theistic understanding of God as creator, first cause, complete in His self and everlasting. In its place, Zarathustra elevates mankind’s own creativity, tied to change and destruction. By comparison, Emerson talked of God being put in debt to man. Zarathustra says talk of God is misanthropic and life denying, and insists on parables of life in nature, through which we would create the Overman.

... let this mean will to truth to you; that everything be transformed into what is humanly thinkable, humanly visible, humanly feelable! You should think your own senses to their conclusion! (2006, p.65)

This is the constraint put on a suitable ‘likeness’, on parable and metaphor. Again, it is a suitability informed by Nietzsche’s reading of Emerson. Nietzsche voices Emerson’s ‘descent’ to mankind in a poetic language grounded in a ‘unity’ of sign and object, and which it has been seen is integral both to Nietzsche’s own philosophical concerns around the origin
of language and to the use he makes of imagery and metaphor centred on an imagery of height and distance.

In this section, I examine how it is constituted as a sensibility, taken as a kind of intuition (Anschauung). It was seen in Part 1 how this has been taken in terms of the initial influence on Nietzsche of a Schopenhauerean understanding of Anschauung, and with which Nietzsche came subsequently to contrast his own thinking. There is in any case a familiar difficulty in assessing an author’s use of a seemingly technical vocabulary, whether it is tied to a previously technical use at all, or relies on a commonly established word while applying it in a fresh context and effectively changing its meaning. I have already noted that Breazeale (1979), for example, has suggested Nietzsche’s use of Anschauung be taken in its simplest sense of ‘perceiving’. By contrast, Crawford (1988) claims it is tied by Nietzsche to the role of unconscious inferences in perception. The word, anyway, was widely used, and it does not have to be the case that Nietzsche was disputing its use by others so much as marking out the space of his own thinking against this broader context. Again, this would be in line with Del Caro’s recommendation (Gemes & Richardson, 2013). And it allows, for example, the supposition that Nietzsche’s understanding of Anschauung accords with his reading of Emerson, taking his use of imagery in its symbolic character. Carpenter (1953) makes a notable point in marking what he calls Emerson’s sensuous neo-platonism, meaning that Emerson’s regard for the transcendent is grounded in immersion in natural phenomena. His imagery is sensually rooted in nature and the world, and in emotions and feelings which are tied to it. The ruling image here is of Emerson’s ‘transparent eye’ and which stands in contrast, for example, to a cold and remote ‘immaculate perception’ (unbefleckten Erkenntnis) in Zarathustra, II (15). Anschauung, then, would be sensual in character.

Another ‘source’ is Hölderlin’s writings. Evidence of Nietzsche’s familiarity with Hölderlin’s work has been collected by Brobjer (2001, 2008). Brobjer (2001) begins with the known facts about Nietzsche’s 1861 Schulpforta school essay on Hölderlin and his reading Hölderlin through the 1870s. There is a record of Nietzsche acquiring an edition of the poetry around 1874. But disputing claims by previous commentators, Brobjer argues against the precocity of Nietzsche’s youthful interest in Hölderlin. He points out that the content of the school essay is mostly copied from a critical account of Hölderlin’s poetry and biography by William Neumann. And he notes that the style of the essay, in the form of a letter recommending Hölderlin’s poetry to a friend, was a teacher’s set task, not a rhetorical invention by Nietzsche. Brobjer acknowledges Nietzsche could have been attracted to details and events in Hölderlin’s biography matching his own. There is a similar pattern of interests and concerns along with both of them having early lost their fathers, and Brobjer acknowledges Nietzsche could have recognised his own self-confidence in Hölderlin. The point which Brobjer is particularly concerned to argue is that the book by Neumann must be recognised as an influence on Nietzsche as equally important as his encounter with Schopenhauer. For example, it is Neumann who emphasises the musicality of Hölderlin’s writing and sets out distinctions between plastic arts and music, and between individuality and its loss. Brobjer also identifies Neumann’s claim that Hölderlin declared the recurrence of all things. And he finds the notion of Ubermensch in Neumann as well, though he acknowledges the term was commonly used in the nineteenth century.
Görner's (2016) account of Hölderlin’s philosophy begins with a characterisation of idealism in terms of individuals’ separation from God or nature, from the original state of Being, or the Absolute, whereby the world is experienced under a relation of subject and object. For Hölderlin, Görner explains, the return to unity in an original self-awareness is drawn on a new ‘aesthetic sense’, to address ‘the divisions in which we think and exist’. This is not a matter of simple reflection, on something known in intuition. Hölderlin remarks in the preface to *Hyperion*, that ‘the resolution of the dissonances in a particular character is not for mere reflection or for empty desire’, and Görner compares this with a claim in an earlier preface, about the experience of beauty bringing us closer to an understanding of the original unity of Being. In the published preface, Hölderlin distinguishes two kinds of reader: one who reads his novel in the tone of its descriptive romanticism, and another approaching it as a treatise from which to learn something. Neither will understand it, Hölderlin says, because it is the resolution of just these dissonances which is at stake.

In his introduction to *Hyperion* (Hölderlin, 1990, p.xxvii), Santner points out a textual ‘pattern of oscillation’ in the novel, citing a passage in which Hyperion describes an emotional tension between feelings of oneness with nature and alienation from it:

> To be one with all that lives, to return to blessed self-forgetfulness into the All of Nature – this is the pinnacle of thoughts and joys, this the sacred mountain peak, the place of eternal rest [...] But an instant of reflection hurls me down. I reflect, and find myself as I was before – alone, with all the griefs of mortality, and my heart’s refuge, the world in its eternal oneness, is gone; Nature closes her arms, and I stand like an alien before her and do not understand her.

Hyperion recognises his life is a ‘torn playing of strings’, even as he hears the ‘astounding infinite consonance’ within him. Citing Adler and Louth (Hölderlin, 2009), Görner points to Hölderlin taking self-awareness in the way that the key note of a chord will resonate more fully within the chord than when it is played separately. This is the basis, then, of Hölderlin’s poetic style, attending to the sound of words and rhythmic structures. In this musical metaphor, an understanding of this original unity proceeds through the sound and rhythm of language. Hölderlin denies self-understanding is fully attainable. We approach it in the way that a circle is more and more closely approximated by increasingly sided polygons. It is then a process, in which contradictions or dissonances in an individual’s character are the condition under which self-recognition is possible.

These dissonances are reflected in the differing characterisations of *Anschauung*. In *On Truth and Lying*, Nietzsche favours the man of intuition in opposition to the ‘man of reason’. He praises the ‘exuberant hero’ who will speak in ‘forbidden metaphors and unheard-of combinations of concepts’. The ‘man of intuition’ is creative in shaping the world and Nietzsche calls it ‘the rule of art over life’. And such a hero is Wagner’s Siegfried, or Hölderlin’s Hyperion. If Nietzsche took up the musical metaphor employed by Hölderlin and the ‘musicality’ of his poetry, it must also be noted that Hölderlin was indebted to Jakob Wilhelm Heinse, author of *Ardinghello and the Blessed Isles*. Görner points out Hölderlin’s friendship with Heinse and the connections with his work, including *Hildegard von Hohenthal* (1796), which argued for a musical aesthetic. But Görner also allows there was a wider context of musical theory on dissonance, contemporary to Hölderlin. The possibility of a link
to Nietzsche has been briefly noted by Babette Babich, on an internet blog, with reference to
the work of Max Baeumer. I shall argue below that Nietzsche’s familiarity with Heinse’s work
can be straightforwardly established on the basis of Wagner’s admiration for Ardinghello,
which is recounted in Borchmeyer (2003). More particularly, I argue for its significance in
relation to Nietzsche’s own break with Wagner. In this respect, I identify an allusion in
Zarathustra which operates not through talk of Zarathustra’s own Blessed Isles, which I have
claimed already stand to be identified as the image, in creation, of his ‘teaching’ (Lehre Bildness),
but through Nietzsche’s description of the neighbouring island Zarathustra visits
as a ghost, in On Great Events.

In name, the Blessed Isles can be taken as signifying a markedly pre-Christian, idealised
vision of Greek antiquity (Burnham & Jesinghausen, 2010(a)). Heinse celebrated both the
intellectual and sensual character of our experiences of beauty and of nature (Görner, 2016,
p.275). An introductory account of his Ardinghello is provided by Mahoney (Shookman &
Mahoney, 1992). Published in the late 18th century, it can be included in the ‘Sturm und
Drang’ genre. Ardinghello’s adventures are of a swashbuckling kind. In the final section, he
and his friends establish a utopia on two Aegean islands. Mahoney explains that while
Heinse celebrated Italian Renaissance art, his novel mixes aestheticism with a plain
eroticism. As such, its vision of antiquity can, he says, be taken as ‘bracingly “Dionysian”’ in
the sense that it is clearly opposite to the classical aesthetic of, for example, Winckelmann,
for whom Greek sculpture was the stimulus to a contemplative serenity. The Dionysian
is evident when, for example, praising some local scenery and the view of a glittering sea,
Ardinghello declares it seizes his heart and all his senses, and that he could have thrown
himself into the eternal abundance of life with a single leap from Olympus and whirled about
in it like a whale’ to cool his sorrows (Shookman and Mahoney, 1992, p.214). The book was
criticised for its sensationalism. It was a plea for ‘nudism, promiscuity, and women’s
suffrage’, one critic wrote (1992, p.xxiv). The point I seek to make here is that the book is
significant in providing the model of an ultimately hedonistic sensualism, standing at the
opposite pole to a Schopenhauerian renunciation of desire. It would stand in contrast, also,
to a sensually grounded ‘higher’ feeling.

There is, tellingly, a link from Heinse to Nietzsche through Wagner. Borchmeyer (2003)
explains how Heinse’s Ardinghello provided a literary model for the aspirations of the Young
Germans movement of the 1830s, for which Wagner was himself an enthusiast. Applauding
popular revolution, the movement espoused a liberated hedonism against conventional
values and political nationalism. The artist was expected to engage in political and social
renewal, not to celebrate some mythical past. Again, the emphasis was on sensual beauty.
And the model was the property-less utopia of Ardinghello’s Blessed Isles, where Heinse’s
characters expressed themselves as individuals, free from convention. Borchmeyer notes
how in February 1883, shortly before his death, Wagner recalls his enthusiasm for Heinse,
saying, ‘It’s this I liked so much about Heinse’s “Blessed Isles” – the people there owned no
property, in order to avoid the many miseries bound up with it’. But this is not the picture
drawn by Nietzsche in Zarathustra II (18), On Great Events, where political agitators’ cries
for freedom are the bellowing of a fire-dog, and their angry politics is compared to an art of
boiling mud. This fire-dog lives beneath a volcano, on an island which is only near the
Blessed Isles. Zarathustra is seen by visiting sailors flying in the direction of the volcano, and their helmsman jokes that Zarathustra is going to Hell.

There is another fire-dog, Zarathustra says, who does not bellow wrath and envy, but with laughter breathes out gold from the heart of the earth. Parkes (2005(b), p.304) notes Hölderlin’s simile, in *Hyperion*, for a stillness like ‘the depths of the earth, where gold mysteriously grows’. And Del Caro (2013) has noted a similarity identified by Bay (2003), between Zarathustra’s ‘going under’ and Diotima’s instruction to Hyperion to descend to human beings, drawn in terms of a ray of light, and accomplished as ‘a turn to the earth’. In the contrast Zarathustra makes between the fire-dogs, where one is said to speak from the heart of the earth while the other is its ventriloquist, Nietzsche can be taken as indicating the opposition between creative world-making and a kind of empty mouthing. One is genuinely creative in contrast to the other’s noisy boasting. This has its parallel in Zarathustra’s image in the mirror. It must be that the devil-image of Zarathustra’s teaching is the island nearby the Blessed Ises. It is the hell of Zarathustra’s devil. It is then an ironic image of Heinse’s Blessed Isles, not so ‘blessed’ because formed as an impotent, superficial sensualism. Its canine inhabitant is suggestive of Goethe’s accusation against Heinse’s ‘canine philosophy’. It is also the image that Zarathustra’s enemies could conjure of his Blessed Isles. As comparative worlds they stand to each other as the sensualism of an Emersonian neo-platonism does to Heinse’s superficial *Dionysianism*. The issue throughout remains, that Nietzsche is acknowledging a constraint on the overman, that he must be reached through man’s own activity in the world, through ‘parables of the earth’, while admitting his disciples and others are likely to misunderstand what is at stake and call his overman ‘devil’.

5.6) Wagner

I have argued that features of Boehme’s ‘vision’ are recognisable in the mythic symbolism Nietzsche draws upon in *Zarathustra*. And I have suggested that the sensibility underpinning Nietzsche’s approach to metaphor and symbol, and to the ‘Dionysian’ which informs it, is to be understood in terms of an experience reading Emerson, with that sensibility exercised on a certain category of imagery and symbol centred on height and distance. Nietzsche’s enduring regard for Emerson is explained by the constancy of this sensibility. This much is indicated in his remarks in *Ecce Homo* (pp.110-111) that ‘all the decisive features’ of his own nature were projected onto Wagner, that what he heard in his music when younger had nothing to do with Wagner. His description of *Dionysian* music in *The Birth of Tragedy* was what he heard, he says, and his praise of Wagner in *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth* was a portrait of the ‘not-yet-existing author of *Zarathustra*’, not of Wagner. As a vision of his own future, Nietzsche singles out the beginning of section 9 as anticipating the style of *Zarathustra*, and section 6 as indicating its theme. Taking Nietzsche at his word, it can be Emerson’s *Dionysianism* which informed his expectations of an art of the future, and the ‘mythological’ thinking he ascribes to Wagner.

In section (9) of *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth*, Nietzsche was explicit in distinguishing mythic thinking as non-conceptual:
The poetic in Wagner manifests itself in the fact that he thinks in visible and palpable events, not in concepts; that means that he thinks mythically, just as the common people have always thought. The basis of myth is not a thought ... but rather myth itself is a kind of thought; it communicates an idea of the world, but in a succession of events, actions, and sufferings. The *Ring of the Nibelung* is an immense system of thought without the conceptual form of thought. (1995, p.309)

Nietzsche goes on here to condemn the ‘theoretical man’ of reason, whose susceptibility to straightforwardly conceptual verbal language is destructive of mythic thinking. His subsequent disillusionment with Wagner will be examined below, but given the remarks in *Ecce Homo*, it is clear that Nietzsche held to an original interest in the expression and communication of the ‘rarer’ states he talks of, consequent on the kind of unity with nature which informs its affirmation in a fully ‘lived’ experience of the world.

As a sensibility, it is traceable to Boehme. Not only influential at the level of image and symbol, Boehme’s overtly theosophical claims stand to be accommodated to a reading of Nietzsche’s works in terms of sacralising nature, not least because a unity with nature is integral to the understanding they share of symbolic language, and which I have argued is fundamental in Nietzsche’s regard for Emerson’s writings, and for Hölderlin’s. Nietzsche echoes Hölderlin’s preface when he wrote in *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth* that Wagner’s art was not to be taken just as another piece of work for intellectual consideration and judgement. Nietzsche held that Wagner was art itself, come to deliver an ‘admonishing’ blow to the modern age. In what follows, I trace a number of features Nietzsche identified in Wagner which may be taken then as indicating the sensibility he claims was always his own. With a focus on nature and loss of self, and on Wagner’s ‘hybridity’, the role of myth, and so on, it is possible to identify the continuity in Nietzsche’s thinking which survives the ‘break’ with Wagner. The focus here is on the *Untimely Meditation* essay on Wagner, though it was written around the beginning of Nietzsche’s disillusionment.

Nietzsche begins in *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth* with the accusation that a contemporary, ‘cultivated’ type of person, the modern intellectual consumer, is likely to experience and understand Wagner’s art on terms which could only be a parody of it. This person does not have the appropriate sensibility, he says, and because they are captive to a debased language, a language drawn on obfuscating concepts, unsuited to communicating what Nietzsche marks in the essay as ‘correct feeling’ (p.282). Nietzsche describes a moment of reflection in Wagner, in 1872, when, returning with him from Bayreuth, having laid the cornerstone of his projected theatre, he observes Wagner in his maturity, as having ‘become what he is, what he will be’ (p.262). It is an art of the future which re-instates the Ancient Greek sensibility. No accident is involved here, Nietzsche says, because it expresses a fundamental human need, fulfilling a social function which is rooted in improving all that stands to be recognised as alterable in the world (p.272). Wagner simplifies the world because he reunifies a disintegrating culture. In Nietzsche’s metaphor, he re-ties the Gordion knot of culture, to rejoin its disparate threads. Where things have been made ordinary in the pernicious atmosphere of contemporary society, they will be seen again as actually unusual and complex. In being affected by this art, those taking part in it will be transforming society. It is in this way that social change is treated by Nietzsche as depending on the emergence of a great artist, as he takes Wagner to be.
He turns then to the character of art as tragedy (pp.278-279). In a momentary stillness, he says, in the gaze of the mysterious eye of tragedy, we forget the anxiety of death and time (pp.278-279). This is as necessary to us as sleep. It is what the art of the future communicates, in the semblance of a simpler world. In the momentary stillness, ‘looking backward and ahead’, Nietzsche says we understand the symbolic. The individual is ‘consecrated’ to something suprapersonal, in common purpose with others. An inevitable, impending doom is confronted in a togetherness rooted in our fundamental humanity, and the very continuance of humanity then depends upon the survival of this tragic disposition. It must not die out, Nietzsche says (p.280). Expanding on Wagner’s own character, he says it has two aspects. A powerful, striving will is coupled to an impulse to nobility and grandeur. Nietzsche offers examples from the operas, notably the episode in which Siegfried wakes Brünnhilde, to illustrate a notion of fidelity, through which, he says, the different sides of Wagner’s character are faithful to each other: a bright, selflessly loving side, and another, darker and tyrannical. In this interrelation of ‘two profound forces’, Wagner remained whole (p.267). There is a context here which is a wider concern with plurality and opposition arising out of an original unity. Gender, for example, is a division in creation. Siegfried and Brünnhilde, in love, regain this unity, losing their identity in each other. Through this artistic presentation, Wagner has provided his audience with the opportunity to experience that momentary, selfless unity.

Nietzsche continues by recalling the account he gives in On Truth and Lying and other of the early unpublished fragments, of the status of language and visual imagery in relation to music. In the essay on Wagner he says that where verbal language would formerly have expressed and communicated fundamental human feelings and needs, it is now an obstacle: ‘humanity adds to all its sufferings its suffering under convention, that is agreement in words and actions without agreement in feelings’ (p.281). Nietzsche is clear that the necessities which need to be communicated are fundamentally emotional in character, such that a conceptual language suited to reasoned thinking is a long way from serving a genuine commonality among people.

As soon as they seek to communicate with one another and join together to accomplish a task, they are seized by the madness of general concepts, indeed, by the pure sounds of words, and as a result of this inability to communicate their thoughts, the creations of their collective sensibility bear the mark of this mutual misunderstanding, insofar as they do not accord with their true needs but only with the hollowness of those tyrannical words and concepts (p.281).

Nietzsche targets the educational system and declares a return to nature, a return to ‘correct feeling’, the enemy of all convention and alienation, and which resounds in Wagner’s music as ‘nature transformed into love’.

In the present age, Nietzsche says, our individuality is defined through a patchwork of borrowed forms comprising a conventional milieu. This conventional world is poor in comparison with what is necessary to life, he says, because it furnishes what is merely ‘pleasant’ and is drawn upon a kind of mutual deceit about ourselves. By contrast, the musical soul moves with a passion which is suprapersonal, with a music ‘that issues into the
light from an unfathomable depth'. This music finds its form, Nietzsche says, in gymnastics, which is to say in gesture and action. As a rediscovered language of emotion, it forms a body for itself: 'through individuals it seeks its path to visibility in motion, action, institution, and morality!' Others are only the 'will-less slaves of false feeling' (pp.284-287).

... primordially determined nature, by means of which music speaks to the world of visual phenomena, is the most enigmatic thing under the sun, an abyss in which strength and goodness are united, a bridge between self and non-self.

Tellingly, it is something received, as a gift, and of which an individual may not be wholly worthy. It is a matter of sensibility. But from the perspective of human needs, it is something Nietzsche says will 'radiate' (pp.290-291).

The language here already anticipates themes and imagery in Zarathustra, in relation to the sense of incorporation there, and Zarathustra’s ‘gift’ to his disciples (as Nietzsche’s to his readers). And a continuity lies in Nietzsche’s concern with an emotion tied here to the momentary experience of self-less unity, in a ‘musical mood’. I am arguing this emotion is Nietzsche’s primary focus. Though tied to a revaluation of values in the overcoming of conventional false-feeling, it depends for its communication upon a particular symbolism. The demand is that a symbol will be suited actually to presenting that which it signs. This is the sense in which it would ‘radiate’. In Zarathustra, Nietzsche uses the imagery of gold in this way, to articulate the sense of ‘gift’ at stake here in terms which both explain and exemplify the theory of symbolism on which this communication, or ‘gift’, is drawn.

5.7) the ‘break’ with Wagner

Nietzsche’s expectations of an art of the future were set out in The Birth of Tragedy, in 1872. The essay on Wagner was published in 1876, Nietzsche having started on its composition two years previously. In this time, he was already beginning to be critical of Wagner. His disappointment was settled when he visited Bayreuth in 1876, just as the essay was published (Nietzsche, 1995, p.406). Williamson (2004), citing Orsucci (1996), suggests that Nietzsche’s reading in works on anthropology and comparative religion dealing with the cultural and historical origins of ancient mythologies and religion, supplied a new ‘conceptual apparatus’ he employed in criticising particular views on myth and religion, and in his assessment of Wagner. Williamson characterises it as a move towards downplaying the role of intuitions and symbols in mythology, to focus instead on its cultural origins and development. Karl Boetticher, for example, had pointed out survivals of the earliest kind of nature worship in later religious practices, such as the wearing of ivy wreaths. The claim is that a shift in Nietzsche’s thinking informs the so-called ‘middle works’, amounting to a turn away from Romanticist concerns with inner life and thought. The emphasis on starting from the social forms and practices of religious belief serves to privilege a sense of embodiment, in contrast to the commonplace idea of the body as prison of the soul, says Williamson (pp.259-261, p.282). But this position on Nietzsche’s middle texts, as advancing a reassessment of his own thinking tied to disillusionment with Wagner’s work can be resisted.
Though he attacks Wagner’s ‘mythologising’, Nietzsche’s criticism can still have a basis in what he originally supposed he recognised in Wagner’s art. That is to say, Nietzsche need not have changed his own view, but rather came to judge he was mistaken in finding it exemplified in Wagner. If his criticism was informed by the earlier judgement on the character of Wagner’s art, then the same may be said of the middle texts. It need not be a change of focus so much as Nietzsche seeking to accommodate fresh concerns and interests around social and religious beliefs and practices. Small (2005), citing work by Schlechta and Anders (1962), allows that Human, All Too Human returns to the early epistemological concerns of On Truth and Lying around the origins of what we take to be truths, and which were interrupted by Nietzsche’s engagement with Wagner’s work. The emphasis remains on thinking and knowledge arising out of a creative use of language as metaphor. This underpins the scepticism Nietzsche claims in Human, All Too Human, in section (11), for example, where he writes that our facility in language, in naming things and ideas, encourages the supposition that a ‘real’ external world is opened to us. Reason and logic depend upon the same error because, in Nietzsche’s example of mathematical truths, they can only have been drawn on what we ‘mean’ by things like a straight line, given no such perfect line could ever have been found in nature.

Small investigates Nietzsche’s friendship with Paul Rée. He notes that Nietzsche intended to publish Human, All Too Human under another name, as Rée had done similarly. With the publisher insisting he publish it under his own name, Nietzsche removed a number of direct references to Wagner. In a draft preface, he also anticipated readers’ expectations, that they might be unprepared for what would seem a significant change of direction in his philosophy. Small (p.30) gives an example of him substituting gothic cathedrals for Wagner in a list of great artworks in section (220), where Nietzsche is addressing the commitment their creators had to the notion of transcendent metaphysical truth. The section stands closer scrutiny in relation to the question I am raising, whether Nietzsche’s ‘break’ with Wagner should be taken as involving a rejection of the sense of ‘mythologising’ he had formerly ascribed to him. I propose it be taken throughout as grounded in the theory of symbol which was outlined above. There is no requirement that Nietzsche’s views should not have developed or changed, but I have argued from the evidence of Zarathustra that Nietzsche was committed to this understanding of the role and operation of a symbolism, as underpinning the communication of the rarer states which informs his ‘aesthetic justification’ of existence.

In the section in question here, (220), Nietzsche says that while artists have been instrumental in promoting a mistaken transcendence, the decline in that belief is consequently a loss to culture:

Artists glorify mankind’s religious and philosophical errors, and they could not have done so without believing in their absolute truth. Now, if belief in such truth declines at all, if the rainbow colours around the outer edges of human knowledge and imagination fade; then art like the Divine Comedy, Raphael’s paintings, Michelangelo’s frescoes, Gothic cathedrals, art that presumes not only a cosmic but also a metaphysical meaning in the art object, can never blossom again. (2004, p.132)
It is notable he talks of the belief in truth and perfection as a rainbow colouring. The metaphor recalls Creuzer’s notion of a fractured unity in the rainbow colouring of a cloud-obscured Sun. It was seen how Creuzer approved of the way in which a symbol will admit a plurality of meanings, because even in this fractured ‘unity’, it serves still to turn us away from everyday concerns. With Nietzsche’s examples, it is clear that their aesthetic power is taken in similar terms to this Creuzerian tension between the ambition to unqualified truth, and its fractured, obscure expression. While it is an ‘error’ to suppose the greatest art will access a supernatural perfection, the ambition is integral to a tension or dissonance in which the aesthetic quality consists, and which is marked here in the symbolism of a rainbow colouring. The ‘error’ is not condemned, because it is the very impetus to achieving the kind of sacralisation of corporeal, sensual nature which is integral to a fully ‘lived’ existence.

In which case, Nietzsche’s removal of Wagner from the list reflects his changing assessment of his art, not a rejection of principles upon which the assessment had originally been made. Nietzsche is not refusing the kind of ‘mythic’ symbolism Wagner had employed. I have argued that the human and ‘divine’ are reconciled in a use of imagery along the lines of a symbol being what it signs, just as the eagle’s gaze is identical with the nobility it signs. If this claim should have the status of a metaphysical truth, then it can acquire that status only through a Symbolik, like that of Boehme’s vision, in his metaphor of ‘descent’ and in the account he gives of God’s self-realisation in creation. It is the same to say that the ‘truth’ of Boehme’s metaphysics is an impetus to that vision, though it fundamentally consists in creative use of language. Further, if Nietzsche came to emphasise the deficiencies he found in Wagner’s art, this judgement is in any case consistent with his having acknowledged the ‘dissonances’ in Wagner’s character which impelled his creativity.

At stake here is the supposition that Nietzsche’s middle works are a ‘break’ with certain fundamentals I take to be the basis of a sustained regard or sensibility, and which informs Nietzsche’s use of figurative language in, for example, Zarathustra. The new ‘conceptual apparatus’ drawn from his readings in anthropology and comparative religion can be looked for in section (111) of Human, All Too Human I, where Nietzsche cites Sir John Lubbock, a contemporary writer on pre-history, in the course of distinguishing an original and ‘primitive’ religious sensibility from our own. A religious attitude was grounded initially, Nietzsche says, in a superstitious fear of nature as being lawless in the sense that successful outcomes might be under the control of capricious powers. With these demonic powers controlled through all kinds of entreaties and ceremonies, religion was modelled on the same kinds of power relation already present in tribal hierarchies. By contrast, it is the reverse for modern man, who looks to nature to soothe and heal his soul.

The meaning of religious worship [was formerly] to direct nature, and cast a spell on her to human advantage, that is to impose a lawfulness on her, which she does not have at the start; whereas in present times man wishes to understand the lawfulness of nature in order to submit to it. pp.(2004, pp.83-84)

Nietzsche emphasises the operation of magic, working on physical nature to influence the spirits which animate it. The evidence of these practices was available in the work of Lubbock, Tylor, and others. But crucially, Nietzsche ends by saying that these practices were founded on ‘other and more noble ideas’, on the mutual concerns we have for each
other in the kinds of contractual relationship which typify human interaction. Between two tribes, one nobler and more powerful, he says there would have been a tacit regard between them that they were ultimately of one kind, and that neither was ashamed before each other.

In the preceding section (110), Nietzsche suggests a post-Enlightenment adherence to religion had treated it as being directed on knowledge and understanding of the world, with the example set by science. This is the modern context, in which the claims of religion stand to be taken allegorically, which is to say, in terms of the truth of what they are about. Nietzsche is concerned to say that religion and science, or rather, what he singles out as ‘real’ science, have nothing in common; they ‘live on separate stars’. But it is the issue around meaning and truth which is his focus. In relation to a supposition that religion and science could have some common purpose in pursuit of ‘truth’, Nietzsche says this is not to be regarded as progress in knowledge itself, but in its communication, and by which he means encouraging people, the ‘masses’, to value it. In this context, the rise of science has also required that religion be divested generally of its mythic form.

It is clear from these claims that Nietzsche does not reject the kind of ‘mythological’ thinking which could inform early religious practices. What came to be lost was their association with certain ‘noble’ characteristics modelled on people’s dealings with each other in socially stratified relations. In making these kinds of observational comparisons and contrasts on the basis of his reading in contemporary authors on anthropology and comparative religion, Nietzsche is concerned to ground values in their human origin, in the human sensibilities which inform certain practices and mutual relations. With these drawn fundamentally on hierarchical relations, it does not follow that Nietzsche is denying their expression in ‘mythic’ forms. All of this is consistent with taking Creuzer’s Symbolik humanistically, as filling out an Emersonian Anschauung. As such, Nietzsche does not acquire a new conceptual scheme on the basis of subsequent reading. Rather, I contend that Nietzsche’s observational judgements and folk psychologising ‘explanations’ are not at odds with the supposition that he holds to the understanding of the role and operation of metaphor and symbol argued in this thesis, and which stands to be taken as the basis of the mythological thinking which, in section (9) of Richard Wagner in Bayreuth, Nietzsche attributed to Wagner.

5.8) mythic symbolism

Among Nietzsche’s contemporaries writing on the origins of myth, was Friedrich Max Müller. His views are summarised in Williamson (pp.217-219), and in Bell (1997). Müller promoted a ‘science of religion’ (Religionwissenschaft), not theological or philosophical, but drawn on empirical data around surviving folk tales and religious texts, and so on, and taking account of the operation of language in the transmission of ideas. The term ‘comparative mythology’ was Müller’s, from an essay in 1856, and he was widely read in the 1870s, not just among academics. There is a political aspect to his findings in as much as they are seen to be informed by an imperialist regard for other cultures and beliefs (Girardot, 2002), but Williamson notes other German comparative mythologists were more socially progressive than Müller. In his account of the origins of myth, Müller appeals to a feeling for the divine which he says early peoples would have experienced in relation to solar phenomena. With
the rising and setting of the Sun, they were inspired to sing. This was in a language of metaphor, so, for example, Müller writes, ‘What is with us a sunset, was to them the Sun growing old, decaying, or dying’ (1856). A mythology came about with the development of a conceptual language. The original metaphor came to be understood in conceptual terms, and this obscured the fundamental experience it originally expressed. Myths became ‘spurious coins in the hands of the many,’ he says, and in tracing the origins of myth, Müller assumed it is always a case of seeking to identify an original metaphor drawn on sun, dawn, dew and night. Myth was a ‘disease of language’ because it corrupted the original poetic metaphor in which a healthy and strong race of men had followed ‘the call of their hearts’. And these original sentiments stood to be recalled. Williamson notes that the philological expertise in tracing these origins of mythic stories was Müller’s technical addition to an essentially Creuzerian standpoint (Williamson, pp. 217-219).

But Williamson (pp.249-251) also characterises Nietzsche’s initial thinking on myth in the Schopenhauerian terms employed by Nietzsche in section (16) of The Birth of Tragedy, where a Dionysian musical inspiration is the language of the Will, and which takes symbolic form in images, notably in tragic myth. In the hero’s death is marked the eternal life of the Will, of which he is mere appearance (2000, p.90). It has been seen already that Nietzsche distinguishes the Dionysian from a merely beautifying art, where the latter would glorify the hero’s death and disguise its pain. In relation to this Apollonian art, Nietzsche is clear in section (16) that ‘a lie is told’. As such, I reject Williamson’s view that Nietzsche had initially approached myth as ameliorating a Schopenhauerian pessimism at the level of appearances. Rather, what stands to be revealed in ‘mythic’ art is the kind of tension or dissonance Nietzsche had described in terms of the spectator’s distance on his identity with the actor on stage. Again, as Dionysian art, it may, like Michelangelo’s frescoes or the gothic cathedrals, be founded on the religious error Nietzsche marked in section (220) of Human All Too Human I, but this must not be conflated with the ‘lie’ of the merely beautifying Apollonian.

Williamson also suggests that Nietzsche came to reserve talk of myth for the error of believing in certain ‘realities’, such as the Kantian thing-in-itself, or individual free will, and to distinguish the creative use of language generally at the level of appearances in other terms, notably in his use of the term Gleichnis. But, against Williamson, this is not a re-characterisation of what was ever at stake in ‘mythic’ thinking. After all, Nietzsche’s declaration that Wagner forces language back into a non-conceptual ‘primal state’, in which language itself is still ‘poetry, image, and feeling’ (1995, p.309), can as easily describe the impetus to his own Zarathustra, as he insists in Ecce Homo that it did. Williamson is addressing a wider political and religious context of Nietzsche’s thinking and that of his contemporaries. In drawing attention to remarks Nietzsche makes in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks (1962) in relation to seeking ‘origins’ of mythological and religious narratives, he notes that Nietzsche is responding to the assertions of Creuzer, Müller and others, that these had a primary source in ancient India. Williamson allows that Nietzsche is denying that an understanding of what is at stake in mythological thinking should be exhausted in an account of its linguistic or material origins (2004, p.242). Nietzsche had written:
People who prefer to spend their time on Egyptian or Persian philosophy rather than on Greek, on grounds that the former are more ‘original’ and in any event older, are just as ill-advised as those who cannot deal with the magnificent, profound mythology of the Greeks until they have reduced it to the physical trivialities of sun, lightning, storm and mist which originally presumably gave rise to it. ... Everywhere, the way to the beginnings leads to barbarism. (1962, p.30)

Williamson adds Nietzsche’s verdict on Müller’s scholarship, that ‘in the long run this kind of examination is somewhat boring’. But in Nietzsche’s remarks in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, the profundity at issue is Greek taste or instinct. Nietzsche is making a point that the Greeks did not simply copy or take from other cultures: ‘... they instantly tackled the job of so fulfilling, enhancing, elevating and purifying the elements they took over from elsewhere that they became inventors after all’ (p.31). So, while the target is likely to be Müller, the ‘barbarism’ at issue here is in his claim to offer a ‘science’ of religion, not the character of a symbolism as such.

That is also to say that Nietzsche’s remarks here do not count against a fundamental commitment to an understanding of symbolism drawn on a unity of sign and signified. Creuzer in any case explains how the myths gave way to analogical comparisons, and ultimately to Christianity. It remains that a pre-linguistic ‘primitive’ Symbolik will have captured the ‘dissonance’ in mankind’s ambition towards the divine, and which is integral as well to a certain kind of mutual regard in hierarchical relations. Nietzsche’s point in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks is against interpreting symbols in terms of another culture’s astrological beliefs, or simply as meditations on weather phenomena. It is a point that has been made by Daniel Sperber (1975), that the time and effort invested in ceremonial practices suggests more is at stake than concerns about the weather. It is the interpretations along such lines which are ‘barbarous’. Again, it is a matter of Nietzsche engaging with the work of Creuzer and its subsequent development by others such as Müller, to organise his own thinking around, say, the role and operation of figurative language, guided by his own sustained sensibility. It is a Symbolik at issue here, like the example of The Ring of the Nibelung, or Zarathustra. Key to this is the contrast between symbol and allegory, or image and parable. A return to myth would be to the nobility it succeeds in expressing and communicating in a symbolism which, when stripped to its essentials, will consist in imagery of height and hierarchical relations.

5.9) humanism

It is outside the scope of this thesis to examine connections between the humanism in Emerson’s talk of man’s descent and its interpretation by Nietzsche, and the humanist philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach. But there is an issue here around the influence on Emerson of German Idealist thought, and a connection to Nietzsche through Wagner’s early radical enthusiasm for Feuerbach’s denial of church authority. Hollinrake (1993) indicates what was at stake. He quotes from the Principles of the Philosophy of the Future Feuerbach’s declaration:
The task today is the reification and humanization of god, the supersession and dissolution of theology in the study of man.

Again, it is a question around sources and influences on Nietzsche’s thinking. It is noted in the secondary literature, for example, that Nietzsche’s choice of word for volcano (Feuerberg) in On Great Events (2006, p.102) may be an ironic pointer to Wagner’s enthusiasm for Feuerbach. But as Hollinrake (1982) also remarks, it cannot be expected it should easily be settled what Nietzsche and Wagner could have agreed on philosophical questions in the course of their own personal exchanges of views.

There is, in any case, a wider context of issues and debates around the philosophical legacy of Hegelian dialectic and its applications. And this will include the position, for example, of Hölderlin’s philosophy. These are complex issues, and it is matter of Nietzsche’s own responses. So, for example, while the ‘dissonances’ which Hölderlin talks of stand comparison with the Hegelian opposition of thesis and anti-thesis, this does not determine the significance of Hölderlin’s philosophy for Nietzsche. I have focused on accommodating dissonance to the Apollo-Dionysus distinction in Nietzsche, in the context of the aesthetic justification of life, exemplified by the Apollo Sauroctonos, or in relation to music theory and the metaphor it informs. A notion of dissonance is integral as well to certain theories of colour, for example in the work of Helmholtz, in which Nietzsche also took an interest. The point to be made here is it is characteristic of Nietzsche’s interest that it does not focus on a particularly Hegelian or scientific meaning. Rather, it is the way in which the examples operate as metaphor, in relation to a certain aesthetic.

Wagner’s Ring of the Nibelung itself sustains a complexity of interpretation, including by Wagner himself as the composition evolved and was revised and re-interpreted. Again, these are complex issues. Hollinrake touches on the case made by William Ashton Ellis for the importance of Feuerbach in Wagner’s thinking, while noting as well the revisions demanded by his reading Schopenhauer in 1854. In sections (9) and (10) of The Case of Wagner, Nietzsche insists there is a typically German taste for the seductions of a Hegelian mysticism which is implicit in Wagner’s work as an art of ‘vague presentiments’, and is attractive to a theological, moralising need. Similarly, in section (10) of Anti-Christ, Nietzsche declares that German philosophy, in Kant, Hegel and Schelling, is an ‘underhanded theology’. It is a taste, he says, which Wagner understood and exploited in his admirers:

It was not music that Wagner conquered them with, it was the ‘Idea’: - the fact that his art is full of riddles, the way it plays hide-and-seek under a hundred symbols, its polychromatic ideal – this is what led and lured these young men to Wagner; it is Wagner’s genius in building clouds, his gripping, dipping, slipping through the air, exactly the same techniques that Hegel once used to tempt and seduce them! ...They tremble as they hear the great symbols becoming audible from out of a shadowy distance and resonating in his art with muted thunder (2005(a), p.252).

But notably, the metaphor is Creuzer’s polychromatic rainbow colouring, with Nietzsche saying it is a matter of perspective, of the sensibility of the audience. Nietzsche insists in section (11) that Wagner only sought to serve a particular taste, of ‘acting’ up to it. Nietzsche does not excuse his own seduction but rather denies it. If Wagner’s admirers suffered his
‘bad weather’, it was their own taste. They were related to bad weather, Nietzsche says. In section (9), it is the mythological content which is implicated in encouraging ‘vague presentiments’. Nietzsche singles out the inclusion of Erde in The Ring. Through Nietzsche’s mockery there is a discernible point. Wagner is condemned for exploiting a superficial appreciation of a mythic heroism which is suited to the kind of bourgeois sensibility he ultimately exploits. In which case it is not a condemnation of mythological thinking as such, understood in Creuzer’s terms as Symbolik. It is its decline which concerns Nietzsche, just as it concerned Creuzer and Müller.

It was seen in chapter (1) how Creuzer acknowledges a symbolism’s theological import in his metaphor of the Sun’s light through obscuring clouds, encountered as a ‘polychromatic idealism’. The ‘great symbols’ Nietzsche targets in section (10) of The Case of Wagner, may carry a religious import. They may serve a taste for the infinite, for the Hegelian Absolute Nietzsche is mocking here. But so much is already granted by Creuzer, that a symbol supports a plurality of ‘meanings’. Creuzer allows this polychromatism the virtue that it turns people away from everyday concerns, towards what he marks as unity with the divine. It does not follow from Nietzsche’s rejection of Hegel that he cannot endorse an understanding along the lines advanced by Creuzer and Schelling of the power of a symbolic imagery. Rather, Nietzsche adds to them by accounting for this ‘polychromatism’ as a matter of ‘taste’, or instinct. That is to say, the symbol resonates in its various receptions, as a subjective matter of taste. My contention is that in his criticism of Wagner, Nietzsche is seeking to reconcile his feelings towards the use and power of a mythic symbolism with his own sustained taste for an Emersonian unity with nature.

Drawing these points together, my contention is that Nietzsche starts from Emerson, engaging with him on Emerson’s own terms. For example, endorsing the distinction Emerson makes between types of character, to distinguish those who speak from within. Their speech ‘is one with what it tells of’ (Emerson, 1995, p.140), where the contrast is with purporting to speak objectively and qualifying only as a spectator. Taken loosely, Zarathustra’s ‘bestowing virtue’ is a speaking from within. More pertinently, in II (21) On Human Prudence, it lies in seeking the overman, even while Zarathustra is unashamed of mankind’s vanity and pride and will sit among people costumed in the same vanities. Again, he descends to man because he seeks the overman in order to live, not to fly from life to God. If it involves a feeling for the eternal, then it may be sought in Emerson’s ‘occult relation’ with nature, in the point of ‘transparency’ when ‘all mean egotism vanishes’ (Emerson, 1982, p.39). In reaching this point, Zarathustra says he will understand how to wash himself clean in dirty water (2006, p.113). At stake here is a broadly sensualist philosophy of feeling and experience. It has in any case been seen how Zarathustra’s teaching, as speech, is dependent on parables, or ‘likenesses’, being taken in the way of Creuzer’s Symbolik.
I began in this chapter with Zarathustra and the child with the mirror, approaching this in the way that I distinguished a symbolic use of imagery and language along the lines of an image being what it signs. Symbolically, the reflecting mirror is a fractured unity of image and self-image. With talk of Dionysus’ dismemberment and Zarathustra’s ‘descent’ to man, and of the Athenian spectator of tragic drama having surrendered his individuality in fusing with the image of the man beheld on stage, the imagery is tied to dissonant feelings of a higher self-possession in ‘descent’ to man. The details here are significant, but they do not further an interpretation or explanation in some other terms. That is to say, though the details stand to be explicated, it is crucially the dissonance implicit in the imagery which is important here. It constitutes the ‘rarer’ state in which a subject rises above mere egotism.

I argued for a link through Emerson to Boehme in respect of this imagery taken up by Nietzsche. At issue is the activity of a creative impulse having its expression in a primordial, pre-conceptual language of images and sounds, in the way, for example, that Wagner’s Ring Cycle has its beginning in non-linguistic vocal sounds and imagery of sunlight in water. I drew a connection with the golden lustre of Zarathustra’s staff, again, taking it symbolically. The key claim here is that the seeming parable Zarathustra relates is itself a caution against treating images allegorically, against understanding them in other terms in the way, for example, Jesus’ parables in the Bible might be taken. I argued Zarathustra’s discourse on the staff is primarily focused on the lustre of its gold because he seeks to indicate how an image can be self-revealing, as the lustre of gold is, and which supplies the sense of Nietzsche’s bestowing virtue. It is the creative out-flowing of a Dionysian inspiration realised in images of height and descent, which are what they sign in expressing and communicating the higher self-possession, and which it can be supposed Nietzsche will have experienced in reading Emerson.

I returned to the question of the kind of intuition involved in taking images symbolically and argued for its sensuous character. Again, it is a matter of dissonances in experience, and I made a case for Hölderlin’s influence on Nietzsche in this respect. I also drew a contrast with feelings implicit in a simpler, hedonistic Dionysianism popularised by Heinse. Turning to Nietzsche’s assessment of Wagner’s art, I found that his account is consistent with approving a mythic discourse taken symbolically. Creuzer’s image of a cloud-obscured sun and its fractured rainbow colouring expresses a higher self-possession in ‘descent’ to individuality and imperfection. With the issues addressed in the previous chapter around the possibility of ‘rarer’ states brought to consciousness, I have sought to demonstrate how they are enabled in the distinctively symbolic character of visual imagery relied upon by Nietzsche. The imagery already expresses what is at stake, even in the use that Nietzsche makes of it in its own explanation.
Chapter 6: metaphysics

6.1) introduction

I have focused on the feelings tied to imagery of height and distance. It was seen how with the development of herd language, these are located at the periphery of consciousness and stand to be ‘rediscovered’ through the symbolic force of this imagery. Two questions are addressed in this chapter, about the ground of this affectivity and the status of its ‘object’. It has been seen how the use of symbolic imagery can involve an identity at the level of phenomena, in the way, for example, that an eagle’s gaze is identical with its nobility. It is not the ‘meaning’ of nobility at stake here, but noble feelings. The symbolism which informs the structure and furnishing of a Mithras temple offers a comparable example. Roger Beck (2006) addresses the question how the Mithras cult as a ‘system of symbols’ would have been experienced by initiates. Arguing for a kind of immersion in the symbolism, Beck’s findings are equally applicable to the imagery of height and distance Nietzsche employs, notably in Zarathustra. The parallel is with Beck’s contention that experiencing the mysteries of Mithras would have consisted precisely in apprehending the symbols: the mysteries come into being in their symbols and are apprehended in that form, he says (2006, p.4). The same can apply to experiencing so-called rarer states through a symbolic imagery drawn on height and distance.

In asking after the basis of a disposition towards certain kinds of imagery and ritual practice, and other forms of expression of ‘rarer’ feelings and emotion, in art, and so on, there is already a sense that a reductive ‘answer’ is being sought. It could be anticipated that certain neurological facts should explain what happens in particular circumstances, or we might talk in vaguer terms of ‘instinct’. I shall examine Nietzsche’s claims for what he marks as drives, or instincts, where it is an issue how far Nietzsche is committed to a physiology of feelings and action. It was seen in chapter 3 how the account he gives in On Truth and Lying, of a metaphoric transfer between different domains, has been taken as admitting a physiological process, and where the difficulty in establishing the precise biological basis legitimates it being spoken of in terms of an over-arching metaphor of transference. It was seen how this is argued by Emden (2005), pointing to Nietzsche’s reading in contemporary science and materialist philosophies. But while it may be granted Nietzsche privileges bodily states, for example, in the role he accords to a gesture symbolism (Blair, 1983), or even in the supposed narcotic effects of vegetarianism (1974, p.193), it does not follow that the body or its states must be a referent or ‘meaning’ of such talk. For example, Rampley (2000), citing Blondel (1991), allows Nietzsche’s emphasis on bodily states is aimed at countering the sense of something metaphysically ‘not here’. As such, it is a rhetorical strategy, not itself a substantive claim (2000, p.167). If it is directed against the general sense of metaphysics drawn on something ‘behind’ the phenomena, then Nietzsche need not be arguing for the ‘truth’ of a certain physiological ground of experience.

The issue here applies as much to the ‘musicality’ which Nietzsche claims for his writing. It can be granted that a sensibility towards ‘rarer’ states may be active in this musicality, or tonality. At the level of appearances, musicality can be sought in the syntactical features of a text, as Nietzsche indicates in section (246) of Beyond Good and Evil. Porter (1994) has
examined the sense in which at stake here is something *embodied* in the text: not its structure as such, but what is heard in it; how the syntactical rhythms ‘colour and re-colour each other in succession’ as Nietzsche puts it in section (246). In short, it is the music behind the words, as that which cannot be written (Porter, p.219). Porter asks why Nietzsche posits such a ‘voice’ *beyond or behind* the text itself. How should it *appear* to a listener? Nietzsche seemingly implies that the text originates in a certain style, rather than style consisting in the choice of words and their relations. Porter’s answer is that Nietzsche’s attack on a modern bourgeois German capacity to *hear* is itself a rhetorical tactic, directed on drawing attention to the rhetorical character of language, which is to say, to its character as entirely figurative, even where this is a matter of gestural, bodily rhythm, because this is, again, only another figuration. This allows language does not have a physiological basis. After all, it has no ground at all, Porter says, because ‘grounded in nothing but its own polemical and rhetorical purpose’ (p.225). Without doing justice to the detail of Porter’s argument, I find the point to be that talk of successive translations of nervous stimuli in *On Truth and Lying*, which culminate in language, is not directed on prioritising the body as such. It is, as Porter says, not so much a theory which is at stake, but a ‘poignant’ feeling for what may be lost as a matter of style, or rhetoric. In short, it is just a way of marking the difference between Bizet and Wagner, with an ear for what ‘dances’.

Porter focuses on the way in which talk of style can overlook the sense in which its basis is entirely in the performance, as, for example, in reading aloud, as Nietzsche sometimes advises his own readers. I have taken musicality as having a wide application, including the wholly plastic art which Nietzsche might be expected to grant only a secondary status. Focusing on the example of the sculpted *Apollo Sauroctonos*, I have argued Nietzsche allows its inspiration is communicable in simple apprehension of it, in its symbolic character. In talking of inspiration, Porter’s warning against the supposition of a ‘fetish-object’ is accommodated in so far as its communication is through features given in experience. They are, in that sense, a matter of syntax, while intimately tied to the feelings they inform. Again, a comparison may be made with the symbolism of the Mithras cult. I follow Beck’s emphasis in allowing an initiate’s experience would have been only loosely connected to intellectual understandings of the ‘meaning’ of the symbols and practices. It allows certain features are necessary conditions of the affectivity of the symbolism. It does not follow that their ‘meaning’ must be sought in terms of a physiological disposition towards hierarchical relations, as Beck (2006), at one point, considers. Rather, there is a unifying aspect at the level of appearances, which Nietzsche identifies as an order of rank, and through which the ‘rarer’ feelings tied to it are ‘heard’.

As a relation of an order of rank, it is apprehended through the imagery in which it undergoes a metaphoric transference as art and ritual activity. While a transcendent metaphysics of height and distance must be rejected, it is the connection between this feature of experience and a certain feeling or emotion which separates my own position from views which centre more on how Nietzsche counters the supposition of ‘objective’ meanings and external referents through rhetorical strategies, and acknowledging the primacy of the text. The attention Derrida has given to misappropriations of Nietzsche in the service of metaphysics is examined by Norris (2002), where he explains how Derrida seeks to demonstrate the indeterminacy of meaning in *Spurs* through his own ‘playful’ use of
language investigating Nietzsche’s jotting in the margin of a manuscript, that he had forgotten his umbrella. Norris makes an important point that however ‘playful’ Derrida’s language, his claims regarding the indeterminacy of meaning and the primacy of texts themselves amount to a theoretical position. Norris insists a position is at stake and that it can intelligibly be questioned.

The same may be said of claims Nietzsche makes about certain pre-linguistic phenomena. They are, after all, intelligible claims advancing a position. Something is seemingly at stake, and which Nietzsche seeks to communicate, however much its expression should depend upon metaphor and other kinds of figurative language. I shall address the issue here in detail below, and take account of Kofman’s view of the status Nietzsche accords to metaphor. If we cannot occupy a position outside language, then reductions cannot escape dealing only in other categories of metaphor. I am arguing for a feature of experience identified in a use of symbolism, having an ‘objective’ status in as much as it informs the way in which the world is perceived as being. To that extent, the claims which may be made for ‘rarer’ feelings are not to be taken as merely rhetorical, as nothing more than a use of language.

6.2) metaphorical thinking

There is no difficulty in allowing Nietzsche valued metaphorical thinking. The point is made by Kofman (1993, pp.19-22), citing Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, where Nietzsche distinguishes as life-affirming those philosophies which privileged metaphor over abstract conceptual thinking. The example here is Heraclitus, whose claims, Nietzsche says in section (61) of The Philosopher, retain their aesthetic value even if they cannot count as scientific. The pre-Socratics were judged by Aristotle according to the demands of reason and logic, and Kofman identifies Nietzsche’s concern with this ‘forgetting’ of metaphor, ‘effaced’ by conceptual thinking. It is indicated, she says, in Nietzsche’s own metaphor in On Truth and Lying, of the faded image on a worn coin. With conceptual analysis taken as destructive of the personality and culture which informs a particular philosophy, Kofman emphasises Nietzsche’s regard for intuition over reason. Ultimately, mankind is ‘a metaphorical animal’ (p.25). Again, the sense of intuition can be taken simply as perceiving, or apprehending. Kofman makes the point that reason and logic are ‘fictions’ themselves, in as much as they originate in the same impulse to creativity, and to mastery.

Kofman points out Nietzsche’s use of architectural metaphors, for example, where they are drawn on an imagery of beehive, pyramid, tower, and so on, and taken as indicating the sense of construction Nietzsche attaches to categorising and ordering the world. As fortification, they allow conceptual thinking is a ‘defensive’ strategy, directed on escaping the admission that ambitions to the ‘truth’ are no less human, all too human, or that ‘reality’ is a fiction (p.64). So-called ‘objective’ truth is as much a perspective as any other, because, on its own terms, it would have, impossibly, to be a view from nowhere. Kofman finds that science is regarded by Nietzsche as a kind of metaphorical thinking, but which refuses to confront its own origin in language. The systematic character of science ‘allows it both to master the world, by enclosing it within the narrowness of its concepts, and to protect itself from it by concealing it,’ she says. The ‘greatness’ of science is ‘an impoverished greatness;
purely fictional, it is a mask designed to scare and deceive’. In section (205) of *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche says it is a matter of taste, with thinkers giving in to scholarly activity, to specialising, seeking in that way to be leaders, but held back by it. In this way, scientists and philosophers may seek an escape from life in the security of knowledge. By contrast, the genuine philosopher ‘risks himself’.

Nietzsche uses bodily metaphors for what we ordinarily take to be mental activities, while also taking the way in which we understand consciousness, for example, in terms of the will, as metaphor for what can occur just as well without consciousness. In this way, Kofman says, Nietzsche underlines the opposition of soul and body: ‘the body and consciousness are two systems of signs which signify each other reciprocally’ (1993, p.26). In this way, Nietzsche seeks to dismantle what Kofman marks as ‘proper’. Metaphysics, religion and science are interpretive activities at the level of appearances, distorted by the secondary level of meaning which is carried in the conceptual language making up our ‘proper’ understanding of ourselves. We take consciousness to be essential, ‘forgetting’ it is only the way in which mankind’s engagement in the world is figuratively expressed to himself. This ‘text of consciousness’, this ‘symbolic and symptomatic mask’, symptomatic of its speaker’s authority, is misconstrued as ‘fact’. Kofman describes a ‘literality’ at stake here; ‘the “literality” of the text of nature – beyond its mystical and religious covering …’. In ‘reading well’, we discover ‘the literality of the writing of the “drives”, a system of differences symptomatic of the “style” of one drive which provisionally masters the others and serves as a “centre” of perspective …’ (p.99). Kofman cites Nietzsche’s declaration in *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, that the philosopher ‘seeks to hear within himself the echoes of the world symphony and to re-project them in the form of concepts’, indicating that with all the plurality of metaphors in play, the philosopher addresses the full range of human values (p.107). In an endnote, she allows that Nietzsche’s letter to Cosima Wagner claiming he was Buddha, Dionysus, Caesar, Shakespeare, Christ, is not an indication of insanity so much as making this point about engaging with the manifold character of humanity.

At stake here is the possibility of a realignment of consciousness. In *The Gay Science* (11), Nietzsche is clear that conscious judgements and beliefs are unreliable because consciousness is only the latest development of organic life, and not yet fully developed. Again, the judgements we make about consciousness itself can be mistaken, overestimating its value and significance.

Believing that they possess consciousness, men have not exerted themselves very much to acquire it; ... To this day the task of incorporating knowledge and making it instinctive is only beginning to dawn on the human eye and is not yet clearly discernible; it is a task that is seen only by those who have comprehended that so far we have incorporated only our errors and that all our consciousness relates to errors. (1974, p.85)

Our ideas come to be internalised, as instinctive bodily drives. Given its developmental character, there is the opportunity to internalise new ideas. This can be a practical matter of trying out new ways of living. Burnham & Jesinghausen (2010(a), pp.73-74) explain this is the basis of Zarathustra’s recommendation to his disciples in I (22), that they should cultivate new instincts which serve ‘the meaning of the earth’, by which Nietzsche means overcoming ingrained errors of the kind of moral and religious thinking which looks to a supernatural
source of knowledge and truth, or which is life-denying. In this way, it is realignment towards whatever serves the body, or living. With the incorporation of knowledge, we will value what is suited to our character as bodily, organic beings. While this can be taken as a realignment to the ‘truth’ of all organic life, that it consists in the exercise of a fundamental will to power, Burnham & Jesinghausen allow it will proceed as an ‘inquisitiveness’ with which we might pursue new ideas and ways of living, and which will be incorporated as drives or instincts, even though they may be spoken of in less obviously bodily, more ‘spiritual’ terms, as virtues.

But underlying this, Nietzsche seems to recommend a return to some original endowment of instinctive feelings towards life, and which he treats in *The Gay Science* (11) as resilient to the ‘errors’ so far incorporated through the operation of undeveloped conscious thinking and knowledge. Burnham & Jesinghausen point to Nietzsche’s example of equality in *The Gay Science* (18), where he says the idea of equality has been internalised in a way that determines our bodily drives are subordinated to its expression as a moral virtue. We are accustomed to the doctrine of human equality, Nietzsche says, while blind to our own condition. Feelings tied to hierarchical relations and required in experiencing genuine nobility, are absent. Crucially, Nietzsche says, ‘not even metaphorically does the word “slave” possess its full power for us’ (1974, p.91). With this link to feelings integral to our organic nature, the ‘incorporation’ of ideas through the development of language and consciousness will admit the possibility of return starting from the level of a use of language, through metaphor, and art. It is indicative that Nietzsche talks metaphorically in (18), in terms of distance and height, rather than, say, the material conditions informing a master-servant relation. It has to be a turn away from conceptual language, back to the image, as Nietzsche puts it in *Ecce Homo*, where this is the means of recapturing feelings in danger of being lost altogether with the development of language and conscious. This would not be possible if, as Nietzsche says in section (11), the damage done by consciousness was not lessened and our preservation ensured by the strength of an instinctive, unconscious ‘knowledge’.

I examine in more detail below how Nietzsche’s talk of drives has been taken more straightforwardly in physical terms, and ultimately of will to power. There is the same difficulty with this kind of analysis, that it does not capture the experiential character of the emotion Nietzsche marks as ‘higher’. In the early unpublished essay, *The Greek Music Drama* (2013), from 1870, Nietzsche’s primary interest is in the affectivity of the drama. It has been seen how he talks in terms of return to the *Ur-Eine*, and of ‘spring-fever’, but he is marking a specific emotion. While it is personal or subjective in character, in regarding it as ‘instinctive’ Nietzsche is allowing for it its universal character. An account of how this experience is expressed and communicated will determine how Nietzsche’s own texts stand to be received, or ‘heard’. And I contend that Nietzsche’s interest in it as ‘instinctive’ is directed on its phenomenal character, at the level of lived experience, appearing through a perspectival reorientation of consciousness.

That is to say, it is not a matter only of physiology. A scientist can talk in terms of how conscious self-understanding obscures an underlying operation of drives and instincts, but Nietzsche does not validate science as a ‘true’ account of ourselves, as biological organisms. In a note from 1887, Nietzsche talks of art as an expansive feeling of power, an
intoxicating animal vigour tied to the ‘oldest joy in festival’, and as much, he says, to what is ugly and dreadful:

Art reminds us of states of animal vigour; it’s on the one hand a surplus and overflow of flourishing corporeality into the world of images and wishes; on the other a rousing of the animal function through images and wishes of intensified life – a heightening of the feeling of life, a stimulus for it. [The ugly, too] in that it still communicates something of the victorious energy of the artist who has become master of [it] (2003, p.160)

It is clear that he is focused on the character of the experience itself. If it is taken as expressing an underlying physiology, then so much is continuous with the metaphor of transference in On Truth and Lying, but which it has been seen above, is itself primarily a figurative use of language.

6.3) physiology

It might be insisted Nietzsche acknowledges a physiological ground of the origin of metaphor. In this section, I look at evidence for his having regarded ‘drives’ in essentially physiological terms, as biological instincts. There are indicative passages which seem to favour that position. For example, in The Gay Science (354), where he allows the ‘greatest portion’ of our life might proceed no differently in the absence of its being mirrored in a conscious awareness, Nietzsche means at the level of physiology. The point is made in support of the claim that all our activity is fundamentally our own, though we come to understand ourselves from the ‘common’ perspective of a shared language. His target is this ‘surface- and sign-world’, which he says is drawn on what is useful to us. With its utility tied to our survival as a species, our dealings with others are marked in the construction of a herd-consciousness. As such, it is a corruption of an individuality consisting at the level of physiology in certain ‘drives’ or instincts.

But Nietzsche is also clear in this section that he does not distinguish a level of appearances as somehow false, as if the ‘truth’ must be elsewhere. At the end of the section, he allows that talk of ‘utility’ is itself only a way of articulating the basis of the ‘herd’ perspective. It does not justify such a perspective in the sense of grounding it in a ‘truth’. Accordingly, Nietzsche must allow the same be said of physiological explanation. We could be ‘driven’ by considerations having a ‘basis’ in utility. And attending to what ‘drives’ us as individuals, we can talk in bodily terms of our physiological constitution. But there need be no ‘real’ difference between these ways of speaking. The physiological account is not ‘true’ in contrast to the other. Rather, at the level of conscious understanding, it is a way of attending generally to what ‘drives’ us. As a change of perspective at the level of phenomena, it allows for a self-conscious distancing on what we may have took for granted as knowledge of our selves. It was seen how Safranski (2002), for example, argues for Nietzsche recommending a kind of close analysis of the interests and concerns of our everyday self, subjecting them to a psychologically framed critique. Then, Nietzsche’s remarks about ‘inner processes and drives’ in section (115) of Dawn, mark the way in which we have come to ‘incorporate’ the legacy of certain ways of speaking and the legacy of historical circumstances.
So much is indicated in what Nietzsche says in *The Gay Science* (18) about our understanding of the doctrine of equality. And it is in this way that talk of drives should make possible the scrutiny of phenomena not immediately given to consciousness. This is not a matter of discovering hidden ‘facts’ of biology. As such, these could have little significance. I follow Safranski’s rejection of the idea that Nietzsche means anything like the repressed drives of a Freudian unconscious. Rather, it is a method of scrutiny. Safranski characterises this as seeking ‘to render visible the jumble of the collaborative resonating stimuli and ideas as if under a magnifying glass’, making a comparison with tones which, though they may not be heard individually, ‘impart an unmistakable nuance to the audible sound’ (p. 206). I have argued for musicality being tied to certain feelings, where these stand to be experienced in sound and visual images involving hierarchical relations, and as distance on our ‘common’ self-understanding. My contention that Nietzsche articulates a rediscovery of phenomena tied to imagery of height and distance, is not incompatible with the kind of scrutiny indicated by Safranski, taken in conjunction with the operation of a *Symbolik* in experiencing the ‘rarer’ states which I say are a primary concern of Nietzsche’s philosophy.

In the course of this attention to more or less peripheral states of consciousness, Nietzsche especially favours bodily metaphors. In *Dawn* (119), he characterises ‘inner drives’ as a ‘thirst’, as a ‘contingent alimentation’ which determines how we experience the world. In his example, someone’s laughter as we pass by may be interpreted in a number of ways, depending on whichever ‘drive’ is ‘surging’ in us at that moment. As such, the occurrence differs according to the condition of the person interpreting it. Nietzsche goes on to consider ways in which we might seek to accommodate what drives us. But, tellingly, he points to his own resort to imagery (*es ist Alles Bilderrede*), having likened these drives to hunger or thirst in their demanding gratification. Again, this is not a scientific, reductive programme, to identify hidden drives, because the analysis remains at the level of our subjective experience of things, seen perspectively, with the possibility of ‘realignment’ through a use of figurative language.

This is evident in *Beyond Good and Evil*, in section (36), for example. There, Nietzsche is clear in considering the ‘life of the drives’ to be ultimately intelligible as the most fundamental form of the will, as will to power, that he does not seek to stand, as it were, outside the causal, mechanistic order of appearances. As a primitive form of the will, it is taken by Nietzsche as being on the same level of reality as the desires and passions we experience. In (37) he mocks the supposition that he only substitutes a physical reality of will for supernatural agency, saying the charge is itself already drawn on a ‘common’ surrender to metaphysical thinking. This supplies the sense in which Zarathustra demands knowledge ‘serve the meaning of the earth’ (2006, p.57), as consisting in a realignment of drives to the ‘truth’ of will to power. It cannot be a reductive programme. A logical refutation of that kind of physicalism is offered in *Beyond Good and Evil* (15), where Nietzsche begins with the premise that the character of our experience is determined by human physiology. If the world we come to know must include the facts of human physiology, then our understanding of this physiology is a product of itself. As such, the argument is a *reductio*, Nietzsche says, of the initial assumption of a physiological determinism. But, in the concluding line of the aphorism, Nietzsche steps away from the logic, to question whether we should want to deny the world is the product of our senses. That is to say, he does not want to concede the kind of
scepticism which follows on the supposition of a ‘real’ world, understood in purely physical terms. The reductio is aimed, then, at the sceptic, who exploits scientific explanations of perception. And in which case, Nietzsche’s naturalism cannot be directed on setting out an ontology of drives.

There is a question whether Nietzsche is not inconsistent on this point. For example, the opening remarks of Human, All Too Human might suggest a scientific reductionism. With metaphysical thinking taken to be drawn on supposed oppositions, such as between wholly self-less action and self-interest, Nietzsche suggests a ‘chemistry of moral, religious, aesthetic ideas and feelings’ can be substituted for metaphysical errors, to reveal the origins of such ideas (Nietzsche, 2004). Small (2005, p.33) notes how this demand for a chemistry of concepts contributed to the break with Wagner, in as much as Wagner recognised the challenge to his own work, that, less honourably, its origins were not to be found in an aesthetic realm accessible to ‘genius’. But talk of chemistry is metaphorical in as much as Nietzsche is recommending a genealogical inquiry, with science only making room, as it were, for what he calls the ‘ontogeny of thought’ (Nietzsche, 2004, p.24). Nietzsche continues:

From this world of idea strict science can, in fact, release us only to a small extent (something we by no means desire), in that it is unable to break significantly the power of ancient habits of feeling. But it can illuminate, quite gradually, step by step, the history of the origin of that world as idea - and lift us, for moments at least, above the whole process.

Nietzsche emphasises, here, a kind of distance gained on what is conventionally given, in language and in everyday belief. In Beyond Good and Evil (12), where his target is the idea of atomism, both in the religious sense of a soul and in science, Nietzsche allows the soul can be reconceptualised in material terms, as, say, a ‘social structure of drives and affects’. But, at the end of the section he indicates he does not grant such a claim is any more or less true than the former position. And in The Gay Science (346), he points to a danger in negating the kind of metaphysical errors which follow on mankind’s need to revere a better world. The danger is that it sets up another opposition, of ‘man against the world’, where that world is the familiar world, in which our reverences at least make life endurable. As such, it is the danger of a too scientific, reductionist understanding of mankind’s nature.

6.4) purity

I have addressed the significance of Nietzsche’s talk of drives and instinct. There is the further question what status could be accorded hierarchical relations themselves. They can, as anything else, be integral to human experience at the level of appearances, where enough has been said already that Nietzsche rejects any sense in which we might suppose the appearances are not all there is. But in arguing for their connection with a category of feelings, I have focused on the way in which an image is symbolic when it does not simply signify but is identical with its ‘object’. It is, then, an identity of certain feelings and imagery, to which hierarchical relations are, in a way, essential. There is an original impulse or inspiration expressed and communicated in such imagery, but this is something apparent in its expression. An illustrative example which I take from Figal (2015, p.120) is useful here.
Fugal addresses the possibility that a visual, plastic art may be ‘musical’, noting that Nietzsche draws examples from visual art. In particular, he asks how paintings by Cy Twombly appear rhythmic, though they are not in motion. Fugal rejects an answer that the rhythm is traceable, by association, to movements of the artist’s own hand in making lines on the canvas. He says the association could only be made if the painting itself already appeared rhythmic:

One would not be able to derive the movement of the painting hand from the painting if the movement were not itself in the painting – not as a trace, but as movedness.

Similarly, he says, the ‘movedness’ in a sound image, such as a piano piece, is not to be found in the movements of the pianist’s hands. The key point is that movedeness may be visible, no less than audible.

I take Fugal’s point as licensing the contention in this thesis, that certain ‘rarer’ feelings are communicated in an imagery of height and distance, through the hierarchical relations informing it. In section (4) of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche draws on the imagery of Raphael’s Transfiguration. The lower half of the painting is pessimistic in its representation of the pain and suffering of individuals, as the empirical ‘reality’ familiar to us. But out of it, Nietzsche says, there rises a ‘new vision-like world of appearance’ which is constituted in its enabling a serenity and distance on suffering. Nietzsche marks it as an ‘apostheosis of individuation’ (Vergöttlichung der Individuation), as a kind of visionary return to Unity out of dismemberment. He describes the painting’s upper half: ‘a brilliant hovering in purest bliss and painless contemplation through beaming wide-open eyes’. This is the ‘second’ appearance, as art, and in the painting it is represented as being hidden to the figures below. The allegorical (gleichnisartigen) character of the painting allows its interpretation in accordance with Nietzsche’s own theme, but in his use of it he draws attention to the way in which the painting achieves what he describes, namely the visionary rendering of pain and suffering.

As such, it can be taken as incorporating the aesthetic feeling which is Nietzsche’s theme, in the way that Fugal allows Twombly’s paintings incorporate movement. It is a short step, then, to allowing this feeling is located in the primarily hierarchical relation of the figures in the two halves of the painting, in the imagery of ‘rising above’, responsible for its affective power. Its allegorical use in describing what is at stake is secondary to this, although this explanation can itself admit an aesthetic response in so far as the language is taken figuratively. The danger is that as explanation it deals in conceptual terms. The painting can be taken literally, just as Nietzsche declares Christianity is Plato for the masses (2002, p.4). It is notable that Plato, in the cave analogy, relies on ‘picturing’ a rational clarity in contrast to reasoning employed by the prisoners in deciphering shadows, even as the analogy itself invites deciphering. In the case of Raphael's Transfiguration, its allegorical character and use of Christian imagery does not have to obscure the aesthetic feeling which I take to be Nietzsche’s primary interest, and which distinguishes it from merely ‘beautifying’ art.

It is, then, a matter of its ‘musicality’. Like the Apollo Sauroctonos, Raphael’s painting identifies a ‘rarer’ feeling, tied to the ‘higher satisfaction’ Nietzsche talks of here, but
apparent in the painting itself. Just as the rhythm in Twombly’s work is not to be traced to the movements of the artist’s hands, so the musicality of Raphael’s painting is not to be found, as such, in Nietzsche’s exposition of it. It consists in the tension or dissonance which informs a successfully Dionysian art. In the painting, this tension can be explored in terms of the details of its contrasting halves, but the Dionysian ‘impulse’ it expresses is wholly emotional. In its expression, its form is fundamentally the kind of separation and movement involved in representations of distance and rank order. In this case: in the floating figure.

As ‘second’ semblance, art and other kinds of figurative expression admit the focus Kofman puts on metaphorical thinking, in opposition to conceptual knowledge and understanding. Kofman is primarily concerned with the deployment of metaphor as a strategy, drawing attention to itself as imagery and rhetoric. Again, my own emphasis is on the feelings tied to imagery of height and distance. In this respect, I diverge, as well, from Safranski’s treatment of what he identifies as the beginnings of a ‘phenomenological programme’ in Nietzsche, constituted as a broadly psychological inquiry, unravelling common motivations and errors of consciousness. Specifically, I take it to be the felt experience of an order of rank which is important. Nietzsche’s project of revaluation is aimed at the rediscovery of ‘higher feeling’, starting from a critical assessment of herd language and the judgements of the so-called ‘false ego’. A certain aspect of things, encountered as part of lived experience and in artistic representations of experience, is implicated in the expression and communication of the ‘inchoate feelings’ Nietzsche values as a renewal of self-consciousness.

Nietzsche also talks in terms of purity. ‘Of all the gradual purifications awaiting humanity, the purification of higher feelings will no doubt be one of the most gradual,’ Nietzsche says in section (33) of Dawn, distinguishing them from kinds of religious fervour tied to fear and superstition around imagined higher powers, where, for example, a community may be led by events such as crop failure to suspect punishment for some moral lapse. Science will reject these kinds of common misconception of higher feelings, but it does not fall specifically to science to ‘purify’ them. Unfortunately, ‘purity’, as a concept, is tied to ‘herd’ language, and in (272) Nietzsche employs a racial analogy. On a charitable reading, he may be taken there as calling for the relevant sense of a close attentiveness to conscious self-awareness, free of cultural distractions. The point remains, as before, that a focus on phenomena of consciousness is the basis for ‘purifying’ our self-understanding.

6.5) Erleben and Erdichten

It has been noted already that Nietzsche talks of drives in terms of a thirst or hunger for satisfaction, so that everyday experience is contingent on which of them is uppermost at some point. If, as a ‘cruelty of chance’, the occasion supplies no opportunity, then a drive may whither, Nietzsche says. In compensation, it is satisfied in dreaming, in which we fantasise experiences. In this case, the same stimulus, in some regular noise at night, such as a clock chime, or in kinds of bodily cramp, can admit a range of fantasies, again depending on which drive is seeking satisfaction. Nietzsche is clear that at the level of nervous impulses there need be no variation, but we imagine different causes for the same impulses ‘according to our drives’ own needs’ (p.90). In the second example given in section
(119), ‘experience and make-believe’ (*Erleben und Erdichten*), in *Dawn*, if we know in advance that someone will fall in front of us the next day, then in the time beforehand we can imagine the experience in many ways, in contrast to the automatic response we would make if not forewarned. Nietzsche allows it is a physiological process which gives rise to these interpretations, and which are no less imagined in waking life than in dreaming. In the case of his other example in (119), of how we might variously experience an occasion on which someone laughs as we pass by, he concludes:

> What then are our experiences? Much *more* what we put in them than what is in them already! Or must we go so far as to claim: In and of themselves, there is nothing in them! To experience is to make believe? –

But the talk of drives in this section is subordinate to the point Nietzsche makes here. It does not admit that everything is illusory in the way that a physical reduction to facts of physiology would allow. The rhetorical question at the end of the section indicates Nietzsche is rejecting a supposition that everything is fantasy. What is involved in a subjectively *lived* experience depends upon our own nature. Metaphorically, it is spoken of as drives. But it is as much a matter of cultural influence and history. Hence, Nietzsche requests an *ontogeny* of drives.

The character of our experience is informed by the commentaries we put upon it and can vary in relation to the same external stimulus. In that way, it is a matter of habituation. But there can be a specific sense in which a *Symbolik* is influential. Roger Beck’s (2006, pp.128-152) discussion of an initiate’s experience of ritual activity inside a Mithraeum provides a useful context here. It has been noted already that Beck starts from Porphyry’s account of initiation in caves, with Zoroaster said to have been the first to dedicate a natural cave in honour of Mithras, furnished as a symbolic image of the universe, and in which it was revealed to an initiate ‘the path by which souls descend and go back again’. He goes on to consider what would be the character of the subjective experience in apprehending the cave as microcosm, rather than in relation to ritual activity itself. As such, it is a focus on feelings the initiate could have in coming to know its structure and furnishing. These feelings are unlikely to be intense. The routine and order inside a Mithraeum are not suited, Beck suggests, to experiencing the kinds of ecstasy anticipated in participation in other kinds of mystery cult. Intellect and emotion are joined, he says, and the initiate’s ‘*pathos* of the soul’ is tied to his apprehension of the purpose and design in construction of the Mithraeum and its furnishing.

The capacity for this *pathos* is treated by Beck as innate, and he follows Walter Burkert’s (1987) discussion of a passage (ch.33) from Dio Chrysostom’s *Oration 12*, on the experience of initiation. He explains how Dio talks in terms of an initiate’s ‘surmise’ that some insight or purpose is at stake. That much can as easily be surmised by the person Dio marks as a visitor from ‘utmost barbary’, even if such an outsider is likely to misinterpret the culturally specific artefacts and practices. Beck’s key point is to warn against separating the interpretive thinking from emotion, as if they must be separable components of the experience. Drawing a comparison with an aeroplane flight-simulator, he says the activity in the Mithraeum organises the participant’s thinking and responses, so that his understanding does not have to be ‘built anew’ each time he enters, but rather ‘reactivated’ (p.146). He includes a discussion of recent findings in neurophysiology, but it is the sense of reactivation
that is useful in capturing the nature of the ‘realignment’ demanded by Nietzsche, and, crucially, its operation through immersion in a class of imagery founded on an order of rank. In the case of the experience in the Mithraeum, of ‘the descent and departure of souls’, Beck writes:

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\text{[this experience is] not the extraordinary subjective pay-off of a single extraordinary ritual, but a habit of mind – admittedly a very strange habit of mind – acquired by repetitive ‘assimilation of the holy symbols’ in numerous acts of worship and communal festivity played out in the Mithraeum, not that different perhaps from the experience of the regular lay participant in the Christian eucharist. (p.151)}
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In this respect, Beck is drawing a contrast with mystery-cult initiations which would be more intense and spontaneously disruptive of the self. It is a habit of mind, grounded in a Symbolik, which characterises the lived experience of the soul-journey in the Mithraeum, and in contrast also to the modern cults of Heaven’s Gate and the Solar Temple, in which cult-members died. The distinction Beck draws in this way can be taken with that between a Dionysian intoxication or ecstasy and the kind of Dionysian art for which I have argued Nietzsche finds a model in the Apollo Sauroctonos.

6.6) Natursprache

While granting that specific imagery may be semantically opaque to those outside a given cultural context, it remains that certain symbols can, in the way that I have argued Nietzsche follows Creuzer, be ‘universal’. The point is made by Suzanne Langer (1990, p.288), where she notes there are certain ‘charged’ symbols which carry the same force of meaning in different cultures, and which determine what she marks as an ‘unconscious orientation’. It is also possible for their ‘spiritual’ import to be lost. Opportunities for new forms are provided in the novelties of modern life, but Langer argues we are bound to have to address these in material and practical terms, just to accommodate ourselves to them. So, for example, an aeroplane could operate just as well symbolically as a ship, but it is too new, ‘it does not sum up our past in guarantee of the present,’ she says.

Poetic simile, not spontaneous metaphor, is its status as yet; it is not a repository of experience, as nature-symbols and social symbols are.

This distinction is useful in granting a sense in which we can acknowledge a natural language, or Natursprache.

Kofman allows that Nietzsche can be taken as admitting a sense of Natursprache. It was seen above how she allows everyday language and the artificial, constructed language of science have removed us from the ‘music of the world’ (1993, p.65). It still remains a matter of ‘reading well’, to resist the allegorical and mystical interpretations which Kofman (p.100), citing section (8) of Human, All Too Human, I, marks as Nietzsche’s target. For Kofman, the natural language is a language of ‘drives’, allowing it is neither the language of science nor a ‘divine’ language. I take it as admitting a Symbolik in which a ‘sacralised’, living experience is already implicated. In section (15), Nietzsche writes:
[Philosophers] think that with deep feelings man penetrates deep into the inside, approaches the heart of nature. But these feelings are deep only to the extent that they regularly stimulate, almost imperceptibly, certain complicated groups of thoughts, which we call deep. A feeling is deep because we hold the accompanying thought to be deep. But the deep thought can nevertheless be very far from the truth, as is, for example, every metaphysical thought. If one subtracts the added elements of thought from the deep feeling, what remains is intense feeling, which guarantees nothing at all about knowledge except itself, just as strong belief provides only its own strength, not the truth of what is believed. (2004, pp.22-23)

Again, it is a felt experience which is Nietzsche’s primary concern, not the possibility of its grounding in facts of physiology, any more than in purported metaphysical truths. It is an experience gained with habituation to a class of imagery, in a Symbolik.

6.7) summary

I have considered here the extent to which Nietzsche is concerned with a physiological basis of ‘rarer’ feelings. I emphasised the specific argument he gives in section (15) of Beyond Good and Evil against any presumption of physicalist explanations. It was also seen on Kofman’s analysis how Nietzsche treats knowledge claims as involving generally what she marks as a forgetting of metaphor, where bodily and ‘spiritual’ language is interchangeable as metaphor. The error is in supposing such language has a basis in truth or ‘reality’, but the bodily metaphor can be favoured as encouraging realignment away from ultimately life-denying claims to other-worldly authority. This is also expressible as realignment to the ‘truth’ of a will to power. Again, this is not as a matter of fact, but only as a stimulus towards new ways of living, free of metaphysical presuppositions around truth, and so on. I diverge from this analysis in as much my focus is on the phenomenal character of an experience of higher feeling, and which stands to be (re-)discovered at the periphery of consciousness. Again, it is the role of a symbolic use of figurative language in Nietzsche’s texts which I take as being operative here, and, as such, this is aside from questions around a naturalistic reduction or a will to power because operating as an identity of symbol and its ‘object’.

The status of this ‘object’ was drawn by comparison with Fígal’s remarks on the incorporation of movement in the patterns in Cy Twombly’s paintings, as in his ‘Bacchus’ series from 2005. A further comparison was with the experience of an initiate into the cult of Mithras, immersed in its symbolism. The initiate’s immersion does not depend upon being able to interpret the symbolic structure, and this admits the experience is possible irrespective of a subject’s cultured presuppositions. It is a matter of aesthetic feeling, but located in the ‘musicality’ of a particular form. I marked Langer’s claim for the universality of certain ‘charged’ symbols, in what she calls an ‘unconscious orientation’, independent of cultural influence. Talk of ‘drives’ is perhaps similarly ‘charged’, even where it is subject to revision by scientific findings. And in respect of images of height and distance, my claim is that Nietzsche allows the ‘depth’ in this charged imagery and language is a matter of feeling gained at the level of experience, in immersion in a Symbolik.
Conclusion

1) summary

I have focused on Nietzsche’s remarks in *Ecce Homo* concerning his own inspiration taking shape in an involuntary, overpowering ‘return’ to imagery and metaphor, along with the use he makes of imagery of height and distance. I took this imagery in connection with the expression and communication of ‘rarer’ states in Nietzsche’s texts, taking this to be dependent upon its symbolic character in line with the Creuzerian distinction between symbol and allegory, and where the key point was that this communication is not to be taken in terms of ‘de-coding’ the text. I argued Nietzsche’s declared affinity with Emerson must be drawn on the affectivity of Emerson’s own use of imagery, in what he marked as its ‘emblematic’ character. I treat such imagery as being forceful in the way that Nietzsche talks in *Ecce Homo* (2005(a), p.125) of being overpowered (überfielt) by his own Zarathustra as a type (als Typus). It is not a response to Schopenhauerian pessimism at stake here. The context is an aesthetic justification of existence constituted as a life-affirming experience of the ‘rarer’ pathos Nietzsche marks as noble.

A pathos of distance is implicated in this, and though it may be tied to circumstances involving the kinds of suffering and frustrated desire inherent in existence, it is the characteristic features of experiences drawn on height and distance which are operative here. The connection with creativity is expressed in an Emersonian metaphor of descent to man, in which a life-affirming inspiration takes form in human relations and engagement with nature. As metaphor, this talk of descent is itself symbolic. Such imagery may have a dualistic import in some contexts, as, for example, in Plato’s imagery of the fallen charioteer in the *Phaedrus*. But its interpretation is incidental to the affectivity of the key feature of it. That is to say, its aesthetic character is given as the formal expression of a creative impulse experienced as the ‘rarer’ pathos. This is not a matter of its interpretation in, say, dualistic terms. As an experience, this pathos is dependent still on the sense of its incorporation in a subject. An individual is, as it were, the locus of a process of revaluation, grounded in human activity, and, in particular, is formed in that activity. A further metaphor for this can be found in alchemical symbolism, in the human body as alchemist’s furnace (athanor), taken up, for example, in Marguerite Yourcenar’s *L’Oeuvre au noir*, published in English as *The Abyss* (1976). It would accommodate Nietzsche’s own use of metaphors of digestion, but it remains that this alchemical process is directed on achievement of the rarer state which Nietzsche symbolises in the lustre of gold, as Zarathustra’s ‘gift’ to the reader.

As the Dionysian impetus to creative image-making, inspiration is no less expressible in figurative language than it is in painting and sculpture or in the iconic imagery of myth and cult symbolism. In sound, it is a tempo and rhythm of written and verbal language, or of music and gesture. In visual imagery, in art and figurative language, it is tied to a symbolism of height and distance. In these formal expressions, it is the fleeting ‘lizard moment’ Nietzsche talks of in *Ecce Homo*. I have sought to explain precisely how Nietzsche supposes an order of rank is integral to the expression and communication of this fundamentally creative instinct, and to examine its implications for issues in his wider philosophy. Evidence
of Nietzsche’s thinking in these terms was sought in his own use of symbol and in finding his account of what is at stake is itself advanced in the same symbolic terms, in *Zarathustra*, also marking the affective power of Emerson’s own use of figurative language. This required dealing with a number of preliminary issues in Part 1, establishing certain key points on which my inquiry turns. In Part 2, I undertook a closer examination of theoretical concerns around these issues, on the evidence of Nietzsche’s texts. I noted in the introduction, Gadamer’s discussion of this key distinction between symbol and allegory, and the connection he makes to the work of Friedrich Creuzer. I argue this distinction underpins the role and operation of imagery of height and distance in Nietzsche’s texts.

In chapter 1, I began with the treatment of pathos as a receptive mood or attunement (*Stimmung*). Again, with Gadamer, it is a matter of how things happen to be experienced (*erlebt*). Appeal to a ‘heightened’ kind of living is by itself too abstract. I sought a connection with Nietzsche’s talk of what he calls in *Ecce Homo* a return to the image, and grounded this in the example of the *Apollo Sauroctonos*, hinted at by Nietzsche. As an example of a Dionysian art, it expresses the fleeting character of a Dionysian impulse taking created form. I turned then to Nietzsche’s regard for Emerson’s writings taken on these terms, as exemplifying a Dionysian artistry. The question of Emerson’s ‘influence’ on Nietzsche was considered in section 4, where I concluded it is less a question of influence than the Dionysianism they already shared. In section 5, I set out the character of Emerson’s Dionysianism, where this stands to be drawn on the distinction between symbol and allegory. He remarks, for example, that a poet’s inspiration is expressed in things in nature being taken symbolically. Where Emerson wrote he would ‘unlock every crypt of every rock’ and give voice to nature, Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra* says all being wants to learn from him to speak. In Emerson, it is a Bacchic ‘intoxication’, but I emphasised a key image, the calm, impartial eye with which ‘one stands above one’s life’. In this respect, it was seen how Emerson allows the poet’s symbols are what they sign.

In section 6, I went on to address implications for assessing the influence on Nietzsche of key claims made by Schopenhauer. I diverged from the view that Nietzsche is concerned to address the so-called problem of pessimism in Schopenhauerian terms. The issue here is with the notion of intuition (*Anschauung*) informing Schopenhauer’s answer to pessimism, in a disinterested turning away from the world of experience. With Nietzsche approving Emerson’s emphasis on nature ‘restored’ to man, I argued that he uses a Schopenhauerian terminology in expressing a fundamentally Emersonian affirmation of experience. This ‘resacralisation’ is at odds with a Schopenhauerian redemption and escape from the world. A key step here was in approaching Nietzsche’s engagement with Emerson’s writings through the visual imagery Emerson employs. Schopenhauer’s emphasis was on music being closer to the expression of a self-less Will. With visual images accorded equal status, Nietzsche can be taken as allowing intuition is sensuous in character and directed on a Dionysian art like that exampled in the *Apollo Sauroctonos*. As such, his adherence to an Emersonian immersion in experience, in a heightened living, precedes and survives his encounter with Schopenhauer’s pessimism.

In section 7, I considered the question of Nietzsche’s regard for a mythic discourse and the role of great artists in conferring meaning on existence. My judgement was that Nietzsche
addresses a loss of feelings attendant on the demise of myth as a tragic sense of life. He
does not favour a return to myth providing solace in ‘necessary’ illusions. Rather, it is a
notion of ‘strength’ in play here, and in respect of which Nietzsche came to say his claiming it
for Schopenhauer and Wagner was a mistake. I take it in the sense of feelings towards
existence. In section 8, it was a 'good will' towards appearances because these feelings
originate in dissonances given in experience and communicated in a Dionysian art.
Nietzsche adheres to the Emerson injunction to rise above mere egoistic interests and
concerns, and it is in this respect that Nietzsche offers the example of the poet Archilochus
taking himself, as it were, objectively. As a unity with nature ‘humanised’ in language,
Nietzsche’s example operates at a symbolic level through the imagery of height and distance
in which it is framed, recalling Emerson’s talk of a ‘transparent eye’.

In identifying the role of imagery of height and distance in Nietzsche’s writings, it needed to
be seen that he took more than a little interest in visual appearances. I addressed this in the
second chapter of part 1, rejecting Bertram’s argument that Nietzsche lacked a ‘visual
sensibility’. In particular, I reject a supposition that Nietzsche’s interest in visual images must
be primarily intellectual, at the level of allegory. In this respect, I examined Shapiro’s claim
that Nietzsche makes use of particular works of art in pursuing a visual metaphor against the
‘oculo-centrism’ of a presumed objective standpoint. By contrast, I approached Nietzsche’s
use of examples along with his own figurative language as being drawn on their symbolic
import. Raphael’s Transfiguration was taken accordingly, having regard to its dissonant
halves and the symbolism of height. The same consideration was extended to Nietzsche’s
engagement with metaphor in Emerson. Evidence was found in Nietzsche’s marginal
markings in his edition of The Essays, in a descriptive passage on our sympathy for the
‘pictures and music’ of Nature, and a line which can be easily fitted to the paintings of
Claude Lorrain, which Nietzsche admired. An example of Nietzsche’s own use of visual
imagery was drawn from sections (280-285) of The Gay Science. Accordingly, my findings
here establish Nietzsche’s visual ‘attunement’.

In chapter 2, the ‘musicality’ of a visual image was taken on the basis of this ‘attunement’
binding our responses to it. I considered claims for the musicality of Nietzsche’s texts in
relation to syntactical structures enabling a kind a cognitive or epistemological dissonance,
by which a subject may be led to revaluation. But I relied on dissonance being taken more
widerly. For example, it is integral to colour theory underpinning Segantini’s technique in
painting, which was aimed at achieving a greater luminosity of colour. Allowing dissonance is
given at the level of appearances, it can inform the image-content of Nietzsche’s figurative
language of height and distance. In section 3, it is tied to delight in existence as a
Dionysianism communicated in the way that Nietzsche talked of the Athenian spectator of
tragic drama identifying with the actor. I noted also that Nietzsche specifically refers to the
‘transfiguring musical intoxication’ embodied in Praxiteles’ statues. As an intoxication of
feeling in return to nature, it is not a rational kind of cognitive realignment. It is crucial here
that nature is taken in the sense that Emerson allowed, of an active, Protean force. And
importantly, it admits a plastic art may be no less Dionysian than other forms.

In chapter 2, section 4, I made the connection between elevated feelings and delight in
existence, before turning to some further preliminary remarks on Übertragung marking a
‘transfer’ between the Protean force of nature and its symbolic forms. It was seen how Emerson finds nature ‘humanised’ in language, and allows a kind of natural agency informs an individual’s strength, or will. This can suggest its humanisation as will to power, though this would already assume a particular understanding of will to power. By contrast, my emphasis was on the sense in which this strength is tied by Nietzsche to a heightened experience of life, mediated in art and language. As such, it is much less a question whether Nietzsche had come to abandon a Schopenhauerian metaphysics. In respect of Anschauung, in the context of remarks Nietzsche makes in section (99) of The Gay Science, I argued in section 6 that it is not a matter of a philosophical ‘journey’ Nietzsche makes, away from Schopenhauer’s influence. Rather, it is feelings Nietzsche had in reading Emerson, and which stand to be drawn as an intuition grounded in sensuous experience. It is questions around the operation of this intuition in relation to imagery and language given in experience, as in reading Emerson, which concern Nietzsche. With these concerns, the basis of his criticism of Schopenhauer’s ‘mystical subterfuges’ lies with how a certain form of expression is unsuited to communicating the ‘strength’ Nietzsche values, or suggests its absence. That is to say, the concern is not with metaphysics, as such, but with a metaphysical seduction in language. Crucially, this admits a possibility of Anschauung marking the identity of higher feelings and the emblematic or symbolic imagery of height and distance in which they are expressed and communicated at the level of appearances.

With these preliminaries, I turned in Part 2 to the central question of this thesis, how an imagery of height and distance sustains the communication of ‘rarer’ states in Nietzsche’s writings. I began with an account of Nietzsche’s views on the origins and development of language. It was seen how primary importance is given in the secondary literature to the account in On Truth and Lying. I held to the distinction between symbol and allegory, familiar to Nietzsche from the work of Friedrich Creuzer and his notion of Symbolik. This has implications for the way in which the central ‘metaphor’ of transference (Übertragung) in On Truth and Lying is taken. As I did in Part 1 with the example of the Apollo Sauroctonos, I considered examples of Nietzsche’s use of images, drawing comparisons as well with approaches to the imagery of the Mithras cult and other kinds of symbolic discourse, notably alchemical, where these are relevant on the basis that Nietzsche’s Zarathustra may be taken as a Symbolik, directed on the expression and communication of higher feelings.

I began in chapter 3 by examining the accounts of Nietzsche’s theory of language given by Crawford, and by Emden. It was seen how they look to a source of Nietzsche’s views in the work of Eduard von Hartmann, Gustav Gerber, and others, and identify a ‘metaphoric process’ by which language and, subsequently, thinking itself develops. In section 4, I examined in detail the role of Übertragung identified by Crawford and Emden. With the notion of transference taken itself as metaphor for whatever is the ground of this process, there remains a supposition that it can be ultimately a matter of physiology. But in depending on a transfer of ‘content’ between impulse, image and sign, a physiological account would implicitly rely upon a sign-object semantic. It would also require Nietzsche’s example of the Chladni figures be taken analogically, in suitably scientific terms. Reliance on a notion of one thing transposing another already admits meaning carried in other terms. By contrast, I looked to Nietzsche’s talk of intuitions expressed in ‘forbidden metaphors’ as indicating the role of symbols. I provided evidence in section 5, where Nietzsche’s remarks in sections
(265) and (268) of *Beyond Good and Evil* were taken in connection with the imagery in his poem, *Star Morals*, as pointing to the ‘transference’ involved in ‘noble’ feelings being expressed in imagery of height and distance. In section 6, this was taken as recalling the account in *The Birth of Tragedy* of a poet merging with his images.

I turned in section 7 to the theory underpinning the distinction between symbol and allegory in relation to claims by Creuzer, Schelling and others. I noted Creuzer’s own resort to metaphor in saying the symbol is comparable to a bolt of lightning that illuminates in a single stroke. The key point here was in allowing transference can be grounded in a kind of ‘mutual exchange’ between higher feelings and imagery of height and distance. I went on to address the symbolism of Dionysus and Apollo. Its antecedents in other writers were noted, and how it was taken over by Nietzsche. In section 8, I explored parallels in *Zarathustra* with the symbolism of the Mithras cult, again in relation to the key symbol of a slaughtered bull and Dionysus’ dismemberment. The emphasis in this section was on approaches taken in anthropology to issues around interpretation of cultural practices, and I endorsed Daniel Sperber’s remarks on this, where it was seen as well how these are taken up by Roger Beck with regard to the meaning of astrological symbolism in Mithraism. The relevance to *Zarathustra* lay in whether it should be approached linguistically as standing to be ‘de-coded’, or whether Nietzsche relies on its imagery speaking, as it were, for itself, in symbolic terms. This was expanded upon in chapter 5, where I examined in detail the imagery in *Zarathustra* of the child with the mirror, and the golden lustre Nietzsche emphasises in connection with the bestowing virtue. My finding was that Nietzsche provides a commentary on the role of symbols which is itself given in the same symbolic terms. As such, *Zarathustra*’s use of imagery informs his own ‘gift’ to the reader.

In chapter 4, I examined Nietzsche’s account of the origins of self-conscious thought, and in particular relation to ‘rarer’ states obscured by a herd consciousness centred on needs and interests of a socially-dependent self. The question was raised how Nietzsche might have supposed a ‘return’ to nobler states is possible, and I examined how this has been taken as suggesting a phenomenological ‘method’ of inquiry. The starting point was Safranski’s claim that Nietzsche anticipates such a method in the scrutiny he exercises on dismantling the influence of herd language. I surveyed recent literature which seeks to build on Safranski’s account in making the case for regarding Nietzsche as a proto-phenomenologist. But I relied on an example, a painting by Caspar David Friedrich, to demonstrate how a *petite perception* can lie, as it were, at the periphery of consciousness, and depend for its (re-) discovery on an image which incorporates it being taken symbolically, with disregard to its allegorical interpretation. As ‘immersion’ in a symbolism, I expanded on this in chapter 6.

In chapter 5, I began from the way in which Nietzsche recalls Creuzer’s claim that a symbol ‘radiates’ in emphasising the golden lustre of a staff which Zarathustra is given. In its symbolic character, Zarathustra’s remarks on this lustre were seen to be a commentary on the character of parable or analogy itself, indicating the role of symbols in a creative use of language and which Zarathustra marks as the bestowing virtue. Creuzer’s talk of the fractured rainbow colouring of a cloud-obsured sun was linked as well to Nietzsche’s supposition of a higher self-possession discovered in ‘descent’ to individuality and imperfection. In the imagery of the child and the mirror, it is tied to certain dissonant feelings
expressible in Emersonian terms as a return to unity with nature in descent and individuation, and where this depends on overcoming the limited egoism inherent in herd thinking.

Two broadly metaphysical questions were addressed in chapter 6. Having argued Nietzsche’s imagery of height and distance is implicated in the expression and communication of ‘rarer’ states, I returned to the question whether Nietzsche treats this affectivity as having a physiological basis. The second question is related to the claimed identity of these feelings and a feature of things given in experience. The challenge here was to say how they can be the ‘object’ of a formal expression in imagery of height and distance. I took them as informing the ‘musicality’ of Nietzsche’s texts, but again the question is what would its basis ultimately be, and how might it be nothing apart from the text? I began with Kofman’s account of Nietzsche’s resort to bodily metaphors directed on the realignment of consciousness against other-worldly concerns. With all our claims to knowledge grounded in the figurative expression of our own activity, a language of instincts or drives is integral to turning away from other-worldly authority and truth. That is to say, it is psychologically enabling in encouraging scrutiny of what Kofman marks as our ‘forgetting’ of metaphor. But while this is directed on new ways of living, my focus remained the experiential character of a specific class of metaphor of height and distance, away from broad concerns around the errors of epistemology and metaphysics. At stake is its phenomenal character, ‘discovered’ at the periphery of consciousness. This is not inconsistent with Nietzsche seemingly approving a physiological basis of our interests and concerns, including realignment to the ‘truth’ of a fundamentally psychological will to power, because scrutiny of consciously held beliefs can legitimately be undertaken in terms of what ‘drives’ us. But it was seen that any stronger sense of this, as admitting a physical determinism, is rejected by Nietzsche, not least, for example, in section (15) of Beyond Good and Evil.

I approached the second question on the model of the rhythmic movement in Cy Twombly’s paintings. In the way that movement is incorporated in these paintings, I drew a comparison to higher feelings incorporated in imagery of height and distance as an identity of image and pathos. It was seen how Figal argues that the movement in Twombly’s paintings does not refer back, for example, to movements of the painter’s arm. In the way that it is something experienced in the painting, I compared experiencing the symbolic structure of the Mithraeum. Again, it is not a matter of de-coding, but of immersion in the symbols, where these are ‘charged’ in the way that Langer talks of an ‘unconscious orientation’, independent of culture. Accordingly, I claimed that Nietzsche pursues this unconscious orientation in his use of imagery in Zarathustra, taking it in connection with the feelings he experienced in reading Emerson. There is an account of symbolic imagery which Emerson gives in terms of the emblematic character of things. In his examples, an enraged man is a lion, a cunning man is a fox (1982, p.49), and the implication is that these images are ‘real’ features of the world, so that a man being enraged will have become a lion. In the case of being ‘uplifted into infinite space’, a subject experiences a higher feeling in so far as the imagery is taken emblematically for what it is, and not in the way that the development of language encourages us to treat it as mystical or ‘mere’ metaphor if it cannot be subjected to a reasoned understanding in other more familiar terms. I concluded that Nietzsche allows the
‘depth’ in this charged imagery and language is a matter of feeling, gained as immersion in a Symbolik.

2) objections

It may be charged that in focusing on simple feelings of elevation, I overlook the complexity of Nietzsche’s thinking and the wider themes in his work. I have examined claims he makes together with his ‘sources’, and in marking out the role of imagery of height and distance in Nietzsche’s writings I have addressed examples of his own use of figurative language along with others he himself raises. In this respect, I emphasised Nietzsche’s metaphor for inspiration, the ‘lizard moment’ symbolised in Praxiteles’ image of Apollo Sauroctonos. This was taken as itself the figuration of a fleeting simultaneity of impulse and form in a Dionysian art, with its symbolic character consisting in being what it figures in the way that an eagle’s gaze is identical with regality. As such, I have focused on a particular emotion as identifying a fundamental strand in Nietzsche’s aesthetics, with implications, then, for assessing wider themes in his philosophy.

It remains that a philosophy of higher feelings must account for how they should be re-identifiable in other examples and in different contexts. That is to say, there must be clear criteria for determining what counts as an expression of these feelings. It is already central to this that I have emphasised the category of symbol drawn on height and distance in art and in everyday contexts in which a pathos of distance is experienced. And this stands to be tested, as it were, against further examples. A context here is cinema, and a good example may be found in the films of Stanley Kubrick. It can be seen these are informed by Nietzschean themes, but in terms of Kubrick’s imagery and cinematic style they succeed in communicating the pathos which Nietzsche identifies as a necessary condition of ‘rarer’ feelings. This is because Kubrick deals in imagery of height and distance, and his images can be taken symbolically in the sense which has been argued in this thesis. Though it cannot be supposed such particular images are sufficient for experiencing higher feelings, they provide a basis of discovery and re-identification of the feelings in question here, in their connection with the specific feature of height and distance.

To focus on a particular instance, a scene in Kubrick’s 2001, A Space Odyssey depicts an ape-like human ancestor coming to understand the heavy weight of an animal bone, then using it to kill other animals for meat and, ultimately, to kill a creature of its own kind. The camera follows the weapon as it is thrown skyward in triumph. In its upward motion it is seamlessly replaced by an image of an Earth-orbiting satellite in a further depiction of mankind’s future technological achievement. Thematically, a more or less Nietzschean message is identifiable here, about the role of power and warfare in the evolutionary ascent of our species, and how ancestral instincts persist beneath a civilised veneer. The film suggests a tribal opposition continues into the future, in a cold war politics already familiar to its contemporary audience. In this way, the imagery has a ‘meaning’. But more is at stake than a commentary on mankind’s warlike temperament. If such imagery succeeds, it does so in communicating a particular feeling or emotion which is grounded in responding to a
certain aspect of the image, and which I am emphasising is synonymous, as it were, with that feeling.

This success also depends upon making an inference to another’s state of mind. In Nietzsche’s terms, it is the film-maker’s inspiration, as *Dionysian* artist, which stands to be communicated. It is an ‘inner’ state, but communicable in an image, it merges with its formal, public expression. The basis of such a communication is addressed in the work of Dan Sperber (1995, 1997, Sperber and Hirschfeld, 1999). Sperber argues that our system of language signs is supplementary to an inferential capacity. Language developed as a useful short-hand for understandings which begin in inferences, where these depend simply upon the capacity to represent in one’s own mind what is represented in someone else’s. It is key that this capacity is prior to and independent of language. And it allows an individual can have the same experience as others. Sperber offers an example of a primitive human ancestor watching another eating berries from a bush and arriving at the same belief the other has, that ‘these berries are edible’. It is an inference from what is observed. With the development of language, a verbal cue would sign that the berries are edible, by saying, for example, ‘eat!’ But it is the initial capacity for inferential communication, Sperber says, which drives the evolution of that further ability to sign a meaning (1995). Accordingly, this may be taken as the basis of the possibility of re-identifying higher feelings.

But a question may be raised then, why not put more emphasis on a physiological basis for feelings towards things, allowing facts about brain structure have priority over cultural influences. It was seen how Roger Beck, for example, raises the possibility of an innate preference towards hierarchical orderings (Sperber and Hirschfeld, 1999, Beck, 2006, pp.88-98). The key point here is that this does not rule out the importance of certain features at the level of phenomena. Away from questions around its meaning and interpretation, the imagery in Kubrick’s *2001* exploits a sensibility in relation to representations of an order of rank in images of height and distance, of floating, flying, and so on. Questions around the basis of this sensibility can themselves be a theme in Kubrick’s films, as they are in Nietzsche’s philosophy. But the interest cannot be in reducing the experience or in arguing for the theory, because the experience is, after all, an aesthetic one, still private to individuals, but at the level of phenomena.

Another challenge to the emphasis on imagery of height and distance in Nietzsche’s texts is that it risks what Aschheim (1992) identifies in some of Nietzsche’s followers as a misplaced regard for Nietzschean *kitsch*. Aschheim points to Segantini’s admiration for Nietzsche. He included the mountain scenery of the Engadine in many of his paintings and his dying words were to ask for ‘his mountains’ (1992, p.35). Aschheim’s criticism is directed both at the thematic content of Segantini’s paintings, and at what he regards as ‘gimmicky’ in his technique. An example here could be *The Punishment of Lust*, in which two female figures are depicted floating horizontally in a desert landscape, against a distant view of mountains. The Walker Gallery’s commentary on this painting (National Museums Liverpool) notes Segantini’s abandonment by his mother, but suggests the image need not be taken in moral terms as a portrayal of ‘bad’ mothers. Instead, its theme can be the renewal and return of life, where the winter landscape indicates delayed renewal, and the floating figures are
‘punished’ in the sense of suffering the wait for Spring. In such terms, it is possible to fit Segantini’s interest to broadly Nietzschean concerns.

But, again, with its opacity to interpretation, it is the way in which the viewer is primarily unsettled by the image that is important here. Segantini believed the juxtaposition of colours achieved a greater luminosity of colouring than by mixing them, which it was seen above has a wider context in colour theory beginning with Helmholtz. The juxtaposition of colour has a correlate in the kind of tension or dissonance which it was seen that Hölderlin sought to rely on in his writings, and where this can be taken in terms of rarer states tied to a pathos of distance. The judgement that Segantini’s work is Kitsch may follow if his imagery is approached in literal, conceptual terms. But it could also be allowed that in its technical artistry, and in the imagery of floating weightlessly, *The Punishment of Lust* communicates a tension or dissonance which is integral to its aesthetic.

I have given little attention to issues around social and political implications of a pathos of distance. Another sense of Nietzsche’s talk of ‘distance’ is suggested by Lovibond (2014), as advancing a kind of aristocratic ‘restraint’ and reflecting an aspect of Nietzsche’s own taste in ‘giving style to one’s character’. She draws attention to Nietzsche’s claim in section (60) of *The Gay Science*, that a ‘noble enthusiasm’ to be in the midst of life must be tempered by ‘standing back’. The feeling for an order of rank is noted, but Lovibond considers it in relation only to the difficulty in seeking to communicate what is ‘rare’ while relying on the common language of the masses. Her particular focus is the social detachment required in seeking to sustain an inner life of higher feelings, and she addresses certain inconsistencies which will follow on this, such as the technical difficulty that Nietzsche must claim authority for his elitism in terms already determined in a common language. For example, in utilising notions of attraction and affection for a particular set of values, he has to rely on a ‘herd’ understanding while seeking to overcome it (2014, p.217). But Lovibond’s own analysis may be similarly affected in so far as these inconsistencies arise in seeking to establish the notion of an aristocratic restraint. By contrast, I have focused on the very character of an experience of higher feelings, not on the social and political difficulties around their recommendation.

Finally, it must be answered whether my approach assimilates Nietzsche’s thinking to a kind of primitivism, opposed to ideas of social and political progress. It was seen how an emphasis on symbolic meaning only undercuts the value we might put on the sort of conceptual analysis which informs, for example, Lakoff and Johnson’s inquiries into the relation between thought and language. And the account I set out is seemingly at odds with a self-reflective, reasoned inquiry, as if Nietzsche expected his readers only to respond emotively. A reply would be that Nietzsche is concerned to undercut established, culturally embedded ways of thinking and their defence. It is then a philosophical question how a ‘return to the image’ is operative in a critical undercutting of conventional mores. It need not be supposed that some reflective, reasoned evaluation of the kind of experience at issue here must be required for it to have any enduring effect on the subject. That is to say, the subject’s self-understanding may be transformed or turned around by what is, after all, an inchoate and ephemeral experience. It was seen how the conceptual reasoning and analysis
which follows on the development of language is, in any case, regarded by Nietzsche as obstructive here.

Again, there is a model in Nietzsche’s remarks in section (18) of *The Gay Science*, where he evaluates a conceptual understanding of equality in comparison with certain feelings towards others. The extent of Nietzsche’s emotivism and its implications are away from the central concern of this thesis, but it can be countered that the charge of primitivism mistakes Nietzsche’s interest in issues around a certain corruption in language and its implications, as, for example, in the case of what we might suppose is the basis of something like equality. In this respect, I have depended upon the distinction between experiencing a symbol and its interpretation. A point is usefully made by Beck (2006, pp.47-48) in the context of cult practices and religion, that an approach to understanding these kinds of experience need not be drawn upon a questionable paradigm which separates naive believers and an intellectually oriented priestly class. The paradigm is itself open to philosophical scrutiny.

3) further research

It was seen how in *Zarathustra*, in Zarathustra’s remarks on his disciples’ gift of a golden staff, Nietzsche defends a use of figurative language in the same figurative terms. With an identity of *pathos* and image enabled in its symbolic use, the explanation of what is at stake in such a use of imagery is already tied to its experience, as *pathos*. There is more to say about the ‘status’ Nietzsche accords to explanation in this context. On his account of the development of language and consciousness, the experience communicated in an identity of image and *pathos* is obscured by explanation in conceptual terms. But if these remain different perspectives, as a difference between feeling and explanation, then they may be accommodated as esoteric and exoteric communication in Nietzsche’s writings. This distinction could be faulted for entailing possibilities of misdirection and ‘conspiratorial’ readings. But it can follow on distinguishing symbolic and allegorical meaning, and pursuing this contrast is a way into evaluating particular themes in Nietzsche’s philosophy, such as claims he makes around the will to power, and the question, for example, whether these must validate a brute strength.

In this respect, the relation of will to power and higher feeling is not always clear in the secondary literature. For example, in arguing Nietzsche was influenced by Emerson in allowing an individual’s ‘inner life’ is strengthened and enhanced as an inward feeling of power, George Stack (1992, p.167) does not adequately clarify what should be expected of higher feelings. On the model he provides, the imagined ape-creature in 2001 would have to be taken as enjoying an ‘intensified state of spiritual “self-existence”’ simply in its act of violence. Kubrick may be following Nietzsche in exploring the concerns around this issue. In the image he employs, there is a tension or dissonance in the balance of its *Dionysian* content and its artistry. We can make an inference to the creature’s primitive thinking, but are distanced from it in the way that Nietzsche writes in section (5) of *The Birth of Tragedy*, as being simultaneously subject and object, poet, actor and spectator (2000, p.38). With attention on the weapon thrown triumphantly skyward, the *Dionysian* intensity is tempered as
the further, ‘rarer’ *pathos* is expressed in imagery of height and upward movement. And as *pathos*, its experience is separate to a conceptual understanding of the operation of a will to mastery in human social development and self-realisation.

As such, the expression and communication of these feelings tied to contexts drawn on an order of rank may be marked as esoteric in contrast to a literal understanding given in straightforwardly conceptual terms. The reader is enabled, as it were, to stand back from this literalism. The contrast here is evident in Nietzsche’s alchemical imagery. The use Nietzsche makes of an alchemical metaphor of transmutation into gold has been noted by Richard Perkins (1983). He cites the design of the staff in *On the Bestowing Virtue* and remarks made by the Spirit of Gravity, and points to the terminology of Zarathustra’s ascent and descent as playing on the imagery of the alchemical process (p.327). For Perkins, this informs what he marks as ‘analogistic strategies’ employed by Nietzsche in seeking to open a perspective on things in a way that is dynamic and unsettling. By ‘analogistic’ he means Nietzsche’s aphoristic, esoteric and poetic style, whereby the reader is drawn into a labyrinth of possible connections between images and encouraged towards a revaluation of all that has been devalued by morality and metaphysics. Among other references in letters and unpublished fragments, Perkins cites a note in which Nietzsche talks in this way, of turning everything into gold (p.335, fn.27). Perkins touches on this being tied to the sense of a fully ‘lived’ experience, though he emphasises the reversal of values required in negating morality and metaphysics and succeeding in a joyous affirmation of life.

If alchemical imagery informs an esoteric reading, Nietzsche dramatises this concealment in *Zarathustra*. In *On the Vision and Riddle*, the Spirit of Gravity mocks Zarathustra for going to his own stoning, taking literally a metaphor drawn on a ‘stone of wisdom’ or philosopher’s stone (*Stein der Weisheit*) which the Spirit says that Zarathustra has thrown skyward but is bound to fall back down upon him. The metaphor has a basis in alchemy. An overview of alchemical texts and ideas can be found in Gray (1952). Gray explains the philosopher’s stone is a metallic ‘seed’ obtained from a process of working on base metals, to produce a pure ‘ quintessence’ which is reintroduced into base metal, to turn it into gold. In this process, in which metals are heated in a vessel, the vapours produced will rise and fall. This was sometimes symbolised as a dove, flying upward and descending. And the seed’s return to base metal is suggestive of a cyclical process, comparable to the organic process by which, say, an acorn develops into an oak, only to produce acorns. The process by which the seed is attained is ‘putrefaction’, and is treated as the death of the originating metal. In this respect, the stone is also identified with Christ’s return, to redeem mankind from its fallen state. Behind the Spirit of Gravity’s remarks lies Zarathustra’s identity with this ‘seed’. He is the returning seed through which mankind stands to be ennobled. But the Spirit of Gravity’s remarks indicate the reader will be misdirected by a linguistic reading of the imagery Nietzsche employs.

In this thesis, I have argued Nietzsche understands the aesthetic justification of existence in terms of immersion in a symbolism. The so-called ‘rare’ or higher feelings which mark a fully ‘lived’ experience are enabled in a class of imagery drawn on an order of rank, and which is a necessary condition of their experience. Noble and life affirming, these feelings are discovered at the level of appearances, as an identity of image and *pathos*. As such, they
are tied to imagery of ascent and descent in the writings of Nietzsche, Boehme and Emerson, and others. As the content of a Dionysian art, these feelings are expressed and communicated in a variety of forms, such as alchemical imagery, for example, or in the imagery of Kubrick’s 2001. I have outlined a theoretical basis for this way of ‘reading’ symbolic and figurative language, and how it is found in Nietzsche’s texts. And it admits the cross-cultural understanding of certain fundamental images which had been posited, for example, by Creuzer. Imagery of height and distance can attract interpretations in terms of other-worldliness, but Nietzsche’s interest is directed on asserting its life-affirming character, in an identity of image and feeling given at the level of our lived experience.
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