

“Organization and the Organic in the Philosophies of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer”

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## **Abstract**

This thesis will investigate the theories of organization and the organic proposed by Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. These questions have been taken up by very few scholars of Nietzsche, and even less scholars of Schopenhauer. The first chapter of this work examines the various attitudes that scholarship takes toward the terms 'life' and 'organic' in Nietzsche's texts. We indicate the significance of the question of life in Nietzsche's thought, and analyze the causes for the proliferation of the indefinite connotations surrounding these terms amongst Nietzsche's commentators. The first chapter catalogues the history of the terms 'life' and 'organism' in Nietzsche's influences, writings, and interpreters.

Our second chapter dissects the Kantian and Schopenhauerian theories of the organic and of organization, with the majority of the chapter focusing on Schopenhauer. We argue that Schopenhauer's critics have neglected two key elements of his philosophy: his doctrine of the Ideas, and his engagement with French naturalists such as Lamarck and Cuvier. Schopenhauer's theory of the organic can only be understood once these two subjects have been connected.

The third chapter in this thesis works on describing the concept of organization in Nietzschean thought. To do this involves describing the untold story of the relation between Nietzsche's theories of types and the will to power with the Schopenhauerian notions of Ideas and the will. In this chapter we attempt to reexamine the concept of the will to power by analyzing the quality of power itself. We claim that scholars have not given enough consideration to the interpretive and organizational functions of the will to power.

The last chapter in this thesis formulates and defines the organic being in Nietzsche's philosophy. It is our contention that the indispensable element to unlocking Nietzsche's concept of the organic is the theme of 'the hidden' in his thought. Our claim is that the initial gestures of life can be understood as a withdrawal, as the building of a boundary, as a hiding away. This is the culmination of the thesis; a theme which has been widely ignored by most scholars will end up at the heart of the Nietzschean project.

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**Abbreviations**

COJ- Critique of Judgment

CPR- Critique of Pure reason

WWR1 - World as Will and Representation Volume 1

WWR2 - World as Will and Representation Volume 2

WN - The Will in Nature

VC- On Vision and Color

P&P- Parerga and Paralipomena

ZP- Zoological Philosophy

M- Monadology

HMVX- History of Materialism Volume X

COSK- Concept of the Organic Since Kant

HC- Homer's Contest

PPP- The Pre-Platonic Philosophers

PH- On the Personality of Homer

BOT- The Birth of Tragedy

TLEMS- On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense

TAF- The Time-Atom Fragment

HATH- Human, all too Human

D- Daybreak

GS- The Gay Science

Z- Thus Spoke Zarathustra

BGE- Beyond Good and Evil

GOM- On the Genealogy of Morality

TI- Twilight of the Idols

EH- Ecce Homo

NCW- Nietzsche Contra Wagner

AC- Antichrist

## Introduction

This thesis addresses the problems of organization and the organic in the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche. The problem of organization is the problem of regulation and regularity in the universe, how systems are coordinated and how different elements interact. The problem of the organic is the question of the nature of life, it addresses the difference between life and death. This problem asks what terms could be used to approach a definition of life. We believe that we can further the understanding of this philosophical problem by properly explicating Nietzsche and Schopenhauer's conceptions of life. This thesis proposes a novel reading of Nietzsche that uniquely approaches these issues by reinterpreting both his relationship with Schopenhauer and his theory of the will to power.

There has recently been a loud lament over the decline of philosophy. Like Demeter mourning Persephone academics have wondered aloud whether philosophy will have a role in our future. But perhaps there has been a shortage of properly philosophical questions in our time, which has given rise to an appearance of a malnourishment amongst philosophers. In this case, we are waiting for a more bountiful time and place where our discipline can flourish, and it is always possible that the first seeds of a new harvest have already been planted. Eugene Thacker begins a lecture: "An era is philosophically defined by the horizon of what it can think. The ideas that delineate limits. What if you said for antiquity the main concern was with 'Being'? [...] And what if you said for modernity there was a preoccupation with god? [...] could we then say the contemporary era in which we live is demarcated by the horizon of 'life?'" (Thacker, 2008). Now that god is a dead issue for philosophy, the issue of life seems to be emerging as a question of prominence. We are in an era that is increasingly interested in Biopolitics, quantum biology, and complexity theory, all of which struggle with the question of the organic being.

The crucial snag that the life sciences encounter is the fact that life is known as an intuition. Jeremy England, a physicist at MIT who was hailed as possibly, "The next Darwin" (Weinglass, 2015) for his theory of the emergence of life based upon dissipative adaptation<sup>1</sup> says, "It's important that we be philosophically careful, and remind ourselves of how words get their meaning in the first place. [...] I don't, as a physicist, want to look

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<sup>1</sup> To give a summary of this theory, England attempts to overturn the second law of thermodynamics that deals with a necessary increase in entropy. He writes that it is possible for a kind of 'memory' to form in a system based on its efficient dealings with energy dissipation. In his words, "While any given change in shape for the system is mostly random, the most durable and irreversible of these shifts in configuration occur when the system happens to be momentarily better at absorbing and dissipating work. With the passage of time, the "memory" of these less erasable changes accumulates preferentially, and the system increasingly adopts shapes that resemble those in its history where dissipation occurred. Looking backward at the likely history of a product of this non-equilibrium process, the structure will appear to us like it has self-organized into a state that is "well adapted" to the environmental conditions. This is the phenomenon of dissipative adaptation" (1. England, 2015).) The key here, is that he believes life can emerge from a foundation of random interactions between inorganic material.

for a definition of life that comes from physics. [...] we start with the empirical phenomena of the way we use this word. There is a collection of phenomenon in the world that we recognize as being alive. [...] A priori, life is totally absent from our description of the physical properties of a system. Physics doesn't make a distinction between the particles in the whale and the particles in the water around it. [...] If we are going to do biophysics and do it well, we have to be aware of the intuitive act of translation between these languages" (England, 2014). In other words: First we have the intuition of life, the intuition of the divide between the living and the dead, and then we theorize about it, more or less scientifically. Every time we must revise our scientific definition of life it is on the basis of this intuition. When NASA astrobiologist Felisa Wolfe-Simon found a strain of rod-like bacteria in Lake Mono that seemed to construct its DNA sequences from arsenic rather than phosphorus, the scientific community realized it might have to redefine its working formula for recognizing life. This was due to the fact that biologists had been approaching an agreement that the use of phosphorous in DNA strands was an hallmark of the existence of Life. Although Wolfe-Simon's theory has been debunked, during this moment of crisis there was never the question of categorizing this bacteria as 'dead.' Instead preparations were made to overturn biologist's definitions of what life was, because intuitively everyone observing it knew that this thing that shouldn't be alive, was. There is also the anomaly of the Tardigrade, a functionally immortal segmented micro-animal. One experiment conducted on February 16th, 2016 was able to revive a Tardigrade which had been taken from Antarctica and frozen in 1983. These microorganisms were reported to have been able to feed and reproduce after revival (Tsujimoto, Imura, and Kanda, 2016). In these extreme instances the question of the organic becomes more clear. There is never a shred of doubt as to whether these organisms exhibit the qualities of life, these qualities are known intuitively as the symptoms of life, but parts of their descriptions challenge our biological definitions of what the physical nature of life is. Thus we propose that the life sciences must let philosophy work to create analysis of this intuition. As Kant writes, "In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may related to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is intuition" (CPR A 19/B 33). Philosophy is more suited to examining these intuitions which mediate between experience and conceptual knowledge because philosophy is more experienced in incorporating intuitions, surfaces, and appearances into its projects than the sciences, and few philosophers surpass Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in this field.

Because what if life were treated as merely the effect of a conglomeration of naturally occurring processes? That is, what if our intuition of the distinction between the living and the dead was a delusion? Would the life sciences successfully circumvent the problem of the organic if, hypothetically, physics were to make a breakthrough in the study of cell membranes or some other relevant subject, and came up with a singular formula that describes life according to the current paradigm of physical laws? This might

prove scientifically that life is entirely coextensive with the inorganic, but we hold that there would still be a problem of the organic. Because even if this hypothetical situation came to pass, it would be the job of a philosophical thinker to explain why this apparition appears to us, why does chaos *appear* purposeful in the rarest of cases? Even if there is no *fundamental* difference between the inorganic and the organic, the *perception* of the difference, the *intuition* of a difference, is a philosophical problem that requires investigation.

In philosophical terms, the question of life is a double inquiry. This is because the organic being is principally understood in its juxtaposition against the inorganic. It would not be possible to formulate the question of life were it not for this perceived boundary between the living and the dead. It is this barrier which is the subject of investigation for the question of the organic, and so what we are really attempting to describe when we are describing life is the *difference* between life and death. Whenever the question is asked "what is life?", the only philosophically satisfactory answer must illustrate the qualities of this barrier. This means that, while pursuing the question of life, we must necessarily explain the nature of the inorganic as well.

This is not to say that there are not positive activities attached to life. Metabolism, reproduction, growth, and evolution are so closely tied to life that we have not observed their absence in any being intuitively considered to be alive. But these activities cannot be used to define life in a philosophical sense, even if they are essential to it. A philosophical definition of life is not just a list of descriptions, it is more than just a negative thread that sews these various activities together.

In relating the story of the organism we must also consider the problem of organization in general. That is, while formulating the organic, we must also explain the organization of the inorganic world in philosophical terms. This is because the universe cannot be divided into pure chaos and teleological purposes, but even in inorganic nature we find rigid displays of organization, structures that are preserved in the organism. In truth, the organic is only the most refined form of organization. This is why the crystal, being a highly organized inorganic form of matter is so often used as the example of that which is almost-living.

We are primarily interested in this thesis in the theories of the organic proposed by Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. The question of the organic has been taken up by a select few scholars of Nietzsche (who we discuss at the end of chapter two), but these authors either frame the question of life in a teleological context of purposive and non purposive nature, or reduce Nietzsche's concept of the organism to the idea of 'struggle' or 'conflict.' We believe Nietzsche abandoned the teleological explanations for life early in his career, and that the organism for him is characterized by disengagement and withdrawal - by mediated, not direct, encounters. The first chapter of this work examines the various attitudes that scholarship takes toward the terms 'life' and 'organic' in Nietzsche's texts. We indicate the significance of the question of life in Nietzsche's

thought, and analyze the causes for the proliferation of the indefinite connotations surrounding these terms amongst Nietzsche's commentators. This involves analyzing some of the first major philosophers who brought Nietzsche out of obscurity, as well as some of the major influences upon Nietzsche's writing, such as Wagner. The first chapter comprehensively catalogues the history of the terms 'life' and 'organism' in Nietzsche's influences, writings, and interpreters.

Our second chapter dissects the Kantian and Schopenhauerian theories of the organic, with the majority of the chapter focusing on Schopenhauer. We argue that Schopenhauer's critics have neglected two key elements of his philosophy: his doctrine of the Ideas and his engagement with French naturalists such as Lamarck and Cuvier. Schopenhauer's theory of the organic can only be understood once these two subjects have been connected.

The third chapter in this thesis works on describing the concept of the inorganic in Nietzschean thought. To do this involves describing the untold story of the relation between Nietzsche's theory of the will to power with the Schopenhauerian notions of Ideas and the will. In this chapter we attempt to reexamine the concept of the will to power by analyzing the quality of power itself. We claim that scholars have not given enough consideration to the interpretive and organizational functions of the will to power. Because of this, the will to power has been widely mistaken for a 'fascist' drive for unlimited domination. However, Schopenhauer offers us a framework for investigating the different kind of nature to this mysterious concept from Nietzsche's late philosophy. This chapter's argument attempts to revitalize some aspects of the critique of the will to power that Deleuze constructed that have been passed over by scholarship, specifically his characterization of the will to power as a hermeneutical process.

The last chapter in this thesis formulates and defines the organic being in Nietzsche's philosophy. It is our contention that the indispensable element to unlocking Nietzsche's concept of the organic is the theme of 'the hidden' in his thought. Our claim is that the initial gestures of life can be understood as a withdrawal, as the building of a boundary, as a hiding away. This is the culmination of the thesis; a theme which has been widely ignored by most scholars will end up at the heart of the Nietzschean project.

# Chapter 1

## *Introduction.*

Before we reach the positive positions this thesis will take, we would like to clarify our relationship to the body of Nietzsche Scholarship. There is an understanding amongst scholars of the importance of the concept of life in Nietzsche. Commentators will frequently use phrases such as 'life-affirmation' and 'life-denial,'<sup>2</sup> or 'advantageous to life' and 'hostile to life'.<sup>3</sup> These widely used terms are meant to indicate a connection between value and life. Traditionally, Nietzsche has been read as advocating a system of ethics based upon 'life.' Schacht writes that Nietzsche, "takes 'life' in this world to be the sole locus of value, and its preservation, flourishing, and above all its enhancement to be ultimately decisive for determinations of value" (Schacht, 1983, p.359). Ansell-Pearson claims Nietzsche is "inviting us to develop a new bad conscience over our aspirations to a 'beyond' and reliance on ideals that oppose life"(Ansell-Pearson, 2016, p.12). Raymond Geuss says that, "[Life] in Nietzsche does seem to function as a criterion for evaluating moralities" (Geuss, 1997, p.10). The issue of life has been recognized as being important, maybe even essential to Nietzsche's project, for example if we believe that his project is the 're-evaluation of all values'. It seems to us that if we are to position the nature of life close to the heart of Nietzschean philosophy, we should have some kind of philosophical description of the nature of life. Without this standard, by what means could we measure whether this or that is 'life-affirming' or not? And yet despite the importance placed upon 'life,' it is surprisingly uncommon for Nietzschean scholars to attempt to formulate a Nietzschean definition of the organic. As we have indicated in the introduction, this investigation should center itself around investigating the intuition of 'life,' how the living thing is known to us.

The word 'life' is used in many different ways in the literature.<sup>4</sup> If our study intends to construct a Nietzschean metaphysics of life, we must first distance ourselves from these Nietzscheans who use 'life' in a different manner from that in which we intend to

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<sup>2</sup> Leiter 2007, Ansell-Pearson 1997, Reginster 2006.

<sup>3</sup> Kaufmann 1974, Lemm 2014.

<sup>4</sup> This is not just a trend amongst Nietzsche scholarship, but amongst modernity. As Thacker notes, "This is a synchronic dimension in which, at any given moment, and in any given context, there are such a wide range of meanings for "life" that the term ceases to have any stable meaning at all. The limit of this is, of course, relativism. If life means everything, then life means nothing" (Thacker, 2010, p.4).

use it. We must categorize and streamline these interpretations in order to establish what questions this work does not intend to address.

We can say from the outset, that the scholars who we are distinguishing ourselves from are not unjustified in making the claims that they do, nor in using the term 'life' in the manner they do. This is because Nietzsche also used the term 'Life' to refer to things other than the organic. Thus while the first part of this chapter discusses the various interpretations of 'life' in Nietzsche, the second part will explain why Nietzsche himself used this term indefinitely at times. If we can illuminate these two subjects then we will be in a decent position to begin to address the origins of the organic problem in Nietzsche's thought in the second chapter.

Let us begin by looking at one of the more common uses of the term 'life,' to denote 'human experience' broadly. The term 'life' is used in this way in order to address problems such as, 'is life meaningless?' 'Is life worth living?' 'How should we deal with adversity in life?' Authors who employ the word in this way are Tracy Strong,<sup>5</sup> Lawrence J. Hatab,<sup>6</sup> Thomas Hurka,<sup>7</sup> Christopher Emden,<sup>8</sup> Peter Poellner,<sup>9</sup> and Alenka Zupančič.<sup>10</sup> Elodie Boubill and Christine Daigle have edited a volume called *Nietzsche and Phenomenology: Power, Life, Subjectivity*. In this volume there aren't any authors who reference the problem of the organic in the way that we will, like the title implies, the entire volume is devoted to the use of 'life' to mean 'the phenomenological human experience of living.'

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<sup>5</sup> Strong mostly identifies life with subjectivity in a section entitled "What is Life" (Lemm, 2014, p.25), but further ties 'life' to the concept of becoming (2014, p.28) with subjectivity to create a new concept of life.

<sup>6</sup> Hatab defines life as 'Worldly existence' (2014, p.48), with the connotation that this existence is full of conflict, that is, a "World governed by will to power" (2014, p.38).

<sup>7</sup> "But Nietzsche does not value just unity of action, as could be found in a life devoted narrowly to a single activity. On the contrary, he heaps scorn on the specialist scholars he finds among European intellectuals, calling them 'nook-dwellers' and 'fragments of humanity.' Instead, his ideal is a unity that combines diverse elements, so a person's greatness lies in his 'range and multiplicity, in his wholeness in manifoldness.' It is an ideal of unity-in-diversity, or what is often called organic unity. It requires that a person have a single guiding impulse, one that organizes all his other impulses, but also that those other impulses be varied, individual, and strong. Then his goals combine the two traits of organized unity and individual diversity"(Leiter, 2007, p.24). Hurka does use the term 'organic' here, but, like our other authors, doesn't move beyond the psychological level, and never attempts to identify the boundary between the organic and the inorganic. Instead his article is an attempt to define Nietzsche's ideal man as essentially the colloquial 'renaissance man.'

<sup>8</sup> "What is generally called 'life' was thus, for Nietzsche, not the result of any existential experience, but a shorthand description for the 'multitude of forces' –including 'all so-called feeling, imagining, thinking'" (Emden, 2014, p.67). Emden has a complex and interesting argument. He discusses Nietzsche's relation to Kantian teleology (2014, p.84,128) and his relation to contemporary biologists (2014, p.186). However Emden concludes that for Nietzsche there is no interior vital force, the organism is only the plaything of external forces that simulate agency (2014, p.173; 190). This lead him to assert that there is no barrier between the organic and the inorganic world, and thus his framework does not allow him to address the question of the organic as we phrase it.

<sup>9</sup> Poellner asserts a direct synonymy between the organism and the human subject (1995, p.165). He uses the term 'organism' which would imply that he is aware of the organic question but he will end up denying the existence of the boundary between life and death (1995, p.277), which characterizes this question.

<sup>10</sup> "The words 'life' and 'alive' refer here to something very specific: to the *capacity of a given practice to produce its own object* (and not merely represent, duplicate, or display other, already existing objects)"(Zupančič, 2006, P.7, also see p.18, p.43). Here Zupančič is drawing on the notion that it is the inspirational source of the experience of creativity that Nietzsche is identifying as life.

A recent representative of this interpretation of 'life' as 'human experience' is Bernard Reginster's *The Affirmation of Life*. In this work Reginster frames Nietzsche's philosophy around the problem of personal nihilism, which is then broken into two problems: the problem of 'disorientation' and the problem of 'despair'. The first indicates the death of god, and the groundlessness of all values, the second problem points at the inconsolability of our 'other-worldly' ideals with the becoming of reality. Reginster argues that European 'disorientation' must confront a Nietzschean perspectivism in order to regain its footing, and that once this occurs, European 'despair' can be assuaged by an acknowledgment of Nietzsche's doctrine of the will to power. Reginster argues that this doctrine is based founded on 'life,' and that by 'affirming' this doctrine we can solve the cultural neurosis that ails us westerners. Reginster actually gives us a great fulcrum for characterizing the problem we find in this type of life-philosophy. He concludes his book with a musing upon the nature of life in general as opposed to one's individual experience, associating his project with the latter category:

Consider, for example, the following note: 'It is here I set the Dionysus of the Greeks: the religious affirmation of life, life whole and not denied or in part; (typical—that the sexual act arouses profundity, mystery, reverence)'. The parenthetical allusion to sex indicates that by "life" Nietzsche means life in general, rather than someone's particular life. The sexual drive is indeed an essential feature of life in general, [...] Yet, Nietzsche also suggests, pointedly in his own case, that the affirmation of life is an affirmation of the particular, contingent ways in which it has unfolded. [...] I rather believe that the reason why [Nietzsche] never draws a distinction between affirming life in general and affirming it in particular must be found in the very ethics that makes such an affirmation possible. To affirm life in general is to recognize that those necessary aspects of it 'hitherto denied' are 'desirable for their own sake' Thus, the ethics of power welcomes the inescapability of suffering in human life. [...] The revaluation based on Nietzsche's ethics of power only makes it possible not to deny life in general on the grounds that suffering is inevitable in it. But to affirm one's particular life, more is required. The ability to overcome resistance is a function of essentially contingent factors, such as what Nietzsche calls the 'strength' or 'weakness' of the agent, or the circumstances in which a particular activity is carried out, namely, the nature and amount of resistance opposed to its successful completion (2006, p.266-267).

What we want to assert here is that when Reginster speaks of 'life in general' he is actually speaking of 'the organic' as we have framed it. One is no longer talking about the meaning of one's particular life or one's personal struggles, one is talking about the general conditions of what it means to live. This is why we can attribute sexual

reproduction to the essence of life in general, but not to Nietzsche's life in particular. However Reginster's project does not include an analysis 'life in general.' When he speaks of 'life in general' he means simply, will to power, unqualified. Thus when he brings up the notion of 'affirming life in general' it is only to dismiss the idea as unimportant compared with affirming one's personal life. By defining life in general as 'will to power' he does not allow himself to ask the question of the organic, centralizing his discussion around the ethical, instead of ontological, repercussions of this definition. His analysis takes place at the level of the ethical and psychological, he is exclusively focused on the daily resistances to be overcome.

Reginster believes that "Metaphysics seeks to 'understand experience'" (2006, p.106), and so his analysis of Nietzsche is formulated within the boundaries of the experience of living. However, Reginster seems to rely on an unwritten metaphysics of the organism in order to ground his arguments concerning the will to power. Reginster asserts that 'despair' can be overcome by re-centering our psychological comportment towards being upon a firmer foundation, this foundation is referenced frequently as "The essence of life" (2006, p.103,104,106,127,132,156). This seems to us to be representative of the issue that we are trying to address in Nietzsche scholarship; the many definitions of 'life' often at least implicitly indicate their reliance on a definition of organism, but a Nietzschean theory of the organism is never formulated.

This thesis will not be addressing these kinds of question that Reginster asks until the first half of the last chapter, and even then, only in so far as they lead us towards a definition of the organism. This is the common link between all the philosophers we mentioned above, they believe that 'life' in Nietzsche's writing means 'the experience of life.' While, as we have mentioned, there is certainly evidence that Nietzsche used 'life' in this sense at times, we believe that he was also working towards a definition of the organism. It is the definition of the organism that we are interested in in this thesis, and we will demonstrate how this definition of the organism ends up shedding light on these questions that center around 'the experience of life.'

As Thacker writes, "the existential correlation of life and death is undone by one particular concept of 'life' - life as that which is lived" (Thacker, 2010, p.255). The reason this conception of life destroys the idea of a boundary between life and death is because there is *nothing* outside of our experience of life. Since we have no experience of death, a conception of life based solely on our experience precludes any mention of the inorganic. It is unable to cope with the thought of death, and so it is incapable of providing an intuition of the boundary between life and death.

*Will to Power*

The second most common use of the word life is as a synonym for the will to power. We are forced to split a hair here. In a later section at the beginning of chapter three we are going to deal with a few authors who put forward serious arguments concerning the ontological status of will to power. However there are many more authors who equate life with the will to power without actually attempting to address the question of the organic or the ontological status of the will to power. The questions that these authors tend to address have to do with the nature of becoming. These philosophers address what Thacker names the question of 'Superlative life,' which is "an ontology of Life that is thought of in terms of time, temporality, and process" (2010, p.34).<sup>11</sup> In doing so, these philosophers redirect the question of life away from the boundary between the organic and the inorganic and begin to think of life as synonymous with either a metaphysical substratum, or a 'law of appearances.' Thus every phenomenal instance of the living is only an imperfect representation of this metaphysical system, and every instance of the dead being a *less* perfect representation. Democritus thought of life along these lines. His explanation was that fiery atoms make a soul in exactly the same way atoms and void account for any other thing. He elaborates on fire because of the apparent connection between life and heat, and because fire seems to be motion and chance embodied. Among the Nietzschean scholars who utilize 'life' in this way are Daniel Conway,<sup>12</sup> Monica B. Cragolini,<sup>13</sup> Christopher Janaway,<sup>14</sup> Herman Siemens,<sup>15</sup> James Genone,<sup>16</sup> G. Watts Cunningham,<sup>17</sup> Paul Kirkland,<sup>18</sup> and Peter Sloterdijk.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Thacker demonstrates in his book that this kind of discourse has been well-trodden by philosophers such as Plotinus, Pseudo-Dionysius, or Eriugena.

<sup>12</sup> Conway asserts that the will to power is the same as life (Lemm, 2014, p.142), and then implies something like a Schopenhauerian 'vis medicatrix naturae' but does not go on to further characterize this grand vital force of life (2014, p.143).

<sup>13</sup> "Life is a constant self-overcoming and it generates its 'own' architectures that are not 'impositions' on life, but a process of life itself. In this sense, will to power as a plurality of forces in constant movement is *Selbstüberwindung* (self-overcoming), hence the forces that disperse are 'stronger,' because they allow for such self-overcoming" (Lemm, 2014, p.215). Now while this could be taken as a definition of life, Cragolini restricts her discussion to a psychological level. This allows her to make claims about how the aesthetic ideal is a force of death, without ever addressing what the boundary is between life and death or answering how it is possible for a living being to be a force that destroys the organic.

<sup>14</sup> "Will to power is to be the new criterion of value in human life, and if we understand will to power rightly, we see that many things that we tend to evaluate in strongly negative terms must instead be valued positively" (Daniel Came, 2014, p. 40). Janaway's definition is an excellent example of how an author can define life as will to power and still frame the question within that of human experience. He does this by concentrating on the psychological ramifications of the theory of the will to power, and thus does not address the question of the organic.

<sup>15</sup> "For Nietzsche, life is becoming, occurring (*Geschehen*), and self-overcoming; it is dynamic and fluid in character" (Siemens, 2010, p.190-191). Siemens is an excellent example of an author who believes that both will to power and becoming, two very ontological terms, are synonymous with 'life.' Although we must be fair to Siemens, he is one of the only authors to recognize this use of the term 'life' is a problem within the Nietzsche scholarship. He qualifies himself in a footnote, "The term 'life' slides between being a synonym for reality as a whole to being a term for specific domains of reality: e.g., all organic life or only human life. This difficulty cannot be addressed within the scope of this paper, where I will simply use what I consider to be synonyms for life in specific contexts" (2010, p.214)

<sup>16</sup> "I want to focus on the fact that he certainly thinks that will and power are basic characteristics of the phenomenon 'life'" (Genone, 2001, p.288). Genone asserts this flatly, but doesn't really go farther in interpreting what either 'life' or 'power' are. He talks about conflict and struggle in the living thing, and even asserts that, "Will to power is the force of

Keith Ansell-Pearson is another author among those who identify 'life' with the will to power,<sup>20</sup> although he will also at times use 'life' in the sense of 'human experience.'<sup>21</sup> Ansell-Pearson's focus is directed more to the processes which surround life, such as digestion and growth, value and meaning, reproduction and memory, aging and decline. And so at times he will use shorthand, saying things such as "an organism can be understood as the play of forces" (Ansell-Pearson, 1997, p.43). The problem with such a definition is that many things 'can be understood as the play of forces,' such as volcanic explosions, supernovas, or milk poured into a cup of coffee. We get more hints as to what the role of life is as Ansell-Pearson discusses death. Ansell-Pearson wants to avoid thinking of unified drives in the organism, such as a life drive or a death drive, but with that qualification he cautiously asserts a connection between death and stasis (1997, p.62), which implies a connection between life and movement. As we mentioned this is a common connection that is made in the literature; life is identified as movement, change, and becoming. Vanessa Lemm has even edited a collection of essays entitled "The Becoming of life".<sup>22</sup> The biggest issue is that we are then dangerously close to asserting that life is just our experience of living in a world of becoming. Or, another common interpretation is that since 'becoming' is identified as a more ontologically sound description of reality that 'being' for Nietzscheans, 'life' is often conflated with this 'ultimate reality.' In this case we find that it is impossible to distinguish life from death, and thus we have moved beyond the framework of the question of the organic as we have formulated it.

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life, the life force of living beings" (2001, p.289). But he doesn't ask the question of the organic. We could ask him, for example, if it is the case that living beings are the only things that are characterized by power struggles.

<sup>17</sup> "The most general statement of the meaning of this doctrine is that life consists in outgoing impulses-structural processes, instincts, desires and interests-which necessarily express themselves in some form of activity. Let us agree to refer to these vital tendencies as 'abilities.' Then our statement of the meaning of the doctrine would be that life consists in abilities; that the living individual, the bearer of life," (Cunningham, 1919, p.479). As is clear from this quote, Cunningham equates life with a rough idea of movement and domination.

<sup>18</sup> "By presenting the will to power as the fundamental drive of all life, indeed all nature, and by articulating human willing as a complex phenomenon, Nietzsche places willing within nature, rather than setting it apart" (Kirkland, 2009, p.48 ). This is a quite astute observation by Kirkland and is a position that many of the philosophers we are talking about are forced to take up. This is that if we equate life with will to power then life becomes just as ontological and pervasive as the will to power, in which case we have to ask, 'is anything dead?' 'Is anything *not* will to power?'

<sup>19</sup> In his essay *Nietzsche Apostle*, Sloterdijk uses 'life' in several different senses, in one sense to mean 'movement' in contrast to 'stasis' (2013, p.58), and later using it to mean the appropriation of the foreign elements inside oneself (2013, p.81-82). In his work *You Must Change your Life Now* he uses the term 'life-form' to indicate a cultural change Nietzsche was attempting to engender (2013, p.30-33).

<sup>20</sup> "Nietzsche formulated his conception of life as will-to-power" (Ansell-Pearson, 1997, P. 97); "[Nietzsche] will come to define life as will to power" (Ansell-Pearson, 2007, p.72).

<sup>21</sup> *Attachment to Life, Understanding Death: Nietzsche and D.H. Lawrence* (Ansell-Pearson, 2013). In this article 'life' is simply 'the experience of life,' and 'death' is 'the thought of death as part of our experience of life,' there is no attempt at the ontology of either.

<sup>22</sup> Lemm writes in the introduction to this volume she edited about how Nietzsche has used the term 'life' to indicate a variety of different subjects. She goes through his works chronologically, and writes a blurb about every definition that 'life' is given in Nietzsche's philosophy, *except* to mean the organic. She talks about life as will to power, as becoming, as suffering, as experience, as conflict, but not as organism (p.1-5 Lemm). In her own article, she chooses the 'human experience' angle, and writes, "For [Nietzsche], life entails a constructive orientation toward the future, which commits an injustice toward the past. [...] one learns that human life (*Dasein*) is a form of life" (p.105 Lemm)

But Ansell-Pearson avoids equating life unequivocally with becoming and change, as many of our other authors do: “to interpret life in terms of continuous variation, is to bring forth the ‘virtual continuum of life.’ Beneath order-words [...] there lie pass-words [...]. When words pass, when they presage passage, the composition of order and organization are transformed into the compositions of passage and consistency: ‘In order-words life must answer the answer of death, not by fleeing, but by making flight act and create’” (1997, p.68). The absolute key to this quote is the phrase ‘beneath,’ this is what we can use to differentiate Ansell-Pearson from the other philosophers we have touched on so far. This word implies that there is kind of a shell of death, of stasis, that *protects* the movement that is life. This protection must be essential for life, so the organism could only exist in conditions where it is marginally restricted, the movement that makes it what it is is not completely free.

This point is furthered by Ansell-Pearson: “For Nietzsche the life process evolves in terms of the shaping, form-creating forces working from within, utilizing and exploiting external circumstances as the arena to test out its own extravagant experimentations” (1997, p.97). We find Ansell-Pearson working here with an implicit conception of an ‘interior’ and an ‘exterior.’ This will end being an essential concept in our own formulation of the Nietzschean organism. However, it does not seem to be an essential concept for Ansell-Pearson, who will only reference the existence of an interior/exterior divide occasionally and obliquely. His ultimate definition of the organism will, his essential terms, will be married to the concept of becoming: “the ‘essence of life,’ namely, its will-to-power conceived as the becoming of the reinterpreting, redirecting” (1997, p.98). The issue with this definition is that becomes very difficult to distinguish the inorganic world from the organic. Surely the laws of becoming also rule the inorganic world, and so then what is the nature of this ‘reinterpreting’ force of life? Unfortunately, as we have stated, Ansell-Pearson’s work is more geared towards explaining the processes that surround life, and the nature of life itself is not fully formulated beyond these occasional explanations.

### *Grandfathered-In*

This issue that we have been addressing has been with Nietzsche scholarship since the beginning. The problem surrounding the ambiguity of the use of the term ‘life’ was inherited by all of these scholars we have discussed from the early giants of Nietzsche scholarship. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Giles Deleuze equates life with ‘force.’ Saying that the conflict between the forces of the universe can be characterized as “life struggles with another kind of life”(Deleuze, 1983, p.8-9). This would place life at the level of the inorganic, equating it with every kind of motion. However, Deleuze has a

philosophical reason for avoiding the question of the organic, because he believes that sensory impressions exist in the inorganic realm for Nietzsche. This is what allows him to identify “the spirit of revenge that Nietzsche diagnoses in the universe” (1983, p.37), or that there is an “interpretation” that takes place at the level of the inorganic (1983, p.53). This reading combines the idea that ‘life’ for Nietzsche is a metaphor for feeling or perception with the idea that it also denotes the will to power, or becoming, as Deleuze interprets it. Deleuze follows the implications of the avoidance of the question of the organic further than any of our other authors by asserting this kind of rudimentary perception that takes place in the inorganic realm. Thacker discusses this subject in his chapter *Dark Pantheism*, stating that for Deleuze, vitalism is a kind of pantheism. Life exists everywhere immanently in all things, but only because life is defined as a rudimentary form of *experience*. This is the necessary consequence of a theory that denies the distinction between the organic and the inorganic.<sup>23</sup> It is true that there is support for this thesis in Nietzsche's texts, in aphorism 109 of *The Gay Science*, for example. However we are not satisfied that Deleuze has adequately dismissed the question. It is easy to claim that any commonly held belief, such as ‘life is distinct from death,’ is an illusion, a simple falsity. But in order to philosophize about this illusion one still must give reasons for why this illusion persists. Deleuze doesn't address this further question. As we will see in Chapter Three in our section *Power as Interpretation, Feeling of Power*, there is some evidence that Nietzsche believed the inorganic to possess some kind of rudimentary perception, although we believe that Deleuze has misconstrued this evidence.<sup>24</sup>

The biggest issue with this confusion that we have pointed out is that authors rarely make a note of how they are going to be using this term in their articles.<sup>25</sup> We have chosen to only mention the authors who explicitly deal with ‘life’ as one of the central problems of their project, and who also fail to ask the organic question. However this state of ambiguity bleeds into the whole of Nietzsche scholarship, so that many articles published on Nietzsche misuse the term ‘life,’ even when these articles are not primarily about human experience, becoming, the organic, or the will to power. There are countless texts in Nietzsche scholarship where writers claim that this or that ‘affirms life,’ or ‘is a form of life.’ Many of these interpretations do rely on some idea of the ‘essence of

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<sup>23</sup> There are other authors who support this thesis, for example Emden (2014, p.46), also Michel Haar asserts that, “The will to power is indeed the ‘word for being’” (Haar, 1996, p.7); “Values constitute the condition of [the will to power's] existence; they are ‘points of view’ that permit it to maintain itself and develop itself” (1996, p.97); “[the inorganic realm] strives, acts, perceives, and even ‘thinks’ (1996, p.116). Laird Addis writes, As for the will to power with respect to life in general, we need not tarry, even though, in at least three places [...] Nietzsche characterizes the will to power simply as the will to life, even seeming to define ‘life’ that way in the last of these passages” (Addis, 2013, p.121)

<sup>24</sup> Georges Bataille is another of these authors who use the word ‘life’ in many different ways. Linking life with ‘the interesting’ (1992, P.23), Evil (1992, p.27), Movement (1992, p.25), meaningfulness (1992, p.58), and theory or criticism (1992, p.9).

<sup>25</sup> With the exception of Herman Siemens and Vanessa Lemm.

the living' as a foundation for their interpretation, but do not articulate what this essence consists of.

We have now concluded our study of the scholarship that we found relevant to the framing of our line of inquiry. The biggest issue in formulating our objectives is the misuse of the term 'life,' to which we have dedicated this chapter. For the problems caused by this ambiguity, Nietzsche himself should bear a small amount of the blame, but this epidemic of misuse didn't actually begin with him. At this juncture we will begin to analyze the misuses of this word in the authors that influenced Nietzsche, before turning to his own transgressions.

### *Misuse of the term 'Life' and 'Death' in Nietzsche's Influences*

Our claim is that the use of the word life to denote things other than the organism is not essentially Nietzschean, it is an idea that originates somewhere else. It is a habit he picked up from people who influenced him. We will discuss three influences of his that used the word life to refer to something besides the organic: Schopenhauer, Lange, and Wagner, then we will form a narrative about how he picked up this habit in his writing.

As we will cover in the next chapter, Schopenhauer has a systematic theory of the organic. Despite this, there are also instances in his work where the word 'life' appears at first to be used more loosely. For example: "Experience shows us the happiest are indeed those pure rational characters commonly called practical philosophers- and rightly so because just as the real i.e. theoretical, philosopher translates life into the concept, so they translate the concept into life" (WWR1 p.90). What we find here is the clear use of 'life' to connote 'perception' or 'experience.'

Schopenhauer repeatedly asserts directly that the will always wills life (WWR1 p.275, p.309), but this cannot mean that everything is alive, that there is no distinction between life and death, a proposition that we have already seen in the secondary literature written on Nietzsche. This assertion is followed by the phrase, "but life, the visible world" (WWR1 p.275), implying that he is again using 'life' in the sense of perception. This would mean that the will wills its own representation, and Schopenhauer is using the word 'life' to connote 'representation.' What we will see in the next chapter is that it is only with the instantiation of life that representation, and thus the visible world emerges. But the impression a casual reader would obtain is that Schopenhauer is using the term 'life' to refer to something other than the organic, such as pure perception or experience. The same confusion is made here: "The same thing that in inner immediate apprehension was grasped as *will*, is *perceptible* presented to this *outward* directed knowledge as *organic body*" (WWR2 p.247-248 Similar quotes on p. 78, 216, 350). These propositions seem at first glance to be nonsensical philosophically, they only

might have some poetic merit. On one occasion Schopenhauer even refers to the past as “dead” (WWR2 p.311), simply because it is not present.

Friedrich Albert Lange had an enormous impact upon Nietzsche, but as far as the question of the organic is concerned, Lange does not move beyond Schopenhauer’s stance. Lange not only relied on Schopenhauer’s good theoretical work, but also picked up Schopenhauer’s bad habit of using the term ‘life’ somewhat poetically. First Lange frames the problem of the organic in the form of teleology and purposiveness (HMV1 p.32), which he gets from Kant, but he ascribes to *Generatio Aequivoca*, (HMV3). Without reconciling these metaphysical differences he also asserts more radical thesis, for example that the development of culture is an extension of physiological life (HMV3 p.43). In volume two there is a tendency to give the quality of life to all matter (HMV2 p.18, 60, 74, 101) that there is a unitary ‘will’ that life is the manifestation of (HMV3 p.148).

With Wagner we may find the worst culprit of this particular bad habit. As we will see in the following sections, Wagner’s use of the word ‘life’ was especially influential upon the young Nietzsche, although this was only one among the many habits that Nietzsche picked up from Wagner.<sup>26</sup> Wagner’s use of the word ‘life’ is much more relaxed than either Schopenhauer or Lange.

‘Life’ was a particularly special word in Wagner’s prose work, it appears very frequently. In *Opera and Drama*, a 187 page work, there are 94 uses of the word ‘organic’ or ‘organism’ and 246 uses of the word ‘Life.’ He implies that mankind as a whole is an organism (1913, p.94)<sup>27</sup>, nature is an organism (1913, p.113), music is an organism (1913, p.6), speech is an organism (1913, p.135), literally, consonants and vowels are related to each in such a way that they create an organism between them (1913, p.138). And that therefore the drama, the combination of music and speech, is also an organism (1913, p.174). In *The Artwork of the Future* there are 314 occurrences of the word ‘Life’ in this 89 page text. The word is equally as ambiguous in this work with passages such as this: “To hold this [“sham-bred”] Art-work up to Life itself; as the prophetic mirror of its Future, appeared to me the weightiest contribution toward the work of damming the flood of Revolution within the channel of the peaceful-flowing stream of Manhood” (Wagner, 2001, p.7)

However these works were penned before Wagner began reading Schopenhauer. His first reading of *The World as Will and Representation* was in 1854, while he was composing *Die Valkyrie* (Magee, 2001, p.156-157). After his reading of Schopenhauer his use of the word ‘life’ became marginally stricter. Also, his ideas were expressed

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<sup>26</sup>The use of the term ‘life’ was not the only trait which he picked up briefly from Wagner, only to write with anger against later, Nietzsche was briefly an anti-semitic (Mandel, 1998 p.89) because of Wagner, he picked up on Wagner’s Vanity, nationalism, and even his spending habits (1998, p.89). Hans von Bulow critiqued some of Nietzsche’s music in 1872 as a bad imitation of Wagner (KGB July 24, 1872).

<sup>27</sup> Apparently forgetting that he wrote 30 pages earlier that everyone belonging to the human race was dead.

through his music, and it would be misrepresenting him to judge him solely on his literary achievements.

Now we have completed our very brief summary of some of Nietzsche's main influences who used the term 'Life' ambiguously. We will now demonstrate *how* Nietzsche was influenced by his 'educators'. To do this we will first elucidate a Musical theory of the organism that Wagner puts forward, then we will find an imitation of this theory in Nietzsche's notes. Having completed our treatment of his texts we will now have to consult Wagner's operas. We must do this on Wagner's own bidding. He thought of the Greek drama as the absolute height of art (Bryan Magee, 1983, p.149-150), because the music was not alone, but came together with the dialogue to produce a meaning that was superior to what could be communicated through a text alone.

### *Tristan und Isolde*

The strangest thing we have to make sense of in this opera is that it is glorifying a desire for death, not just for these star crossed lovers' specific situation but for the entire situation human beings find themselves in. Does this mockery of organic life embodied in the character Kurneval clash with Wagner's praise of life in his prose?

As Magee will indicate, the desire for death is something found in both Lohengrin and Tannhauser, two operas Wagner composed before he read Schopenhauer. Even more auspicious, Wotan's famous speech at the end of *Die Valkyrie* where he expresses his desire for the end in very Schopenhauerian terms, was written months before Wagner first was introduced to Schopenhauer. Wagner has said of this speech that Wotan "rises to the tragic height of willing his own destruction." (1983, p.166).<sup>28</sup> Death, the return to a world not characterized by perception, desire, space or time, is symbolized in *Tristan und Isolde* by the metaphor of 'night,' in contrast to 'day,' the realm of representation, endless desire, and partial satisfactions.

The theme of 'night' in this opera is tied to the 'inner organism' that Wagner refers to in his prose works. He believes an artist must have a connection to the will in order to create something truly artistic. He inverts a vaguely Schopenhauerian use of the word 'life,' where 'life' denotes the will breaking into representation, and asserts that the will breaking into representation is actually *Death* breaking into life. Wagner follows the implications of this and asserts that all creation and creativity comes from death intruding on life. In act two scene one, when Brangäne reproaches herself for exchanging the poison for a love potion Isolde reassures her that the transformation of the lovers was not Brangäne's work, but the fulfillment of the wishes of the all-powerful Frau Minne, the

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<sup>28</sup> And so part of the reason Schopenhauer had such a tremendous impact on Wagner is that he was an echo of his own beliefs.

goddess of love. The assumption many make is that the nurse gave them sugar water, a placebo, and that there is no such thing as a love potion.<sup>29</sup> Tristan and Isolde only fell in love because they both *entirely expected to die*. This is the reason Wagner spends so much time at the beginning of act one scene five demonstrating that Tristan *knows* that Isolde is poisoning him. It is only when directly confronted with and even *desiring* (yes Wagner takes it that far here) death that truly creative and magical acts of love can occur.

Roger Scruton asserts in his book on the opera that love is used as a force synonymous with life (Scruton, 2003, p.130). Love not only completely individualizes both parties, but is the vehicle by which life is continued. And yet it is abundantly clear from the opera that love is in conflict with the realm of the day, Tristan and Isolde can only make love at night (Act two Scene 2), Tristan laments light and day, and equates them with all the moral regulations that stops him from loving Isolde such as honor and duty (Act 3 scene 1). If we follow Tristan's line of thought in act three we can recognize then that the metaphor of 'day' is tied to the notion of illusion and error in the opera, but 'night' is truth, a truth that is beyond all knowledge. Tristan and Isolde are pursuing true joy and by transforming their hatred (Tristan killed Isolde's fiance, Isolde owns a tremendous debt of Tristan's honor) of one another into love, *only* by letting death into their world of representation. In this sense Tristan and Isolde are living more authentically, yearning for the *actual* satisfaction that will come with death, dissatisfied with all the apparent, illusory partial satisfactions of the realm of representation.

Illusion is represented musically in this opera as well. The very first four notes of the opera are A-F-E-D#/G#: the 'Grief' motif. The last D#/G# is also the beginning note of the 'Desire' motif which runs: D#/G#-A-A#-B (Wagner, 1865, p.1). As the second motif arises, the brass and woodwinds join the cellos on the D#/G#, giving the impression that 'Desire' is laid overtop of 'Grief,' before moving to C/E#. This overlap is the famous 'Tristan Chord.' In the overture we are getting a miniature version of the 'creation of the world' schematic that Wagner will use in the prelude to *Rheingold*, which he had already written by this time. In the world of *Tristan und Isolde* pain, loss, and suffering are the ultimate reality, which is then covered over by desire and partial satisfaction. Life for Wagner is illusory pleasure, that is always laid overtop the true foundational suffering that is death.

To draw together Wagner's musing about the nature of life as formulaically as possible, he seems to have believed that a deep unmanageable suffering was the basis of all reality. This suffering gives rise to desire ('Grief' into 'Desire') and simultaneously gives rise to life. Life is the cycle of pursuing final satisfaction, and only gaining substitute gratification. The pursuit is ended in the final, ultimate satisfaction of the destruction of all limitedness, all individuality. Wagner takes this idea to an extremity in a way that only a

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<sup>29</sup> For example Robert Greenberg (2010)

delusional artist could, advocating suicide, berating the partial satisfactions life has to offer, championing the final satisfaction in death, the reunion of the individual with the will, and also claiming that the creative act, insofar as it is closer to attaining complete satisfaction than everyday actions, must be inspired by a connection to death.<sup>30</sup>

### Nietzsche

#### *'The Concept of the Organic Since Kant' - Early 1868*

We can now move on to Nietzsche's early engagement with these theories. I am going to be making claims about some sharp changes that can be detected in Nietzsche's thinking during this time period. The first thing we are going to establish is that from some of the earliest writings we have of Nietzsche he was interested in the problem of the organic. Once he meets Wagner we find that he begins to imitate some of 'Der Meister's' theories on the organism. After 1873 and the publication of the first *Untimely Meditation* we find him returning to his original interests.

In 1868 Nietzsche drafted plans to write a doctoral dissertation entitled *On the Concept of the Organic since Kant*.<sup>31</sup> He never completes the dissertation because he was offered a professorship based on his previous publications, however he had compiled extensive notes that outline his plan for his thesis. I will cover these notes more extensively at the end of the next chapter, following an analysis of Kant and Schopenhauer's positions. For now our goal is biographical, I want to assert the fact that Nietzsche was extremely interested in the problem of the organic before he met Wagner. Although these notes for his dissertation have many themes running through them we can summarize them quite succinctly. Nietzsche demonstrates frustration with the Kantian Schematic, and expresses hope that Schopenhauer can help him to think past Kant's restrictions on knowledge. He concentrates heavily on the problem of the purposefulness of an organism and how its part function in relation to that purpose. This theme of the relationship between the parts and whole of an organism will become important for his engagement with Schopenhauer. By the end of these notes we see that the organic being remains a problem for him, he never reaches anything resembling a

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<sup>30</sup> And this is where he gets Schopenhauer completely and utterly wrong. The will for Schopenhauer is not satisfaction, it is entirely the opposite, pure blind desire. The only thing the individual is 'liberated' from in its return to the will is the 'impediments' of partial satisfaction, in the will as such there is the *complete absence of any sort of satisfaction whatsoever*. The opera would be properly Schopenhauerian if there was no resolution at all, but instead a deeper descent of the music into complete discord, if perhaps the men and women of the orchestra pit were instructed to smash their instruments at the end of the 'Verklarung' like they were in a rock and roll band. Wagner betrays his misreading of Schopenhauer by positing a final resolution in death. It is true that for Schopenhauer, the genius has an intimate connection to the Ideas, and in doing so denies the will, and thus in a sense wills their own death, but this is *completely absent of any sense of satisfaction*. Satisfaction as such is precisely what is renounced in the denial of the will.

<sup>31</sup> He writes of this plan in a letter to Paul Deussen, in Berlin: "If you incidentally end of this year get my PhD dissertation, you will have multiple regurgitations, which explains this point through the limits of knowledge. My topic is 'The concept of the organic since Kant' semi-philosophical, half science. My preliminary work is pretty much done" (KGB April, 1868). He also mentions his plans for a thesis in passing to Erwin Rohde a few days later.

breakthrough conclusion. But importantly these notes do not contain any traces of the spurious definitions of life that we covered in the early parts of this chapter.

*Intermediary Period: Nov. 5th, 1868 To Dec. 24, 1869*

Nietzsche first met Wagner November 5th 1868 (Cate, 2005, p.82). Between then and his first Christmas at Tribschen lies a kind of intermediate period, in which he is questioning many things about the direction his life and thinking is taking. In his letters he expresses a discontent with philology as a discipline and wonders whether he wants to do philosophy, or chemistry. On January 10th 1869 he was offered a position at Basel, on the recommendation of Ritschl (2005, p.87). He accepts this position and moves to Basel. On the 17th of May 1869 he travels to Tribschen for the first time, and spends an afternoon at Wagner's lunch table. On the 5th of June he returns, and that very night Wagner's first son is born. Nietzsche leaves the next day. He visited Tribschen again on the 31st of July 1869, for only one day. He left to climb Mount Pilatus, promising he would be back the next day, but he didn't return, instead he stayed on the mountain for a few days and then headed straight for Basel (2005, p.92-100). In total he would visit Wagner six times in the summer of 1869, and once more on the 13th of November, before arriving for the Christmas of 1869.

In between Nietzsche's first meeting with Wagner, and the first Christmas they spent together at Tribschen we find a divide in Nietzsche. We find this expressed clearly in his inaugural address, *On the Personality of Homer*, delivered on the 28th of May 1869, eleven days after his first Tribschen visit. He says, "Life is worth living, says art, the beautiful seductress, life is worth knowing, says science [Wissenschaft]"(PH). What Nietzsche is describing in this statement are two of the different meanings that can be attributed to 'life' that we have made the focus of this chapter.

We find many references to the 'scientific' organism in this text. From the very beginning lines he says, "At the present day no clear and consistent opinion seems to be held regarding Classical Philology.[...] The cause of this lies in its many-sided character, in the lack of an abstract unity, and in the inorganic aggregation of heterogeneous scientific activities which are connected with one another only by the name '*Philology*'"(PH). This statement *might* just be a spurious use of the term 'inorganic,' except that he is framing his discussion in terms of the way he framed his earlier interest in the problem of the organic. He is constantly looking for the unity that brings together disparate and heterogeneous parts. We find throughout this speech more references to the organism in this context, for example: "classical philology seeks only the final end of its own being, which is the melding together of primarily hostile impulses by force" (PH).

What other schematic besides the whole and its parts, besides the question of the living being could Nietzsche be using to understand the discipline of philology here?

The question Nietzsche is addressing in this speech is that of the authorship of the Iliad and Odyssey, “The zenith of the historico-literary studies of the Greeks, and hence also of their point of greatest importance—the Homeric question—was reached in the age of the Alexandrian grammarians. [...] They conceived the Iliad and the Odyssey as the creations of one single Homer; they declared it to be psychologically possible for two such different works to have sprung from the brain of one genius, in contradiction to the Chorizontes, who represented the extreme limit of the scepticism of a few detached individuals of antiquity rather than antiquity itself considered as a whole” (PH). The ‘Homeric question,’ the question of single unity or division within these texts, is phrased in the same way that Nietzsche talks about the relationship between the whole and its parts in the case of the organism. His answer to this question is extremely tricky, he divorces the idea of a single taste from the idea of a single author. He accepts that “a certain standard of inner harmony is everywhere presupposed in the manifestations of the personality” (PH), but then goes on to assert that, “Homer as the composer of the Iliad and the Odyssey is not a historical tradition, but an aesthetic judgment” (PH). As we will see in the next chapter, it is through aesthetic judgment that both Kant and Schopenhauer approach the problem of the organic. His argument is that, “The design of an epic such as the Iliad is not an entire whole, not an organism; but a number of pieces strung together, a collection of reflections arranged in accordance with aesthetic rules” (PH).<sup>32</sup>

So after positing this autonomous aesthetic judgment, that occurs culturally, without a single thinker, and subtly connecting the problem of authorship to the problem of the organism, he makes an incredibly important move for the interpretation I am setting out here. To account for the authorship of the Homeric poems, one school of thought, “postulated a mysterious discharging, a deep, national, artistic impulse, which shows itself in individual minstrels as an almost indifferent medium. It is to this latter school that we must attribute the representation of the Homeric poems as the expression of that mysterious impulse” (PH). And so we see that here Nietzsche is attributing these poems to a will-like, Dionysiac, cultural, *artistic* force. But this force is *not* the force of life.

Nietzsche ends his speech, “*Philosophia facta est quæ philologia fuit* [What was once philology has become philosophy]. By this I wish to signify that all philological activities should be enclosed and surrounded by a philosophical view of things, in which everything individual and isolated is evaporated as something detestable, and in which great homogeneous views alone remain” (PH). What is he intending to convey using this

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<sup>32</sup> Also, “The Iliad is not a garland, but a bunch of flowers. As many pictures as possible are crowded on one canvas; but the man who placed them there was indifferent as to whether the grouping of the collected pictures was invariably suitable and rhythmically beautiful. He well knew that no one would ever consider the collection as a whole; but would merely look at the individual parts” (PH)

kind of language? We should look back at how he began his speech, when he claimed that philology was not a unity, but series of heterogeneous parts. He is suggesting that it is philosophy that is the life giving force, that formulates the organism, enveloping and protecting the philological discipline. It is precisely philosophy, *not art*, that is this unifying force that is necessary for the organism to surface.<sup>33</sup> This distinction will become important in the next few sections, where the influence of Wagner causes him to begin theorizing that the organism is a fundamentally artistic phenomenon.

Admittedly there are philosophical problems with this formulation. Most obviously we can ask if he really believed a discipline is alive in the same sense that an organism is alive. We do not believe that this speech he gave at the inaugural address at Basel represents his final view on the question of the organic. On the contrary he was still extremely interested in this question. At this point he had only met Wagner twice, he is not yet using the term 'life' in a spurious way to indicate 'existence,' or 'will,' or 'experience' at all. He is genuinely and seriously pursuing the question of the organic.

To continue our examination of this intermediary year (Nov.5th 1868 - Dec. 24th 1869) we turn to the one notebook Nietzsche was writing in during this time. It would be helpful if we could track chronologically Nietzsche's submission to Wagner in this notebook, but as Nehamas (2009) has noted, Nietzsche wouldn't write in his notebooks page by page, but all over the place. And so it is difficult to say when one specific note was written. What we can point to however are marks of resistance towards Wagner, and notes that exalt the man. Whether this implies a back and forth in Nietzsche, or a descent, is impossible to answer. What we are able to say, is that there was a divide in his thinking as he came under Wagner's spell.

There are some nasty attacks on Wagner in this notebook: "Opera has arisen without a sensual template, from an abstract theory, a conscious willing attempt to achieve the effects of the ancient drama. So it is an artificial homunculus [a tiny person believed in the 16th century to live inside a sperm, who would eventually grow into a baby], in fact: a malicious goblin of musical development. Here is a cautionary example of what harm can come from the direct imitation of antiquity. Through such unnatural experiments grown from the 'folk art of living,' unconscious roots are cut, or at least badly mutilated"(KSA 1[1]). In this jotting we find Nietzsche using his superiority in philology to assert a dominance over the discipline of opera, but further, calling those who write operas small men, goblins. Especially important for us, he claims that opera arose from an experiment in 'the art of living,' specifically from a non-organic definition of life.

Nietzsche also writes, "What is art? The ability to create the world of the will without the will? No. To recreate the world of the will without the product *willing*."

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<sup>33</sup> Acampora has argued here that Nietzsche believes philosophy as the 'whole' has an ability to stimulate the agnostic tendencies of the 'parts,' and that this leads towards the ultimate goal of re-sensualizing Homer. Acampora reads this address as contest between Schiller and Nietzsche for the future of educational practices (2003). We will return to her analysis of the contest in Chapter Three.

Therefore the thing to do is to create the will-less through the will and *instinctively*" (KSA 1 I[47]). It seems clear that this is an argument against Wagner. Because what does this note imply? That to engage in art is to create something *dead*. To create art is to create something that *does not will*, that does not exhibit even the illusion of purposiveness. Nietzsche continues with his uncharacteristic detestation of art: "The absolute arts are a sad modern vice. Everything falls apart. There are no organizations that cultivate the arts as an art together, in the areas where the arts come together" (KSA 1[45]). Here we find another attempt to interpret a discipline from the viewpoint of the organic, he is claiming that art today is degenerate because it is a disparate set of disciplines, which have some natural meeting points, but lack an organizing vital force. This state of art is perhaps what inspired these desperate experiments to revive the corpses of ancient tragedy, and create Frankenstein's monster: opera.

However those who are familiar with Wagner also know that this is *his* estimation of modern art, and that his project of *Gesamtkunstwerk* is exactly this attempt to bring many different artistic disciplines into a singular work. It is possible that Nietzsche made this note after speaking with Wagner, but it is also possible that Wagner just happened to be the answer to a few of the questions Nietzsche was already asking. Because later in the notebook we find Nietzsche switching his tune, "Music drama and opera: The former strive for privileges, the latter has not its life in the realm of art, but in artificiality" (KSA 1[16]).

We find a few more indications that Nietzsche is becoming very connected to Wagner in this notebook. For example he expresses admiration for clear expressions of a Dionysian spirit throughout history beyond the literal festivals for Dionysus the Greeks engaged in. He writes about medieval wandering dancers, lamenting that modern arts "Do not stem from such a mysterious source" (KSA 1 I[1]).<sup>34</sup> He likens this period of Dionysian revival to an 'epidemic,' which would seem to be an indication that he is making a connection between cultural movements and organic life. Insofar as a society is likened to a living body, an undeniably Platonic concept, he is describing what he will later call "epidemics of health" (HATH p.342) as a contrast to plagues. This seems to be an early attempt to link the position of the artist, Wagner, with a metaphysical 'life-giving' force.

The relationship between Nietzsche and Wagner is endlessly complicated. We are attempting to keep our analysis as focused as possible so as not to venture too far into territory that goes beyond the scope of our work. Our observations are simply that

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<sup>34</sup> One argument I am going to make is that it is not tenable to assert that Nietzsche had realized the importance of hiddenness to life, in spite of these teasing partial comments that seem to imply otherwise. They are too few and far between to suggest that Nietzsche was deliberately positing hiding as a positive force, or that this concept was connected to life in anyway. Nearly every time he approaches the question of the organic in this period he doesn't think to even consider the concept of hiddenness, but every once in awhile it makes its way into a passage as if by coincidence, this time the orbits of his concepts aligned. Nonetheless I will note the occurrences of each of these instances or 'foreshadowing': Nietzsche, 2008, p.28,59,121 ,132; Nietzsche, 200, p.23, 38.

during this period Nietzsche makes uncharacteristic criticisms of art in general and opera in particular. Despite his letters, which are full of praise for Wagner, we conclude that these are not only private contentions he was disputing concerning the role of art in his philosophy, but also a kind of underground resistance to the influence of Wagner. Most importantly, we have seen that he often chooses the framework of the question of the organic as the battlefield upon which these skirmishes occur.

### *Wagner Era: 1870-1873*

From his first Christmas at Tribschen in 1869 until the publication of *David Strauss The Confessor and The Writer* (1873) I mark as the Wagnerian period of Nietzsche's thought.<sup>35</sup> What we find significant about this period of Nietzsche's thought is that the question of the organic is almost entirely dropped, and spurious uses of the term 'life' become a chronic condition of Nietzsche's writings. In this section we are going to attempt to tie this tendency to the influence of Wagner.

We will now try to detect signs in his notes that Wagner overawed him. The first note we will look at is a comment from Nietzsche upon the shortcomings of his age, "The division of labor is a principle of barbarism, domination of mechanism. In the organism there are no separable parts. Individualism of modern times and the contrast in antiquity. [...]Naivete of the ancients in the distinction between slave and free: we are prudish and conceited: Slavish our character" (KSA 3[44]). We find here a pessimistic note where Nietzsche seems resigned to identify himself as subordinate, and furthermore, *because* of his inquiries into the nature of the organism.<sup>36</sup> He also uses the strange mechanism/organism distinction that we found in Wagner earlier. What has changed in his thinking, why is philosophy no longer championed as the discipline of vital force?

He seems to have figured out the philosopher's position after his first Christmas at Tribschen, writing just after those days that every 'unity' achieved a triumph through its struggle, including art and religion. And then ridicules the annihilation of the world through knowledge, championing the 'stupid Siegfried' (KSA 3[55]). This is Nietzsche's turning point, all of these themes are variations upon his submission to Wagner, first by ascribing the unifying power to art, not just philosophy, and then making fun of the project of philosophical knowledge. He begins writing about the benefits of stupidity and illusion (KSA 5[25]). The word he uses for 'illusion' is '*Wahn*,' one of Wagner's favorite words, especially during this period when he was composing *The Ring*. With the loss of the dominating interpretation of philosophy, the new role of 'ultimate discipline' in

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<sup>35</sup> Which puts me against the general scholarship that the *Untimely Meditations* are a part of his early Schopenhauer and Wagner period, I place them in the middle period. I will explain why the publication of the first UM is a good place marker later in the chapter.

<sup>36</sup> The link he is making here between the individual organism and the society one lives in will be taken up at the end of chapter two.

Nietzsche's writing becomes music, "Words are of course the most deficient signs" (KSA 2[11]). Nietzsche also signifies his submission by beginning to privilege hearing over seeing (KSA 3[1]), music over all.<sup>37</sup>

And so we see that there are subtle indications in his notes that Wagner had him under his spell. In the next section we will see how this impacted his philosophy.

### *Primal Pain/ Superficial Pleasure in Illusion*

What is most interesting to us, is that early on during this time period Nietzsche still constructs something that resembles a theory of the organic. In this theory certain motifs that are associated with different definitions of 'life' such as happiness, human experience, meaning, and illusion are all worked into this pseudo-definition of the organism. This definition should be familiar to us, it is nearly identical to the definition Wagner puts forward in *Tristan und Isolde*. This is what Nietzsche is referencing when he asserts a primal, 'productive pain' (KSA 7[116]) at the base of existence. To contextualize this primal pain as simply as possible, it is essentially another name for Schopenhauer's will. We will cover Schopenhauer extensively in the next chapter, but as a very quick background: for Schopenhauer suffering is lack, lack is desire, and blind desire, (desire without an object and thus a hope of satisfaction) is the Will. Now using the transitive property we can assert, as Nietzsche does, that since the will is the ultimate reality, that ultimate reality is suffering and pain (KSA 7 [117]). It is interesting to see Nietzsche's thought process here. He places beauty and enjoyment on the level of appearances, as the necessary counterweight to this primal pain. Beauty arises from, and is dependent on the pain itself. All representation is a kind of soothing of the suffering of the will, an illusion that allows joyous *escape* from primal suffering, "Tragedy offers the most sublime illusion: *freedom* from *existence* itself" (KSA 5[102]).

As we will see Nietzsche does take this notion a step further, and applies it to the question of the organic, "And is perhaps all life, as far as it is enjoyment, nothing but such a [representational] reality?" (KSA 7[116]). We can assert here that he is utilizing the word 'life' to refer to the concept of the organic and not something else, because as he goes on to question these points of creation of the joyous illusion. He concludes that they distinguish a fundamental divide in existence using the example of the crystal (KSA 7[117]), which was Schopenhauer's favorite subject for examining the barrier between life and death.

Nietzsche will conceptually tie the creation of the joyous illusion to the faculties of imagination and intuition (KSA 19[178]) in order to take 'his' conclusion further. He

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<sup>37</sup> In contrast to Heraclitus! "The eyes are more exact witnesses than the ears" (DK B55)

asserts that the creation of a pleasurable illusion is a fundamentally artistic act, "Then we need a being that produces the world as a work of art, as harmony [...] The tendency of art is to overcome dissonance [dissonance here being the discord, and thus suffering essential to the will][...] The will as supreme pain brings forth from itself an ecstasy which is identical to the pure intuition and production of the work of art" (KSA 7[117]). To make this point absolutely clear, the division between life and death is defined by the appearances of art, which creates pleasure through illusion, out of pain. "*The projection of illusion is the artistic primal process. All that lives, lives on illusion*" (KSA 7[167]), "the artistic too begins with the *organic*" (KSA 19[51]). If we recall, this is exactly the way Wagner defined life in *Tristan und Isolde*, as a superficial illusion supported by a 'primal pain,' or 'supreme pain.'

But why does Nietzsche continually use the word 'pain' [der Schmerz]<sup>38</sup> to denote the will? What is the significance of this word? Recall our discussion of the opening motifs of *Tristan* and their philosophical meaning. 'Grief' leads into 'Desire,' pain leads to artistic life. So we can confidently say that Nietzsche is philosophizing about Wagner, he is elaborating on Wagner's philosophical theory of life. This is going to be Nietzsche's answer to the problem of the organic until his disengagement from Wagner.

The flip side of tying together the artistic and organic is that objective knowledge becomes and anti-artistic *and* anti-organic process because its modus operandi is precisely to *destroy* illusion (KSA 19[21]). He tries to save philosophy from being categorized as 'objective knowing' by making it serve intuition, and thus, music (KSA 19[27]). Philosophy can be used to control the sciences, which are objective knowing proper, and bring them back under the control of intuitive knowledge, of artistry (KSA 19[24]). He mentions that a philosopher can only 'assist' art, and allow art to "dominate life" (KSA 19[35], 19[52]). This is a metaphysical correlation of, and justification for, his subservient relationship to Wagner, which has supreme influence over his conception of life and the organic at this point in his work.

### *Slipping away from the Question of the Organic*

We find as the decade progresses Nietzsche begins using the term 'life' more and more to mean something other than the organic, "only with the Greeks everything became *life!* With us it remains knowledge!" (KSA 19[42]). Instances like this in the notes

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<sup>38</sup> Serendipitously, Wagner had composed several musical scores based on Mathilde Wesendonck's poems while he was writing *Tristan und Isolde*, one of which was entitled "*Schmerzen*", the songs ends with the lyrics, "And Death gives only life,/ pain only gives pleasure:/ Oh, how thankful I am that I was given/ Such pain as my nature!" (Wesendonck Lieder, *WVV* 91). So this idea might have even been Wesendonck's ideas mixed with Schopenhauer, although it is too difficult to tell who was the muse in that relationship.

require a careful reader to step back and observe the story we have told to discern what assumptions allow statements like this to be made: 1. The organic being is defined as the creator of pleasurable illusion, 2. The organic drive is synonymous with the artistic drive, 3. Knowledge, which proposes to be a destroyer of illusion must be a force of death, or anti-life. We can now see how this logic is stressed and stretched in statements like this, to the point where Nietzsche is clearly talking about something besides the organic when he uses the word 'life.' We could also say that the influence of Wagner has hijacked this concept from Nietzsche, and taken it into territory that it doesn't belong. I would posit that at this point Nietzsche is talking about culture in a vague sense, as he contrasts culture and knowledge in other places, "It has proved impossible to build a culture on knowledge" (KSA 19[105]). Nietzsche has taken his inquiries into the organic and over applied it, in the same manner that Wagner does.

If the organic process is synonymous with the creation of joyous illusion, then it certainly *resembles* art, but is not necessarily art in the colloquial sense. Wagner is not actually creating life when he writes an opera, despite his assertions. But this is what Nietzsche, under the influence of Wagner, seems to be saying. It is perhaps this absurdity of an answer to the question of the organic that pushes Nietzsche away from the question.

In *The Birth of Tragedy* his schematic of the organic as representational, artistic enjoyment manifests as an essential contradiction of the Dionysiac 'painful' will. Art is the release of the will into Apollonian "semblance" (BOT p.8, 27, 30 p.31). Now at this point his concept of art has changed, it is a metaphysical stance about the nature of existence, and it no longer attempt to answer the question of the organic. We can clearly see the deep Schopenhauerian influence in this schematic, but *he ignores* those sections of Schopenhauer's philosophy where he addresses the organic problem directly. The word 'organic' is missing from *The Birth of Tragedy*. However, omitting colloquial phrasing such as "family life" (which constitute the bulk of its use), the word 'life' is used in at least four different senses: in the sense of the organic, artistic, being that we have been describing in this section (BOT, p.15, 16, 40, 55, 76, 80, 85,109); In the sense of joyous experience which harks back to his earlier definition (BOT, p.17); to designate the primal Dionysian chaos, or nature in general (BOT, p.22, 39, 75, 79), and originality in art (BOT, p.56;72). Even the colloquial phrasing of the word 'life' gets mixed up with the concept of life (BOT, p.56).

Nietzsche's prose, so clean and clear in his pre-Wagnerian notes even starts to resemble the mystical ramblings of the master, "But, like art, the state also plunged into this current of timelessness in order to find respite there from the burden and greed of the moment. And a people - or, for that matter, a human being - only has value to the extent that it is able to put the stamp of the eternal on its experiences; for in doing so it sheds, one might say, its worldliness and reveals its unconscious, inner conviction that time is relative and that the true meaning of life is metaphysical" (BOT, p.110). As we will

see, according to Schopenhauer the organic is metaphysical, but is that really what Nietzsche means here? No, he is talking about the process of inspiration; he is unconcerned in this passage with the problem of the organic.

This is the most confusing part about the use of 'life' in *The Birth of Tragedy*. If it weren't for our access to Nietzsche's notebooks we would have no idea that intuition, art, and imagination are all direct products of the primal organic process. We know because of our access to these notebooks that he, however dubiously, linked all these processes with the question of the organic. But there is no way to clearly determine that he is even interested in this question, using only the published text itself.

### *The End of the Wagner Era*

At this point we have demonstrated how Nietzsche got entangled with Wagner and what the consequences of this were for his theory of life. Now we will move towards explaining how he untangled himself, and we will conclude the section by explaining what the consequences of this detangling were. Once again, we emphasize that our goal is not to chronicle Nietzsche's relationship with Wagner any more than is necessary. We understand that marking their break with the publication of the first *Untimely Meditation* in early May of 1873 (Cate, 2000, p.174) is arbitrary in a sense. In a certain way, Nietzsche could never make a complete break from Wagner. Even years after his death, Nietzsche still published reminiscence about him, "Over our sky, not a cloud ever passed" (EH p.92). In the last year of his life Nietzsche published two books that were direct commentaries on Wagner and a third whose title was a reference to the composer (*The Case of Wagner, Nietzsche Contra Wagner, Götzen-Dämmerung*).

But for our purposes the publication of the first Meditation is the first real rift that opens up between the two men. Thus, not surprisingly, it is immediately after the publication of this essay that Nietzsche returns to the question of the organic. The first *Untimely Meditation* was written just after Nietzsche had paid a visit to Wagner at Bayreuth. He had received an icy response to his *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* from Wagner, and "Within four days of his return he had read Strauss's *The Old and the New Faith* from cover to cover" (Cate, 2005, p.172). So it was in this obsessive mood that Nietzsche penned his criticism of Strauss.

On the 19th of December 1873, 20 days before his death, David Strauss wrote to his friend Pfarrer Rapp concerning Nietzsche's first *Untimely Meditation*, "The only thing I find interesting about the fellow is the psychological point - how can one get into such a rage with a person whose path one has never crossed, in brief, the real motive of this passionate hatred" (cited from UM p.XIV). Strauss was astute, Nietzsche was not quarrelling with him. The true object of Nietzsche's bitterness in this essay is Richard

Wagner. None of the few people who have written directly on this first meditation have yet made this claim.<sup>39</sup> Let us look at the relevant components of the text and unmask them as criticisms of Wagner.

Nietzsche begins the essay with a criticism of German nationalism that makes several subtle connections between Bismarck and Alexander the Great. He says they share an inability to endure a victory;<sup>40</sup> he also makes an analogy between the discipline of Macedonian soldiers over the more cultured Greeks, and the militaristic Germans over the decadent French. On the surface Nietzsche is reprimanding the German people for confusing a military victory over France with a cultural one. It was the conquests of Alexander that spread Greek culture, but the two were still distinct movements. But now where does Nietzsche get this idea that the German folk are ignorant of what culture is (“a unity of style”, as he puts it.<sup>41</sup>)? Wagner is the source; it was Wagner who felt (justifiably) wronged by the Parisians for a string of failed performances of *Tannhäuser* a decade earlier. He latched onto German nationalism in order to claim a spiritual revenge on Paris through the Kaisereich’s success on the battlefield (Cate, 2005, p.112-113).

Nietzsche makes a telling jab at Strauss’s sense of humor. This is one of the most obvious signs that this essay is about Wagner. There is no way Nietzsche could have known if Strauss had a comedic side to him, he never met the man. And so this comment seems like a superfluous conjecture until we put it in the context of his relationship with Wagner. Nietzsche had been a prankster since Pforta (Hayman, 1980 p.49), and Wagner was famous for his intolerance of frivolous humor (More, 2014, p.188).

Nietzsche’s jab comes when he is talking about how the ‘philistines’ have a characteristic weakness about them, and he says, “If only these weak were not in possession of power! What can it matter to them what they are called! For they are the masters, and he is no genuine master who cannot endure a mocking nickname” (p.13 UM) Not only was Wagner the epitome of ‘Persian’ weakness and decadence,<sup>42</sup> but he was called ‘Der Meister’ by all of his followers (Young, 2010, p.91). Nietzsche refers to Strauss as “der Meister” thirty one times in this essay.

A large portion of Nietzsche’s argument against ‘Strauss’ is that the philistine culture he surrounds himself with which, “lodges [itself] in the works of our great poets and *composers* like a worm which lives by destroying, admires by consuming, reveres by digesting” (emphasis added, UM p.25). So perhaps Nietzsche sees the possibility of redemption for Strauss/Wagner, if he could extricate himself from the web of philistines. But, “Now everyone, even the most sullenly orthodox, flatters Strauss to his face [...]

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<sup>39</sup> (Waite 1996, Mullin 2005)

<sup>40</sup> Which is perhaps a reference to the famous saying about Hannibal, who Idealized Alexander: “Hannibal knew how to gain a victory but not how to use it” (Livy, *The History of Rome*, 22.51).

<sup>41</sup> UM P.5

<sup>42</sup> Laurence Dreyfus has written a whole section on Wagner’s excessive relationship with silk (2010, p.136-143)

(p.39 UM). Again, it is *exceedingly* unlikely that Nietzsche would have known that Strauss surrounded himself with yes-men. In fact, as Waite points out, it was the complete opposite; Strauss lost nearly all of his friends because of this publication (1996). So who does admit flatterers into his inner circle who ‘live by destroying, admire by consuming, revere by digesting’? It is Richard Wagner who was known to have kept company only with his admirers.

We cannot make a judgment whether writing a polemic against his father figure was a conscious or unconscious act; we are not Nietzsche’s analysts. Nietzsche’s malicious anger is the primary evidence that he was unconsciously attacking Wagner, but there are times when it seems to be possible that he was trying to communicate something to him. For he knew Wagner would surely read this piece, as it was Cosima who suggested he write it (Cate, 2005, p.174).

In the next *Untimely Meditation* we see Nietzsche breaking forcefully with everything he used to hold dear: criticizing the philologists for studying, but not living history; more precisely, for not imitating the Greeks who they claimed to devote their lives to (UM p.79-80). Rebuking Schopenhauer as well, because it was Schopenhauer who said, “History appears to us as scarcely an object worthy of the serious and arduous consideration of the human mind” (WWR2 p.442). There are also much clearer attacks on Wagner, “There are people who believe that German music could have a transforming and reforming effect on the Germans: they are angered, and consider it an injustice against the most rigorous part of our culture when they see men such as Mozart and Beethoven [*both* of whom Wagner wrote about] engulfed by all this learned dust of biography and compelled by the torture-instruments of historical criticism to answer a thousand impertinent questions” (UM p.97 Brackets added).

To our minds, these aren’t even subtle strikes against Wagner. It is strange how scholarly consensus places their break three years later in 1876 at the opening festivals at Bayreuth. Some scholars even wait until the publication of the last *Untimely Meditation* to claim Nietzsche “showed subtle signs moving away from Wagner”(Guess, 1999, p.xxxii). It seems to us that Nietzsche explains the superficial praise that fills up *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth* in *Dawn*. After several aphorisms referring to Wagner, Nietzsche writes “*Revenge in Praise* - Here is written a page full of praise and you call it shallow: but when you discern that revenge lies hidden in this praise, you then find it almost too subtle and amuse yourself greatly over the richness of bold little strokes and figures. Not the person but his revenge is so subtle, rich and resourceful: he himself is hardly aware of it” (D p.166).

*Back to the Question of Life - May 1873 onward*

Now let us return to the notebooks, to observe that after this break with Wagner his interest turns back to the question of the organic. We will also consider his second meditation *On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life*, and we will attempt to show how his use of 'life' in this essay is a reference to the organic being.

In a notebook dated to the beginning of 1873, the exact time period we believe he began to break from Wagner, Nietzsche writes "But where do the artistic forces appear? Certainly in the crystal. The production of *form*: but does this not presuppose a being that perceives?" (KSA 19[142]). In the same notebook he asks, "Great question: is sensation a primal fact of all matter?" (KSA 19[149]). We should recognize that what he is asking is a crucial question concerning the status of the organic. As we noted earlier with Deleuze, one must posit that this question be answered in the affirmative in order to continue using a spurious definition of 'life.' This question of sensation in inorganic matter will be answered differently at different times in this notebook. He will say that seeking pleasure and avoiding displeasure are "the eternal laws of nature" (KSA 19[161]), but he will also admonish the anthropomorphic viewpoint which leads him to assert this. His stance on this subject was in flux, but for our analysis the only thing that matters here is that he is beginning to revisit a question that he put aside for the past three years.<sup>43</sup> Further proof of this revival that coincides with the beginning of his break from Wagner is that in the next notebook, dating from the summer of 1873, he begins to revisit the problems of teleology. "There is something unpurposeful [unzweckmäßiges] that must be laid at the door of nature" (KSA 29[223]).<sup>44</sup>

We find in the second *Untimely Meditation* a mixture of definitions of 'life.' He equates life with 'action' in the very first paragraph (UM p.59), which is reminiscent of the definition of life as 'becoming,' that we covered earlier. He even uses the term 'organic' in this sense of 'action' (UM p.62). He continually uses phrases such as, "history stands in the service, not of pure knowledge, but of life" (UM p.65), which again, seem to be playing on the idea of knowledge as stasis and life as movement. But what we find in this essay is that these spurious uses of the term 'life' are the exception. I propose that Nietzsche is truly using history in this essay to attempt to reach a definition of life, the organic question is the question that drives this meditation.

It is in this essay that he begins to talk about the concept of incorporation (UM p.62, 78, 87),<sup>45</sup> Interiority and exteriority (UM p.63,78-79), and dissimulation (UM p.63, 67, 80-81, 97). He also begins to frame his questions to indicate his returned interest in the question of the organic: "It is said that one possesses content and only form is

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<sup>43</sup> This notebook has quite a few ponderings that come very close to asking the question of the organic, "how did measuring come into existence? The plant is also a *measuring being*" (KSA 19[156]).

<sup>44</sup> It will become much more explicit that he is talking about the problem of the organic with this language by 1876 where he writes, "Among countless unpurposeful [unzweckmäßig] forms there were some capable of life" (KSA 23[9])

<sup>45</sup> This notion appears to play a big role in his notebooks for this time period, for example, "What is the power that enforces imitation? The appropriation of an alien impression through metaphors. [...]Result: similarities are discovered and given new life" (KSA 19[227]).

lacking; but such an antithesis is quite improper when applied to living things. This is precisely why our modern culture is not a living thing" (UM p.78).

As will become clear by the end of this thesis, the concepts that Nietzsche considers to be essential to life (dissimulation, interior/exterior, incorporation) in the second *Untimely Meditation* are the very same concepts that will be most essential to defining the organism in his late philosophy. Coupled with the fact this this essay rebukes Schopenhauer and the philologists, and his last essay contained stinging rebukes of Wagner, we use the second *Untimely Meditation* to mark the most decisive break in Nietzsche's conception of life. While it is true that he does not have a working theory of the organism at this point, he has all the ingredients in front of him, it will just be a matter of time and effort to get from here to his final position. As we will be proving throughout chapters three and four, there will not be any ideas that concern the organism that Nietzsche significantly revises in the manner that he revised his philosophy to be more favorable towards Wagner. There will be no more major derailments or distractions that impact the development of his theory of the organism. And so here we will end our biographical treatment of Nietzsche.

### *Conclusion*

In this chapter we have identified the popular treatments of the term 'life' in Nietzsche scholarship. We picked out certain assumptions in these trends, such as defining life as 'experience,' or 'will to power,' or even 'the thing in itself.' We traced these particular methods of defining life back to some of Nietzsche's influences, and demonstrated that the word 'life' was used in an ambiguous and sometimes contradictory way by those men who exerted intellectual pressure on Nietzsche. We focused on Wagner, and discussed why and how he was perhaps Nietzsche's biggest influence on this subject. We then took a chronological approach to Nietzsche's life and gave evidence that he was genuinely interested in the question of the organic prior to meeting Wagner. We took selections of Nietzsche's published work and his unpublished notebooks from 1869-1873 and tracked the use of the term 'life' and 'organic' throughout this time period. Our conclusions from these sections were that Nietzsche began to use the term 'life' more loosely, to mean more things. We then presented information that leads us to believe that Nietzsche began breaking from Wagner in 1873, and upon analyzing his notebooks and his next publication; we saw strong evidence in a resurgence of his interest in the question of the organic.

While it is the case that 'life' was not used to refer to the organic in an ambiguous sense prior to the winter of 1869, it is not the case that things simply reverted to how they were after 1873. Nietzsche will continue to use these spurious definitions of 'life' in

nearly all of his published writings. Nietzsche was definitely interested in questions such as “How should one live in the face of suffering and adversity?”, “What is the meaning the of experience of living life?”, “How can our lives be enriched and made worth living?”, this is unquestionable.<sup>46</sup> However, it is our belief that these questions could be better approached if we reach an understanding of a Nietzschean metaphysics of the organism. For it is also true that alongside these spurious usages, he will begin to construct a theory of the organic being. At the end of the next chapter we will encounter a few writers who have attempted to write on this subject, but as we have seen, the understanding of the term ‘life’ to mean ‘the organic’ has been almost completely ignored by philosophers. We will see by the end of this thesis just how much of Nietzsche’s philosophical enterprise is currently missing from the scholarship.

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<sup>46</sup> Some examples Nietzsche’s attempts to address these questions include; KSA 5[188], 5[26], 32[67]; BGE p.10, 28, 33, 37, 49, 64, 105, 140; D p.11, 30, 78, 87, 118, 127, 141

## Chapter. 2

### *Introduction*

What we want to demonstrate in the following two chapters is that in order to understand Nietzsche's approach to the organic problem it is essential to understand how Schopenhauer conceived of the organism. There was no greater influence upon Nietzsche in the realm of the organic question than him. This chapter will be devoted to analyzing Schopenhauer's study of the concept of the organic. We will start by explaining the stance of the philosopher that Schopenhauer is building upon and responding to, Kant.<sup>47</sup> Following our explanation of Kant's theory of life, we will introduce Schopenhauer through a series of notes that Nietzsche made as a student. The main problem that Nietzsche points out in these notes, that which he calls the 'border of individuation,' will remain central to our discussion throughout this chapter. This will allow us to begin to explicate Schopenhauer's theory of organization. The key structural component of Schopenhauer's philosophy of organization is his doctrine of the Ideas. As will become apparent, this will be a necessary precursor to uncovering his theory of the organic. A significant portion of this chapter will be devoted to the study of Schopenhauer's theory of organization, as it will require us to go beyond what current scholarship has covered and engage with Kant, Plato, and proto-evolutionary theorists such as Lamarck. As we discuss Nietzsche's theories in the chapters to come, we will point out their connections to these problems of organization that we find in the work of Schopenhauer. So this apparent deviation is not only a necessary detour, but will also be reintegrated into our ultimate goal. Following our discussion of Schopenhauerian organization, we will be able to define the organic being in Schopenhauer's philosophy and conclude the chapter. For now, let us begin with describing the Kantian view of the organism. It is within the *Critique of Judgment* that we find the closest thing his philosophy has to a theory of the organism.

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<sup>47</sup> Incidentally, Thacker has done an excellent job tracing the origins of the question question of the organic in Ancient and Medieval thought, and ends his book *Afterlife* with a brief analysis of this problem in Kant. And so, through no intention of our own, we happen to be picking up from where he left off.

## *Kant on the Organism*

Kant frames the problem of life in a broader discussion concerning the faculty of the power of judgment [*Urteilkraft*]. Judgment for Kant, “Is the faculty of thinking the particulars as contained under the universal” (COJ p.15 ). The judgment of purposiveness [*Zweckmasigkeit*] is Kant’s definition of how humans identify what is organic, that is, we ascribe purposiveness to organic beings. The judgment of purposiveness in nature is called a transcendental principle of judgment, which means that it is “*a priori* the universal condition under which alone things can become objects of cognition generally” (COJ p.16). Kant will eventually draw out the conclusions of this discussion, showing how purposiveness is a judgment that man cannot help but to apply to nature. But for Kant, this purposiveness cannot accurately represent what nature is in itself. Instead, the purposiveness that we posit into nature functions only as a mirror, illustrating to us what the foundations of our knowledge rests upon. We replicate our judgment of ourselves as purposiveness into nature, and so we cannot know if that is the way nature really is, all we can know is our limitations.

What makes an object qualify for the judgment ‘a natural purpose with and end’ (COJ p.200; Quarfood, 2006, p.737), and thus as an organism, is that it is “both cause and effect of itself” (COJ p.199). This idea gives Nietzsche trouble in his notes (that we will cover at the end of this chapter), and it is worth calling close attention to. The phrase Nietzsche repeatedly uses is “The idea of the effect” (COSK p.10), it is almost certain he got this phrase from Kuno Fischer’s reading of Kant.<sup>48</sup> This is a very fertile phrase, and will require careful unpacking. Kant uses this phrase only once in the Critique of Judgment,

There is only one case in which our experience leads our judgment to the concept of an objective and material purposiveness, that is to say, to the concept of an end in nature. This is where the relation in which some cause stands to its effect is under review [ein Verhältnis der Ursache zur Wirkung zu beurteilen ist], and where we are only able to see uniformity in this relation on introducing into the causal principle the idea of effect and making it the source of the causality and the underlying condition on which the effect is possible (COJ p.194).

There is a subtlety here that isn’t immediately apparent. First we have to note that Kant is talking about *material* purposiveness. This means that while our judgment can apply

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<sup>48</sup> It is worth noting that from the outset that Kuno Fischer has a *very* Schopenhauerian read of Kant, with chapter titles that could have been taken directly from *The World as Will and Representation*, such as “Chapter 2, The Kantian Philosophy as doctrine of Freedom, subsection 2: The Thing-it-itself as Will” (1902).

universal concepts to objects and determine their relation to these universal concepts, this is always our intuition and imagination being subsumed under our rationality. What Kant is attempting to demonstrate is that our experience is interrupted when we perceive in the object a *relation of judgment* to its effect, “*beurteilen*” has the connotation of ‘judgment,’ but it is not the technical word which Kant uses to designate Judgment, which is ‘*Urteil*.’ Kant asserts that we are only able to understand this relation the cause has to its effect in the object if we posit “the idea of the effect” in the cause that creates the effect in relation to itself. This means that we assert *an intelligence*, at its most primal level, into the *material* object. We experience matter as having a mind. This is the foundation of how we perceive life, and it is going to be where Kant sets our limit to understand what life is.

Now because the effect has to have the idea of a creator behind it Kant describes the effect as an art product (“*kunstprodukt*”) (COJ p.195). This means that the first act of life as we perceive it, the baseline by which we can determine what is alive and what is not, is through our recognition that it creates, that there is something artistic in nature.<sup>49</sup> Kant notes that it is possible to divide further down in the causal chain, that a certain effect can be seen as an end or as a means to an end, an art product or a part of an art product, and this derivation process is what is known to us as ‘utility,’ which is a kind of prophetic foresight of the effect. This idea of the effect being pushed down the causal chain could be for example a chimpanzee picking up a rock, climbing a tree, breaking a branch with the rock, and gnaw at the branch, all to create a primitive spear (Hopkin, 2007). An effect necessitates a cause for itself, but cannot itself be this cause, it is dependent on something other than itself, and in turn engenders something other than it to be dependent on it, an effect has an effect, which has an effect, and so on. This is the causal chain, and the principle that governs it is that of efficient causes (*nexus effectivus*). Where ends and purposes come in is in our thought. We have the capacity to think a causal chain according to its end, we assert a purpose and an end to these causal actions the monkey undertakes. This transitive movement of the idea of the effect is what allows the judgment to be made that the earth is alive, that nature as a whole has a purpose. Kant even says that nothing in the forms of life is in vain, that every part is “reciprocally both end and means” (COJ. p.204), this means that every end that we perceive in the organism is at the same time perceptible as a means to a greater end.<sup>50</sup> Kant describes a certain causal chain of how rivers deposit silt along its banks downstream, and so indirectly increases the fertility of an area of land, which has an abundance of other effects. Kant states that this is how the judgment that nature is

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<sup>49</sup> In german ‘*kunst*’ carries with it the connotation of ‘craft’ or ‘creation’ as well as ‘art,’ and so there is the possibility that this interpretation is too strong.

<sup>50</sup> Now a close reader, as Schopenhauer was, will recognize that there is still a category of judgment which takes no ends, the judgment of the beautiful, and we will see how Schopenhauer comes to privilege this specific purposiveness judgment in his philosophy, as the literal salvation of mankind.

purposive arises amongst us. If we assert a purpose to a causal series we are asserting that the series has “regressive as well as progressive dependency” (COJ p.200). This means that we tie a knot conceptually: if A is a cause and B is the effect of this cause, then in teleological judgment we are affirming this as well as adding that B is the cause of A. But *we do* distinguish between the material chain of causes and the teleological cause which we ourselves add. Kant uses the example of a house, which materially causes money to be generated in the form of rent. But the idea of this rent, *the idea of the effect*, is the cause of someone building the house in the first place. Kant stresses that this is a fundamentally different kind of causality from mechanistic, or material causes.

This question of whether nature itself has a purpose is probably the most colloquial philosophical question imaginable; it is the question of ‘the meaning of life.’ But while Kant illustrates the conditions by which this question arises he believes that its answers are not the business of philosophy. Kant purposely keeps this ambiguity in front of the reader’s eyes and refuses to answer it, because for him, it is not answerable. He will carefully construct his phrases to ensure this ambiguity is preserved, “A thing is possible only as an end where the causality to which it owes its origin must not be sought in the mechanism of nature, but in a cause whose capacity of acting is determined by concepts”(COJ p.197). This could easily be read as an endorsement of conceptuality in nature were it not for the phrase “must be sought” which brings the entire schematic back within the framework of the subject. Kant is always interested in what can and cannot be accomplished from our perspective as knowing beings, and we should be reminded that this concept of purposiveness in nature is strictly something that *cannot* be known a priori. This is a burdensome limitation on Kant’s theory of the organic, the consequences of which we will now show.

Kant gives us an example of this through his analysis of the relationship between the parts of an organism and the whole. Every part of the organism is in a relationship of mutual support with, and dependence on every other part. This is a particularly problematic section for Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, as we will see, because Kant here covers the relationship of the parts to the whole in an organism with surprisingly brevity, and in our opinion, suspicious dismissal of the problem. Kant makes the claim that, “The first requisite of a thing, considered as a natural end, is that its parts, both as to their existence and form, are only possible by their relation to the whole” (COJ p.201) This implies a lopsided relationship, as opposed to the ‘mutually supportive’ relationship that Kant had posited just a page earlier. Quarford explains this discrepancy, saying it depends on whether we are taking the stance of matter and causal mechanism or ends and idealism (2006, p.738-9). It is without a doubt that the idea of a whole is absolutely tied to the idea of an end, they point to the same concept.

We find Kant saying that the whole may reciprocally determine its parts, not as their effect (because that would mean the whole is a piece of art, a creation), but as their cause, as the idea of the effect, as the intelligence that creates. But of course this is only a reflective judgment, it can only come about as a production of the parts themselves working collectively (2006, p.740). We see the double game Kant is playing, withholding our ability to judge whether our judgment of purposiveness in the natural object is a mere fantasy or whether it is an accurate state of affairs, while at the same time, spending a lot of time articulating a detailed description of what judgment is made. In this way his argument seems to continually run backwards: he makes progress in his description of this particular transcendental judgment, then reminds us that because it is transcendental we cannot trust it to reveal knowledge of nature in itself to us. Then he continues in his description, until he runs up again against the mystic assertion that the world is purposeful, intelligent and alive, then he retreats and drags his reader back to mistrust of the transcendental.

We are in a bind: we must judge things to be teleological but cannot know if our judgment has any accuracy. We are trapped in this judgment. We retrospectively posit the idea of the effect in the cause, based off of our experience of the effect. The implication is that this is a subjective judgment, like the beautiful, it tells us something about our position as subjects, not the object as it is in-itself. Teleological judgment is a principle of the faculty of judgment, not a principle of nature.

As Nietzsche suspects, Kant wants to restrict us, while implicating tantalizing interpretations that lay beyond our restrictions (Hill, 2003, p.21, 25). He claims that we have no way of knowing *a priori* whether or not the universe is ultimately nothing more than the mechanical and material (COJ p.216). It may be the case that matter strives after natural purposes as we judge it to, and that there really is a vitalist force with its own kind of causality that acts on matter in a completely different logic from mechanical forces of causality. Nietzsche will respond to the Kantian analysis of the organism, but we will not be able to formulate his response until the very last sections of Chapter Four. For now, let us examine the Schopenhauerian concept of the organism, which builds upon the Kantian schematic, and which was more influential upon Nietzsche.

### **Schopenhauer**

*Nietzsche's Criticism/ The World as Will and Representation*

Kant was the background against which both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer were thinking about the organism. Now that we have explicated the foundational Kantian theories, we can begin to engage with Nietzsche's most critical influence, Schopenhauer. My argument will be that the organic being first becomes a problem for Nietzsche

because of his readings of Schopenhauer; at the end of this chapter we will show that Nietzsche's plan for a doctoral dissertation entitled *The Concept of the Organic Since Kant* was really an attempt to conceptualize the problem of life in a Schopenhauerian framework. In order to give Schopenhauer his due we will have to take the scenic route through Schopenhauer's philosophy of life. It is our claim that the organic plays a pivotal role in Schopenhauer's thought, and that it has been mostly overlooked by scholars who attempt to untangle his system. We will first introduce the basics of Schopenhauer's system, then we will survey the attitude scholarship takes towards the key to his philosophy of life: the doctrine of Ideas. Once we have completed this preliminary work, we will move on to outline an original interpretation of the problem of the Ideas, and finally we will utilize our discussion of the Ideas to analyze the position of the organic in Schopenhauer's philosophy.

We can find access into Schopenhauer through Nietzsche's first critical notes he made of Schopenhauer's philosophy. In 1867, just a few years after he first picked up *The World as Will and Representation* on a whim from his landlord's second hand bookstore, he wrote a series of scathing notes about it. These notes will help us to elucidate what I see as the core of Schopenhauer's philosophy, and we will move outward from there.

Nietzsche's primary point of contention in these notes is that Schopenhauer made the thing-in-itself accessible through the body. He claims Schopenhauer placed the word 'Will' in the position of the thing-in-itself because he "did not want to feel the contradictory darkness in the region where the principle of individuation ceases" (Swift, 2005, p.57).<sup>51</sup> This means that Nietzsche was hesitant to follow Schopenhauer in asserting some *quality* to the thing-in-itself, something from the world of representation placed upon the will.

Nietzsche's condemnation of this central concept in Schopenhauer's philosophy orbits around the paradox that a non-spatial, non-temporal will could break into representation, which is essentially spatial and temporal. This breakthrough is actually a common occurrence in Schopenhauer's writings. Schopenhauer says explicitly that the will reaches into the world of causality from its standpoint outside of space-time to directly intervene in the phenomena of: Stimulus (WWR1 p.115), Magnetism (WN p.69), Blood (WWR2 p.254-255), Music (WWR1 p.257), the human heart (WWR2 p. 253) the entirety of our 'lower senses' (WWR2 p.27), poetry (WWR2 p.314), action at a distance (WN p.41) and even in genuine acts of Magic (WN p.76).

Nietzsche points out this problem haphazardly in his notes. Admittedly it is hard to conceptualize Schopenhauer's stance on the status of the thing-in-itself. To put it formulaically: through intuitive contemplation of the Ideas, we can know the Thing-in-itself (Will) *bypassing* the barrier of representation through intuition, because we

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<sup>51</sup> We can note Nietzsche's style, even in his twenties, is geared towards probing philosopher's secret motives, their psychology, rather than engaging them with logical arguments.

ourselves are this will, and all representation is completely subservient to the will. This implies the very Hegelian notion that this blind will desires to have knowledge of itself; and so it must alienate itself from itself in order represent itself to itself. "Indeed [representation] is only the copy of the will's own inner being" (WWR1 P.150).

Surprisingly, what Nietzsche criticizes Schopenhauer for is not the assertion of the breakthrough of the will into representation, but for not going far enough with this assertion: for having *too much* respect for Kant and Plato. Just as Schopenhauer gives us "a new knowledge [...] like a holy scripture, wider and further reaching" (Swift, 2005, P.57), he halts. He indicates a different kind of knowledge, and points out its applications (in music and such) but spends the vast majority of his book in the world of representation, demonstrating the Will's existence from a comfortable distance. He intimates that we have direct knowledge of the noumenal realm through the existence of an intuitive intelligence that is entirely different from reason, but spends virtually no time at all describing this realm, and not nearly enough time describing this kind of knowledge.

The two realms of Will and Representation *must* interact systematically, if for no other reasons than we are supposed to know the will in an intuitive way, and that the realm of representation is founded on the will. Despite the fact that they are closely linked they are of two essences (WWR1 p.360): the will is thing-in-itself, and representation is phenomenal appearance. This critique has been leveled at Schopenhauer by many Scholars since Nietzsche, and has been *the* major stumbling block for Schopenhauer's interpreters, as we will see in our section *Contemplation*.

Immediately after attacking Schopenhauer with real malice, Nietzsche redeems him, in a section that thinks through the problem more objectively. He asks himself if Schopenhauer is purposefully being arbitrary, or inaccurate in naming the thing-in-itself 'Will.' Perhaps Schopenhauer wants to pinpoint the site of the problem for his readers, so that they can look up from his book and observe this truth in the world around them: "Listen not to me, but to the λόγος" (Heraclitus, DK B50). This means that the realm of intuitive intelligence can only be indicated for the reader to explore, but resists description, translation into concepts. So Schopenhauer's system *necessarily* gets into these tangles *precisely where* the will meets representation, these points of logical interaction, "borders of individuation" (Swift, 2005, p.58). Nietzsche conjectures that Schopenhauer is aware of this, and there are passages in Schopenhauer to support this reading. For example, "It is the will which is what we know most intimately, and is therefore not to be explained further by anything else; on the contrary, it furnishes the explanation for all else. Accordingly it is the *thing-in-itself*, in so far as this can in any way be reached by knowledge" (WWR2 294). We can see here that Schopenhauer is actually taking a stance towards the radical limitation of our knowledge: ultimately the only way we can know anything stems from our knowledge of that which is at our core, the will. This is a deviation from the limitations placed on us by Kant, in that it places the source

of knowledge on a mysterious 'inner' knowing which is at the same time distinguished from intuition, which is an outer, perceptual knowing,<sup>52</sup> but is a return to Plato, for whom the good is the source of all knowledge (Phaedo 66d, Symposium 210e – 212a, Republic 476b, Phaedrus 247c). We can assert that this is Schopenhauer's major break from Kant. Schopenhauer and Kant's outer intuition corresponds to the intuitions of space and time, the forms of perception, but Schopenhauer posits an inner intuition that contemplates the Platonic Ideas, a concept not found in Kantian philosophy.

As Toscano rightly points out, Nietzsche approached the problem he articulated in 1867 with Schopenhauer's philosophy by the *principum individualis*, because it is the principle that demarcates the 'borders of individuation' (2001, p.41), the boundary between Will and representation. It is interesting to note that he is obviously obtaining this phrase from Schopenhauer's philosophy, so what we are seeing is the first unraveling doubt of a true believer. He is still trying to save the system from within the system, working with Schopenhauer's own language to redeem him.

Nietzsche ends by criticizing the problem of the origin of the intellect. Is it really the case that for billions of years the world was nothing but will? *Then* once the intellect emerged, representation emerged? This is the question that divides Idealism. How could the flower of knowledge come about with no seed, and from a soil that is entirely different in its essence from knowledge? How can the thing-in-itself give birth to something that is completely and utterly cut off from it, how can it give birth to causality, time and space, and knowledge in one fell swoop?

This question is more important than it might first appear to be. By bringing up the problem of historical time Nietzsche is making a move that Plato could not have made, but that Schopenhauer *should* have. This is the problem of evolution, which we will cover further on in the chapter. Having now introduced Nietzsche's explicit engagement with some of the basics of Schopenhauerian philosophy we will now approach one of the biggest problems with Schopenhauer: the interaction between will and representation, explained through the Platonic Ideas.

### *Ideas*

As will become clear, it is impossible to understand Schopenhauer's theory of the organism without understanding how he uses the term 'Idea' [*Idee*].<sup>53</sup> The *Ideen* are a principal of organization that the organism is based off of, without the knowledge of how organization in general is accomplished in Schopenhauer's universe we could never fully

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<sup>52</sup> This inner knowledge is associated with the transcendental unity of apperception (WWR1 ch.22).

<sup>53</sup> Throughout this work I will refer to this theory using the German singular: 'Idee,' and plural: 'Ideen.' This is in order to avoid confusion with the colloquial use of the term 'idea.'

grasp how the organism emerges. So we will have to engage with this difficult section of his philosophy in order to achieve our aim. We will briefly introduce the function of the *Ideen* here as a solution to the 'Borders of individuation' problem that Nietzsche identifies. We will then explain one of the origins of this concept in Kant, but we will refrain from digressing into a discussion of the other origin, that of Plato. This is because while Kant is clear and concise in his use of this theory, Plato is anything but. Furthermore there is reason to believe that Schopenhauer did not actually engage very deeply with Platonic philosophy, and that instead he is reading Plato through the Neoplatonist Plotinus, who he quotes six times in the second volume of *The World as Will and Representation*. In order to not lose sight of our destination, we will quote Plato and Plotinus wherever relevant, but avoid any unnecessary analysis.

Perhaps the best-known quote of all of Schopenhauer's philosophy is his characterization of the will as "absence of all aim, of all limits, [this quality] belongs to the essential nature of the will in itself, which is endless striving" (WWR1 p.165). The problem that Nietzsche points out is how then does objectification, the phenomenal world of appearances, mechanism, and matter gain its character of definiteness? Or to push the question further, arbitrariness? We have these two essentially distinct realms, will and representation, one of which is supposed to be the expression of the other, how is this relationship supposed to work? If representation is the expression of the will, then their division must be related to the question Kant asked: "why does nature *seem to us* to strive after a specific goal?" *Ideen* are Schopenhauer's answer to this question. They are the link between the will and representation, straddling the noumenal and phenomenal realms, and explain why specific strivings can manifest from indefinite desire. As Vandabeele explains, "the Ideas are situated metaphysically "between" the thing-in-itself (the will) and the empirical appearances" (2011, p.52). The *Ideen* are at the same time direct formations of the desire of the will, and the form-giving power that is perceived in matter. Schopenhauer equates them directly with Plato's forms, claiming that he is borrowing this theory in its entirety from Plato: "These *grades of the objectification of the will* are nothing but *Plato's Ideas*" (WWR1 p.129).

The *Ideen* occupy a strange position in Schopenhauer scholarship, they are 'an inconvenient truth.' Many of the major Schopenhauer scholars do not incorporate them into their commentaries on the philosopher. Brian Magee, for example, asserts that the *Ideen* were superfluously placed in Schopenhauer's system to deal with the problem of repetition in nature, and that "A Careful shave with Occam's Razor could, I suspect, succeed in removing [the ideas] without a trace" (1983, p.239). Magee goes on to make a psychological judgment of Schopenhauer, stating that the *Ideen* are not mentioned "until three-quarters of the way through Schopenhauer's exposition of his epistemology and ontology" and that therefore they may have been thrown onto the system to patch a hole. However, three-quarters of the way through that particular exposition where the

Ideen are first mentioned is actually only forty pages into the first volume, which runs over 500 pages. I will be arguing that it is not the case that the Ideen were thrown in at the last minute out of desperation, but rather that they occupy perhaps the most pivotal role of any of the concepts in Schopenhauer's system.

Julian Young gives the Ideen more attention, but still spends only about a page (2005, p.77-78) explaining the Ideen as they are, and about twenty pages of his nearly three hundred page book describing their relationship to art (2005, p.129-150). He attempts to demonstrate that Schopenhauer was trying to achieve a 'universal beautiful' with the Ideen, and concludes that, "What needs to be removed, however, is the tyranny of this quasi-Platonic paradigm" (2005, p.150). By saying this, Young was attempting to do away with the problematic metaphysical aspect of the Ideen. Young therefore argues that the Ideen play a more marginal role in Schopenhauer's system, and are only of an aesthetic concern. Again, I will be arguing that not only are the Ideen absolutely crucial to understanding Schopenhauer's project, but that it is precisely because of this problematic metaphysical aspect that the Ideen are important.

Hannaman articulates a very honest stance on the Ideen that perhaps expresses what many scholars are implicitly thinking. From the epistemological perspective she writes, "So, how is it possible for the intellect of the genius to achieve 'will-less knowing'? It would seem that intellect cannot detach itself from the will! This is as mysterious as the ability of the Platonic Forms to separate themselves off from the great Will. These are contradictions in Schopenhauer for which I cannot account" (Hannaman, 2009, p.13). Concerning the perspective the will, and the hierarchy of the Ideen she says, "How there could be such Ideas is difficult to grasp, since the thing-in-itself is supposed to be non-individuated (the principle of individuation belongs to cognition and therefore applies only to objects in the phenomenal world). When Schopenhauer asserts that the thing-in-itself divides itself into distinct natural forces and natural kinds, he seems to be asserting something inconsistent—that the thing-in-itself is both differentiated and undifferentiated" (2009, p.12). We note here that she is asking the same question Nietzsche was, what is the 'border of individuation'? She concludes, "Should I try to resolve this tension and somehow reveal Schopenhauer's philosophy to be consistent? I cannot. Schopenhauer's philosophy is not consistent" (2009, p.15).

The reason I believe that Hannaman is here articulating the unspoken thoughts of many Schopenhauer scholars when she states that the Ideen represent an inconsistency, is that there are fewer than ten shorter articles written about this concept, and none attempt to reconcile the theory of the Ideen with Schopenhauer's larger philosophy. The Ideen are a puzzle for Schopenhauerian scholarship, but I will assert that far from being a redundancy, an inconsistency, or a side note, the Ideen are Schopenhauer's answer to the most radical and intriguing problem that his system

creates. We will attempt to restore the Ideen to their proper place in Schopenhauer's philosophy, first by examining their origin in Kant.

### *Kant on Ideas in 'The Critique of Pure Reason'*

Schopenhauer is drawing his theory directly from Kant, who before him explicitly linked his definition of the term 'Idea' with the Platonic rendering. "Ideas for him [Plato] are archetypes of things themselves, and not, like the categories, merely the key to possible experiences" (CPR p.A313 B370). The word for 'archetype' here is '*Urbild*,' original image. Kant cannot mean with this passage that Ideas are the thing-in-itself, because we have a clear connection to them, but he *also* cannot mean that Ideas are just another aspect of the phenomenal world. Kant too is placing the Platonic forms in somewhere in between the noumenon and phenomenon, for much the same reason Plato does. Although unlike Schopenhauer and Plato, Kant's Ideas are regulative, they only *seem* to originate from the noumenal realm, but in reality they arise from our faculty of reason, merely indicating the noumenal realm. According to Kant, we must posit the existence of the Ideas, as distinguished from 'concepts' or 'notions' because we have concepts and notions that go beyond the possibility of any experience.

For Kant reason is a unifying activity, an activity that abstracts content from a concept but broadens to concept to envelop more concepts underneath it. This is one reason Kant is linking his 'Ideas' with Plato's. As we get closer to the form of something we lose the image of it (Republic 509D). Reason works by identifying the common sub categories that two or more concepts fall into and unifying them to a "higher" category by stripping away their differences (CPR A659 B687). For example, unifying cats, dolphins, and humans under the concept 'mammal,' the final concept has less imaginary content, but a wider scope. The key to this is that the higher concept lies in between the others, as the points where their content overlaps; the significance of this intermediate status will expand in Schopenhauer.

Kant ascribes to this activity of reason a directional aspect. As we move further from the sensuous and more into the realm of the rational, representations become more and more pure, hinting at something outside of the sensuous, outside of experience.<sup>54</sup> The obvious problem with all this is that a central tenet of the Kantian system is the

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<sup>54</sup> "The genus is representation in general. Under it stands the representation with consciousness. A perception that refers to the subject as a modification of its state is a sensation; an objective perception is a cognition. The latter is either an intuition or a concept. The former is immediately related to the object and is singular; the latter is mediate by means of a mark, which can be common to several things. A concept is either empirical or a pure concept, and the pure concept, insofar as it has its origin solely in the understanding, is called *notio* [notion]. A concept made up of notions, which goes beyond the possibility of all experience, is an idea or a concept of reason" (CPR A320 B377)

injunction to cement our knowledge firmly within the boundaries of experience. The Ideas are a venus flytrap, promising the irresistible sweetness of the noumenon to our understanding, and then ensnaring us. For Kant these Ideas of Plato pose themselves to us as ‘problems’ (CPR A647 B675). This is to say, they present themselves as impossible solutions, solutions which go beyond all empirical observation and are completely unreliable, and yet we cannot help but posit them. The ideas appear in the unifying process of reason, we *project* the kind of unity an Idea would have onto objects of our empirical experience. For Kant this is as far as we can go with this, the Ideas must remain a problem for us, we aren’t qualified to assert or deny their existence. We see the same exact method being used to deal with the Platonic Ideas as Kant used with the problem of the organic, this is because the organic being is one of these Platonic forms, one of these Kantian ‘problems’ that exist for a knowing subject. Ideas for Kant are ‘ends’ (CPR A318 B375).

Although Kant makes sure to stipulate that logic and experience do not have any power to ascertain the possibility of something like the highest unity, which has no content at all but encompasses everything, he does mention that it may be *the* problem set by the regulative powers of reason (CPR A649 B677). This is an attempt to account for the Platonic form of the good. Kant even further mentions that it is the Ideas that give rise to the phenomenal world to cement this relationship between his terminology and Plato’s (CPR A318 B374). When discussing the concept of God Kant says, “we have to consider everything that might belong to the context of possible experience as if the experience constituted an absolute unity, but one dependent through and through, and always still conditioned within the world of sense, yet at the same time as if the sum total of all appearances had a single supreme and all-sufficient ground outside its range, namely the independent, original, and creative reason, as it were, in relation to which we direct every empirical use of our reason in its greatest extension as if the objects themselves had arisen from that original image [Urbild] of all reason” (CPR A673 B701). This articulates the position nicely. Plato explicitly asks us to have a leap of faith<sup>55</sup> to go beyond experience, to get to absolute knowledge. Kant is more rigorous, if we are looking for absolute knowledge, this means that we want to know something absolutely, what good is it to take leaps in our logic to find it? We are undermining ourselves when we do! For Kant the ideas are beyond the edges of human understanding (CPR A702 B730), and there is no justification to follow them, as they surpass our experience.

Schopenhauer will invert this Kantian concept. He agrees that the ideas are placed between the noumenal and phenomenal realm, and that as reason abstracts more and more from a representation, the representation loses its sensuous content.

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<sup>55</sup> “Whether it is true, only the god knows. But this is how I see it: in the knowable realm, the form of the good is the last thing to be seen, and it is reached only with difficulty” (*Republic* 517b )

However Schopenhauer believes that we must look in the opposite direction for the noumena, we must abandon our reach into the world of abstraction and instead turn our attention to a serious analysis of the sensuous.

### *Schopenhauerian Ideen, The Hierarchy*

For Schopenhauer Ideen are a force that exists in the world, they are not just objects for human knowledge. Specifically, they are an active process by which form and matter come together, "the Idea, in itself unextended, certainly imparted form to matter, but first assumed extension from it" (WWR2 364). This is a concept lifted from Plotinus for whom; "Everything has something of the Good, by virtue of possessing a certain degree of unity and a certain degree of Existence and by participation in IdealForm" (I.7.2). Schopenhauer refers to this process as the *objectification of the will*. "By *objectification* I understand self-presentation or self-exhibition in the real corporeal world" (WWR2 245). Ideen are the structural element that allows this activity of objectification to occur, they are the link between will and representation. "The (Platonic) Ideas are the adequate objectification of the will" (WWR1 p.257). The reason he is using the term 'will' at all and not only 'Idee' is because Ideen are not really their own separate category of substance, will and representation are the only two essences. The Ideen exhibit characteristics of both the will, such as existing outside of space and time, and of representation, such as distinctness and determinacy. Thus we have a system of two extremes with an intermediary activity.

Thacker makes a very similar distinction while parsing through the ontologies of life of the Neoplatonists

The distinction of Creator-creation-creature also implies that creation itself—as a process implying temporality—is not necessarily identical with creatures. [...] Eriugena, for example, distinguishes between "that which creates and is not created," which is the Creator, and "that which creates and is created," which, in a Neoplatonic vein, are the Intelligences, the intermediary spheres that create actual creatures from the first emanations of the Creator. [...] just as Platonic forms are arranged in an ascending order of perfection from the perfect Idea to the imperfect thing, so does the created world radiate from the unity of a perfect, infinite Creator to the multiplicity of dependent, finite creatures" (Thacker, 2010, p.105).<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Thacker also notices the same issue in Duns Scotus (Thacker, 2010, p.115)

The 'Creator-creation-creature' distinction is exactly the 'Will-Idee-Representation' that Schopenhauer is making.<sup>57</sup> Where representations are either concepts or intuitions according to whether they are known by the causal understanding or the image-based sensibility. The latter has the possibility of accessing the Ideen.

One of the key concepts mentioned in the previous quotation, and essential for understanding the will's relation with representation, is the fact that Ideen are grouped into a hierarchy. Schopenhauer uses the word 'grades' [*Stufen*], as in 'grades of the will objectification' [*Stufen der Objektivation des Willens*]. Schopenhauer states that he is amazed that despite the infinite variety of representations, there exist only a comparatively small number of concepts used to categorize these representations. To be absolutely clear here, a grade of objectification, or Idee, is any kind of natural repetition that exists in reality, organic or inorganic: gravity, diamonds, bugs, mushrooms, wood, eyes, soybeans, wind, mountains. This is the same problem that Plato's Forms address, how is it that many different things are beautiful (*Greater Hippias*), many different actions are called courageous (*Laches*), or even that many distinct living things can be called bees (*Meno*). There is nothing that exists that doesn't correspond to some Idee *and* some conglomeration of Ideen. Ideen are inexplicable 'problems' for consciousness, just like the organic was a problem in Kant, they are the point at which our knowledge can go no further in physical explanation and must turn to metaphysical explanation (WWR2 p.164). For example, for Schopenhauer physiology is the attempt to reduce life to the physical explanations of causality that govern the inorganic realm, and thus is an impossible project. There will always remain something inexplicable about every Idee.

Schopenhauer arranges the Ideen hierarchically according to *how accurately* they represent the will, "There is a higher degree of this objectification [of the will] in the plant than in the stone, a higher degree in the animal than in the plant; indeed, the will's passage into visibility, its objectification [is a spectrum]" (WWR1 p.128).<sup>58</sup> The hierarchy of these concepts consists in their "inverse relation to each other, and thus the more that is thought under a concept, the less is thought in it, concepts form a sequence, a hierarchy" (WWR2 p.64). That Schopenhauer is explaining the nature of Ideen with reference to concepts is not surprising. As we will describe in the next section, concepts and intuitions describe the same thing. Concepts attempt to reunify through reason and abstraction the Ideen that have fallen into plurality through the forms of space and time. Again, each of these discrete grades of objectification which make up every object of representation corresponds to a Platonic form, "Therefore every universal, original force of nature is, in its inner essence, nothing but the objectification of the will at a low grade, and we call every such grade an eternal *Idea* in Plato's sense" (WWR1 p.134).

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<sup>57</sup> This division is also found in Plotinus, and named 'Matter-Ideal form-The Good.'

<sup>58</sup> Very soon after saying this, Schopenhauer goes on to say, "Therefore by Idea I understand every definite and fixed *grade of the will objectification*" (p.130 WWR1). This means we find in the hierarchy of Ideen the first moment of separation between the Ideen and the will, the first step the will takes toward differentiation and therefore representation. The 'border of individuation.'

The Nietzschean question to ask is if there is a specific morality that is used to distinguish between higher and lower objectification of the will. Schopenhauer's answer: "The most universal forces of nature exhibit themselves as the lowest grade of the will objectification" (WWR1 p.78). He goes on to give the example of gravity and impenetrability as the lowest grades. So two concepts are tied together in the hierarchy of Ideen: the more common an Idee is, the less accurately it expresses the will, and the more rarefied an Idee is, the more accurate it is in representing the will. The value of an Idee based on its exclusivity is the claim Schopenhauer is making by using the word 'higher' without explaining how it is 'better.'<sup>59</sup> This is a working definition of the hierarchy and will be refined in our section entitled *Complexity*.

If we remember there are certain direct acts of the will on the world of representation, and they occur in the lower strata of the hierarchy of Ideas (WWR2 p.27). We are now prepared to follow a further implication of this. First, things that are higher are somehow more distanced from the will, such that the highest Idee, that of the human, actually has the capacity to break free of the will in contemplation. Remember that, "An *Idea* thus apprehended is, of course, not as yet the essence of the thing-in-itself" (WWR2 p.364). The will is the thing in itself, the overarching Idee which encompasses all the others, and is at the very top of the hierarchy.

To close our section on hierarchy, we can note that this concept of Schopenhauer's is clearly prefigured in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*. It is implied (COJ p.217) that natural, mechanical causes would be the intermediate cause, the means, to a transcendental cause's ends, with the qualification that it is not the case that the existence of this transcendental cause can be firmly asserted. Kant takes it for granted that mechanical nature would be subservient to vital nature, and this is precisely how Schopenhauer thinks of the hierarchy of the Ideen, as a relationship of power. Gravity is used as an example of the lowest bass notes of the Ideen. All the Ideen are in some sense restricted to the form of gravity, but this is only because they are exploiting gravity for their own means, gravity is presupposed and made use of in all the higher Ideen. This is a delicate subject, to decide which Idee has power over the other one, and an example is warranted. The Idee of a lung is connected to the Idea of oxygen (parts are all individually purposive, the will wills something specific in every situation), gravity is an intermediate Idee that lungs and oxygen are both built upon, or assume in order to function. Without gravity, ultimately breath could not function.

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<sup>59</sup> We can see here the roots of Nietzsche's struggle with 'the spirit of gravity,' as the most common and therefore the lowest grade, and further his awe in how animals like birds have managed to overcome it through nuance and escape, not through beating it in direct competition. And yet we can push this even further, since as we will describe gravity is a part of what we are, not just an "outside" force that imposes rules upon us, we are in a sense running from reality, hiding, digging deeper.

It is at this juncture that we have now begun to discuss the problem of organization. The problem of organization is the problem of the qualitative difference between Ideen, how the Ideen interact with each other. Why does all magnesium behave in a certain fashion? Why are there specific, distinguished patterns of behavior for all water, fire, and bees? Why is reality organized in the way it is, and what are the rules that govern this organization? This is the extremely abstract problem that the Ideen (like the Platonic forms) attempt to tackle. As we will discover near the end of this chapter, a theory of the organism must be built upon a theory of organization. For the moment, let us focus on elucidating the nature of the Ideen, and thus of the problem of organization in Schopenhauer. This analysis of the Ideen will take up a significant portion of this chapter from the section entitled *Problems with the Scholarship/ Evolution* up to the section entitled *Schopenhauerian Complexity*. At this point we have now introduced the position and purpose of the Ideen. Before we can pursue the question of organization any further we must explain how it is that the Ideen are known, which we will do in the next two sections.

### *Conception*

The question of how the Ideen are known is the focus of the majority of scholars who write about this subject. The main goal of this section will be to describe what concepts are in Schopenhauer, and how they differ from intuitions, especially with respect to the Ideen. This will set up the groundwork so that in the next section we can explain this special kind of knowledge. But for now we can state simply that Schopenhauer argues against Kant and Plato that the Ideen cannot be reached through rational reflections, but only through outward, perceptual, intuition and imagination.<sup>60</sup> This philosophical stance is central to Schopenhauer's system, and is what causes authors such as Paul Guyer to argue that Schopenhauer has abandoned Kant's transcendental method in favor of a phenomenological method. As discussed at the end of this chapter on Schopenhauer's method (Janaway, 1999), Schopenhauer maintains that the Platonic use of the word 'Idea' is the only use that he ever acknowledges (WWR2 p.364, p.408), but deviates from Plato's conclusions. He also attacks Kant, saying that the Ideen of pure reason should not be concepts (WWR1 p.431). We can pinpoint where he begins this deviation from both Kant and Plato, in distinguishing between a 'concept' (Begriff) and an Ideen.

The Ideen is the unity that has become plurality, whereas the concept has created this unity once more from plurality by means of reason and abstraction (WWR1 p.235). As White puts it, "Wherever there is a unity to be found in a plurality of homogeneous

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<sup>60</sup> (WWR2 p.379 WWR2), These are two faculties which Plato explicitly says can never reach the Idee (Republic 510b-511a). Kant follows Plato in suit (CPR A328 B384).

individuals, that unity is an Idea. Schopenhauer adds that an Idea may therefore be described as a unity *ante rem* [prior to reality], by contrast with a concept, which is merely *post rem* [subsequent to reality]" (White, 1999, p.134). A concept can never produce more than what it was constructed out of, whereas an Idee is inexhaustible (WWR2 p.408). To be clear, an Idee is inexhaustible because it is accessible to intuition, not reason, thus it is an abyss filled with ever more minute details and ambiguity (WWR2 p.76). This is in contrast to Kant, who believed it to be inexhaustible because it was located outside of the boundaries of knowledge.

After a brief summary of what a concept is in Schopenhauer's system, we will begin explaining how Schopenhauer views intuition and Ideen in the next section. Concepts are unique to the human being, but they are ultimately always in service of the will, and thus they are, in essence, a pleasure seeking activity. Schopenhauer explicitly distances himself from Kant's definition of 'concept' (WWR1 p.6 f.) equating his notion of 'concept' with abstract reason, and opposing it to the understanding which is, "knowledge of causality, transition from effect to cause and from cause to effect, and nothing else" (WWR1 p.21). Schopenhauer finds the term 'reflection' is especially apt to describe the process of abstract reason, as reason mirrors the representations of perception and understanding and universalizes them, removes them from the specific situations of sensation characterized by time and space (WWR1 p.40). But even as reason frees itself from perception its very essence is for its representations to be grounded in, and therefore still tied to, perception or the understanding (WWR1 p.41). As he will also do with intuition, Schopenhauer ascribes the Kantian power of judgment of finding the universal in the particular to reason (WWR1 p.42). Concepts are similar to Ideen in several respects, but this is the most significant, that they both are unities that represent pluralities of particulars (WRR1 p.233). An Idee has all the universality of a concept, but is perceptual, intuitive. An Idee is a universal that is applied to many particulars but Ideen exists *ante rem* whereas concepts are a construction of our faculty of reason. For Schopenhauer concepts are not only useful, but also necessary so that we can have things such as medicine and physics.<sup>61</sup> However concepts are almost entirely useless in creating a work of art. When speaking of poetry Schopenhauer notes that by arranging the spheres of meaning concepts have so that they intersect in just the right way poets are able to create perceptive impressions (which concepts originate from) in reader's imaginations. As well philosophy, reminiscent of Deleuze's famous

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<sup>61</sup> Schopenhauer also notes that, contra Plato, the forms of manufactured articles do not express Ideen, but mere concepts. Rather it is the "mere material as such" of the manufactured items that expresses an Idee (WWR1 p.211; WWR2 p.365). This is an instance where the reunification of an Idee seems to be done poorly, or misconstrued. A strange implication, that material goods are failed attempts at representing the will, but it has extremely deep connotations. For Plato there were forms for both φύσις (physis) and νόμος (nomos), both natural forms and the forms constructed by living in a polis, the forms of custom. By claiming that there only exist the Ideen which correlate to φύσις Schopenhauer is naming the entire endeavour of rational society superfluous. The highest achievements of human civilization operate by the same principle as consumption and fornication, the principle of pleasure. This is a subtle but radical claim, and one that is necessitated by his stance that the Ideen can only be known through intuition.

definition, is the creation of new concepts out of the impressions of representation (WWR2 P.83). In fact Schopenhauer acknowledges his debt to Spinoza here, and believes that concepts can be said to arise due to the confusion of perception, and that it is philosophy's duty to reaffirm these basic problems of the world that have been covered over (WWR1 p.85). These basic problems as we will see, are the Ideen.<sup>62</sup>

### *Contemplation*

Now we will discuss these problems, the Ideen, from the standpoint of intuition; how do we know the Ideen? As we have mentioned, it is through perceptive, imaginative knowledge, the human has the possibility to reach closer to the noumenon than it can through abstract reason, or concepts (WWR2 p.74, 77, 80). Schopenhauer calls this act of intuiting the Ideen 'contemplation,' a term which he gets directly from Plotinus.<sup>63</sup> This involves turning the will against itself, to deny the will by apprehending the Ideen in perception, and thus engage in an anti-pleasure activity. We will take this step by step; the first issue is to show how Ideen are known through the faculty of intuition and imagination. The first time Schopenhauer mentions intuition it is in a more or less innocent way,

[Intuitive representation] embraces the entire visible world, or the whole of experience, together with the conditions of its possibility. As we have said, it is one of Kant's very important discoveries that these very conditions, these forms of the visible world, in other words, the most universal element in its perception, the common property of all its phenomena, time and space, even by themselves and separated from their content, can be not only thought in the abstract, but also directly perceived (WWR1 p.6-7).

But we will eventually find that Schopenhauer's concept of intuition not only incorporates the Kantian function of Judgment (finding the universal in the particular), but many of the functions philosophers generally ascribe to reason. And crucially, it is through intuition that contemplation of the Ideen can occur.

We can pursue such a consideration of the relations more or less to the most distant links of their concatenation. In this way the consideration

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<sup>62</sup> As we discussed earlier, Kant also called the Ideas 'problems.'

<sup>63</sup> Plotinus's eighth tractate in the third Ennead is entitled 'Nature Contemplation and the One'. In this tractate he enumerates the possibility for the intellect to know the ideal forms, using the term 'contemplation' in a technical manner, "This vision achieved, the acting instinct pauses; the mind is satisfied and seeks nothing further; the contemplation, in one so conditioned, remains absorbed within as having acquired certainty to rest upon" (III.8.6).

will gain in accuracy and extent, but remains the same as regards its quality and nature. It is the consideration of things in their relations, in fact by means of these, and hence according to the principle of sufficient reason. In most cases and as a rule, everyone is abandoned to this method of consideration; I believe even that most people are incapable of any other. But if, by way of exception, it happens that we experience a momentary enhancement of the intensity of our intuitive intelligence, we at once see things with entirely different eyes, for we now apprehend them no longer according to their relations, but according to what they are in and by themselves; and then, in addition to their relative existence, we suddenly perceive their absolute existence as well. Every individual at once represents its species; accordingly, we now apprehend the universal in beings (WWR2 p.372).

It is up to conceptual understanding to comprehend things according to their relations, but the intuition is capable of uncovering the truly universal which is expressed in the particular object. The contemplation of this universal is facilitated by the beauty of an object, and it is intuition that is able to grasp the beautiful, which for Kant was the job of Judgment, although a special category of 'intuitive judgment.' Here we find another deviation from the Platonic Forms; there is no form of 'beauty.' Here we follow White's analysis: "[Schopenhauer] thinks of beauty as a purely relational property, the property of facilitating the contemplation of Ideas; and he does not believe that there are Ideas of relations" (White, 1999, p.138). Our attraction to beauty is actually our attraction to knowledge of the Ideen. As Foster states: "art ignites the consciousness whereby Ideas in nature are apprehended" (Foster, 2012, p.223). Schopenhauer is trying to open his readers eyes to an element of the human experience which he feels has been unfairly dismissed in Western, but not Eastern, philosophy. He privileges the intuitive intelligence as having access to the solutions to the problems philosophy has posed but failed to solve with abstract reason.<sup>64</sup>

This is why Schopenhauer is framing his philosophy in the same picture as Kant and Plato; he thinks that he has found the end of the rope in the Gordian knot that philosophers have puzzled over since ancient times. Both volumes of *The World as Will and Representation* are nearly nothing but a lengthy discussion of aesthetics and beauty. Every metaphysical point Schopenhauer makes is arrived at through an explanation of beauty. Schopenhauer attempts to radically turn philosophy on its head, claiming that reason and the understanding are essentially hedonistic faculties, and that it is through the sensuous and intuitive that real knowledge is attained.

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<sup>64</sup> What all his commentators have failed to note on this subject is that he is getting this directly from Plotinus. For Plotinus beauty was what lured the soul away from the material world of evil and back into communion with the One, and furthermore beauty always revealed itself through the 'Ideal Forms' (I.6.1-3).

All intuitive perception [Anschauung] is intellectual. For without understanding we could never arrive at intuitive perception, observation, and apprehension of objects; rather, all would remain mere sensation, which could have at most a meaning in reference to the will as pain or comfort, but otherwise would be a succession of states devoid of meaning and nothing resembling knowledge (VC p.44 ).

It is reason and the understanding that knows things according to their relations, and thus there is a divide in knowledge, "outside influence can bring it about that the will pursues the goal to which it aspires once and for all in accordance with its inner nature, by quite a different path, and even in an entirely different object, from what it did previously. But such an influence can never bring it about that the will wills something actually different from what it has willed hitherto" (WWR1 p.294). This conception of the understanding is taken from Kant (CPR A644 B672) but stretched to the extreme. Only our 'Intuitive intelligence' has the capacity to perceive things as separate from their contingent position, and according to the Idee that governs their form. This means that Ideen cannot be grasped in reflection, but only in perception (WWR2 p.376, 406, 408) or imagination (WWR2 p.379).

Most importantly this intuitive Idea is still intelligible, it still is *a kind of knowledge* despite having no relation to the understanding or reason. Schopenhauer isn't abandoning logic in favor of ambiguity and mysticism; he thinks that the kind of intelligible character we can apprehend through intuition leads us to a more ontologically fundamental phenomenon, in truth only a small step away from the noumenon. "Thus the intelligible character coincides with the Idea, or more properly with the original act of will that reveals itself in the Idea" (WWR1, p.156).

So what is the experience of this different kind of knowledge? During the act of contemplation Schopenhauer describes that the subject "comprehends calmly, unshaken and unconcerned, the Ideas in those very objects that are threatening and terrible to the will" (WWR1 p.204). What is implied in this is that the subject is still in situation, and perceives the Ideen associated with the objects that are immediately around it, but as they are outside the situation. Hein makes this point very eloquently: "In contemplation of the Ideas [...] the viewer takes on the characteristics of the object and becomes a pure infinite timeless subject of knowledge" (Hein, 1966, p.141-142). Her interpretation demonstrates how radical an act contemplation actually is. However we could also say, more mildly: In the act of contemplation the will ceases to will something specific in its specific situation.<sup>65</sup> Intuition locates the universal in the particulars, ultimately, the will in

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<sup>65</sup> Here we note another deviation from Plato, as Hein states, "For Plato, the Ideas are not immanent in things. It is only after having been repeatedly reminded of it by the contemplation of fair forms and fair institutions that the philosopher recalls the Idea of Beauty and then systematically achieved full recognition of it. [...] But for Schopenhauer

representation. This intuitive faculty separates its object from their relations to the world, and likewise separates itself as a knowing subject from its own desirous connections to the world. This intuition recognizes a man who does us injustice without trying to get revenge. Intuition can contemplate injustice as such, as a Platonic Idee, separate from its relation to causality and its particular instances.

The main division in scholarship upon the Ideen lies in this context of the division between will and representation in the contemplation of the Ideen. There are subjects that live in an individualized dream-like state of desire and subservience to the will, and there are subjects of pure knowing, the difference lies in whether the consciousness is contemplating a concept or object, or contemplating an Idee. Schopenhauer speaks as though the two subjects are separated by a gulf (WWR1 p.178). Scholars like Foster read these passages as extremely significant. Foster is one of the Ideen theorists who believes in a very radical distinction between states of contemplation and states of willing, saying, "Will as perceived through Ideas in art stands in exact contrast to the willing involved in any conscious attempt to meet a goal, even the goal of will's unification. Ideas are after all required to induce the transition from ordinary, goal-governed intellect to the pure subject of knowing, from hectic immersion in willing to an entirely different state of consciousness in the absence of willing" (Foster, 2012, p.224). For Foster the division is nearly total, the experience of contemplation is like a religious epiphany. To support her reading Foster points to a difference in the terms that Schopenhauer uses to describe the conceptual understanding and the intuitive understanding of the Ideen. "It is the job of the intellect to know (Wissen), and the intellect of genius continues to 'know' (Erkennen), but in a non-discursive form and with an object that detaches itself from ordinary representations" (2012, p.228).<sup>66</sup> Vandenabeele follows Foster. He asserts that conceptual understanding is solely the knowledge of the principle of sufficient reason. Whereas intuition is, "aesthetic, will-less perception—which Schopenhauer identifies with Spinoza's notion of knowledge 'sub aeternitatis specie,' that is, from the standpoint of eternity—" (Vandenabeele, 2011 p.51). We agree with these authors, intuition must have some special power to access noumenal reality, for reasons that will become clear as the chapter progresses. In our interpretation of Schopenhauer this is a necessary power because it is the intuition that knows the Ideen. If the Ideen are located too far in the realm of representation and do not at least have one foot in the noumenal realm then they lose their power to form representation from outside of representation. This relation of this division between

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Ideas *are* present in the realm of ordinary experience. [...] This leads Schopenhauer to deny the necessity of wide experience of particulars in order to gain knowledge of the Ideas; on the contrary, he contends that there is more to be gained from intense concentration upon a single things than from "measuring out the boundless world". (Hein, 1966, p.139).

<sup>66</sup> This is a subtle reference to the Platonic knowledge of the forms, the prefix 'er' in german functions almost identically to 're' in english. So 'Erkennen' could be best translated a 'recognize.' So Schopenhauer is saying we recognize the Ideen, just as Plato said we 'remember' our previous knowledge of the forms (Phaedo 73c-75)

phenomenon and noumenon in the context of the Ideen will be repeated in Nietzsche, and covered in Chapter Three.

The authors who read Schopenhauerian Contemplation as a quasi transcendental activity make an important connection between Ideen and the will. This connection is framed by the activity of the Ideen, which in some way fights the will, or at least instill obstacles to the will's satisfaction. In this sense contemplation is active (P.609 WWR2) "The genius apprehends the Idea and, through the power of productive imagination, completes, amplifies, fixes, retains, and repeats at pleasure 'all the significant pictures of life, according as the aims of a profoundly penetrating knowledge and of the significant work by which it is to be communicated may require'" (Foster, 2012, p.218). As we will show this point of contention between the will and the intuitive intellect gives rise to what is called a 'freedom' of the intellect (WWR2 p.610-611, p.368). The significance of a conflict 'freeing' something will make itself known to us as we discuss the birth of an Idee.

A corollary to this subject is that the denial of the will is the same thing as the contemplation of the Ideen, "The will itself cannot be abolished by anything except knowledge" (WWR1 p.400 also WWR2 p.367). Schopenhauer explains the strangeness of his doctrine by writing, "For the will, as the principle of subjectivity, is everywhere the opposite, indeed the antagonist, of knowledge. [...] What makes this state so rare is that in it the accident (the intellect) so to speak, subdues and eliminates the substance (the will)" (WWR2 p.368-369). Schopenhauer wants to assert that in this act of denial of the will, the intellect attains a state of freedom that was henceforth only a quality of the noumenal will (WWR2 p.380).

However, despite this antagonism between contemplation and willing, Schopenhauer makes it clear that contemplation is only ever momentary *and partial* (WWR1 p.206). He laments the fact that the will continually retakes the intellect, so that humans can only have a glimpse of noumenal freedom (WWR2 p.383). Even the man of absolute genius lives in the world mostly automatically, having to deal with the frustrating contingencies of his situation. The genius is waiting in line, staring at the back of the head of someone in front of them. If this person has particularly magnificent blonde hair, the genius' intuition can momentarily contemplate glimpses of pure Idee of hair, but the contingent considerations of the situation will quickly reassert themselves. This could imply that contemplation is only an extension or extreme of 'everyday' consciousness, and not something that is different in kind. It should be remembered that the subject is entirely dependent on their situation to remove themselves from the situation. If there are no beautiful objects surrounding them the genius is out of luck. So we find that as Schopenhauer continues to reinforce the split between subject and object in contemplation he simultaneously cements the subject to its situation. The more beautiful an object is, the more it seduces the subject to contemplate it (WWR1 p.210). In the

same sense that the lower objectifications of the will seduce the subject to base pleasure, away from the Ideen of the will, the Ideen themselves seduce the subject towards them.

It is undoubtedly the case then that accidents and coincidences get in the way of our contemplation of the Ideen.<sup>67</sup> But the concept of accidents may add an unforeseen problem to our discussion: he says in many places that the will desires its own representation, it desires for contemplation to take place. So what is it that is stopping this self-expression from occurring? There should be no other force aside from the will, but somehow in its objectification, the will creates obstacles that hinder its own representation of itself. Schopenhauer anticipates our question, "The *law of nature* is the relation of the Idea to the form of its phenomenon. This form is time, space, and causality, having a necessary and inseparable connexion and relation to one another. Through time and space the Idea multiplies itself into innumerable phenomena [...] only because all those phenomena of the eternal Ideas are referred to one and the same matter must there be a rule for their appearance and disappearance" (WWR1 p.135). So we can formulate this real question as to what opposes the will like this, "Does space, time, and causality, or in a word: representation, have a power of its own?"<sup>68</sup>

We can find this question articulated in the works of scholars like Chansky, who in contrast to philosophers such as Foster, believe that contemplation should be seen as an intensification of the understanding. That is, contemplation still follows the basic rules for knowing regular objects under the guidance of the will as the understanding.<sup>69</sup> This means that as we contemplate the Ideen through the intuition, what we are contemplating is still the same representations that we are considering when we conceptualize normal objects, we do not *really* get closer to the will. This solves the issue of contemplation being a 'counter-force' to the will, because Chansky denies that representation actually is capable of acting in the disinterest of the blind desire of the will.

Chansky believes that Ideen are 'pure representations,' that is, they are taken up as *representations*, aside from their relations to one another. "As objects of knowledge, of perception, the Ideas could hardly be known if they were completely undetermined by the subjects form of knowing, that is, by the principle of sufficient reason as the essential form of consciousness" (1988, p.72). For Chansky, intuitive knowledge is just an extension of conceptual knowledge, meaning, they are fundamentally the same thing, both tied to the principle of sufficient reason. The understanding follows a chain of causality, seeing one object only in its relation to other objects, intuitive knowledge stops

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<sup>67</sup> Now we can see the deeply Platonic attitude here. The world of deceptive, transient pleasures is a disappointment (WWR2 p.634) and a distraction. Plato exemplifies this most clearly in his indifference, even eagerness to die in *Phaedo* 62-69.

<sup>68</sup> Because every cause is a cause of the here and now (time and space WWR1 p.138) and matter is nothing but causality (WWR1 p.135 although he *also* says 'time' is nothing but causality). This represents Schopenhauer resisting his Plotinian influences. For Plotinus matter was a kind of force of its own, separate from the One, he goes so far as to call it the 'essence of evil' (VI.7.28) in contrast to the One, which is 'The Good.'

<sup>69</sup> Most scholars are undecided voters on this subject, and fall somewhere in between Foster and Chansky.

at an object and contemplated it for what it is. However with Chansky's interpretation, we lose any sort of universality that accompanies the Ideen.

The world is ultimately only will and representation. Ideen are an attempt at articulating the way in which we can describe the relationship between the two. Chansky seems to suggest by the term "pure representation", that the Ideen exhibit the essence of representation. However, Schopenhauer explicitly states that causality is the essence of knowledge of representation, "matter is through and through causality" (WWR1 p.135); "Perception is brought about by the application of causality" (WWR2 p.22), and that Ideen express the will *in* representation, not representation itself. Chansky seems to want to assert that the Ideen express nothing otherworldly, nothing outside of representation.<sup>70</sup>

Some scholars try to find a middle ground, such as White, who asserts that: "Meanings, like Ideas, are non-sensible entities, differing from what expresses them in belonging to no particular language, in having no determinate number of parts, and so on. It may be added that, on the assumption that Ideas are meanings, it seems less 'eccentric' to think of artists as seeing something over and above what others see, since artists may now be compared to those who grasp the meaning of sentences that are heard but not understood by others" (White, 1999, p.142). By positing that Ideen aren't fundamentally differentiated from the kind of meaning we deal with in everyday experience, White partially sides with Chansky. However White is ultimately cautious, and notes that, "At times he [Schopenhauer] even speaks as if having knowledge of Ideas is seeing things in a certain way, namely independently of the principle of sufficient reason" (1999, p.136). Terri Graves Taylor follows a similar model of privileging representation but making a series of qualifying comments (1987). Perhaps this is the most rational way of explaining the problem, however it doesn't move our understanding of Schopenhauer forward. Our claim is that Schopenhauer was a very radical thinker, and would not have been satisfied with this kind of compromise. As we intend to demonstrate, if we adopt the viewpoint of Foster and other scholars who assert the transcendental qualities of Contemplation, it will lead us to further radical conclusion found in Schopenhauer's philosophy.

### *Problems With the Scholarship / Evolution*

Hilde Hein says that, "Of Schopenhauer's concept of the Ideas, one might almost say that they are identified by their effect upon the perceiver. They are all but defined as

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<sup>70</sup> Plato mentions that contemplation of the Ideas is contemplation of an object devoid of all relations. (Symposium 211)

the sort of thing which can be experienced only by a pure will-less subject who has laid aside all individual features" (1966, p.142). Hein is expressing the implicit majority view, that the *Ideen* are most worth considering from the epistemological standpoint. Of course, the key phrase is 'all but,' because the *Ideen* are not just an effect upon a perceiver, but govern the world of representation, giving it form and enacting its antagonisms.

The epistemological treatment of the *Ideen* is certainly important because it is Schopenhauer's radical attempt to invert Plato and Kant, and assert a kind of knowledge of the thing in itself that is more accurate than rational understanding. However the question remains of what 'more accurate' means in this context: how is contemplation 'closer' to the will than conceptual knowledge? If contemplation really does get us closer to knowledge of the will than conceptual knowledge can, then we should be able to find the 'border of individuation' that Nietzsche speaks of in Schopenhauer's definition of the intuition. Because if we are denied direct perception of the will by the inadequacy of the "temporal and spatial form of our intuitive apprehension" (in the same way Glaucon is denied knowledge of the good) then by examining our 'intuitive apprehension' we should be able to find some kind of line between will and representation. In fact this is an instance where Schopenhauer retreats from his statements in Volume one, that we can intuit the will directly, and in volume two takes a more conservative and Kantian approach to the thing-in-itself. So Schopenhauer himself switched sides, in the first Volume considering the *Ideen* from the side of the will and the second from the side of representation. Nietzsche noted this in his small redemption of Schopenhauer, that when backed into a corner he will deny us ultimate knowledge of the thing in itself.

The few philosophers who have worked on the *Ideen* have concentrated on the epistemological ramifications of the theory, and have given very little consideration to how else the *Ideen* impact his philosophy. As we just noted, from the epistemological viewpoint, if our intuition can grasp the *Ideen* as they have been created by the one will then we must have come right to the edge of this border between will and representation. But Nietzsche was not asking *where* the border is; he was asking *what* it is. And this is our question too. As we will see by the end of this chapter, the border of individuation will be an essential component to Schopenhauer's definition of what life is. In order to address the question of this border Schopenhauer will have to explain how the will fragments into *Ideen*, and what the relationship is between the fragments and the whole. In truth, this is the fundamental question that the scholars we have covered have been attempting to address. Our claim is that they approach this question from the wrong angle; this specific issue cannot be examined by examining the act of contemplation. This is why philosophers who only deal with the epistemological side of the *Ideen* find them difficult to explain, Foster articulates the common view that, "the implied singularity of will beneath all things is logically problematic within the terms of Schopenhauer's own

definitions" (Foster, 2012, p.223).

To continue analyzing the question of this border we will turn to another concept that is intimately tied to the concept of life: evolution. All life evolves, and evolution only occurs in living organisms, and so we consider evolution to be a positive quality of life as mentioned in the introduction. Any definition of one that does not include the possibility of explaining the other is wanting.

Now we can return to the problem of organization that we introduced several sections previously. If the *Ideen* are the Platonic Forms, they are not just phenomena of our minds, or experiences we endure, but actually powers that govern nature. This issue of the power of *Ideen* over nature is even more dramatic in Schopenhauer than it is in Plato, because for Plato the forms were eternal and unchanging. The form of a horse has remained the same forever. But Schopenhauer lived through the period of the industrialization of Europe. His time gave rise to the birth of paleontology: while mining for resources on an unprecedented scale, industrialists discovered huge quantities of fossilized life, including the first recognition of the existence of dinosaurs. This led to the first tenable theories of evolution, most notably Lamarck. The theory of evolution leads to a dramatic difference in the way in which the organization of the organic is understood; it introduces the groundbreaking notion that the way things are organized now was not the way they were organized in the past. This implies that relations between *Ideen* are fluid, changeable.

Schopenhauer read a large amount of contemporary scientific literature, and familiarized himself especially with Lamarck, Cuvier, and Bichat. His theory of *Ideen* is also meant to account for the change of *Ideen*. How would entire strata of Platonic forms, such as the Dinosaurs disappear? How would new *Ideen* be created? The relatively few authors who do actually give attention to the *Ideen*, do so unanimously from an epistemological perspective, and so completely ignore questions such as these.<sup>71</sup> Schopenhauer was aware of recent discoveries and theories concerning the existences of fossils (WWR2 p.584). He ascribes to the Lamarckian hypothesis that there were three previous strata of life that came into existence before the existence of humans (WWR2 p.352), although he follows Cuvier's theories of extinction events, and proclaims that these species were lost forever, unlike Lamarck who merely asserts that they have been radically changed. The belief in the possibility of extinction is not an inconsequential belief, and it gives rise to Schopenhauer's major deviation from Plato's theories. Up until this point scholars have pointed to Schopenhauer's inversion of the value of images as the biggest difference between the two philosopher's theories.<sup>72</sup> But

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<sup>71</sup> White explicitly denies the changeability of the *Ideen* (White, 1999, p.135). Chansky avoid mentioning evolution even when talking of the identification of the *Ideen* with the different species, he ends up relating his discussion to consider how we contemplate the species (1999, p.77).

<sup>72</sup> "Schopenhauer turns the hierarchy of Plato topsy-turvy: the *Ideen* glimpsed in nature by the genius, at the level of what Plato terms the 'visible world,' and is filtered 'downward' into images, which subsequently direct the ordinary

for Plato the forms were eternal and unchanging. As we will discuss in this section, Schopenhauer believed that forms can *die out*, and *be born*. This is even more radical and astonishing a claim because *The Origin of Species* wouldn't be published until less than a year before Schopenhauer died, and at the time he was writing evolution was still a fringe Idea.

Arthur Lovejoy was the first scholar to express surprise at the lack of work done on Schopenhauer and theories of evolution back in 1911, it is still the case that no body of literature examines this subject. Lovejoy is the only author who entertains the consequences of a conception of the will as “A force or tendency at work in the world of phenomena” (1911, p.198), as opposed to an epistemological problem. However, his work does not connect the *Ideen* to this power of the will to shape and govern reality. He only spends a little over a paragraph talking about the *Ideen* (1911, p.200), in which he expresses puzzlement at the ‘contradictory’ ontological position of these concepts. Lovejoy describes and categorizes Schopenhauer’s evolutionary beliefs, but because he doesn’t engage with the *Ideen*, he is unable to sufficiently integrate these evolutionary beliefs into Schopenhauer’s system.

For example, Lovejoy points out that Schopenhauer could be considered a mutationist (1911 p.207) because he believes that all evolutionary change in an organism occurs radically and rapidly. This means that a species ‘jumps,’ say from neanderthal to human, with few if any intermediary stages. He notes that this is a deviation from Schopenhauer’s main evolutionary influence, Lamarck, but Lovejoy is unable to account for why Schopenhauer holds this belief.

Lovejoy notes other deviances from Lamarck, most significantly, in Lamarck’s belief that desires (which lead to evolutionary change) stemmed from the contingencies of an organism’s environment, while Lovejoy argues that they stem from the will in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. This is a very important point, the ramifications of which we will cover in our section *Trace, Lack, Desire*.

There are a host of other observations and categorizations that Lovejoy makes in his article, for example he links Schopenhauer to Cuvier’s extinction theories, and notes his subscription to the concept of *Generatio Aequivoca*. The significance of these observations will be covered later in this chapter, for now, we can note that Lovejoy was writing a ‘preliminary’ report on Schopenhauer’s theory of evolution. In his article,

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intellect ‘upward’ to apprehension of the Idea. Schopenhauer’s apprehension remains perceptual, while Plato reserves a grasp of the Ideas for intellection, a grasp that must pass through logical and mathematical reasoning before reaching enlightenment (Schopenhauer rejects the necessity of such a passage outright, as is made clear by his distinction between aesthetics and science). Most obviously, Schopenhauer extols the virtue of images for the ordinary intellect’s apprehension of Ideas; Plato undermines artistic images by placing them at several removes from reality and linking their power to appetite” (Foster, 1966, p.232). Although this is not entirely true as Schopenhauer also talks about the role of appetite in the contemplation of *ideen*, specifically talking about paintings of food or sex as aiding the beauty of a piece. It is also the case that there is not scholarly consensus on the fact that Plato thought reason was the only faculty which could access the forms, many note that the very word for ‘form,’ ‘εἶδος,’ means the ‘look’ of an object, and it has its root in ‘εἶδομαι’ -to see.

Lovejoy called for more investigation into Schopenhauer's evolutionary theory.<sup>73</sup> We intend to show how many of these disparate evolutionary beliefs are woven together by the theory of the *Ideen*.

*Evolution: How the Ideen are Born, Change, and Die*

Schopenhauer demands a cunning reader, and we are now approaching questions that he does not address directly at length, or that any scholar has approached, and so we will have to draw together tangential and partial statements in order to form our argument. To deal with his theory of evolution we will first be brought back to the problem of how representation opposes the articulation of the will; that is, if the will is the only force, why is our world brimming with every kind of conflict everywhere one looks? If the will desires to represent itself, to express itself in the world of representation, then there should be nothing stopping it, unless perhaps representation is an opposing force, or at least has a little inertia. This problem of conflict will first be dealt with from the point of view of intuitive representation. In the next section, entitled *Essential Discord*, we will explain it from the standpoint of the will. There is also a teleological aspect of evolution in Schopenhauer's philosophy, in the sense of a 'teleology of nature,' or 'meaning of life' that we covered in the last section on Kant. To conclude our treatment of his theory of evolution we will consider this teleology in *Trace, Lack, Desire*. To begin, we should examine what he says directly about the creation of an *Idee*: if we can determine how a new Platonic form could be born upon earth (for example, the form of 'Dolphin') then we will have made the most difficult step towards explaining evolution in his philosophy.

He actually says fairly directly how this process occurs very early on in the first volume of *The World as Will and Representation*, "If several phenomena [Erscheinungen] of will at the lower grades of its objectification, that is, in inorganic nature, come into conflict with one another, because each under the guidance of causality wants to take possession of existing matter, there arises from this conflict the phenomenon of the higher *Idee*. The higher *Idee* subdues all the less perfect phenomena

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<sup>73</sup> There has only been one author who has taken up this call since Lovejoy. In his paper 'Unintelligent Purposes. Schopenhauer's way over Kantian Teleology,' Nicoletta De Cian asks the question of whether Schopenhauer is an evolutionist and concludes, "he is neither creationist nor evolutionist.[...][he is] not yet Darwinian" (Illetterati, 2009, P.97). De Cian does not recognize the influence of Lamarck on Schopenhauer, and frames Schopenhauer's concept of the organic entirely within the Kantian discourse. Ultimately he ends with the conclusion that, "To recognize the will, thus conceived, the deep and common matrix of the whole nature means to recognize an essentially 'tensional' structure in nature: everything 'tends to' something" (2009, p.102). The whole point of this is that because of Schopenhauer's theory of the will, all representational objects will 'tend' towards certain ends without *intending* those ends. So, he is saying that even though we must assert a purposiveness in organic matter, the matter itself has no 'idea of the effect.' This thesis doesn't take Schopenhauer very far outside of the Kantian answer to the question of the organic.

previously existing, yet in such a way that it allows their essential nature to continue in a subordinate manner, since it takes up into itself an analogue [Analogen] of them"(WWR1 p.144-145). Unfortunately, this quote may bring up more question than answers. The first issue to clarify is his use of language that puts power struggles 'under the guidance of causality.' His manner of speaking implies that the will is forced to act in a specific, channeled way in the world of representation. Power struggles between Ideen over matter are a necessary element of the world governed solely by causality, and yet they are all supposed to illuminate the one will. This is the first aspect of the will that he covers in the first volume of *The World as Will and Representation*, that the will always wills something specific in every specific situation, while at the same time not deviating from its form.<sup>74</sup> This seeming paradox is the same one that we have identified has baffled scholars and is encapsulated in his quote, "the *phenomenon* of the will, in itself groundless, is yet subject to the law of necessity, that is to say, to the principle of sufficient reason" (WWR1 p.114). We see here that causality takes a measure of power over the will, and yet is supposed to be nothing but the expression of the will. We will confront this paradox in our section *Essential Discord*. Also, this concept that the will wills something specific in every specific situation will come back to us in *Trace, Lack, Desire*.

The second thing to note about the above quote is how exactly he envisions these conflicts. These conflicts between Ideen are not abstract or imperceptible, but are tied to his readings on evolution. "Moor-fowls appear equipped with extra long legs, extra long necks and extra long beaks, in short, the strangest shapes, in order to seek out reptiles in their marshes" (WN p.28). And so we could characterize these conflicts he is describing as the conflicts of every kind and variety that make themselves known to us in our daily experience of the world of representation, the oldest rivalries between cats and birds, gravity and granite, weeds and flowers. But let us be cautious, as we will come to see, while the world appears to be brimming with representational conflict, what would it mean for Ideen to be in conflict?

The essential question to elucidate here is what precisely is the nature of this conflict, such that it can give birth to an overarching Idee that dominates all the more common Ideen that are at war? Schopenhauer calls it a "victory" over, and a "contest" between lower phenomena (WWR1 p.145). This notion of the 'contest' between Ideen will become important in the next chapter as we describe Nietzsche's conception of Agon. In Schopenhauer, it is true that Ideen are not affected by the contingencies of representation, if a particular sloth loses an eye the form of sloth remains the same (WWR1 p.209). But it is also true that Ideen are *connected* to one another, and this is only seen through situational relationships in time and space. The Idee of sloth is

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<sup>74</sup> "These acts of will always have a ground or reason outside themselves as motives. Yet these motives never determine more than what I will at *this* time, in *this* place, in *these* circumstances, not *that* I will in general, or *what* I will in general," (WWR1 p.106)

*connected* to the Idee of tree (WN p.21).<sup>75</sup> Schopenhauer notes how the whole body of the sloth seems to be uncannily suitable to the task of climbing trees. This indicates not a contingency of the realm of representation, but an actual connection between the Idee of sloth and the Idee of tree, as it is a character of the form of sloth. This insight can allow us to further characterize this contention between Ideen. We can first say that this conflict is solely and only between Ideen, fighting with one another for control of the lower Ideen that are being dominated, for control over a scrap of space and time. Crucially, Schopenhauer never gives any indication that he was aware of coevolution.<sup>76</sup> And so these ‘struggles’ we observe between predator and prey for example are actually a *connection or relationship of power* between Ideen. The teeth of a wolf express a connection between the Idee of wolf and the Ideen of deer, moose, beaver and bison. But this connection is not necessarily a conflict, even if it involves exploitation. A conflict brings with it a crisis, an opportunity, and most Ideen are *not* in a constant state of crisis. For a conflict to take place between Ideen there must be some kind of imbalance of the natural state of things, something *unnatural*, or completely contingent must occur.

Furthermore, Schopenhauer says that during these conflicts the more primitive Ideen “have a prior right to that matter” (WWR1 p.146). So there is a sense of *establishment*, that things are *set*, and conflicts disrupt the current paradigm of the Ideen. This furthers our point that this conflict, that may give rise to a new Idee, is something extraordinary. The question of the ‘unnatural’ nature of this conflict can be approached from the perspective of Contemplation.

Concerning the contemplation of architecture Schopenhauer states,

Even at this low stage of the will’s objectivity, we see its inner nature revealing itself in discord; for, properly speaking, the conflict between gravity and rigidity is the sole aesthetic material of architecture; its problem is to make this conflict appear with perfect distinctness in many different ways. It solves this problem by depriving these indestructible forces of the shortest path to their satisfaction, and keeping them in suspense through a circuitous path; the conflict is thus prolonged, and the inexhaustible efforts of the two forces become visible in many different ways (WWR1 p.214).

What is it here precisely that causes the Ideen to present themselves? What is being done to these phenomena to make them articulate *more accurately* the essence of the

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<sup>75</sup> As Plotinus writes, “A quality is something persistently outside Reality” (II.6.2).

<sup>76</sup> Coevolution is the idea that two species can evolve in reaction to one another, thus having an ‘evolutionary struggle,’ for example grass began growing thicker and taller to avoid being eaten by grazers in prehistoric north America, who in turn developed Hypsodont teeth. It would seem likely that he would not be familiar with this concept as it was first discussed at length by Darwin 17 years after the death of Schopenhauer (Darwin, 1877).

will? The answer is emphasizing the state of conflict that already exists between these Ideen: *stressing* the representations to their extremes, making them *beautiful*.

This is going to be Schopenhauer's answer to how new Ideen are created. He frequently speaks of crystallization in relation to the boundary between the Idee of life and death (WWR1 p.118, 132, 136, 145, 148, 155, 182, 534). What is it about crystals that make them such an apt example of a boundary between Ideen? They are cases in which the extremes of gravity (high pressure) meet the extremes of heat (closer to the earth's core),<sup>77</sup> which meet the extremes of impenetrability of matter (stone).<sup>78</sup> Let us speculate that when a high intensity conflict occurs between Ideen, and is exacerbated to a breaking point, it is possible for pressure to build up in such a way that something latent escapes. Imagine as an analogy the force with which a teakettle boils, or a gun shoots. Steel sparks when struck because an irresolvable struggle takes place that demands something be released, set free. We must be precise here, what is it about the extreme or intense strata of a grade of the will's objectification that Schopenhauer privileges as capable of creation?

We can partially explain how new Ideen are born through the extremities of representation with Schopenhauer's concept that resistance increases the strength of a force, "In this constant struggle [between gravity and the magnet] the magnet grows even stronger, since the resistance stimulates it, so to speak, to greater exertion" (WWR1 p.146, 118). At first glance this seems to only explain how conflict can exacerbate itself. But if we take 'force' to be a reference to the will, which is constantly striving toward its goal, then perhaps an exacerbation in an extreme conflict can lead to a breakthrough by the will into the world of representation. Like a black hole, phenomena reach a point of such impossible tension that they rip open the fabric of representation, allowing the will to assert direct control over the situation.<sup>79</sup>

There is a clue that this speculation may be warranted, he called the birth of new Ideen "Generatio Aequivoca"<sup>80</sup> (WWR1 p.145). Further, on the same page he says, "I wish it had been possible for me by clearness of explanation to dispel the obscurity that

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<sup>77</sup> Schopenhauer actually has quite an extensive theory of the internal heat that different planets provide themselves in his essay *The Philosophy of Natural Sciences* (P&P Volume 2).

<sup>78</sup> Schopenhauer's scientific basis for this comes from Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon, who asserted that not only crystals, but also possibly fossils were created by extreme conditions of heat that existed on earth before earth was capable of sustaining life. (Buffon, 1778)

<sup>79</sup> To the credit of Lovejoy, he does note that extreme tension between 'forces' is required for life. His mistake is that he doesn't take the theory of Ideen into account, and restricts himself to merely noting that situations of extreme stress must have been necessary for life to emerge (Lovejoy, 1911, p.208-209). Because of this, he not only fails to understand that life is only one Idee among many, but furthermore that this is an instance of the will breaking into representation.

<sup>80</sup> The idea of life emerging due to spontaneous generation first appears in Aristotle's *History of Animals* Book V, but Schopenhauer probably picked up this notion from Bichat, as his name is commonly associated with this concept (P&P p.504). Schopenhauer is using this term to suit his own ends, as we will see he has a theory of life that loosely can be considered '*Generatio Aequivoca*,' but has a very specific context.

clings to the subject-matter of these thoughts. But I see quite well that the reader's own observations must help me a great deal, if I am not to remain uncomprehended or misunderstood" (WWR1 p.145). Both of these are instances where Schopenhauer points out the primacy of intuition in the faculty of knowledge. In particular the second example where he appeals to the reader's 'observation' could be an implication that there is a force that is different in essence from the world of representation, and that we are not capable of understanding conceptually what is at work in the birth of new *Ideen*. This is an example of Schopenhauer reflecting his philosophy into his method, how does one explain something that can only be grasped in a quasi-mystical experience? Some aspects of the nature of the *Ideen* can only be hinted at in the text, not made explicit.

### *Essential discord*

So let us then turn to the perspective of the will. It has been made clear that power struggles between *Ideen* are a phenomenon of the world of representation. However there *also* must be a non-spatial, non-temporal *kind* of contention in the unity of the will. Schopenhauer confirms this paradox, "Yet this strife itself [in the phenomenal realm] is only the revelation of that variance with itself that is essential to the will" [ist doch dieser Streit selbst nur die Offenbarung der dem Willen wesentlichen Entzweiung mit sich selbst] (WWR1 p.147). This inner contradiction in the unity of the will is expressed in representation, but it isn't expressed like a quality. This aspect of the will must be given special consideration in Schopenhauer's system, firstly because it is paradoxical to have an inner contention in a unity, secondly because, as we have asserted in the preceding section, it is only through this quality that new *Ideen* can emerge in the world of representation from their source in the will. In this sense the inner contradiction in the will itself must be the vehicle by which the will creates new *Ideen* that govern the temporal world of representation.

First let us discuss the will as a unity. Schopenhauer even implies that the one Will is actually one *Idee*, "the whole world with all its phenomena is the objectivity of the one and indivisible will, the *Idea*, which is related to all the other ideas as harmony is to the individual voices" (WWR1 p.158), which could mean that the will is in some intuitive sense intelligible. We remember that the will is unified yet *acts* to create a multiplicity of *Ideen*. In this way, the will has dominion over the *Ideen*, and thus the world of representations. This element of *power* in the relationship between the will and representation is reiterated over and over; so then why does he choose the analogy he does? If the will is 'harmony,' then it is the effect or what the fragments produce, not the immanent cause. This analogy makes little sense if it is supposedly a relationship of expression. The way out of this is to call upon his relation to Plato. If the will is

synonymous with Plato's form of the good, then we could say that the Ideen appear in multiplicity but in actuality are just the diffracted forms of one Idee. It is only by having an intuition of every Idee simultaneously that we could form an understanding of the whole (*Republic* 508d-e).

Schopenhauer repeats this concept, "The Idea is the unity that has fallen into plurality by virtue of the temporal and spatial form of our intuitive apprehension" (WWR1 p.234).<sup>81</sup> The most important part of this quote is that it reminds us that although Ideen are expressed in representation, they are, like the will, essentially non-temporal. The non-temporal nature of the will and Ideen is difficult to understand without an example, "man's inner nature, however, receives its complete expression above all through the connected series of his actions" (WWR1. p.275). Now, this is a more nuanced point of view than just saying Ideen are just completely *separate* from time. It implies that time is also essential to an Idee. This is why music is so important to Schopenhauer; it is not the notes but the rhythm, the silences, the breaks where there is nothing but the empty flow of time that is perceived, that is important in music for him. The experience of time, of *succession*, must be an essential element of an Idee. Succession, the fact that a silence comes directly after a triumphant march, or interrupts a punk rock melody, is absolutely inseparable from the Idee that is being expressed in the music. The reasoning here, is that contra Kant's thing-in-itself, Ideen have an essentially temporal component, despite being non-temporal. A *latent* or *compressed* time.<sup>82</sup> "The plant, however does not express the Idee of which it is the phenomenon all at once and through a simple manifestation, but in a succession of developments of its organs in time" (WWR1 p.155) in fact, as he says a few pages later, "all organisms express their Idea through a succession of developments" (WWR1 p.157). This means that the abundance of suffering which characterizes the world of representation is in fact limited to this world. The truth is that there is nothing at all blocking the will from expressing itself. The image of discordance or struggle in the world of representation is an *accurate temporal expression of an essentially non-temporal will*.<sup>83</sup> This would explain why there have been species of dinosaurs before there was man. Stegosaurus may have been essential for the will to progress further in this temporal realm, even though it is non-temporal, like a motif that is only found in the first movement of a symphony.

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<sup>81</sup> We can see how this kind of quote would map nicely onto Plato's theory of forms, with the will being the Idee of the good, which splinters into a multitude of different forms. He even gives reasoning why "absolute Good" is better represented by 'will' (WWR1 p.362). Of course, as Frank White explains, "Given his views on the nature of the will, together with his belief that Ideas are the "immediate and adequate" objectifications of the will, it is obvious why Schopenhauer would not want an Idea of good to enter into his scheme of things, since the will would then have to be seen as manifesting itself in a predominantly good world" (White, 1999, p.138)

<sup>82</sup> The essence of time "is nothing more than the very form of the principle of sufficient reason," (WWR1 p.8). He equates himself from Kant here by considering space is the form of the outer sense and "Time is primarily the form of the inner sense"(WWR2 p.35); "Time is nothing other than the form of the inner sense" (CPR A33 B50).

<sup>83</sup> Kant actually gives us a precursor of this concept when he states that teleological causes contradict one another (COJ p.218).

Music is an analogy used repeatedly to explain the fundamental concepts of Schopenhauer's system; he will use it to explain the nature of the will at the most obscure points of his philosophy. The lowest notes are connected with the highest in harmony, and he says this is an analogue of how the lowest *Ideen*, such as gravity, fight with the highest for the same matter (WWR2 p.448). Music is such a fantastic analogy, according to Schopenhauer, because it does not exhibit the *Ideen*, but the will itself, and thus directly affects the individual will of the listeners, who supposedly ultimately desire nothing but to have this will represented to them.

Music presents the *Ideen*, *in succession, in time*. It is only in this harmony of *Ideen*, in which they are all composed together in succession that the will comes close to being confronted with itself. This means when a conflict between *Ideen* does occur, it only appears as conflict or tension from our point of view from within space and time. "it must be possible to act upon things from inside, instead of from outside, as is usual; that it must be possible for phenomenon to act upon phenomenon by means of that being-in-itself, which is one and the same in all phenomena" (WN p.76). This conflict is no conflict at all, but something like the movement from tension to resolution in a piece of music, the existence of dissonance in music. Far from being a struggle, both the moment of discordance and the moment of resolution are inseparable from the *Idee* that is being expressed in the music, everything is reintegrated into the unity of the will. "tragic myth in particular must convince us that even the ugly and disharmonious is an artistic game which the Will, in the eternal fullness of its delight, plays with itself" (BOT p.113).

### *Trace, Lack, Desire*

At this point we can deepen our discussion of evolution. We have seen how new *Ideen* can come about through tension in the realm of representation, and through a compressed succession from the point of view of the will. However there should still be a problem for us. We have yet to get rid of the element of contingency in our analysis of *Ideen*. If as the *Ideen* unfold throughout time they are only seeming to conflict while actually expressing the inner antagonism of the will through this conflict, then shouldn't there be some kind of order or purpose to these conflicts? To answer this question we will analyze how Lamarck influenced Schopenhauer.

One of the most mysterious claims that Schopenhauer makes is that, "in everything less perfect there must be seen the trace, outline, plan of the next more perfect thing" (WWR1 p.144). This trace, this outline *must* be some direct interference by the will into the world of representation, such as we mentioned earlier. This is because the will is striving to attain its own representation, "The will desires to speak" (WWR1

p.222). If Ideen are valued higher or lower based on their accuracy at representing the will then any kind of line or necessary sequence latent in an Idee must indicate toward a fuller expression of the will. Therefore every specific Idee and representation must be in some sense a failed, or restricted attempt of the will at reaching its goal.<sup>84</sup>

In a section on syllogism Schopenhauer says, "It must be borne in mind that the syllogism consists in the line of thought itself. The words and propositions by which it is expressed indicate merely the trace of it left behind" (WWR2 p.109). As we recall, for Kant, the syllogism ultimately ended in the unconditioned, the absolute, "the being of all beings" (CPR A336 B393) that is the immanent cause of all representation. For Schopenhauer this is the will. The syllogistic birth line will eventually lead to the one Idee of the will in a necessary way. Because of this necessity, Schopenhauer posits that there is an outline or a trace of the next more perfect Idea in every Idea, again perfect in the Spinozistic sense, of a more adequate representation of the substance or will.

This teleology of the will actually has a correspondent in the world of representation: *Desire* (WWR2 p.319). "All willing springs from lack, from deficiency, and thus from suffering" (WWR1 p.196). We will now show how this lack is actually the same things as the trace of the higher Idee. We remember that victory, the birth of a new Idee, is accompanied by a feeling of pleasure (WWR1 p.146). Desire in Schopenhauer springs out of the concept that everything, even inorganic beings, struggle to preserve their own existence (WWR1 P.313). Thus the notion of suffering due to a lack of must not come from the world of representation, or willing would be reduced to mere preservation. This is clearly a point where the will interacts with representation, what is desired, and lacking, is the higher Idee.

Lamarck heavily influences Schopenhauer's concept of desire. Schopenhauer posits that the Idee of an organ exists before the organ itself, in the form of a desire and a lack:

In fact every organ must be looked upon as the expression of a universal manifestation of the will, i.e. of one made once and for all, of a fixed longing, an act of volition proceeding, not from the individual, but from the species. Every animal form is a longing of the will to live which is roused by circumstances; for instance, the will is seized with a longing to live on trees, to hang on their branches, to devour their leaves, without contention with other animals and without ever touching the ground: this longing presents itself throughout endless time in the form (or Platonic Idea) of the sloth. [...] This purpose must have preceded the animal's existence (WN

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<sup>84</sup> Schopenhauer takes his teleological view of the universe to absurd extremes, even asserting that the alignment of the planets is not an act of chance, but an indication of the strivings of the will (P&P p.130).

p.21-22).<sup>85</sup>

So we see first of all that he is attributing desire not to individuals but to the species, this means the *Idee*, which in turn means that desire ultimately stems from the will. This is a radical conception; it allows him to assert that even though desires seem to be contingent upon their environment, their source is in the will, "Only the appearing, the becoming visible, in such a place and at such a time, is brought about by the cause, and is to that extent dependent on it, but not the whole of the phenomenon, not its inner nature. This is the will itself, to which the principle of sufficient reason has no application, and which is therefore groundless. Nothing in the world has a cause of its existence absolutely and generally, but only a cause from which it exists precisely here and now" (WWR1 p.138). Furthermore, by ascribing desire to the species and not to the individual Schopenhauer has made desire responsible for all changes in the species. This combination of desire and evolution was inspired by Lamarck, who Schopenhauer refers to in an extremely rare display of praise as: "the Immortal de Lamarck" (WN p.26).

The kernel of Lamarck's theory is that, "The frequent use of any organ, when confirmed by habit, increases the functions of that organ, leads to its development and endows it with a size and power that it does not possess in animals which exercise it less" (ZP p.119). He gives several examples, stating that:

Suppose, for instance, that a seed of one of the meadow grasses in question is transported to an elevated place on a dry, barren and stony plot much exposed to the winds, and is there left to germinate; if the plant can live in such a place, it will always be badly nourished, and if the individuals reproduced from it continue to exist in this bad environment, there will result a race fundamentally different from that which lives in the meadows and from which it originated. The individuals of this new race will have small and meagre parts; some of their organs will have developed more than others, and will then be of unusual proportions (ZP p.109).

In this example we see that he is privileging the environment of the species that stimulates it to different habits rather than an activity of the species itself. But this is not always the case, for example, "Snakes, however, have adopted the habit of crawling on the ground and hiding in the grass; so that their body, as a result of continually repeated efforts at elongation for the purpose of passing through narrow spaces, has acquired a considerable length, quite out of proportion to its size" (ZP p.117). In this passage he speaks more as if there is a choice or activity of the species itself that causes the

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<sup>85</sup> "Therefore the parts of the body must correspond completely to the chief demands and desires by which the will manifests itself they must be the visible expression of these desires. Teeth, gullet, and intestinal canal are objectified hunger; the genitals are objectified sexual impulse grasping hands and nimble feet correspond to the more indirect strivings of the will, which they represent (WWR1 p.108; WWR2 p. 259; WN p.31).

development of organs. The same is true in this passage, "Every new need, necessitating new activities for its satisfaction, requires the animal, either to make more frequent use of some of its parts which it previously used less, and thus greatly to develop and enlarge them; or else to make use of entirely new parts, to which the needs have imperceptibly given birth by efforts of its inner feeling" (ZP p.112). So we see that there is perhaps a struggle between environmental factors and the activity of the organism in Lamarck's work, but in every case the development of a new organ is linked with the habits or the desire of the species.

Schopenhauer has only a minor criticism of this schematic, stating, "Lamarck could not conceive of his construction of living beings otherwise than in time, through succession" (WN p.27). What Schopenhauer is implying is that these desires are not arbitrary or contingent upon their environments, but follow the trace left by the will. They originate from outside of time and break onto the scene of representation spontaneously in situations of enormous stress. In this way Schopenhauer is going to attempt to describe how it is that animals are seemingly 'miraculously' well suited for their environments (WN p.28).<sup>86</sup> The will *leads* all *Ideen* into conflict with one another, in order to produce a higher *Idee* that will take power over them. Each step leads us to something more perfect, in the Spinozian sense,<sup>87</sup> that is, something more representative of the substance, or will's essence. Schopenhauer thinks we cannot explain away species behavior with the schematic of causality alone, we must resort to a governing will and its *Ideen*. The other key is that the concept of a next more perfect thing means something specific in every situation. The next more perfect thing from an chicken egg is a chicken, the next more perfect thing is a matter of *necessary* succession, in the sense that we discussed in the section *Essential Discord*. This means that even seemingly contingent events such as the alignment of the planets are actually an expression of the teleology of the will. This is why Schopenhauer adheres so strictly to determinism.

### *Schopenhauerian Complexity*

At this point we have thoroughly discussed the connection between evolution and the philosophy of Schopenhauer. We have developed a basis for talking about a

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<sup>86</sup> We can note that he makes a subtle jab at Plato, asserting that only timid, herbivorous animals have long intestine (WN p.28), whereas Plato asserted that we were given long intestine in order to be able to study philosophy for long periods of time without having to find food (Timaeus 73A).

<sup>87</sup> For Schopenhauer the birth of an *Idee*, or the movement of causality to a more adequate representation of the will, is accompanied by a feeling of pleasure (p.146 WWR1). Spinoza implies the same, "III. Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less perfection" (in 'definitions of the emotions *ethics*). Spinoza is the one influence that Schopenhauer is very reticent to admit to. Possibly because he was anti-Semitic (p.232 WWR1).

Schopenhauerian theory of organization, which we will connect to Nietzsche in the next chapter. We can now turn to Schopenhauer's assessment of the status of the organic.

A representation always wills a particular thing in a particular situation; an object always represents the will according to its own conditions and bearings. This implies that Ideen are attracted to connect with one another, but he also claims that once we reach the organic Ideen that they will also *avoid* Ideen (WN p.41). This notion of avoidance being a primary quality of living matter is another point of agreement with Lamarck. Lamarck posits, "It is known that irritability is a faculty essential to the parts or to certain parts of animals, and that it is never suspended or annihilated so long as the animal is alive and the part possessing it has suffered no injury. Its effect is seen in a contraction which takes place instantly throughout the irritable part on contact with a foreign body" (ZP p.52). Schopenhauer uses this same word 'irritability,' for the same concept, "The capacity for reacting to stimulus" and calls it a direct act of will into the world of representation (WWR2 p.248). All of this can be understood under the directive of the living body to *avoid* the external world's intrusions upon it.

Schopenhauer takes this concept much further than Lamarck, even asserting, "Natural phenomena therefore become proportionately less easy to comprehend, the more distinctly the will manifests in them, i.e. the higher they stand on the scale of beings; [...] (WN p.58). This indicates that there is some relationship between knowledge and the living being which is not being articulated, namely, that the living being avoids being known. Schopenhauer says in the second volume, "And just because the plant is without knowledge, it ostentatiously displays its organs of generation in complete innocence: it knows nothing of them. On the other hand, as soon as knowledge appears in the series of beings, the genitals are shifted to a concealed spot" (WWR2 p.295). This shows us that as Ideen move upwards in the hierarchy, the great line of thought which will lead to the Idee of the will, the will actually conceals its nature from knowledge. The movement of the Ideen is a "direction inward" (WWR2 p.318), beginning with the lowest, most common, obvious, and the largest forces in the universe, and complicating itself into the smaller, more rare, and more nuanced forces. The only method of resolving a conflict is to escape the conflict, to avoid it. At each of these higher orders, as the Ideen grow in complexity and move inward, they become less accessible to knowledge, both intuitive and conceptual.<sup>88</sup>

Schopenhauer notes that representation is used to serve the "now complicated" ends of the will (WWR1 p.176). This is an addition to the Kantian notion of an organism as an end. So where does complication arise? Why does Schopenhauer stress this? The will is uncomplicated because it has no ends, just boundless desire. So this complication

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<sup>88</sup> The lack of knowledge is how Eugene Thacker characterizes the Schopenhauerian organism, "In short, it would seem that the life common to all living beings is ultimately enigmatic and inaccessible to thought" (Thacker, 2011, p.14).

can only come from the world of representation. These complications exist because of an organism's specific connections to its environment, in the same sense that a will wills something particular in its particular situation, which again means that Ideen pursue and avoid one another. "the world as representation, however feeble, dull, and dimly dawning this first and lowest specimen of it may be. Yet it is marked more and more distinctly, more and more widely and deeply, in proportion as the brain is more and more perfectly produced in the ascending series of animal organizations. But this enhancement of brain-development, and hence of the intellect and of the clearness of the representation, at each of these ever higher stages, is brought about by the ever-increasing and more complicated needs of these phenomena of the will" (WWR2 p.279). So as we move up the hierarchy of Ideen, we see a *necessary* increase in complexity.

This is another concept he is receiving from Lamarck, who writes, "vital energy increases in proportion to complexity of organization" (ZP p.48). Lamarck famously suggested that we begin categorizing and ranking life forms in terms of their complexity, as this was the only natural method of organization:

Meanwhile I shall show that nature, by giving existence in the course of long periods of time to all the animals and plants, has really formed a true scale in each of these kingdoms as regards the increasing complexity of organization; but that the gradations in this scale, which we are bound to recognize when we deal with objects according to their natural affinities, are only perceptible in the main groups of the general series, and not in the species or even in the genera. This fact arises from the extreme diversity of conditions in which the various races of animals and plants exist; for these conditions have no relation to the increasing complexity of organization, as I shall show; but they produce anomalies or deviations in the external shape and characters which could not have been brought about solely by the growing complexity of organization (ZP p.58).

There was a literal drive towards complexity for Lamarck called the "pouvoir de la vie", and it was completely distinct to what is commonly called 'the adaptive force,' which he called "L'influence des circonstances". One force is internal, the other external.

"If the factor which is incessantly working towards complicating organization were the only one which had any influence on the shape and organs of animals, the growing complexity of organization would everywhere be very regular. But it is not; nature is forced to submit her works to the influence of their environment, and this environment everywhere produces variations in them. This is the special factor which occasionally produces in the course of the degradation that we are about to exemplify, the often curious deviations that may be observed in the progression" (ZP p.69). These are some

of the more famous Lamarckian doctrines, the fact that he is identifying vital force as a protective, complexifying power is echoed in Schopenhauer.

We must bring this point of the necessary complexifying nature of life into our discussion of Schopenhauer. We recall that in a human many *Ideen* are subsumed under a singular *Idee*, and the higher an *Idee* is in the hierarchy, the more relations between *Ideen* it must subsume under itself. Lower *Ideen* are simpler in the sense that they do not have as many components, but the higher *Idee* that subsumes the lower *Ideen* also subsume their relations, and therefore the higher the *Idee* is, the more relations and parts have been subsumed under it, thus making it more complicated.

Moreover we can again note the agreement here with Lamarck. If we recall that each of these relationships between *Ideen* was expressed in a trace, that is, the *Idee* was expressed before the organ. The stomach is the manifest *Idee* of digestion, brain is the manifest *Idee* of knowledge (WWR2 p.259). Then we can say that each relation in representation is accompanied by a desire, which is a lack, a suffering, and so as an *Idee* subsumes other *Ideen* and complexifies itself, it also increases its capacity for suffering.

"What suffers always conceals itself" (WWR1 p.325). With this, Schopenhauer implies the movement toward the fulfilling of a desire, the striving towards a higher *Idee*. And so we can speculate that the movement of evolutionary/teleological desire toward higher *Ideen* is one marked by an increase in depth, intricacy, sublimity, but also by neurosis, knotted vexation, and distress.

Thus the more complicated the organization becomes in the ascending series of animals, the more manifold do its needs become, and the more varied and specially determined the objects capable of satisfying them, consequently the more tortuous and lengthy the paths for arriving at these, which must now all be known and found (WWR2 p.205).

What does this language of 'tortuous lengthy paths' remind us of? Schopenhauer makes an analogy between the art of architecture and the lower *Ideen*, the low bass notes of the will's objectification, and how these lower *Ideen* become distinct for intuitive intelligence through the art of architecture. "[Architecture] solves this problem [how to make the essential discord of the will appear for perception] by depriving [lack, desire, suffering] these indestructible forces of the shortest [kürzesten] path to their satisfaction, and keeping them in suspense through a circuitous path [umweg]: the conflict is prolonged, and the inexhaustible efforts of the two forces become visible in many different ways" (WWR1 p.214). What we are suggesting here is that an *Ideen* moves up in the hierarchy it seeks more and more conflict with other *Ideen*, and attempts to take possession of other *Ideen* at an exponential rate. It attempts to create situations of tension whereby it can overthrow an *Ideen* and reorganize all the *Ideen* under it. This is the sense in which he means, "Thus the more complicated its organization became through higher

development, the more manifold and specially determined became its needs; consequently, the more difficult and dependent on opportunity became the procuring of what satisfies them" (WWR2 p.279). This notion of opportunity is pregnant with meaning. An opportunity is a change in circumstances where the state of things is irregular.

### *Schopenhauer on Life: Parts and Whole*

At this juncture we have completed our discussion of the philosophical context in which Schopenhauer situates the question of life. We have described in detail how reality is organized according to a Schopenhauerian Philosophy, how it flows and functions. We are now finally able to conclude our study of Schopenhauer with a direct elaboration of his theory of the organic and its consequences. We will begin our discussion with the relationship between parts and whole.

In the preface to *The World as Will and Representation V.1* Schopenhauer describes the "organic, i.e. of such a kind that every part supports the whole just as much as it is supported by the whole" (WWR1 p.xii). While this statement contains echoes of Kant's question about the whole's relation to its parts, we are operating in a different context with Schopenhauer, because the unity that is problematic for Kant is substituted for the Idee in Schopenhauer's philosophy. We recall the discussion of how in an extreme conflict a new Idee can emerge that subordinates all of the conflicting elements to itself. This is the relationship between a whole and its parts for Schopenhauer. They are mutually supportive and yet mutually in conflict. Gravity is continually attempting to disassemble the Ideen higher than it, despite being the supporting foundation that the higher Ideen are built upon. "Although these lower Ideas have been brought into subjection, they still constantly strive to reach an independent and complete expression of their inner nature" (WWR1 p.127).

In the 25 years between the publication of the first and second volume of *The World as Will and Representation* Schopenhauer claims his views remained the same in every respect, just expressed differently. Here we are forced to criticize his lack of reflection, for while much did stay the same he changed his fundamental position on knowledge of the will. The major change between volumes is that we can no longer know the thing-in-itself in the second volume, but are given an immediate knowledge of our own individual will as a consolation prize. In addition one of the minor changes concerns a part's relation to its whole in an organic being, "The astonished admiration that usually seizes us when we contemplate the endless appropriateness in the structure of organic beings, rests at bottom on the certainly natural yet false assumption that that agreement or harmony of the parts with one another, with the whole of the organism, and with its aims in the external world, as we comprehend and judge of it by means of knowledge,

and thus on the path of the representation, has also come into being on the same path; hence that, as it exists for the intellect, it was also brought about through the intellect” (WWR2 p.327).

And so we see that Schopenhauer pulls back here from the ability of our intellect to recognize the organic. He is going to use this move of ignorance to retract his statements he made in Volume 1, “The liver will do nothing more than secrete bile for the service of digestion; in fact, it exists merely for this purpose, and every other part is just the same. So also the workers will do nothing more than collect honey, separate wax, and build cells for the brood of the queen; the drones will do nothing more than fertilize, the queen nothing more than lay eggs. Thus all the parts work merely for the continued existence of the whole, which alone is the unconditional aim or end, exactly like the parts of the organism” (WWR2 p.345).

So we find that when a higher Idee is born, it takes power over the lower Ideen, which are bent to its will. There is no more ‘mutual support,’ only domination and subservience, organization under the higher Idee. This actually makes his theory more consistent, it leaves room for the lower forces to struggle in bringing the higher ones down, as long as they do the work that the higher forces demand. As an example, gravity makes constant pitiful attempts to crush and disassemble our bodies, but our bodies utilize these attempts to digest food, and walk.

We should recall in this discussion, that each organ is its own Idee (WN p.13) which leads us to the strange notion that every organ at some point was the governing Idee and existed only for its own purpose, which Schopenhauer confirms with the example of how in some organisms certain organs can continue to function after the dominating organ, the brain, has been destroyed (WN p.13). We should be reminded of the Lamarckian concept that Schopenhauer ascribes to, of the Idee of an organ existing as desire before the organ itself is actualized (WWR2 p.259).

A careful reader will notice here that it is impossible to distinguish whether the part or the whole is in the position of domination unless a *purpose* is ascribed to the action, For just as an instinct is an action, resembling one according to a concept of purpose, yet entirely without such concept, so are all formation and growth in nature like that which is according to a concept of purpose, and yet entirely without this. In outer as well as in inner teleology of nature, what we must think of as means and end is everywhere only the phenomenon of the unity of the one will so far in agreement with itself, which has broken up into space and time for our mode of cognition (WWR1 P.161).

This is clearly a nod to Kant's treatment of the organic question; 'concept of purpose' is the same notion as 'Idea of effect.'<sup>89</sup> Schopenhauer will continue on to describe how the variance in purposes between individuals expresses the inner discord in the unity of the will, which we have covered in our section on *Essential Discord*. Cats torture birds like they were medieval inquisitors and yet do no harm to the Idee 'bird,' which unconscious instinct ensures the survival of.

### *Metaphysics*

We will now formulate a definition of the organic in Schopenhauer's philosophy. As Hanna says, "Schopenhauer does not believe that the vital force, that which moves living organisms to respond to stimuli and to act voluntarily, is reducible to other, more basic natural forces. The vital force, further differentiated into the character of each plant and animal species and the individual character of each human being, is ontologically distinct from chemical and physical forces" (Hannan, 2009, p.7). The name of this vital force is 'The Will to Live, and for Schopenhauer it is a unified thing that is present in all life (WN p.34). Our goal is to show that this will to live is in fact an Idee, which is why it is not reducible to other forces, "For everything in nature there is something for which no ground can be assigned, for which no explanation is possible, and no further cause is to be sought" (WWR1 p.124). We should infer that what is common between the essences, or Ideen behind representations, is the latent trace of a higher Idee. So if there is a definite Idee of the organic, then there must be a way of describing the difference between the organic and the inorganic for our understanding. "In fact, the boundary between the organic and the inorganic is the most sharply drawn in the whole of nature, and is probably the only one admitting of no transitions, so that here the saying *Natura non facit saltus* ['Nature makes no jumps' - Aristotle] seems to meet with an exception. Although many crystallizations display an external form resembling the vegetable [trace], yet even between the smallest lichen, the lowest fungus, and everything inorganic there remains a fundamental and essential difference. In the inorganic body the essential and permanent element, that on which its identity and integrity rest, is the material, is matter; the inessential and changeable, on the other hand, is the form. With the organic body the case is the very opposite; for its life, in other words its existence as something organic, consists simply in the constant change of the material with persistence of the form; thus its essence and identity lie in the form alone. [...] The organic body has its continued existence precisely through incessant movement and the constant reception of external

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<sup>89</sup> It is worth noting that Schopenhauer here lives up to his reputation as a philosopher of the unconscious: organisms acting as though they know, while lacking conceptual knowledge is very close to the Lacanian definition of the unconscious, "They do not know that they know".

influences. As soon as these cease, and movement in it comes to a standstill, it is dead” (WWR2 p.296 Brackets added, see also WN p.56)

We are told that the inorganic is essentially matter and inessentially form and that the organic is the reverse. What are the implications of this? We should recall what Schopenhauer’s definition of matter was, causality, representation, a force seemingly alien to the will. There is now something that asserts itself against and resists the endless change and turmoil of the chain of causality, in order to actively preserve its ‘form.’ Matter is not formless outside of organic life, but now there is something that arrests this form, an activity that doesn’t *impose* form, but preserves it. This activity must come from another source outside of representation, which always must be the will. Now we can answer the question posed earlier about how matter resists the will. The organic is the most extreme example of the will breaking into the world of representation. This occurs in such a way that it challenges causality, and therefore matter itself. The organic makes apparent the deficiencies in the casual or mechanical method of explaining nature because the organic is itself a different kind of causality.

If we recall Kant’s argument in the *Critique of Judgment*, it roughly agrees with the general principles of Schopenhauer’s stance. The organic thing defies physical, causal, experiential explanation. And so we are forced to assert a metaphysical cause for the organic. “Wherever explanation of the physical comes to an end, it is met by the metaphysical” (WN p.15). For Schopenhauer, a rock’s entire being is subject to the principle of sufficient reason to the laws that govern matter, whereas as soon as life comes on the scene we have a more radical breakthrough of the will into the world of representation. Life has causes behind it that cannot be explained through this principle of causality, but must be considered as direct acts of the will (WWR1 p.158).<sup>90</sup> We should ensure clarity of one point our discussion, that while life is a very distinct, complex, large, and powerful *Idee*, it is only one *Idee* among others. Also we should recall the mechanics of *Ideen*: they are foundations, limits to thought, at which point we can go no further, in the sense that Kant expounded: “We have a natural tendency to explain, whenever possible, every natural phenomenon mechanically, doubtless because mechanics calls in the assistance of the fewest original, and therefore inexplicable, forces” (WWR2 p.301). Every *Idee* has something that is inexplicable at its center, not something that requires no explanation, but according to Kant, something that *demand*s explanation, and yet hides from us.

The way that Schopenhauer characterizes the *Idee* of life, the will-to-live, is by saying that now form is the essential element of an organic representation. If form becomes essential it means that previous to this point mechanism had been the only

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<sup>90</sup> To add further proof, Schopenhauer rails against, “mechanical physiologists who obstinately try to explain the whole of life and all the functions of the organism from the ‘form and combination’ of its component parts” (WWR1 p.142). We also have another Kantian influence on this point, for Kant this teleological kind of causality is a form giving power, it is separate from the material. the upshot of this is that The form of the organism must indicate its purposiveness, this is a clearly Lamarckian idea. Kant separates between this power of formation and matter itself, saying it would be impossible to ascribe this power to matter itself (COJ P.202).

kind of causality on the scene, this can be seen in the first quote in our section on *Evolution: How Ideen are Born, Change, and Die*. Again, this shows *not* that there was no form to matter before life, he notes that the form of matter gives matter what we view as its essence (WWR2 p.42), but every form, such as a crystal for example, could only be formed by chance, the contingency of mechanistic world. Now it is the case that *desire* enters into the realm of representation, which allows for the possibility of evolution (Lamarck), remembering that all desire is the desire of the will.

While praising Lamarck, Schopenhauer critiques his attachment to physics. Lamarck's primary animal, without organs or qualities, that then gives rise to all the definite animals with definite qualities, is precisely the will to live. The only difference, Schopenhauer says, is that the primary animal is theorized to have been a physical entity, whereas the will to live is outside of time and space, and is thus metaphysical (WN p.28). For Lamarck the primary animal was a material thing, for Schopenhauer it is an almost magical breakthrough of will into representation, an *Idee* that is a quantum leap beyond all other *Ideen* that had so far appeared. Schopenhauer makes further passing remarks on the necessity of a metaphysical principle for life in the second volume of *The World as Will and Representation* (WWR2 p.469, 471), that places him firmly in the vitalist camp.

Schopenhauer believes that the emergence of life can be traced back to a certain epoch in time. Drawing on his reading of Cuvier, he asserts that, "it seems that the earth was once in a state of intense heat and fusion and in fact still is, since only its surface has cooled and hardened" (P&P p.128). It is this extreme of tension and stress that must have given rise to life. However, it must also be asserted that these conditions *do not exist anymore*. In terms of the larger, inorganic forces, the conflicts have more or less settled. This adds something to his theory of evolution, that things are becoming smaller and smaller, more concerned with nuance and complexity. "When, in order to enjoy looking at the incunabula of the globe, I contemplate a piece of granite freshly broken off, I cannot possibly believe that this primary rock could have originated in any way through fusion and crystallization in a dry manner, or again through sublimation, and as little through precipitation; but it seems to me that it must have come about by a chemical process of an entirely different kind which now no longer takes place. The notion of a rapid and simultaneous combustion of a mixture of metals and metalloids combined with the elective affinity of the products of this combustion which operates at once this comes nearest to my conception of the matter" (P&P p.149). This notion, that the laws that govern our universe are not eternal but have *developed*, just like an organism, is one of Schopenhauer's most radical theories.

Now we come to the point where we can finally answer the question that Nietzsche posed. As we have stated, desire is a lack that attempts to follow the trace of the will towards a more perfect representation of the will. However desire also always presupposes a subject and object; this is the very form of representation (WWR2 p.205).

Representation as such only emerges with the organic (WWR2 P.204, 275-6). The organic Idee *irritates* the will, "stirs" and "agitates" it (WWR2 p.204). Life itself is the 'border of individuation' between the will and representation, the moment of the creation of the latter. The thought that representation originates at the same time as the organism is the only justification for quotes such as this: "The *organism* is the will itself, embodied will, in other words, *will* objectively perceived in the brain" (WWR2 p.216 also WWR1 p.275). Or "Whoever has penetrated the meaning of this rather difficult discussion, will now properly understand Kant's doctrine that both the suitability of the organic and the conformity to law of the inorganic are brought into nature first by our understanding; hence both belong to phenomena, not thing in itself" (WWR1 p.157).<sup>91</sup>

Eugene Thacker answers the Schopenhauerian question of the organic in the same context. Saying that in order for the question of life to be answered by Schopenhauer, "This split between phenomena and noumena can only be overcome if it is in some way collapsed – or rendered continuous" (Thacker, 2011 p.14). Further, he asserts that, "The Will-to-Life is, then, Schopenhauer's attempt to overcome the Kantian split by asserting a subtractive continuity, a continuity paradoxically driven by negation" (2011, p.19). This 'Kantian split' that he is referring to is the boundary between noumenon and phenomenon, will and representation. Thacker believes Schopenhauer does not move beyond Kant, and asserts that there is an unknowable 'something' that we must posit as a vital force in life, and yet always must remain beyond our scope of understanding. This is what Thacker means by 'subtractive continuity;' 'driven by negation.'

We have now concluded our study of Schopenhauer. We have gone beyond the scant scholarship that exists and reconstructed his philosophical system based upon the themes of organization and the organic. We have demonstrated how the forces of the universe are identified as 'Ideen,' which stand between the will and representation, we have explained the ontological status of these Ideen and recounted how they can change throughout time. Using this theory of organization we have explained the position of the organism within Schopenhauer's system. In the next section we will move to How Nietzsche initially thinks about the organism in some of his first philosophical fragments. We will see how close the problems he was working with are to the problems Schopenhauer attempted to solve. In the next chapter we will continue this investigation into the connections between the two philosophers' theories of organization.

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<sup>91</sup> See also: "I now then employ to indicate the sphere to which knowledge presents itself as belonging, when considered, not as is usual from the inside, but realistically, from an outside standpoint of itself, as if it were something foreign: that is, when we gain the objective view for it, which is so extremely important in order to complete the subjective one. We find that knowledge then presents itself as the mediator of motives, i.e. of the action of causality upon beings endowed with intellect in other words, as that which receives the changes from the outside upon which the inside must follow, as that which acts as a mediator between both. Now this narrow line hovers the world as representation that is to say, the whole corporeal world" (WN p.46-47)

## Nietzsche

### *Concept of the Organic Since Kant*

At this point we can return for a more detailed look at Nietzsche's 1868 plan for a doctoral dissertation that we mentioned in the last chapter. We have covered the Kantian and Schopenhauerian theories of the organic, so let us see how Nietzsche reacts to them.

These notes can be read as a deadlock between Kant and Schopenhauer. Kevin Hill posits that these notes are attempts to solve a formal problem with teleology (2003, p.74), and that Kant offered an opportunity to move beyond Schopenhauer in light of Darwin. That is, to assert that purposiveness characteristic of organisms could have come about through chance, and is not necessarily an indicator of vitalism. It is true that near the beginning of these notes Nietzsche concentrates on the idea that the purposiveness that characterizes organisms could come about by chance. But we will take a more investigative approach to analyzing these notes. We are more concerned with what problems he is struggling with than with what problems he set out to solve. While this idea that the life could have emerged through random events is important, it is a theme that he will come to repeat with less and less certainty throughout these notes.

We actually claim the reverse about the general content of these notes; it seems to us that Nietzsche is using Schopenhauer to reject Kant. Even though Nietzsche uses many of the terms Kant used: "end" and "purpose"[*Zweck*; or 'purposiveness': *Zweckmässigkeit*], we believe that Nietzsche is using Schopenhauer to overcome the restrictions of Kant's theories, and is struggling to do so.<sup>92</sup> The Kantian standpoint that "we must scrupulously and modestly restrict ourselves to the term that expresses just as much as we know, and no more - namely an end of nature" (COJ p.210) creates a lot of friction with the notes Nietzsche made concerning Schopenhauer in 1867. If we were to engage in a psychological reading of Kant, we could turn to a passage where he states, "Indeed, so certain is it, that we may confidently assert that it is absurd for human beings even to entertain any thought of so doing or any hope that maybe another Newton may some day arise" (COJ p.228). Kant is giving a vehement refutation of the thinker who tries to know knowledge that is denied to him. This reflects profoundly on Kant's desires, the underlying morality in his writings that is so antithetical to Nietzsche's style, we saw

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<sup>92</sup> We also disagree with Thomas Nawrath Paderborn when he says, "The concrete aim was to prove that metaphysics belongs to the realm of psychological needs or the arts" (Nawrath, 2010). This was most likely a reading in light of later writings. We want to assert that philosophy at this point is superior to the arts, and that it gets downgraded once he meets Wagner. We think that the primary aim of the dissertation plans was to attack Kantian restrictions placed upon the understanding, not philosophy in general.

at the beginning of this chapter him praising Schopenhauer for committing precisely this act of hubris.

Perhaps the most frequent motif throughout these notes is the constant restriction Nietzsche places on his own speculation. He is perpetually reminding himself that the scope of knowledge is limited to human analogy (Swift, 2005, p.95, 96, 99). The frequency of this reminder is because Nietzsche's line of thought is epistemological: he asks how we can know life. Nietzsche ultimately ends up questioning the nature of knowledge, such that things appear to us as purposeful or not.<sup>93</sup>

In a moment of clarity he recognizes that ultimately, there are two human standpoints here. He continues to oscillate between them, but he has a reason for his wavering. Either we can view life as a complete accident, the occurrence of random forces, or as having an inherent purposiveness. In both cases we assert that we view, at a superficial level, the purposiveness of life, but we can *then* either assert random chance, or real purposiveness *behind* this appearance of purposiveness (2005, p.96). The key is that both of these assertions are *still* part of the human worldview, neither touch the noumenon. What Nietzsche is criticizing is that we first posit the essence of life beyond appearances, *and then* give it qualities such as randomness or purposiveness, both of which he is guilty of doing in these notes. In fact, he articulated the futility of this very standpoint in his 1867 notes on Schopenhauer.<sup>94</sup> Importantly, he is here articulating the intuition of life that we discussed in the introduction: even if we get behind appearances and discover that there is nothing but chaos and matter we still have to account for what gave rise to the appearance of 'something else.'

Nietzsche attempts to solve this problem of 'appearances vs. reality' by appealing to a more Schopenhauerian kind of knowledge, a more intuitive knowledge: "Through this it would only show that the highest reason had merely worked sporadically, that there is also a terrain for lesser reasons. Therefore there is no uniform teleological world: but a creative intelligence" (COSK p.4). We can clearly see the Schopenhauerian influence in these lines, he is admitting that the Ideen of Schopenhauer strive toward *something*, but its *purpose* is not clear to us, just the bare fact that it is active. This is a trespassing of knowledge and purpose into the realm of the unpurposeful, and is

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<sup>93</sup> Nietzsche's strict definition of 'purposiveness' is, "The idea of *effect* is [...] the *concept of the whole*. [...] In organisms the active principle is the [...] idea of created effect" (Swift, 2005, p.99) He is referencing section 65 of the COJ here. Nietzsche writes that the idea of the 'effect/cause' is not 'life' but only 'form' (COSK p.25). Which means decisively that the Kantian sentiment of teleology is *not* correct, but Schopenhauer's may be.

<sup>94</sup> Even near the end of the notes, Nietzsche still is having trouble articulating his question, "A tragedy can be thrown together (Zusammenwürfeln) from letters [against Cicero], an earth from meteor pieces: but the question is just what is "life," whether it is just a mere principle of order and form (as in the tragedy, or something very diverse [ganz diverser]): Against this is admitted that within organic nature no other principle exists for the behavior of organisms with one another than in inorganic nature. The method of nature in the treatment of things is the same, she is an impartial mother, equally severe against inorganic and organic children" (COSK p.19-20 Brackets added) Here we see a raw and genuine divide in young Nietzsche's thought. He can't get farther than Kant could yet. He wants to explain how life appears to have a super-casual purpose, but wants to assert that nature has a wholeness about it, applying its rules uniformly without exceptions. The only obvious way out of this deadlock is to retreat to the restrictive Kantian camp.

conceptually dangerously close to asserting a teleology of the thing-in-itself. Nietzsche is here redefining teleology not as any end whatsoever, but rather ends as we understand them, and defining our knowledge as knowledge of the mechanistic world, and the mechanistic world *only*. This means that our causal understanding posits the Ideen and their purposes, a Kantian stance. However, Nietzsche allows room for a *different* kind of knowledge, one based in intuition, to access the purposes of Ideen.<sup>95</sup>

Schopenhauer is never explicitly referenced in these notes but his philosophy is clearly what is implied in the 'since' of 'The Concept of The Organic Since Kant.'<sup>96</sup> "Such an assumption is made by human analogy: why can the purposive not be an unconscious creative power i.e. given by nature: one thinks of the instinct of that animal. This is the standpoint of natural philosophy" (COSK p.4). It isn't difficult to find the deep engagement with Schopenhauer's metaphysics of evolution in this passage. Nietzsche repeatedly adopted throughout these notes both the Schopenhauerian standpoint that there is something substantial and eternal behind the representations that humans use to understand the organic, and therefore we are epistemologically *justified* in thinking of the organic as something purposive, *as well as* the reverse stance asserted by Kant.<sup>97</sup>

We see Nietzsche attempting to cut through the problem with finer and finer distinctions, "Life itself cannot be thought of as purpose because it is assumed to act in accordance with purposes. [...] In other words we absolutely do not approach final cause by the explanation of *life*, but only its *form*" (COSK p.19-20). Nietzsche is trying to pave a way between the phenomenon and noumenon, by asserting that the 'form' of life is all that is accessible to us, but we remain incapable of explaining what life is if we only have the form to go on. What else could this remind us of except for the Idee of life in relation to the will? Once again, we find Nietzsche attempting to tear away at the Kantian restrictions placed on human knowledge by relying on Schopenhauer's critique.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> We get our first hint that intuition has a role to play in this haphazard arrangement in this note: "A way of viewing things is still not knowledge" (Swift, 2005, p.98). This is a protest against Schopenhauer, who is whispering in his ear that the way to escape from this deadlock is through a different type of knowledge, and intuitive knowledge. He will later give in to the devil on his shoulder, saying that no intelligence is required to think of the vitalist force, we do not have to think of it as mind, contra Kant (COSK p.14).

<sup>96</sup> He even uses Schopenhauer's favorite 'crystal example.' (Swift, 2005, p.101)

<sup>97</sup> At times Nietzsche also rejects the notion that teleology exists in the inorganic world (Swift, 2005, p.96), which is we recall, is a tenet of the striving of Schopenhauer's Will. But Nietzsche in the same passage acknowledges that this only pushes the problem to the boundary of the teleological and the non-teleological world, which is the same as asserting that some things are governed by teleology *and chance* and some just by chance. Further on in his notes he denies that this stance is defensible, "nature works the same in the organic and inorganic worlds" (COSK p.24). Again this is an indication that he was far from having an internally coherent schematic he was expounding upon, rather he was wrestling with a problem.

<sup>98</sup> There is some confusion in Nietzsche when it comes to the philosophy Schopenhauer, specifically how 'form' and 'Idea' relate. While Nietzsche is speaking about how the parts of an organism must be characterized as purposive for the organism to be alive he says, "The whole does not necessarily condition the parts while the parts necessarily condition the whole. Whoever maintains the former, maintains the highest purposiveness i.e. among different possible forms of purposiveness is selected: whereby he assumes that there is a hierarchy of purposiveness" (COSK p.18) A clear jab at Schopenhauer's 'hierarchy of Ideas,' but the punchline is unclear, Nietzsche doesn't mention why a belief in this hierarchy is forbidden.

In an attempt to resolve the deadlock between a purposive or chaotic universe Nietzsche opposes the idea of an “external” force that governs purposiveness in favor of an internal one (Swift, 2005, p.96). Here we must think of ‘external’ in the sense of gravity, a force that envelops an object through and through, something which is bigger than us and fundamentally different from what we are. ‘Internal’ must mean that which is logically prior to us, what we are more so than our bodies, an essence which is *immanent* in the organism.<sup>99</sup> Again, we have to assert that he seems here to be referencing the *Ideen* of Schopenhauer which we have just spent the chapter discussing.

An internal force introduces something very important in this context, it implies a relationship between itself as force and the world a appearances, a connection between the causal, mechanistic world, and the Noumenal realm. Nietzsche writes, “Existence is perforated with miracles” (2005, p.97). Not only does this line *clearly* demonstrate that he is still grappling with the first stages of his critique of the concept organic being, but he is *still* wavering in regards to the criticism he made against Schopenhauer a year earlier. This is *exactly* what he was criticizing Schopenhauer for doing, positing super-casual forces in the world of causality.

In fact, we begin to get the sense that Nietzsche has deepened his reading of Schopenhauer since the notes he made a year earlier. Take the idea behind this quote: “The organism is a form. We overlook the form’s multiplicities” (2005, p.99). On a first read through this draft this quote seems to be out of place, as though it was arguing several steps ahead of some of the other notes which were still trying to frame the problem, as if it was already a part of a system and just needed context. Well, this is exactly what it is; it is a reference to Schopenhauer’s theory of *Ideen* (2005, p.103). Here he equates form with *Idee*, by denying the impact that situational accident has upon form; Schopenhauer also used these two words interchangeably.

Nietzsche will continue to try to find a way out of this problem through thinking of purposiveness as non-essential to life in-itself, only contingent, a description of ‘*how*’ something lives, not ‘*what*’ life is, reminiscent of the “life vs. the living’ distinction in Thacker. This goes against his statements that life is found in the purposiveness of a thing’s parts, but even back then he noted that there are then infinitely different ways to live (COSK p.25). This will lead him to posit “The purposiveness is not absolute, but a very relative one: seen from another angle, often unpurposiveness” (COSK 24). We can say here that if he has moved beyond purposiveness it is only because purposiveness is rooted in the world of representation. Think of how Schopenhauer describes the connection between *Ideen* that shaped the matter of the *Idea*, like the sloth and the tree.

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<sup>99</sup> Thacker summarizes how this is intrinsic to the Kantian debate, “We have seen how Kant’s reflections on purposiveness and teleology vis- à-vis life eventually revolve around a fundamental contradiction. In this way, Kantian *purposiveness* recapitulates Aristotelian *entelechy*. Both grapple with the idea that there is some sort of innate orderliness or organization in life that serves as the fundamental guarantor that the question of Life is different from either the question of Being or the question of God. And both Aristotle and Kant also grapple with whether this orderliness that is innate to life, this vital order, can be said to be fully internal to life itself, or whether it must have some sort of external source” (Thacker, 2010, p.258)

Nietzsche implicitly has latched onto the argument that nothing from the world of representation, or causality will ever be able to explain what life is.

Having given an overview of the concepts Nietzsche is wrestling with in these notes, and demonstrating their Schopenhauerian influence, we will introduce one specific theme that will never leave Nietzsche's philosophical thought. This is the relationship between the whole and its parts, the problem of what makes up an individual. This is the very first problem he mentions in the notes, "The simple idea [idee] separates into a multiplicity of parts and states of the organism, but it remains a unity in the necessary connection of the parts and functions. This is the product of the intellect" (COSK p.1). The problem is that since Kant, the concept of an organism has changed drastically, and not just through the work of Schopenhauer. Although there had been observations of cellular activity since the late 18th century, Matthias Schleiden and his school of biological thought developed the first cellular theory in 1838 (Sapp, 2003) and it was with this theory that cells began entering the public consciousness in a big way. It's true that Kant was concerned with the whole's relation to the parts, but he never dreamed that any of the parts could go on living without the whole. Now for the first time the sciences became convinced that living things are made up of smaller living things. This adds an entirely new dimension to the relationship between a whole and its parts, because cells must be both wholes composed of parts, and parts of larger wholes themselves. This of course brings up the question of whether humans are also just parts making up a greater whole, as Nietzsche states, "All parts of nature accommodate each other because there is one will" (COSK p.1). In this statement he is intending to state that in the same manner the heart and stomach work in some kind of uneasy cooperation, so do humans and animals.

This has profound implications, and it will stay with Nietzsche throughout his career. What we will have in Nietzsche is a three-tiered system of organisms. The first tier is the physiological, cellular life and the life of organs. The second tier is the psychological, the level of the individual. The third tier is the evolutionary and political, 'above' the individual, the society. It is clear that tier one and two, cells and individuals, are both considered to be living things, it is unclear in Nietzsche whether or not the society is considered an organism. This is an old philosophical concept; it is present in Plato and Hobbes, both of whom drew analogies and between an individual human being and an individual culture. Hobbes seemed to take a more hardline stance, claiming that the society is a body in the same way the individual is a body. The major difference is that neither of these two philosophers could have anticipated cellular theory, so in Nietzsche's time it became possible to add another tier to this concept.

Between these tiers the question becomes 'what makes up an individual'? In complexity theory there is the notion of the swarm; a swarm of bees, or starlings in flight seems to act and react as if it were a single individual, but should it be considered an individual organism? As noted at the end of the above quote ('This is the product of the

intellect'), Nietzsche theorizes continually about the status of the knowledge of the organism, and implies repeatedly that a conceptual understanding will not lead us to victory, but rather that we need an intuition (COSK p.13). This is the utilization of Schopenhauer to defeat Kant that we spoke of previously. But let us draw some conclusions concerning this, if we access the organism through intuition, then it means the organism is an Idee. "The idea [idee] of the whole as the cause: thereby it is said the whole conditions [bedinge] the parts" (COSK p.20). In this note we get a crystallization of the problem of individuation. The whole is the higher Idee that dominates ('conditions') the lower Ideen, the parts. He even speaks of a "hierarchy of purposiveness" (COSK p.18), which is a clear reference to the hierarchy of the Ideen. And so we see that it is Schopenhauer who gives Nietzsche preliminary justification for asserting that there are three tiers of organisms.<sup>100</sup>

Let us briefly note how Nietzsche will use this metaphorical tactic throughout his career. First we can state that Nietzsche will most frequently use this concept in order to apply a judgment made on one of these three tiers to explain another tier. "Microcosm and macrocosm of culture. - The finest discoveries concerning culture are made by the individual man within himself when he finds two heterogeneous powers ruling there. [...] Such a hall of culture within the single individual would, however, bear the strongest resemblance to the cultural structure of entire epochs and provide continual instruction regarding them by means of analogy" (HATH P.130).

Another example of how he switches between tiers: "Countless things that man has acquired at earlier stage, but so feebly and embryonically that no one could tell that they had been acquired, suddenly emerge into the light much later, perhaps after centuries, meanwhile they have become strong and ripe. Some ages seem to lack completely some talent or virtue, just as some people do, but just you wait for their children and grandchildren, if you have time to wait - they bring to light the inner qualities of their grandfathers" (GS P.36). We emphasize here that Nietzsche goes directly from talking about a concept that applies to a culture and its history, tier three, to applying that concept an individual, tier two, in the space of a single sentence. Why? It would seem arbitrary and reductive to simply state that Rome, for example, 'brought to light the inner qualities' of Greek culture. Such a reductive and encompassing argument could be equally stated that Rome completely misinterpreted Greece. But next to the idea that a son articulates his father's inner qualities, somehow this thought gains justification in Nietzsche's mind. This is because the substance of the aphorism, the idea that seems to be expressed to the reader is not so much this precise pattern between father and son that Nietzsche feels he has discovered, but rather that this precise pattern is applicable to cultures as well. This is to say, the import of his message is not a theory of inheritance, but that the theory is applicable to multiple tiers.

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<sup>100</sup> Danto recognizes this trend in Nietzsche as well (1965, p.198-199), although he does not connect his reading to Schopenhauer or cellular theory.

To round off our series of glimpses into Nietzsche's future, "Fellow-feelings exist only in social formations (one of which is the human body, whose individual living beings 'feel with' one another), as a consequence of a larger whole" (KSA 43[1]). Here he is applying the second tier to the first tier, and once again, it seems as though the weight of what he is trying to communicate is precisely that a judgment that applies to the individual also can apply to the physiological.

Moore makes the claim that Nietzsche is perhaps receiving justification for this theory from Rudolf Virchow, who "described aggregates of individual cells as autonomous 'citizens' forming a 'cell state'" (2002, p.35). Moore explains that this idea was not uncommon amongst German biologists, citing Ernst Haeckel as an example. Sapp adds Ernst von Brücke, Matthias Schleiden, Arthur Tansley, Frederick Clements, Herbert Spencer, Oscar Hertwig, Theodor Schwann, Charles Whitman, and Edmund Wilson to this list of biologists who attempted to make analogies between cellular activity and political activity (2003). While we have no evidence that Nietzsche was aware of these authors, we can still see that this analogy between cells and societies had fascinated the scientific community around this time period.

And so we bring our analysis of these notes to a close. We repeat our conclusions from the introduction that Nietzsche is frustrated with the Kantian view of the organic, he is attempting to use Schopenhauer to move beyond Kant's philosophy. In the process of doing this it seems as though he attaches himself to the Schopenhauerian concept of *Ideen*, which we have spent a significant amount of this chapter covering. We further drew forth one of the most important consequences of the conclusions that he comes to in these notes, the three tiered system of physiology-psychology-politics. We indicated how this would affect his later thinking in order to demonstrate how difficult it would be to understand some of the conclusions he will come to without understanding his connection to Schopenhauer here. In the next two chapters we will be commenting more and more on his relationship with Schopenhauer's metaphysics in his mature works. We will note how his interest in the problem of life moved far beyond the scope of topics covered in these notes.

### *Correct Identification of the Problem of Life*

To conclude this chapter we will have short interlude to discuss authors who frame the problem of life along the same lines that we do. The reason we are choosing this particular moment to do this is because nearly all of them frame their discussion in terms of a debate between mechanism and teleology. Just after discussing these theories to some extent, and right before we launch into an analysis of Nietzsche's

philosophy of the organic, seems like an appropriate place to examine those authors who are closest to us in terms of the scope of their works.

Virginia Cano is an example of one scholar who believes that Nietzsche does have a conception of the organism, and sees him as attempting to find a middle ground between mechanics and teleology. Cano, like Müller-Lauter (who we will discuss below), believes that understanding the notion of 'conflict' is the first step to understanding the organism. She explains that through conflict it is possible to produce entities that are inherently unstable. "Nietzsche will follow in Roux's footsteps and focus on the idea of the struggle of the parts that constitute organisms and make up an entity that is unstable and continually being formed" (Lemm, 2014, p.56). It is this instability that Cano believes is the origin of animation in organisms. Cano's theory rests upon an interpretation of the 'will to truth.' "The notion of becoming operates as a limit concept. It signals that which escapes the attempts to fix a world of being. [...] life cannot remain imprisoned in any lethal logic of calculability and stability" (Lemm, 2014, p.53-54). And so Cano's theory of the Nietzschean organism is intimately tied with the distinction between 'being' and 'becoming.' Life is that type of unity that is open towards and embraces becoming, while escaping the confines of stable being.

Mariana Cruz is another philosopher who correctly frames the question of life, including explicitly framing it against the realm of the inorganic (Lemm, 2014, p.68). However she also doesn't believe Nietzsche actually had a definitive answer to this question, but rather that he is reliant on another thinker for his definition. She begins by stating that "For Nietzsche, organisms are characterized from the very beginning by the struggle between their elements, without any direction to guide them" (Lemm, 2014, p.77). She then poses the problem of how a unity, or direction, could come about in an organism, and finds the answer in Trendelenburg, and Aristotelian modern scientists who Nietzsche had read. She then asserts that Nietzsche subscribed to the Trendelenburg definition of the organism, "For Nietzsche, then, the final cause, understood in an Aristotelian way as potentiality of the whole that promotes and sustains the harmony between its parts, becomes within the framework of contemporary theories an architecture of organic nature" (2014, p.79). Her justification for making this move is firstly that Nietzsche set up the problem of the organic in a way that the answer Trendelenburg and Aristotle provided could fit well (2014, p.80), but secondly that this follows the work of Anaxagoras, and that while studying Anaxagoras, Nietzsche made certain remarks that seem to fit into this framework (Lemm, 2014, p.75).

Rafael Winkler, in his essay *Nietzsche and le 'lan Technique: Technics, Life, and the Production of Time*, equates Nietzsche's theory of the organism with that of Bergson's in his work, *Creative Evolution*. Winkler begins by framing his discussion between teleology and mechanism. "Nietzsche remains close to Bergson in seeking a path midway between finalism and mechanism" (2006, p.77). Winkler continues to reinforce the connection between Bergson and Nietzsche, "The 'will' in Nietzsche is

perhaps closest to something like Bergson's *élan vital*, a process in which life differentiates itself into species and individuals owing to a pair of causes, the storing up of physicochemical energy in the organic parts of plants and animals, and the elastic canalization of this energy in diverse directions, leading to its free expenditure in the creation of new forms. This is why the terms "l'élán technique" have been chosen to suggest what the thinking of the will to power stakes out, inasmuch as life's creative evolution in Nietzsche is through and through a technical, artistic phenomenon (2006, p.76). Winkler's discussion relies on tying Nietzsche's concept of the organism to both an intellectual futuristic force that is not thinkable in terms of mechanism, and a creative artistic force. In this sense Winkler's conclusions are similar to Cruz and Cano, in that the idea of the organism is intimately tied to the notion of becoming.

Wolfgang Müller-Lauter does perhaps the most thorough job of analyzing the organism of any author that we have read. It is clear reading authors such as Ansell-Pearson or Cano, that Müller-Lauter's analysis has been very influential. In fact, we could say that his interpretation of the organism is what has caused many scholars to identify the organism with the will to power.

Müller-Lauter argues that Nietzsche rejected the teleological explanation for the organism due to his reading of Roux (1999, p.168). Roux's treatise *Der Kampf der Theile im Organismus*, attempts to do away with the philosophical dualism, verging on vitalism, that is a necessary consequence of thinking of the organism as purposeful. This destruction of the 'other-worldly' or 'the beyond' is a massive theme in Nietzsche's philosophy, and Müller-Lauter makes an excellent move in removing the notion of 'purposefulness' from Nietzsche's theory of the organism. After discussing the difference between the mechanical and vital interpretations of the organism Müller-Lauter writes, "Nietzsche is striving to find a third way to explain the organic, running a certain way between the two above-described ways" (1999, p.172). This is important because Nietzsche's discussion of teleology is only found in his pre-Wagnerian period. Müller-Lauter is the only author we have found who attempts to formulate the organism by drawing on Nietzsche's late works, which is our project as well.

Müller-Lauter then asserts that Nietzsche reduces, "all organic process to the will to power" (1999, p.163), and that the organism itself is the site of conflict between various wills to power. This is similar to what our other authors have argued, especially Cano, and some of the authors we covered in the first chapter in the section *The Will to Power*, many of whom explicitly link this conception of the organism to Nietzsche's reading of Roux.

Müller-Lauter begins to strike onto promising ground when he starts to examine the notion of assimilation in the organism. He links the act of assimilation very strongly with the power struggles that characterize and organism. He brings in the idea of stimulus vs reception, which functions very much like Deleuze's active/reactive forces, that is: the stimulus and reception are both ontological forces, one denoting action and

domination, the other reaction and obedience (1999, p.176-177). It is between these two powers that conflict can be sustained, two active forces would break contact or one would be transformed into an obedient force. But if, as Müller-Lauter states, there are two qualities of force, then conflict between the forces can be sustained

Müller-Lauter believes that Nietzsche was highly influenced by his reading of Roux, for whom this struggle is linked with the 'self-regulation' of the organism (1999, p.169), thus giving rise to the *illusion* of purposiveness in life. But at this point Müller-Lauter runs into an issue, he does not specify exactly how it is possible for a *conflict* to preserve itself and lead to a *sustainable* system of regulation or *not*. This step forward isn't at all an obvious one. Is it the case that every conflict in which one force is made subservient is preserved? If this is true, then Nietzsche must subscribe to the *Generatio Aequivoca*, and life must be spontaneously emerging everywhere all the time. Unless most forces fail to dominate each other in a conflict, in which case the problem again re-centers around the nature of this passage from conflict to 'self-regulation.'

'Self regulation' is a Rouxian concept that is tied to digestion, because the digestive process is one by which new energy is procured from the world and distributed throughout the body in an organized, patterned way. New energy is forced into the service of old forms of action. But how could the emergence of assimilation, of this system of management, of 'self-regulation,' could come about from a conflict of forces, or wills to power? Müller-Lauter says that, "[the dominating force] *preserves what has itself been overpowered*" (1999, p.178). This is very much like the Schopenhauerian conflict between Ideen, when the Idee of 'granite' emerges; it subdues but preserves the Idee 'gravity.' As we will see in the next chapter, this is a key link between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. However, this is not yet a definition of life, for inorganic forces also overpower and subdue each other. Furthermore, for us, any conflict between wills to power implies chaos, disorganization, and dissolution of systems of management. The essential step to make is to define how this leads into its opposite: preservation, sustainability, and self-regulation.

Once Müller-Lauter reaches this difficult and critical problem in his work, he begins analyzing the human body. He conceives of the Nietzschean body as a composite body, made up of parts, that is itself a part in a larger body. He brings this into his discussion of the conflict between wills to power, saying, "The cooperation of the living beings in the body is no more derivable from reason than from the so-called nerve-and-brain apparatus. [...] By attributing the cooperation of the many living beings in the organism to the original spontaneity of such supreme masters, Nietzsche escapes teleology as the ultimate ground for "the great reason of the body" (1999 p.179).

But teleology was never meant to answer whether this apparent purposiveness was *rational* or not, teleology is concerned with how to define the living organism. The formation of the human body is a problem that is related to the problem of the organic, but it isn't splitting hairs to say that it is essentially an entirely different problem. Müller-

Lauter wouldn't get an answer to one if he had answered the other. And yet Müller-Lauter here says that the problem of 'self-regulation' is solved by the doctrine of power struggles (1999, p.181). He ends his analysis by stating that, "The "imagery" of the body as a social structure points to the supra-individual realm of social organization - [...] The social formations, too, are for [Nietzsche] organisms" (1999, p.181). But this is not exactly the problem of life as we have formulated it; this is the problem of how complex bodies, composite bodies, become composite, this is the problem of the relation between the whole and its parts. This is distinct from the question of life; there exist complex bodies that are not alive, watches for example. The question of life as we understand it must be framed as the distinction between the living and the dead. This is because in order for a definition of life to have any meaning it must be distinguished against that which it is not. Under Müller-Lauter's definition it is hard to see what distinguishes the inorganic from the organic.

While Müller-Lauter does an admirable job in framing the question and does make some progress towards answering it, we must ultimately reject his analysis. The issue with all these authors we have discussed is that they frame the problem of the organic within the context of teleology. Even when they claim that Nietzsche is attempting to find a way out of teleology they have a difficult time in explaining his alternative.

As we have seen in this chapter, even Schopenhauer moves beyond the teleological schematic. And as we will demonstrate in the following chapters, Nietzsche certainly does. We have now concluded the preparatory work necessary to introduce Nietzsche's thought. In the following chapter we will explain the functions of the inorganic world in Nietzsche's texts, this will lead us to uncover his principle of organization, which we will see has its roots in the Schopenhauerian Ideen.

## Chapter 3

### *The Will to Power*

In the first two chapters of this thesis we have distinguished what our question is and why it has been so often misunderstood, and we have covered Nietzsche's influences in detail. This was done in order to give us a foundation for speaking about Nietzsche's conception of the organic. However in order to properly appreciate his theory of life we first must cover the scope of the inorganic in Nietzsche's philosophy. We will uncover just how Schopenhauerian Nietzsche actually was when theorizing about organization and the inorganic being.

The first point we will make, is that the inorganic does not include the concept of 'death.' Death is an event that can only occur in relation to something that has been living. What we wish to discuss is the realm outside of life: the realm of the inorganic. The majority of this chapter will be devoted to expounding upon the metaphysics of the will to power. We will be demonstrating its many connections to the Schopenhauerian will and *Ideen* that we have laid out in the last chapter. We wish to organize the interpretations of many scholars who have commented upon the nature of the will to power, and then elucidate our interpretation of the will to power. Further, we will try to indicate how Schopenhauer can help us understand what kind of questions Nietzsche is aiming to solve with his theory of the will to power. We will use what was covered in the last chapter to illuminate several key aspects of the will to power that we feel have been misunderstood. Finally we will end the chapter by exposing how Nietzsche moved beyond Schopenhauer with this doctrine.

The will to power has received a variety of treatments by philosophers, many note its technical deficiencies, and interpret it to be an incomplete theory.<sup>101</sup> Many philosophers will use the phrase 'will to power' without clearly defining their conception of it. This gives the will to power an ambiguous meaning in Nietzsche scholarship. In this chapter we will be covering some of the philosophers who write specifically about the will to power. These scholars tend to focus their attention on the ontological status of the will to power, which is what we wish to do as well. A representative portion of our authors write about the perceived discrepancy between Nietzsche's 'well-known perspectivism' (Loeb, 2010, p.77), and the fact that he seems to be asserting some timeless truth about ultimate reality with this doctrine. While most scholars will leave the phrase itself, 'will to power,' unexamined, a select few authors take a further step and actually discuss what is meant by the word 'power.' We will follow these writers and attempt to further define the nature of power, in doing so we will discuss significant concepts such as resistance, interpretation, risk, and the *Agon*. We postulate that there is a general indefinite 'feel' to

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<sup>101</sup>(Kaufmann 1968, p.510; Clark 1999, 119–35; Young, 2010, p.544–5; Porter 2009; and Staten 2009)

the way that the will to power is interpreted in scholarship. While the details of many author's analysis of the will to power differs in their technicalities, there appears to be a common thread that runs through much of the scholarship. This concerns what might be called the 'quality' of the will to power. It is something indefinite which is difficult to discuss in part because it is too obvious, too apparent. This 'quality' will be very important for our analysis, as it will come to be our definition of the inorganic forms of organization. We will implement an analogy to capture the essence of what this term currently implies amongst many Nietzsche scholars.

Historians are unsure of precisely when, but sometime during the course of the life of Genghis Khan, the great Khan dictated a document of *Yasa*, or 'laws.' Among these laws is to be found many descriptions of internal domestic affairs, ruthless punishment for crime, strict military organization, regulation of religious practices, prohibitions against homosexuality, even a defined hunting season. But there is only one law that the Mongols possessed that guided their foreign policies. It is this law that we feel characterizes the current sentiment towards the will to power. It reads, "It is forbidden to ever make peace with a monarch, a prince or a people who have not submitted" (Lamb, 1927). The consequences of this meant that for the neighbors of the Mongols, there was a choice between instant unconditional surrender, and total war. This intemperate injunction towards endless expansion, fluid borders, and supreme domination is the sense in which the 'quality' of the will to power is most often understood by Nietzsche's commentators. We will refer to this interpretation as 'Mongolian.' It will be juxtaposed against an interpretation of the will to power that we call 'Agonistic,' which is discussed later in the chapter.

### *Metaphysics and Perspectivism*

We can begin by our examination of the will to power by stating some representatives of the common view of the nature of the will to power. Like many others, Michel Haar believes that the "will to power is indeed the 'word for being' (1996, p.6). This means that the will to power is a substitute concept for notions such as substance. The will to power is the 'immanent' instead of the 'transitive' cause (to use Spinoza's terminology) of all change in the world. Thus, it must be an activity that is present throughout the inorganic as well as the organic world; it is what is common to both. It intends to deal with problems such as being and becoming, or the issues surrounding mechanical conceptions of force. John Richardson writes in his book *Nietzsche's System*, "The will to power [is] deeply diverse in [its] types, differentiated by [its] distinct efforts and tendencies" (2002, p.21). This is the point made implicitly in most of the literature to differentiate between Schopenhauer's 'unified' will and Nietzsche's 'diverse'

will to power. This is Deleuze's analysis: "Nietzsche's break with Schopenhauer rests on one precise point; it is a matter of knowing whether the will is unitary or multiple. Everything else flows from this" (1983, p.7). This problem between unity and multiplicity is what we will try to solve in the first part of this chapter.

The first problem that arises from this breaking of the will to power from unity into multiplicity is the question of its differentiation from its phenomenal manifestations. How could we assert that there is something such as a will to power that is immanent in all things except by asserting that it is a unity behind appearances? And if the will to power is a 'unity behind appearances,' how could we possibly differentiate it from the thing-in-itself? It seems we need to move away from this Kantian framework in order to grasp this question.

R. Lainer Anderson is very representative of how philosophers will tend to solve this problem. He writes, "Nietzsche's doctrine of will to power claims that the behavior of things at the most basic level is governed by their attempt to expend force to influence their environments. Nietzsche characterizes this drive as a will to power in order to emphasize its extreme generality. Its operation is unconstrained by any particular aims or any given idea of what the environment ought to be like" (2005, p.77). In addition to being a proponent of what we have called the Mongolian interpretation, Anderson firmly places the will to power on the side of the thing-in-itself, a single unity that manifests through different phenomenon that remains essentially unchanged throughout space and time. After briefly discussing some of the problems that arise from the combination of this theory with 'Nietzsche's perspectivism,' Anderson states, "To all appearances, the will to power is a claim about the unique underlying essence of the world. [...] His doctrine thus seems to be just the kind of view that perspectivism is supposed to rule out – a uniquely true, unrevisable theory, based on purported metaphysical insight into the nature of the world" (2005, p.77). This is the usual path that philosophers embark on when writing about the problems with the will to power.<sup>102</sup> Anderson's solution, "The key is to resist the temptation to view the will to power as a straightforward claim about the nature of the world. Rather, I propose to read it as an interpretation of the unity of science" (2005, p.78). It isn't necessary to explain what he means by 'unity of science,' we are here concerned with how he represents the majority of Nietzsche scholarship by wrapping the theory of the will to power in the qualification of 'perspectivism.' The upshot of denying that the will to power makes 'claims about the nature of the world' is that, "The general doctrine of will to power therefore remains a provisional interpretation, an empirical theory in the human science of philosophy. As such, it is compatible with perspectivism in the same way that any other empirical account is" (2005, p.89). So we see that his essential argument is to couch the theory of the will to power within the realm of

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<sup>102</sup> If we recall our previous chapter, this is very similar to the complaints lodged against Schopenhauer.

phenomenal appearances. The will to power is just a perspective, just a manifestation, a skiff on the river of becoming just like every other interpretation.<sup>103</sup>

For another example of this perspectivist interpretation, here is Linda L. Williams: "Will to power is contrasted with Schopenhauer's concept of will, and Wille for Schopenhauer was undeniably meant as his metaphysics. If Nietzsche's project was simply to improve Schopenhauer's concept of Wille, then the case could be made that will to power is Nietzsche's metaphysics. This is a common inference made by those who believe will to power is Nietzsche's metaphysics. However, Nietzsche believed Wille zur Macht was a superior concept to Schopenhauer's Wille for two reasons. Not only did Nietzsche's phrase include a better notion of the goal toward which will strove (toward power rather than "life") but it also was not metaphysical" (Williams, 1996, p.453-454). In order to explain how the will to power was not metaphysical, Williams adheres to the same perspectivist notion that Anderson does.<sup>104</sup> Now we can point out a tendency in Williams that we also see in Anderson and that is true throughout Nietzsche scholarship. What should be apparent by now to those who have read our second chapter is that these authors are not being fair to Schopenhauer. The problem of unity and multiplicity is one of the *central* problems of Schopenhauer's philosophy; we spent a significant portion of the previous chapter discussing how the 'metaphysical' will related to the world of phenomenal representation.

Richard Schacht is another example of this paradigm. He first states his Mongolian metaphysics, "In its most general and rudimentary form, 'will to power' for Nietzsche is simply the basic tendency of all forces and configurations of forces to extend their influence and dominate others. This is what he considers to be 'the one will that is inherent in all events,' in terms of which he proposes to analyze and 'explain' all phenomena as its multiform 'development and ramification'" (1983, p.220); "one is obliged to . . . employ man as an analogy to the end of transforming this concept from an empty word into a significant notion in terms of which what goes on in the world becomes explicable. [...] And he further argues that this is really the *only* such 'interpretation' of force and change of which one can thus 'make use' and get somewhere, once one recognizes the untenability of any sort of thing-ontology and of any other construal of the basis and character of the notion of causality" (1983, p.215-216). So we see that Schacht, like Anderson and Williams appeals to Nietzsche's 'perspectivist' leanings in

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<sup>103</sup> Paul Kirkland Follows this interpretation exactly, "In this way, Nietzsche's fundamental doctrine of the will to power generates his famous "perspectivism" Nietzsche does not simply aim to remain consistent by offering his own view as yet one more interpretation, for he does not suspend evaluation of different perspectives" (2009, p.49)

<sup>104</sup> We also believe Williams fails in her analysis to bring the will to power out of the realm of the metaphysical. Towards the end of her article she states that the will to power is a concept which covers both the organic and inorganic strata, in other words, it is applied to all of being (1996, p.454). And Williams further writes that, "Machtgelust was psychological in the sense of 'inner' motivation. Desires have goals-we desire something. With Machtgelust, Nietzsche invites us to consider that a goal of our desires might not be something tangible, e.g., a new car, but more general and thus less apparent" (1996, p.451). So we get a principle of willing power that exists as a substratum to all of existence but manifests itself differently in every situation, which implies that it is a principle that transcends physical situations. Is this not the very definition of a metaphysical doctrine?

order to rescue the theory of the will to power from its apparent supremacy over other theories. Schacht however, is a bit more honest in his writing than some of the others and re-installs this supremacy, arguing that the will to power is a 'first among equals' in the realm of perspectives.

Donovan Miyasaki follows this same trend, "Perspectivism is, then, compatible with the empiricism that becomes explicit in later works: [...] Nietzsche is not simply defending empirical evidence; he is limiting knowledge to it entirely. After equating scientific knowledge with the testimony of the senses, he explicitly rejects every competing form: [...] This is, to be sure, a radical empiricism, and it is only a guiding methodological ideal, one impossible to achieve perfectly in practice. In his critique of the "will to truth," Nietzsche insists that some fictions, including those of metaphysics, may be necessary and even beneficial to human life" (Miyasaki, 2013, p.255). Miyasaki here is developing Schacht's 'first among equals' position of the will to power, and making the claim that this theory is in that position because it is necessary for 'life.' We see that perspectivism is again the foundation here, but Miyasaki is using Nietzsche's 'radical empiricism' to raise the theory of the will to power to the position of a first among equals. However he doesn't realize that when he says 'radical empiricism' he actually means the same thing Schopenhauer did when he used the phrase 'intuitive knowledge of the thing-in-itself.' If we recall, it was Schopenhauer who asserted that we know the *Ideen* and the will through intuition and imagination. This is repeated more ambiguously in Nietzsche, and this is what Miyasaki is picking up on.

Paul Loeb will be the last author we mention on this subject, "For panpsychism<sup>105</sup> turns out to be merely a counterfactual thought experiment whereby Nietzsche thinks we humans are best able to attain an imaginative vision of the cosmological will to power. This is why Nietzsche does not say that the so-called mechanistic (or 'material') world is panpsychist, but only that his experimental panpsychism would suffice for understanding the so-called mechanistic (or 'material') world" (2015, p.81). So Loeb also finds trouble in the 'perspectivist' Nietzsche. We believe that this issue is not specific to the will to power, a theory that wants to describe a substratum to experience; we believe this problem arises from the internal contradictions of perspectivism itself. A perspectivist approach to the world is the approach of extreme doubt, the dismissal of any mode of communication between people, an utterly extreme sophistry. The problem lies in positioning the viewpoint of perspectivism *above* all the viewpoints that are determined as 'perspectives.' Perspectivism must avoid being considered one among these perspectives. This is because the very essence of perspectivism is the activity of sterilizing every philosophical stance it encounters. If it itself were subject to this disabling practice it would not be able to carry out this activity, and devolve into utter impotence. And so it must separate itself from its own activity, it must keep its shears at

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<sup>105</sup> Panpsychism is the thought that there is a mind inherent in all nature; we will cover this in the last section of our chapter.

arms length. It must view itself as a gardener working in their garden, pruning and slicing, and pulling weeds, without ever directing this violence towards itself.

### *Will and Representation*

It is important to remember that our authors have had the goal of dressing the will to power in the armor of perspectivism, but have not actually disputed the metaphysical leanings of the theory in itself. Rather, they have attempted to protect it from the charges of 'metaphysics' by adding a further tenet. If we reflect upon these approaches we find that they leave the metaphysical claims of the will to power intact, even if these claims are qualified as being themselves a part of the 'perspective' of the will to power. This means that implicitly, our scholars still accept that the theory is metaphysical in nature; it aims at something behind the appearances of the phenomenal world, *even if it simultaneously admits its failure to reach this 'something.'*

In order to delve further into this problem the first question to ask is what does Nietzsche mean by the word 'will'? Schopenhauer wrote extensively and systematically about the nature of the will in his philosophy, whereas Nietzsche did not. His references to the will to power are situated mostly in notes that, by their aphoristic nature, are left untidy philosophically. Nonetheless there is good evidence that the will to power was going to be a central component of Nietzsche's philosophy before he went insane, such as the fact that he had used it as a title for the plan of a book. If for no other reason, because of this disorderly state of affairs we are hesitant to unequivocally equate the 'will' of Nietzsche's will to power with the Schopenhauerian will. Our claim is going to rather be that it occupies the same position as the Schopenhauerian will. That is, it takes the place of the thing-in-itself behind appearances. Many scholars have argued that this aspect of the Schopenhauerian will is precisely what Nietzsche is attempting to avoid with the will to power.<sup>106</sup> In our mind, they have done so unsuccessfully, mainly because they understand the will in the same terms that Nietzsche did in his 1867 notes which we used to introduce Schopenhauer in chapter two. At the end of this section we will address these concerns. For now, as we connect Schopenhauer and Nietzsche's will we should be clear: we are not claiming that Nietzsche purposefully copied Schopenhauer's theories, or that he saw himself as promoting Schopenhauerian philosophy or anything else concerning the psychological state of Nietzsche. This section, as well as the section entitled *Type, Idee* have the narrow aim of pointing out strong similarities between the Schopenhauerian will as we have described it, and the Nietzschean will to power. So let us turn to our first author who can help us understand what the 'will' part of 'will to power' signifies.

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<sup>106</sup>(Rehberg, 1994; Rayman, 2014; Doyle 2012; Clark, 1991).

Ansell-Pearson offers a different conception of the will to power from many of the perspectivists we have been discussing. He asserts that there is something important about the metaphysical aspect of the will to power; it is not to be so easily dismissed. In his essay *Nietzsche's Brave New World of Force* Ansell-Pearson writes of Roger Joseph Boscovich's influence upon Nietzsche's theory of the will to power. Throughout this essay he is examining a fragment from Nietzsche's notebook that we will also draw upon. One of the main connections he makes is that for Boscovich and Nietzsche, time and space were constituted by non-temporal, non-spatial centers of force, "If time is conceived in terms of instants - a preference that characterizes one major strand of philosophy from Leibniz to Bachelard- then there are two options: (a) that of generating a conception of temporality or temporal processes from points or parts (instants) that are devoid of time or temporality, [...] Nietzsche follows Boscovich in pursuing the first option" (Ansell-Pearson, 2000, p.10). Ansell-Pearson's Nietzsche conceives of a force that is outside of time that gives rise to the temporal world. Robin Small gives us a similar account of the role of space in Nietzsche's interpretation of Boscovich, "for Boscovich, atoms were no longer solid particles but instead 'points of matter,' located in space but without any extension of their own" (1986, p.419).

So we find that the representations within space and time are controlled by something that is outside of them. This 'something' is given the name 'force.'

Poellner summarizes the technical details of Boscovich's own position as follows: Boscovich concludes that change does not take place instantaneously and discontinuously upon contact between moving particles, but rather continuously, on account of a repulsive force acting asymptotically as the distance between them decreases. Since the magnitude of this repulsive force approaches infinity with diminishing distance, it makes direct contact between the elements impossible. Hence the ultimate constituents of matter must be assumed to be perfectly simple and at some distance from each other, for they must be indivisible *in principle*...The upshot of Boscovich's theory of matter is that matter consists of unextended point centres surrounded by fields of 'force' (Ansell-Pearson, 2000, p.17).

Ansell-Pearson notes that it is this exact concept of force that will morph into the will to power, the thing beneath causality.<sup>107</sup> We agree entirely with Ansell-Pearson on this

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<sup>107</sup> "Significantly the next section of *BGE* introduces the notion of 'will to power.' It does so in terms of the 'demands' of a method, one that must be based on an 'economy of principles.' The demands of this method are those of thinking 'life,' and to think it in a way that avoids 'superfluous teleological principles,' such as the 'instinct of self-preservation' (and he famously attributes an inconsistency to Spinoza precisely on this point; as far as Nietzsche is concerned even in the great anti-teleologist there are still residues of the old God and the old metaphysics). The section after this explores the issue of 'sensualism' - the use of visual and tactile evidence to formulate a physics of the world, and contains a complex and important contrast between the noble way of thinking to be found in Plato (and his attack on the senses) and the 'Darwinists and anti-teleologists among the workers in physiology.' It is not until section 36 that Nietzsche elaborates upon the 'conscience of method' with regard to the speculative and regulative idea that 'all

point, and believe he does a good job of promoting an unpopular position in Nietzsche scholarship. Namely, Ansell-Pearson has taken the position that the 'will' of the will to power refers to some kind of substratum, some force that produces repetition but is itself distinct from all phenomenal instances of its manifestations.

We find further evidence of Nietzsche's subscription to these theories comes from a lecture on Heraclitus that Nietzsche delivered at Basel. "Nowhere does an absolute persistence exist, because we always come in the final analysis to forces, whose effects simultaneously include a desire for power. Rather, whenever a human being believes he recognizes any sort of persistence in living nature, it is due to our small standards" (PPP p.60). The key to this passage is the term 'absolute,' that all the forces in the universe, gravity for example, are not unchangeable laws, but rather persistent intrusions upon phenomena from their source in the noumenon. The forces of which appear to sustain all repetition are actually outside of every instance of repetition. This is a nearly identical concept to what Ansell-Pearson has put forward, that there is something metaphysical about 'will.'

Nietzsche further asserts that these other worldly persistencies are absolutely ontological in nature, "If we were to conceive of human perception indefinitely increased according to the *strength* and power of the organs, there would conversely exist no persistent thing in the indefinitely smallest particle of time [time-atom] but rather only becoming" (PPP p.62). So these persistencies, these 'forces,' are placed in contrast to 'becoming,' wouldn't that make them 'being'? This must be our conclusion; they are forces from the noumena that hold back the fluid world of becoming in certain ways.

Now we can perhaps see the close similarity between the 'will' in the 'will to power,' and the Schopenhauerian will. Both are active forces which are properly outside the relations of space and time, both are alternatives to mechanical causality, and situate themselves at an ontologically more fundamental position than causality. When speaking of the differentiation between the realm of 'force' and the realm of space, time, and causality, Nietzsche will even use the Schopenhauerian term for the latter, 'representation': "Then there is no coexistence except in representation" (TAF p.2). This differentiation from the spatial-temporal realm of mechanical causality, which if we remember from the previous chapter is the *essence* of Schopenhauerian representation, will come to fundamentally characterize the position of the will to power.

The will to power is an explanation for the phenomenal world,<sup>108</sup> an explanation that explains the fundamental essence of the phenomenon, relations of causality, in terms of force. "*All struggle* - and everything that happens is a struggle -- *takes time*. What we call 'cause' and 'effect' omits the struggle, and as a result does not correspond to what happens" (KSA 1[92]). Recalling that for Schopenhauer causality was the

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efficient force' can be thought univocally as will to power: 'The world viewed inside, the world defined and determined according to its 'intelligible character' - it would be 'will to power' and nothing else" (Person, 2000, p.26)

<sup>108</sup> "One cannot explain pressure and stress themselves," that "the dynamic interpretation of the world . . . will shortly come to dominate physicists, through an inner quality in dynamis—" (KSA 11:36[34])

essence of representation, we can say that Nietzsche places the will to power outside our experience of the phenomena, and where does it have to go except the noumena? Ciano Aydin calls the 'will' of the 'will to power,' "a teleology without telos" (2007, P.26). Whatever qualms scholars have about asserting the will to power, a teleology without telos' is *also* a perfect description of Schopenhauer's metaphysical will. "In itself this will is endless and beginningless; it alone is, so to speak, the substance of existence" (WWR2 p.500).

Of course, we know why philosophers will be reticent to hear these specific connections between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer specifically equates his theory of the *Ideen* with Plato's theory of the Forms, which is known as a philosophy of transcendence *par excellence*. We are questioning one of the sacred tenets of Nietzsche interpretation, that his philosophy is one of immanence. It would go well beyond the scope of this thesis to defend this transgression of ours from every angle of attack; there are too many philosophers who have written on Nietzsche's philosophy of appearances. It would likewise lead us too far astray to give an exhaustive account of the philosophical differences between the concepts of transcendence and immanence; this debate stretches back into scholasticism, the Ionian Enlightenment, and Bronze age Eastern religious philosophies. And so instead, we will attempt to briefly show how the debate becomes confused when it attempts to identify a philosophical concept as either immanent or transcendent. We will first deal with this ambiguity in Plato, *the* representative of transcendental philosophy for Nietzsche Scholars. We will then consider this subject in Spinoza, who was perhaps the only philosopher of immanence who was persecuted for being one.

Eric Perl discusses this ambiguity between transcendence and immanence in Plato, noting that, "Plato indicates that a form is 'in' (ἐν) its instances; that it is 'through' (διὰ) the instances" (1999, p.342). As Perl goes on to discuss, this phrasing suggests that the forms are immanent in their representative instances. He further asserts that Plato never *seriously* implies a separate reality in which the forms, like transcendental gods, would dwell. For Perl, the only correct way to theorize the forms is by locating them imminently in the matter that they shape. However he goes on to claim that this use of immanence cannot be called a 'philosophy of appearances' because they are radically absent from the world as it appears to us, we can never have any *experience* the forms. And so Perl concludes that the distinction between transcendence and immanence falls apart once scholars attempt to demonstrate in what sense the 'transcendental' forms are separate from their physical instances. "As soon as we recognize that the forms are the universal intelligible natures of sensible particulars, we are able to break free from spatial metaphors, from thinking of immanence and transcendence in terms of the local

presence or separation of one sensible thing to another. Thus the apparent opposition between them disappears” (1999, p.344).<sup>109</sup>

This same problem can be found in Spinoza, of whom Deleuze has written, “Herein lies the sense of Spinoza’s concept of immanence; it expresses the double univocity of cause and attribute, that is, the unity of efficient and formal cause” (1992, p.165). The test here will be to ask if it is possible for the attributes or substance to exist in space and time. Because certainly efficient causes exist in this representational realm, but can we say that formal causes do? That is, If the Spinozian substance is immanent in its modifications (with the knowledge that we ourselves are only modifications that know other modification by the way in which they affect us), can we say that we experience substance? Does substance affect us? We do not encounter substance in our experience of objects; we only experience the modifications of substance. But it is possible to say that because substance constitutes our core it is something that we experience. This is very similar to the noumenal position of the Schopenhauerian will. Spinoza makes further claims that obstruct our ability to define his philosophy as imminent: he says substance is infinite (*Ethics*, Part 1, Definition 6), a singular thing (*Ethics*, Part 2, Proposition IV), the cause of every finite thing while itself being self-caused (*Ethics*, Part 1, Proposition IV, XXIV), and most damning that, “Substance is by nature prior to its modifications” (*Ethics*, Part 1, Proposition I).

We can see how quickly the act of naming a philosophy ‘immanent’ or ‘transcendental’ devolves into confusion and chaos. If a philosophy is transcendental, what is it transcending? Does a philosophy earn this title by positing *anything* that transcends knowledge and human experience, or must it assert something that goes beyond even an ‘external reality’? Where is the line drawn? Likewise with immanence, is an ontology considered immanent if it asserts a substance that is so well hidden in the object that it can never be experienced? We will make further arguments relating more directly to Nietzsche at the end of the section *Types, Idee*, but for now we believe we have achieved our goal of sowing doubt into the field of interpretation of interpretation which names Nietzsche a ‘philosopher of immanence.’

### *The Definition of Power*

In the last section we have linked the ‘will’ in ‘will to power’ with the Schopenhauerian will. We also mentioned how we will begin to address concerns that our readers will naturally have concerning the metaphysical aspect of the will to power.

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<sup>109</sup> The same kind of ambiguity is found even more acutely in Plotinus, who abhors the material world, and writes with scathing longing for the ‘intellectual beyond,’ and yet at the same time writes, “the intellection is inherent to the Beings” (Plotinus, p.505).

For the moment we will have to keep all these considerations concerning the ‘will’ in the back of our minds as we inquire into the nature of ‘power.’ Our inquiry into the nature of power will lead us to the heart of this chapter; Nietzsche’s theory of organization. The three sections following this one will elucidate Nietzsche’s theory of organization drawing upon the previous analysis we have accomplished in this chapter.

One of the reasons that so few scholars address this question is perhaps because the answer *seems* to be too simplistic. Arthur Danto articulates the Mongolian assumptions of a majority of scholars when he writes, “A force will tend to move outward forever until some external force impedes its dilation. We might think of this as the ‘first law’ of Nietzsche’s theory. Were it not resisted, a body (force) would occupy the whole of space. But there are other forces, each endeavoring to do the same” (Danto, 2005, p.202). Now we should unpack some of these assumptions. First of all this is Newtonian language, Danto is explicitly setting up the will to power to be a substitute for causational-based mechanics. We are describing a force like gravity, which permeates everything in the universe. This furthers the point we made in the last section that the will to power is the immanent cause of all these forces, like Schopenhauer’s will. And of course, Danto continues to clarify that “each force occupies a territory (an area of space)” (2005, p.202). So we see that the problem of space and time once again come into play. The problem that Kant set up and Schopenhauer based his theories upon, are once again playing a central role here, but this time no one recognizes them as the foundation.

Second of all, Danto is very representative of what we earlier termed the Mongolian interpretation. He claims the will to power is an, “active [...] blind urge, [...], without assistance, but also without interruption” (WWR1 p.150). What this means practically is that the will to power is primarily characterized by power struggles along its borders. There is one author who articulates what is implicit in this commonly used position extremely well: Donovan Miyasaki.

Miyasaki subscribes to the same thesis we have been pushing, that the will to power functions as an immanent ‘thing-in-itself.’<sup>110</sup> Miyasaki splits Nietzsche's will to power into two halves: qualitative and a quantitative. In his analysis the quantitative aspect of the will to power could be called the super-human viewpoint, or ‘objective

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<sup>110</sup> “From this twofold critical position, the inseparability of causal agencies from each other and from their own actions, we can draw the first key conclusion of the will to power ontology: reality consists of “will,” a general, holistic form of causality, rather than of discrete causal objects, agents, desires, or drives. For, if there are no discrete efficient causes, Nietzsche can describe events only as processes and objects only as elements within processes. This may be why he preserves the language of “will” despite its misleading connotations of agency and freedom. The word “will” is an appropriate critical description of a reality that lacks efficient causes because its meaning lies on the ambiguous border between agent and action. The will in “will to power” is a negative metaphor for the ontological absence of subjects, agents, and objects, for causality without causes (“will,” rather than “a will” or “wills”). So, the first claim in our argument for a will to power ontology is one that Nietzsche draws directly from the naturalist rejection of metaphysics: namely, there are causal processes but no causes; reality is a “will” that is equivalent to the causal process as a whole” (Miyasaki, 2013, p.255). And we can note here that , as we discussed in Chapter Two, Schopenhauer at his best *also* used the word ‘will’ negatively to describe the activity behind appearances.

measurements of power,' in contrast to the qualitative *feeling* of power. It is through the quantitative aspect that a '*hierarchy*' of more or less powerful wills is formed (Miyasaki, 2013, p.2). But Miyasaki chooses to focus on the qualitative aspect of the will to power; the subjective feeling of power, and more or less uses the quantitative aspect as a point of juxtaposition with which he can more clearly distinguish his project. He certainly doesn't follow the consequences of the quantitative hierarchy, or describe in detail what this hierarchy entails.

For Miyasaki the qualitative aspect of the will to power is characterized by resistance: "the will to power is a description of the causal process as a whole, according to which every event tends toward the maximal manifestation of power in the form of the activity of resisting, of action against obstacles" (2013, p.265); "Finally, the highest good, the feeling of power (das Gefühl der Macht), is inseparable from resistance (der Widerstand)" (2013, p.4). But this notion of 'resistance' is more than just an empty word to replace 'power,' it carries with it important ontological connotations. Significantly, the idea of resistance turns the will to power into an essentially *relational* theory: "At the same time, 'der Widerstand' (literally, what stands against) – a description of the obstacle rather than the act of resistance – perfectly captures the connection of power to equality. For the activity of resisting requires worthy opponents, resistances that can 'withstand' our activity, in order to produce the feeling of power. Consequently, Nietzsche's conception of resistance, as a relational concept joining subject and activity (widerstreben) to object that withstands (der Widerstand)" (2013, p.11). This is perhaps Miyasaki's most important step, it is an implicit assumption that is present in many critiques of the will to power, but it is only with Miyasaki that we see it made explicit. The notion of resistance being the primary characterization of the will to power. This is one of the reasons we chose the analogy of the Mongolian foreign policy, beyond the connotation of expansion at all costs, and brutal struggle, the Mongolian law relates to other bodies. This is precisely what Miyasaki is pointing out with this article.

When speaking of 'resistance,' Miyasaki is utilizing the common feeling of resistance in the most general sense, that all of his readers experience in their daily lives. He has taken this shared feeling that accompanies so many experiences and applied it to the level of ontology. In our opinion, Miyasaki takes this notion a little too far when he claims that Nietzsche makes a mistake in attempting to take his psychological theory into the world of the inorganic, "This move away from subjectivity complicates the qualitative dimension of power, since the desire to heighten the 'feeling' of power may be neither a conscious desire nor a desire for conscious states of feeling, but rather a drive for the complex, relational physiological or psychological conditions of such states" (2013 p.7). Although Miyasaki mentions the physiological implications of this theory, all of his conclusions place the will to power solely on the level of psychological. Miyasaki has a very difficult time translating his idea of resistance into the inorganic world, and truthfully, he doesn't feel like it belongs there. Resistance for him defines the qualitative aspect of

the will to power, but it seems that it fails to characterize the quantitative aspect. Miyasaki feels that the will to power is best used to describe motivations and psychology, as opposed to events or causality.<sup>111</sup> In this sense he follows Bernard Reginster, who we covered very closely in chapter one (2008, p.126–27).

While describing the relational significance of the will to power Miyasaki tells of a tennis player who can only experience a feeling of power or resistance while playing someone on her skill level, not a level above or below, thus implying the establishment of some sort of hierarchy of power (2013, p.11).<sup>112</sup> These power relations are such that she submits to the level above her, but dominates those who are below her ability, and fights those who are her equals. The relation to other external sites of power is what is essential, and this relation is one of constant antagonism and tension with one's neighbor's, ending in absolute domination or utter submission.

Because Miyasaki tends to restrict the will to power to the psychological realm, he doesn't follow up on the significance of *organization*. We have many implications of a quantitative hierarchy of power in his work, but he never pursues these implications to any sort of conclusions. The extrapolated significance of this example of the tennis player is that not only are certain subjectivities embroiled in these types of power relations, but that *all of existence is*. What follows from this is the question of organization.

### *Agon and Organization*

At this juncture we encounter a minority of scholars who write on Nietzsche's will to power in connection to his theory of Agon. We will be drawing mostly on Christa Davis Acampora as representative of the Agonistic interpretation of the will to power, but scholars who fall in line with her work include: Benjamin Sax (1997), Herman Siemens (2002), and Yunus Tuncel (2013). We contrast this interpretation of power against the Mongolian interpretation, in order to state what exactly our stance is on each of these we will first have to explain and contextualize them more fully. Following on a distinction that Nietzsche makes in *Homer's Contest* between 'Eris' and 'Envy,' these authors are all careful to distance themselves from an unqualified, 'raw' conception of power. In *Homer's Contest* Nietzsche quotes the description in *Works and Days* of Eris and Envy, saying that while Envy engenders competition and contest, Eris creates only war. We want to assert that Eris is representative of what we have called the Mongolian will to

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<sup>111</sup> "Nietzsche's ontology is indeed a tautological description of experience; it does not add positive information to sensible experience" (Miyasaki, 2013, p.265)

<sup>112</sup> Quantitative power increases relative to a decrease in others' power, necessitating inequality among agents. Qualitative power, in contrast, requires proportionality, a relative equality allowing only for non-disabling, non-dominating, and non-demoralizing degrees of inequality. (Miyasaki, 2013, p. 13)

power, an unrelenting, uncompromising, unmediated expression of domination. On the other hand Envy represents the more subtle Agonistic conception of the will to power. Writers who we have termed 'Agonists' such as Acampora use this distinction to attempt to retrieve Nietzsche's theory of power from fascist interpretations; defining 'Agon' against the interpretation that Nietzsche "is an *advocate* of war, violence, and cruelty" (2006, p.193). For the Agonists, the Agon is an essential part of a system that wards off these chaotic Erisian events.

The Agonistic conception of power expands upon Miyasaki's in that it posits an organization to the struggles of power, "Nietzsche remains attentive to *forms* of the struggles" (2006, p.186). The key to the Agonistic interpretation is the concept of *sublation*. This means that the Greek city-states did not just hold competitions for the entertainment of the people, but rather competition was a way of moving the entire society forward, it was a means of creation. Nietzsche asserts in *Homer's Contest* that until Homer, the Greek world resembled a barbarian landscape ruled by Eris. But once the structures of the Agon are established these Mongolian drives of power are redirected into a system that benefits the city-state: "A competitive institution comprises more than just the competitors and their intentions. Through reward and punishment, recognition and dishonor by the judges and the community, competitive institutions direct and influence modes of action that are realized in particular agonistic exchanges" (2006, p.20).

This structure of organization is essential to the Agon, which is very fragile and can disintegrate into its baser Erisian drives for power at any time, "The disappearance of Agon is bad not only for the individuals who lack an outlet to distinguish themselves but also for the community as a whole. Nietzsche thinks the Agon effectively channeled aggression, coordinated it with productive goals, and, once it disappeared, violence ensued" (2006, p.34).<sup>113</sup> Acampora makes an important move by linking this structure of the Agon to interpretation and meaning: "Although contests typically end when a particular individual distinguishes himself or herself in whatever way the contest sets up as decisive, there is a significant communal basis to this distinction" (2006, p.185). So we can assert that contests occur on an already established hierarchy of interpretations, and it is this hierarchy that provides the structure for the Agon.<sup>114</sup> This structure of interpretation may equally be termed 'Homeric' in so far as it was Homer who Nietzsche

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<sup>113</sup> This seems to be a concept developed by Plato in his *Republic*, where he defines Justice as 'Harmony of the city' (Republic 434c) and 'Doing one's own job.' (Republic 443b). In Nietzsche's words: "Every Athenian was to develop himself, through competition, to the degree to which this self was of the most use to Athens and would cause the least damage" (HC p.98). He also praises Plato on the next page, while mimicking Plato he says "Now I reject all of that and condemn all imitative art! Only the contest made me a poet, sophist and orator!" (HC p.99).

<sup>114</sup> A good practical example of this would be Lucius Cornelius Sulla's first march on Rome. Rome was surrounded by a sacred boundary called the Pomerium that by law no army could pass under arms, in exception of being granted a Triumph. Politically outmaneuvered by his rival Gaius Marius, Sulla brought an army into the city to enforce his will, proclaiming he was there to free the city from tyrants. His reinterpretation not only caught everyone completely off guard, but also destroyed the sanctity of the Pomerium, and powerful generals who came after Sulla now saw marching on the city as a viable way to achieve political aims.

identifies as instantiating the Agon. We will continue to bring in the Agonistic interpretation of the will to power in this chapter and the next, but for the moment our discussion leads us back to Miyasaki's question of organization; if the tennis player must rely on a structural hierarchy in order to participate in the Agon, what is the nature of this hierarchy? How does it originate?

The question of the organization of the will to power is not an obvious query. In essence we are looking for an explanation of the existence of repetition. What else does organization bring about except repetitiveness? So far, all the accounts of will to power that we have covered focus on individual wills to power, and conceptualize the universe as the battleground by which these qualitatively unique wills to power struggle with one another for absolute domination. The biggest issue with this worldview is that it doesn't seem to explain why there is so much similarity between what should be completely different wills to power. Why is it that the same inorganic material that is found everywhere on our planet is also present in large quantities elsewhere in the universe? This is to say nothing of living species: can species be said to be wills to power, or only their individual members? This is where most readers fail to take Nietzsche's theory seriously enough. When Nietzsche replaces the notion of causality with the notion of will to power, "All events, all motion, all becoming, as a determination of degrees and relations of force, as a *struggle*-" (KSA 9[91]), what does this actually *add* to our understanding of the universe? Somehow the theory of the will to power must account for *the same regularity that causality accounts for*. It is easy to see in an individual case how the synthesis that occurs between a specific piece of iron and sulfur to form iron sulfide could be characterized as a 'struggle between powers'; but how does the theory of the will to power account for the fact that this happens *anywhere* at *anytime*? Doesn't the very idea of a 'struggle' imply that in the billions of occurrences of this particular power relationship that occur across space and time, the iron or the sulfur would 'get the upper hand' in in at least some of them?

In order to explore this question we are going to have to deepen our understanding of 'power' to take some of these instances into account. Schacht is a good starting point, as he recognizes that the problem of organization in general does follow directly from the theory of the will to power: "What is decisive for the establishment or modification of the associated power-relationships is not their relative quantity as such, but rather their *organization*. To be sure, 'power' for Nietzsche is no more synonymous with 'organization' *per se* than it is with 'force.' There is 'power' as he conceives of it, however, only where there are 'power-relationships between two or more forces'; and these power-relationships, as he understands them, are essentially a matter of the establishment of one sort of organization (between competing systems or centers of force)" (1983, p.217). This is the same problem that Miyasaki ran into and avoided. If power is to be understood primarily as a relationship, then the interconnecting web of

power relations must be organized in *some* kind of fashion, even if it is accidental or chaotic.

Although he is not an Agonist, Ciano Aydin makes an impressive attempt to deal with this problem in a very direct fashion. He ascribes to the notion of power that we have been working with so far, namely that, “[Power] is characterized, and this is a crucial point, by intrinsic relationality: power is only power in relation to another power” (Aydin, 2007 p.26). Aydin follows the further implications of this, stating that if relationality is inherent in the will to power, then organization must be the immediate by-product of the will to power, and follow directly from its ontological implications.<sup>115</sup> The immediate implication of the ontology of the will to power upon its general structure of organization is that a hierarchy is formed. Miysaki had noted this in passing, but Aydin deals with it at more length, “‘will to power’ organization is subdued when it is converted into a function or functionary of another ‘will to power’ organization. [...] the suppression of a ‘will to power’ organization by another ‘will to power’ organization is accompanied by a hierarchical order: [...]The suppressing and converting into a function of a ‘will to power’ organization do not go on without struggle. The ‘will to power’ organization that is being subdued resists, because every ‘will to power’ organization is inherently directed at subduing. It is by virtue of this directedness that a ‘will to power’ organization resists being assimilated” (2007, p.31). Now at this point we can stop concealing our stance on the subject of hierarchy. It seems to us impossible to read quotes such as this without being reminded of Schopenhauer’s hierarchy of the *Ideen* that we covered in the last chapter. The relation between wills to power is characterized by domination or submission, forming a hierarchy of qualitatively different *types* of power, or *Ideen*. This language used in this quote supports this connection eerily well.

If we let Aydin continue, we can even see how the formation of new orders of power is increased through tension, in a replication of Schopenhauer's theory of how new *Ideen* arose, “Applying Robert Mayer's thesis of discharge, Nietzsche states that the suppression of a weaker ‘will to power’ organization by a stronger and the (re)arrangement of the elements of the organization that go along with that do not proceed gradually but abruptly. Nietzsche speaks about ‘regulating explosions’ A condition for that is tensile force, which Nietzsche relates closely to the will to power, as the following fragment shows: 'Will to power / tensile force' [Spannkraft]” (2007, p.32).<sup>116</sup> This is further connection to the Schopenhauerian schematic that Aydin unintentionally

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<sup>115</sup> “Nietzsche's interest in organization is not surprising: if multiplicity, variability, and relationality are essential constitutive aspects of reality, and if, as a result of that, there are no pre-given forms, then a seemingly independent and durable unity, that is, every perceivable form of reality, can only exist as a variable and relational multiplicity that is held together in some way. In Nietzsche's words: "All unity is only as organization and interplay a unity" . A variable and relational multiplicity that is kept together is an organization, that which keeps it together is, according to Nietzsche, will to power. Any instance of will to power as such cannot be a durable and independent unity. It is always a variable and relational multiplicity held together, and those wills to power exist only as a multiplicity of wills to power, and so on ad infinitum" (Aydin, 2007, p.30)

<sup>116</sup> It is possible Nietzsche gained insight into the nature of energy discharge through Mayer, but surely this notion of organizational power relationships came from Schopenhauer.

picks up on. This is not a coincidence; the question of the creation of new forms of organization must have a very specific framework in which it even makes sense. These two points of intersection imply a hidden ontological structure in Nietzsche that looks remarkably similar to what we have found in Schopenhauer.

The Schopenhauerian connection, which our authors do not mention, implies that these questions of organization in Nietzsche can be pushed even further. If this concept of power relationship is supposed to bring organization into the world, then it implies that general forces are in a relationship. Say, stones have a certain relationship with gravity, oxygen with fire. In which case we have stumbled into the territory of *Ideen*, that is, these conflicts must occur outside of space.

### *Types, Ideen*

It is our conjecture that Nietzsche has a concept that plays the same role in his philosophy that *Ideen* play in Schopenhauer's, this concept is *Types* [*Art, Arten*]. These two concepts are virtually identical, being attempts to answer the same question.<sup>117</sup> We will focus on Brian Leiter, who has consistently and specifically tackled the concepts of 'Types' in Nietzsche, and is representative of how scholars view this concept. Although we differ from Leiter in that he takes a strictly psychological approach to the subject, and we are going to treat the doctrine of types as virtually synonymous with the theory of *Ideen*. Leiter is focused on the ramifications the doctrine of types has upon the notion of fatalism and moral agency, we are interested in the ontological implications. Because of the scant scholarship on this subject we will use Leiter to introduce the concept of 'types,' he formulates his theory with clarity: "*Type-facts*—facts about the unconscious psychology and the physiology of agents—explain our actions"(Leiter, 2007, p.122).

Our question concerns the status of these 'facts.' Is every 'fact' repeatable, such as "John, Peter, Luke, and Paul are all men"? Or are these 'type-facts' absolutely individualized, so that none could be shared between different people? Leiter doesn't address this question directly, possibly because he's not interested in the same questions that we are. His main point seems to be trying to hammer home the idea that human beings have "immutable, determining characteristics, such that one may ask of a human being, as one may ask of a tree, 'What is it made of essentially?'" (2001, p.221). Leiter is implying here that a tree has an obvious foundational nature that it adheres to

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<sup>117</sup> Although it should be noted that early in his career, In *Human-All-Too-Human*, Nietzsche criticizes Schopenhauer's theory of *Ideen*. "It is not the world as thing in itself, it is the world as idea [*idee*] (as error) that is so full of significance, profound, marvelous, and bearing in its womb all happiness and unhappiness. This consequence leads to a philosophy of *logical world-denial*" (HATH p.27); also "*By what kind of philosophy art is corrupted*: - When in the midst of a metaphysical-mystical philosophy succeed in rendering all aesthetic phenomenon *opaque*, it follows that they are also *incapable of being evaluated* one against another, because each of them has become inexplicable"(HATH p.221).

with every new branch that it grows, and that humans function in a similar fashion. But we can see how he tantalizingly skirts our question, what about multiple trees? Does a copse of aspen trees share similar 'type-facts'? If so, can we say the same thing about humans, that all Christians for example share similar structural blueprints? All Jews? The implications of this theory need to be carefully considered, unfortunately Nietzsche never directly addresses his theory of types, preferring to attach this doctrine to other ideas he is exploring, for example: "What helps feed or nourish the higher type of man must be almost poisonous to a very different and lesser type" (BGE p.31).

Still, we claim Leiter does a good job of inferring the underlying philosophical thoughts behind these subtle aphorisms. However, we believe that Leiter is caught in a bind: "So morality and religion [...] prescribe and proscribe in order to *cause* a 'happy life' are, in fact, *effects* of something else, namely the physiological order represented by a particular agent" (Leiter, 2007, p.117). On the one hand by using the phrase 'particular agent' he seems to be asserting that every 'type-fact' is utterly unique to every individual. He will reinforce this by connecting the 'type-fact' with the particular environment and experiences of every individual. But on the other hand he attempts to explain mass movements such as the Christian religion as also based upon 'type-facts.' Either we have to say that certain 'type-facts,' and thus experiences and environments, are widely repeated throughout human beings, or that every 'type-fact' retains their uniqueness in subtle nuances. If the latter is the case then we would be forced to assert that many 'type-facts' resemble each other very closely. It is these resemblances that group together in amalgamations that form mass movements, and this amounts to very close to the same thing as the first option.

Even when Leiter does connect Nietzsche's doctrine of types to environmental factors in a move that would individualize each type, he also undermines this individualization, "Type-facts radically circumscribe possible developmental trajectories, but the environment (for Nietzsche, especially the *moral* environment) is quite significant in determining the outcomes. Think of some seeds from a tomato plant. No amount of environmental input will yield an apple tree from those seeds, yet the 'environment' (the amount of water, sun, pests, etc.) will affect which of the trajectories possible for a tomato plant—wilting, flourishing, or any of the stages in between—will be realized. Yet still the fact is that the *type* tomato is the only possible outcome, even though the particular token of a tomato we get may vary quite a bit" (2006 p.90). So Leiter actually uses an example that we might use when explaining the Schopenhauerian theory of *Ideen*. The tomato plant demonstrates how certain representations mold to their environment but each are fundamentally repeating a format that is described by the *Idee*. But this is just an example that Leiter uses to describe a psychological state, he nowhere follows the implications of a doctrine of types that could be extended beyond the contours of the human mind.

Leiter vacillates on the question of the ‘physicality’ of types, “Each person has a fixed psycho-physical constitution, which defines him as a particular *type* of person. These ‘type-facts,’ for Nietzsche, are either *physiological* facts about the person, or facts about the person’s unconscious drives or affects. The claim, then, is that each person has certain largely immutable physiological and psychic traits that constitute the ‘type’ of person he or she is. While this is not, of course, Nietzsche’s precise terminology, the ideas are familiar enough from his writings” (2006, p.88) What is significant about this quote is that instead of limiting himself in scope to psychological facts, Leiter leaves an opening for himself by stating that these facts may be physiological. Now this would allow us to assert that his example we have quoted is perhaps a bit more accurate. If a certain physiological fact that repeats itself throughout human beings can be considered a ‘type-fact,’ then we are in Schopenhauerian territory. In fact, there are times when Leiter acts as though these ‘type-facts’ are suprahuman, that the human is an accidental construction of these ‘type-facts’: “A ‘person’ is an arena in which the struggle of drives (type-facts) is played out” (2007, p.125). What is implied here is that these ‘type-facts’ are something that is not human in character, but rather an ontological product of the industry of the universe. Leiter will be even more explicit later on, and use the word ‘physical’ to describe what types act upon, “Nietzsche’s Doctrine of Types, his doctrine that the psycho–physical facts about a person explain their conscious experience and behavior” (2007, p.121). But we see that even though he is asserting that ‘type-facts’ *exist* on the level of the physical, he strangely restricts their domain of *influence* to the psychological, to ‘conscious experience and behavior.’

Furthermore, while Leiter makes a decent attempt to explain the role of types in human psychology he ignores the many places in which Nietzsche says that *man* is a type. “The time has finally come to replace the Kantian question ‘How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?’ with another question, ‘Why is the belief in such judgments necessary?’ – to realize, in other words, that such judgments must be believed true for the purpose of preserving beings of our type” (BGE p.13). In this instance the ‘type’ must be ‘human;’<sup>118</sup> we humans *all* believe in synthetic judgments, not a specific subset of humans. The implication is that if ‘type’ can refer to all humans generally, then it implies that the human is just a *category* of types. It wouldn’t make sense to assert here that there can only be types of humans, but not types of trees or types of stone. If we abstract this logic to its limit then ultimately “we ourselves are a type [art] of chaos –” (BGE p.114).

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<sup>118</sup>For more examples see also: “humanity has still not exhausted its greatest possibilities, and how often the type man has already faced mysterious decisions and new paths” (BGE p.92), “Every enhancement so far in the type “man” has been the work of an aristocratic society” (BGE p.151), “A *species* originates, a type grows sturdy and strong, in the long struggle with essentially constant *unfavorable* conditions” (BGE p.158), “Nothing can be predicted, but with a certain heightening of the human type a new force may reveal itself of which we have previously known nothing” (KSA 34 [125]), “the human type is to be heightened” (KSA 37 [8]), “the diminishment of the whole human type” (KSA 2 [13]), and “Anyone considering how the human type can be raised to its greatest magnificence and power [..]” (KSA 5 [98]).

We see only a couple instances where Nietzsche implies that the theory of types extends beyond the organic realm, “The will to one morality thus proves to be the *tyranny* of the type to which this one morality is tailored, over the other types: it is annihilation or standardisation in favour of the prevailing type (whether with the aim of ceasing to be dreadful to it, or of being exploited by it)” (KSA 9 [173]). It is true, here Nietzsche is speaking in the context of the types of men, but this logic of domination followed by reorganization and reinterpretation is undeniably influenced by Schopenhauer’s theory of *Ideen*. Perhaps this is why Nietzsche continually asserts that “the strong type is upheld as determining value...” (KSA 11 [407]). What determines value is what reorganizes, what *interprets*, and we have to admit here that the concept of type applies to the inorganic as well, granite and gravity are types. Also speaking of Kant, Nietzsche asserts, “The mechanical form of existence as the highest, most venerable form of existence, worshipping itself (- Type: Kant as a fanatic of the formal concept ‘Thou shalt.’)” (KSA 10 [11]). In this aphorism we have a clearer movement between the inorganic and the organic, by using the phrase ‘form of existence’ Nietzsche is implying that the type is an integral component of the organization of existence.

Let us consider this theory from a critical distance, isn’t it strange to say that there is a quality of repetitive certainness across the psyche of the human population, and *not* to say that there isn’t also a repetitive certainness that is found all throughout the universe? How could we claim this stability and repetitive sameness of our minds, which seem to be the sites of the *most* unpredictability and chaos in all of existence, and *not* apply this stability to the regularly ordered world outside of us? When Leiter continually uses these examples from the external world, comparing the human psyche to trees or plants, isn’t he attempting to indicate the regulative, repetitive quality that we observe in these natural, even inorganic phenomenon? Isn’t the very repetitiveness that we see in every apple tree and every slab of marble precisely what he is trying to bring to the level of the psyche? If so, isn’t the proper response to make an inquiry into this repetition itself? Leiter’s argument necessitates an expansion of the theory of types to the realm of the inorganic; it doesn’t make sense when it is restricted to the psyche.

Just as Schopenhauer’s will is connected to the theory of *Ideen*, the will to power is connected with the doctrine of types.<sup>119</sup> So there must be some drive to repetition in the will to power itself. In our examination we have not found any scholars who emphasize this aspect of the will to power, but in Nietzsche’s words, “The calculability of something that happens does not lie in a rule being followed or in a necessity being obeyed or in a law of causality having been projected by us into everything that happens: it lies in the recurrence of identical cases” (KSA 14 [98]). If we recall, the will to power is

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<sup>119</sup> Leiter actually almost takes up this very connection between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer that we are addressing. However like most of the authors who deal with Nietzsche and Schopenhauer his mistake is to not take the *Ideen* into account. Leiter posits that because in Schopenhauer the equivalent of these ‘type-facts’ are connected to the noumenal will, he is entirely distinct from Nietzsche (2006 p.249).

being used as a substitute interpretation for causality, and so this means that the will to power must be intimately tied to 'the recurrence of identical cases.' Nietzsche is attempting to *explain* these repetitive cases with the will to power. Nietzsche repeats this theme in his notes: "The rule is, rather, the struggle for power, for 'more' and 'better' and 'faster' and 'more often'" (KSA 34[208]). We see here an even more explicit equation between repetition and the will to power. To us this equation can only indicate that Nietzsche was attempting to solve the same problem that Schopenhauer was. If the Schopenhauerian will is used in part to explain the existence of repetition, then the Nietzschean will to power is also attempting to solve this very same issue, at the level of the noumenon.

So let us be explicit about what is happening beneath the dress of appearances, let us lay out Nietzsche's metaphysical claims about this repetition of types. Returning to the 'Time-Atom Fragment,' "Between each interval of time there is still room for infinite time-points; [...] a reproducing being is necessary, which holds earlier moments of time beside the present. In this our bodies are imagined. [...] The number and type of the succession of that one repeatedly placed point would then constitute the body. The reality of the world would then consist of a persisting point" (TAF p.2). In this dense note Nietzsche seems to be making a point about the *quality* of the will to power, it is not resistance, but rather *persistence*. He is positing the existence of a 'reproducing being' (we might equally say a 'reproducing force') outside of time itself, because otherwise he cannot solve the problem of repetition.<sup>120</sup>

To add more textual confirmation of this, in a Letter to Peter Gast dated March 20, 1882 quoted from Ansell-Pearson's *Nietzsche's Brave New World of Force*: "Boscovich and Copernicus are the two greatest opponents of optical observation. With effect from him there is no 'matter' (*Stoff*) any more - except as a source of popular relief. He has thought the atomistic doctrine through to the end. *Gravity* is certainly not a 'property of matter,' simply because there *is* no matter (*Materie*). The *force of gravity* is, like the *vis inertiae*, certainly a manifestation of force (*Kraft*), simply because force is all there is! Now the *logical* relation between these phenomena and others - for example, heat - is still not at all clear" (2000, p.27). Now certainly we see here the *exact* same problem between the nature of the Idee of gravity and the Idee of matter that we found in Schopenhauer. This specific problem wouldn't even arise for philosophies that aren't already considering the wider problem of repetition that the theory of Ideen and the doctrine of types attempt to solve. How could we fail to see the Schopenhauerian framework when Nietzsche calls gravity a 'manifestation of force'?<sup>121</sup> This implies that gravity is a type that wills itself to be more frequently repeated. In this sense every type

<sup>120</sup> Leiter talks about how type-facts are, "non-deterministic, perhaps even non-causal, *necessity*" (1996, p.225). This is a perfect description of the Schopenhauerian Ideen.

<sup>121</sup> Nietzsche also writes about the problem of knowing these forces in the same way Schopenhauer writes about the problem of knowing an Idee "The specifically qualitative aspect for example of every chemical process, still appears to be a 'miracle,' as does every locomotion; no one has 'explained' the push" (GS p.113)

can be said to be a singular will to power. But as he notes, there is still the problem of the interaction between these manifestations of force, or types. This is the issue we turn to in the next section.

### *Power Relations*

At this point we have been attempting to establish the existence of types as a solution to the problem of organization and repetition. We have seen that *the effect* of the doctrine of types is to assert the existence of fixed similarities between the psychologies of individuals. We then attempted to show how the doctrine of types only made sense if it extended beyond individual psychologies and instead encompassed all being. We then asserted the equivalence of the doctrine of types and the will to power; every type could also be called an individual 'will to power.' As per our discussion of the will to power earlier in the chapter, this would imply that every type was a metaphysical force that desired its own repetition. This is how Nietzsche is framing the problem of organization. As should be evident, this is very similar to how Schopenhauer framed the exact same problem. In this section we will sew Nietzsche to Schopenhauer more tightly by pointing out the similarities between how types interact with each other and how *Ideen* interact with each other. In doing so we will reencounter the Agonistic interpretation of the will to power. Acampora, our representative Agonistic interpreter, treats the types as a link between organization and power, "These structures of *orders of rank* and their discernible patterns are one significant, but not exhaustive, aspect of what might be regarded as Nietzsche's interest in types" (2013, p.162). What we will argue is that the significance of the Agon lies in the struggle between metaphysical types.<sup>122</sup> Recalling our section in the last chapter about the connection between *Ideen*, where we used the sloth and tree as an example, what we will assert is that it is at this level that Agon achieves its purpose: creation. Under Schopenhauer creation occurred due to contingent representational accidents, this was because the will was always attempting to express itself in the realm of representation. Creation of the new type does not occur for Nietzsche in the realm of causality, but rather the drama occurs between types, as we will see.

The famous critique of causality in Nietzsche is, "The unalterable sequence of certain phenomena demonstrates no "law" but a power relationship between two or more forces" (KSA 2[139]). If all repetition and regularity is a power play between at least two forces, then two main points follow from this. The first is an entailment of tension

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<sup>122</sup> Although it should be noted that the Agonistic authors unanimously disagree with our conception of the will to power as a metaphysical doctrine, "Nietzsche's will to power hypothesis does not posit a simple *Über-will*, or a will that promises to one day overpower all others, but rather functions as a descriptive characterization of the world as composed of dynamic conflicting forces" (Acampora, 2013, p.100).

between these two forces, in the same sense that we saw it implied in chapter two, in the section *Hierarchy of Ideas*.<sup>123</sup> This would mean that every regularity in the universe is a scene of stress and conflict.

The second subject that follows from this is more difficult. If we witness matter interacting with gravity in an extremely predictable way across a variety of circumstances, how could it possibly be construed as a 'power relationship'? Surely, 'power relationship,' or 'conflict,' would imply a kind of drive towards overpowering. How can we characterize the predictability and regularity of the forces in the universe as antagonistic? Could the earth's gravitational force decrease its hold on matter every now and then? Strangely enough, we will assert that this is entirely possible under Nietzsche's philosophy in the next section, but let us first discuss why.

Perhaps the second most anti-causal aphorism in Nietzsche's notebooks reads, "There is absolutely no other kind of causality than that of will upon will" (KSA 35[11]). This statement seems mystical, and nearly unexplainable, until one recognizes that the same assertion could just as well be said of *Ideen*. *Ideen* do not operate on 'matter' or representations, but primarily interact with each other, "it must be possible to act upon things from inside, instead of from outside, as is usual; that it must be possible for phenomenon to act upon phenomenon by means of that being-in-itself, which is one and the same in all phenomena" (WN p.76). Again, recall the example of the changing form of the sloth as it grew attached to the form of the tree from chapter two, and also that conflict at the level of representation does not affect the form of the *Idee* or type. The implication is that this struggle, or 'power relationship,' is not occurring on the level of causality, the phenomenal trees the phenomenal sloths climb do not affect the form of the sloth. Rather the drama between the two is taking place at the level of the noumenon, outside of space and time as they are represented. The 'wills' are acting on each other, the phenomenon we encounter are mere expressions of a struggle that is occurring in the world behind appearances.<sup>124</sup> This is the Agon that we wish to draw attention to, because it is only through this noumenal antagonistic struggle that the conditions for creation become possible.

This noumenal struggle is even described similarly by our two philosophers. For example, the power relationship between Nietzschean types is characterized by domination and exploitation in a very Schopenhauerian sense, "the stronger will directs the weaker. There is no other causality whatsoever than that of will on will. So far there has been no mechanistic" (KSA 35[15]). We recall that for Schopenhauer the lower *Ideen* still express their nature, for example gravity still works in the same way, but the

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<sup>123</sup> This tension is also what Aydin is referring to when he speaks of *resistance* characterizing the will to power.

<sup>124</sup> We should recall the metaphor of the symphony that Schopenhauer uses, the inner tension between *Ideen* is compressed in the metaphysical *Idee* itself, but is unfurled in the transient movements of the music. In the same way the struggles between types such as gravity and matter are essentially non-temporal, they struggle at the noumenal level.

higher Idee has made use of the lower one for their own benefit, the way the digestive tract utilizes the pull of gravity. This is precisely why Nietzsche used the term 'directs' in the previous quote, he means the higher type 'reorganizes' the types beneath it. In the same vein, "Slavery and division of labour: the higher type only possible by pressing down a lower one until it becomes just a function" (KSA 2[76]). So we can draw the conclusion that types contest each other in the same manner and be the same mechanisms that Ideen fight. That is, there is a dominating Idee or type that reorganizes all the types or Ideen below it in order to exploit them for its own purposes.

This is the very schematic that our Agonistic interpreters use to describe the will to power, "Another way of accounting for *willing* as Nietzsche depicts it is as shorthand for the *processes of organization of an entity* (Acampora, 2013, p.161). As well: "Agon, moreover, as an institution and structure, is a manifestation of this mastery" (Tuncel, 2013 p.175). And so we see that the product of the Agon is organization, the exploitation of the lower drives for the good of the higher type, the parts serve the whole.<sup>125</sup> This whole, in the Agonistic interpretation, is precisely the type that interprets and exploits the lower types that would devolve into chaos without its interpretive organization.

This is why Nietzsche writes in *Homer's Contest* about the practice of ostracism in the Greek cities. This is a metaphorical practice of freeing these lower types from the tyranny and repetition of the highest, organizing type, in order to create a bit of chaos. With chaos comes the risk that the whole which was held together by the strong type could disintegrate: "that pre-homeric abyss of a gruesome savagery of hatred and pleasure in destruction [...] appears quite often when a great figure was suddenly withdrawn from the contest" (HC p.99). *But it is also only in this period of enforced chaos that the Agon actually occurs.* A well organized and well ordered being controlled from the top down does not engender much competition, it is only through Agon, only by risking everything that a new type can be created. It is to this concept that we will now turn.

In the last two sections we have equated Types with Ideen, and placed them in the same ontological position. We further demonstrated the similarities between how they functioned Agonistically in relationship to other Types or other Ideen. Now we can begin to relate this slightly more closely to empirical experience by using an example. In the next section we will discuss the regularity and irregularity of the universe, the true Agon, and the concept of the 'risk.'

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<sup>125</sup>See: "In this book, I have tried to make the case that he thinks agonistic economies of power are particularly effective for coordinating and organizing various elements because they potentially produce values and provide imminent occasions for the development and exercise of judgment and such activities potentially orient organizations toward productive ends" (Acampora, 2013 p.161); and, "In this sense, what is destined to rule is simply whatever proves strongest, whatever succeeds in enabling the multifarious drives to be effectively coordinated in a single entity" (2013, p.164).

*Let the Die Be Cast!*

A Type manifests itself as a rhythm, some force that repeats itself at regular intervals. This much was implied in our section on the *Time-Atom* fragment earlier in the chapter. A will to power wills repetition in the phenomenal world, but not a repetition that merely preserves, a repetition that *expands*, "The rule is [...] struggle for *power*, for 'more' and 'better,' and 'faster' and 'more often'" (KSA 34[208]). What we are describing is the problem of regularity and irregularity. The manner in which Types behave in the phenomenal realm governs the regularity and organization, or lack thereof that we witness in the world. Not only are scientific experiments conducted on the assumption that a certain power relation (say between sulfur and oxygen) will repeat itself with precision, but the foundations of our planet, of the development of life, depend on a faith in innumerable repetitions, "Without this transformation of the world into figures and rhythms there would be nothing 'the same' for us, thus nothing recurrent, and no possibility of experiencing and appropriating, of *feeding*" (KSA 38[10]).<sup>126</sup> Our universe is composed of repetitions, if types did not manifest themselves as repetitions that scorn the distances of space and time then nothing could be built, one type could not *exploit* or *command* another, "I will say it again: what seems to be essential 'in heaven and on earth' is that there be *obedience* in one direction for a long time" (BGE p.77-78).

It is only through the submission of one type to another that Nietzsche can explain repetition and regularity in the universe, "Everything competes to preserve its type [...] Every type has its limits; beyond these there is no evolution. Up to this point, absolute regularity" (KSA 13 [315]). Types, like *Ideen*, must be fixed forces that work to repeat themselves. But what does he mean by 'limit' in this quotation? Here we enter into the concept of irregularity. Just as in Schopenhauer there could develop tension and antagonism between *Ideen* that led to catastrophe and vast reordering, so there is also something similar in Nietzsche's philosophy, this is the *Agon*.

"All overpowering and becoming-lord-over is a new interpreting, an arranging by means of which previous "meaning" and "purpose" must of necessity become obscured or entirely extinguished. [...] But all purposes, all utilities, are only *signs* that a will to power has become lord over something less powerful and has stamped its own functional meaning onto it" (GOM p.51). Every regularity which we have such faith in, must contain for the philosophical detective traces of an ancient struggle which occurred during a time when the universe was not so perfectly ordered, but also not so complex.

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<sup>126</sup> This falls in line with the *Agonists*: when discussing the debt that the competitors in an *Agon* owe to their predecessors Acampora writes in a footnote, "This system of indebtedness, its multiple layers and circuits, is playfully treated by Pindar in his ode for Hagesidamos, the boys' boxing victor in 476 B.C.E., *Olympian X*; it also is where Pindar recounts the founding of the Olympic games" (2006 p.197).

As we noted in the last chapter, this concept also exists in Schopenhauer. Disorder gives rise to an Agon between types, but the dominance and reordering of a single victorious type is the usual outcome of the Agon. "Ultimately and at their best, creative struggles aim at the production of new values and meanings" (Acampora, 2006 p.187).

As in Schopenhauer, the relations between types that govern the regularity of our universe are not quite in perfect harmony. For Schopenhauer it is when many Ideen conflict in a certain space and are stretched to their limitations that the will breaks into representation. Due to lack of evidence we cannot say if this is how Nietzsche thinks of the problem of regularity, but he certainly preserves something of this sentiment, "To recognize the active force, the creative force in the chance event: - chance itself is only the clash of creative impulses" (KSA 19 24[28]). Chance can only occur in a pocket of chaos, when certain power regulations cease to repeat perfectly. What is an accident except for something happening that is not part of the regular order? Something has failed to repeat, something about the situation was not predictable. Accidents could never occur if there were an totalitarian regularity of power relationships. The Agon develops out of this pocket of irregularity; its objective is to provide "radical openness for the circulation of power that avoids ossification into tyranny" (Acampora, 2013, p.25). And so there is something opportunistic, experimental, and creative, in the accident and the Agon.

Most familiar to our readers will be the historical accidents that occur when the commanding interpretations break down; the 'golden age' of Athens, the French Revolution, the Communist Revolution, the fall of the Roman Republic. In periods of history such as these, rhetoric (which we will discuss in the next chapter) becomes the most important skill. Any interpretation at all that can pander to the mob, that can at least mobilize the lower forces in *some* direction, gains power. These are times of tremendous tension and uncertainty, where every interpretation seems to be equally valid and nothing seems to have absolute meaning, giving rise to skepticism in Greece, and nihilism in Europe.

Even amongst the more stable power relations it is still possible for regulation to disintegrate and an Agon to emerge. Even amongst the types which govern our physiology as humans this is possible. "Mankind is a rope fastened between animal and overman – a rope over an abyss" (TSZ P.7). In these eras of catastrophic decline (say, the era of the death of god) all footing is lost, and there is no small risk that in the disorder amongst regulative power relations every bond could disintegrate. Which is why the philosopher is so vital, to bring a new organization and interpretation to ascendancy, "In all commanding it seemed to me there is an experiment and a risk; and always when it commands, the living risks itself in doing so" (TSZ p.89). As Deleuze points out, smaller accidents occur constantly, it is the choice of a gambler to take hold of these micro-events (1983, p.26-27).

The more catastrophic the breakdown of interpretative power is, the more chance there is for the accident to imprint its own order upon the system, but the more perilous it becomes to do so.<sup>127</sup> This is why omens were important in the Classical world, they were representative disturbances that signified that there was a disruption amongst the larger, more regular forces of the universe (Scott, 2014).

“*Cassius*: But if you would consider the true cause  
 Why all these fires, why all these gliding ghosts,  
 Why birds and beasts from quality and kind,  
 Why old men, fools, and children calculate,  
 Why all these thing change from their ordinance,  
 Their natures, and pre-formed faculties,  
 To monstrous quality, why, you shall find  
 That Heaven hath infus’d them with these spirits  
 To make them instruments of fear and warning  
 Unto some monstrous state.  
 Now could I, Casca, name to thee a man  
 Most like this dreadful night,  
 That thunders, lightens, opens graves, and roars  
 As doth the lion in the Capitol;  
 A man no mightier than thyself, or me,  
 In personal action, yet prodigious grown,  
 And fearful, as these strange eruptions are.

*Casca*: ‘Tis Caesar that you mean, is it not, *Cassius*?’  
 -(Act One Scene Three, *Julius Caesar*, Shakespeare)

### *Immanence*

Now we will take a brief interlude to conclude what we started earlier, and cement our criticism of Nietzsche as an ontologist of immanence. Instead of listing all the scholars who we feel adhere to this interpretation of Nietzsche we will instead engage

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<sup>127</sup> Acampora writes of the nature of the *failure* of the risk taker, which leads to total disintegration “Exceptional victory has a tendency to induce *hybris*, a belief in invincibility that can lead to the commission of violence, and a lack of respect for one’s opponents and the shared institutions that legitimate the triumph. Nietzsche claims that this happened in Athens following the Persian Wars—when the Athenians showed themselves to be such decisive victors in the war against the Persians, they disrupted the rivalry among the Greek city-states that had previously prevailed and served to regulate the significance of what it meant to be “Greek” (2006, p.186). And it was the *hybris* of the Athenians, this risk they took in an attempt to gain interpretive power not just over Greece, but over the whole mediterranean that led to their utter ruin, and opened the door to the conquest of Macedonian Barbarians.

with the cardinal proponent of this reading, the one who baptized Nietzsche along with Kant as a 'philosopher of immanence,' Deleuze.<sup>128</sup>

For Deleuze, an immanent critique is one that locates the problems it identifies within the system of methods it employs. He writes that in Kant, "what is criticized is no longer external to reason: [...] but illusions coming from reason as such. [...] What is the will which hides and expresses itself in reason? What stands behind reason, in reason itself? In the will to power and the method which derives from it Nietzsche has at his disposal a principle of internal genesis" (2006, p.91). What we notice here is that Kant is considered a transcendental philosopher because the noumenon is outside of rational understanding. The same could be said of Hegel, who in his *Logic*, asserts a primal movement of becoming between being and nothingness which stands outside of dialectical reason. But now where is the Schopenhauerian noumenon located? Deleuze has misread Schopenhauer because (aside from also asserting that the Schopenhauerian will is unitary) he fails to mention Schopenhauer's influence on Nietzsche concerning the *immanence of the noumenon*. For Schopenhauer the will is *precisely* what is found in reason, as we recounted in chapter two, reason is a pleasure seeking activity, sewn tightly to the will.

What is more interesting is that this is a conservative definition of the difference between transcendence and immanence, there is no mention of space or time, being or becoming, stasis or movement, or any of the other words which have commonly characterized scholarship concerning Nietzsche's 'philosophy of appearances.' Under this Deleuzian definition Schopenhauer is a philosopher of immanence, despite the fact that his will is not found in space or time. And so we return to the question with which we ended our first discussion of immanence and transcendence, 'where do we draw the line with Nietzsche?' The position of the Deleuzian line defines Kant as a transcendental philosopher but Schopenhauer as a philosopher of immanence.

And here we will see that Deleuze, the patriarch of this interpretation, cannot help but admit that at the very core of the dynamics of Nietzsche's will to power there is a confusion as to whether it is transcendent or immanent. "Action and reaction need affirmation and negation as something which goes beyond them but is necessary for them to achieve their ends. [...] Affirmation is not action but the power of becoming active, *Becoming active* personified. Negation is not simple reaction but a *becoming reactive*. It is as if affirmation and negation were both immanent and transcendent in relation to action and reaction" (1983, p.54). There is really only one way to successfully interpret this difficult passage, and that is through recourse to Lamarck. It is only with his notion that a desire exists as a pioneer, and that physical manifestation of the desire follows, that we see the meaning of the divide, not between will and representation, but between *Idee* and representation. This is the model for Nietzsche's conception of how

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<sup>128</sup> As Louis P. Blond notes in *Nietzsche and Heidegger: Overcoming Metaphysics*, Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche is precisely one of non-immanence (2010, p.136).

phenomena can express their type. And so we see the reason that Deleuze wrote such a sober and restrictive definition of the difference between a transcendental and an immanent philosophical method: he acknowledges that if one is to define 'transcendence' in the manner of the scholastics as that which is outside of space and time then it is impossible to deny instances of the transcendent in Nietzsche's philosophy of the will to power.

We are now in a position to articulate a final argument against scholars who view Nietzsche as a philosopher of immanence, and who will completely reject our analysis here. We claim that perhaps Nietzsche himself was aware of the problem between the noumenal will to power and his claims to a philosophy that dealt solely with appearances. In Schopenhauer the will is metaphysical, the *Ideen* are Platonic forms, so there is no need to explain action at a distance. Action at a distance becomes *the* big problem for Nietzsche when attempting to articulate the repetitive qualities of the types. For if there is a 'reproducing being' that creates all the corporeal instances of granite, for example then this reproducing being is the 'immanent cause' that is present in every instance of granite. We would then either have to assert, like Schopenhauer and Plato, that this force is not a part of the corporeal world, or that this force is somehow corporally unified across great distances of space and time, while remaining immanent to each phenomenon. As we demonstrated at the beginning of the chapter, this is a popular but mistaken viewpoint. But nonetheless, in Nietzsche's notes we find him attempting to explore this second option through the concept of action at a distance as an agent of unification. For example, in the 'Time-Atom fragment,' "The order of the world would consist in the regularity of time figures: yet one would then certainly have to think of time as working with a constant force, according to laws which we can only interpret from the coexistence. *Actio in distans temporis punctum* [Action at a distance of time]" (TAF P.2); "An effect of a sequence of time-moments is impossible: for two such time-moments would compenetrates. Thus every effect is *actio in distans*, i.e., through a leap" (TAF p.3); Also, "The triumphant concept of 'force,' with which our physicists have created God and the world, needs supplementing: it must be ascribed an inner world which I call 'will to power,' i.e., an insatiable craving to manifest power; or to employ, exercise power, as a creative drive, etc. The physicists cannot eliminate 'action at a distance' from their principles" (KSA 36[31]).

Our interpretation of these attempts at restricting the scope of the will to power to the realm of the phenomenal is that they are just that: attempts, experiments. Because so far it seems as though Nietzsche is at least implicitly considering the phenomenal world to be Schopenhauerian, that is, of an essentially causal nature. If the will to power is supposed to be beneath causality, it doesn't really have anywhere to go except to the noumenal realm. So Nietzsche would have to reinterpret the nature of appearances, the nature of the phenomena, in order to confine the will to power to this newly defined

phenomenal realm. All that we can point out is that he *attempts* to do this in places, that he seems to understand this predicament.

### *Power as Interpretation, Feeling of Power*

Now that we have finished our analysis of the links between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, we reach a stage where we can begin inquiring where Nietzsche departs from Schopenhauer. This would be in his conception of the nature of power: where Schopenhauer's will wills blindly, Nietzsche's will wills power. We have already touched on how the scholarship deals with the meaning of the word 'power,' and we do not wish to retract this analysis or argue with anything that has been said. We believe that the technical discussion that has surrounded the doctrine of the will to power is mostly correct. What we want to do is deepen the understanding of the nature of power in Nietzsche by adding a new aspect to the nature of power. As Aydin notes in his essay on the nature of power, "In Nietzsche's notebooks, will to power is further stipulated as commanding. Nietzsche states that 'the only force there is, is of the same type as willing: a commanding'" (Aydin, 2007, p.27).<sup>129</sup> Now Aydin attempts to read this as a confirmation of his theory of power as a will to overcome resistance, and in so doing encircles himself within the Mongolian sense of power as oppression. We interpret this aphorism differently; we ask what the nature of commanding is.

For us the key aphorism concerning power is this, "The will to power interprets: the development of an organ is an interpretation; the will to power sets limits, determines degrees and differences of power" (KSA [148]). For our reading the will to power is fundamentally an activity of interpretation.<sup>130</sup> It is through the act of interpretation that command is achieved and the hierarchy of types is ranked. Aside from Deleuze, whom we discussed in chapter one, several other authors agree with our estimation<sup>131</sup> that there is an interpretive element in the will to power: Aydin,<sup>132</sup> Poellner,<sup>133</sup> and Hill.<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> Another example of this is Miyasaki, who has written, "Power is tyrannical [...] It cannot be limited, delayed, or prevented except by a stronger power; it is ontologically, rationally, and morally lawless. Yet it remains a negative form of tyranny, based in the absence of any causal agency that could limit its impact. Because power has no agency, no capacity for self-mastery, only power relations can restrain it" (2013, p.261). Power does indeed contain an internal agency; this is the upshot of every type being an interpretation.

<sup>130</sup> It is our speculation that 'power' was another concept of Nietzsche's that greatly evolved after he broke with Wagner (especially because as we will see it is tied to the concept of imitation). It would deviate too far from our discussion to tell the story of the history of this concept in Nietzsche's thought, but there is clearly a marked difference between the power we are describing as interpretation, and the way the term 'power' is used in *Homer's Contest*.

<sup>131</sup> And as Loeb notes (2015, p.67), there are several authors such as George Stack (2005) whose theories imply panpsychism, but they shy away from explicitly asserting this radical doctrine.

<sup>132</sup> Aydin asserts that, "The activities of assimilation, selection, secretion, and so forth that are commonly attributed to the mind are, according to Nietzsche, in reality the essential functions of all organic life. Furthermore, all mental processes are in reality primarily characterized by these activities. By calling these activities "organic," Nietzsche does not want to reserve them only for the organic world, as distinguished from the inorganic. He accentuates with this

However Loeb vehemently disagrees with this position. First, Loeb claims the importance of published material over unpublished, and notes that there is only one occurrence of Nietzsche asserting panpsychism in his published work: BGE aphorism 36. To us, this is just a strategy to neatly limit the scope of his inquiry to a single aphorism. We have already noted repeatedly the ambiguous division between unpublished and published work, and we intend to show that Nietzsche's notes demonstrate this was a significant issue for him.

The substance of Loeb's argument lies in his adherence to the 'perspectivism' of Nietzsche, which leads to his that Nietzsche would transfer qualities that are unique to the mind into nature; citing several instances of Nietzsche criticizing similar tendencies of anthropomorphism. "Nietzsche's point here is that even what appears to be an absence or lack (in this case, of meaning) is actually still a human projection and falsification of the actual nature of physical reality. [...] It is very implausible that Nietzsche would want to counter the nihilism of mechanistic physics by further psychologizing and mythologizing a theory that he thinks is already too psychologized and mythologized" (2015, p.69). We would counter this argument with the criticism that in order to assert this argument one would have to presume that there was an actual name of being that one is mispronouncing. Loeb's assertion that Nietzsche does not want to mythologize, "the actual nature of physical reality" seems to us to be an untenable position aimed at condensing Nietzsche into a perspectivist mold.

In a more telling moment Loeb calls panpsychism: "A confused projection of human psychology into places where it simply cannot be" (2015, p.72). Which indicates more honestly his stance in this matter. He uses the term 'panpsychism' throughout his essay as if it is a logical fallacy. He attempts to save Nietzsche by placing it under the harmless category of a 'mere' interpretation. "I would like to contest this point of agreement among all these commentators and propose that in BGE 36 Nietzsche is not concerned at all to prove the truth of his power physics" (2015, p.78). Loeb makes a very well reasoned argument, he does note that Nietzsche often creates 'traps' for his readers in his published work, and he dissects the language of the aphorism to find the seeds of doubt and perspectivism placed in crucial locations. "On this new exegesis of BGE 36, there is no question of Nietzsche anthropomorphically claiming the truth of panpsychism, and there is no worry about Nietzsche contradicting the post-theological, naturalistic methodology announced in GS 109. For panpsychism turns out to be merely a counterfactual thought experiment whereby Nietzsche thinks we humans are best able to attain an imaginative vision of the cosmological will to power" (2015, p.81). Loeb makes the convincing argument that many other interpreters of this aphorism have not taken the

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designation their preconscious and necessary character. These processes essentially characterize all reality" (Aydin, 2007, p.33).

<sup>133</sup> Poellner believes that "we should think of force—and hence, granted the truth of dynamism, all of reality—as somehow involving mentality or a "will" (Poellner 2013: 688).

<sup>134</sup> 2003, p.85-89

'conditional language' of the aphorism into account, and do not recognize that Nietzsche has philosophical reasons for using this kind of language. Where we would have to disagree with Loeb is in his dismissal of Nietzsche's notes. It seems to us that these give more credence to his panpsychism than to relegate it to a 'mere interpretation.' As we will continue to demonstrate, it was an interpretation that he spent a lot of effort thinking over, and testing out. Furthermore, we will demonstrate that the ramifications of the doctrine of panpsychism will be crucial to defining the Nietzschean organism.

The problem we find with all of the interpreters who agree with us is that they not only use the idea of panpsychism to do away with the problem of the organic (like Deleuze did in chapter one), but that they retreat from describing the consequences of this radical doctrine. If the will to power is really at its basis just interpretation, then how would an interpretation contest its neighbors? How would an interpretation come into contact with resistance?

Under the Schopenhauerian framework this is not difficult to speculate upon. As we have shown in the previous chapter, every *Idee* is connected to others, and fights to exploit the others. There are many examples at the political/cultural level of wars between interpretations. What is difficult to tell is how far Nietzsche is moving away from Schopenhauer in stating that power is interpretation. Would Schopenhauer say that an *Idee* is an 'interpretation'? It is difficult to say, certainly every *Idee* a limitation, a determining of the will, and furthermore something that is to be known, but it would probably go too far to state that an *Idee* is something that does the knowing.<sup>135</sup>

But for Nietzsche every type *is* a kind of activity of knowing, "Because every drive craves mastery, and *this* leads it to try philosophizing" (BGE p.9); "philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the "creation of the world," to the *causa prima*" (BGE p.11). These sections illustrate not only that types are fighting using interpretation as their weapon, but that *domination* is gained through interpretation. "Interpretation is itself a means of becoming master of something" (KSA 2[148]). As we implied in *Let the Die be Cast!* philosophy is the ultimate establishment of an interpretative world view.<sup>136</sup> Every organ interprets, but there is always a commanding interpretation under which every other interpretation fits. In the same way that there is a commanding *Idee*, which governs the *Ideen* below it.<sup>137</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> Although there are tenuous reasons to believe that he might: when he names the thing-in-itself 'will,' this does imply an assortment of qualities, such as purpose or desire, and maybe even intelligence. Also, Plotinus believed that sensation was a property of matter (I.1.2; I.1.6).

<sup>136</sup> It is with philosophy that one names, one claims *this* is such and such. For Nietzsche the other disciplines are imitators of the forms that philosophy gives them. The confidence with which Mirebeau speaks of freedom was given to him by Voltaire, Pericles would not have been possible without the Ionians, Washington would not have fought were it not for Locke.

<sup>137</sup> While we do not have the space to account for the many uses of the term 'interpretation' in the Nietzschean philosophy, we can say that it is here, at the noumenal level of types, that morality comes into play as an appendage of interpretation, "The will to one morality thus proves to be the tyranny of the type to which this one morality is tailored, over the other types: it is annihilation or standardisation in favour of the prevailing type (whether with the aim of ceasing to be dreadful to it, or of being exploited by it.)" (KSA 9[173]).

Now that we have established that the will to power is an interpretative activity before it is an activity of domination, we should attempt to further define 'interpretation.' How colloquially is Nietzsche using this word? Is he really asserting that there is a kind of thinking or perception that happens even in the inorganic world?

We assert that yes, he does.<sup>138</sup> Our thesis argues that for Nietzsche the will to power is not only a force that creates unities, and repetitions (like the *Ideen*), but that it is also in the most rudimentary sense imaginable, 'aware.' "The will to sameness is the will to power - the belief that something is thus and thus, the essence of judgment, is the consequence of a will that as far as possible it shall be the same" (KSA 2[90]). We understand the connotations of 'sameness' as 'rhythm,' but what is curious here is the word 'judgment.' It is used to denote the same thing as interpretation, so that it could equally be said that a will to power judges, or that a type interprets. And so whether we use the term 'interpretation,' or 'feeling,' or 'perception,' or 'thinking,' in this section, know that we are referring to the elementary awareness that Nietzsche claims of every Type. To remind our readers of the radicality of this, we are still at the level of the inorganic, so in what sense could granite contain a faculty of judgment? In order to answer this question we will have to begin on the level of what is obviously organic, and work our way down.

First we should distinguish between a judgment and a judge, for Nietzsche, the former takes place without the latter (there is no doer behind the deed). So judgment is a kind of interpretation that occurs autonomously, it is a kind of thinking that is without reference to a subject that thinks. Let us look at what level Nietzsche believes this process to occur: "There must have been thinking long before there were eyes; 'lines and shapes' were thus not originally given. Instead thinking has longest been based on the sense of touch: yet this, if it is *not* supported by the eyes, only teaches degrees of pressure [Druckgefühls], not shapes. Thus, before we started practicing our understanding of the world as moving shapes, there was a time when the world was 'grasped' as changing sensations of pressure of various degrees" (KSA 40[28]). Now here Nietzsche is obviously talking about life forms, so this cannot be taken as an answer to our question of a degree of thinking in the inorganic, but if we begin here our examination can lead us further down. Nietzsche is making an evolutionary claim in this note; he is speaking of the first organic life forms. It is his contention that these life forms were also 'thinking' beings, that they 'grasped' the world. And the way that they grasped the world was through *feeling* or sensation.

If we follow this line of thought we could begin to identify the boundary between the organic and the inorganic. But we will have to wait until the next chapter to go into detail about the nature of this boundary. So as Nietzsche does in the following note, let's skip over it:

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<sup>138</sup> The scholars who agree with us on this subject we have already covered at the beginning of chapter one.

'The sensation of force cannot proceed from motion: sensation in general cannot proceed from motion.' It is only an apparent experience that speaks in favor of this: in a substance (brain), sensations are produced by transmitted motion (stimuli). But produced? Would this prove that the sensation did not exist there at all? so that its appearance would have to be conceived as a creative act on the part of the motion? The sensationless state of this substance is only a hypothesis! it is not experienced! - sensation is thus a *property* of substance: There are substances that have sensation (KSA 24[10]).

There is something very haphazard about this note, he is thinking through a problem, but which problem? What Nietzsche is contemplating here is the possibility of the existence of interpretation, or judgment, or *thinking* in the realm of the inorganic. We see him attaching sensation, in the sense of 'rudimentary judgment' that we have just covered, to an even more rudimentary force, the *most* rudimentary force: motion itself. *And this* is why Nietzsche continually uses the phrase '*Feeling of power*,' "Can we assume a *striving for power* without a sensation of pleasure and unpleasure, i.e. without a feeling of the increase and diminution of power?" (KSA 14[82]).<sup>139</sup> Nietzsche has tied together the ideas of thinking, judgment and sensation, and then declared that these are properties of *motion*.

At this point we probably cannot help but wonder what then is nature of the border between our experience of sensation, and feeling that belongs in the inorganic? Even if Nietzsche is bowling over the difference here and asserting a *fundamental* sameness between the kinds of sensation we experience and the kinds of sensation that exists in the inorganic, we still must ask where the *appearance* of difference originates. This is the question of life, the question of the nature of the barrier between the organism and world. So again, we will have to wait until the next chapter to describe this in depth.

Let us summarize: the will to power is interpretation; interpretation for Nietzsche is a foundational activity that unites the inorganic and the organic. At the lowest levels of our being, we interpret. It is our contention that the colloquial understanding of the term does not need much modification in order to explain. "Who interprets? - Our affects" (KSA 2[190]). Interpretation is the bodily creation of *meaning*. The meaning that we experience through touch and sensation is close to what Nietzsche means when he uses the term 'interpretation.' It is a limiting, directing, commanding, unifying activity, "Every willing unites a multiplicity of feelings" (KSA 38[8]).<sup>140</sup> In this aphorism we come to the

<sup>139</sup>Williams has posited that he makes the switch from desire for power, to feeling for power because he wants to move the theory will to power beyond the psychological. Of course, as Miyasaki notes (2013, p.6), he also uses this phrase 'feeling of power' in his last works, so this isn't correct. Miyasaki believes, "By equivocating between power and the feeling of power, Nietzsche can ignore aspects of qualitative power that are unhelpful to his anti-egalitarian arguments" (2013, p.4). If we recall Miyasaki differentiates between qualitative and quantitative power, which relies on an 'objective standard, by which power could be measured, which we believe is a mistaken reading.

<sup>140</sup> See also "*The will to equality is the will to power - the belief that something is thus and thus (the essence of judgment) is the consequence of a will as much as possible shall be equal*" (KSA 2[90]).

key point, he is linking sensation and 'will.' We can say that sensation is the *phenomenal manifestation of a type*; sensation is something like the kind of thinking and judgment that a type engages in. Because even our understanding is only a more nuanced and complicated flowering of this rudimentary thinking, if we wanted to be poetic, as Nietzsche frequently does, we could call the kind of interpretative activity that all types undertake 'thinking.'<sup>141</sup>

This is what Nietzsche means when he says "In every act of will there is a commandeering thought, - and we really should not believe this thought can be divorced from the "willing," as if some will would then be left over!" (BGE p.18). Or, "Thoughts are actions" (KSA 1[16]). Nietzsche is here connecting the will to power with rationality, tying the knot between thinking and sensation; this is also what he is referring to when he speaks of the 'great reason of the body' in *Zarathustra*.<sup>142</sup>

But how does this play into our concept of power relations? Let us revisit our quotation, "The will to power interprets: the development of an organ is an interpretation; the will to power sets limits, determines degrees and differences of power" (KSA 2[148]). So every organ produces significance, that is, it communicates. "It is of the essence of a language, a means of expression, to express a mere relationship-" (KSA 14[122]). We notice he says 'a language' here, which indicates to us that he could be talking about this rudimentary form of communication that occurs at the physiological level. To reaffirm this concept of meaning in the physiological realm let us use an example. The liver is struggling for power, just as the heart is, but they are unified and *kept down* by the brain. It is the brain that subjugates them and commands them, and it is *for* the brain that they interpret, it is primarily towards the brain that they articulate meaning. We have already noted that they surrender to this unity so that they can still subjugate lower types than themselves; the heart governs the blood for example, which communicate messages to it.<sup>143</sup> This same system of interpretive relations occurs on the level of the inorganic. Just as in Schopenhauer, stones dominate and interpret gravity; they make use of the gravitational functions. This is why Nietzsche makes the connection between life and the will to power (which we have dealt with in chapter one), not because the definition of life

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<sup>141</sup> It should be again qualified that one of hazards we run into in this interpretation is that it is clearly still a question for Nietzsche, "Morality is part of the theory of the affects: how closely do the affects approach the heart of existence?" (KSA 1[73]). He did not have his mind made up on this subject, but the fact that the thought occurred to him many times is undeniable. Although he will also write more confidently later on that, "That the will to power is the primitive form of affect, that all affects are just elaborations of it" (KSA 14[121]).

<sup>142</sup> It also gives the full weight to this aphorism, "The greatest events and thoughts – but the greatest thoughts are the greatest events – are the last to be comprehended: generations that are their contemporaries do not experience these sorts of events, – they live right past them. The same thing happens here as happens in the realm of stars. The light from the furthest stars is the last to come to people; and until it has arrived, people will deny that there are – stars out there. "How many centuries does it take for a spirit to be comprehended?" – this standard is also used to create the rank order and etiquette needed – by both spirit and star" (BGE p.171)

<sup>143</sup> See KSA 11[111]

is the will to power, but because the inorganic and the organic share this one foundation of will to power.<sup>144</sup>

As we mentioned in chapter one, there have been a few philosophers who have picked up on this topic. But in general they use it to deny the existence of the organic in Nietzsche, and to dismiss the boundary between the inorganic and the organic. As we will show in the following chapter, Nietzsche does not dismiss this boundary at all.

The most prominent of these authors is Deleuze, “The birth of a living body is not surprising since every body is living, being the ‘arbitrary’ product of the forces of which it is composed” (Deleuze 1983, p.40). But it may be just as fair to say that Deleuze is picking up on this notion in Nietzsche as it is to say that Nietzsche and Deleuze both appropriate this idea from a different scholar Leibniz.

For Leibniz the monad is the simple substance, or “the real atoms of nature and, in a word, the elements of things” (M prop. 3,). The monad has only one quality, “perception” (M prop. 14). These smallest units of reality that carry the property of perception are called ‘simple’ in contrast to ‘complex.’ The difference between the perception of the living and the perception of the dead for Leibniz is only one of the relative simplicity of complexity of the sensations experienced. “But as feeling [*le sentiment*] is something more than a bare perception, I think it right that the general name of Monads or Entelechies should suffice for simple substances which have perception only, and that the name of Souls should be given only to those in which perception is more distinct” (M. prop. 19). Furthermore, we have noted that sensation is the first qualitative representational expression of a type. And while Leibniz does not ascribe to any notion that is similar to the ‘type’ he does hypothesize that this one quality of the monad, perception, is fundamentally a *relation* (M prop. 13, 14). This mimics the relations between types that occur separately from space and time.

We could perhaps even trace this idea further back than Leibniz. It may be found in Anaxagoras or Democritus, both people that Leibniz, Nietzsche, and Deleuze all certainly read.<sup>145</sup> For Anaxagoras everything was originally a multiplicity, *indistinguishable*, completely heterogeneous, yet completely homogeneous, similar to Deleuze’s idea of a *pure* difference, where difference precedes sameness ontologically. Then a force arrives which separates this universe into distinct things, and therefore creates *sameness, compression, generality, and repetition*. Only with separation do we

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<sup>144</sup> “The organic functions translated back into the fundamental will, the will to power- and as having split off from it” (KSA 35[15]) For Nietzsche, the will to power a fundamental force in the universe, and when Nietzsche says ‘life is will to power,’ he isn’t excluding inorganic material from *also* being will to power, he is simply asserting that life *too* is will to power.

<sup>145</sup> Thacker picks up on the significance of this concept in the history of the philosophy of life. His term for this is ‘univocality’ “the oneness of the divine in the earthly, or the Creator in relation to the creation” (Thacker, 2010, p.119). Thacker is using the term ‘divine’ in this context to refer to the metaphysical idea of life that is beyond all instances of the living. He ascribes this concept to Eriugena, Duns Scotus, Spinoza, Deleuze. Thacker situates his discussion in terms of the proliferation of pantheism, because he has shown earlier in his work how the ontological idea of life is associated with the divine.

get complexity, which is the reintegration of difference based on sameness into this unified multiplicity, and then we are able to distinguish between different things. This sundering force goes by two names in Anaxagoras, 'movement' and 'mind' [voũς]. And so with brilliant succinctness Anaxagoras recapitulates all of the major concepts we have covered in this chapter. He first implies that separation is a transcendent act, it is something ontologically different from pure difference, it acts upon and affects pure difference. This is *similar* to the metaphysical nature of the will to power (except like the *Ideen*, the will to power does not have 'material' that it acts upon). He asserts that the force of kinesthetic movement in the universe is characterized by thinking; the same move we saw Nietzsche making a few paragraphs earlier.

### *Conclusion*

So now that we have established the existence of something *like* meaning or thinking in the inorganic, let us summarize the chapter by revisiting our question of how Nietzsche breaks from Schopenhauer in the concept of power, and what power is in the context of interpretation. In this chapter we tied our analysis of Schopenhauer to Nietzsche's philosophy. We have demonstrated the connections between the will to power and Schopenhauer's will, between Nietzschean types and Schopenhauerian *Ideen*. This allowed us to conceptualize how organization was achieved in the Nietzschean universe. We have also moved beyond Schopenhauer, and concentrated on the nature of power in Nietzsche's philosophy. We have shown that the Mongolian interpretation of the will to power which gives sense to most scholarship is all in all mostly correct, but lacking in finesse and subtlety. We contrasted this to the Agonistic interpreters, a division which we will have occasion to explain more fully at the end of the next chapter.

For Nietzsche power *does* strive for domination, but its primary activity is interpretation, not brute force. Or rather, brute force is just a certain kind of interpretation. We have shown what the meaning of interpretation is, and why Nietzsche continually uses the phrase 'feeling of power.' Most importantly we have explained Nietzsche's radical supposition that a rudimentary kind of thinking exists in the inorganic realm. Again, we have qualified this to show that this type of thinking is closer to our experience of 'feeling' than our experience of 'thinking.' This was an important move to make because it means that we can categorically reject any definition of life that relies on the experience of life. There is a rudimentary 'experience' in the inorganic world, this is something shared between the living and the dead, and so it cannot be used as a basis of distinguishing one from the other. In this chapter we have restricted ourselves to the realm of the inorganic, in the next chapter we will define and describe the organic world.

# Chapter 4

## *Part One: Psychological Secrets*

*"The mass of mankind wears thousands of layers that cover his true being, the world, and all of life's surfaces which in spots harden and become impenetrable" (Andreas-Salomé, 1988, p.47)*

### *Introduction*

As we have shown at the very beginning of the first chapter, it has been generally assumed by scholarship that when Nietzsche gives us moral commands they must in some way be connected to his conception of life. Scholars have even described this as the central project of the Nietzschean philosophy, commonly claiming that the 're-evaluation of all values' is an attempt to re-establish values that are based on 'life' instead of Christianity, or Nihilism. But so far, we have found that scholars tend to only cite the ethical injunctions Nietzsche gives us that counsel us to expand our power in a Mongolian fashion (p.106, 108, 114-116). There is an entirely different category of mandates in Nietzsche's writing that is mostly ignored: "Run away and hide! And be sure to have your masks and your finesse so people will mistake you for something else, or be a bit scared of you! And do not forget the garden, the garden with the golden trelliswork! [goldenem Gitterwerk]"<sup>146</sup> (BGE p.26), and "Stand tall you philosophers and friends of knowledge, and beware martyrdom! Of suffering 'for the sake of truth'! Even of defending yourselves! You will ruin the innocence and fine objectivity of your conscience, you will be stubborn towards objections and red rags, you will become stupid, brutish, bullish if, while fighting against danger, viciousness, suspicion, ostracism, and even nastier consequences of animosity, you also have to pose as the world wide defenders of truth" (BGE p.26).<sup>147</sup> These aphorisms contradict the Mongolian interpretation, and so present a problem for scholars who adhere to this reading.

How are we to make sense of these instructions Nietzsche gives us? It is my hypothesis that we do not have to abandon the understanding that Nietzsche's ethics is tied to a conception of the organism. The purpose of the following section is to introduce

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<sup>146</sup> The garden with golden trellis work is a reference to the 1304 tragedy *Amadis of Gaul* (Later parodied in *Don Quixote*). The garden is on an island that belongs to Don Gandales, in chapter 3 volume 4. It is described as a rare hideaway, where all the rarest and unseen things of the world are collected. There is also a reference to a garden with golden trelliswork in Emile Zola's *Rome*, but this work was published in 1896.

<sup>147</sup> See Also: "Against war it can be said: it makes the victor stupid, the defeated malicious" (HATH p.163); "[In anyone who subjugates himself to custom] the organs of attack and defense [...] degenerate: in other words, that particular someone becomes increasingly more beautiful! For it is the workings of those organs and their corresponding disposition that both sustain and increase ugliness" (D p.23)

a theme in Nietzsche's thought that has been all but ignored by scholars. The themes of the 'hidden' and 'masks.' We will begin by restricting ourselves to the psychological level. This will allow us to develop a more simple language for understanding this subject, so we don't get immediately lost in the complexity of the role this topic plays in Nietzsche's philosophy. As we continue through the chapter we will make more and more references to Nietzsche's ontology that we covered in the last chapter. The second half of this chapter will be entitled *Ontological Secrets* and will deal exclusively with the ontology of the organic.

By dividing this chapter into two parts, the psychological and the ontological, we will be returning in a sense to our first chapter. Among the kinds of questions we will encounter in the first part of the chapter are 'how should life be lived?' 'How are we to deal with suffering?' In the second half of the chapter, we will answer the question of the organic, the definition of the organism. By linking the explanations in these two sections we will not only be pursuing a definition of life, but we will be establishing the continuity in Nietzsche's thought between the different definitions of life. We will be drawing out the significance of a theory of the organism, by describing its consequences the psychological world.

### *Clothes, Convictions, Masks*

We can begin our examination of Nietzsche's psychology of secrets with a deceptively simple assertion, "Every man strives instinctively for a citadel of secrecy where he is saved from the crowd, [...] where he may *forget* "men who are the rule" (BGE p.27).<sup>148</sup> Like most great philosophers Nietzsche writes very precisely. When he writes 'every,' he does not mean 'most,' or 'a lot,' he means exactly what he writes. It can be difficult to interpret Nietzsche literally; many of his aphorisms seem to make liberal use of hyperbole and metaphor. However it is one of the goals of my thesis to adhere to the letter of his texts in my interpretation, and indicate the advantages of doing so. In this instance we must stress that Nietzsche is making a claim about human nature: specifically that every human being actively attempts to hide from other human beings. But this is a very ambiguous claim, and like 'power,' we risk misunderstanding Nietzsche if we assume that his use of this word stays faithful to our ordinary usage. Nonetheless, in order to build a firm foundation we must begin by analyzing the most obvious associations Nietzsche is drawing on with this term.

The first step towards a conclusion that readers will undoubtedly take from this aphorism is in the direction of 'embarrassment.' When women or men hide, it is out of

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<sup>148</sup> Also see: "How worm-eaten and full of holes, how well and truly built on deception and dissimulation, human life seemed to me to be. (KSA 30[68])

embarrassment, "Shame exists wherever there exists a 'mystery'" (HATH P.53, see also HATH p.327). If we combine this aphorism with our first thought of this section, that man strives to be the mysterious, we can say that society is structured around a system of avoiding this shame that accompanies the mystery. Nietzsche implies that at least the higher men operate in this way, "a more refined humanity will have great respect for "masks," and will not indulge in psychology and curiosity in the wrong place" (BGE p.167). Shame exists as a kind of *protection* for the mystery, this is why Zarathustra feels shame before the ugliest man, and attempts to flee, he wants to keep secrets from this poisonous being.

The protection that shame offers can be taken in a straightforward, biblical sense, referring to the fact that people literally cover themselves with clothing. One of the impetuses of early Nietzsche's work, especially in *Human-All Too-Human*, is to reveal how problematic the things that are closest and most familiar to us are. The problem of clothing, as an example, is a problem that "first confronts us when we begin to realize how much we could do without it" (GS p.211). And so we find Nietzsche talking about what is too familiar to us, "The naked human being is generally a disgraceful sight - [...] I think not only mirth would be lost, but also the strongest appetite discouraged, - it seems we Europeans are utterly unable to dispense with the masquerade called clothing. [...] The European disguises himself *with morality* because he has become sick [...]" (GS p.210). Reading to the letter, Nietzsche is asserting here that the beauty and laughter of European culture relies on a basic hiding of oneself from others, a dissimulation. What is interesting about this passage is that after dealing with concrete reality, he makes a more abstract psychological observation. In the same way the Europeans wear clothes to ensure that beauty, laughter, and appetite are sheltered and preserved, they also hide *something else*, under a mask of righteousness. Nietzsche is implying that in both cases, the European man is trying to avoid embarrassment.

We see an analogy being formed between clothing and thinking, "Most people are nothing and count for nothing until they have clad themselves in general convictions and public opinions - in accordance with the tailor's philosophy: clothes make the man.<sup>149</sup> In regard to exceptional men, however, the saying should read: only the wearer creates the costume; here opinions cease from being public and become something other than masks, finery and camouflage" (HATH p.288). Nietzsche is saying something very important here, and we could miss his point if we dismiss the first part of this aphorism as hyperbole. But if we hold on to our hypothesis that he is very specific with his wording, and is more interested in philosophy than drama, we can postulate that this 'something else' we referred to in the above paragraph is in fact, 'nothing.' Wouldn't we agree with the statement that 'the opinions make the man'? That what is most dear to a human being are the beliefs and convictions they hold? Maintaining a psychological reading of

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<sup>149</sup> "Kleider machen Leute" perhaps a reference to Hamlet Act I Scene III "For the apparel oft proclaims the man."

this quote, we can speculate how certain opinions, just like clothes, assert positive qualities; they are marks of distinction in our society. Can we not think of certain opinions that certain subcultures all seem to share? Certain opinions that are requisites for holding a public office? And isn't clothing one of the first indicators of which subculture an individual belongs to? Nietzsche's hypothesis is that opinions are like clothes, that is, they are designed to distract from the fact that they are hiding something.

But what of the second part of the above quote? What does he mean when he says exceptional men do not take up finery as a public gesture? How then might these fashions and opinions come about through exceptional men? If there is a way out of the cynical world-view just posited it seems that the exceptional men are an essential part of this equation, "Origin and utility of fashion. - The obvious self-contentment of the individual with his form excites imitation and gradually produces the form of the many, that is to say fashion: the many want through fashion to attain to precisely that pleasing self-contentment with one's form and they do attain it. [...] Even foolish laws bestow freedom and quietness of heart provided many have agreed to be subject to them" (HATH P.262)

Among other things, this quote is an oblique reference to Alexander the Great, whom Nietzsche praises as a creator of forms, and as inwardly content with his creation.

The tyrants of the spirit [...]The small single questions and experiments were counted contemptible: one wanted the shortest route; one believed that, because everything in the world seemed to be accommodated to man, the knowability of things was also accommodated to a human time-span. [...] in the domain of knowledge too it was possible to reach one's goal in the manner of Alexander (D p.548).

One of the commonly understood controversies of the Alexandrian reign was his donning of Persian court fashions. This act remained controversial especially in Greece after his death, but many great conquerors after him attempted to imitate him through his style of dress (Lane, 1974, p.447).<sup>150</sup> Nietzsche is trying to imply here that certain fashions in clothing and opinion come about because common people wish to partake in the *feelings* of the great types. They scramble for status, in a rat race that runs parallel to the competition for money. This game of symbols has its own economy, for example before Alexander a clean-shaven face was an indication of being effeminate. Alexander single handedly raised the value of a shaven face (1974, p.40). The last sentence of the

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<sup>150</sup> This was true of Caesar as well; during the period of the Roman revolution he was the one setting the fashion trends. "Rome was filled with ambitious young men, all of them desperate for marks of public status. To be a member of the smart set was to sport precisely such marks. So it was that fashion victims would adopt secret signals, mysterious gestures such as the scratching of the head with a single finger. They grew goatees; their tunics flowed to the ankles and wrists; their togas had the texture and transparency of veils and they wore them, in a much-repeated phrase, 'loosely belted.' This, of course, was precisely how Julius Caesar had dressed in the previous decade. It is a revealing correspondence. In the sixties as in the seventies, Caesar continued to blaze a trail as the most fashionable man in Rome" (Holland, 2003, p.191)

previously quoted passage deals with the safety that these fashionistas have from others, how they are allowed to blend their diverse and perverted desires into the mix of society as long as they display certain signs. This simultaneously protects them and helps them to compete for higher status.

There are two sides to this equation of creation: the form givers, the 'self-content' such as Alexander, and their imitators, the mediocre. We must describe first how and why the latter engage in these actions of imitation. Following these sections on the concept of imitation we will then discuss the position of the form giver, the act of creation, and how the theme of the hidden functions in each. By doing so we will be furthering our project of describing the function of the hidden in the psychological strata of Nietzsche's philosophy.

### *Imitation*

At this point we are going to begin drawing on some of the concepts concerning organization that we covered in the last chapter. We will cover in these next four sections (*Imitation, The Mediocre, The Higher Men, Birth*) a psychological reading of the concept of power relations and the creation and evolution of a type. We should keep in mind that as we are staying on the level of the psychological, we will be describing strictly organic forms of organization. This means that these forms of organization should have some connection with the theme of 'hiding.'

We can note here to begin that imitation becomes a theme in Nietzsche's notebooks during the Wagner years. Given what we have covered in the first chapter about his tendency to imitate Wagner's great and small habits, we can speculate that this concept was born from their relationship.<sup>151</sup> It is also a concept with a very broad scope, as we noted in the last section, intending to be applicable to all of culture at least, "The untruthfulness of man towards himself and others: the prerequisite is ignorance - necessary in order to exist (oneself - and in society). The deception of representations steps into the vacuum. The dream. [...] Stimuli, not complete knowledge. The eye gives shapes. We cling to the surface. The inclination to the beautiful. Lack of logic, but metaphors. Religions. Philosophies. Imitation" (KSA 19[225]). And moreover, it seems to leak into the cultural world from the physiological world, "only at this depth ['the deepest depths of the animal world' which underlie civil society] do we view the design behind all

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<sup>151</sup> In fact it might have even been a central tenet of their relationship, as Nietzsche writes in a notebook dated to the summer of 1872, "Here too we see that the single outstanding moral man exercises a magic that causes others to imitate him. The philosopher must spread this magic. What is law for the highest specimens must gradually become the law as such:" (KSA 19[113]). Now obviously here Nietzsche is referring to himself as the philosopher and Wagner as the 'outstanding moral man.' As we noted in the first chapter, the relationship between Nietzsche and Wagner is too complex to analyze sufficiently in this thesis.

these charming precautionary measures: one wants to escape from predators and to gain advantage in capturing prey. For this reason animals learn to control and to disguise themselves in such a way that, for example, many adapt their colors to that of the environment, many play dead or assume the shapes and colors of another animal or of the sand, leaves, lichen, fungi (what English researchers refer to as mimicry)" (D p.23). We see here Nietzsche implying a physiological, or perhaps even ontological, drive towards hiddenness, expanding his theory beyond the realm of the psyche to a lower tier of life. One thing that we notice from these quotes and our discussion in general is the close link between imitation and hiding. What is the common link between these two concepts?

My claim is that the mask is the common term that embraces them both. A mask is an imitation of something that hides something else beneath it. "What is this ability to improvise out of the character of another? [...] What must really be asked: how is it possible to step into the individuality of another?" (KSA 9[105]). The phrase 'improvise out of the character of another' I take to mean 'imitation.' Nietzsche is questioning here what the mechanism is that allows for the possibility imitation, and I claim that a *mask* is this mechanism. The mask will become the central concept for hiding that will reappear in part two of this chapter. But now that we have linked the two terms 'imitation' and 'mask,' we will see that a mask is not a simple concept in Nietzsche. The second part of the quotation goes further, and asks at what point a mask ceases to be something alien, and becomes a *perspective* of the individual.

Let's look at the role of perspectives in this dense aphorism, "Becoming obscure is a matter of perspective of consciousness" (KSA 5[55]). Something can only be obscure in reference to a lack of knowledge. Obscurity defines something that *escapes* from a certain perspective that knows. A perspective is the first instance, a mask that allows one to coexist and to be separate at the same time (the universal and the particular). Our example of a general subculture can function here as well, isn't one of the characteristic traits of any subculture one can imagine (hipster, Republican, sports nerd, ect.) that they abhor being limited to the defining characteristics of their subculture? Any true member of one of a subculture wishes to escape these definitions and limitations, they wish to be known as more than 'just' a Republican, they wish to be obscure. This is why Nietzsche says that obscurity is a matter of perspective; he is calling on the ideal of the Renaissance man, who is a painter, a composer, an architect, a poet, and a traveller. *This* is what Nietzsche means when he says that in order to become obscure and escape understandability, one must transverse different perspectives, "No, No, I am *more* than just *that!*", "*Do not mistake me for what I am not!*" (EH p.3).

This striving for obscurity is a beneficial driving force that seems to be what allows for civil society, "Coexistence *without* being against or for one other: [...] The most interesting men belong in this category: the chameleons" (KSA 14[157]) In this quote we

can see clearly the essential link he is making between a mask (an imitation) and the drive to avoid. The italics in this quote emphasize how a mask allows one to successfully avoid contact with others, to avoid being known. In some cases, one's only option is hide: "He who regards men as a herd and flees from them as fast as he can will certainly be overtaken by them and gored by their horns" (HATH p.272).

This fundamental desire for obscurity is not just a method of avoidance but is also linked with the concept of power. Nietzsche broadly interprets how this desire has affected our culture, "The striving for distinction is the striving for domination - be it very indirect and only sensed or even imagined - of the other" (D p.81). 'Distinction' is referring here to what makes us distinctive, different and unknowable to others, obscure. It is important to diversify one's investments in the symbolic economy: "Become what you are: If one wants to *count* for precisely what one *is*, one has to be something that has *its fixed price*. But only the commonplace has a fixed price" (HATH p.391). Again Nietzsche is claiming that it is through one's distinctiveness that domination over others is achieved. This concept will lead us to our own unorthodox interpretation of how the Agon functions. We assert that when organized by a dominant type the lower types can only gain the upper hand through secrecy. We will discuss this more in the second half of the chapter.

This traversing of different perspectives, this *becoming obscure*, is the desire to hide that we began discussing at the beginning of *Clothes, Convictions, Masks*. We can reaffirm this central tenet of Nietzsche's psychology, "There is nothing we like so much to impart to others as the seal of secrecy - along with what is under it" (GS p.140). Again, we have to take Nietzsche literally in this aphorism, not 'some people like to do this,' but 'there is nothing we like more than to do this!' As Clancy Martin writes, "However little else we know about Nietzsche's elusive *Übermensch*, we rightly suspect that, were one to appear, he or she would be a liar" (2006, p.1). At this point we have described some of the manifestations of this Nietzschean drive for secrecy, namely by tying together the terms 'imitation,' 'hiding,' 'mask,' 'obscurity,' and 'power' into a sketch of a Nietzschean psychology.

Having now given an introduction into Nietzsche's psychology of secrets, focusing on the topics of imitation and masks, we can now briefly cover some of the scholarship which deals with the concept of mask. The existing writings can be categorized under those who believe that Masks are a Nietzschean symbol meant to convey a philosophy of 'perspectivism': Paul Kirkland (2009, p.48), Gianni Vattimo (2001),<sup>152</sup> and those that believe that masks are used to relieve psychological suffering: Rüdiger Görner (2007, p.57-67), Edith Ehrlich (2010, p.76). There are also two authors whom we agree with, who posit that masks are a type of unconscious perspective that are necessitated by the historical situation that one finds oneself in, Burnham & Jesinghausen (2011, p.45). In

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<sup>152</sup> Vattimo holds the thesis that after the death of God, all perspectives lose their foundation, and the mask is a symbol that represents a perspective that ironically acknowledges its own lack of foundation.

the next section we will begin to treat with this subject on more ontological terms. This means that we will begin referencing the concepts we have drawn out in the previous chapter.

### *The Mediocre*

To begin, let's take a look at what it is the mediocre, the rabble, avoids: Every morality, as opposed to *laissez-aller*, is a piece of tyranny against both 'nature' and 'reason' [...] What is essential and invaluable about every morality is that it is a long compulsion. In order to understand Stoicism or Port-Royal<sup>153</sup> or Puritanism, just remember the compulsion under which every language so far has developed strength and freedom: the compulsion of meter, the tyranny of rhyme and rhythm. [...] But the strange fact is that everything there is, or was, of freedom, subtlety, boldness, dance, or masterly assurance on earth, whether in thinking itself, or in ruling, or in speaking and persuading, in artistic just as in ethical practices, has only developed by virtue of the 'tyranny of such arbitrary laws' (BGE p.77).

There are many references that can be drawn to our discussion of Nietzschean types. First we can note that he continually refers to morality as a 'compulsion,' and links this compulsion to the idea of rhythm and repetition. We recall that the types are characterized as a rhythmic tyranny or domination, which unifies, interprets, and forces obedience of the lower types. This is exactly the language Nietzsche is using here. Nietzsche is attempting in this passage to draw the connections that we made explicit in the last chapter concerning the ontology of types, with the psychology of imitation and hiding, which we are currently enumerating.

Nietzsche begins to make this important link by first forging the link between psychology and physiology,

Imitation is the medium of all culture; it gradually produces instinct. All comparison (primal thinking) is an imitation. Species develop as a result of the first specimens' preference for imitating only similar specimens, i.e. copying the largest and strongest specimen. The instillation of a second nature by way of imitation. [...] Imitation presupposes reception, followed by the continuous transfer-ence of the received image into a thousand metaphors, all active (KSA 19[226]).

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<sup>153</sup> *Port-Royal* by Sainte-Beuve is a history of the Jansenist abbey of [Port-Royal-des-Champs](#), near Paris. It not only influenced the historiography of [religious belief](#), but also the [philosophy of history](#) and the history of [aesthetics](#).

This note is very dense. What we see here is not just Nietzsche connecting psychology and physiology,<sup>154</sup> but he is bringing the concept of evolution into the picture as well.<sup>155</sup> How else are we to interpret the very Lamarckian idea that a species begins to change because of its own *desire*? The implication is that what was once consciously imitated now works its way into our bodies and becomes fossilized in our natural rhythms.

The main import of these passages is that this schematic that we have been setting up concerning the form giver (who we will cover in the section *The Higher Men*) and imitation exists at the level of the physiological. But this note is addressing the physiology of a species, how does the theme of imitation work in the physiology of an individual? "What is the power that enforces imitation? The appropriation of an alien impression through metaphors. [...] Stimulus perceived - now repeated, in many metaphors, with related images, from different categories, flooding in. Every perception achieves a multiple imitation of the stimulus, but transferred to different areas" (KSA 19[227]). While it is true that this note is obscure, we can still perceive that imitation is something that occurs at the most basic levels of perception, in fact as a descriptor of what regulates the physiological process of perception. His opening question in this quote, referring to imitation as a 'power,' reveals that he believed it probable that imitation exists outside of the organism, in the realm of the inorganic. This is a topic we covered at the end of our last chapter. The implication is that when imitation occurs it is always due to some outside force, a type, enforcing its own interpretation upon matter.

"*To reassure the skeptic* - 'I have no idea what I am *doing!* I have no idea what I *should do!*' You're right, but make no mistake about it: *you are being done!* Moment by every moment!" (D P.92). What Nietzsche is speaking of here is not just our opinions and thoughts, but our very physiology, is morphed and interpreted against our will. This is what it means for meaning and imitation to exist on the level of the physiological, to think of our opinions and convictions in the same way we conceive of the rhythm of our heart beat or digestion, entirely out of our control!

Nietzsche continues to berate the psychological and physiological state of the mediocre imitators: "We laugh at anyone who steps out of his chamber the moment the sun exits its own way and says, "I *want* the sun to rise"; and at anyone who cannot stop a wheel from rolling and says, "I *want* it to roll": and at anyone who is thrown down in a

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<sup>154</sup> Which he does elsewhere as well, "Only as creators! - This has caused me the greatest trouble and still does always cause me the greatest trouble: to realize that what things are called is unspeakably more important than what they are. The reputation, name, and appearance, the worth, the usual measure and weight of a thing - originally almost always something mistaken and arbitrary, thrown over things like a dress and quite foreign to their nature and even to their skin - has, through the belief in it and its growth from generation to generation, slowly grown onto and into the thing and has become its very body: what started as appearance in the end nearly always becomes essence and effectively acts as its essence! What kind of a fool would believe that it is enough to point to this origin and this misty shroud of delusion in order to destroy the world that counts as 'real,' so-called 'reality'! Only as creators can we destroy! - But let us also not forget that in the long run it is enough to create new names and valuations and appearances of truth in order to create new 'things'" (GS p.69-70)

<sup>155</sup> See also, "Knowledge is merely working with the most popular metaphors, i.e. an imitation that is no longer perceived as imitation. [...](KSA 19[228])

wrestling match and says: "Here I lie, but *I want* to lie here!" Yet despite all the laughter! Are we, after all, ever acting any differently from one of these three whenever we use the phrase: "*I want*"? (D p.93). Nietzsche is not asserting here a metaphorically autonomous power that controls us, but a literal alien repetition, a type that has control of the very matter of our bodies. The mediocre masses are organized by the types, utterly seduced, and *used*.

"*Mark Antony*. A barren spirited fellow; one that feeds  
On objects, arts, and imitations,  
Which, out of use and stal'd by other men  
Begin his fashion. Do not talk of him  
But as property.  
-(Act 4 scene 1, *Julius Caesar*, Shakespeare)

What we have described in this section is the theme of imitation, and how it is virtually synonymous with the motif of masks. We have positioned these themes in Nietzsche's philosophy by contextualizing them both in the psychology of the mediocre and by touching on some of the concepts we covered in the last chapter. We have further tied the notion of imitation with the seduction of the type. Alexander *seduced* the territories of the Persian empire: centuries after he died, after the wars of the Diadochi, after new political kingdoms were constructed and long after their dynasties had collapsed, "Indian Buddhists still carved the tale of the Trojan horse alongside their life of Buddha" (Lane, 1974, p.493).

### *The Higher Men*

"Everything profound loves masks; the profoundest things go so far as to hate images and likeness" (BGE p.38).<sup>156</sup> With this aphorism I want to show how easy it is to misread Nietzsche. What is profundity aside from depth, something behind the surface appearances? According to how we have defined masks as an escape from appearances, the first part of this aphorism is redundant. Profundity loves masks because profundity is nothing but the wearing of masks. But then what is the meaning of the second part of the aphorism? 'Images and likeness' are appearances that hide depth, that is, they are superficial mirages, masks. So what Nietzsche is really saying in this aphorism is "Profundity loves to hide, *but* the most profound things *hate* to hide" This is another formulation of the equation we have articulating, the mediocre strive for

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<sup>156</sup> We can note the biblical reference here without it detracting from our point, "You shall not make for yourself an image or likeness in the form of anything in heaven above or on the earth beneath or in the waters below" (Exodus 20:4).

appearances, changing their masks to fit the fashion. The rare higher men play a different game; they strive for more *inwardness* more *stability*.

We have already noted that there is a connection between the psychology of the higher men and Nietzsche's ontological doctrine of types. In this section we are going to draw out this connection. We are also going to describe imitation from the point of view of the creator. Recalling our last chapter and our definition of power as interpretation we will describe how certain types are able to *persuade* or *seduce* the masses to imitate them. One of the foundational concepts that makes this schematic work is that a kind of rudimentary meaning exists on the level of the physiological and even in the inorganic realms, so let us look at the higher men's relationship to the concept of 'meaning'

"I am free, 'it' must obey' -this consciousness lies in every will, along with a certain straining for attention, a straight look that fixes on one thing and one thing only, an unconditional evaluation 'now this is necessary and nothing else,' an inner certainty that it will be obeyed, and whatever else comes with the position of the commander" (BGE p.19). Why does Nietzsche create simplified 'voices' for each 'will' in this aphorism? Surely he is using the term will in the sense of unconscious drives, and so we must assert that he is giving them a voice because they actually possess a rudimentary voice. He is attempting to posit again that there is meaning at the level of the physiological; as he says further down, "our body is, after all, only a society constructed out of many souls" (BGE p.19). Furthermore in this aphorism he is asserting that it is on the level of physiological meaning that persuasion occurs, the body persuades. But what is the nature of this 'inner certainty' at this level? What is its origin? As we will attempt to show in the following section, it is a metaphysical confidence, it arises from the type. When speaking of the interconnectedness between the ideas he puts forward in *Towards a Genealogy of Morality* Nietzsche writes that this, "strengthens within me the cheerful confidence that they came about not singly, arbitrarily, not sporadically, but rather from the beginning arose out of a common root, out of a *basic will* of knowledge which commands from deep within" (GOM p.2). Let us observe the italicized 'basic will,' does this not imply the idea that a type is the most foundational component of the will to power? It is a type that organizes and streamlines Nietzsche's thoughts.

"Those law giving tyrannical spirits capable of *tying fast* the meaning of a concept [...] 'I want it exactly *this way*. I want it *for this* and only for this.' - Lawgiving men of this kind were bound to exert the strongest influence in all ages; all the typical formations of man are owed to them: they are the sculptors and the rest (the very great majority, in this case-) are compared to them, only *clay*" (KSA 34[88]) We interpret this aphorism to mean that not just the meaning of a concept, but all the meaning that flows underneath that concept, at the level of the will to power, even the inorganic, is mastered by the great man. This is the question that we asked in the section from the last chapter entitled *Let the Die be Cast!* Cassius links the unnaturalness of the night with Caesar, but is Caesar an articulation of the great inorganic forces that battle and struggle? Or is it his

presence from which emerges a restructuring of the world? We side with the latter interpretation. If Caesar is the higher type than all the lower types are organized around him, this is why the great majority are 'only 'clay.' It is the higher man or woman who shapes the world, not the reverse. Nietzsche will say the masses try to incorporate the masks and forms given to them in the hopes that they will partake in the beautiful feelings that accompany them. So the activity of this molding, what appears to be a domination of the world, is actually a *seduction*. Seduction in the sense that the seduced have lost their will to resist, they imitate the types (all the 'typical formations') given by the higher men without a struggle. And so our discussion should turn to this concept of seduction. What is it that makes this higher human? What gives them this power over the world?

As noted at the beginning of the previous quote, it has something to do with unification, something to do with immobility, a 'tying fast.' In our interpretation, it has something to do with the type as we described it in the last chapter. "The right of lords to give names goes so far that we should allow ourselves to comprehend the origin of language itself as an expression of power on the part of those who rule: they say 'this *is* such and such,' they seal each thing and happening with a sound and thus take possession of it" (GOM p.11). We recall the power of the Type to reorganize the 'feelings' below it, this how it becomes an interpretation.

Caesar: I am constant as the norther star,  
 Of whose true-fix'd and resting quality  
 There is no fellow in the firmament.  
 The skies are painted with unnumber'd sparks,  
 They are all fire, and every one doth shine;  
 But there's but one in all doth hold his place.  
 So in the world: 'tis furnished'd well with men,  
 And men are flesh and blood, and apprehensive;  
 Yet in the number I do know but one  
 That unassailable holds his rank,  
 Unshak'd of motion; and that I am he.

-(Act Three Scene One. *Julius Caesar*, Shakespeare)

The mediocre are nothing but imitations, from their opinions down to their heart beat, they are thrown about by forces external to them, seduced and dominated, utilized for a purpose which is beyond them. Nietzsche calls alcoholism a "stupid imitation, the cowardly or vain adaptation to a dominant régime: -" (KSA 15[80]). The higher humans stand up in the river of becoming as vortices accumulate around them; Cato says:

“Caesar was the only man who undertook to overthrow the state while sober” (*Suetonius*, 2004, p.22).<sup>157</sup>

To conclude our discussion of the imitation and seduction let us look at a passage from *Zarathustra*:

And it was then that it happened – indeed happened for the first time! – that his words pronounced *selfishness* blessed, the sound, healthy selfishness that wells from a powerful soul to which the high body belongs, the beautiful, triumphant, invigorating body, around which every manner of thing becomes mirror: -the supple persuading body, the dancer whose parable and epitome is the self-joyous soul. Such self-joy of body and soul calls itself: “Virtue” With its words of good and bad such self-joy shields itself as if with sacred groves; with the names of its happiness it banishes from itself everything contemptible (TSZ p.152)

We see in the beginning of this passage the famous ‘rebaptizing,’ the naming that is supposed to create values, the type which ascends to power. Look how he brings several concepts into play with each other in rapid succession, the connection between soul (type), beauty, health and body, which persuades the imitators who ‘mirror’ the body. He states that ‘every manner of thing becomes a mirror’ in order to include the inorganic (like Caesar’s night). And it is ‘the body’ that everything mirrors, this is a reference to the kind of rudimentary meaning that exists in the inorganic, ‘the *feeling* of power.’ This is the radical point Nietzsche is attempting to make: the form maker does not just send ripples through culture, but through reality. Nietzsche calls the form maker a ‘*persuading* body,’ because it is not through raw domination that the form maker stamps his mark on the world, but through nuance, through enticement, and perhaps even weakness.<sup>158</sup> This is the concept of imitation, seen from the point of view of the higher human, where the imitated quality originates.

But what does he mean when he claims the higher men ‘shield themselves in sacred groves’? What is this ‘banishment’ he speaks of in the last section? This will lead us to a new concept, how the theme of hiding interacts with the higher human in Nietzsche’s philosophy. In the next section we will begin to draw out how hiding is essential for the creation of a new type. This connection between hiding and creation will continue to be a theme for us in part two of this chapter. For now, let us introduce this link with a few quotes.

“The collection of precious things, the needs of a high and fastidious soul; to desire to possess nothing in common. One’s own books, one’s own landscapes. [...]

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<sup>157</sup> Nietzsche says of Caesar, “The first consul was faced with the greatest spectacle, he would have had to feel the deepest and désintéressée émotion before this scene, which is unique in history because Caesar found an old and expiratory Republic. But he thought of himself!” (KSA 25 [110]).

<sup>158</sup> Plutarch compares Alexander’s epilepsy to Julius Caesar’s ‘falling sickness’ (Plutarch, 1918); Nietzsche states, “The grandiose prototype: man in nature; the weakest, cleverest being making itself master, subjugating the more stupid forces” (KSA 2[139])

We know we are hard to recognize, and that we have every reason to give ourselves foregrounds" (KSA 35[76]). We should pay special attention to his desire not to possess anything in common. This is the same desire for distinctiveness we observed in the mediocre men. He gives himself foregrounds, masks, and barriers just like the mediocre men. But then how is the higher man to be differentiated from the mediocre? It is through the act of creation. In a remark that could aptly describe Alexander the Great, Nietzsche says, "He is quite without envy, but that has no merit because he wants to conquer a country that no one has yet possessed and hardly anyone has ever seen" (GS p.147). It is to this act of creation that we will now turn, in order to conclude our study of the psychology of secrets.

### *Birth*

At this point we have discussed the power relations between types on the psychological level. Following the same structure of the last chapter, we will now explore the process of the creation of these types. What does creation specifically entail? Nietzsche will frequently use the analogy of birth to explain creation in general.<sup>159</sup> "With peoples of genius, there are those who inherit the female problem of pregnancy and the secret task of forming, ripening, and bringing to completion" (BGE p.140). For Nietzsche pregnancy and birth are metaphors that link the themes of hiding and creation. It is this link that we intend to explore in this chapter.

The process of birth has a temporal element to it. By this we mean that the activity of hiding is a kind of project that looks toward the future. "We withdraw into concealment: but not out of any kind of personal ill-humor, as though the political and social situation of the present day were not good enough for us, but because through our withdrawal we want to economize and assemble forces of which culture will *later* have need, and more so if this present remains *this* present and as such fulfills *its* task. We are accumulating capital and seeking to make it secure: but, as in times of great peril, to do that we have to *bury* it" (HATH p.368). This quote clearly implicates this link between creation and secrecy, and adds in this futuristic element. The question we now have to ask is what is the nature of this gestation period of preparatory work?

The nature of this activity of hiding and secrecy is to protect. Elements of the current time period are hidden in a kind of nurturing gesture. "Our eruptions. - Countless things that humanity acquired in earlier stages, but so feebly and embryonically that no one could tell that they had been acquired, suddenly emerge into the light much later,

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<sup>159</sup> This was also a technique of St. Paul, "For you yourselves know well that the day of the Lord comes like a thief in the night. For when they are saying, "Peace and safety," then sudden destruction will come on them, like birth pains on a pregnant woman; and they will in no way escape" (5:2-5:3 Thessalonians 1).

perhaps after centuries; meanwhile they have become strong and ripe" (GS p.36). This is where we could say Nietzsche begins to deviate very significantly from Schopenhauer. If we recall, Schopenhauer believed that new Ideen were born in situations of extreme stress, by tearing apart the fabric of representation and opening up a gash for the will to enter in. For Nietzsche new types must be protected and cultivated if they are to one day take a measure of power. It is not the tension inherent in the workings of the world of representation that creates new types for Nietzsche, rather it is the new type which gives rise to a state of crisis as it ascends and challenges the ruling types.

This is also an area where Nietzsche gives us more depth than Schopenhauer, for Schopenhauer new Ideen sprang from the head of Zeus fully formed into the world. Nietzsche takes the view that there is an incubation period, where several older elements must be coordinated and organized to form a new unified type, "The statue of humanity. - The genius of culture does as Cellini did when he cast his statue of Perseus [the mythical founder of Mycenae]: the liquefied mass seemed to be insufficient, but he was determined to produce enough: so he threw into it keys and plates and whatever else came to hand. And just so does that genius throw in errors, vices, hopes, delusions and other things of baser as well as nobler metal, for the statue of humanity must emerge and be completed; what does it matter if here and there inferior material is employed?" (HATH P.121 Brackets added). Nietzsche is claiming here that the act of futuristic creation is committed using the weaponry of the present. To explain this quote in practical terms: "Between you and me, there is absolutely no need to give up 'the soul' itself, and relinquish one of the oldest and most venerable hypotheses – [...] But the path lies open for new versions and sophistications of the soul hypothesis – and concepts like the 'mortal soul' and the 'soul as subject-multiplicity'" (BGE p.14). So there is a necessity to use what is at hand, but Nietzsche is claiming that what is at hand can be melted down and transformed into something else if one is willing to hide it away.

These 'base metals,' such as the concept of the soul, are a necessary part of the process of secrecy and creation. "These lower, mediocre, and by no means thoroughly indispensable goals [civil goals] toward which one ought not to strive with the *altogether* highest means and instruments in *existence* - means that one ought to *store up and reserve* for precisely the highest and most exceptional of purposes!" (D p.130). Here again he is advocating one to *pretend* to pursue social goals (how many politicians champion social justice or environmentalism in order to attain power?), or to pursue them without committing fully to them. The mediocre goals are always only the means to the higher goals; they are melted down and transformed by the process of creation.

At this point we have described how the theme of hiding is linked to the concept of creation in the analogy of pregnancy. But what happens when we assert that meaning and interpretation exists all throughout the universe, even in the inorganic? The question of how these interpretations spread and gain power becomes urgent, what is the relation between the birth of a new type and *persuasion*? It is at the level of individuality that we

will tackle to problem of how the method or pregnancy manages to persuade, recalling the importance that imitation plays in Nietzsche's theories. The most logical example to engage with is then the profession of persuasion, rhetoric.

In 5th-century Athens rhetoric was at its height as a discipline, the proliferation of the court system under Solon and the democratic reforms under Cleisthenes had created a system of government that favored the rhetorician. One could not hire a lawyer or a press secretary, if an ancient Athenian was brought to court or standing for office they had to plead their case themselves. And so the best speakers, those who could persuade a crowd, were favored by the political system. Nietzsche takes a disparaging view of the rhetoricians; he views their position as among the mediocre imitators. They are manipulators to be sure, but they themselves are only tools of the greater forces that higher men create,<sup>160</sup> "Oh you poor devils in the great cities of world politics, you talented young men tormented by ambition who consider it your duty to remark on everything that happens - and something is always happening! Who, having drummed up noise and dust in this fashion, believe you are the very chariots of history! [...] The profound speechlessness of pregnancy never comes to you! The event of the day propels you here and there like chaff," (D p.129). The rhetoricians speak like pigs eat, they must comment on everything and have something to say about everything. But something is sacrificed to achieve this supremely opinionated state. They cannot actually claim that any of these opinions, any of this meaning, as their own. They are the imitators, those who, as we discussed in our section *Clothes, Convictions, Masks*, "count for nothing until they have clad themselves in general convictions and public opinions" (HATH p.288).

Nietzsche takes this example even further though, and uses it to deepen this notion of pregnancy. He claims, "whoever thinks in *words* thinks as a speaker and not as a thinker" (GOM p.77). This passage is an attempt to reinterpret the notion of thinking along this divide of 'pregnancy/rhetoric.' What would we 'think' with if not words? This is why Zarathustra scolds his animals for attempting to articulate his doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence (TSZ p.176), this is why Nietzsche writes the true thinkers must not be known to themselves (GOM p.1). Nietzsche is attempting to redefine thinking and the thinker, "His spirit has bad manners, is hasty and always stutters out of impatience; hence one hardly recognizes how much stamina and robustness the soul possesses in which this spirit dwells" (GS p.143). What Nietzsche is trying to portray here is that the true thinker, the creator who is destined to alter the course of history<sup>161</sup> with their thoughts should not appear to be eloquent communicators, like the rhetoricians.

Nietzsche is drawing on a common experience that most of his readers must be familiar with. Our thoughts seem to us to be absolutely unique but in the act of

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<sup>160</sup> This is the same view Plato articulates toward the orators in *Gorgias*.

<sup>161</sup> "The greatest events and thoughts – but the greatest thoughts are the greatest events – are the last to be comprehended: generations that are their contemporaries do not *experience* these sorts of events, – they live right past them" (BGE p.171)

articulation they lose their importance.<sup>162</sup> Or more accurately, we are never given the correct opportunity to use our power of articulation and thoughts to their fullest extent, that we are somehow always *better* than we appear to be in any given situation, "We always express our thoughts with the words that lie ready to hand. Or to express my entire suspicion: we have at every moment only that very thought for which we have ready to hand the words that are roughly capable of expressing it" (D p.176). And so the rhetoricians and imitators sacrifice every meaningful contribution they have to the conversation at hand. Would the alternative even appear to them as a possibility? Would they ever choose to *not* express themselves, to keep silent in order to preserve and protect their meaning, even from themselves?

It is only through this method of pregnancy that something new and *infectious* can be born, "His whole being fails to *persuade* - that is because he has never remained silent" (GS p.146). In order to interpret this quote to its fullest we should recall the importance of the body in the previous section. Nietzsche is not referring to persuasion in the colloquial sense, he is thinking of persuasion in the sense of a disease: an unconscious imitation that takes hold of and reorganizes the body.

Nietzsche disparages these rhetoricians who adapt themselves to whatever situation they happen to find themselves in, and allow themselves to be reordered by it. "There are highly gifted spirits who are always unfruitful simply because, from their weakness in their temperament, they are too impatient to wait out the terms of their pregnancy" (HATH p.264). The dangers of this premature birth have been made clear, what could have been a new type, what could have restructured the world, is destroyed as a sapling, because it was not protected. "I caught this insight on the wing and quickly took the nearest shoddy words to fasten it lest it fly away from me. And now it has died of these barren words and hangs and flaps in them - and I hardly know anymore, when I look at it, how I could have felt so happy when I caught this bird" (GS p.169). Look at his language; remember how he had said that we always express in a situation whatever words are already in the situation? When our body receives an experience it receives a meaning (recalling that meaning exists even in the inorganic, discussed in the last section of Chapter Three). What happens if we immediately transfer this meaning to the public sphere? The experience, the meaning ceases to be ours, it even ceases to be *interesting*, something worthy of imitation.

At this point we have given an exposition of the role 'the hidden' plays in the field of Nietzschean psychology. This involved integrating the Nietzschean conception of organization through types into our discussion of key concepts such as 'imitation' and 'creation.' Our discussion maintained the perspective of psychology, of perhaps the most complex form of organic organization. From this standpoint, we have discussed the process of the creation of types and how the new type comes to dominate, how it wills

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<sup>162</sup> "At bottom, all our actions are incomparably and utterly personal, unique, and boundlessly individual, there is no doubt; but as soon as we translate them into consciousness, *they no longer seem to be*" (GS p.213)

power. Our conclusions were in the same vein as our discussion in the last chapter; namely that power was an interpretative phenomenon, that types gained power through seduction, not brute force. We demonstrated how, in our interpretation of Nietzsche, creation and seduction were tied to a psychology of secrets. Having concluded this first portion of our fourth chapter, we will now expand these psychological theories into the realm of ontology, and finally articulate a formulation of the organic being.

## Part Two: Ontological Secrets

φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ  
 “Nature loves to hide”  
 -Heraclitus (DK B123)

### *Nietzschean Complexity*

In the second half of our final chapter we are going to delve further into Nietzsche’s ontology of ‘the hidden.’ This first step will involve discussing his conception of evolution. As we will discover, Nietzsche is similar to Schopenhauer in that his theory of evolution follows directly from his theory of creation. We will discuss the Nietzschean concept of evolution in this section, *Nietzschean Complexity*, and the next, *Freedom, Escape*. These are our last two sections of ‘groundwork.’ Following the explication of the quality of evolution, a quality essential to life, we will then take four sections to define the organism in Nietzsche’s philosophy: *The Value of Life, Accumulation, Interior/Exterior Yes and No, and Life begins in Error*.

First, there is a concept we have covered which will play a crucial role in deciphering Nietzsche’s theory of the organism. Let us remind ourselves of the existence of meaning on the level of the physiological “*The logic of our conscious thinking is only a crude and facilitated form of the thinking needed by our organism, indeed by the particular organs of our organism*” (KSA 34[124]). Every ontological type has a meaning or quality that it expresses. For our interpretation of Nietzsche, the relation between organs is one of communication, and in order for there to be communication, there must be interpretation. But if we stick with the example of organs we must assert that the heart and the lungs are independent types, repetitive interpretations that assert themselves upon reality. In this sense they are connected in the same manner that the type sloth is connected to the type tree.

We have misinterpreted Nietzsche if we assume that birth is a process of creating something that is outside of oneself. Nietzschean creation is always a movement *inward*, “Greater complexity, sharp differentiation, the contiguity of developed organs and functions with the disappearance of the intermediate members - if that is perfection then there is a will to power in the organic process by virtue of which dominant, shaping, commanding forces continually extend the bounds of their power and continually simplify within these bounds: the imperative grows” (KSA 12 7[9]) This is another way we attack the Mongolian interpretation of the will to power, once we get to the organism, power wills itself towards more inwardness, more depth, nuance, and subtlety, not necessarily outward expansion or annexation. This is why we interpreted the Agon to be a contest of

subtlety, because domination is obtained through nuance. This is the question we will have to articulate by the end of this chapter: 'is this drive towards complexity unique to the organism, or is it present amongst the inorganic types as well?' If it is unique to the organic realm then it will be an essential component of our definition of the organic.

Nietzsche is surely talking about organic organization when he states, "all instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly *turn themselves inward* - that is what I call the *internalizing* of man" (GOM p.57). This notion is counterintuitive at first. How can Nietzsche say this about humans, which literally take up more space as they grow, and grow physically stronger? Nietzsche believes that we make these apparent expansionist gains through subtle and slow refinement. This is why we find otherwise impossible to understand quotes such as this, "The greater the impulse toward unity the more firmly may one conclude that weakness is present; the greater the impulse toward variety, differentiation, inner decay, the more force is present" (KSA 36[21]). If we recall our discussion on Lamarck and Schopenhauer, it was their belief as well that the progress of evolution could be measured by the complexity of the organism. And yet we were missing the ontological link between the creation of the new and the progress of complexity. For Lamarck, desire is what gave rise to new formations, but it was unclear why desire necessarily increased in complexity. For Schopenhauer, it was the extreme tensions and conflicts that opened up the world of causality to the monstrous will, but again, like Lamarck, it wasn't clear why the will manifested itself as increasingly complex. For Nietzsche, there is a necessary correlation between increase in complexity and evolutionary progress because the act of creation is an inward movement of hiding. When something new is born, it is born as a nuance, a qualification of existing structures.<sup>163</sup> This is the very question that Müller-Lauter articulated in his work, the question of how complex bodies arise. Although we disagree with his conclusion that conflict is the agent of creation, rather we posit that avoidance is this agent.

The concept of complexification is also present in Deleuze's reading of Leibniz; "Development does not go from smaller to greater things through growth and augmentation, but from the general to the special" (2006, P.10). Because Deleuze doesn't distinguish between the living and the dead body, complexity is a component of reality; he names these contours of reality, 'folds.' [...] a flexible or an elastic body still has cohering parts that form a fold, such that they are not separated into parts of parts but are rather divided to infinity in smaller and smaller folds that always retain a certain cohesion. [...] the smallest element of the labyrinth is the fold [...] In a system of complex interaction, the solid pleats of 'natural geography' refer to the effect first of fire, and then of waters and winds on the earth" (2006, p.6). And so we see that the world is built up, or rather built inward, through these structuring contours. And there is also this idea of building inwardly in Nietzsche: "But because this state of powerlessness and fear was in

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<sup>163</sup> As Moore notes, Nietzsche found scientific justification for his thinking here in the writings of Carl Nägeli (2002).

a state of almost perpetual excitation for so long a time, the *feeling of power* has developed such a degree of *subtlety* that, in this regard, humans can now compete with the most delicate balance that measures gold" (GOM p.22). Let us here recall the ontological position of the feeling of power, it's important to note here that he is talking about the natural helplessness that humans feel when confronted with the great powers of the universe. All life is at the mercy of these powers, and its growth is an attempt at escaping from its situation.

In the next section we will explain another aspect of this hidden, complexity inducing, growth pattern that will make it more clear. For now, let us use our own bodies as an example of the result of complex evolution to outline the ramifications of this theory.

"Sense perception happens without our awareness: whatever we become conscious of is a perception that has already been processed" (KSA 34[30]). In this passage we see that Nietzsche is describing a kind of impassable space between our consciousness and reality. This passage contains an implicit question: if it is the case that the higher types are burrowing deeper, a making more complex, than how far are we from 'the surface,' from reality? We have no apparent pressure gauge to tell us how deep inside of ourselves we are, but we do know that as our type evolves, like a tree, we construct more and more barriers between us and the world. Our skins and permeable membranes, our body's methods of selection, our physiological masks and imitations, have already filtered sense impressions that come from the outside. What we are conscious of is already cooked and chewed, ready for digestion. "The distinguishing feature of that 'consciousness usually held to be the only one, the intellect, is precisely that it remains protected and closed off [...] and that [...] it is presented only with a *selection* of experiences - experiences, furthermore, that have all been simplified, made easy to survey and grasp, thus *falsified* -"(KSA 37[4]). This indicates to us that our consciousness is extraordinarily deep within ourselves, there is an immense gorge separating us from the world. As we have been trying to demonstrate, this is the effect of a Nietzschean evolution, a *deepening* of every organ. "*Consciousness*, beginning quite externally, as a coordination and becoming conscious of impressions- initially furthest away from the biological centre of the individual; but a process that becomes deeper, more inward, moves constantly closer to that centre" (KSA 7[9]).

But perhaps we are painting too gloomy a picture. It may be assumed that if we are distanced from the world, then being surrounded by only ourselves is like being a prisoner bound in place, engrossed in a false reality. Not so, for only with depth do we actually become free, only by digging can we create for ourselves a space in which we can breathe our own air,

The drive to create metaphors, that fundamental drive of man [...] is not truly defeated but barely tamed by constructing for itself, out of its own evaporated products, the concepts, a world as regular and rigid as a prison

fortress. It seeks a new territory and a new channel for its operation, [...] it continually reveals the desire to make the existing world of waking man as colorful, irregular, free of consequences, incoherent, delightful and eternally new, as the world of dreams (p.262 TLEMS).

This is what we were articulating in *Birth*. We would be misinterpreting Nietzsche's metaphor of pregnancy if we assumed that the child must be born. Creation occurs through the very act of protection, of hiding away. We used the example of the term 'soul,' Nietzsche makes this term his own by burying its meaning deep within his philosophy. His style does not lend itself to ease of readability on purpose. He does not wish for his reader to immediately understand him. As we covered in the section *Birth*, anything that could be immediately understood is automatically universal, by definition it is a repetition, and has nothing to do with the creation of the new. Complexity is the method by which secrets strive to protect themselves, to clothe themselves in layers of meaning. Recall our discussion concerning obscurity (p.147), obscurity of perspective is only obtained by way of complexity. It is only through complexity that organic creation can occur. So let us now turn to Nietzsche's explanation concerning the desire that is made explicit in this movement towards greater complexity: the drive for freedom.

### *Freedom, Escape*

Staying in the context of evolution, and the problem of a system of growth that engenders complexity, let us ask the simplest philosophical question: 'why?' Schopenhauer was forced to posit a desire in the will, "The will desires to speak" (WWR1 p.222) in order to account for *why* the Ideen continually drew into conflict and created new Ideen. In Schopenhauer there was something akin to an aspiration or a task that drove evolution forward. And so we ask Nietzsche: 'why? For what purpose is the organism hollowing out caves for itself? Why is it digging further and further beneath the surface?' Nietzsche claims that it is in the pursuit of freedom: "-man's most dreadful and deep-rooted craving, his drive to power- this drive is known as 'freedom' -" (KSA 1[33]). Again, it is important to read these passages to the letter, Nietzsche isn't making some hyperbolic comment about how lots of people really like to be free, he is directly equating the drive to power with the drive to freedom. This puts the hunger for freedom at the level of ontology, at the level of interpretation.

The assertion of the drive to freedom in the realm of ontology implies its close connection with the process of creation we described in our section *Birth*. It means that in the same way in which we can say that the will desires articulation for Schopenhauer, we can say that the will to power desires freedom. "Every elevation of man brings with it the overcoming of narrower interpretations: that every strengthening and increase of

power opens up new perspectives and means believing in new horizons - this idea permeates my writings" (KSA 2[108]). What is most important from this passage is that strength and power are equated with the idea of the new; 'overcoming' is used in the sense of creation. We have introduced the complexifying concept of growth in order to oppose the contemporary scholarship's habit of understanding growth in the colloquial sense of increasing in physical size and strength, and now we will demonstrate how Nietzschean 'strength' lies in freedom and escape.

While discussing the development of spirit Nietzsche makes an analogy, "The butterfly wants to get out of its cocoon, it tears at it, it breaks it open: then it is blinded and confused by the unfamiliar light, the realm of freedom" (HATH P.58). This is perhaps an allusion to *Republic* 516. The most important part of this section, however, is the cocoon. The creation of a cocoon is a process of hiding, of shutting out the world.<sup>164</sup> It is only through the creation of this barrier that the caterpillar is able to achieve the potential flight, to move away from the current schematic into something entirely new. Were it not for Solon binding the Athenians to his laws, one tyrant would have been overthrown and another would have taken his place. Solon knew that trouble came from the outside, "By winds the sea is lashed to storm, but if it remain unvexed, it is the most peaceful of all things" (Bergk, Fragment 9 verses 1-2), and that Athens needed a period of isolation and barriers, for example he blocked all exports from the city aside from olive oil. It was only because of these restrictive measures in the archaic age that Athens became what it was during the 5th century.

To give us another evolutionary example, Nietzsche talks about sea creatures walking on land in this same sense of 'a flight from pressure.' Nietzsche specifies this pressure by saying it was the "strongest demand made upon creatures at that point" (KSA 36[2]).<sup>165</sup> We can note the connection to Schopenhauer, but we should be rigorous in demanding that our readers not take this the wrong way. Pressure is not resolved through catastrophic increases in strength; the birds did not escape from the spirit of gravity by becoming strong, but by becoming weak, or light. Pressure is relieved through *escape*, growth occurs along internal channels of re-routing and avoidance. True victory is not to win in an Agon, but to be liberated from the terms of the struggle.

Let us recall the role of philosophy in interpretation. In the last chapter in the section *Power as Interpretation, Feeling of Power*, we asserted that philosophy was the means by which certain interpretations came to power, associated with creation. "What does it mean to us today to *live* philosophically, to be wise? Is it not almost a way of *extricating* oneself from an ugly game? A kind of flight?" (KSA 35[24]). We should understand this passage as applying to much more than the life choices of certain people, but rather to the foundational interpretations that make up our bodies.

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<sup>164</sup> Burnham and Jeningausen also link the cocoon with the mask (2011, p.50)

<sup>165</sup> We can link this with the preface to *Ecce homo*, where Nietzsche claims that he "must shortly approach mankind with the heaviest demand that has ever been made on it" (EH p.3)

These claims contest our earlier endorsement of the Agonistic interpreters, for whom having a strong domineering type at the top of the pyramid strangled the process of creation. But let us examine their beliefs more closely here, recalling that they recognize that the Agon can only exist under some form of unification and law: “Nietzsche’s Homer is not simply the founder of a certain form of culture; he is a revolutionary, a reformer, someone who effects a tremendous revaluation” (Acampora, 2013, p.43). This is the concept we covered earlier when we stated that the Agon is constructed on an established interpretation. Homer is juxtaposed against the Erisian abyss; he was a lawgiver that stamped his interpretation upon a chaotic world. Homer was an ‘aesthetic taste,’ as we mentioned in the first chapter. The uniqueness of the dominance of Homer’s taste is that it aims at struggle, and it encourages competition within itself.

Deleuze picks up on the connection between escape and creation in Nietzsche and writes it into his own philosophy. The concept of the ‘ligne de fuite’ or ‘line of flight’ plays a pivotal role in *A Thousand Plateaus*. The line of flight is what allows for ‘relative deterritorialization’ in their philosophy (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p.89). In the Nietzschean discourse we would say that it is only through escape that we are capable of encountering something that is unfamiliar to us, even if it is reintegrated into the familiar. To use another example, when speaking of the acts of patriarchy, and society taking possession of the female body, Deleuze and Guattari discuss the part of the woman who escapes this act of appropriation, “She is an abstract line, or a line of flight. Thus girls do not belong to an age group, sex, order, or kingdom: they slip in everywhere, between orders, acts, ages, sexes; they produce *n* molecular sexes on the line of flight in relation to the dualism machines they cross right through. The only way to get outside the dualisms is to be-between, to pass between, the intermezzo that is what Virginia Woolf lived with all her energies, all her work, never ceasing to become” (1987, p.277). What do our authors mean when they say that this line must always be in relation to the dualism machine? They mean that the line must *hide*, that it must mask itself as a *functioning* part of society in order to achieve its ulterior goals of freedom. And do we see the privilege Deleuze and Guattari are giving to the ‘in-between’ spaces in this passage? This is precisely the burrowing deeper, smaller, more nuanced kind of growth that we have described as being representative of evolution. Deleuze and Guattari are clear that this concept applies at the evolutionary level as well, while speaking of fish who had to grow legs they state, “In one way or the other, the animal is more a fleer than a fighter, but its flights are also conquests, creations” (ATP p.55). It is in this sense that escape is linked to creativity, creativity being the production of the new, not the re-production of the familiar. Escape from and masking of familiar forms is the prerequisite to creation of the new. At the level of psychology they describe the escape from a system, “What is a tic? It is precisely the continually fought battle between a facility trait that tries to escape the sovereign organization of the face and the face itself, which clamps back down on the

trait, takes hold of it again, blocks its line of flight, and reimposes organization upon it" (ATP p.188).

The other concept to connect to escape is that of 'risk' that we introduced in the last chapter. "The line of flight is like a tangent to the circles of significance and the center of the signifier. It is under a curse. [...] Anything that threatens to put the system in flight will be killed or put in flight itself" (ATP p.116). A tangent line is one that touches a circle at exactly one point; we can see here the idea of a mask, that protects itself from being recognized for what it is. This is because there is a risk involved with deviation, with creation. Deleuze is not exaggerating when he claims it is protecting itself from death. "The absolute necessity of a total liberation from ends: otherwise we should not be permitted to try to sacrifice ourselves and let ourselves go. Only the innocence of becoming gives us the *greatest courage* and the *greatest freedom!*" (KSA 8[19])

It is important to reiterate that flight is completely distinct from fight. Escape is *not* a refutation of anything, or a battle with anything, but yet it is a reaction to the pressure of the struggle. "One can no longer have any association with it [Christianity] without incurably dirtying one's intellectual conscience and prostituting it before oneself and others" (HATH p.61). Wearing a mask to escape is an attempt to, as he says, not 'have any association with it,' the mask wards things off, erects a barrier between the organism and the world. This is where we come to more fundamental disagreements with the Agonists.<sup>166</sup> Even though they have redefined struggle in contrast to the Erisian/Mongolian interpretation, they retain a conception of creation that is *essentially* tied to conflict and struggle, in which the struggle acts as a stimulant to creative activity.<sup>167</sup> While we assert that conflict and struggle are necessary for creation (insofar as the concept of Agon is tied to the concept of the 'risk'), we assert firstly that the act of creation, the outcome of the Agon, occurs in hidden spaces. Secondly that creation, the formation of a new type, gains dominance not through overpowering but through escape. While the Agonists will debate us on the first point, we believe that they may accept the second. For example Acampora writes, "Nietzsche's contest with Homer is one in which Nietzsche attempts not so much to overthrow Homer as he seeks to excel the standards that he set" (2003, p.103).<sup>168</sup> To call the 'standards' into question means not just to

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<sup>166</sup> Acampora is once again our representative for this essential theme, "even if [ostracism's] later use was clearly to avoid serious competition, precisely the opposite of what he seems to admire" (2013 p.25)

<sup>167</sup> "*Machtgefühl* can be produced in relation to resistances, obstacles, or challenges. And this process can function as a stimulant and propellant toward overcoming" (Acampora, 2013, 171).

<sup>168</sup> See also, "Nietzsche's approach to Homer is uniquely different: in the case of Homer, Nietzsche's actions do not take the form of an attack. To read Nietzsche as a contestant with Homer is, in part, to see him joined with the group named in the epigraph at the beginning of the paper – Xenophanes and Plato, who were consumed by 'the monstrous desire [...] to assume the place of the overthrown poet [Homer] and inherit his fame.' Nietzsche longs to pick up the 'torch of contest' he claims to receive from Homer in order to 'set afire new greatness.' But we would be hard-pressed to argue that Nietzsche's contest of Homer is organized on terms similar to those found in his contest with Socrates. The contest with Homer lacks the kind of attacks characteristic of his agonies with others. Why? Part of the reason, it seems, is that unlike the others it is not necessary to defeat Homer. As we learn in *The Birth of Tragedy*, a Socratic form of optimism replaced optimism of the sort that Homer is supposed to have embodied. Nietzsche himself writes in

replace the president but to replace the government. Isn't this the risk that Sulla took? To give new *meaning* to an organization requires an interpretation that escapes from the current paradigm. Recalling that a new meaning is the first symptom of a Type emerging into the world of representation, we are here reasserting the connection between avoidance and creation. This is why Nietzsche writes of Homer's Agon: "Combat is salvation and deliverance" (*HC* p.96). A deliverance from the Erisian abyss, a reinterpretation, an escape from "this thickened Bœotian air" that was "difficult to breathe" (*HC* p.96).<sup>169</sup>

Let us briefly examine the end of the Agonal age of Greece as a concrete example of how this kind of complexifying progress works in Nietzsche's conception of history. Nietzsche writes, "Open air and modesty invented the competition [wettkampf] as the ever-increasing refinement of that need to manifest power: by this competition hubris was prevented: which produced a long-standing dissatisfaction with those who lusted for power" (KSA 7[161]). He is of course here referring to the practice of ostracism. Ostracism was put in place by Cleisthenes reforms and is the most essential component of the Agon, the mechanism whereby Athenians blocked one person from stamping their own interpretation upon the city. So then why is it that 461-429 BC is commonly referred to as 'The Age of Pericles'? How did Pericles avoid the fate of Themistocles? The answer lies in Pericles' avoidance of the traditional Agon, "in a Greece marked by the culture of *Agon*, Pericles' prudence was often interpreted by his opponents as pusillanimous or even as cowardly" (Azoulay, 2010 p.36-37). However, Pericles ensured that he didn't have many opponents: "Pericles neglected the traditional forms of friendship (*philia*) and the sociability that was associated with them. So as not to arouse the people's jealousy, the *strategos* even avoided private banquets and such friendly entertainment" (2010, p.85). 'Jealousy' is the very god that Nietzsche identified as fundamental to the Agon in *Homer's Contest*, and here we see Pericles taking significant steps to remove the feeling of jealousy from his political opponents. Pericles took further steps to reduce competition within the city in general, such as filling public offices by lottery (Fears, 2001). These were by no means the traditional methods of maintaining power, the Athenians had valued the Agon, and it was only through *avoiding* this contest that Pericles was able to win it more utterly than any Democrat to come before him.

Pericles' acts of disintegrating the culture of Agon were done with a greater purpose. He calmed tensions between individuals in order to create a contest for Greece. Who could deny that the ambitions of the Delian league were to spread the Athenian Empire to the edges of the Greek-speaking world? The first step was to create a culture similar to one of the aspects of Plato's *Republic*, where citizens would be loyal

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Ecce homo that he only attacks causes that are victorious. Instead of assaulting Homer, Nietzsche strives to surpass him" (2003 p.102).

<sup>169</sup> Acampora also notes a connection between freedom and reinterpretation in the context of the Agon, "Meaningful freedom is not just a state of mind for Douglass: it is fully *embodied*; it gives the body new meaning" (2006 p.180).

to the city rather than their families, “There can be no doubt that the Strategos entire policy aimed to place civic fraternity above real kinship” (Azoulay, 2010, p.88).<sup>170</sup> Nietzsche contrasts the Periclean conception of Agon against a more traditional one, “The true joy of the age consists in being honored says Pericles. Simonides thought it was the desire to win” (KSA 7[168]). This reflects more than a difference of opinion, Pericles represented the creation of a new national Greece, Simonides represented the old culture of Agon between cities, being known especially as the author of the epitaph commemorating the battle of Thermopyle, “Tell them in Lacedaemon, passerby / That here, obedient to their word, we lie.”

Just as the heart and the stomach minimize competition between them by submitting to the brain in order to pursue greater goals, Pericles was uniting the Greek cities under Athens. As we have mentioned, the Agon always implies a risk, and so in order to become the dominant power in Greece, Pericles had “invariably opposed Sparta, allowing no concessions and urging Athens on to war” (Thucydides, 1972, p.110). Not out of a desire for Agon, but out of a desire to stamp out any competing interpretation. Pericles organized the Athenian’s urge for domination under his interpretation, and thus redirected them to bigger contests, but with every new organization, new chaos emerges. Pericles is a counterexample to Caesar, a gambler whose vision met with disaster.

In this section we have attempted to demonstrate at the evolutionary and individual level how power is not outward expansion, but an inward drive to freedom. It is not by Mongolian domination that we attain freedom, but by digging reservoirs deep enough to be open seas, “greater expansion of distance within the soul itself” (KSA 2[13]). When we think of the common Mongolian interpretation of Nietzsche we are all reminded of the famous note of trees fighting each other and expanding in the jungle “for power” (KSA 11[111]). But when we see a ‘mighty oak,’ which seems to us to be physically so strong, what is it we are seeing? Couldn’t this aphorism also be interpreted in the exact opposite fashion? The height of the tree a testament to its will to escape from this fight occurring in such a crowded jungle, the thickness of its trunk is a *protective layer* that insulates its vitality from their world, that puts it at more and more of a distance from the world. It grows through avoidance, it creates through protection, and perhaps we have here an explanation for crown shyness.<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> This, in contrast to how Burckhardt characterizes the Agonal age, “by the peculiar ideal of *kalokagathia*, the unity of nobility” (1998 p.160).

<sup>171</sup>(Rebertus, 1988)

### *The Value of Life*

At this stage, having given an overview of how the themes of the hidden and the secretive function in Nietzsche's philosophy, we have explicated how these themes also appear in Nietzsche's conception of evolution. We are now in a position to begin formulating the final positions of this thesis. The remainder of this chapter will be concerned with the definition of the organism in Nietzsche's philosophy.

To begin let us take a look at one method by which Nietzsche will approach the question of the organic, "Our mental life, including our 'feelings' and sensations, is a tool at the service of a many headed, variously-minded master: this master is our valuations. Our valuations, however betray something of what the *conditions of our life* are (the smallest part being the conditions of the individual, a large part those of the human species, the largest and most extensive the conditions under which *life* is possible at all)" (KSA 40[69]). The organic can be investigated through observing our most basic prejudices, those that exist in all life. In our thesis we have postulated the existence of meaning and interpretation on the level of physiology. And so these basic prejudices can be said to be discriminations at this level, they are types, recalling that every type expresses a quality. Now let us examine the second part of this quote, the section that is in parenthesis. Does not this hierarchy remind us of the hierarchy of the *Ideen* in Schopenhauer? A general *Idee* under which more and more complex, individualized *Ideen* exist? Our postulation is that when Nietzsche is speaking of the 'values of life,' he is talking about the type of life, in the same sense Schopenhauer posited an *Idee* of life. So let's take a look at how he characterizes this type, what is the prejudice of this type?

There is a fair amount of discussion in Nietzsche's text about the concept of unity being "our oldest article of faith, if we did not hold ourselves to be unities, we would have never formed the concept 'thing'" (KSA 14[79]). The assertion of unities in the world, the assertion of objects, is implied to be the condition for all judgment and measurement (HATH P.310). Unity in this sense is contrasted with chaos and becoming, "If our 'I' is our only being, on the basis of which we make everything be or understand it to be, fine! Then it becomes very fair to doubt whether there isn't a perspectival illusion here - the illusory unity in which, as in a horizon, everything converges. [...] Assuming that everything is becoming, knowledge is only possible on the basis of believing in being"(KSA 2[91]). These quotations set up the belief in unities (sometimes, in the same vein, he specifically favors the unity of the ego) to be the instantiation of knowledge. So what else can we say about this 'oldest article of faith?' This type which may characterize all life?

The concept of unity is only plays a part on a Nietzschean stage that already has certain actors on it, "Being' as a fabrication by the man suffering from becoming. [...] Happiness with becoming is only possible in annihilating the reality of 'existence,' of the beautiful semblance, in the pessimistic destruction of illusion" (KSA 2[110]). So the type

that discriminates by creating unity is a *reaction* against the becoming of the universe. But a careful reader here could object that becoming itself must also just be an interpretation, a type of collection of types. This is correct, the type which asserts unity must be in conflict with other types which assert becoming. This will be a very important concept when we get to our final section, *Life Begins in Error*. To prefigure our return to this contention between unity and becoming, we will say that it is our claim that the conception of unity presupposes certain other mechanisms, interior and exterior for example. In order to assert a unity 'out there' or 'inside ourselves,' the division first has to be made between a thing and the world. For now let us turn to the next concept that will lead us towards a definition of the organic.

### *Accumulation*

Accumulation has been put forward as another candidate for the definition of life, in no small part due to aphorisms such as this, "The will to accumulate force is special to the phenomena of life, to nourishment, procreation, inheritance, - to society, state, custom, authority. [...] Life, as the form of being most familiar to us, is specifically a will to the accumulation of force" (KSA 14[82]). There are two questions here; aside from what does it mean to 'accumulate,' what is the meaning of the word 'force'? To answer the second question, we can assert that a force is a will to power, that is, a type. The word 'force' has been a colloquial way for Nietzsche to refer to the will to power and types since the 'Time-Atom Fragment.' So what is accumulation? How can we be more precise in describing this force that has begun to 'accumulate' more forces?

We must answer this question using the concepts that we have already covered in the last chapter, "This seems to me to be one of my most essential steps forward: I learned to distinguish the cause of acting from the cause of acting in a certain way, in a certain direction, with a certain goal. The first kinds of cause is a quantum of dammed-up energy waiting to be used somehow for something; the second kind, by contrast, is something quite insignificant" (GS P.225). What is strangest for most readers must be the significance that he gives this concept, which at first must seem misplaced. The only way to understand the gravity of this seemingly insignificant distinction is given by our discussion on the act of creation in *Birth*. This is because when he says 'dammed-up' he is speaking in this passage about the importance of protection and hiding in the act of creation. He equates this with 'accumulation' and juxtaposes it to what we have defined as 'rhetoric.' This passage gives us a subtle addition to the passage in which we introduced accumulation. In the first passage, one could be forgiven for thinking that not much is said beyond that life is the will to power in the naive sense of a will to endless accumulation. With this first impression one might conclude that the *Übermenschen* are

the type of people with BMI's over 40. With the second passage we gain the connotation that it is difficult to dam something up. This difficulty is associated with the act of creation. "A dammed-up force brings with it a kind of *stress* and *pressure*"(KSA 13 7[18]). This connection between pressure and accumulation must be a reference to the role pressure plays in creation. Accumulation is the specific kind of power relation between types that allows for the process of organic creation. The fundamentals of this relation between types is similar to how it was between *Ideen* in the inorganic; one type is subordinated to the tasks of the other, as is evidenced by this aphorism, "a species grasps a certain amount of reality in order to become master of it, in order to press it into service" (KSA 14[122]).

But there are two ways in which the type of accumulation is not different from there power relations between inorganic types.

First, the conflict between inorganic types is accidental, passive, accumulation is an activity of the organism. "All thought, judgment, perception, considered as comparison has as its precondition a '*positing* of equality,' and earlier still a '*making* equal' The process of making equal is the same as the process of incorporation of appropriated material in the amoeba" (KSA 5[65]). Incorporation in its most basic and abstract form is the assimilation of exterior bodies into an interior. This gives us an indication as to why Nietzsche gives such favor towards the concept of digestion in his writings, "Let us take the simplest case, that of primitive nourishment: the protoplasm extends its pseudopodia<sup>172</sup> in search of something that resists it - not from hunger but from will to power. Thereupon it attempts to overcome, appropriate, assimilate what it encounters: what one calls "nourishment" is merely a derivative phenomenon, an application of the original will to become *stronger*"(KSA 14 [74]). We can note here what seems like a very Mongolian approach to the will to power, searching for 'resistance,' seeking to become 'stronger.' This is the usual interpretation of the digestion metaphor, 'submit to the whole and be decimated.'

But let us briefly reinterpret this metaphor of digestions under the blanket of interpretation and imitation. Recalling that in our thesis the will to power seduces, it does not trample and tyrannize, we seem to have found a counterexample. Let's observe how the idea of domination is portrayed in the context of digestion, "The spirit *wants* equality, i.e., to subsume a sense impression into an existing series: in the same way as the body *assimilates* inorganic matter" First we can note that he is referring to desire here at the level of physiology, recalling Lamarck, for whom desire predated and was the foundation of any kind of physical organ. Second, he uses the word 'subsume' and 'assimilate,' these are much softer words than 'dominate.' For an individual to assimilate into a culture for example means for them to freely take up the mannerisms and habits of that culture, to *imitate* that culture. Our claim is that we can view the act of digestion as a an

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<sup>172</sup> Pseudopodia (from the Greek word ψευδοπόδια, broken into ψευδός "false" + πόδια "feet") are projections of eukaryotic cells.

act of seduction, of coercing the external elements that are brought into the interior to mimic the rest of the body, so that they can be *used* by the body. In this case it would be the digestive function that stamps its interpretation upon all matter, "All prejudice arises from the intestines" (EH p.24).

Given our analysis up to this point, it is natural to tie together imitation and digestion. The digestive system is what organizes the different foreign elements it encounters according to the interpretation of the body as a whole, it is the first instrument of the enforcement of the type. It persuades everything that it encounters to join the type, it interprets the exterior types according to the schematic of the higher type, the human body

The stomach is a tool. The magnificent binding together of the most diverse life, the ordering and arrangement of the higher and lower activities, the thousand-fold obedience which is not blind, even less mechanical, but a selecting, shrewd, considerate, even resistant obedience - measured by intellectual standards, this whole phenomenon 'body' is as superior to our consciousness, our 'mind,' our conscious thinking, feeling, willing, as algebra is superior to the times tables (KSA 37[4]).<sup>173</sup>

This is one of the clearest references Nietzsche makes to the connections between types and Schopenhauerian Ideen. It is clear from this aphorism that the stomach is a subordinated type that works for the greater type that unifies it with the other organs, of which one is 'consciousness.' It interprets the foreign types it encounters and brings them into the fold for the sake of the organizing interpretation, the higher type, what Nietzsche refers to as the "phenomenon 'body.'"

The second aspect of accumulation that distinguishes it from inorganic types is that it is an interiorizing of the external, a hiding away, it takes what it not-it and protects it from the rest of the world. It is this aspect of accumulation that is creative, "A man who says: 'I like that, I'll take it for my own and protect it and defend it against everyone' [...] in short a man who is naturally *master*" (BGE p.174). He is speaking here of the type, the interpreter. He uses the phrase 'naturally' master in reference to the ontological assertion of meaning that exists for this type. Furthermore, we can say that this is why we were earlier discussing an 'economy of masks.' The goal in an economy is to accumulate; capital is a force which accumulates more capital. This occurs on the level of the historical as well, "Towards the men of the future who in the present tie the knots and gather the force that compels the will of millennia into *new* channels [...] In a single glance [the new philosopher] will comprehend everything that *could be bred from*

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<sup>173</sup> See also: "the most important element has been underscored again and again, but the weakest features too remain. In the organic realm there is no forgetting; though there is a kind of digestion of what has been experienced" (KSA 34[167]), and, "'Modernity,' using the metaphor of feeding and digestion. [...]Artificial adjustment of one's nature into a 'mirror'; interested, but only, as it were, epidermally interested; a fundamental coolness, an equilibrium, a lower temperature kept steady just below the thin surface on which there's warmth, motion, 'storm,' the play of the waves" (KSA 10[18]).

*humanity*, given a favorable accumulation and intensification of forces” (BGE p.91-92). We see here that it is only through interiorizing and protecting forces that creation is possible in the organic realm. The ‘new channels’ can only be actualized through this process of accumulation and hiding.

But we still have not reached the definition of the organic once we have defined digestion. There is still a substructure that digestion requires in order to function. “Nourishment’ is only a derivation; the original phenomenon is wanting to enclose everything in oneself” (KSA 5[64]). Before assimilation can take place there must be external elements that can be assimilated *in contrast* to an internal space into which they can be assimilated. Before it is possible to incorporate foreign objects into a given area there must be a boundary which divides that area from what that area is not. For Nietzsche the organism begins as a wall, the first instance of the organism is to demarcate a zone, “What’s firm, powerful, solid, life that rests broad and massive and encloses its force-” (KSA 7[7]). Accumulation can only take place in a space that is protected, and hidden from the rest of the world, an asylum in which a certain mode of interpretation can grow.

### *Interior / Exterior, Yes and No*

We can now return to the question we asked in our introduction to this thesis: if the organic is an extension of the fundamentally inorganic will to power, that is, if they share the same ‘essence,’ how can life be differentiated from death? We say that life begins as an impediment, an admittedly porous barrier that differentiates one space from another.

There are two authors that write about the importance of the interior/exterior divide in Nietzsche’s philosophy of life.<sup>174</sup> They are Roberto Esposito and Elizabeth Grosz. Because this concept is so deeply hidden in Nietzsche’s philosophy, we should directly address the scholars who do detect it in order to give our own claims more legitimacy. We will now give a brief overview of how Grosz and Esposito interpret this concept in Nietzsche’s philosophy.

Beginning with Grosz, she ties Nietzsche both to Darwin and Lamarck, finding the same drive towards complexity in Nietzsche’s conception of evolution that we discussed

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<sup>174</sup>Kristen Brown also briefly address the notion of an interior /exterior divide in her book *Nietzsche and Embodiment*. She draws connections between Merleau-Ponty and Nietzsche, writing, “The implication is a “weak teleology,” weak in the sense that it involves a ‘non finality,’ that is, no determinate end-objective (Vallier 2001, p.200–201). Its open-ended finality is a purposive mobilizing from animal interior to animal exterior—even beyond the animal’s body. Russell’s work is important for Merleau-Ponty because it shows the formation of a condition necessary for the possibility of signification: the animal negotiating a body differentiated from a milieu ‘beyond’ it. This indicates a ‘sort of personification’” Unfortunately, she does not apply this distinction she drew from Merleau-Ponty to Nietzsche’s philosophy, or we would give her more time in our thesis.

earlier in the chapter, as well as the connection between ethical and political organizations and Nietzsche's theory of the organic,

I have argued that if the Darwinian model is appropriate for understanding the complexity and variability of biological existence, then it must also provide an appropriate model for cultural life—not by way of analogy, as social Darwinism proclaims when it argues that memes are 'like' genes or ideas are 'like' biological entities, but directly, through the same principles and processes, through the dynamic movement of elaboration that coheres in temporal emergence. (2004, p.95)

But the most important Grosz makes for our purposes is to distinguish between the interior and the exterior of the organism, and to emphasize the significance of this distinction.

These [conflicting] forces may be understood to constitute an Outside, that which is beyond systematicity, which is composed of forces, and which must be acknowledged as such. This outside, which is not the exterior of a subject or a culture, that is, a subject's or culture's own representation of its limit, an image or projection of an outside, is the force that disrupts, intervenes, to break down expectation and to generate invention and innovation, to enable the emergence or eruption of subjectivity or culture. The outside is the (successful or victorious) series of forces that impinge on structures, plans, expectations of the living (2005, p.49)

We can see from this quote that Grosz is asserting a divide between the chaotic outside forces, which resist any form of systemization or understanding, and the forces of order and causality. We will return to this divide in our next section as it closely mirrors our own estimation. A further note of interest in this quote is that Grosz can be said to be a Wagnerian. Recalling that in our analysis in Chapter One of *Tristan und Isolde*, we explained how for Wagner creativity was only possible by the forces of death intruding upon the forces of life.

Esposito's analysis of the Nietzschean organism is very similar to Grosz, in that he subscribes to this Wagnerian stance, that in order for a creative act to occur, the exterior must break into the interior. Esposito also places much importance on the barrier between the two,

Identifying life with its own overcoming means that it is no longer 'in itself'—it is always projected beyond itself. But if life always pushes outside itself, or admits its outside within it, which is to say, to affirm itself, life must continually be altered and therefore be negated as it is life. Its full realization coincides with a process of extroversion or exteriorization that is destined to carry it into contact with its own 'not'; to make of it something that isn't simply life—neither life nor life only— but something that is both

more than life and other than life: precisely *not* life, if for 'life' we understand something that is stable (Esposito, 2008 p.88)<sup>175</sup>

We can see the importance of the exterior and interior in Esposito. However what we want to call attention to is the specific language he uses, using a visceral 'not' to refer to the exterior. It is this use of language, which mirrors Nietzsche's own, which will allow us to deepen and clarify this concept of the interior and exterior.

We turn to one of Nietzsche's most famous imperatives, 'Yes-saying.' Nietzsche reveals this activity to be associated with life on the ontological level in aphorism nineteen of *Twilight of the Idols*: "Nothing is more conditional — or, let us say, narrower — than our feeling for beauty. [...] In beautiful things, man posits himself as the measure of perfection; in exceptional cases he worships himself in them. A species cannot help saying yes to itself alone in this way. Its most deep-seated instinct, for self-preservation and self-expansion, radiates out of even such sublimates" (TI p.201). In order to continue to read Nietzsche to the letter we firstly and most importantly assert that life can only, and must, say 'yes' to itself and only itself. To connect this notion with our definition of life, it can only say 'yes' to forces that have been enclosed. 'No' must be said to that which is external and foreign to the organism. "Everything that is of my kind, in nature and history, speaks to me, praises me, spurs me on, comforts me - everything else I don't hear or forget right away. We are always only in our own company" (GS p.134). What is not well understood in Nietzsche's ontology of the body is that he establishes a schematic where the organism is divided into affirmation of itself, its interior, and a negation of everything that is exterior to it. This divide, this instantiation of a resistance towards the outside and a protection of the inside is what makes accumulation possible. It is the first realization of life.

One of the rare men Nietzsche praises is Goethe, of whom he writes: "He surrounded himself with nothing but closed horizons [...] he said yes to all that was related to him [...] the man who knew how to turn to his advantage what would destroy the average type" (TI p.222). Under what other reading than the one we have presented of Nietzsche could we explain his praise of 'narrow horizons'? In his notes he also lauds "the feeling of superiority, e.g. when the caliph of Morocco is only given globes that show his three united kingdoms taking up four fifth of the earth's surface" (KSA 11[285]). Nietzsche is complimenting these two men, but he is complimenting traits in them that most of his readers would not find praiseworthy. He is complimenting the strength of their skin.

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<sup>175</sup> However both authors reach a similar conclusion that is different from ours. The ultimate definition of life for both authors is 'becoming': "The Dionysian is life itself in absolute (or dissolute) form, unbound from any presupposition, abandoned to its original flow. Pure presence and therefore unrepresentable as such because it is without form, in perennial transformation" (Esposito, 2008, p.89); "Life becomes definitively linked to the movement of time and the force of the unpredictable, even random, future. Life is this very openness to the dynamism of time, an active response to time's provocation to endure. In short, life is now construed, perhaps for the first time, as fundamental becoming (Grosz, 2005, p.37). We covered the criticism we had towards this definition at the beginning of Chapter One, in the section entitled *Will to Power*.

This barrier is the essence of the organism,<sup>176</sup> the organism at its height must say 'no' to many things *in order to* say 'yes' to just a few: "How much falsity I shall *require* if I am to continue to permit myself the luxury of *my* truthfulness?... Enough, I am still living; and life is, after all, not a product of morality: it *wants* deception, it *lives* on deception..." (HATH P.6). And, "he forgets most things so as to do one thing" (UM p.64). This indicates that 'no-saying' will naturally be more abundant than 'yes-saying,' this is why nothing is narrower than our feeling for beauty. Furthermore, it necessarily must be this way, an organism cannot maintain an 'open' state towards the world and preserve its life. Accumulation depends upon this barrier to function. All openings that we have toward the world are small and mediated, in a bodily sense.

We have discussed the importance of mediation earlier in our section *Nietzschean Complexity* but let us turn to an aphorism that deals with mediation in this context, "Each of these choices - of nutrition, of location and climate, and of recuperation - is governed by an instinct for self-preservation that is most clearly expressed as an instinct for *self-defense*. Not seeing much, not hearing much, not letting things come close- this is the first principle of cleverness" (EH, p.95). The barrier between the interior and the exterior must be kept strong. If the interior has any shot any genius it will create a restricted exterior, small openings into the world. "Every nobler spirit and taste selects his audience when he wants to communicate; in selecting it he simultaneously erects barriers against 'the others'" (GS P.245). Especially notice the abbreviated way of talking about the unknown, 'the others': what is not a part of the interior.

The existence and importance of this barrier between the interior and exterior is expressed subtly in many other aphorisms of Nietzsche, "Cheerfulness, the good conscience, the joyful deed, confidence in the future - all of them depend, in the case of the individual as of a nation, on the existence of a line dividing the bright and discernable from the unimaginable and dark" (UM p.63). The metaphor of darkness is classically tied to the notion of the unknowable, "Tracing something unknown back to something known gives relief, soothes, satisfies, and furthermore gives a feeling of power. The unknown brings with it danger, disquiet, worry - one's first instinct is to get rid of these awkward conditions. [...] Proof of pleasure ('strength') as criterion for truth-"(TI p.180). The terms "unknown" and "known" are used in a way for a reason, an organism 'knows' something that is within the boundaries of itself. The unknown is the exterior. Recall the last section of chapter three where we equated the type with a kind of knowing at the physiological level, if we use this context to explain this aphorism, it is easier to see what kind of radical divide he is positing between what is outside and inside the organism. Even the

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<sup>176</sup> Deleuze does note the importance of the interior and the exterior for the organism, "It is the inorganic that repeats itself, with a difference of proximate dimension, since it is always an exterior site which enters a body, the organism, in contrast, develops an interior site that contains necessarily *other* organisms, those that envelop in their turn the interior sites containing yet other organisms" (2006, p.9). It is unclear by this statement whether Deleuze considers the barrier to be essential to the organism, or even if there can be said to be an 'initial envelopment' or if rather even what we considered organisms are themselves 'enveloped' in the universe.

imagery of the quote provided by “tracing [...] back” gives the connotations of “outside” and “inside”.<sup>177</sup>

Our strong statements about the strength of this barrier must be qualified, because at the same time there must be a minimal permeability that exists. “Darwin absurdly *overestimates* the influence of ‘external circumstances’; the essential thing about the life process is precisely the tremendous force which shapes, creates form from within, which utilises and *exploits* ‘external circumstances’” (KSA 7[25]).<sup>178</sup> This aphorism makes it clear that in order for accumulation to occur there must be some kind of minimal openings that allow passage between the interior and the exterior.

To bring this discussion to the level of physicality, “or to give [ugly things] a surface and skin that is not fully transparent: all this we should learn from artists while otherwise being wiser than they. For usually in their case this delicate power stops where art ends and life begins” (GS p.170). Under our interpretation of life we can understand the full connotations of this aphorism: the interior/exterior is a *skin*, in this sense a protective layer that *hides*. “Every skin reveals something, but *conceals* even more” (BGE p.33). What Nietzsche is saying here is that the skin is permeable, it allows for absorption and incorporation, but those are secondary qualities. The skin is mainly a barrier that *hides* the organism away from the world; the skin’s demarcation of the boundaries of the organism is the defining quality of life. Whether it is a cell membrane or an individual’s skin, it is the existence of a barrier that defines an organism.

### *Life Begins in Error*

Having broadly introduced the defining qualities of this barrier, we now turn to positioning it within the framework of Nietzsche’s ontology that we have spent the last two chapters discussing. During the course of this final section we will deepen our understanding of the nature of this barrier as well as the nature of the organism. So let us turn to our final postulation concerning the nature of life: “the conditions of life might

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<sup>177</sup>Thacker recognizes a similar schematic in the Christian Neoplatonist Pseudo-Dionysius, who wrote in the late fifth or early sixth century. Thacker writes, “If the divine superlative life is a pure interiority, then would not evil have to be a pure exteriority?” (2010 p.53). Although Thacker believes that this evil exteriority is metaphysical thought of life that transcends all instances of the living, and that it appears as a negation to the Pseudo-Dionysius because of its transcendence. Whereas for Nietzsche this exteriority is death, with the first act of life being to negate this pure exteriority. Thacker traces the construction of a philosophy of superlative life via negation through the works of several late-antiquity scholars, concluding, “In both cases, the affirmation of negation itself pointed to a superlative limit beyond the affirmation of negation itself” (2010, p.80-81)

<sup>178</sup> This view might have been influenced by Bichat who writes, “The Measure, then, of life in general, is the difference which exists between the effort of exterior power, and that of interior resistance” (1978, p.11). Bichat puts the kernel of life in an power of the interior of the organism to resist the encroachment of what is exterior to the organism. Certainly both Nietzsche and Bichat share the sentiment that life is a *reaction* towards death, and both seem also to emphasize that this reaction can appear to be very much an autonomous activity.

include error" (GS p.117).<sup>179</sup> The first thing we must note about this statement is that 'error' only has any sort of meaning in reference to a 'truth,' and a knowledge of this 'truth.' And so we postulate that Nietzsche is referencing here what has become interpreted as his 'perspectivism.' In this case we are completely in line with the most common interpretation of this aphorism. Alexander Nehamas is representative of this orthodoxy, and contests that this aphorism, and others like it, are microcosms of Nietzsche particular brand of perspectivism. Nehamas writes in reference to this aphorism, "[Nietzsche's] Perspectivism does not result in the relativism that holds that any view is as good as any other; it holds that one's own views are the best for oneself without implying that they need to be good for anyone else" (1985, p.72). We agree with Nehamas here, because if every perspective is equally valid, it is impossible to say that any perspective has made an error, and so how could 'the conditions of life include error'? Equally, it would be impossible to say that any perspective has hit on the truth (except the perspective that recognizes perspectivism, but one can't have a garden without a gardener), and so we have to distance Nietzsche from a 'radical' version of perspectivism.

Nehamas continues, "By the strange artifice of calling his views true, Nietzsche underscores their deeply personal and idiosyncratic nature, the fact that they are his own interpretations. Having presented his perspectivism not so much as a traditional theory of knowledge but as the views that all efforts to know are also efforts of particular people to live particular kinds of lives for particular reasons, he now applies that view to himself" (1985, p.75). Here is where he parts company with the common interpretation of this aphorism: we believe that Nietzsche is speaking about the organism when he says 'life,' not 'the experience of living,' which is self-evidently full of glaring errors. As we have tried to demonstrate in an earlier section of this chapter, his 'perspectivism' is tied to his theory of masks, which extends below the psychological realm into the physiological. So in this section we will further connect the ideas of 'error' and 'mask' to our formulation of the organism.

Upon examining this concept of the interior and the exterior we can connect it strongly to the concept of masks, "Sometimes in matters of *custom* to act contrary to your better judgment, to give now and then outwardly, in praxis, and yet retain one's inner integrity, to do as everyone else does and thus to render everyone else a courteous good turn of compensation, as it were, for the deviance of our opinions" (p.115 D). What we recognize here in the theory of the interior/exterior is the conceptual base of a mask. An interior and exterior is *the* basic presupposition in order to formulate what a mask is. And yet what else can we read here: physiological and psychological secrets *must* be connected in the idea of a mask. Otherwise this statement is nothing, it is completely banal. This assertion about politeness is not even a secret; it's not even

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<sup>179</sup> See also, "a high degree of deception were one of the prerequisites of the enhancement of life" (KSA 11[112]).

anything everybody doesn't already know they know. As in, "Don't talk about your political views around her please". The only thing that could possibly save this thought from being embarrassingly insignificant is if the language refers to an ontological schema, one of an interior and exterior.

If we continue to advance this notion that a mask is the very essence of life, we must do so in light of the claims we made to introduce this chapter; Nietzsche's ethical injunctions ('to run and hide,' 'to avoid struggle and conflict') are bound to his conception of the nature of the organism. He is building a bridge between the physiological and the psychological. So let us continue down this path, and discern to what depths this concept of 'the hidden' reaches. Nietzsche writes, "Increase in "dissimulation" [Verstellung] proportionate to the rising order of rank of creatures. It seems to be lacking in the inorganic world - power against power, quite crudely - cunning begins in the organic world; plants are already masters of it. The highest human beings, such as Caesar, Napoleon [...] The perspective of all organic functions, all the strongest instincts of life: the force in all life that *wills* error [...] (KSA 10 12[159]). Here we have reached the dividing line. In the organic, defined by masks, demarcated by a barrier, power grows inwardly, more and more complex. 'Error' (*Irrthum*) here is being used synonymously with deception (*Verstellung*), evolution through nuance, subtlety, and refinement. "All the manifestations of life are accompanied by dissimulation" (TLEMS p.264). Life is subtle, therefore hidden and obscured, but obscured and hidden *from what?* What is outside of life, what is the exterior? As we have seen in the above aphorism, the inorganic world is here characterized as 'crude' and brutal, it is the colloquially understood world of the will to power that we have been criticising in this thesis. In the the inorganic world the will to power is Mongolian; life is a Great Wall, an attempt at protection.

Let us define the two sides of this boundary further, "Living - isn't that wanting specifically to be something other than this nature? Isn't living assessing, preferring, being unfair, being limited, wanting to be different?" (BGE p.10). Again we see the assertion of judgment, desire, and meaning at the level of physiology, which we equated with the type in chapter three. The formation of a boundary, the distinction made between an interior and an exterior is a *type*. Just like life was an *Idee* for Schopenhauer, life is a type of death for Nietzsche, "Life is only a type [Art] of death, and a very rare type" (GS p.110). We encounter here once again the subtlety of Nietzsche's writing. We claim that he is here using the term 'type' technically and not colloquially, as this aphorism has usually been read. This means that life follows the same fundamental principles of organization that the inorganic types follow. Life is a type.

So what difference does the type of the Great Wall make? What changes in the instantiation of life? Or to put the same question in another manner: what is life like on the other side of the wall? "*-All movements are to be taken as gestures*, as a kind of language through which the forces understand each other. In the inorganic world misunderstanding is absent, and communication seems perfect. It's in the organic world

that *error* begins"(KSA 1[28]) When Nietzsche claims that every 'movement' is a 'gesture', he is further confirming the theory we have been pushing, that every iota of force is meaningful, every piece of kinetic energy that constitutes reality is a sensuous being. He is claiming then that *there is communication between inorganic types*. But what is even more interesting for our purposes is that the instantiation of error, of *miscommunication* is being called the instantiation of the organism. The organism is the *failure* to transmit something from force to force, and instead the organic force *retains something*, the first step toward accumulation. *This* is why 'error' is the condition of life. Life is a barrier, a skin that first hides an iota of meaning, denying its possibility of communication. And so this is the fundamental reason we cannot agree with those who equate life with the unrelenting expansion of power, or with fluidity of movement in the process of becoming. Nietzschean life is *precisely the opposite!* Life is an *escape* from the great struggle between inorganic powers, and it is a *retention* of force.

It is true that the dominating, Mongolian will to power is the metaphysical essence of the universe, and life is an extension of this power. However just because life is a 'mere' type does not mean that life cannot be characterized. Just as life was the most extreme intrusion of the will into representation for Schopenhauer, life is the most radically reactionary type for Nietzsche. Once it is recognized that this drive towards secrecy and confinement is the essence of life, many of Nietzsche's most puzzling aphorisms are resolved. This is how we ultimately divide the Mongolian from the Agonistic approach to the will to power. The Mongolian will to power is an accurate descriptive of the inorganic realm, while the organism expresses this same power through subtlety, in Agon; through mediated struggles won by means of seduction and nuance.

The commanding element (whatever it is) that is generally called 'spirit' wants to dominate itself and its surroundings, and to feel its domination: it wills simplicity out of multiplicity, it is binding, subduing, domineering, and truly masterful will. [...] The same [inorganic dominating will] is served by an apparently opposite drive of spirit, a suddenly emerging resolution in favor of ignorance and arbitrary termination, a closing of its windows [skin] an inner nay-saying to something or other, a come-no-closer, a type of defensive state against many knowable things, a contentment with darkness, with closing horizons, a yes-saying and approval of ignorance: all of which are necessary in proportion to the degree of its appropriating force, its 'digestive force,' to speak metaphorically - and really, 'spirit' resembles a stomach more than anything. The spirit's will to be deceived belongs here too, perhaps with a playful hunch that things are *not* one way or another, that people just accept things as one way or another, a sense of pleasure in every uncertainty and ambiguity, a joyful self-delight as the arbitrary narrowness and secrecy of a corner (BGE P.122 Brackets added).

As we have been attempting to argue, Nietzsche frequently refers back to the physiological world when writing about psychology, and frequently looks forward to the psychological world when writing about physiology. This is why we get passages such as this, which could be read from either perspective: either as a rudimentary psychology; using primitive wording such as ‘nay-saying’ to describe psychological states, or as a slightly psychological description of physiology; giving ‘voice’ to the different drives. In the latter case Nietzsche is laying out here a very subtle formulation of the distinction between the organic and the inorganic; we see that the ur-state is the ‘commanding element,’ the type, which operates in the inorganic world in a simple, domineering manner, *touching* all other types. But there is an inversion, an ‘apparently opposite drive,’ which creates *distance*, barriers, and begins to appropriate and digest. This is the story of the origin of life.

Let us examine a note Nietzsche made regarding the evolution the species as it is tied to the concept of the organism, “Regarding that which all life reveals as a diminutive [verkleinert] formula for the total tendency; here a new definition of the concept ‘life’ as will to power” (KSA 7[54]). Again, we see him asserting that the organic will to power is the exact opposite of what his commentators have taken it to be. He has asserted that life is a ‘verkleinert Formel’ of the will to power. Not a growing stronger but a growing weaker, growing more complex and fragile. To draw this statement further into the context of our thesis we can turn to another note he made.

“The loss involved in all specialisation: the synthetic nature is the higher one. Now, all organic life is specialisation; the inorganic world behind it is the greatest synthesis of forces and therefore the highest and most worthy of reverence. - In it there is no error, no narrowness of perspective” (KSA 1[105]). First when he is talking about the ‘loss involved in specialisation’ he means that by becoming more nuanced, more subtle, more differentiated, the organic world becomes weaker, or smaller: ‘verkleinert.’ It is in the inorganic that we find the combination of forces that results in extremely powerful and extremely active forces such as a sun. Life on the other hand needs narrow horizons; it *essentially is* a barrier from the outside world, a hiding away from these giant forces. And because of this it is fragile, and under the control of the larger forces. But the term ‘specialisation’ that he uses also implies a difference, let’s quote again, “Isn’t living assessing, preferring, being unfair, being limited, wanting to be different?” (BGE p.10). By hiding and protecting itself from the larger forces, life is *escaping*, and escaping into a freedom to become something, to become some *other* that what it is surrounded by.

We find this formulation of the organic very subtly referenced in the much of the published material, “After all, we know roughly what the organic is, are we then supposed to reinterpret what is inexpressibly derivative, late, rare, accidental, which we perceive only on the crust of the earth, as something essential, common, and eternal, as those people who call the universe an organism?” (GS p.109). The key thing to understanding this passage is to read partially literally and partially metaphorically at the

same time. When he says 'inexpressibly derivative' he isn't just using hyperbole, he really means it is inexpressible. But when he says we perceive on the crust of the earth, he means that we perceive life only in appearances. This will be Nietzsche's succinct response to the Kantian position. Recall that Kant posited that we cannot have any understanding of the vital energy of life, and so we must posit 'purposiveness' into matter while recognizing that it is an illusory placeholder. Nietzsche places the blame for this inability to understand life not on the side of the knower but on the side of the living; the living *resists* being known. Knowledge permeates reality; the inorganic world is characterized by crude, but real, pure communication. Things *understand* one another in the realm of death. This resistance to being understood is the vital force of life.

We have established that life is many things at the same time, life is a will to escape, to create, to hide, to resist the encroachment upon barriers that it erects, to resist understanding, it is a Great Wall intent on holding off the Mongol horde for as long as possible. Life is an asylum from the unceasingly Erisian war-like forces that occupy the inorganic realm; life shelters, collects, accumulates and integrates forces.<sup>180</sup>

I pursued the living, I walked the greatest and the smallest paths in order to know its nature. [...] However, wherever I found the living, there too I heard the speech on obedience. All living is an obeying. [...] Along secret passages the weaker sneaks into the fortress and straight to the heart of the more powerful – and there it steals power. And this secret life itself spoke to me: "Behold," it said, "I am that which must always overcome itself. To be sure, you call it will to beget or drive to a purpose, to something higher, more distant, more manifold: but all this is one, and one secret. I would rather perish than renounce this one thing; and truly, wherever there is decline and the falling of leaves, behold, there life sacrifices itself – for power! That I must be struggle and becoming and

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<sup>180</sup> There are actually two authors who intimates a thesis that is something along these very lines. The first is Daniel Ahern, who after explaining how the will to power extends from the inorganic world into the realm of the living writes, "The organic realm is also a plethora of power quanta, but here a capacity for *deception* reveals [itself] [...] It seems odd to think of plants as masters of deception. But what Nietzsche saw in them was an uncanny ability to subjugate and exploit organic and inorganic compounds in order to enhance themselves. [...] Inorganic things are of course, power quanta, but these lack the exploitative subtlety of the organic realm" (Ahern, 1995, p.14). We see here Ahern making the same move we are, to show how *before* this act of subjugation and domination takes place there necessitates a withdrawal, a deception, a secretive gesture.

Secondly Michel Haar also hold the thesis that, "The move from the inorganic to the organic realm is a move from what is clear and certain to what is obscure and indefinite" (1992, p.72). He further asserts the importance of the interior/exterior boundary and claims, "Life is a lie in as much as it is appearance, dissimulation, endless mask-donning" (1992, p.76). All of this would seem to imply that he is supporting our thesis outright. However, he muddles his definition of life by also claiming that life is interpretation, and the life is 'logic incarnate,' and that life is will to power, and that life is consciousness, and judgment, and justice. His article is unorganized and his thesis isn't clear, it seems as though he does pick up on the importance of hiding for life but is unable to draw out its consequences. As we covered in the last chapter, by the time he publishes his book *Nietzsche and Metaphysics* four years later he has come to understand life as will to power, and will to power as the "Word for being" (1996, p.6)

purpose and the contradiction of purposes – alas, whoever guesses my will guesses also on what crooked paths it must walk! (TSZ p.88-89).<sup>181</sup>

We see Nietzsche articulating in this passage the contrast between the Mongolian and Agonistic doctrine of power between the inorganic and the organic. It is in life that the will to power learns to *obey* and not just to command, all life bears the signs of a burrowing deeper and deeper into reality, pursuing freedom, creating caves. Life gains power through cleverness, sneakiness (πολυτρόπως). Overcoming is only attained through sacrifice, through renunciation of power, building the most crooked paths, nuanced and subtle. Look at humans, the 'highest form' of this drive to hide. Look at our fluidity, compared to a tree for example, our "adaptability", our ability to *evade*. We have nearly shut ourselves out completely from the outside world. The only organ that seems to come in direct contact and conflict with the world is the one that attracted the most attention from Nietzsche: the stomach. This organ must wrestle with the actual "impressions" that the world gives us (after of course our teeth and tongue, eyes and nose have examined and selected what is fit for the stomach). We have many physical layers of protection from reality. Skin is thick and heals, we only have small holes opening up to "being" to "the world" through layers of membrane. The most evil art that is practiced is the art of creating the greatest pain in another human being, often in order to get them to reveal a secret. And what else is torture itself, aside from a method of careful, prolonged, directed exposure to the world? "A naked man has few secrets, a flayed man, none" (Martin, 1999, p.656).

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<sup>181</sup> This parable of Zarathustra is reminiscent of the story of Trophonius, who Nietzsche identifies with in the preface to *Morgenrothe*. In Pausanias' *Description of Greece* he is said to be a builder who stole the treasure of Hyrieus through a secret passage (9.37.5). He is also mentioned as being half man and half god in Lucian's dialogues of the dead, because he is a son of Apollo.

## Conclusion

This thesis has addressed the problem of the organic and organization in the philosophies of Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche. To conclude our study, we would now like to review the material that we have covered, and point out the contributions that we have made to existing scholarship along the way.

We began in our first chapter by defining our goals in juxtaposition to the abundance of scholarship that we feel has mischaracterized or ignored the question of the organic. Most writers who author papers on Nietzsche's conception of life define 'life' very loosely as 'experience,' 'becoming,' or 'power.' We spent time categorizing and explaining these many scholars who have written tangentially on this subject in order to better define our own project. We then moved on to trace a chronological story of the term 'life' that covered Nietzsche's early years as a student through the rise and fall of his friendship with Wagner. This was to indicate the significance of the concept of 'life' for Nietzsche, and to explain why many of Nietzsche's interpreters use 'life' in a spurious way. We blamed Schopenhauer, Lange, and especially Wagner for providing Nietzsche with the justification necessary to use 'life' loosely. We believe that this framework for defining what kind of questions are and are not associated with the question of the organic will be a necessary step to consider for all future authors who are interested in this problem in Nietzsche's philosophy. The state of Nietzschean scholarship surrounding the term 'life' is extremely chaotic: most authors who write on this just utilize their own impressions, ignoring everything that has been said before and is being said around them. Our work defining and categorizing, as well as historicizing and justifying these various interpretations is what allowed us to begin our investigation without having to continually refer to authors who are not interested in the same problem that we are. Hopefully this framework will be useful to future authors who wish to pursue similar questions.

Our second chapter dissects the Kantian and Schopenhauerian theories of the organic, with the majority of the chapter focusing on Schopenhauer. We first briefly summarized Kant's writings on the nature of the organism, sticking close to the existing scholarship that we found more than adequate. The main focus of the chapter was on the concept of organization in Schopenhauer's philosophy, which we demonstrated was closely tied to his conception of the organism. In terms of what we accomplished for Schopenhauerian scholarship we believe that we have opened up new means of accessing the most controversial concept in Schopenhauer's philosophy, the *Ideen*. The *Ideen* are Schopenhauer's response to the most common criticism leveled at him: the quality of the relationship between will and representation. This understudied subject has only been approached from the angle of epistemology, not from the angle of evolution or organization. We connected the notion of the *Ideen* to all of its Platonic, Neo Platonic,

and Kantian influences, something that surprisingly has not been done yet. We further demonstrated how this concept is a combination of the Platonic forms and early French concepts of evolution and extinction. Our goal was to show how this mysterious subject is actually the center-piece of Schopenhauerian philosophy, and how it can be used to address many of the metaphysical concerns that scholars have used to keep Schopenhauer out of continental philosophy departments. We further used this essential concept of Schopenhauer's philosophy to determine a definition of the organic. At the end of the chapter we note that a few scholars have taken up the question of the organic in Nietzsche's philosophy in an authentic manner. We have discussed Nietzsche's conception of teleology in this section, along with the reason why we disagree with these scholar's conclusions. This work must be considered as part of the organizational efforts of this thesis, it was used to frame our question and indicate what other authors have articulated similar inquiries.

The third chapter in this thesis introduces an unorthodox ontology of Nietzsche that attempts to tie his conception of organization to Schopenhauer's. In this chapter we attempted to reexamine the concept of the will to power by breaking it into 'will' and 'power' and analyzing each component separately. We claim that scholars have not given enough consideration to the hermeneutical aspects of the will to power, and because of this, the will to power has been widely mistaken for a 'Mongolian' drive for unrelenting expansion. We contrasted this drive with an 'Agonistic' interpretation of the will to power, and spent a significant portion of the chapter showing how many scholars throw their weight on the side of the Mongolians. In this chapter we bring to light an ontological connection between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer that has no precedent in the scholarship, the connection between types and *Ideen*. We further the scholarship that has been done on the will to power, and especially upon the scant literature that covers the doctrine of types and the risk. We put forward a bold thesis that goes against the grain of traditional thinking on Nietzsche's conception of the will to power insofar as we argue that the will to power and the doctrine of types reaches into the metaphysical realm, in the same sense that the Schopenhauerian will does.

The last chapter in this thesis defined the organic being in Nietzsche's philosophy. Our claim was that the initial gestures of life can be understood as a withdrawal, as the building of a boundary, as a hiding away. We began by describing the role of these themes in Nietzsche's psychology in the first half of the chapter, and moved to his ontology in the second half. There are very few authors who write about this theme of 'hiding,' and so our study of a 'psychology of secrets' will be a starting point for authors who wish to explore this subject. We talked at length about the economy of imitation that Nietzsche envisioned shaped the mediocre actors in history, as well as contrasting this with a psychological portrait of the form creator. We further talked about this notion of creation, and in contrast to the Agonistic interpreters, have claimed that the creation of a new type can only occur through the act of hiding. In the second part of this chapter we

make what we feel to be the main contribution of this thesis to academia. We formulate a original definition of the organic being. The notion of 'life' has long been considered to be an extremely important, if not the most important, concept in Nietzsche's philosophy. Our conception of the Nietzschean organic attempts to fit into this mold of importance, as we argue that the concept of the organic is tied to all different threads of his philosophical thinking, such as ethics and evolution. Our conception of life in Nietzsche draws on our conception of hiding which we discussed in the first half of the chapter, we assert that life begins when a boundary is built to distinguish between and interior and an exterior. We relate some of the positive qualities of life such as consumption to the installation of this barrier, and show how they are secondary, not primary, qualities of life. This is the most speculative part of our thesis, and we draw heavily on primary texts in order to prove our case.

There is are still unanswered questions that we have not had the time or the opportunity to address in this thesis. What is death? What is reproduction? What is heredity? All of these are essential aspects of all life, but could not be answered in the scope of this thesis, as they would entail delving into Nietzsche's philosophy of humor and history, both of which are exceedingly complex. There are also the questions of Nietzsche's relationship with Plato or Wagner, which appear to have been intensely personal to the man, and could not be exposed without a much more biographical approach. We also admit that our rebuttal of Nietzsche as a 'philosopher of appearances' was not exhaustive, and more research is needed in order to further determine his relationship with the metaphysical versus the phenomenal.

One theme that we have been repeating throughout this work is that Nietzsche's writing style is perhaps more difficult to analyze than is commonly accepted. Not only are there are many diverse interpretations that can be pulled out of his work but he seems to actively attempt to mislead us. It is ultimately up to each reader to determine how much attention should be paid to the letter of the text, and when it is appropriate to make more liberal interpretations from enigmatic passages or notes. But it is my opinion that after over a century of scholarship, a radical, perhaps even hazardous reading that attempts to see well beyond what Nietzsche explicitly takes up in the text is necessary to force readers to reexamine these works. By running through Nietzsche's labyrinthine style we lose ourselves, and often end up writing long labyrinthine books. But by drawing bold conclusions that shake up the tenets of traditional Nietzschean interpretation we hope at the very least to engender some reevaluation.

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