

"You will be responsible to the GOC"


Intelligence Management and the security stovepipe in Northern Ireland, 1968-1974

Cambridge Intelligence History Seminar – 24 Feb 2017



Job Description I


28 August 1969 – NB Not Passed on to NI Government on orders of Edward Peck – Chairman of JIC.



UKREP Oliver Wright

GOC Sir Ian Freeland

Intelligence reporting arrangements 1969-72



Security/Operational Intelligence only.
Taken from, 'Northern Ireland: background brief for CGS, Part III Annex A, April 1971, DEFE 25/304, TNA.

SLO, Directors of Intelligence, Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence – All Civil Intelligence agencies

- 1966 –SLO MI5- ?
- 1969-70 SLO MI5 - ?
- 1970 –SLO MI5 – **David Eastwood**
- 1970-October 1972 Director of Intelligence, MI5 - **David Eastwood**
- October 1972- 73/74 – Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence MI6, **Frederick Allan Rowley**.



David Eastwood, MC, 1919-2010



Frederick Allan Rowley, CMG, OBE MC, 1922-2014

THE BLOODY SUNDAY INQUIRY

3. The Director of Intelligence was a comparatively new post and there was no established procedure for how I was supposed to operate. My task was to co-ordinate the intelligence gathering efforts of the various elements of the security forces operating in Northern Ireland at the time. My role was to oversee a department consisting of Security Service and military officers. I had to liaise with the police, and in particular the Special Branch of the RUC. The people in my department both received intelligence from the RUC and obtained intelligence themselves. The intelligence was collated and assessed for inclusion in reports that were then disseminated within Whitehall and the Intelligence community.

in report that were then disseminated within Whitehall and the Intelligence community. A lot of the documentation would be addressed to me as Director of Intelligence but such was the volume at the time that I could not have seen it. It was my job to ensure that this collation and dissemination was done as efficiently as possible.

4. My priority was to improve Special Branch where necessary through the provision of training and assistance. I also tried to ensure that the Army and Special Branch did not fall over one another in their operations. My role included monitoring security and ensuring that agents were not killed through sloppy handling.

5. My department created various intelligence reports and if there was time I would try and check them to see that everything was being done properly but I was aware the originator of the intelligence they contained. I personally would rarely have received the individual 'Brigade' internal intelligence summaries nor those reports prepared by the Army or Ministry of Defence in London, although members of my department could well have seen them.

6. Special Branch were a lot better at intelligence work than they were given credit for. Although I had army officers within my department only one, my deputy, was from the Army Intelligence Corps.

The MI5 SLO became 'Director of Intelligence' and operated between the RUC and the Army.



Bloody Sunday Inquiry – Witness Statement KD_0002 'David'

The Intelligence Co-Ordinator –Sir Dick White

- Former head of MI5 (1953-56) and MI6 (1956-68)
- Came out of Semi-retirement as Intelligence Co-ordinator under Wilson and Callaghan.




March 1971, Dick White, The Intelligence Co-ordinator reports to JIC on Northern Ireland.



March 1971, Dick White, The Intelligence Co-ordinator reports to JIC on Northern Ireland.


3. The Report shows that real progress has been made in improving the intelligence organisation since the last Report in January and it is fair to conclude that the measures taken by MOD have made a significant contribution to that improvement. Nevertheless, we have freely admitted (in paragraph 18 on page 10) that there are still weaknesses in the direction, collection and collation of security intelligence but have pointed out that the recent posting of a GSO 1 (Int) should effect an early improvement. However, it is important to keep this point in perspective: the Army's contribution is probably only about 10% of the total intelligence take – the balance being principally from RUC SB. Thus, however much we improve our own arrangements, there cannot be a consequential radical improvement in the intelligence situation as a whole. For this we must look to the RUC (SB), as Sir Dick White has clearly indicated in his own report.

Chief Defence Staff memo on Northern Ireland Intelligence Arrangements April 1971, Ref JIC(A)(71) 23, DEFE 25/304, NA.




Political Vs Security/Operational Intelligence in Northern Ireland

- SLO was replaced by political reporting from UKREP after 1969
 - UKREPs Oliver Wright, Ronnie Burroughs, Harold Smith
 - Deputy UKREP from October 1971 was Frank Steele (MI6)
- Advent of Direct Rule continued requirement for political intelligence
 - Frank Steele remains advisor and is responsible to Frank Cooper.
 - Steele replaced at NIO's Laneside offices by Michael Oatley and James Allan (on secondment from MI6 and FCO) in 1973.




Frank Steele (right) in Derry, early 1970s.



Secret Intelligence and 'Parallel Diplomacy'



Complicating the narrative



Expanding the explanation(1970-76)



- October 1972- 73/74 – Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence MI6, **Frederick Allan Rowley**.
- **1974-75** Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence, **Denis Payne (MI5)**



Frederick Allan Rowley, CMG, OBE
MC, 1922-2014