THE STRUCTURE AND MEANING OF EMOTION IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MERLEAU-PONTY AND SARTRE

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To the memory of:

Cécile Barberger 1936-2018

Angela Kershaw 1971-2018

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Contents

Abstract

The aim of the thesis is to explore whether the early phenomenological works of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty can be used to create a satisfactory phenomenological account of emotion, and if so what the major concepts of this account are.

Sartre, throughout all the works examined, describes a wide range of emotions, emotional situations and behaviours. He expresses the embodiment of human existence, which can then be applied to its affective dimension. He also examines the relation between the qualities of objects and being, how they have meaning for us, and how the passions relate to our decisions and choices. He formulates the phenomenological characteristics of emotion and affectivity. His fullest and most explicit attempt at this in *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions* is flawed, mainly because of his theory of emotion as a magical transformation of the world

Merleau-Ponty shows limited interest in the affective aspect of our relationship to the world. In *The Structure of Behaviour* he describes the structure of existence and consciousness, which details the integration of the physical, mental and cultural. This can be used to explain the physiological aspects of emotions and affects and their groundedness in the lived experience of the body. This continues in *Phenomenology of Perception*. Although his main focus is perception, he examines sexuality as a privileged area of our affective life. He also explores the way that we valorise objects in the world and make decisions based on our individual ways of being.

An interesting feature in both authors is the stress on behaviour. Here we see the close relationship between behaviour and existentialism, in its concern with the 'movement of existence'.

I have formulated a synthesis of the major points arising from the close reading of relevant passages from the works concerned. This provides a framework for a general phenomenological account of affectivity and emotion and a basis on which analyses of the experience of particular affects and emotions could be undertaken.

Primary sources - Abbreviations

Sartre	
TE	La Transcendance de l'ego
ETE	Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions
IMG	L'Imaginaire
EN	L'Être et le néant
Merleau-Ponty	
SC	La Structure du comportement
PP	Phénoménologie de la perception
VI	Le Visible et l'invisible
Heidegger	
BT	Being and Time

Translations – Abbreviations

(see Bibliography for full references)

Sartre	
Brown	The Transcendence of the Ego
Mairet	Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions
Webber	The Imaginary
Barnes	Being and Nothingness
Merleau-Ponty	
Fisher	The Structure of Behaviour
Smith	Phenomenology of Perception

Approach to translations

A variety of approaches has been taken to the translations. Many are my own; some are my own assisted by the published translations, where this expedited the translation process; some again are fully the published translations, but modified, where I judged that they could be improved. In all cases I hope that I have made the approach clear by means of bracketed references placed after the translations.

INTRODUCTION

Background and rationale

The meaning and significance of emotion and affectivity have historically been neglected philosophically. They have even been despised and regarded as dangerous[1]. The phenomenological approach provides the opportunity and means to examine their meaning.

My initial idea was to use Merleau-Ponty's early works to develop a phenomenological account of emotion. This proved difficult; as Merleau-Ponty acknowledges, he focuses systematically on the experience of perception, beginning in SC and giving a complete account in PP. Moreover he rarely refers explicitly to emotion or affectivity.

Sartre on the other hand, from the start of his phenomenological work, in TE, is interested in and analyzes emotions and affective states. He publishes a work specifically concerned with emotion (ETE), in IMG gives a general account of affectivity in support of his analysis of the affective aspect of the Imaginary, and in EN frequently describes the role of affective states in his ontological framework. Just as Merleau-Ponty focuses intently on perception as the foundational unreflected action, so Sartre with his focus on consciousness views emotion and affectivity in the same way.

So a more promising approach appeared to be to use both Merleau-Ponty and Sartre's early works to attempt to develop an account of emotion. If we then go back to Merleau-Ponty to consider what can be used, apart from specific material, we also find the focus on the structure of behaviour in both SC and PP in addition to the exposition of phenomenological methodology. Another aspect, in this case common to both, is the stress on the meaning of mental actions.

The questions which I will attempt to answer are therefore whether the early work of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty can be used to create a satisfactory phenomenological account of emotion, and if so what the major concepts of this account are.

I will begin by examining the method and framework of phenomenology, described in the Preface to PP. I will also briefly examine the treatment of emotion and affectivity by Husserl

[1] Mazis (1993) traces this back to the influence of Plato (pp.6ff.) and locates the seeds of it in Parmenides (pp.17f.). He also criticizes Descartes at length for 'the Cartesian retreat into a disembodied mind' which 'doesn't affirm the unique contribution of e-motion to our understanding and enmeshment with the world' (p.51).

and Heidegger, and briefly summarize the important role played by the body and embodiment in the topic. I will then examine and comment on the treatment of emotion and affectivity in the work of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty by other writers. I will conclude the Introduction by formulating my detailed objectives, the scope of my project and its major themes.

Phenomenology - The Preface to *Phénoménologie de la Perception*

Described by Dastur as 'the manifesto of French phenomenology'[2], this is perhaps the best starting point for a definition of phenomenology as practised by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, although it is sometimes clearer to look at Merleau-Ponty's comments on method elsewhere in his work. This is because of his characteristically non-adversarial approach to his predecessors in the Preface ('Avant-Propos'), so that it is frequently difficult to disentangle where his own views are to be distinguished from those of predecessors whose views he describes[3]. This is particularly acute in the Preface, where he presents Husserl as the 'fountainhead of phenomenology'[4], but glosses the latter's major themes, in order to reconcile them with Heidegger's. Morris describes this as Merleau-Ponty's 'reconciling project'[5].

1) 'The things themselves'

Four Husserlian themes are examined in the Preface. Firstly Husserl ordained that phenomenology should be concerned with 'the things themselves' (PP, p.II). 'It is a matter of describing, not of explaining or analysing' (Smith, pp.ix modified: ibid), and then 'The real is to be described, not constructed or formed' (Smith, pp.xi modified: PP, p.IV). 'To return to things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge … in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign language' (Smith, pp.ix-x modified: PP, p.III). The relationship between the 'détermination scientifique' and the 'things themselves' and the world is compared to that between geography and the elements of the landscape.

> Perception is not a science of the world, …it is the background from which all acts stand out, and is presupposed by them. The world is not an object of which I possess … the law of its making, it is the natural setting of, and field for, all my thoughts and all my

[2] Dastur, E. (2007), p.154.

[3] See Morris, Katherine J. (2012), p.xvi.

[4] Ibid, p.9.

[5] Ibid, p.9.

> explicit perceptions. Truth does not "inhabit" only "the inner man", …, man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself. (Smith, pp.xi-xii modified: PP, p.V)

2) The phenomenological reduction

The second Husserlian theme which Merleau-Ponty examines is the phenomenological reduction (pp.V-IX). Here, there is a clear 'development', a difference in Merleau-Ponty's view. Husserl's belief in the power of the phenomenological reduction is at odds with Merleau-Ponty's conception of individual consciousness' embeddedness in the world and his resulting scepticism about the possibility and effectiveness of a fully transcendental reduction. 'A … transcendental idealism rids the world of its opacity and its transcendence' (Smith, p.xiii: PP, p.VI), and then 'The true *Cogito* … does away with any kind of idealism in revealing me as "being-in-the-world" … The most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction' (Smith, pp.xiv-xv: PP, p.VIII). On the other hand, the suspension of the reduction enables us to perceive and appreciate what we take for granted in our thought and perception. He quotes the formulation of Fink, Husserl's assistant, when he spoke of the reduction as '"wonder" in the face of the world' (Smith, p.xv: ibid). Merleau-Ponty concludes the section on the phenomenological reduction:

> … since … we are in the world, since indeed our reflections take place in the temporal flux which they are trying to capture …, there is no thought which embraces all our thought … (The philosopher) takes for granted nothing that men, learned or otherwise, believe they know …. (philosophy) is an ever renewed experiment in making its own beginning; … it consists wholly in the description of this beginning, and finally … radical reflection is a consciousness of its own dependence on an unreflective life which is its initial, constant and final situation. (Smith, pp.xv-xvi modified: PP, p.IX)

He ends with an allusion to the « In-der-Welt-Sein » of Heidegger, which qualifies the reduction, while, he says, only appearing by means of it.[6]

[6] Morris (2012) summarizes the thrust of Heidegger's conception and Merleau-Ponty's acceptance of it: '… whereas Husserl's conception of intentionality was a structure of consciousness, Heidegger eschews the term "consciousness" altogether and makes intentionality into *practical* encounters with "environmental things"' (p.8). The state of Dasein implies that 'there is no understanding humans without simultaneously understanding the world in which they dwell, … The Being of Dasein is gradually revealed as *care …* Merleau-Ponty, while retaining the word "consciousness", wholeheartedly embraces the notion of being-in-the-world' (pp.8-9).

Françoise Dastur, in her article 'Philosophy and Non-Philosophy according to Merleau-Ponty'[7], summarizes a *note de travail* from VI dated November 1960, which well illustrates Merleau-Ponty's position (and the position of existential phenomenology). 'It' (philosophy) 'is not *above life*, hanging over it. It is beneath' (own translation: VI, p.313). Dastur comments:

> … it is a question of the destitution of the *Kosmotheoros* and of any thought from on high (*pensée de survol*), which must lead us towards an entirely new idea of philosophy, in which thought is not a movement of elevation taking us "beyond being" (as in transcendentalism), but in which thought implicates us in being and makes us plumb its depths. …. philosophy is *praxis* as much as *theoria*, implication in being as much as thought about being[8].

'No absolute difference then between philosophy or the transcendental and the empiric (it would be better to say: the ontological and the ontic)' (own translation: VI, p.314).

3) <u>The eidetic reduction</u>

The third Husserlian theme on which Merleau-Ponty comments is the eidetic reduction (pp.IX-XII). Here it seems to me that he expresses most clearly in the Preface the distinctiveness of the philosophical approach of phenomenology and his own interpretation thereof. Every reduction, said Husserl, is at the same time as transcendental necessarily eidetic. 'That means that we cannot subject our perception of the world to philosophical scrutiny … without drawing back from our commitment which is itself thus made to appear as a spectacle, without passing from the *fact* of our existence to its *nature* …' (Smith, p.xvi: PP, p.IX). But the study of, the attempt to capture essences is not the end, but a means. Existence needs the ideal field 'to become acquainted with and to prevail over its facticity', 'our existence is too tightly held in the world to be able to know itself as such at the moment of its involvement' (ibid).

He then discusses the role of language and the problem of its usage in expressing existence, beginning with a criticism of the language philosophy of the Vienna School. The latter believe that we can only relate to 'significations'. Thus for them the word 'consciousness' does not express what we are but is to be considered primarily as the product of a complex semantic history (PP, pp.IX-X). Merleau-Ponty radically disagrees; for him there is a 'core of primary

[7] See Dastur (2007).

[8] Dastur, p.161.

meaning round which the acts of naming and expression take shape' (Smith, p.xvii: PP, p.X)[9]. He continues:

> Seeking the essence of the world is not looking for it as an idea once it has been reduced to a theme of discourse; it is looking what it is in fact for us before any thematization … (The eidetic reduction) is the ambition to make reflection equal to the unreflective life of consciousness. (Smith, p.xvii modified: PP, pp X-XI)

This requires us to make the world appear such as it is before any return on ourselves (p.XI). The task of the eidetic reduction (and phenomenology in general) is to explain 'our primordial knowledge of the "real"' (Smith, p.xviii), to describe the perception of the world as that which founds for ever our idea of truth. However, and this is a central theme in Merleau-Ponty's view, perception is never absolute, it always has limitations:

> The world is not what I think, but what I live. I am open to the world, I have no doubt that I am in communication with it, but I do not possess it, it is inexhaustible. "There is a world", or rather: "There is the world"; I can never completely account for this ever-reiterated assertion in my life. (Smith, pp.xviii-xix modified: PP, pp.XI-XII)

Katherine Morris summarizes succinctly Merleau-Ponty's use, shared by Sartre, of these first three Husserlian themes:

… the study of phenomena may be seen as having two stages: the description of phenomena' (theme 1), 'and the elicitation of their essence from that description' (themes 2 & 3). 'For Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, this second stage is not complete until this essence has been put into relation to some fundamental aspect of human reality. (Morris (2008), p.26)[10]

4) <u>Intentionality</u>

The final Husserlian theme examined in the Preface is the notion of intentionality, and here again Merleau-Ponty deals with the limitations of phenomenology in a similar manner to the

[9] Later in his career Merleau-Ponty did engage with the linguistic structuralism of Saussure – see, for example, the essay, 'Le Langage Indirect et les Voix du Silence' in *Signes* (1960).

[10] In the following section, Morris puts this in a slightly different way. In the view of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, the phenomenological reduction, as conceived by Husserl, cannot be complete because the claim to existence of perceived objects cannot be bracketed out (Morris (2008), p.27). However there is still a role for 'something *like* the phenomenological reduction'. This is described by Morris as the suspension of *unastonishment,* to put ourselves in a position to describe the familiar, which otherwise we take for granted (ibid).

above, its rootedness in existence and its more general philosophical nature. He repeats Husserl's analysis of intentionality:

> … Husserl distinguishes between the intentionality of act, which is that of our judgements and of those occasions when we voluntarily take up a position … and operative intentionality … that which produces the natural and antepredicative unity of the world and of our life, being apparent in in our desires, our evaluations, and in the landscape we see, more clearly than in objective knowledge, and furnishing the text which our knowledge tries to translate into precise language. Our relationship to the world, as it is untiringly enunciated within us, is not a thing which can be any further clarified by analysis; philosophy can only place it once more before our eyes and present it for our ratification. (Smith, p.xx: PP, p.XIII)

It is the latter that phenomenology tries to unearth by its reductions. Merleau-Ponty uses various phrases to express what phenomenology is aiming at. 'Through this broadened notion of intentionality, phenomenological "comprehension" is distinguished from traditional "intellection", … and phenomenology can become a phenomenology of origins' (ibid). In fact here his notion of intentionality joins the eidetic reduction: 'Whether we are concerned with a thing perceived, a historical event or a doctrine, to "understand" is to take in the total intention, … the unique mode of existing expressed in the properties' (ibid). Everything has a meaning and is an implicit part of the structure of existence (pp.XIII-XV)[11].

Katherine Morris highlights the notion of the preconceptual as a distinctively Merleau-Pontyan theme:

> … perception is prior to judgements or predications, hence the intellectualists' efforts to reconstruct the perceived world via judgements and concepts are fundamentally misguided'. We also see this in his lauding Husserl's operative intentionality, which produces 'ante-predicative' or pre-conceptual unity, over the intentionality of act which is that of judgements and predications. (Morris (2012), p.18)

This notion unifies some of the major features of Merleau-Ponty's approach: his commitment to the study of basic perception, his criticism of intellectualism, and his adoption of Husserl's view of operative intentionality.

[11] Merleau-Ponty expresses this in various formulations. He particularly focuses on the way that 'doctrines' cannot be the pure product of the human sciences.

5) Rationality and phenomenology as philosophy

In the final section of the Preface (pp.XV-XVI), Merleau-Ponty examines the role of rationality and the fundamental nature of phenomenology as philosophy[12]. It is not that phenomenology rules out rationality as a means. In fact he defines its application:

'There is rationality, that is to say: perspectives blend, perceptions confirm each other, a meaning emerges' (Smith, p.xxiii modified: PP, p.XV).

But there is no pre-existing Reason, lying behind the world and existence (ibid). 'True philosophy consists in relearning to look at the world, and in this sense a historical account can give meaning to the world quite as "deeply" as a philosophical treatise' (Smith, p.xxiii modified: PP p.XVI). All forms of knowledge rely on a « ground » of postulates and finally on our communication with the world as the original establishment of rationality. This goes for philosophy as well. But as 'réflexion radicale', philosophy must question itself just as it questions all other forms of knowledge. So, it will be open to an endless self-examination and will never know where it is going. This is inevitable for phenomenology, because its task is to reveal the mystery of the world and the mystery of reason (ibid). It is not chance that it has been a movement before being a doctrine or a system. Just like other modern artists and thinkers[13], it has the same desire to grasp the meaning of the world or the meaning of history 'as that meaning comes into being' (Smith, p.xxiv: PP, p.XVI).

6) Summary

Two themes described above are common to all the material which we will consider. The first is the notion of operational intentionality described by Husserl. The second is the importance of man's embeddedness in the world, in existence.

It is important to point out that Merleau-Ponty's own project is the description and examination of basic perception. He presents this as the foundation of existence – '(Perception) is the backgound from which all acts stand out, and is presupposed by them' (Smith, p.xi: PP, p.V). Sartre, while giving equal weight to the world and existence, has a different focus, starting from *La Transcendance de l'Ego.* This includes the experience of emotion.

[12] See also the discussion of the Note de travail from VI above.

[13] Balzac, Proust, Valéry and Cézanne are cited (ibid).

Fundamental to our topic is the centrality of 'la vie irréfléchie' to phenomenological philosophy. This is formulated in various ways in the Preface - 'To return to things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge' (Smith, pp.ix-x modified: PP, p.III). 'radical reflection is a consciousness of its own dependence on an unreflective life which is its initial, constant and final situation (Smith, pp.xv-xvi modified: PP, p.IX). 'Seeking the essence of the world … is looking what it is in fact for us before any thematization … (The eidetic reduction) is the ambition to make reflection equal to the unreflective life of consciousness' (Smith, p.xvii modified: PP, pp X-XI), 'the intentionality of act … that which produces the natural and antepredicative unity of the world and of our life, being apparent in in our desires, our evaluations, and in the landscape we see, more clearly than in objective knowledge' (Smith, p.xx: PP, p.XIII)[14]. Thus emotion and affectivity become 'proper' subjects for the radical reflection of phenomenological philosophy and cease to be treated as impediments to the clear knowledge of the objective world.

This does not rule out a role for reason, but it is as a means and a tool, not as a basis or an end (pp.XV-XVI).[15]

A major aspiration of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is to enable us to see as fully as possible that which we normally take for granted free of the 'intellectual prejudices' which handicap our views and understanding. The latter are examined specifically in the Introduction to *Phénoménologie de la Perception* and are a constant theme throughout the work. So the reductions are not aiming at some kind of absolutely clear knowledge. The phenomenological reduction aims to bracket out the 'acquired knowledge' (own translation) of the (human) sciences, so that we can see with fresh eyes the 'vie irréfléchie' (p.IX). The eidetic reduction is required as a means to thematise the facticity of our existence (ibid), to explain 'our primordial knowledge of the "real"' (Smith, p.xviii: PP, p.XI). Reflection, reduction and language are the means we use to express, in so far as we can, the 'core of primary meaning' (Smith, p.xvii: PP, p.X) of existence.

Merleau-Ponty stresses that reduction can never be complete, the views of phenomenology, and philosophy in general, are always limited. The basis which he posits is profoundly sceptical. Our reflections take place in the temporal flux and are always dependent on the

[14] Morris' notion of the preconceptual also refers to this (see p.8 above).

[15] Merleau-Ponty was, however, interested in how the capacity for reason develops from the preconceptual (See, for example, p.146f. below).

unreflected life which they are trying to capture (p.IX). I am open to the world but I never possess it entirely (p.XII).

Heidegger and Husserl on the phenomenology of affectivity

What was the contribution of Husserl and Heidegger to the phenomenology of affectivity and emotion? Husserl developed a phenomenological method, the modification of which by Merleau-Ponty, in particular, we have examined above. However Husserl expressed little interest in the affective dimension of life[16].

Heidegger, however, does engage with affectivity and we will find echoes of his analysis in the accounts of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. He focuses particularly on 'mood'[17] rather than emotion, although fear and anxiety, which he specifically analyses, fall in the emotional range of the spectrum of affectivity. Mood is '*ontically* the most familiar and everyday sort of thing'; it is 'What we indicate *ontologically* by the term "state of mind"[18]' (BT, H.134, p.172), it is 'a fundamental ***existentiale'*** (ibid, p.173). Of course Heidegger's main interest is in the central role of mood in the relation between Dasein and its world but his relatively brief account is not only relevant to the meaning of affectivity but also has a phenomenological dimension.

1) The disclosure belonging to 'moods' is 'primordial'; that of cognition falls well short by comparison. We are never free of 'mood' as a kind of Being (H136, p.175).
   … in every case Dasein always has some mood … the possibilities of disclosure which belong to cognition reach far too short a way compared with the primordial disclosure belonging to moods, in which Dasein is brought before its Being as "there" … A mood makes manifest 'how one is, and how one is faring'. In this 'how one is', having a mood brings Being to its "there". (H.134, p.173)

2) 'It comes neither from 'outside' nor from 'inside' but arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being' (ibid, p.176). State-of-mind, mood is neither 'the reflective apprehending of something within' nor an inner condition which then reaches forth …' (ibid).

[16] Solomon (2009), pp.291 and 296.

[17] 'Stimmung'.

[18] 'Befindlichkeit'.

3) Encountering what is disclosed in the world is not just a matter of sensing something or staring at it. It is to be affected by it. What Being encounters in the world *matters* to it and this is grounded in its state-of-mind. Thus, for example:
   state-of-mind … has already disclosed the world as something by which it can be threatened, … Only something which is in the state-of-mind of fearing (or fearlessness) can discover that what is environmentally ready-to-hand is threatening. Dasein's openness to the world is constituted existentially by the attunement of a state-of-mind. (ibid)

We will see that these three characteristics are present in the accounts of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Where there appears some tension with Merleau-Ponty is in Heidegger's comments on perception. For the latter there is no such thing as 'pure' perception. The senses belong 'to an entity whose kind of Being is Being-in-the-world with a state-of-mind' to which 'entities within-the-world "matter" … in a way which its moods have outlined in advance. … we must as a general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to "bare mood"' (H138, p.177). Although Merleau-Ponty could agree that there is no such thing as 'pure' perception, it is at the very basis of his work that perception does provide the basis of the primary discovery of the world. A way to reconcile the two views might be to point to the way that in Merleau-Ponty's view perception is always accompanied by an evaluation of the world and its qualities.

But it is important to note that Heidegger does not sublimate 'mood' as state-of-mind. States-of-mind, he says, are 'to a large extent' delusive. But these delusions constitute precisely the worldhood of the ready-to-hand, 'which is never the same from day to day' (ibid). Theory reduces the present-at-hand to uniformity, although we cannot get away from the role of state-of-mind in any cognitive determining. This is echoed precisely by Merleau-Ponty's comment in the Avant-Propos to PP (see p.6 above) on the dependence of reflection on the unreflected life.

Heidegger also comments on the special and innovative role of phenomenology in engaging with affectivity[19]. Previously, it has been treated as a psychical phenomenon, and then only on the level of an accompaniment. One of the merits of phenomenological research is to have brought the phenomena of affects and feelings into sight (H139, p.178). This summarizes well the phenomenological enterprise in relation to affectivity. 'Phenomenological Interpretation …'

[19] Heidegger makes the somewhat extreme claim that 'the basic ontological Interpretation of the affective life has been able to make scarcely one forward step worthy of mention since Aristotle' (H139, p.178).

raises ‘to a conceptual level the phenomenal content of what has been disclosed,’ (i.e. things disclosed by Dasein primordially) and does so ‘existentially’ (H140, p.179).

The role of the body and embodiment in emotion and affectivity

The physical plays a particularly marked role in the experience of emotion and feeling. Darwin himself collected data on the physical aspect of emotions and summarized his findings in *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals,* characterized by Ekman as ‘the book that initiated the scientific study of human behaviour – the first book in psychology’ (Darwin (2009), p.xiii).

To quote Darwin:

> … the links are indeed wonderful which connect cause and effect in giving rise to various expressions on the human countenance; and they explain to us the meaning of certain movements, which we involuntarily and unconsciously perform, whenever certain transitory emotions pass through our minds. (Darwin (2009), p.194)

Contemporary neuro-science has also focused on the physical aspect of emotion:

> I see the *essence* of emotion as the collection of changes in body state that are induced in myriad organs by nerve cell terminals, under the control of a dedicated brain system, which is responding to the contents of thoughts relative to a particular entity or event… emotion is the combination of a *mental evaluative process*, simple or complex, with *dispositional responses to that process,* mostly *toward the body proper*, resulting in an emotional body state, … (Damasio (2006), p.139)

‘…, *the essence of feeling an emotion is the experience of such changes’* (in body state) ‘*in juxtaposition to the mental images that initiated the cycle’* (ibid, p.145).

‘The inescapable and remarkable fact about these three phenomena - emotion, feeling, consciousness – is their body relatedness… all of these processes … depend for their execution on representations of the organism. Their shared essence is the body’ (Damasio, (2000) p.284).

The physical element in emotion and affectivity can be classified into four components:

Neurological. Except in very extreme circumstances, this is not experienced by the subject and is only knowable through science.

Physiological, e.g. cardiovascular, skin complexion and other external bodily changes. These are experienced by the subject and may be perceived and apprehended by the other.

Behavioural. Changes in action motivated by or associated with emotions and affective states. Typical gestures associated with emotional states might be seen as falling under physiological *and* behavioural. This was Darwin's particular concern.

Existential. It is a truism to point out that emotions and affects and their components listed above, as any other psychological and physiological actions, are experienced by embodied beings.

These can be correlated to the classification of organic behaviour and the schema of the orders set out by Merleau-Ponty in SC (see Chapter 4). The neurological is broadly covered by Merleau-Ponty's examination of reflexive behaviour; the physiological falls under 'l'ordre physique' and 'l'ordre vital'; the behavioural under 'l'ordre vital' and 'l'ordre humain'; the existential unites all the elements and the orders.

Of the other texts examined here, the physiological element of emotion is examined in ETE (Chapter 1 below), the behavioural in ETE, EN (Chapter 3) and also by Merleau-Ponty in PP (Chapter 5) in relation to sexuality. The existential aspect is covered in EN and PP, again mainly in relation to sexuality in the latter.

Other approaches

I shall look at three other detailed treatments of the topic of affectivity and emotion, the first relating to Sartre, the second to Merleau-Ponty and the final one, which, although predominantly dealing with Merleau-Ponty, also covers relevant material in Sartre. All three are largely based on or include close readings of the texts which I shall examine.

Emotion in the Thought of Sartre by Joseph P Fell III

Joseph P. Fell, III, in *Emotion in the Thought of Sartre*, works through Sartre's accounts of emotion chronologically, dividing them into two parts, the phenomenological theory and the theory in an ontological context, i.e. as it is dealt with in Sartre's major work, *L'Être et le Néant.* He gives more space to the latter than to Sartre's earlier work, which has a more explicitly psychological programme. He then concludes the first part of the book with a synthetic account of Sartre's theory of emotion. The second part, entitled 'A Critical Examination of Sartre's Theory', both broadly and in detail concludes that Sartre's theory is inadequate.

A striking feature of Fell's account is that he examines the diverse material on emotion in Sartre's philosophy (i.e. spread across the four works which I also examine) and formulates a self-consistent theory. This assumes that Sartre had a consistent theory which he held to over several years, during which he produced several works with different philosophical objectives. My own approach is to examine, critically if it is appropriate, his various formulations, identifying development and growth, consistency and inconsistency as they appear.

When we come to consider Fell's critique of this hypothetical unified theory, his broad conclusion is that Sartre's phenomenological analysis of emotion does not work because it does not satisfactorily account for its full nature. This is partly because of the shortcomings of phenomenology as a general approach. Fell in fact develops a fundamental criticism of an *exclusively* phenomenological approach (pp.219-221). '… emotional phenomena', he writes, 'are particularly recalcitrant to explanation *solely* by phenomenological means' (p.218). Fell has earlier built up an alternative account of emotion based on various sources, principally Hampshire, James, Whitehead, Dewey and Ryle:

> … there is now a need to see phenomenology in perspective; there are 'two perspectives to be reconciled: the processive-objective-naturalistic and the subjectivist-phenomenological. … This will entail … taking systematic account of both (a) the individual's own (subjective) conscious evaluation of the emotion-producing situation and (b) the results of "objective" analysis of such causal-genetic factors as are both relevant to the production of emotion and not available either to the "immediate experience" of the emotional subject or to a phenomenological analysis which legislates in advance the irrelevance of such factors … neither description of acts of consciousness nor analysis of non-phenomenologically apprehensible processes has necessary priority as a method for investigating the nature of human experience and conduct. (pp.219- 220)

In fact, to support his view, Fell refers to some comments by Merleau-Ponty in his essay, 'La Querelle de l'Existentialisme'[20]. He quotes him as comparing Sartre's 'acosmic freedom' with the opposite view of man as the result of material and sociological influences (p.220). In fact, Merleau-Ponty's view as expressed in the original essay is typically much more nuanced. It may be implied but he never actually qualifies the phrase 'liberté acosmique' as Sartre's (SNS, p.124). Merleau-Ponty, in the essay referred to, then goes on to comment on the contribution of existentialism in reconciling the two approaches:

[20] See *Sens et Non-Sens*, pp.123-143.

> The merit of the new philosophy is precisely that it looks in the notion of existence for the means to conceptualize it ('la condition humaine') Existence in the modern sense is the movement through which man is in the world, engages himself in a physical and social situation which becomes his point of view on the world … My engagement in nature and in history is at the same time a limitation of my views on the world and my only way of having access to it … The relationship of subject and object is no longer that *relationship of knowledge* which classical idealism spoke of … but a *relationship of being* according to which paradoxically the subject *is* his body, his world and his situation, and in a kind of way *swaps over*. (own translation: SNS, p.125)

Fell concludes by rejecting fundamental features of Sartre's phenomenology of emotion. He does not accept his account of the nature of emotion as always intentional and an aspect of consciousness:

'… emotion is not an act of consciousness. We suggested that, though emotion may arise as a result of the most sophisticated conscious evaluations, it is nevertheless a reaction which man shares with the animal' (see, for example, Darwin (2009)). 'The emotional reaction, far from being intentional, can occur when it is least wanted[21]. In emotion … consciousness … assimilates evidence from the person's entire cumulative past history as to the importance of the object of emotion for the person' (p.236).

The merit of Fell's approach is the close reading which he supplies of Sartre's treatment of emotion. On the other hand his attempt to formulate a unified theory based on Sartre's works omits consideration of the changes and developments in his thought and favours an uncritical presentation of that thought. Fell's criticism of Sartre rests primarily on two points: firstly, he thinks that the latter's analysis (and phenomenology's in general) does not satisfactorily account for the full nature of emotion. On one level this deficiency of phenomenology is self-evident and applies to any human action. Some of the answer to this is, I believe, provided by Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of human and organic structure, which I consider in Chapters 4 and 5. Moreover I view Sartre's treatment of the body, situation and facticity, considered in Chapter 5, as fundamentally consistent with Merleau-Ponty's, even though framed differently. Fell's second criticism is that emotion is not necessarily intentional (thus contradicting a fundamental tenet of Husserl's phenomenology) and may not even be an act of consciousness. Fell seems to be confusing intentionality with the will and *conscious* intention. Merleau-Ponty and Sartre (for example, in the section on existential psychoanalysis) both give

[21] This would not prevent the reaction being intentional on some level, if we accept a model of the mind with non-conscious content.

accounts of motivation which explore the springs and, while not accepting the unconscious, the difficulties and obscurities of unreflected action.

Emotion, Depth and Flesh: A Study of Sensitive Space: Reflections on Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy of Embodiment by Sue L. Cataldi

The difficulty of using Merleau-Ponty to examine emotion and affectivity is that he writes little specifically about them. As Cataldi comments in the summary of Chapter 5, 'Emotion and Emotional Depth':

> None of Merleau-Ponty's works is exclusively devoted to a discussion of the emotions. His stance on emotion appears as an outgrowth of his interest in aesthetics, his work on perception, his theory of embodiment and his later Flesh ontology. … His approach to the emotions is neither cognitive nor behavioural. (pp.106-7)

However Cataldi's approach is to use Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological work to provide material and a method for the treatment of emotion and affectivity, in particular by applying his treatment of space to them. In both parts of her book, Part 1, which is more theoretical, and Part 2, which looks at emotional experience more specifically and concretely[22], she closely examines passages from Merleau-Ponty's work (and others). However, her primary project is not to write an account and critique of his work. Her intention is to examine one particular aspect of emotion, depth, and, while analysing relevant material in Merleau-Ponty and her other sources, use it to develop an account of embodied emotion, depth of emotion and their relationship to personal identity. In looking at depth, which is being used metaphorically in the context of emotion, she is able to use Merleau-Ponty's work on the perception and experience of physical space and distance.[23]

Cataldi writes that some understanding of space, some sensing of distance is implicit in our understanding of emotional experience, e.g the closeness of love, or the forces of repulsion and separation in hatred (p.45). The following example shows her application of the concept of 'depth' in emotion.

[22] See Cataldi's own summary in the Introduction, p.2.

[23] For another 'indirect' use of Merleau-Ponty's work, see Solomon (2009), p.305, where it is suggested that his notion of 'motility' provides the clue to the experience of feeling.

She compares the sense of awe

> to its less “depthful” cousin, admiration … in admiration, we seem to stand apart or stand back from the object of admiration … but when we are standing “in awe of”, we do not have this same “from afar” sense … The differences in “depth” between awe and admiration seem to have to do with a felt difference in “distance”. (p.122)

A striking difference between Fell and Cataldi is their use of other sources. Fell uses his to effectively build up an alternative account or accounts to use as a critical benchmark for comparison with Sartre’s. Cataldi uses hers to deepen and broaden her perspective. Although she does criticize Merleau-Ponty briefly (pp.97-8), this is an aside, and she almost always uses her sources in a positive way to develop or to support the development of her own view. These different approaches, of course, grow out of the different nature of their projects.

Cataldi, like Fell in respect of Sartre, provides a close reading of Merleau-Ponty. But she is not looking globally at emotion and affectivity in his work; rather she applies his work on perception, and, in particular, space, to one aspect of them, namely depth. In a sense, her work is an attempt to fill the hole, which is Merleau-Ponty’s own lack of interest in emotion. This is an interesting approach, but too limited for my purposes. I have tried to counter this lack by incorporating Sartre in my study. I have also looked at some more specific material in Merleau-Ponty in Chapter 5, for example on sexuality and the valuation of qualities in the world. I also emphasize the centrality of behaviour in his analysis of the structure and meaning of organic and human existence.

Emotion and Embodiment: Fragile Ontology by Glen A. Mazis

This is the most wide-ranging of the three books examined here. As made clear by the title, a major topic is the ontology of emotion. To arrive at its ontological conclusions, it considers in detail the phenomenology of emotions. The main (but not only) basis for this is the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty in *Phénoménologie de la perception*, while Mazis adopts the ontology of Merleau-Ponty’s work, *Le Visible et l’invisible*, edited and published posthumously, in formulating his ontological account. He also examines Sartre’s treatments of emotion in TE and ETE, and relevant material in EN.

The phenomenological and existential aspect is set out in the first sentence of the preface:

‘This book focuses on a particular possibility of the emotions to reveal aspects of our experience of the world’ (p.viii).

But Mazis' purpose goes beyond the phenomenological aspect of emotion. His main purpose is didactic, even polemical. He outlines this as follows:

> Many people are strangers to their emotions. Not that they literally do not know what emotions hold them in their grip, but they are enmeshed in certain manifestations of the emotional life which block access to other emotional possibilities…., many people haven't the slightest idea of how their emotional life can open a path of sensitive revelation to the nuances of the world and others…. This book is addressed to that situation. (ibid)

Later, on p.xi, he suggests that emotion can lay claim to a special role – the focus will be 'on the possible primacy of emotional revelation to enlighten other factors of apprehension'.

The means to achieve this, however, is described in phenomenological terms:

> The way this book seeks to communicate and discover the nature of emotion is through description, through disentangling strands of experience that may not have been noticed in their possible significance, and through using sources in fiction and other accessible examples to give the "lived sense" of emotional experience to discover distinctive differences that can emerge from a detailed wondering at emotional phenomena. (p.xii)

One of the major targets of Mazis' polemic is the way in which Western philosophy has traditionally viewed the emotions. His main targets are Plato and Descartes.

Thus, in the *Phaedo,* Plato (via Socrates) warns us not to heed the emotions in learning about the world, as they threaten the purity of the soul and its ability to transcend (p.9). This is the product of Plato's view of true reality. As Mazis writes, he 'asserts that our essence makes fullest use of our rationality when totally detached from the body, the senses and the perceptual realm to think the unchanging which is what really is' (p.11). Plato denies the power and cognitive worth of the emotions. They are seen as bestial, an inheritance from our 'lower natures'.

For Mazis, on the other hand, 'to identify with eternal form is to lose one's place, to buy stability at the cost of becoming dislocated from time and space' (p.19). For him understanding is an awareness of the movement of becoming. His work will seek 'to listen to emotion in its own voice'.

Mazis' other major target is Descartes. Unlike Plato, Descartes does not wish to 'leave the earth behind'; rather he is classed among 'the precise manipulators of the earthly', his project is 'to transform the earth into a well-regulated, discrete, knowable, orderly, mathematized,

predictable, and non-threatening environment for a rational subject' (p.34). Descartes sees our true 'selves' as outside the circuit of the embodiment-world (p.37). He did not dispute the *experience* of emotion, as he shows in his work, ***Les Passions de l'Âme***[24]; but emotions are to be controlled by the will, so as not to threaten the sovereignty of mathematical reason.

'Descartes has no interest in trying to understand the emotions … *from within themselves, on their own terms, generating new notions of sense*, a different kind of sense than the clear and distinct' (p.38).

There is a Cartesian retreat into a disembodied mind (p.51).

At the same time Mazis attempts to address the criticisms of emotion in the philosophical tradition. This, he writes, can be reduced to the simple question, 'Is it a good or a bad thing?'. He refers to 'the Buddhist critique of the delusive dangers of e-motion[25] as they are lived' (p.236), while hesitantly suggesting his approval of the emotional sublimation of the Romantics: 'Perhaps the Romantics were correct in their vision that e-motion allowed the individual to join some being of the whole?' (ibid).[26]

His Chapter 5 is entitled 'E-motional Dangers'. Here he addresses another aspect of his pedagogic purpose, the importance of 'controlling' emotion, of being emotional 'in the right way'. He explores what he describes as the 'foreclosing avenues' (p.279) of emotion, which fail to bring forth its distinctive excellences. The revelations of e-motion are fragile and can easily be thrown 'out of kilter'; they must be conserved in care or perish (p.280). He cites the destructiveness of Ahab's obsession in *Moby Dick,* taking this as an example of man's overwhelming desire for the 'en-soi', described by Sartre in *EN* (pp.284-289).

Mazis identifies the ontology of 'la chair', the flesh, which appears in Merleau-Ponty's posthumously edited work, ***Le Visible et l'invisible*** as forming much of the inspiration of his own study. He acknowledges that Merleau-Ponty did not focus in his own work on the specific role of emotion in the circulation of meaning but he 'did articulate a new sense of embodiment, spatiality, temporality, depth and what he called the "flesh of the world"' ('la chair'), 'which is

[24] The Passions of the Soul.

[25] Mazis uses this formulation for emotion to refer to the etymology of the word pointing to motion outward or out from. 'E-motion seems to entail both the motion away from the person to his or her world and away from the world to the person' (Mazis, 1993, p.29).

[26] This reference to the universal, impersonal, anonymous 'one' is reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty's references to an impersonal, anonymous level of experience (see Chapter 5).

Being seen as relatedness, process, and interweavement' (p.73). This takes 'us further down the path opened by Heidegger in uncovering the "openness to the world" allowed by emotion'.

Mazis examines the notions of perception, space and body in *Phénoménologie.* All three are much richer than in empiricism or idealism; they have a 'built-in' significance, based on their intertwining with e-motion (pp.73-90). Merleau-Ponty's notion of 'flesh' brings together body, the perceptual and the material as a synthetic term which can 'do justice to the emergence of sense from an environing becoming with the thickness of meaning to which e-motion testifies' (p.94). The western rational tradition has assumed that e-motion 'represented an aberration from the normal sense of experience and therefore … was some sort of intoxication or madness or confusion that overcomes us' (p.96). Mazis draws on VI to assert that 'E-motion is the "flesh of the world"' (p.99). He quotes Woolf's *To the Lighthouse* to show how qualities in the world are not just perceived facts but the 'fully significant perception of embodied human being' (p.100).

Although he several times talks about the emphasis on the *description* of experience in his work, he also has positive 'hopes' for e-motion:

> Without a letting themselves be released into the e-motional circulation with the flesh of the world, many aspects of reality will just never become experienced … The e-motional dangers articulated in this chapter come back to a thesis of this book: that e-motion is not just a behaviour, … but is a way of allowing situations and events to become and a way to understand their becoming as part of this process. (pp.310-312)

He even foresees the end of human life as we know it if we ignore the e-motional world. For example, we might endure as machines, or as machines motivated by certain obsessions, or as machines who indulge in a few false feelings for pleasure, but that means we are no longer enmeshed with the world, have removed ourselves from its flesh, are no longer terrestrial or communal beings (p.313). Without this shared experience, the rules of ethics have no common ground (ibid).

Mazis explores what the 'fragile ontology' of his title refers to in his final Chapter. He begins with a summary of his method, which is again entirely consistent with the descriptiveness of Husserlian phenomenology (p.317). But his aim is not just descriptive; he wants to open up the reader to a fully emotional experience of being:

> E-motions show that what is often taken for granted as "given", is often the hardest to achieve, an art that has to be renewed continually in becoming. To be embodied, to be located in time and space, to be with other people, to have the world matter, and to be

> able to direct one's focus towards what is important to one only come to be as felt, as a result of finding the how of letting the world move one e-motionally. (p.319)

Other cultures and traditions have kept these possibilities, as did other epochs of history 'before the current Plato-to-Hegel tradition' (ibid).

So Mazis' phenomenological approach and analysis are consistent with and helpful to my own. Other interesting aspects of his work are his powerful critique of the traditionally negative view of emotion in historic philosophy and his use of a corpus of literary sources to describe and examine instances of emotional experience.

I am more doubtful about his sublimation of emotion. This goes beyond a phenomenological project. Although it seems correct to say that philosophy has to a large extent *devalued* emotion and not paid enough attention to it, there is a danger in overvaluing it and giving it an ethical status, so that its value is distorted in the same way that the value of reason has been overstated historically. This is a danger to which any project focussing on one aspect of psychology is exposed, my own included. It seems to me important to guard against distortion resulting from isolating a mental action, which is usually only one aspect of the whole picture of experience.

Thus, in Mazis' ontology, to view emotional experience as part of Sartre's 'en-soi, pour-soi' and Merleau-Ponty's 'flesh of the world' can be seen as simply an extension of its phenomenology. I am much more hesitant about the idea of *valuing* emotion or encouraging certain types of emotion[27].

Others

There are several other general surveys of the phenomenology of emotion and affectivity, which constitute chapters in general works on emotion or phenomenology and existentialism, i.e. 'The Phenomenological Approach to Emotion' by Joseph P. Fell in Candland (1977), 'Phenomenological Analysis of Emotion' by Magda B. Arnold in Arnold (1960), and chapters on 'Affectivity' and 'Emotions in Phenomenology and Existentialism' by Béatrice Han-Pile and Robert C Solomon, respectively, in Dreyfus and Wrathall (2006). Suzanne L. Cataldi (see above) also draws on a broad selection of Merleau-Ponty's work in the chapter 'Affect and sensibility' in Diprose and Reynolds (2008). However, their aim and scope is not on the scale

[27] To be fair to Mazis, at the same time he does recognize and discuss the 'dangers' of emotion.

and depth of the works discussed above and they do not attempt the detailed synthesis of the work of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, which is the aim of this project.

Komarine Romdenh-Romluc (2011) has a section entitled 'Emotion' but it is effectively a commentary on pp.432-9 of PP. She does not comment at all on sexuality or mention Freud.[28]

A much broader and deeper view is provided by Stephan Strasser in *Phenomenology of Feeling* (1977). However his focus is diffuse and not concentrated on Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.

Objectives

So all of the three main works examined above attempt to produce coherent accounts of affectivity and emotion in the work of Sartre or Merleau-Ponty or based on it. However none of the three examines the possibility and modality of synthesising the work of both. Fell, focusing on Sartre, is ultimately critical of the phenomenological approach. Cataldi, focusing on Merleau-Ponty, certainly accepts and uses the phenomenological approach, but does not attempt an overall account. She uses Merleau-Ponty's method and phenomenology of perception to examine one particular characteristic of emotion. Mazis also is mainly focused on Merleau-Ponty but of the three provides the most comprehensive account of the phenomenology of emotion. Less convincing, in my view, is his suggestion of the special role of emotion in ontology. My own focus is an attempt to use both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty to produce a synthetic account of emotion and affectivity and to identify the principal characteristics of such an account.

To achieve this, I will use as my initial basis the framework of phenomenology, described in the Preface to PP. My detailed objectives are to answer the following questions:

1) What characteristics of the phenomenology of emotion can be found in the early works of Sartre?

2) What characteristics of the phenomenology of emotion can be found in the early works of Merleau-Ponty?

[28] Katherine J. Morris, in *Starting with Merleau-Ponty*, similarly bypasses sexuality, Freud and psychoanalysis.

3) To what extent can these be synthesised into a unified coherent account of the phenomenology of emotion? What are the strengths and limitations of this synthesis? What are its major characteristics?

The achievement of these objectives will be based on a detailed reading of and commentary on relevant material in the works of the two writers. Chapters 1-3 will cover Sartre's early works; Chapter 1 deals with *La Transcendance de l'Ego* and *Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions,* Chapter 2 with *L'imaginaire*, which briefly but perhaps surprisingly contains the most coherent account of affectivity of any of the works considered, and Chapter 3 with relevant passages in *L'être et le néant*. Chapters 4 and 5 look at Merleau-Ponty's *La structure du comportement* and *Phénoménologie de la perception.* The former provides a general view of the structure and meaning of organic and conscious behaviour; the latter supplements this and in selected passages deals with specific aspects of emotion and affectivity. Finally in Chapter 6 I will attempt to synthesize the major points arising from the six works into a coherent phenomenological and existential account of affectivity and emotion.

Major themes

I will track the following themes in the works to be examined, representing their distinctive contributions to the topic.

1) The emphasis on behaviour as a central means to describe and examine emotion and affectivity and their existential meaning.
2) In spite of their criticism of scientific and empirical approaches to causality and their commendation of the emphasis in phenomenology on essence and meaning, the recognition by both writers of the role of the empirical method in examining the facticity of existence.
3) The description of the phenomenal qualities of affectivity and emotion: intentionality, spontaneity, unreflectedness, their ubiquity, their role in the human[29] grasp of objects and the world, and their meaningfulness.
4) The special role of affectivity in the experience of the qualities of objects and the valorisation of the world.
5) The physiological, psychological and cultural structure of existence, with an especial emphasis on the carnal, and its exemplification in the experience of emotion and affectivity.

[29] Neither of these authors deal with the affective and emotional experience of animals. See Darwin (2009) for an example of a work which does.

6) The engagement of both writers with psychoanalysis. Though they reject the central psychological principles of classic psychoanalysis, they both draw on it as a method for uncovering the meaning of affective experience.
7) The description and analysis of emotional and affective experience in the works examined and their adequacy both in providing a satisfactory account of such experience and a basis for broadening the scope to other examples of such experience.

I will also detail and explain the major aspects of the thinking of the two writers which have **not** been carried forward into the attempt to synthesise their ideas.

CHAPTER 1 EMOTION IN EARLY SARTRE

In this chapter I shall examine Sartre's treatment of emotion in two of his early works, *La Transcendance de l'Ego* (1936), and *Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions* (1938). The *Esquisse* can easily obscure Sartre's treatment and use of basic emotional states in his other works (including in *L'Être et le Néant)*. Although the title suggests something quite general, it actually focuses on a fairly narrow part of the spectrum of emotional states. It tends to be picked out as representative of Sartre's view of emotion[1], whereas we obtain a broader picture if we look elsewhere. This chapter, together with the following one, will concentrate on the earlier phase of Sartre's philosophical career, when his published works focused on 'psychologie phénoménologique' (to quote the subtitle of *L'imaginaire*) rather than the 'ontologie phénoménologique' of *L'Être et le Néant.*

I shall deal with the two works chronologically.

1. La Transcendance de l'Ego

In this work Sartre strikingly uses basic emotional states to illustrate his examination of consciousness. This characteristic will carry on into *L'Être et le Néant.* Where Merleau-Ponty concentrates on basic perception to elucidate consciousness, Sartre focuses on basic consciousness, of which feeling and emotion are essential manifestations.

1) 'L'irréfléchi'

Sartre uses feeling and emotion in his examination of the nature of and difference between 'l'irréfléchi' and 'le réfléchi' (TE, pp.39-43). He initially uses the example of pity (p.39) to criticise those who hypothesise a further layer of thought or feeling *behind* the feeling (including possibly in the unconscious). On the contrary, he says, '… the quality of unreflected desire is that it transcends itself by grasping, in the object, the quality of desirability' (Brown,

[1] See for example Calhoun, C. & Solomon, R.C. (1984), *What is an Emotion? Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology*, New York: OUP.

p.19: TE, pp.41-2). It is *as if* we lived in a world where objects did not only have their material qualities, heat, smell, form etc. but also those of repulsion, attraction, utility etc. which act upon us (‘exerçaient sur nous certaines actions’). It is only in reflection that affectivity takes on a separate existence. On the unreflective level, it is a response, spontaneous. He uses the striking phrase, ‘Reflection “poisons” desire’ (Brown, p.20). But he somewhat qualifies this (TE,pp.42-3); he is not saying that spontaneous affectivity is always morally superior to reflective affectivity. ‘… reflective life generally presupposes spontaneous life. Before being ‘poisoned’, my desires were pure; it is the point of view I have adopted towards them that has poisoned them’ (ibid). Feelings which are immediately identified as mine, i.e. personal, are products of reflection; spontaneous feeling transcends itself instantly towards an object. As Sylvie Le Bon comments in the footnote on TE, p.41, ‘This conception of the ontological priority of the unreflected over the reflected’ (Brown, pp.61-62) remains central in Sartre’s work.

2) ‘Les états’

In Part II he examines the constitution of the Ego. He identifies two transcendencies of consciousness: ‘les états’ and ‘les actions’ (TE,p.44). The example which he gives of an ‘état’ is hatred, which he examines at length on pp.45-51. When an ‘état’ is identified, we are then in the domain of reflexive consciousness: ‘If I hate Pierre, my hatred of Pierre is a state that I can grasp by reflection. This state is *present* to the gaze of reflective consciousness, it is *real*’ (Brown, p.21 modified: TE, p.45). Sartre wants to show, as he explains in the introduction to the section, that the Ego is ‘the unity of states and actions, … a transcendent pole of synthetic unity’ (Brown, p.21: TE, p.44). And, according to Sartre, this pole only appears in the world of reflection.

He describes a strong experience of repulsion:

‘I see Peter, I feel a a kind of profound upheaval of revulsion and anger on seeing him …: this upheaval is consciousness. I cannot be in error when I say: I feel at this moment a violent revulsion toward Pierre. But is this experience of revulsion hatred? Obviously not’ (Brown, p.22: TE, pp 45-6). For Sartre hatred has a continuity from the past to the future. ‘Une conscience instantanée de répulsion’ cannot be my hatred. ‘“I feel revulsion for Pierre *at this moment* “, and in this way I will not engage the future. But precisely because of this refusal to engage the future, I would cease to hate’ (ibid). My hatred appears *through* this experience of repulsion but unlike the latter it is not instantaneous but permanent.

It exists even when it does not appear in consciousness. 'It extends beyond the instantaneous moment of consciousness' (Brown pp.22-23: TE, p.46). It is not of consciousness but 'un objet transcendant'. It is a belief ('créance'), the transcendant unity of an infinity of conscious states of anger and repugnance (p.47).

He moves on to consider the limitations of reflection (pp.47-8), which reminds us of Le Bon's comment about 'la priorité ontologique de l'irréfléchi' (see previous page). 'it is certain that I loathe Pierre, but it is and will always remain doubtful that I hate him' (Brown, p.23 modified: TE, p.47). 'répugne' for Sartre is 'l'irréfléchi', the instantaneous feeling; 'haïsse' is 'le réfléchi', a judgement, a kind of decision. As he said earlier, the 'irréfléchi' is always true – 'I cannot be in error when I say: I feel at this moment a violent revulsion towards Pierre' (Brown, p.22: TE, p.45). But 'le réfléchi' can be either true or false (like any judgement or decision): 'hatred … truly is a real object, which I grasp through the *Erlebnis*, but this object is outside consciousness and the very nature of its existence implies its "dubitability"' (Brown, p.23: TE, pp.47-8).

Sartre distinguishes two types of reflection, the impure and the pure. The former lacks self–knowledge. (It) 'operates a passage to the infinite on the spot' (own translation: TE, p.48); I have a feeling of repulsion for someone, and move straight to a state of hatred, 'son objet transcendant'. 'Pure' reflection knows the spontaneous feeling for what it is and knows not to identify the future on the basis of 'l'irréfléchi'.

This leads to two errors (pp.48-9). Firstly, we conclude that introspection is in itself misleading and that we have to interpret symbolically all the apparent instances of feeling to find out what the real feeling ('sentiment') is, as if there is an unconscious activity. Then we interpret the feeling as causing the manifestations. Secondly, we may project the certainty of our unreflected consciousness onto the feeling and conclude that our hatred itself is immanent, i.e. interpret 'le sens transcendant' as immanent. Hatred is a state, says Sartre (p.49), and by this term he expresses its character of passivity and inertia.[2]

This attempt to describe the characteristics of 'l'état' becomes more confused in the next paragraph (pp.50-1). The state, he begins, is, as it were, an intermediary between the body

[2] 'Toute la psychologie des états … est une psychologie de l'inerte' (TE,p.50)

This concept of 'un état d'émotion' assumes a universal psychological model. It seems to be a particularly French concept, arising from the emphasis linguistically and in popular psychology on 'états d'âme'. In English semantics, 'hatred' could equally well be used to express or describe an instantaneous and spontaneous feeling.

and 'l'Erlebnis' (the lived experience). Its action on the body is causal – it causes my gestures. I would say it goes wider than gestures to my actions in general. But it is not the same for consciousness. Here he introduces the notion of 'émanation' to describe the relationship between 'les états psychiques inertes' and the 'spontanéités de la conscience' (p.50). 'the consciousness of disgust appears to reflection as a spontaneous emanation of hatred' (Brown, pp.25-26: TE, p.50). This is to satisfy the 'demands' ('les exigences') of hatred, to be first, to be the *origin.* What is the link between hatred and the experience of repulsion? Here for the first time in his published work Sartre brings up the idea of magic – 'It is, to be sure, a magical link' (Brown, p.26: TE, p.51)[3].

What does he mean by 'magic'? It is certainly a connection which is 'pas logique' ('not logical'), because the sentence follows the statement that 'the relation of hatred to the particular *Erlebnis* of repulsion is not logical' (Brown, ibid). It is also certainly applied to a relationship which is not *causal*, as it is in contrast to the role that 'l'état' plays in relationship to the body and action (see paragraph above). Sartre's view thus appears to be that if we cannot find a cause or a logical relationship, then the relationship must be 'magique, assurément'. This seems to close off other forms of relationship and any further investigation[4].

The second problem with Sartre's accounts of the relationship between 'l'état', hatred, and the associated feelings is the contradiction between 'je saisis' (la haine) 'à travers l' « Erlebnis »' on TE,pp.47-8, and the concept of the "Erlebnis" emanating from hatred. The only way to resolve this contradiction is to take it that the perception of emanation is simply an appearance,

[3] Sartre continues (p.51), '… c'est en termes exclusivement magiques qu'il faut parler des rapports du moi à la conscience'.

[4] For a comparison of the use of the concept of magic in all four of the works of Sartre examined here, see the Summary at the end of this chapter (pp.49-53).

An alternative view to Sartre's of affectivity in general and the affective state of negativity towards someone or something, would be that the connection between hatred and the '"Erlebnis" particulier de répulsion' does not need such an explanation since they are simply different points on the same affective spectrum. Sartre has to explain the connection because he has formulated the notion of the 'état psychique', of hatred in this case, which sees as a kind of reflective judgement, the product of a conclusion we come to. In the model of the continuous spectrum of affect, on the other hand, the distinction between hatred and 'la conscience spontanée de dégoût' (p.50) requires no qualitative explanation. Both are feelings with an admixture of judgement. I may feel, think or say that I hate George Osborne. I may have a good idea that, though I may not think about him for two hours, the next time I do I will still hate him. But there is nevertheless an instantaneous quality to the feeling. I have a fair idea that, if he walked in and I shared a drink with him, I wouldn't hate him, at least for a time (possibly the result of 'pure reflection' in Sartre's terms, but more likely arising from the awareness of the spontaneity of feeling and judgement). This continuity model does not recognize such a fundamental distinction between the 'état' and spontaneous feeling

even an *illusion*, which masks the real genesis of 'la haine'. This is precisely Sartre's contention.

This interpretation is confirmed in a later passage in the chapter on the constitution of the Ego (pp.62-65), which also gives more detail on the nature of the magical relations which Sartre describes. There he describes the Ego as 'a virtual locus of unity' (Brown, p.34), a passive creator (p.63), contrasted with the *real* order of production:

> what is *really* first is consciousnesses, through which are constituted states, then, through these, the Ego. But as the order is reversed by a consciousness that imprisons itself in the World in order to flee from itself, consciousnesses are given as emanating from states, and states as produced by the Ego. (Brown, pp.34-35: TE, p.63)

So Sartre posits an order of psychological reality, roughly speaking, spontaneous consciousness leading to 'les états', leading to the Ego. But *experience,* how this *appears* to us, is exactly the opposite. This raises various problems, which Sartre addresses in the Conclusion. If the Ego is a construction and its role an illusion ('It' (the Ego) 'consists of a pseudo-spontaneity that would find suitable symbols in the gushing forth of a spring, a geyser, etc.' (Brown, p.33: TE, p.62)), why and how has this illusion developed? Does the illusion have a function? Is it just an 'error'? Could or should it be corrected?

3) 'Conclusion'

The Conclusion is divided into three sections. The first is the most interesting psychologically. The second returns to the question and refutation of solipsism; in the third he contends that the Ego and the World are both objects for the 'conscience absolue' and that the Ego takes all its contents from the world, enabling us thus to escape what he calls 'les pseudo-valeurs spirituelles' (TE,p.86) of the subject.

The first section makes it clear straightaway that he believes that he is proposing an improvement, that there is an error which can and should be corrected – 'The conception of the Ego which we are putting forward seems to bring about the liberation of the transcendental field at the same time as its purification' (Brown, p.43: TE, p.74). 'Les états', as he described them earlier ('Doubts, remorse, the so-called "crises of consciousness"' (ibid: TE, p.75)), do not come from within, they are simple representations.

Sartre describes this pure transcendental sphere as 'une sphère d'existence *absolue*' (p.77). It consists of 'pure spontaneities, which are never objects and which determine themselves to

exist' (Brown, p.45). He quotes Rimbaud (TE,p.78) to support his reiterated view that the spontaneity of consciousness can never emanate *from* the 'Je', it goes *towards* it. This spontaneity is individualized yet impersonal. The idea of the Ego producing spontaneity is an illusion.[5] He also criticizes the idea of spontaneity produced from an impersonal *unconscious,* being 'personalised' in becoming conscious. For Sartre this just takes the problem of existence a step further back.

Sartre then formulates the thesis which lies behind the essay and to which it has been leading:

'… transcendental consciousness is an impersonal spontaneity. It determines itself to exist at every instant, without us being able to conceive of anything *before it* …. Every instant of our conscious lives reveals to us a creation *ex nihilo*. Not a new *arrangement* but a new existence' (Brown, p.46: TE, p.79).

He uses this again to criticize the idea of the unconscious and also the force of the will. Firstly there is something anguishing about feeling subject to this endless creation of which we are not the agents. Again, he suggests that the idea of the unconscious is an error, an illusion, a way of accounting for the feeling of constantly escaping ourselves, of 'the surpassing of the *me* by consciousness' (own translation). The will has no power over this spontaneity because it is itself a product of it.

Sartre takes a clinical example of Janet to show how this spontaneity 'monstrueuse' can produce a pathological neurosis (pp.80-1). Normally consciousness is unified by the 'Je'; suddenly it realizes that it has the freedom of an infinity of possibilities, even transgressive, and it is terrified.

He moves on from this to provide an answer to the problems of illusion which I raised earlier (see previous page). What can be the function of this illusion which is the Ego? It is practical; perhaps it is precisely to be able to live with this vertigo of spontaneity.[6] In fact there is no distinction between voluntary and involuntary spontaneity. '… consciousness constitutes the Ego as a false representation of itself, …, as if it made it its safeguard and its law' (Brown, p.48 modified: TE, p.82). Sartre catalogues a series of psychological notions and distinctions, which depend on the notion of Ego – 'action and passion', 'an autonomy of the will', 'activity

[5] Illusion is my word; Sartre does not use it. He does talk about 'erreur' on p.78 and I cannot see any other interpretation of this.

[6] '… peut-être son rôle essentiel est-il de masquer à la conscience sa propre spontanéité' (TE,p.81).

emanating from a passivity', 'the possible and the real', 'appearance and being', 'between what is willed and what is yielded to' (all, Brown, ibid: TE, p.82).

But there can be moments when pure reflection sees consciousness for what it is, perceives 'la fatalité de sa spontanéité'. This causes anxiety, 'fear of oneself' (Brown, p.49: TE, p.83), and explains the neurosis in the Janet example.[7]

2. Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions

Sartre's *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions* was published in 1938. To situate that in his philosophical trajectory, *The Imaginary* was published in 1940 and the magnum opus of his early philosophy, *Being and Nothingness*, in 1943. It was originally part of or material for a work which was never finished, called *The Psyche*[8], which could possibly explain some of its difficulties. It has obviously attracted some interest as a rare work more or less exclusively dedicated to emotion by a major figure in 20th century philosophy.

Introduction

As well as providing the outline of a theory of emotion, the work also has an explicit methodological objective. This is to explore the possibility and method of the phenomenological psychology which could be said to culminate in *L'imaginaire* (subtitled *Psychologie Phénoménologique de l'Imagination*). So the introduction, entitled 'Psychologie, phénoménologie et psychologie phénoménologique', is primarily methodological. Sartre begins (pp.7-13) with a critique of psychology. He summarizes the two methods which psychology uses; it looks at two types of experience – 'that which is given to us by the spatio-temporal perception of organized bodies and that intuitive knowledge of ourselves which we call reflective experience' (Mairet, p.14 modified: ETE, p.8), i.e. introspection. But, whatever the methodological difficulties and rivalry of the two approaches, they are in agreement on one thing; they are concerned with *facts*. The problem with 'scientific' psychology, according to

[7] Sartre continues (pp.83-4) by suggesting that the phenomenological reduction is not the 'opération *savante'* which seems to be required by Husserl; rather there is a constant motive for it if we want to experience consciously our spontaneity. In fact we cannot avoid it – '… c'est à la fois un événement pur d'origine transcendentale et un accident toujours possible de notre vie quotidienne' (p.84). Although the grounds of this critique of the Husserlian phenomenological reduction are not the same, this does echo Merleau-Ponty's critique in the 'Avant-propos' to PP, summarized above in Introduction, pp.3-4.

[8] Gardner, p.19.

Sartre, is that it is precisely the collection of facts, which puts off for ever actually formulating the concept of the essence of the human psyche. 'To wait upon the *fact* is, by definition, to wait upon the isolated; it is to prefer … the accident to the essential, the contingent to the necessary, disorder to order…. The psychologists do not notice … that it is … impossible to attain the essence by heaping up accidents …' (Mairet, p.17f. modified: ETE, p.12).

He then moves on to examine the study of emotion as an example of the defective approach of 'scientific' psychology (pp.13-16). Emotion will just be one phenomenon among many, one chapter in manuals of psychology alongside the other chapters on other psychic phenomena. The psychologist will rely on experience to establish the limits and definition of emotional phenomena (p.15). She will seek the explanation and the laws of emotion *in the processes of emotion itself*, not in the 'structures générales et essentielles de la réalité humaine' (p.16).

'essences alone enable us to classify and examine facts' (Mairet, p.21: ETE, p.17), and it is through Husserlian phenomenology that we can establish the essence of emotion (pp.17-18). Psychic facts, in their essential structure, are reactions of man to the world; so, to get at their true meaning, we have first to elucidate the two notions of 'man' and 'world' (p.18). And the source of man, the world and the psychic is 'la conscience transcendantale et constitutive', which we attain by the 'phenomenological reduction' (pp.18-9). Husserlian phenomenology will not look at particular emotions but will study emotion as 'phénomène transcendantal pur' and seek to elucidate its essence as 'type organisé de conscience' (pp.19-20).

Sartre then draws on and quotes Heidegger in considering the exceptional identity of the subject and object of research in the study of man. 'for human reality … to exist is always to *assume* its being; that is, to be responsible for it instead of receiving it from outside, as a stone does.… For indeed this understanding is not a quality that comes to human reality from outside, but is its own mode of existence' (Mairet, pp. 23-24 modified: ETE, pp.20-22). On the basis of this, we could successfully analyze 'la réalité-humaine'. This analysis could serve as a basis for an anthropology (p.21). We are not talking about introspection here but what Sartre names as 'l'herméneutique de l'existence'. This will found an anthropology which will serve as the basis of all psychology (pp.21-2). This is the inverse of traditional psychology since we establish the essence of man first, whereas psychology starts with facts and aims to use them to produce a synthetic account of man.

Now what will the phenomenological study of *emotion* give us? Husserl for his part thinks that a phenomenological description of emotion will reveal the essential structures of consciousness, since an emotion is precisely a consciousness (p.23). The difference between the phenomenological and the psychological/ scientific approach to emotion hinges on the

question of signification or meaning (pp.24-26). For the psychologist a mental state is always a fact and accidental; she takes all meaning out of it. Whereas for the phenomenologist 'tout fait humain est par essence significatif' (p.24). Emotion signifies *in its own way* 'the whole of consciousness or … of human reality' (Mairet, pp.27-28 modified: ETE, p.26)[9]. It is not the effect of human reality; it is human reality realizing itself in the form 'emotion'.

It is striking here that Sartre, although in a somewhat modified form, is fundamentally faithful to the Husserlian method, whereas we have seen that Merleau-Ponty, in the 'Avant-propos' to PP, is sceptical about the possibility and effectiveneness of a fully transcendental reduction (See p.4).

In the final section of the introduction (pp.26-30), Sartre defines his objectives in this study. His ambition is not a full-blown phenomenological study of emotion. This would involve the study of affectivity as an existential mode of human reality. His ambitions are more limited. Using emotion as a case study, he wants to explore if psychology can draw a method and instructions from phenomenology (p.27). Psychology is concerned with man '*en situation'.* One day phenomenology will construct a true anthropology which will define the notions with which psychology is concerned. But for the moment psychology can use phenomenological methods to focus not on the collection of facts but on the interrogation of 'phénomènes', that is psychic events in so far as they have meaning, and not just as pure facts. For Sartre this means interrogating consciousness itself (p.28). This will mean abandoning the methods of inductive introspection or external empirical observation. Here we see him making the case for his characteristic focus on consciousness, largely ignoring physiological, developmental and cultural factors. This work, he says (p.30), is to be an *experiment* in phenomenological psychology, the object of which is to establish whether emotion, as an example, is 'un phénomène signifiant'.

Other theories

Before putting forward his own theory, Sartre examines other theories. First he looks at, what he calls, the classic theories of emotion; then the psychoanalytic theory; finally he proposes a phenomenological theory.

[9] For critical consideration of this idea, see pp.112f. in Chapter 3.

He first examines the theory of William James (pp.33-36), the so-called 'théorie périphérique des émotions', according to which emotions are initially physiological states, of which the mind then becomes conscious. Among other criticisms Sartre focuses on the following:

James distinguishes two groups of phenomena; firstly physiological phenomena, e.g quickened heart rate, sweating, etc.; and secondly a group of psychological phenomena, which we will call states of consciousness, e.g. joy, anger, etc. In the Jamesian theory, these are nothing other than consciousness of the physiological states. For Sartre and others this simply does not wash. There is *more* in the emotional states than is explicable by physiological factors alone. Sartre's other principal objection reveals aspects of his own views; the Jamesian view has emotion based on a 'désordre physiologique'. This is not consistent with emotion, since emotion is not at all disorder: '… it has a meaning, it signifies something … It arises as a certain relation between our psychic being and the world; and this relation – or rather our consciousness of it – is not a chaotic relationship between the self and the universe; it is an organized and describable structure' (Mairet, p. 34 modified: ETE, pp.35-36).

The second 'classical' theory which he looks at is that of Pierre Janet, the French psychologist and psychotherapist (1859-1947). He was less interested in the physiological aspect than the behavioural. There are aspects of Janet's theory which seem to come over into Sartre's, at least as formulated in this work. He says that Janet is sensitive to the appearance of disorder which every emotion presents (p.37). Emotion is 'a behaviour of disadaptation, a behaviour of failure' (Mairet, p. 35 modified: ETE, p.38). When a task is too difficult and we cannot maintain 'la conduite supérieure' adapted to it, the psychic energy is freed and is used in another direction: we adopt 'une conduite inférieure', which requires less psychological tension. In the examples which Sartre cites from Janet (pp.38-9), it is clear that this is a theory derived from pathology. Emotion is both 'une conduite d'échec' and 'la conscience d'un échec' (p.39). Sartre's conclusion on Janet is that his theory is a mixture of the purely mechanistic, which is how he sees James' physiological explanation, and a truly psychological theory which is purposive (p.45). On this view emotional behaviour is not a *disorder:* it is an organized system of means to an end, which is to mask, replace or reject a behaviour which we do not want to or cannot sustain. Each type of emotion is a different means of avoiding or escaping a difficulty.

The third theory which Sartre looks at is particularly associated with followers of Gestalt psychology, especially Lewin & Dembo. This is a theory of emotion as a form of behaviour. He gives a long quote (pp.46 – 50), describing research showing the functional character of emotion. It is striking that this focuses on anger (a subject on which Dembo in particular carried

out significant experimental research). This again leads to a somewhat negative view of emotion, as we can see both in the quotation below and in Sartre's commentary:

> In anger, and doubtless in all the emotions, there is a weakening of the barriers that separate the deeper from the more superficial levels of the self which normally ensure the regulation of action by the deep personality and maintain self-control; a weakening of the barriers between the real and the unreal. (Mairet, p.44 modified: ETE, p.49)[10]

Sartre comments:

> Certainly anger is not an instinct nor a habit, nor is it a calculated action. It is an abrupt solution of conflict, a way of cutting the Gordian knot… anger here appears as an escape … the behaviour "anger", though less well adapted to the problem than the superior – and impossible – behaviour that would solve it, is still precisely and perfectly adapted to the need to break the tension, …. (Mairet, p.45 modified: ETE, pp.50-1)

What he thinks that this theory leaves out is the role of consciousness in dissolving and reconstituting 'des formes' (of emotion) 'sans cesse' (p.54) and it is there that we should start to address the real problem.

'La théorie psychanalytique'

The ideas and argument in this chapter are fundamental to the development of Sartre's own theory. Although he radically rejects aspects of the psychoanalytic theory, it acts as a sounding board both here and in *L'Être et le néant* against which to define and clarify his own ideas.

Initially he summarizes what we can conclude from his consideration of the 'classical' theories. Emotion has a functional signification (p.57), a finality, a purpose. We can grasp this finality, this purpose by the objective examination of emotional behaviour. Both an empirical approach and an examination of the essence of emotion by intuition show us that this purposiveness is inherent to its structure. He then makes a claim about this finality: it supposes a synthetic organization of behaviour which can *only* be the unconscious of the psychoanalysts *or* consciousness (p.58, my italics)[11]. The former would explain another aspect of the essential

[10] Quoted by Sartre from *Psychologie de la Forme* by P. Guillaume.

[11] What is the justification for making consciousness and the unconscious mutually exclusive? What if *or* was simply replaced by *and*? Recent neurological research has shown that unconscious factors and consciousness both play an essential role in the organization of behaviour (see Damasio (2000), pp.296-302). This would also help to explain the experience of passivity alongside the intuition of purposiveness.

character of emotion – the passivity of its experience; it is *undergone*, it develops according to its own laws, without our conscious spontaneity being able to modify its course in any appreciable way (p.59).

Sartre gives an account of psychoanalytic psychology (pp.59-62), both in general and in respect of emotion. It is the first theory to have insisted that every conscious state has a significance other than itself (p.59). He gives some examples; it may be the result of an initial complex; a paralyzing fear may be an attempt to escape the revelation to oneself of a disturbing memory (p.60); anger can be interpreted as a symbolic satisfaction of sexual feelings.

We then get to the heart of Sartre's objection to psychoanalytic psychology. 'The psychoanalytic interpretation conceives the conscious phenomenon as the symbolic realization of a desire repressed by the censor. Note that, for consciousness, the desire is *not implicated in its symbolic realization'* (Mairet, p.51: ETE, p.61). If we had some consciousness of our real desire, we would be in *bad faith* and psychoanalysis does not see it in that way. The signification of our conscious behaviour is entirely exterior to this behaviour. It is possible to decode it by the appropriate techniques. 'In a word, the conscious fact is related to what it signifies, as a thing which is the *effect* of a certain event is related to that event ….' (Mairet, p.51: ETE, p.62). There is a relationship of causality between consciousness and its signification; the former is essentially passive in relation to its cause. Only a consciousness which has acquired the necessary technical knowledge can interpret the acts of consciousness as signs. At the same time these acts are what they are, they exist 'in themselves outside all signifying interpretation' (own translation).

The objection to this is that it turns consciousness into a 'thing', 'an existent of the same type as a stone' (own translation: ETE, p.63). It makes consciousness 'a secondary and passive phenomenon': 'consciousness can constitute itself into a meaning without being aware of the meaning that it constitutes' (Mairet, p.52). Sartre cannot accept this; for him it is a contradiction, fundamentally incompatible with the Cartesian *cogito,* in accordance with which consciousness is the essence of existence. This leads him to make a powerful summary of how he sees consciousness and of its importance. 'In so far as a consciousness *makes itself* it is never anything other than what it appears' (Mairet, pp.52-53 modified). If it possesses a signification, it must contain it in itself 'comme structure de conscience'. This does not mean that the signification must be perfectly explicit; there are degrees of condensation and clarity. But we must seek in consciousness itself its signification. 'Consciousness, if the *cogito* is to

be possible, is itself the *fact,* the *signification* and what is ***signified'*** (Mairet, p.53 modified: ETE, pp.63-4).

After this clear statement, Sartre continues with his criticism of psychoanalysis (pp.64-66). He identifies a contradiction in it. The theoretician of psychoanalysis establishes a rigid link of causality between the phenomena which he studies, say repressed desire, and the symbols which surface in consciousness. The practitioner on the other hand can only work using his own and the patient's facts of consciousness to comprehend and interpret them[12]. Sartre's argument is that, if consciousness can comprehend the symbolization process, that is because the structure of symbol and symbolization is constitutive of consciousness. Consciousness *constitutes itself* in symbolization. There is nothing behind it; the relationship between symbol, the symbolized and symbolization is 'an intra-structural bond of consciousness' (Mairet, p.54: ETE, p.65).

He then moves on to apply this to emotion:

'a theory of consciousness which affirms the meaningful character of emotional facts must look for this meaning in consciousness itself. In other words, it is consciousness which *makes itself* conscious, moved by the need for an inner meaning' (Mairet, p.66 modified: ETE, p.66).

However, in the final paragraph of the chapter (pp.66-7), he raises two objections, which the partisans of psychoanalysis can make against his view and which their theory of the mind on two levels appears to explain. Firstly, if it is consciousness which organizes emotion as a certain type of response adapted to an external situation, how come it is not conscious of this adaptation? Secondly, if consciousness constitutes emotion, how come, says Sartre, in the majority of cases, consciousness fights to suppress the development of the display of emotion?[13]

Sartre concludes that a phenomenological description of emotion must remove these contradictions.

[12] '… c'est-à-dire en cherchant avec souplesse le rapport intra-conscient entre symbolisation et symbole' (ETE, p.66); 'that is to say in seeking with suppleness the relationship within consciousness between symbolization and symbol' (own translation).

[13] '…in the majority of cases we struggle against the development of emotional manifestations ; we try to control our fear, to calm our anger, etc. … we push back the emotion with all our strength and it invades us in spite of ourselves' (own translation: ETE, p.67).

‘Esquisse d’une théorie phénoménologique’

He begins this section by laying down some ground rules. Firstly, ‘La conscience émotionnelle est d’abord irréfléchie’ (ETE, p.70). Commonly the initial form of emotion is taken to be ‘une conscience réflexive’, i.e. consciousness *of* emotion, ‘un *état de conscience’* (pp.69-70). But that is not the original experience of emotion.

Secondly, ‘Emotional consciousness is first consciousness *of* the world’ …. ‘the man who is afraid is afraid *of* something’ (Mairet, pp.56-57 modified: ETE, pp.70-71). Everyone agrees that emotion is set off by a perception or some kind of representation (p.71). But then, for psychologists, emotion moves away from its object and becomes absorbed in itself. My interpretation of this is that he is criticizing psychologists for confusing introspection and the articulation and analysis of emotion with emotion itself. In his view, however, ‘emotion returns to the object at every instant, and feeds upon it.… In a word, the emotional subject and the object of the emotion are united in an indissoluble synthesis. The emotion is a specific manner of apprehending the world’ (Mairet, p.57 modified). Sartre is very concerned to make the point that reflection does not have to play any part in this. There can be an unbroken passage from the non-reflective consciousness ‘instrumental world’ (action) to the non-reflective consciousness ‘hateful world’ (anger). The latter is a transformation of the former[14].

This leads into a lengthy digression (pp.73-78), in which he describes ‘le plan irréfléchi’. We can reflect on our action. ‘But an operation *upon* the universe is generally executed without our having to leave the non-reflective plane’ (Mairet, pp.58-59: ETE, p.73). He gives the extended example of himself writing:

> … I am writing but I am not conscious of writing…. the act of writing is not at all unconscious, it is an actual structure of my consciousness. Only it is not conscious *of* itself. To write is to maintain an active consciousness of *the words* in so far as they come into existence under my pen. Not of the words inasmuch as they are written *by me:* I apprehend the words intuitively inasmuch as they have this quality of structure of emerging *ex nihilo,* while not being creators of themselves, of being passively created. (Mairet, p.59 modified: ETE, pp.73-4)

He describes the word ‘borrowing’ the hand which writes (p.74). The words which I write are *necessities* (p.75). They appear as potentialities *having to be realized.* But not having to be realized *by me.* The ego does not appear here. I am conscious of my hand in the sense that I

[14] Mairet, p.72.

see it directly as the instrument by means of which the words realize themselves (p.76). It is an object in the world, but, at the same time, it is present and lived ('vécu').

He finishes this section/paragraph by summarizing what we can conclude from this examination of the example of creative writing (pp.76-78). He gives three more ground rules which have a more general phenomenological and existential relevance than to emotion alone. However, as we shall see, he needs them to demonstrate important aspects of the phenomenology of emotions.

Firstly, action 'as spontaneous unreflective consciousness' (Mairet, p.61 modified) constitutes an existential layer in the world. There is no need to be conscious of oneself acting to act. But, secondly, this does not mean that unreflective behaviour ('une conduite irréfléchie', ETE, p.77) is unconscious behaviour, it is conscious of itself non-thetically ('non-thétiquement'). Its way of being thetically conscious of itself is to transcend itself and to seize on the world like a quality of things ('saisir sur le monde comme une qualité de choses', p.77). Sartre's final ground rule is vital to his theory of emotion but requires us to accept a general idea of our view of the world, incorporated in an interesting metaphor (pp.77-8). First he posits what he calls 'the pragmatic intuition of the determinism of the world' (Mairet, p.62); by this he means our intuitive grasp of predetermined means to achieve our ends. He compares the world to a game (p.78), like a pin ball machine, where you manoeuvre the ball down pre-set paths. But there are also holes which you have to avoid. In Sartre's image this represents the *difficulty* of the world. This notion is not the product of personal reflection but a quality of the world given in perception.

The description of writing[15] has given us an example of action 'sur un plan irréfléchi conscient'; then he has given us ground rules for how such action inter-relates with the world. He now gives us his theory of what emotion is (pp.79-83). It arises from the difficulty of the world which he has just mentioned.

> (An emotion) is a transformation of the world. When the paths before us become too difficult, or when we cannot see our way, we can no longer remain in a world so urgent and so difficult…. So then we try to change the world, that is, to live it as if the relations between things and their potentialities were not ruled by deterministic processes but by magic. (Mairet, p.63 modified)

[15] Writing is a vivid example because it is what the author is actually doing. On the other hand, it is high on the scale of sophistication among the actions of 'conscience spontanée irréfléchie'. It only becomes such an action after a long and difficult apprenticeship, when it is anything but spontaneous and unreflected. Nor is it universal.

It is easier to see what he means by magic here than when he introduced it in TE (see discussion on pp.27-8 above). We can define it by what it is not in the quote – it is not a relationship regulated by a deterministic process. Think of it in the context of the example of the pin-ball type game which he has just given. The ball instead of following the determined path keeps falling in the holes. The impossibility of finding a solution to the problem, apprehended objectively as a quality of the world, motivates the new unreflected consciousness – the emotion – which seizes the world differently and orders different behaviour (p.81). But emotional behaviour is not the same as other behaviour, it is not *effective,* says Sartre in a striking phrase. Its aim is not to change the structure of the object in reality by using particular means. It seeks to confer on the object itself another quality, a greater or lesser existence or presence (ibid). 'In a word, in emotion, it is the body which, directed by consciousness, changes its relationship with the world so that the world should change its qualities. If emotion is a game it is a game in which we believe' (Mairet, p.65 modified: ETE, pp.81-2). He then gives the example of someone being unable to reach a bunch of grapes and reacting to his inability with a feeling of disgust at their bitterness. 'I confer magically on the grape the quality which I desire' (own translation: ETE, pp.82-3). This suggests that there is something factitious about emotion[16].

Sartre then describes how various emotions set out to magically change the world. First he looks at 'la peur passive' and 'la peur active' (ETE, pp.83-85) and concludes with his understanding of the true meaning of fear: 'It is a consciousness whose aim is to negate an object, by means of magical behaviour, and will go so far as to annihilate itself in order to annihilate the object at the same time' (Mairet pp.67-68 modified). Passive fear may end up in a faint to achieve this; active fear is often seen as rational, a calculation, but in fact flight is another means of denying the existence of the dangerous object.

Next he looks at sadness, depression, again subdividing it between passive and active. His description of passive depression is especially vivid and gives an interesting phenomenological description of the experience (pp.85-7). His explanation of the emotion is as follows: one of the ordinary conditions of our action has disappeared, for example we are ruined, or perhaps someone we love has died. Most of the conditions are still in place, but we have to find new ways to achieve our ends. But that is precisely what we do not want.

[16] After all you might just become angry, for instance angry at yourself for your inability or angry at the farmer for not providing a long enough ladder.

> The sadness aims to suppress the obligation to look for these new ways, to transform the structure of the world by replacing its present constitution by a totally undifferentiated structure. What it comes to, in short, is making the world into an affectively neutral reality, a system in total affective equilibrium, discharging objects with a strong affective charge, bringing them down to affective zero … (Mairet, p.68-69 modified: ETE, pp.86-7)

We live in a reduced state, the world is dreary, 'une structure indifférenciée'. The only differentiation in this total monotony is the little corner where we take refuge (ETE, p.87).

The example which he gives of active sadness or depression is of a mentally ill person, who has a nervous attack because she does not want to confess the source of her problems (pp.87-9). She puts herself in such a state that the confession would be impossible. Its potentiality is still there but the action is no longer in her power. 'The emotional crisis is here an abandonment of responsibility. There is a magical exaggeration of the difficulties of the world …. The emotion of active sadness in this case is therefore a magical play-acting of impotence, … (Mairet, p.70 modified: ETE, pp.88-9).

Sartre continues (p.89) by stating that he will not deal with anger in this section as he has dealt with it at length elsewhere. And, anyway, it is the most obviously functional emotion. He concludes the section (p.92) by pointing out that so far he has only dealt with the functional role of emotion, but not with its nature. He has only given a few examples. But he insists that all emotions have this magical function:

> We are only affirming that they are all reducible to the constitution of a magical world, in using our bodies as instruments of incantation. In each case the problem is different, the behaviours are different. To grasp the signification and finality, one would have to know and analyse each particular situation. (Mairet, pp.73-74 modified: ETE, p.93)

But behaviour is not enough to define emotion (p.94). There can be emotional behaviour without real emotion. A situation may call for emotional behaviour and we may play the part, but the emotion is false. This is not the same as the actor, whose very conduct is false, addressing as he does 'un univers fictif' (pp.94-95).

He now begins to examine the nature of emotion. True emotion is something else entirely – it is accompanied by *belief* ('croyance', my italics). 'The qualities "willed" upon the objects are taken to be real' (Mairet, pp.75-76: ETE, p.96). It is not just by running away that an object becomes horrifying. That would give it the formal quality of the horrifying but not 'la matière de cette qualité'. 'For us to really grasp the horrible, we have not only to mime it, we must be spell-bound,' (another reference to magic) 'filled to overflowing by our own emotion, the shape

and form of our behaviour must be filled with something opaque and weighty which gives it substance' (Mairet, p.76 modified: ETE, p.96). Sartre identifies the physiological phemonena related to emotion as fulfilling this role – 'They represent the *genuineness* of emotion, they are the phenomena of belief' (ibid). But he does not subscribe to the James theory. Emotions are the kinds of behaviour which he described earlier accompanied by a certain state of the body (p.97). The physical upheaval ('bouleversement') may continue even after the behaviour has finished or been resisted but it is the behaviour which constitutes the form and the meaning of the upheaval (p.98). The upheaval is the belief in the behaviour; without it the behaviour is just play-acting.

In the remainder of the chapter (ETE, pp.98-117), Sartre explains his theory of the effect of emotion on the relationship between consciousness and the world. He also continues to expound and develop his idea of the magical nature of this effect. One problem in his account is his consistent view that emotion is a degradation of consciousness. Indeed he links the two ideas:

'… all ways out being barred, consciousness leaps into the magical world of emotion, plunges wholly into it by debasing itself' (Mairet, p.78: ETE, p.98). Both ideas seem to me to be born from Sartre's difficulty in seeing emotion as a *normal* action of consciousness. On the other hand his description of the intensity and intimate authenticity of affectivity encapsulates well the experience:

> Consciousness does not limit itself to the projection of affective meanings upon the world around it; it lives the new world which it has just constituted. It lives it directly, commits itself to it, and suffers the qualities which the concomitant behaviours have sketched out …. It is a new consciousness in front of the new world and it is with what is most intimate in itself that it constitutes it, with that presence to itself, without distance, of its point of view on the world. (Mairet, pp.77-78 modified: ETE, pp.98-9)

Sartre compares emotional consciousness to sleeping consciousness (p.99). Both change their bodily state in order to live the new world which they are in. The physiological upheaval is simply the obscuration[17] ('l'obscurcissement') of the conscious point of view on things in so far as consciousness realizes and *spontaneously lives* this obscuration (pp 99-100).

He repeats his interpretation of emotion as 'dégradation' – 'Thus the origin of emotion is a spontaneous and lived degradation of consciousness in face of the world' (Mairet, p.79

[17] Mairet, p.79.

modified: ETE, p.100). What it (consciousness) cannot support, it tries to grasp in another way, by putting itself to sleep, by reducing itself to the consciousnesses of sleep, dream and hysteria.

I will leave aside Sartre's *evaluation* of emotion in considering the rest of his account. Indeed he acknowledges himself (pp.100-101) that such evaluation has no place in the *experience* of emotion. Let us concentrate on what he has to say about the phenomenology of the emotional experience. In summary, emotion for Sartre is no different from any other conscious act – it is a quality of the world, it is in the objects in the world which consciousness takes hold of[18]. But what are the characteristics of emotional consciousness, what is its particular nature?

It is non-thetic consciousness of itself. The finality (the final purpose) of emotion is not posited by an act of consciousness in the midst of the emotion itself. But nor is it unconscious. It uses itself up ('s'épuise') in the constitution of the object (p.101). The major characteristic of emotional consciousness, in Sartre's account, is its absorption in the quality of the object. Precisely because it *believes* in the new aspect of the world which it is living, it is captive of itself, exactly as in a dream or in hysteria. The spontaneity of consciousness does not mean that it is always free to deny something at the same moment that it posits it. It is impossible for it to draw back into itself to doubt that it is outside in the object (p.102). Emotional consciousness tends to perpetuate the world where it is captive. It transfers this characteristic of absorption, captivity, onto its objects – '… the objects are captivating, enslaving, they have taken possession of consciousness. Liberation must come from a purifying reflexion or from the total disappearance of the emotional situation' (Mairet, p.81 modified: ETE, p.103).

Sartre continues this theme of the absorption of the subject in emotion (pp.103-5). 'All emotions have this in common, that they make appear a same world, cruel, terrible, etc.' (Mairet, p.81 modified: ETE, p.103). It could be said that here he is expressing in other words the characteristic of belief in emotion, which he has already identified. Conferring an emotional quality to an object is 'un passage à l'infini' (p.104). The 'horrible' for example is not only the present state of the object, it spreads itself over the future and obscures it, it is a revelation of the meaning of the world (ibid).

> …in every emotion, a multitude of affective protensions are directed towards the future to present it in an emotional light. We are living emotionally a quality which penetrates into us …. Immediately the emotion is lifted out of itself, it transcends itself, it is not an

[18] 'La conscience se transcende, par essence ; …. Elle ne se *connaît* que sur le monde' (ETE, p.102).

> ordinary episode of our daily life, it is an intuition of the absolute. (Mairet, pp.82-83 modified: ETE, p.105)

After this formulation, Sartre at last but fairly briefly addresses less disturbing forms of emotion in the paragraph on pp.105-106. He starts with what he calls, 'les émotions fines', which he later differentiates from 'les émotions faibles'. Mairet translates 'fines' as subtle (p.55). He does not seem to mean the so-called social emotions, guilt, shame, pride, etc. since his examples are based on simple feelings of pleasure or displeasure. It is hard to see how the previous paragraph explains them, as he states at the beginning ('It is this that explains the subtle emotions' (Mairet, p.83: ETE, p.105), other than as another less intense form of apprehension of the quality of an object.

In the next section (pp.106-112), he does widen significantly his definition of emotion. He introduces this with the example of the feeling of horror or disgust at something suddenly seen (p.106). In the examples which he has given so far consciousness 'se dégrade' and suddenly transforms the deterministic world in which we live into a magical world. But sometimes it is the world itself which reveals itself as magic, when we expected it to be determined (p.107). It is not us who project an ephemeral quality of magic on the world in accordance with our mood, he says, but 'There is an existential structure of the world which is magical' (Mairet, p.84). He says that he does not want to expand on this here. The category 'magique' controls our perception of others, 'les rapports interpsychiques des hommes' (p.108). He quotes Alain: 'The magical … is "the mind trailing among things"; … an irrational synthesis of spontaneity and passivity' (Mairet, p.85 modified). It is a consciousness made passive. Consciousness can only become a transcendent object by being turned into something passive[19].

Anthony Hatzimoysis (2013) disagrees with the view that Sartre is here widening his definition of emotion, arguing that the physical reaction to the grimacing face is another example of trying to change the meaning of the situation. This is somewhat undermined by the fact that he bases this on the phrase 'frozen with terror', which appears in the Mairet translation (p.84). This is a figurative translation of the original, which reads 'je me sens envahi de terreur' (p.106). Hatzimoysis' case is that the inertness of the 'frozen' is a means to negate the threat, but 'envahi de terreur' has no specific implication of inertness. Hatzymosis is responding to Richmond (2011), who puts forward the view that this is not compatible with the earlier theory and introduces a new dimension (p.153). Richmond (2014) has published a further article in response to Hatzimoysis defending her view that there is an inconsistency in Sartre's theory.

[19] Because the consciousness of another is an 'en-soi', I presume.

Her conclusion is that there are two co-existing theories in the *Esquisse.* The dominant theory is that emotion is a 'magical' strategy to escape practical difficulty, a theory which has the same wish-fulfilling function which Freud ascribes to fantasies, dreams, etc. (Richmond (2014) pp.612-3). The minor theory offers an account of the emotional consciousness of the subject disclosing a quality of the world (pp.613-5).

So, Sartre continues, man is always a sorcerer in the eyes of another man and the social world is first and foremost magical. It is not impossible, he writes (pp.108-9), to take a determinist view of the magical interpsychological world nor to construct rational superstructures on it. This sounds like a direct attack on the pretentions of the 'human sciences'. He continues, 'But this time it is they' (the rational superstructures) 'which are ephemeral and unstable, … which crumble away as soon as the magical aspect of faces, gestures and human situations is too strong' (Mairet, p.85 modified: ETE, p.109). And what happens when the superstructures laboriously created by reason collapse? If the object is disagreeable, 'The sudden passage from a rational apprehension of the world to a grasp of the same world as magical' (Mairet. p.86 modified) gives us horror; if it is agreeable, it gives us admiration. And there are many similar examples.

So now we have established two forms of emotion, which both involve magic. In the first it is us who magically change the world in order to replace a deterministic action which cannot be realized. In the second it is either the world itself which cannot be realized or which reveals itself suddenly as magic around us (p.110). The structures of both forms are the same – in particular in both consciousness takes the body along with it involving 'the upheaval in our own organism' (Mairet, p.87: ETE, pp.110-111). Moreover the two types may often overlap and be mixed together (p.111f.).

Sartre continues with further description of what it means to be emotional in the world (pp.112-4) and then with a more general view of the being of consciousness in the world (pp.114-6). '… no emotional apprehension of an object … can arise except against the background of a complete alteration of the world' (Mairet, p.88: ETE, p.112). It is an act of consciousness which destroys all the structures of the world which 'might *dispel* the magic and reduce the event to reasonable proportions'[20]. The distance to the window where the terrifying face appears is obliterated at the moment of terror. The window and the distance are grasped at the same time in the act by which consciousness seizes the face behind the window. But in this act they have lost their character of '*ustensiles* nécessaires'. The gap to the window is seized as

[20] Mairet, p.88.

‘*backgound* united with the horrible’, ‘*frame* of the frightful face’ (Mairet, p.89 modified: ETE, p.113). ‘For the horrible is *not possible* in the deterministic world of the usable’ (Mairet, p.89 modified: ETE, p.114). The horrible can only appear on a world such that the things which exist in it be magic in their nature and that possible ways of dealing with these things be magic also. In a word, to seize an object as horrible is to seize it ‘against the background of a world which reveals itself as *already* horrible’ (Mairet, ibid: ibid).

Thus there are two different ways for consciousness ‘to-be-in-the-world’. The world can appear to it as ‘un complexus organizé d’ustensiles’ such that, if we wish to produce a determined effect, we must act on determined elements of the ‘complexus’ (ETE, pp.114-5). There is no way of introducing an absolute action or radical change into this world.

The other way for consciousness “to-be-in-the-world” is the emotional way, the magical way. In this the world appears as ‘une totalité non-ustensile, … modifiable sans intermédiaire et par grandes masses’ (p.115). The categories of the world act immediately on consciousness; they are present to it ‘*sans distance’.* It aims to change these objects without distance or determined means by absolute and massive changes to the world. Sartre repeats again and again the magical nature of the world in emotion:

‘This aspect of the world is entirely coherent; this is the *magical* world. We will call emotion a sudden fall of consciousness into magic’ (Mairet, p.90 modified: ETE, pp. 115-6). So emotion is not a passing disorder of the organism and the mind which comes from outside. ‘On the contrary, it is the return of consciousness to the magical attitude, one of the great attitudes which are essential to it, with the appearance of the correlative world – the magical world’ (Mairet, p.91, ETE, p.116). Emotion is not an accident, it is a mode of existence of consciousness, one of the ways in which it ‘understands’ its “being-in-the-world”.

He concludes the chapter with some comments on how reflective consciousness deals with emotion (pp.116-7). Emotion appears to it as a structure of consciousness. It has a meaning, ‘it *signifies something for my psychic life’* (Mairet, p.91 modified, ETE, p.116). Using the phenomenological reduction, we can grasp emotion in constituting the world in magical form. But usually we, as it were, rationalize it and reflect on it as motivated by an object. He distinguishes two formulations: the first, produced by the reduction, ‘I find him hateful *because* I am angry’, the second, the normal one, ‘I am angry *because* he is hateful’ (p.117). In the first emotion in consciousness makes me transform the world; in the second I find a reason in the world for the emotion. The first is consistent with his view of the structure of emotion – I am angry and the world is transformed accordingly. The second provides a cause for the emotion.

The emotion does not transform the world, it is caused by it. Sartre is implying that it is an illusion, providing a comforting structure of cause and effect.

Conclusion

Sartre picks out the idea of signification, or meaning, as the quality of emotion which his theory has foregrounded. '… we hope we have succeeded in showing that a psychic fact like emotion, commonly taken to be a lawless disorder, possesses a signification of its own, and cannot be understood in itself, without the comprehension of this signification' (Mairet, p.92 modified: ETE, p.122). It perhaps shows how things have changed in the human sciences and philosophy since 1939 that the idea of emotion as 'un désordre sans loi' now seems incomprehensible. But even the suggestion that James thought that emotion was without signification, which he implies on p.121, seems somewhat of a travesty of James' idea of the connection between body, mind and behaviour, not to speak of the philosophical tradition of the significance of emotion, from Plato and Aristotle, through Spinoza to Hume etc. Can I suggest that the phrase is another example of an ambiguity in Sartre's approach? On the one hand he is fascinated by consciousness and as such is interested in the actions of the unreflective mind, on the other he is implicated in an intellectual tradition of rationality and a bourgeois culture of self-control and suppressed feelings, which finds difficulty in integrating emotion. Could this help to explain why he resorts to magic as an explanation, which seems to exaggerate the mystery of the meaningfulness of emotion, and which his own descriptions of the interrelationship between consciousness and the world do not seem to require?

In the final paragraph, Sartre returns to the methodological discussion which he undertook in the introduction. There he quoted Heidegger: '… in every human attitude … we will rediscover the whole of human reality, for emotion is human reality assuming itself and "emotionally-directing" itself towards the world' (Mairet, p.25 modified: ETE, pp.22-23). He repeats this (p.122) and states that his study has verified this principle[21]. But he also defines emotion in a differentiated way. 'The onset of emotion is a complete modification of "being-in-the-world" according to the very particular laws of magic' (Mairet, p.93 modified: ETE, p.123). This begs the question of what these 'lois très particulières' are – he has given us various examples of the operation of what he calls magic but he has never clearly defined it. What is clear in this passage is that he is distinguishing emotion from affectivity. This is not to say that emotion is

[21] See the Summary to Chapter 3, p.112f., for consideration of this idea.

not an instance of affectivity but it is a 'modification totale de l'être', whereas affectivity is constitutive of 'l'être de la réalité-humaine'.

Sartre concludes (pp.123-4) that, before we can fully understand emotion, we need a description of affectivity. This would be described and fixed by intuition *a priori,* he says, presumably by an eidetic reduction. Phenomenological psychology is regressive; it starts from the experience of particular emotions with the (unattainable) ideal of establishing the essence of emotion. Pure phenomenology on the other hand is progressive; it establishes the essence of human reality, in so far as it is affect, by eidetic reduction (p.124) and then applies this to the particular. What is the point of using both disciplines? Will not the second do the whole job? But Sartre argues that that will not account for the facticity of human existence and the particular emotions in which it manifests itself. For that a disciplined empirical approach is required (ibid).

We can, I think, link this to the final part of *Being and Nothingness* with existential psychoanalysis providing the empirical input to complement the fundamental ontology. In the *Esquisse* his conclusion is that there is a place for empirical psychology, in spite of his earlier criticisms.

Summary

In principle, ETE has the potential to provide the basis for the coherent phenomenological account of affectivity and emotion, which is the objective of this thesis. Sartre himself acknowledges (ETE p.123) that his theory of the emotions requires a preliminary description of affectivity. We will see that in IMG he does put forward an account of affectivity. Although there is much useful material in ETE, as shown below in the summaries of its contribution to the major themes defined at the end of the Introduction to the thesis, it is lacking in three important respects:

Firstly, not only does he not deal with basic affectivity, but at the same time the scope of emotional experience described is largely restricted to responses to situations of extreme difficulty.

Secondly, although a major purpose of his work is to show that emotion is not the incoherent disordered phenomenon, which it is commonly taken for, but has its own meaning (ETE, p.122) and structure, he still tends to see it as a degradation of consciousness (ETE,

pp.98,100, 107). He still tends to see the rational, which must necessarily be reflexive, as a *superior* form of consciousness.

Thirdly, and in a similar vein, he puts forward a theory of the magical function of emotion. I discuss this in detail below. This casts emotions, restricted in scope as detailed above, among other things as forms of escape from difficult situations. The magic theory is part of a theory of consciousness put forward by Sartre (ETE, p.114-5. For references in EN see footnote 29 on p.53 below), that there are two ways for consciousness to relate to the world. The world can appear as an organized complex of utensils or, alternatively, as completely non-utensile; in the latter case the world is present to consciousness without distance and can be modified by it absolutely and massively. According to Sartre, 'Cet aspect du monde est entièrement cohérent, c'est le monde magique' (ETE, p.115). This theory of consciousness appears to be an invention of Sartre's, in which he provocatively applies the category of magic, in contradiction to generally accepted theories of magical thinking, to what are quite normal, everyday conscious experiences.

Magic

As discussed above, the role of magic is central to the theory of emotion put forward in ETE, so this seems a suitable point to examine in more detail Sartre's use of the concept, before I move on to a more general summary of the treatment of emotion in the two early works. As part of this examination, I will also review the use of magic in I and EN.

1) *TE* and *ETE*

Sartre brings up the idea of magic and a magical relationship in relation to emotion for the first time in TE (see pp.27-8 above). Thus at TE, p.51, we are told that the relationship of hatred to the "Erlebnis" of repulsion is 'pas logique', but is 'assurément' magical.

Magic is central to the theory of emotion put forward in ETE. There are numerous references to magic in the text, as detailed above (passim). After the introduction and the discussion of other theories, he eventually gives his definition of emotion (ETE 79). It is a transformation of the world. When things become too difficult, we try to change the world, that is to say, to live it as if the relation between things and their potential was not determined, but governed by magic. There is a clear echo here of the 'pas logique', used to describe the relationship between the feeling of repulsion and the state of hatred in TE (see above). The examples of this which he gives are fear and passive and active sadness or depression. He also mentions anger (ETE 89). The idea of transformation might work for these particular emotions, which

could be classed as strong, negative and responses to difficulties, but do they work for positive emotions such as joy, satisfaction and contentment? Sartre never satisfactorily defines the scope of his investigation, what he means by emotion; we have to infer his scope from the examples which he gives and they narrow the normal concept of 'émotion' and restrict the application of any theory which he produces. To see what he means by emotion, we have to start with the metaphor which he gives, for our progress through the world, of a pin-ball game where we manoeuvre the ball down pre-set paths while trying to avoid holes placed on the paths. The holes represent the difficulty of the world. 'This world is *difficult.* This notion of difficulty is not a reflexive notion …. It is there, in the world, it is a quality of the world given to perception' (Mairet, p.63 modified: ETE, p.78). Sartre goes on to say that emotion, in his restricted and very particular sense, is a response to this difficulty, and that in emotion we replace the usual pragmatic, determinist potentialities of 'things' with magical ones (p.79).

It is worth emphasizing that he is *not* saying that emotion is magical. Rather it has a magical function, i.e. to transform the world (p.92).

What is both provocative and original in Sartre's use of magic is that he presents it as a *fact* of conscious operations. Magic in modern times in educated (and other) discourse tends to be used as a marker for the primitive, the non-civilized, by comparison with the rational and civilized or, less pejoratively, in anthropological descriptions of primitive cultures and mentalities[22]. Sartre on the other hand uses magic as a serious explanation for psychological universals.

Sarah Richmond (2011) examines possible sources for Sartre's concept of magic. She begins with the anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857-1939), who studied and wrote about mentalities in primitive societies, which he described as 'pre-logical'. Richmond suggests that Sartre's idea of the use of magic in emotional episodes shows the continuity of the 'pre-logical mentality' in civilised societies. She also references Bergson (1859 – 1941), who, in *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion,* like Sartre, insists, against Lévy-Bruhl, that 'primitive' mentality has not been superseded but remains a factor in civilized thinking (Richmond (2011), p.148). She quotes Bergson: 'Magic is then innate in man, being but the outward projection of a desire which fills the heart' (Bergson (1977), p.145). However she acknowledges that Bergson does *not* associate magic with emotion.

The third possible source mentioned by Richmond is the philosopher Alain (1868-1951), whom Sartre quotes in ETE (p.108). But again there is no evidence that Alain made any connection

[22] e.g. Lévy-Bruhl – see below.

between emotion and magic. The fourth source discussed by Richmond is Freud's *Totem and Taboo* (2013). Freud points out that magical thinking resembles the wish-fulfilling thinking that psychoanalysis attributes to infants and children (Richmond (2011), p.150). Limited in their ability to fulfil their desires in reality, they often engage in hallucinatory satisfaction of their wishes, to avoid unwelcome experiences. Primitive man does just this in his use of magic, although, as an adult, he has greater opportunity to use *actions* as well as thoughts. For Freud the overvaluation by primitive man and children of thinking involved in magic becomes a symptom of neurosis in modern adults[23].

It is true that Sartre's examples of emotion and his explanation of their intention significantly involve wish-fulfilment. But 1) can a general view of emotion be based on his examples? And 2) even in the examples which he gives, is that a satisfactory interpretation of the primary intention of the emotion? Fear and anger, for example, can be interpreted as transforming the world primarily in a useful way, by enhancing self-preservation and aggression. They therefore usually have a 'real' function.

So Sartre's theory of the magical function of emotion in TE and ETE is unsatisfactory because he has not satisfactorily defined emotion, nor established magic as a major component of emotional intentionality.

I suggest that there is an even more fundamental flaw in this theory. The so-called 'primitive' mind does not need magic to explain the everyday behaviours of affectivity, expressivity and intersubjectivity, which develop in the early months and years of life. Sartre is misapplying magic to categories of behaviour which may pose philosophical problems but are not mysterious, even to a child. Merleau-Ponty criticizes precisely this inclination in Chapter IV of SC:

> One can say, if you like, that the relation of the thing perceived to perception, or of the intention to the gestures which realize it, is a magical relation in naïve consciousness; but it would still be necessary to understand magical consciousness as it understands itself and not to reconstruct it from subsequent categories: the subject does not live in a world of states of consciousness or representations from which he would believe himself able to act on and know external things by a sort of miracle. He lives in a universe of

[23] e.g. the fear of neurotic patients that real harm will occur to themselves or others merely as a result of critical or hostile thoughts.

> experience, …, in a direct commerce with beings, things and his own body. (Fisher, p.189: SC, p.204)

This suggests that Sartre's magical theory is fundamentally 'unphenomenological'. Generally we take the affective life for granted, except in highly intellectualized reflection. Sartre effectively replaces the scientific explanation, which phenomenology aspires to contest, with the magical explanation, which 'naïve' consciousness is equally unaware of and has no idea that it needs. This theory also tends to close off any further examination. It seems in fact to be an attempt to explain the extreme reactions to which Sartre mainly restricts his examination in ETE.

2) *L'Imaginaire* and *EN*

Richmond (2011) continues on to consider the role of magic in *EN* (pp.156-9)[24]*.* However, to complete the picture of Sartre's use of the concept, it is also worth describing the reference to it in *L'Imaginaire.* This helps to show how widely he applied it. This arises at the beginning of the fourth part, 'La vie imaginaire', p.239.

> The act of imagination, …, is a magical act. It is an incantation destined to make the object of one's thought, the thing one desires, appear in such a way that one can take possession of it. There is always, in that act, something of the imperious and the infantile, a refusal to take account of distance and difficulties. Thus the very young child, from his bed, acts on the world by orders and prayers. Objects obey these orders of consciousness: they appear. (Webber, p.125: IMG, p.239)

In relation to EN*,* Richmond stresses the use of the concept of magic in a pejorative sense, to discredit the theories of those with whom Sartre disagrees, in particular Freud and experimental psychologists (Richmond (2011), pp.157-8). However, as described in Chapter 3 (see pp.94 and 99 above), he also repeats the theory put forward in ETE of emotion as a 'magical' behaviour, which aims to escape the stress of difficult situations (EN*,* p.489). His claims in this passage are quite as strong as anything in ETE and are explicitly related to the ontology of the later work. There is 'a magical stratum of the world'; '… the for-itself must as a free project of itself give to itself magical or rational existence' (Barnes, p.445: EN, pp.489-

[24] She also examines its use by Sartre in a magazine article from 1939, entitled 'Visages', where he emphasizes the magical power of 'le regard' (pp.155f).

90). Neither (the magical behaviour of emotion nor the rational behaviour of the will) are privileged as 'manières d'être'. In fact, far from the concept of magic being used primarily negatively, its use is commonplace in EN in descriptions of non-material relationships.[25]

So Sartre's view of magic as an essential component of existence is consistently present throughout all four of these works.

Major themes

Behaviour

The behavioural approach figures more as description than on a theoretical level. There are vivid descriptions of emotional behaviour, used to analyse or exemplify. Thus, in TE, he uses the example of pity (p.39f) to criticise those who hypothesise a further layer of thought or feeling behind the feeling. In ETE, he gives a lengthy analysis of the act of writing to describe 'le plan irréfléchi' (pp.73-76). Later he describes a catalogue of various emotions, passive and active fear, passive and active depression and joy, and their function, as he believes, of magically changing the world (pp.83-92).

Methodology

The main purpose of the Introduction to ETE is methodological, to explain how the meaning of emotion is to be explored. Sartre begins by criticising psychology for being exclusively concerned with the collection of facts, without having any concept of man, the psyche, the world or existence (ETE 8ff); since the full anthropology which is phenomenology's ultimate goal has not yet been completed, phenomenological psychology will focus, not on the collection of *facts,* as practised by experimental and introspective psychology, but on the interrogation of psychic phenomena in so far as they are 'significations' (ETE 28).

[25] In passages examined in Chapter 3, see, for example, EN, pp.377-8, where he stresses 'la cohésion magique du psychique' and p.391, 'le corps pour autrui est l'objet magique par excellence'.

Meaning

Sartre stresses the importance of the meaning of emotion in the Introduction. 'To the phenomenologist, …, every human fact is of its essence significant. If you deprive it of its significance you rob it of its nature as a human fact. The task of the phenomenologist will therefore be to study the significance of emotion' (Mairet, p.27 modified: ETE pp.24-5). What is this, what is the 'signifié ? The phenomenologist knows from the start what it is (p.26):

> … emotion signifies *in its own way* the whole of consciousness, or, if we place ourselves on the existential plane, of human reality …. It expresses under a defined aspect the synthetic totality of human existence in its integrity …. It is that human reality realizing itself in the form "emotion". (Mairet, pp.27-28 modified: ETE, p.26)

The *signification* of emotion and the centrality of *meaning* is further examined in the context of his review of psychoanalysis (pp.35-7 above and see below).

The need for the empirical method

He returns to the question of method in the Conclusion of ETE (pp.47f. above). His main conclusions are as follows:

To formulate a satisfactory theory of emotion, we first need a phenomenological description of affectivity.

If the hypothesis is correct that a purely phenomenological approach can prove that emotion is an essential realisation of human reality in so far as it consists of affect (ETE 124), why do we need an empirical psychological approach to the particular phenomena of emotion? Because, says Sartre (ibid), the latter is needed to deal with the *facticity* of human existence, to show that human reality must necessarily manifest itself in such and such an emotion and not another. This will require 'un recours réglé à l'empirie' (ibid 124), in the light of the essence of human reality established by the eidetic reduction.

Phenomenal qualities of emotion

La Transcendance de l'Ego

The phenomenological characteristics of emotion are clearly described - intentionality, the transcendant nature of feeling in projecting and grasping the quality of the object, the spontaneity of affectivity, and what Le Bon calls, 'la priorité ontologique de l'irréfléchi'.

Esquisse

Emotion is primarily unreflected, 'irréfléchi'. As in TE, Sartre firmly rejects any idea of 'un état de conscience' as an original experience of emotion (ETE 69-70). While acknowledging that emotion is set off by a perception or representation of some kind, psychologists have treated emotions as self-developing phenomena. But for Sartre emotional consciousness always has an object (p.71).

In the course of his lengthy description and explanation of writing as an example of action 'sur le plan irréfléchi' (ETE, pp.73 – 78 & p.40 above), Sartre is careful to make it clear that unreflective behaviour is not unconscious behaviour. This reinforces his rejection of the Freudian model (see below and Chapter 6). So he wants to show action on the unreflective, spontaneous level (pp.73 and 77 – see p.40 above); but this does not make it *unconscious* behaviour, rather he defines it as behaviour conscious of itself *non-thetically* (p.77).

When he comes to examine the nature of emotion (92ff), he strikingly states that true emotion is accompanied by belief (p.96). This idea of emotion as accompanied by belief, with belief an intrinsic aspect of its essence, captures well the authenticity of emotion for the subject as compared with the rationality of opinions or ideas. Sartre also connects the physiology of emotion with the intensity of this belief (p.96 - see p.42 above).

<u>The qualities of objects</u>

These are central to Sartre's account of the *nature* of emotion (ETE, pp.92-116). This centrality is easy to overlook behind the foregrounding of his theory of the magical function of emotion and a magical world and his concentration on the horrible as his prime example. But if we strip those out, we find a vivid account of emotion as a transcendent form of consciousness in which we grasp the qualities of objects and the world (pp.101-106). Emotional consciousness is captive, captive of itself. It may be spontaneous but it is not free to deny the very thing in which it is absorbed.

> It is of the essence of consciousness to transcend itself, and it is therefore impossible for it to withdraw within itself and to doubt whether it is outside in the object. It *knows* itself only in the world … they (the objects) … are captivating, imprisoning it, they have taken possession of … consciousness. Liberation can come only from a purifying reflection or from the total disappearance of the emotional situation'.
>
> (Mairet pp.80f. modified, ETE p.102f.)

Pursuing his example of the horrible, he concludes, 'Thus through the emotion, an overwhelming and definitive quality of the thing appears to us' (Mairet p.8 modified, ETE p.104). The horrible is not only the present state of the thing, it extends over the whole future, it is a revelation of the meaning of the world. 'We live emotively a quality which penetrates us, which we suffer … it is not a banal episode of our daily life, it is an intuition of the absolute' (own translation, ETE p.105).

The physiology of emotion

The first reference to this is in the Introduction (ETE p.28). There Sartre downplays its significance. While acknowledging the reality of the physiological manifestations of emotion, he states his belief that the 'phénomène corporel' is *not* an emotion and that the meaning of emotions must be sought in consciousness. '… a body cannot be emotional, not being able to attribute a meaning to its own manifestations[26]. Psychology will immediately look for something beyond the vascular or respiratory disturbances, this something beyond being the *meaning* of the joy or sadness' (Mairet, p.29: ibid).

Later, in putting forward his own theory, he returns to the role of the body and deals with it at some length (pp.96-100). The body plays *two* roles in the experience of emotion. On the one hand the body is the vehicle of emotional *behaviour* (as of all behaviour); on the other hand there are the physiological phenomena inherent in emotion, 'les troubles' (p.97), the trembling of fear, the icy hands of terror, etc. The behaviour and the 'troubles' coexist 'dans une forme synthétique totale' (ibid). So he defines emotion as:

> the behavior of a body which is in a specific state: … the emotion appears in a disordered body carrying on a specific kind of behavior …. without this disorder the behavior would be pure signification, affective form … *to believe* in magical behaviour one has to be in physical disorder. (Mairet, p.98 modified: ETE, pp.97-8)

Criticism of psychoanalysis

Sartre heavily criticizes psychoanalysis in ETE. The so-called classical theories have established that emotion has a functional signification, a finality and a purpose. This purposiveness is inherent to its structure. In fact he agrees with psychoanalysis as to the

[26] Making clear his opposition to the Jamesian theory (See pp.34 above).

centrality of meaning. His disagreement is over the role of consciousness. Psychoanalysis is based on the theory that conscious states have a significance other than themselves; conscious thoughts and feelings are interpreted as caused by and as symbols of unconscious drives; consciousness is 'un phénomène secondaire et passif' (p.63), with 'real' meaning in the unconscious. For Sartre meaning, even if not perfectly explicit, is an aspect of the very structure of consciousness – 'Consciousness is itself the *fact,* the *signification* and the *signified*' (Mairet, p.53 modified: ETE, p.64). For Sartre the psychoanalytic view is fundamentally incompatible with the Cartesian cogito, in accordance with which consciousness is the essence of existence.

CHAPTER 2 L'IMAGINAIRE

Introduction

Although the subject of *L'Imaginaire* (1940) is self-evidently not primarily emotion or affectivity, at various points Sartre describes their involvement in imagination and the image, and indeed gives a description of the nature of affectivity in general. This is a much 'tighter' work than *L'Esquisse*; there are not the same problems of scope and definition; the subject matter is clearly defined and it appears that Sartre has now satisfactorily arrived at the description of affectivity, which he concluded was lacking in the *Esquisse*[1]. Limited as it is by the focus on the imaginary, it could be seen as providing the clearest account of affectivity in the four works by Sartre which I am considering here.

Maurice Chevalier and the consciousness of imitiation

The first reference to affectivity comes in the first part, 'The Certain', when Sartre examines the structure of the consciousness of the image by looking at how imitation leads to the image of the imitated (IMG,pp.56-64). I stress that I am not seeking to develop a critique of his account of imagination and the image. My aim is to summarize what he has to say about affectivity in the course of it.

What interests him in this analysis of imitation and mimicry is how the viewer perceives someone who is clearly not the person imitated, in this case Maurice Chevalier, and yet comes to form an image of Maurice Chevalier. He calls this 'a hybrid state, neither completely perception nor completely image' (own translation: IMG, p.64). 'In the absence of a complete equivalence of the person imitated, I must realize in intuition a certain *expressive nature*, something like the essence of Chevalier as intuited' (own translation: IMG, p.61). Sartre proposes that it is the affective reaction that enables us to grasp 'la *nature expressive'* (pp.62-63). He states two principles:

'1. Every perception is accompanied by an affective reaction:

2. Every sentiment is a sentiment *of* something, that is to say, it targets its object in a certain way and projects onto it a certain quality' (own translation: IMG, p.62).

[1] 'the psychological theory of emotion supposes a preliminary description of affectivity' (own translation: ETE, p.123)

So when I see Maurice Chevalier I have an affective reaction, which projects onto his physiognomy 'une certain qualité indéfinissable', which we could call '"son sens"' (p.63), his "meaning". It is the affective meaning of the face of Chevalier which is going to appear on the face of the impersonator. What we see on the body of this person is a unified object in image, consisting of signs united by an affective meaning, i.e. 'la *nature expressive*' (of Chevalier). This is not the only instance, says Sartre (p.63), where affectivity substitutes itself for the strictly intuitive elements of perception to realize the object in image.

'L'affectivité'

The second significant treatment of affectivity appears in the second part, 'The probable', where after examining the role of knowledge in the formation of mental images, he devotes a whole chapter to the role of affectivity (pp.135-145). His basic approach is similar to the mimicry example above, in that he begins with some comments on affectivity in general, before showing its importance as a component of images. First he surveys the development of theories of affectivity. He criticizes French psychology for effectively being stuck in the late nineteenth century, and not having taken on board the phenomenological approaches of Brentano, Husserl and Scheler. It has not gone beyond the physiological or the subjective approach (p.135). 'Feeling is presented as a kind of purely subjective and ineffable shiver, … which remains enclosed within the subject who experiences it. Fundamentally it is indeed again simply becoming conscious of organic modifications … It is pure subjectivity, pure interiority (Webber, p.68 modified: IMG, p.136). From this comes the idea that 'l'affectivité' is 'a primitive stage of psychic development' (own translation), as if the world of things and other people do not yet exist. Yes, affective states are usually linked to representations, but mechanically, in the terms of associationist psychology. Feelings have no objects (ibid). He criticizes both psychology and literature for promoting 'a kind of solipsism of affectivity' (own translation). where the feeling is isolated from its meaning (IMG, pp.136-7).

He rejects the existence of *'états* affectifs' (affective states), which he analysed in TE, that is, 'inert contents which would be hauled along by the stream of consciousness and which would fix themselves sometimes, according to the chance of contiguities, on representations' (own translation: IMG,p.137). Reflexion does not give us affective *states,* but affective *consciousnesses*, joy, anguish etc. He repeats the second principle from the earlier passage, the intentional nature of feelings:

'… we must apply to them' (affective consciousnesses) 'the great law of consciousness: every consciousness is consciousness *of* something. In a word, feelings have special

intentionalities, they represent one way – among others – of *transcending oneself* (own translation: IMG, p.137). Hatred is hatred *of* someone, love is love *of* someone. He criticizes James for reducing affectivity to its physiological manifestations; he counters that there can be no affect without an intentional object of the affect (ibid). 'To hate Paul is to intend Paul as a transcendent object of a consciousness' (Webber, p.69). But neither must we commit the intellectualist error of believing that Paul is the object of an intellectual representation. Classical psychology proposes that feeling is merely a certain subjective tonality of consciousness. For Sartre this is to confuse reflective and unreflective consciousness (p.138). It appears like this to reflexion, which precisely gives us consciousness of the feeling. Here we get to the heart of Sartre's view of consciousness; hatred is not consciousness *of* hatred, it is consciousness *of* Paul as hateful. This goes further than just being a quality of the object. 'It would be more valid to say that' qualities 'consitute the meaning of the object, that they are its affective structure' (own translation). In one sense feeling is a kind of knowledge, but not an intellectual knowledge. It projects onto the object a certain tonality which we could call the affective meaning of its quality or qualities (p.139). He quotes from D H Lawrence, who he says, while appearing only to describe the form and colour of objects, excels at suggesting 'those imprecise ('sourdes') affective structures which constitute their deepest reality'.

Sartre then moves on to examine the importance of affectivity for the genesis and structure of the image (pp.139-145). Firstly he shows how the affect does not have to be tied to a representation (pp.139-141). For example one emotion can be provoked by another; a feeling may be awakened by a representation but it may not be directed at it; so I may see a place, which arouses my love for the person associated with the place, rather than for the place itself.

He then takes this further, using the example of what he describes as 'un cas limite' (p.140). He analyses a feeling, in his example provoked by the beautiful white hands of an absent person, but 'pure of all knowledge' (own translation), where hypothetically, 'Knowledge and sensible representations are lacking' (own translation). The details of the hands do not give themselves to consciousness 'in their representative aspect' (own translation: IMG, p.141) but rather 'as an undifferentiated mass resistant to all description' (own translation). And this 'affective mass' is *present* in a way not shared even by the most complete knowledge.

Now what if we also add desire to the feeling, but again 'pur de tout savoir' (ibid)? So, in this case, 'the *desire* is a blind effort to possess on the plane of representation what is already given to me on the affective plane …'. This gives us the same structure as the image: '… as in the case of the image a present synthesis functions as a substitute for an absent

representative synthesis' (own translation: IMG, p.142).

Sartre criticizes (ibid) a psychological theory which posits a feeling seeking out the appropriate image to express itself. This is guilty of 'l'illusion d'immanence', and is totally at odds with transcendent consciousness and affective intentionality (p.143). In fact the image is a sort of ideal for the relevant feeling, 'un état limite' (a limit state) for affective consciousness. If the image is the degraded state towards which knowledge descends, it also gives itself as the upper limit towards which affectivity tends, when it seeks to know itself.

The image is (generally) a synthesis of affectivity and knowledge (p.143). But this is not like a mixture of physical qualities, with on the one hand knowledge and on the other feelings. 'Consciousness is always transparent to itself; it must therefore be, at the same time, entirely knowledge and entirely affectivity' (own translation).

He goes back to the hands which sparked the affective reaction and then desire. Instead of a pure *affective* consciousness of them, let us posit a *cognitive-affective* consciousness. 'Quelque chose', something, is given as a transcendent in my consciousness. This 'something' is filled with an imaging knowledge that it is two hands (pp.143-4). I find myself in the attitude of quasi-observation; at the same time on the affective plane I feel the ineffable qualities of these hands. It is that which gives opacity to the empty knowledge of the imagined objects (p.144). At the same time I am aware that these hands have not yet come into existence. 'What I have in front of me is a substitute of these hands, concrete, complete but not sufficient to exist on its own' (own translation). This is the essential characteristic of the mental image: *it is a certain way that an object has of being absent within its very presence*.[2] For Sartre this cognitive-affective synthesis is the deep structure of the consciousness of image (p.144); he accepts that there may be image-consciousness which is more complex or where the affective element is almost excluded; but for him the source of the image must be sought in this structure (p.145), especially all those images aimed at the sensible qualities of objects, other than form and movement.

'La vie imaginaire – le réel et l'irréel'

The other lengthy passage in which affectivity is dealt with in some depth is in Chapter II of

[2] Translation taken from Webber, pp.72f.

the section entitled ‘La vie imaginaire’. This is entitled ‘Les conduites en face de l’irréel’ (‘Behaviour in the face of the unreal’). The first interesting point which he makes relevant to affectivity is that the evocation of images can provoke the same physical reactions as a direct stimulus (p.261). This will include the physiological changes associated with emotion – for instance, he cites the example of the thought of a disgusting object provoking nausea (ibid). Sartre analyzes what he calls, the ‘complete imaging attitude’ (own translation) into two layers, both of which almost always have an affective element:

1) The constitution of the image.

2) Reaction to the image.

Up to now he has only spoken about the first, that is, ‘real elements which, in consciousness, correspond exactly to the unreal object’ (of the image) (own translation: IMG, p.262). There are therefore ‘intentions, movements, knowledge, feelings which enter into composition to form the image’. But there are also ‘intentions, movements, feelings, knowledge which represent our reaction more or less spontaneous to the unreal’. But, says Sartre, ‘The first of these are not *free*’ (IMG, p.263): ‘they are subject to a controlling form, to a primary intention and are absorbed into the constitution of the unreal object, They are not targeted in themselves, do not in any way exist for themselves but through them, consciousness targets the object in its image’ (own translation). The reactive group are more independent, they develop freely but they do not confer new qualities on the object (own translation: ibid).

Clearly there are two different types of mental operation taking place. But it is interesting that he is distinguishing intentions, feelings etc. which are free and spontaneous from intentions, feelings etc. which by implication are not. The first operation, the formulation of the image, is more complex or potentially more complex; the essence of the second operation is that it is reactive, but is it necessarily freer and more spontaneous? There does appear to be an element of judgement and choice in the second; could he be referring to this by characterizing it as ‘free’? But it seems significant that he is distinguishing a type of mental operation where the action of consciousness, for example a feeling, has no autonomy, but is subject to ‘une forme directrice, … une intention première’.

Even more surprising is Sartre’s next observation. The physiological changes associated with emotion belong to the first operation, ‘the level … of constitution’ (own translation: IMG, p.63). This is because the image is not a simple content of consciousness among others, but is ‘une *forme psychique’* (pp.63-4), in the constitution of which the whole body collaborates. So,

although he yet again makes clear his rejection of the Jamesian theory of the primacy of the physiological in emotion, he also makes clear his acceptance of it as a component: 'In the same way, although a feeling may be quite something other than a simple physiological upset, there are no feelings without an amalgam of physical phenomena' (own translation: IMG, p.264). In the reaction to the image, on the other hand, we can mimic an emotional reaction, but in reality we have been little touched.

Although I can see that phenomenologically there is often a lessening in intensity between 1) and 2), I am not convinced that a physiological component to the reactive affect can be ruled out. For Sartre it follows from the distinction he makes between the 'réel' and the 'irréel'. Reaction to the formed image, 'l'objet irréel', cannot cause 'the real and perceptible movement of the dilation of the pupil of the eye' (p.262). On the other hand 'la conscience imageante réelle' can. He gives a fairly lengthy analysis of nauseous reactions to defend this (pp.265-6). He explains how it comes about that we are deluded into thinking that the nausea is reactive. If you feel very nauseous or actually vomit, firstly the consciousness of this will take over and secondly the constitution of the unreal object may have become a memory. Then we fall into 'the illusion of immanence' and the unreal object will appear in the consciousness of vomiting as the real author of this real vomiting; hence the illusion that the reaction to the image has caused the physiological phenomenon.[3]

Although Sartre stresses the 'weakness' of the image[4], he does believe that 'l'état imageant' ('the imaging state') has an effect on basic affectivity. It intensifies the pre-existing but low-burning desire, for example, so that it becomes a fully involving emotion with its physiological components; 'They (my hunger, my sexual desire, etc.) have become concentrated, made precise, and their intensity has been increased' (own translation: IMG, p.267). He then gives a phenomenological description in terms of intentionality of how desire is modified by 'le stade imageant'.

'Desire, disgust exist at first in the diffuse state, without precise intentionality' (IMG, p.267). He continues, 'By organizing itself with knowledge in a form of image, desire becomes precise and concentrated. Enlightened by knowledge, it projects its object outside of itself'; '… the

[3] As in other instances (see TE passim) Sartre uses illusion to explain an inconsistency between his psychological theory and intuitive experience. He is so concerned to establish a demarcation between the real and the unreal that I cannot help thinking that he underestimates the affective power of reactions to images. Consider, for example, the physical reactions to dreams or in PTSD.

[4] 'Certainly the unreal always receives and never gives. Certainly there is no means to give it the urgency, the demands, the difficulty of a real object' (own translation: IMG, pp.266-7).

affective state *as consciousness* could not exist without a transcendant correlative' (own translation: ibid). He then contrasts 'un corrélatif transcendant' which is 'real', a perception, with the 'unreal', the imaginary. It is worth quoting more or less in full what he says about feeling in the face of 'la chose réelle':

> … the thing sends back to it (the feeling) like a screen the light that it (the feeling) dispenses to it (the thing). And the feeling, by a game of back and forth, is even constantly enriched, at the same time that the object imbibes affective qualities. There follows, for the feeling, a particular depth and richness. The affective state … assimilates all the aspects of the object; … at every moment perception overflows it and sustains it and its density, its depth comes from its merging with the perceived object: each affective quality is so deeply incorporated into the object that it is impossible to distinguish what is felt and what is perceived. (Webber, p.139 modified: IMG, p.268)

One thinks of the different descriptions of Bouville in *La Nausée*, where the qualities of the town are transfigured by the emotional states of Roquentin.

In the constitution of 'l'objet irréel', the image, knowledge plays the role of perception (ibid). The mechanism of feeling is the same in responding to the unreal as to the real. But the unreal does not have the richness of perception. The affective state finds a thousand things in the objects which it perceives to enrich and deepen it (IMG,p.269). But, in face of the unreal, feeling can only be fed by its own reflection, as it were (p.268). Sartre picks out both positive and negative qualities in this (pp.269-70). On the one hand it has a sort of freedom, an autonomy: it determines itself. On the other hand it shares in the emptiness of the object which it addresses. And 'It lacks that element of passivity which creates the richness of the feelings which constitute the real' (own translation). But it is exhausting to keep in front of ourselves the character of an unreal object. There is a quality of nothingness ('néant) which characterizes the whole process.

He then makes a further but related distinction between reactions to the real and the unreal object (pp.270-1). He takes a book as the example of the real. He repeats how affectivity constitutes the qualities of the object. 'It is wholly penetrated by our affectivity and as such appears with this or that affective quality. These qualities enter into the constitution of the object perceived and, as such, cannot be detached or appear separately under the scrutiny of reflection' (own translation: IMG, p.270). There is also a behavioural aspect to our perception of the qualities of the real object and these can be distinguished by reflection. I pick the book

up or put it down, I don't like its cover, I make judgements of fact or value. These reactions do not constitute the object but rather indicate our orientation in respect to it. No doubt they may appear to unreflective consciousness as qualities of the object. But they can easily be detached by reflection to give themselves in and for themselves as judgements, feelings and volitions.

Although there may be similar behaviour in face of the unreal, we need to distinguish it from the simple development of the 'sentiment imageant' (p.271). He gives two examples of how this development works. A thought awakens my love for Annie; this love unites synthetically with knowledge (of Annie's face), passes through the imaging stage and gives birth to the 'visage irréel' ('unreal face') of Annie.

> … the image gives itself as the meaning, the theme, the pole of unification of spontaneous affective developments. No doubt these are blemished by an essential "void", no doubt they quickly exhaust themselves or change their nature if they do not feed themselves on a real object. But the whole process was free, unreflective, automatic … (own translation)

It is my love for Annie which makes her unreal face appear and not her unreal face which provokes my love.

On the other hand (IMG,pp.272-3), I might react to the image with a new feeling, a new judgement, 'the appearance of a new synthetic form' (own translation). Sartre gives a situation with three possible imaginary reactions. Yesterday a gesture of Annie provoked a strong feeling of tenderness in me. The reappearance of the tenderness could bring back 'irréellement' the gesture 'tout chargé d'affectivité' (p.272). I could also bring back 'irréellement' both the gesture and the tenderness, but charged with the aura of 'not being present'. On the other hand, I could reproduce the gesture to regenerate the tenderness, but in this case I am not aiming at yesterday's tenderness; I want to feel a real tenderness, present but analogous to yesterday's. What Sartre wants to bring out is the radical difference between what happened yesterday and today's attempt to recreate the feeling, which superficially appear to be the same (p.273). Yesterday the feeling of tenderness was completely unexpected but natural. Today on the other hand the feeling appears first as my aim. Reflective knowledge therefore comes before the feeling itself and the feeling is targeted in its reflective form. We know already the relationship of the object with the affective state and we make it appear in so far as it contains as one of its qualities the power to generate this surge of tenderness. Unlike the

original gesture, the power of the unreal object (the image) appears with the object, as one of its absolute qualities.

What is the purpose of this analysis? Sartre is showing the weakness, the fallibility of affective states which accompany the imaginary. In fact he wants to show that there is an illusion here, namely that emotion is causally linked with the imaginary. What he has shown so far is the mechanism by which the illusion is generated and operated. He goes on to show (pp.274ff.) that this illusion leads to a 'mauvause foi' ('bad faith'), which may be unwitting.

He begins the new paragraph on p.274, by stating categorically, '… we know that the unreal object cannot exercise causal action' (own translation). So how does it happen that we summon up the image to relive the emotion? Once the unreal object has been reproduced, it is *my* determination to be tender in response to it. I assert that the unreal object acts on me, whereas there cannot be a real action. In fact, I have to force myself to mime the action. 'My feeling, …, is wholly activity, wholly tension; it is acted rather than felt' (own translation: IMG, p.274). The tenderness remains cut off from the (unreal) object; reflection sees it as an effort to rejoin the unreal gesture which it cannot reach. Sartre gives the image of ballet dancers dancing around a statue (p.275). Whatever they do the statue is not affected; there is no real relation between it and the corps de ballet. He distinguishes between what he calls 'le sentiment-passion' and 'le sentiment-action'. 'Le sentiment-passion' is sustained by, fed by a real object; 'le sentiment-action' is self determined and lacks the richness of 'le sentiment-passion'. He expressly says that 'le sentiment-action' does not lack sincerity but the example which he gives to help us understand the difference does suggest an element of delusion in the feeling. He compares the difference between 'le sentiment-passion' and 'le sentiment-action' to that between the real pain of the cancer victim and the pain suffered by the neurotic who believes that he is suffering from cancer. None of the latter's behaviour is put on, strictly speaking. But nothing that he does can make it that he really suffers. The pain is no doubt there, but 'in image, inactive, …, unreal' (own translation: ibid). At the same time, he *knows* that he does not suffer (p.276). Whereas the real cancer sufferer will do everything to diminish the effects of his suffering, the neurotic uses all his energy to suffer more.

Sartre then gives a lengthy description of the difference between love in response to the real, i.e. the loved one present, and in response to the imaginary, the absent loved one (pp.276-280).

When Annie goes away, my knowledge of her qualities and my general behaviour remain the same. There are also some 'authentic' feelings, as Sartre describes them (p.276), generated

by my love and her absence; sadness, melancholy, despair even. But these are provoked more by the real and present void of my life than by the unreal and absent Annie. The positive aspect of my love on the other hand is profoundly changed. Annie in image is not comparable to Annie as perceived. Our feeling for each other has *stopped;* it cannot develop any further, its manifestations are exactly limited by the knowledge which we have of it (p.277). At the same time 'le sentiment s'est dégradé', for its richness, its inexhaustible depth came from the object. The feeling which at every moment went beyond itself was surrounded by a vast halo of possibilities. But these have disappeared just like the real object. Now it is the feeling which produces its object and not the other way round. Now it has 'une pauvreté profonde' (p.278) ('a profound impoverishment'). Gradually it becomes fixed in a rigid form; it becomes love in general; Annie is no longer there to confer on it that individuality which made it 'an irreducible consciousness'. 'Dry, scholastic, abstract, extended toward an unreal object which has itself lost its individuality, it evolves slowly towards the absolute void' (own translation). At the same time as it becomes impoverished and schematized this love becomes much *easier* (p.279). In every person whom we love there is an inexhaustible richness, an impenetrability which demands constant efforts. But the unreal object is never more than we know of it. And what we know soon becomes weakened and remains in suspense, 'if we cannot find an affective matter on which to focus' (own translation). In fact the unreal object will conform much more to our desires than Annie ever did. Her return will explode this whole formal construction. Eventually the degraded feeling will be replaced by the real feeling. We may even regret the amenability and simplicity of the imagined Annie. But that will be because we have forgotten 'l'appauvrissement affectif' ('the affective impoverishment'), which inevitably accompanied the image (p.280).

Sartre goes on from this to his conclusion that there are 'two irreducible classes of feelings: true feelings and *imaginary* feelings' (own translation). By the latter phrase he does not mean that the *feelings* are unreal, but that they only appear in face of unreal objects. He lists the essential characteristics of the second class; they are '*degraded,* impoverished, jerky, spasmodic, schematic' (own translation). and they need not-being to exist. He gives a further example (pp.280-1), the difference between hating someone in imagination and responding to their presence. 'Just now,' when the enemy was only imagined, 'the feeling alone gave the meaning of the image. The unreal was only there to allow the hatred to be objectified'. But now, when the enemy is present, 'the present overflows the feeling completely and the hatred remains in suspense, diverted' (own translation). He cites Proust as having shown the gulf between the imaginary and the real, and that the real is always accompanied by the

disintegration of the imaginary, ‘because the incompatibility comes from their nature and not from their content’ (own translation: IMG, pp.280-1).

He moves on to examine the effect on behaviour of this gulf (pp.281f.). ‘There is therefore a continual hiatus between the preparation of an action’ (in imagination) ‘and the action itself’ (in the real situation). He then applies this schematized dichotomy to personality: ‘So we should distinguish two distinct personalities in ourselves: the imaginary self with his tendencies and his desires – and the real self’ (own translation). There are imaginary sadists or masochists, people who are violent in imagination. At every moment ‘notre moi imaginaire’ explodes and disappears, to be replaced by ‘le moi réel’. Because the real and the imaginary cannot, *by essence,* (my italics) coexist. ‘It concerns two types of objects, feelings and behaviours which are entirely irreducible’ (own translation: IMG, p.282).

In the last paragraph of the chapter (pp.282-5), he goes even further and suggests that there are two categories of individuals, those who prefer an imaginary life and those who prefer a real life. He uses the schizophrenic as a type of the former. Again he expands on the contrast between the essential poverty of the imaginary and the inexhaustible richness of the real, although he does touch on the relationship between the two.

> … in fact, a desire is never granted to the letter … The object that I desired can well be given to me but it is on anther plane of existence to which I have to adapt myself … I wanted Annie to come: but the Annie which I wanted was only the correlative of my desire. Here she is but she completely overflows my desire, an entirely new apprenticeship is required. (Webber, p.147 modified: IMG, p.283)

He sums this up: ‘… the real is foreseen with the unreal, that is to say something whose richness is infinite, by means of schemas which are in their essence impoverished’ (own translation: IMG, footnote p.283). The feelings of the morbid dreamer are fixed; like an actor choosing his costumes, he/she can choose the feelings which he wants to put on and the objects which correspond to them. Only objects as images and their “essential impoverishment” can docilely satisfy our emotions, without ever surprising them, deceiving them or guiding them (p.284).

Conclusion

The ontological importance of the dichotomy between 'le réel' and 'l'irréel' is indicated and explored in the Conclusion, which builds upon but moves away from 'la psychologie phénoménologique' of the rest of the work. This is made clear at the start of the section:

'We can now pose the metaphysical question which has been … uncovered by these studies … what are the characteristics which can be attributed to consciousness from the fact that it is a consciousness which can *imagine*?' (own translation: IMG, p.343). Later in the section (p.355), he makes clear the central role which he sees for affectivity in the generation of the imaginary. He gives an example; 'the appearance of a dead friend as unreal occurs on the background of an affective apprehension of the real as *an empty world* from this point of view' (own translation).

It is not my intention to examine Sartre's ontological views in detail but his conclusion here explains why earlier he was so insistent on the dichotomy between 'le réel' and 'l'irréel'. The imagination is far from just being a particular characteristic of consciousness; it is an essential and transcendental condition of consciousness (p.361). It plays a fundamental role in the functioning of the freedom of consciousness and in the 'nothingness' of its structure. The world or more precisely our situation in the world carries in itself at every instant and from every point of view its possibility of negation by an image (p.356). At the same time an image can only ever appear '*on a backgound of the world*' (own translation) and in liaison with it. The unreal is produced outside the world by a consciousness which remains in the world and it is because he is transcendentally free that man imagines (p.358).

Summary

In this work we have a coherent account of affectivity. Sartre has apparently solved the methodological problem which he posed in the Conclusion of the *Esquisse* (ETE, p.123 and p.54 above) that we need a phenomenological description of affectivity, before we can formulate a satisfactory theory of emotion.

He first deals with affectivity in the passage when he uses the example of an impersonator to examine how we form an image of the imitated. He starts from two basic facts:

1) Every perception is accompanied by an affective reaction.

2) Every feeling is intentional, i.e. it is a feeling of something, that is, it is aimed at an object and projects a quality onto its object.

Our affective reaction enables us to grasp 'la nature expressive' of what we perceive.

The second significant treatment of affectivity is in the eponymous Section II in the second part (pp.135-145). Again he begins with an exposition of affectivity in general and then moves on to examine its importance for the image. He criticizes the purely subjective approach to affectivity, allied to and originating in physiological changes. He firmly rejects the existence of 'états affectifs' ('affective states'), which he examined in *TE* (pp.26-29 above) and gives a fuller account of the intentional nature of feelings. Feeling is a kind of knowledge of its object, but not an intellectual knowledge. The qualities felt constitute the meaning of the object, they are its affective structure. In a formulation which recalls the impersonator example, he declares that feeling projects onto the object a certain tonality which we could call the affective meaning of its qualities (IMG, pp.138-9).

After these general comments on affectivity, he moves on to consider the role of affectivity in the genesis and structure of the image. His view is that the deep structure of the consciousness of image is a cognitive-affective synthesis (p.144). Affect does not have to be tied to a representation (pp.139-141). But the image is a sort of ideal for the relevant feeling. The image generally represents a degraded form of knowledge; it is the affective element which gives opacity to the empty knowledge of imagined objects.

The third section in which affectivity is dealt with is Chapter II of the section entitled 'La vie imaginaire', entitled 'Les conduites en face de l'irréel'. Here there are interesting phenomenological and psychological descriptions of affectivity involved in the constitution of images and reaction to them. His main point here is that there is an affective distinction between 'le réel' and 'l'irréel'. He will show in the Conclusion to the work that this dichotomy is important for his ontological view. Our situation in the world carries in itself at every moment the possibility of being negated by an image. Every affective state as consciousness has to have 'un corrélatif transcendant' (p.267). The affectivity of perception is directed at the real, the affectivity of the image at the unreal. The affective response to the object perceived is inexhaustible, constantly enriched and enrichening. But the unreal object, the imagined, lacks this richness. The affective response only has the image to feed on.

He claims that the physiological components of emotion cannot arise in response to the 'irréel', i.e. in reaction to the image. They do arise as components of the perception of the 'réel', as

well as of the consciousness which forms the image, 'la conscience imageante réelle' (p.262). The *constitution* of the image, as distinct from the *reaction* to it, is 'une *forme psychique'* (pp.263-4), in which the whole body collaborates.

He concludes (p.280) that there are 'deux classes irréductibles de sentiments: les sentiments vrais et les sentiments *imaginaires'*. He does not mean that the feelings are imagined or unreal, but that they only appear in response to unreal objects. They are put to flight as soon as the real appears. They are '*dégradés*, pauvres, saccadés, spasmodiques'. …'[5].

[5] For translation see p.67.

CHAPTER 3 L'ÊTRE ET LE NÉANT

Introduction

There are numerous discussions of and references to affectivity and emotion in *L'Être et le Néant* (EN). I will not attempt to deal comprehensively with these but will concentrate on passages dealing with the structure of consciousness and affectivity, the role of affectivity in embodiment, and the meaning of affectivity and emotion in Sartrean ontology and psychology. In the latter, I will examine their relationship with freedom and the will, Sartre's existential psychoanalysis, and the importance of quality in our relation to objects, the world and being.

There are two areas in the work relating to emotion which I have not covered. The first is the topic of anguish. Anguish sits with nausea and shame as emotions given a special philosophical status by Sartre (and by other existentialist philosophers, as detailed in footnote 15 on p.83

I have considered nausea below (pp.83f.). Clearly all emotions may have or may come to have a metaphysical significance, but here my objective is to clarify the general experience of emotion and affectivity in the light of phenomenological psychology, and on that basis to remain detached on the question of the metaphysical meaning of any particular emotion.

The second area which I have not covered is that examined in the first two sections of Chapter III of Part Three of EN, attitudes towards the other, which can be summarized as love and hate. Again my comment above on anguish applies equally here and I have nothing to add to the extensive treatment of these sections elsewhere. Fell (1965) examines them in detail (pp.66-78); Gardner (2009) provides a brief outline (pp.181-2), concurring in describing the material as a metaphysical analysis (p.179). Other treatments can be found in Warnock (1965), pp.83-6, and Natanson (1951), pp.42-6.

The structure of consciousness and 'le manque'

I begin with Sartre's examination of 'L'Être-pour-soi' and the first chapter, 'Les structures immédiates du pour-soi' (EN, pp.109ff.). Here in the first section, 'La présence à soi', he looks closely at the operation of consciousness. As he says, what he is attempting is 'the description of non-thetic consciousness (of) self' (own translation: EN, p.110). The example which he uses is the operation of belief ('croyance') but this can be applied implicitly to other states of

consciousness, such as emotions, which he goes on to do[1]. He is looking at the being of consciousness. First he says that states or acts of consciousness cannot exist en-soi. The characteristics of the en-soi are an infinite compression, an infinite density to the point of identity; it is 'full of itself' (own translation: EN, p.110).

The characteristic of consciousness on the other hand is a decompression of being. Sartre gives a paradoxical description of belief and the consciousness of belief. The two terms are in a symbiotic relationship; they are equivalent yet different from each other. It is here that he explicitly links belief to the consciousness of emotional states (p.111):

> … belief, nor pleasure nor joy can exist *before* being conscious, consciousness is the measure of their being …. Thus consciousness (of) belief and belief are a single and identical being, of which the characteristic is absolute immanence. But as soon as we want to grasp this being, it slips between our fingers and we find ourselves in front of a rough sketch of duality, of a play of reflections, for consciousness is reflection; but precisely as reflection it is the reflecting and, if we try to grasp it as reflecting, it vanishes and we fall back on the reflection. (own translation: EN, pp.111-2)

Sartre's main purpose here, using this example, is ontological. He moves on to describe the characteristics of the pour-soi and concludes that there is always something separating the conscious state from itself and that this 'something' is 'le néant' (pp.112-5) ('nothingness'):

'Nothingness is the putting into question of being by being, that is to say precisely the consciousness or the for-itself …. Being in itself being isolated in its being by total positivity, no being can produce being and nothing can arrive at being, unless it is nothingness' (own translation: EN, p.115).

He moves on in the third section of the chapter, entitled 'Le pour-soi et l'être de la valeur', to examine the 'lack' ('le manque') which he contends is at the heart of human reality. First he looks at desire to show this – 'That human reality is lack, the experience of desire as a fact of human existence would be sufficient to prove it' (own translation: EN, p.123). He also refers to hunger and thirst. It is easy to show (pp.123-4) that these three by definition need 'une transcendence extérieure' to constitute the mental state that they are, 'a lack tied to what defines its lack' (own translation: EN, p.126). But do these examples *prove* that human reality is a 'lack'? He needs to show that all conscious states are 'un manque'. Let us take more positive emotions, joy, satisfaction, pride; there is an intentional object, what you take joy,

[1] In ETE, Sartre states that true emotion is accompanied by belief (ETE, p.96).

satisfaction or pride in, but in what sense are they a lack? Rather they are felt not as a lack, but as a consuming presence or possession.

Gardner (2009) summarizes the metaphysical basis of desire and 'lack' in this conception:

> Desire (according to Sartre) exhibits a deep structure which commonsense psychology does not recognize … Sartre regards desire … even in its most 'rudimentary' pre-reflective forms, … as conditioned and made possible by the structure of metaphysical lack, …. The richness and complexity of what it means for a human subject to desire, and for its desire 'to be satisfied', requires … a metaphysical account from which it follows that thirst 'as an organic phenomenon, as a "physiological" need of water, does not exist. (BN, p.87)[2]

Sartre gives another illustration of 'manque' in the course of the development of his argument in this section (pp.127-9). This is the contention that every emotion is experienced as lacking the full normative emotion to which we aspire and which we express in our ideas and language.

> A feeling is … feeling in the presence of a norm, that is to say, of a feeling of the same type but which would be what it is. This norm or totality of the affective self is directly present as a lack suffered at the very heart of suffering. We suffer and we suffer from not suffering enough. The suffering of which we *speak* is never fully that which we feel. (own translation: EN, p.127)

He then eloquently expands on the experience of the difference between suffering 'en-soi' and our own suffering (pp.127-9). In the terms used earlier it is the difference between suffering and the consciousness of suffering, between the en-soi and the pour-soi, which is 'haunted' by the en-soi (p.128). But he is describing more than an ontological 'difference' here. He describes a lack, a *gap* between a feeling and its norm: 'on souffre de ne pas souffrir assez', '… it can only *be* suffering as consciousness (of) *not being sufficiently* suffering in the presence of this plenary and absent suffering' (own translation: EN, p.129). He uses the language of play-acting, role playing to describe the experience of feeling.

'… I find only *myself*, myself who complains, myself who groans, myself who, to make real this suffering which I am, must play-act suffering without respite' (own translation: EN, p.128).

Does this give a valid account of all feeling? There can be an element of play-acting in emotional experience and expression. Sartre speaks of a norm 'ou totalité du soi affectif' present as a lack; but is it always? What if someone suddenly loses their temper or is afflicted

[2] Gardner (2009), pp.119-120.

with a general feeling of melancholy[3]? Is there necessarily a lack or gap in the emotional experience? Sartre uses the notion of norm here. There are clearly cultural norms of emotional expression, e.g. different ways of expressing grief. There are also universal and possibly cultural norms of feelings in specific situations, which if they are not met may cause distress and dismay to the feeler and may even excite disapproval in others present if the discrepancy is perceived or expressed; we are expected to feel sad if a close relative dies and joyful if we succeed but what we feel may fall short or be different. But we do feel *something,* even if it is abnormal by some criterion, so what is the lack or gap in that feeling?

To explain this lack, Sartre repeats the definition/description of the difference between the pour-soi and the en-soi:

'My suffering suffers from being what it is not, from not being what it is; at the moment of rejoining itself, it slips away, separated from it by nothing, by this nothingness of which it is itself the foundation' (own translation: EN, p.128).

But it seems to me that the gap between the norm and actual emotion is *not* rien, a néant. Is he not here (falsely) identifying a psychological, behavioural phenomenon with his ontology? The question which I am raising here seems to me to be one of authenticity. According to Sartre, the *moi* can only play the role of suffering ('jouer sans répit la comédie de souffrir', p.128) because all it (I) can do is aspire to the 'en-soi' of suffering. My objection is that he uses metaphors and adjectives here to describe the 'in-itself', 'norm', 'statue', 'play-acting', 'suffering immobile and silent' (own translation: EN, pp.128-9), by which he creates a gap between the actual experience of feeling and the idea of a fully authentic feeling, which may sometimes occur, but generally sells the experience short. He distorts experience to fit his ontology.

'La valeur'

Sartre examines the role of 'valeur' in his ontology on pp.129-132. Since the value of objects encountered is fundamental to the affective response, it seems worthwhile to examine their ontological structure. Initially Sartre deals with the being of value as an 'existant normatif' (p.129). Paradoxically from one point of view this is beyond being. On the other hand, 'human reality is that by which value arrives in the world' (own translation: ibid). He refers to Scheler, who showed that we can attain to the intuition of values from concrete examples, i.e. nobility from noble acts. Value 'is as the meaning and beyond of all surpassing; it is as the absent in-

[3] Clearly melancholy has a cultural history but I am less sure about anger. This tends to support the classification approach to the subject, i.e. treating each emotion as individual in its genesis and operation, e.g. Descartes, *Les Passions de l'Âme*.

itself which haunts being-for-itself'[4]. It is consubstantial with the pour-soi; human reality in the broad sense envelops le pour-soi and value (p.131). For the value to actually become a specific object, the pour-soi which it haunts must show itself in reflection. Reflexive consciousness posits the lived experience which is reflected on in its nature of lack ('manque') and at the same time unblocks value as the out-of-reach meaning of what is lacked (ibid). But this does not mean that reflection is the only thing which can make value appear. The object of intuition, as a transcendent phenomenon of human reality, gives itself immediately with its value.

'Le manque' (cont.)

He gives a clearer and more credible ontological account of the 'manque', when he returns to it in the chapter on 'La transcendance'. He also links it specifically to affectivity (p.235). Here he explains how the 'néant' leads to action.

> The for-itself can only be lack *here* if it is suppression of lack over there; … It is that original relation which then allows us to judge empirically particular lacks as lacks *suffered* or *endured.* It (that relation) is the foundation, in general, of affectivity: it is also that which we will attempt to explain psychologically by installing in the psychic those idols and phantoms which are named *tendencies* or *appetites*. (own translation: EN, p.235)

Sartre rejects the conception of tendencies or appetites as immanent aspects of character. Psychology treats them as 'existants en soi' (ibid), whereas most of the time they are simply inactive and any unity they have is scattered across various encounters with the outside. They are in fact a projection into the en-soi of an immanent relation of the pour-soi to the soi. This relation is precisely the lack (le *manque).* It cannot be defined and known as such by unreflective consciousness, any more than it can be by impure reflection (the initial, spontaneous movement of reflection, which seeks to objectify the object of reflection into en-soi)[5], which understands it as a psychic object, i.e. a tendency or feeling ('sentiment').

Gardner (2009) summarizes the consequences of impure reflection in objectifying the ego and the emotional state, echoing Sartre's earlier work in TE.

[4] Barnes, p.93.

[5] See EN, p.195f. for the definition of impure reflection.

> What Sartre's analyses of pleasure, belief and desire bring to light is the elusive, complex character of the 'mineness' of my mental states, which … the psychological conception either overlooks or actively strips away from the mental in order that the human subject may be regarded as presenting *explananda* of the same kind as those presented by non-human empirical objects … (p.121)

In this conception, 'The mineness of the mental becomes accordingly a secondary, supplementary, inessential feature' (ibid).

'When the psychic has been unified on the model of a substance with properties, so that it exhibits "the cohesive unity of an organism" (Barnes, p.165), we have the entity which Sartre in TE called the ego but now calls "the Psyche". Sartre recapitulates his earlier analysis of it into states, qualities and acts (Barnes, pp.162-3)' (p.122)[6].

'Le corps'

I will examine this Chapter[7] in detail. It gives us an account of Sartre's view of the role of the body in experience, which necessarily includes specific references to affectivity and examples thereof,

He begins epistemologically in the introduction to the chapter. What interests him in 'The problem of the body and of its relations with consciousness' (own translation: EN, p.342) is not the body as a thing ('chose') but how it is *lived*. If we seek to connect our consciousness to our body by a series of reflections, this will not be my body as it is for me but my body as it is for others, in the middle of the world, such as it never appears to me. The order of our reflections must conform to the order of being. 'L'être-pour-soi' (Being-for-itself) is entirely body and entirely consciousness; it cannot be united to a body (p.344); in it the body is entirely "psychic". On the other hand, says Sartre, 'l'être-pour-autrui' (being-for-the-other) is entirely

[6] Sartre, however, rejects the idea that this makes the ego/Psyche an illusion, as I suggested in Chapter 1 (p.29) that he does in TE, although the rejection is itself somewhat slippery. '… Sartre grants that the Psyche cannot be considered an illusion, if only because it has 'intersubjective reality' (Barnes, p.158-9)'. He 'describes the Psyche's mode of existence as "virtual" but not abstract (idem, pp.161-3) … though in one sense "a phantom world", the Psyche also constitutes a "*real situation"* of the for-itself (idem, p.170)' (Gardner (2009), p.122).

[7] EN, pp.342-400.

body; there is nothing *behind* the body; there are no "psychic phenomena" to unite to the body (pp.344-5)[8].

In the first section of the chapter, he proceeds to analyze 'Le corps comme être-pour-soi'. To summarize he identifies facticity as the major feature of the body in 'L'être-pour-soi'. The world appears to us as made up of and structured by objects, whose properties are 'potentialities, absences, instrumentalities' (Barnes, p.322: EN, p.362). He lays great stress on the usability of objects as fundamental to our engagement in being and it is through that and in that way that we become aware of and understand our bodies.

'Far from the body being *for us* first and uncovering things for us, it is things-instruments which, in their original appearance, indicate our body to us' (own translation: EN, p.365).

He then continues to the role of the body in action. The body is part of 'This given which I am' (p.366), moreover an ungraspable 'donné', 'for it is everywhere recovered and surpassed, utilized for my projects, assumed'. The body is

> a necessary condition of my action … Birth, past, contingency, …, factual condition of all possible action on the world: such is the *body,* such it is *for me.* Thus it is in no way a contingent addition to my soul, but on the contrary a permanent structure of my being and the permanent condition of possibility of my consciousness as consciousness *ot the* world and as transcendent project towards my future. (Barnes, p.327 modified: EN, p.367)

Sartre uses several formulations to describe the non-reflexive experience of the body (pp.368-370). '… the body could not be *for me* transcendant and known; spontaneous and unreflective consciousness is no longer consciousness *of the* body. It would rather be necessary to say, using the verb exist as a transitive, that it *exists its body*' (own translation: EN, p.369). He uses the image of the point of view to illustrate the relationship of the body both to objects and consciousness: I take a point of view on an object; the point of view on the point of view is my body. But unreflective consciousness has no point of view on that (ibid), there is no unreflective consciousness *of the* body. Rather '*my* body is a conscious structure of my consciousness' (own translation); it belongs therefore to the 'structures de la conscience non-thétique (de) soi'. He compares the consciousness of the body to the consciousness of the sign (p.370). The sign, which incidentally, he says, is one of the essential structures of the body, is never

[8] This seems to be contradicted by what he says in the following section about the expression of emotions (pp.386-7 and pp.84-5 below), when he describes 'attitudes signifiantes du corps' and the way that a gesture *is* anger.

grasped for itself[9], it is the signification, the meaning which matters. Presumably the essential structure which he is referring to is expressivity. Then he links the body to affectivity:

'Consciousness (of the) body … is non-thetic consciousness of the way in which it (consciousness) *is affected.* Consciousness of the body merges with original affectivity' (own translation: ibid).[10]

This leads into a lengthy discussion of types and aspects of affectivity. He starts by examining the affectivity 'revealed to us by introspection', which, I take it, is being distinguished from 'affectivité originelle'. Affectivity as revealed by introspection is already

> *constituted* affectivity; it is consciousness *of the* world. All hatred is hatred *of* someone, etc. … a transcendant "intention" directs itself towards the world and apprehends it as such. There is therefore already a surpassing, an internal negation; we are on the plane of transcendence and of choice. (Barnes, p.330 modified: EN, p.370)

This however is not what is meant by 'conscience (du) corps'.

In the next paragraph he describes another instance of affectivity which is not pure 'conscience (du) corps' (pp.370-1). He begins by discussing what are described as 'emotional abstracts'[11]. This is the idea that we can realize affectively in ourselves certain emotions without feeling them concretely, for example in sympathizing with another's suffering. What seems to bother him is that this is somewhere between pure knowledge and true affection (p.370). His interpretation is that these 'emotional abstracts' are empty intentions, pure projects of emotion. As he puts it, consciousness transcends itself but '*à vide*' (p.371) (in emptiness). The pain is there, objective and transcendant, but it lacks concrete existence. What separates it from 'real' feeling is the absence of the 'vécu' ('the lived). Sartre concludes: 'Thus there exist pure affective qualities which are overtaken and transcended by affective projects' (own translation). He identifies 'pure' affectivity with the phenomenon designated in psychology as coenesthesia[12]. His view is that this rarely appears without being overtaken towards the world

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[9] Except in sophisticated reflection.

[10] Sartre's account of 'l'affectivité originelle' reminds me of Heidegger's treatment of 'mood' as 'primordial' (see above, Introduction, pp.10-12). The disclosure of being by cognition falls well short by comparison. However there are significant differences between their two views. Heidegger lays no stress on the body as the contingency of consciousness, which is the basis of this whole passage. Sartre also believes that there are affective states, of which we may even be conscious, which have no intentionality. Heidegger is only concerned with 'mood' as disclosure of the world.

[11] Sartre does not like the term. He describes the appellation as 'impropre' (p.370).

[12] 'General awareness of one's own body', *Collins World English Dictionary* (online), http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/coenesthesia (accessed 24 June 2014)

by a transcendant project of the 'pour-soi'. Therefore it is difficult to study separately. He fixes on physical pain as the best example. 'It is therefore to this experience which we are going to address ourselves to fix conceptually the structures of the consciousness (of the) body' (own translation: EN, p.371).

This paragraph moves from the experience of sympathy to physical pain. To understand the direction here, it is helpful to summarize his classification of affectivity. On page 370 he refers to 'l'affectivité originelle', without, however, defining it. This is distinguished from 'l'affectivité *constituée*', which consists of a transcendant intention directed towards the world. Then on page 371 he distinguishes the latter from 'des qualités affectives pures', which are transcended by 'des projets affectifs'. He refers again to the purity of an experience when he discusses coenesthesia and physical pain. Although he picks physical pain as his illustrative example, I think, by 'l'affectivité originelle', he is also referring to quite 'low-level', non-intense affective states, mood, for example, or what may be described as character. Hence he refers to the 'texture' of consciousness:

> … for us … it is about the way in which consciousness *exists* its contingence; it is the very texture of consciousness in so far as it overtakes this texture towards its own possibilities, it is the manner in which consciousness *exists,* spontaneously and in the non-thetic mode, that which it constitutes thetically but implicitly as its point of view on the world. (own translation: EN, p.371)

What Sartre is addressing here are areas of even conscious experience which do not apparently fit in with his account of consciousness as a series of intentional acts constituting separate 'projets' and forming parts of an overall 'projet'. So, he needs to explain the structures of affective experience with no apparent intentionality, such as low-level mood and physical feelings. Part of the key to Sartre's view lies in the sentence: 'Consciousness of the body merges with original affectivity' (own translation: EN, p.370). To use the example from Scheler which he gives lower down on that page, my headache is 'l'affectivité originelle'. There is also an 'affectivité intentionnelle', the way in which I choose to endure the headache, how I valorize it. This is an 'acte pur et déjà projet' ('a pure act and already a project'. This, he says specifically is *not* 'conscience du corps'. Neither is 'l'affectivité originelle', although it gets confused with it).

'The general feeling of bodily existence arising from the sum of bodily sensations as distinct from the particular sensations themselves; the vital sense', *Oxford Dictionary of Psychology* (Third edition 2009), OUP.

So he has decided (p.371) to use the example of physical pain to arrive at the structures of bodily consciousness, which coincides with original affectivity. The example which he analyzes is that of my eyes hurting when I am reading (pp.371-3). His initial description and analysis of the experience of reading and the eyes hurting is typically acute and limpid (pp.371-2). Then on page 372 he analyzes how consciousness *exists* its pain. Pain, he says, presumably as original affectivity, is completely without intentionality. In terms of consciousness of the body, 'the pain is *precisely the eyes* in as much as consciousness "exists them"'. What kind of 'thing' is this pain? It exists 'nowhere among the actual objects of the universe. It is not to right or left of the book' (which I am reading) 'nor among the truths which are revealed via the book, nor is it in my body-as-object'. It is simply 'the translucid material of consciousness, its *being there*, its attachment to the world, in a word the particular contingency of the act of reading. It exists beyond all attention and all knowledge, since it infiltrates itself into every act of attention and of knowledge, since it is that very act, …' (own translation: EN, p.373).

But at the same time the *consciousness* of this pain is no different to any other 'Sartrean' consciousness. 'elle est dépassée'; it is 'négation interne du monde', but exists itself as 'arrachement à soi' ('wrenching away from self', Barnes, p.333).

'Pure pain, as simple lived experience, …, would be one of the species of indefinable and undescribable experiences, which are what they are. But the consciousness of pain is a project towards a later consciousness which would be free of all pain, etc.' (own translation: EN, p.373). But this does not make the pain a psychic object; it is

> a non-thetic project of the for-itself; we only apprehend it through the world, … Besides – and it is the characteristic of corporal existence – the ineffable which we wish to escape is refound at the heart of this very wrenching away, it is the latter which will constitute the conscious states which overtake it. Nowhere else will we touch more closely this negation of the in-itself by the for-itself and the regrasping of the for-itself by the in-itself which feeds this same negation. (own translation)

Sartre next analyzes the situation where I have a pain *not* 'caused' by the activity, e.g. a pain in my finger while I am reading (p.373), which it would be difficult to argue is a contingency of the act. Here he brings in the idea, examined in detail by Merleau-Ponty[13], of consciousness of the world '*comme fond'* (p.374) ('as background') to the activity to which I am attending. '… my reading is an act which implies in its very nature the existence of the world as a necessary background' (own translation), the individual features of the world are lost in the 'totalité

[13] 'la structure figure et fond', PP, p.117, and passim.

indifférenciée' of this 'background ('fond'). 'Thus my body does not stop *being existed* in its totality in so far as it is the total contingency of my consciousness. It (my body) is … the totality which I exist *affectively* in connection with the objective apprehension of the world' (own translation: EN, p.374). Just as a particular 'ceci' ('this') is picked out as form on the background of the world, consciousness exists a bodily form which stands out from the bodily whole which it exists. So in the case of reading it is the eyes, not the eyes as an organ of sense seen by the other, but as the context ('contexture') of my consciousness of seeing. It is a singular structure of the body on the background of the whole. The pain in my finger, on the other hand, is a subordinate structure which disappears into the background, unless it is exacerbated by a new organization of my body. In Sartre's view, it is neither absent nor unconscious, just part of the background. The world and the body are always present to consciousness, although in a different fashion (ibid).

In the next paragraph (pp.375-6), he analyzes the reflexive consciousness of pain[14]. The first movement of reflection is to transcend 'the pure conscious quality of pain towards an object-pain' (own translation: EN, p.375). This tends to make the pain into 'un objet psychique', which has all the characteristics of pain but is transcendant and passive. It has cohesion and its own temporality. It has its own past and future; reflection organizes 'le mal' ('the pain'):

'A pain which is experienced as shooting followed by respites is not grasped by reflection as simple alternating of painful consciousness and non-painful consciousness: for organizing reflection, the brief respites are part of the pain, just as the silences are part of a melody' (own translation: ibid).

And what about the body in this process (p.376)? For unreflective consciousness the pain *was* the body. For reflective consciousness 'le mal' is distinct from the body, but the body is still present to consciousness in another way. Sartre describes it as 'a pure noematic correlative of a reflective consciousness' (p.377) and calls it '*psychic body*' (own translation). This is not cognitive; 'It (reflection which seeks to grasp the consciousness of pain) is affectivity in its original revelation' (own translation). Cognition of the body, for him, is a function of the structures of the 'corps-pour-autrui' ('body-for-the-other'). This 'corps psychique' constitutes the implicit matter of all the phenomena of the psyche. Just as the original body is existed by each consciousness as its own contingence, so the psychic body is endured as the contingence of each affective state, of actions and qualities. This contingency of the body is

[14] This paragraph analyzes how we move from basic affects to 'states' of emotion, which was somewhat unclear in Sartre's earlier work. See for example the section on 'Les états' in *TE,* in Chapter 1 above.

like ‘an implicit space extending beneath the melodic span of the psychic’ (own translation). The body determines a ‘psychic space’ (p.378), which is without physical dimensions. Not that the psyche is united with a body, but:

> …beneath its melodic organization, the body is its substance and its perpetual condition of possibility. It is it (the body) which appears as soon as we *name* the psychic; it is it which is at the base of the metaphorical mechanism and chemistry which we use to class and explain the events of the psyche; it is it which we target and inform in the images (imaging consciousness) which we produce to target and present absent feelings; it is it, finally, which motivates and in some degree, justifies psychological theories like that of the unconscious, etc. (own translation: EN, p.378)

Sartre ends this section of the chapter with a description of his concept of ‘nausée’ (ibid). This is a kind of default affect which is experienced whenever consciousness does not ‘exist’ any precise feeling. Pleasure or pain are experienced on the background (‘fond’) of this. Consciousness never stops ‘having’ a body:

‘Coenesthenic affectivity is then a pure non-positional grasping of a contingency without colour, …. This perpetual grasping by my for-itself of a *dull* taste without distance …, is what we have described elsewhere under the name of *Nausea’* (own translation: EN p.378). He goes so far as to say that this is not a metaphor taken from physiological nausea, but rather that ‘toutes les nausées concrètes et empiriques’ (‘all concrete and empiric nauseas’) are derived from this feeling.

‘La nausée’ sits alongside anxiety and shame as a feeling given a special status and role in Sartrean existentialism.

What evidence is there that ‘une nausée discrète et insurmontable’ is a universal feeling? It is generally accepted that pleasure and pain are universal; even physical nausea in certain circumstances; but spiritual nausea? I do not question the power of the image of the feeling, either here or in Sartre’s novel, but the imaginary *power* does not turn it into a universal. One could *imagine* a possible response to ‘the pure apprehension of oneself as factual existence’ (own translation) as complete emptiness and indifference. Why is nausea more ‘natural’ or likely?[15]

[15] Fell (1965) only deals briefly with the philosophical meaning of nausea, but does examine Sartre’s treatment of anguish in EN in detail. He points out that anguish is also given a place of special importance by Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Freud. It is reflective (‘L’angoisse est donc la saisie réflexive de la liberté par elle-même’, EN, p.74). Fell raises the objection that anguish cannot be held an emotion of such importance because, as I say above about nausea, it is not universal and Sartre is unjustifiably generalizing from his own experience (Fell (1965) pp.62f). However he rejects this on the grounds that the philosopher is in a special position ‘to formulate explicitly what is only implicit in unreflective

Existentialism is here *valuing* certain emotions in developing its philosophical view[16].

The claim in the last sentence that spiritual nausea comes first and is the foundation of physical nausea seems dubious. Again Sartre is sublimating his own concept of nausea. Having spent the whole chapter explicating the structure of how we *experience* the body and *not* dealing with the physiological genesis of mind and its link to body, here he puts forward an interpretation that demands that those two issues be addressed for it to make sense. His rejection of 'nausée' as a metaphor taken *from* the physical on p.378 is in conflict with the fact that the language of emotion and feeling is saturated with physical metaphors; the origin of the word 'emotion' is precisely such a metaphor.

In the next section, Sartre looks at 'le corps-pour-autrui'. In the course of this he analyzes what is normally denoted as 'expression', although he thinks that this term is misleading (pp. 386-7). The body of the other is the same as the other-for-me. The only thing that exists for me is the body of the other, with its different meanings; being a body is an ontological modality strictly equivalent to 'the being for the other of the pour-soi' (p.386). Though he accepts that certain phenomena are hidden and have to be deciphered, he does not admit an 'au-delà du corps' (p.387) ('beyond the body'). He particularly refers to emotional manifestations or the phenomena usually described as expressive. These do not indicate a hidden affect, lived by some psychic entity:

'these frowns, this redness, etc., these furtive looks which seem at the same time nervous and threatening do not *express* anger, they *are* anger' (own translation)[17].

But in itself a clenched fist, for example, is nothing and signifies nothing. To signify and *be* anger it has to be considered in relation to the past and possibilities, and understood in the light of the synthetic totality 'corps en situation' ('the body in situation'). The 'psychic object', anger, is entirely handed over to perception, and is inconceivable outside of bodily structures. The body (with its manifestations) is the 'psychic object' *par excellence.* Perception of such objects is of a different type and structure to that of inanimate objects, because of their nature as 'transcendance-transcendée'. It is not necessary to resort to learned habit or reasoning by analogy to explain how we understand expressive behaviour. The body of the other, like the

experience' (p.63). This begs the question of whether it *is* implicit. Would it not be more accurate, if Sartre said, 'I feel such and such an emotion (anguish or nausea); on the basis of this, I have these insights into freedom and being', rather than universalizing *both* the feeling *and* the ontology.

[16] Morris (2008), pp.104f., makes the distinction between nausea at the empirical level and nausea as ontological (following Heidegger). She describes ontological nausea as referring to 'our implicit awareness of our own body-for-itself, *whether or not* that awareness is unpleasant'.

[17] Merleau-Ponty uses the same formulation in PP: see Chapter 5 below, p.184.

inanimate object, is given to us immediately as what the other *is*[18]*.* But, in the case of the psychic object, 'we grasp it as that which is perpetually overtaken towards an aim by each particular signification' (pp.387-8). '… these (expressive behaviours) deliver themselves to perception right from the start as comprehensible; their meaning constitutes part of their being as the colour of paper constitutes part of the being of paper' (own translation: EN, p.387).

Sartre ends the section by considering character, the liberty of the other and subjectivity (pp.388-391). His view is that character only has a distinct existence as an object of knowledge for the other. Consciousness has knowledge of its character only by adopting the point of view of the other in reflection. The pure introspective description of oneself does not reveal one's character (p.389). For the other however character (or temperament) is no different from any other object of perception; it is given immediately to intuition as a synthetic 'ensemble'. This doesn't mean that we can immediately describe the character:

'It will need time to make appear differentiated structures, to explain certain data which we immediately grasped affectively, to transform the global lack of distinctness which is the body of the other into an organized form' (own translation: EN, p.390).

We could be mistaken; we may want or need to interpret what we see. But this is only to organize the content of our first intuition. 'From the first encounter, … the other is presented entire and immediately, without veil or mystery' (own translation). Character is part of facticity, original contingency (p.391). In Sartre's ontology, the other is always free, in having the unconditional power to modify the situation. Character is thus always given to us as that which is overtaken ('le dépassé'). Irascibility is always promise of anger; to become angry is to overtake irascibility and to give it a meaning. But, in his view, this does not lead us to a subjectivity. The body is always 'a body-which-indicates-beyond-itself' (own translation), both in space to the situation and in time to the freedom-object ('liberté-objet'). For the other the body is the magical object par excellence. The body and the objectivity of the other are inseparable but not to be confused. The objectivity of the other is 'sa transcendence comme transcendée'; the body is the facticity of this transcendence. It never appears out of situation.

In the final section of the chapter on the body, Sartre expands his examination of what he calls its third ontological dimension. The three dimensions are as follows (p.392):

J'existe mon corps (I exist my body).

[18] Again the same formulation is used by Merleau-Ponty: see Chapter 5, p.172.

Mon corps est utilisé et connu par autrui (my body is used and known by the other).

J'existe pour moi comme connu par autrui à titre de corps (I exist for myself as known by the other in respect of my body).

The most interesting aspect of his analysis of the third one, in the context of consciousness and affectivity, is the quality of fleetingness, ineffability, ungraspability which he brings out. My body exists outside me as an 'en-soi' for the other in a dimension which *escapes* me (ibid). It is there not only as the point of view that I am but also as a point of view on which points of view are taken which I will never be able to take. The things which I perceive designate what 'I exist' subjectively (p.393). But as soon as I grasp ('saisis') the other perceiving my body with his, the 'vécu' designated becomes something designated *outside my subjectivity,* in the middle of a world which is not mine. My body is designated as alienated. He gives the example of shyness as an affective structure where alienation is experienced. The shy person has a vivid and constant self-consciousness about her body. She is said to be embarrassed by her own body. But in Sartre's ontology and psychology she cannot be embarrassed by her body as she exists it; rather it is her body for the other which must embarrass her. And the root of this embarrassment is that her body for the other is never present to her, it is ungraspable: '… it is in principle out of reach and all the acts which I undertake to take possession of it escape me …' (own translation: EN, p.394). In fact the shy person will often end up wanting to make herself invisible, to suppress her body-for-the-other. '… it is not his body-for-himself which he wishes to nullify, but this ungraspable dimension of the alienated body' (own translation).

In the next paragraph (pp.394-5), Sartre examines the question of how and in what form we 'know' our body and its structures. 'le corps existé' he says in brackets (p.394) 'est ineffable'. So we try to get round this by attributing to the 'corps-pour-l'autre' as much reality as to the 'corps-pour-nous'. In fact, he says, the 'corps-pour-l'autre' *is* the 'corps-pour-nous', but ungraspable and alienated. It then appears to us that the other accomplishes for us a function of which we are incapable and which nevertheless is incumbent[19] on us (ibid): '*to see us as we are'* (own translation). The means by which this is done is language:

> We resign ourselves to seeing ourselves with the eyes of the other; that means that we attempt to apprehend our being through the revelations of language. Thus there is a whole system of verbal correspondences by which we designate our body as it is for the other, in using these designations to name our body as it is for us. (own translation)

[19] Why is it incumbent on us? Presumably we are the agents of this 'incumbency'. I can see that we may *want, choose* to see ourselves as we are (particularly if we are engaged in philosophy and similar activities) but is it incumbent?

For this to happen, the body has to become an object for me (p.395). This can only happen through reflective consciousness, which alone has access to knowledge of facticity as a quasi-object. This access enables us to achieve 'the objectification of the psychic quasi-body' (own translation: ibid). Reflection grasps facticity (of consciousness) and overtakes it towards something unreal, which we have named 'psychic'. The quasi-object of the psychic body is then overtaken in its turn towards characteristics of being which cannot in principle be 'given' to me (directly), but simply signified (ibid). Thus Sartre makes this third ontological dimension of the body the key to the conceptualization and articulation of ontology itself. At the same time, it is also the key to the objectification of the body into the 'quasi-corps psychique', which makes psychology possible.

Elizabeth Behnke (2010) both criticizes the Sartrean viewpoint on the body and also suggests a more dynamic, less static conception of the body as evolving and changing in response to social and personal factors and experiences. She describes the Sartrean viewpoint as a body functioning anonymously, lived solely from its own viewpoint, 'which is one of self-effacement in favour of the project that the embodied experiencer … is engaged in' (p.235). She, on the other hand, favours

> placing in brackets the notion of a 'determinate' world (where, for instance, bodies simply 'are the way they are') in favour of a dynamic notion of bodily plasticity, …. I am leaving room for transformative somatic practice and other modalities of bodily re-education that can free the lived body from its current shaping and reshape it anew. (p.232)

It seems to me that Behnke's criticism applies equally to Merleau-Ponty's idea of existence having two forms, the personal and the impersonal or the general. The latter is generally identified with the organic and the body (see Chapters 4 and especially 5). Behnke wants the body to be seen as having a much more dynamic function, with its own socially conditioned characteristics, in place of which alternatives can be developed using its own expressive motility (an important concept in PP).

As an example, she analyses the startle pattern (or reflex, as it is usually interpreted). It can be taken as a 'natural', instinctual response, but it also carries cultural meanings. The startle response can become a sedimented style of embodiment. '… what stands in need of critique is the ongoing, pervasive, yet unnoticed self-shaping whereby one continually shrinks oneself into some version of the startle pattern' (p.244). '… one can readily make a general connection between the sunken body and the lived bodily experience of radical disempowerment' (ibid). Behnke's view is that we must realise that this shaping is not irreversible, but is an ongoing, dynamic process (p.245). 'The point is to retrieve our own ongoing self-shaping from

anonymity, and to take some measure of kinaesthetic self-responsibility for it' (ibid). This is crucial for achieving something like authentic embodiment.

'La liberté, la volonté, et les passions'

In the first chapter of the fourth part, 'Avoir, Faire et Être' ('Having, Doing and Being'), Sartre reflects on the relationship between freedom, the will and the passions. There is a common tendency to identify free acts with acts of the will (p.485), while explaining the passions as determined. This was precisely the position of Descartes – 'The Cartesian will is free, but there are "passions of the soul"' (own translation). Descartes gave a physiological explanation of these passions. Later this was turned into a purely psychological determinism. Sartre cites Proust as an example. On this view we would conceive man as free and determined at the same time. So what would be the relationship between unconditional liberty and the determined psychic processes? We would be led to distinguish three kinds of acts; those which are entirely free, determined processes over which free will has power, processes which escape human will by definition[20].

Sartre cannot accept the duality required by this. 'How to conceive, …, of a being which would be *one* and which, however, on the one hand, would constitute itself as a series of facts determined the one by the other … and, on the other hand, as a spontaneity determining itself to be and depending only on itself?' (own translation: EN, p.486). This is simply not consistent with his idea of the 'pour soi'. It is impossible for a determined process to act on a spontaneity, just as it is impossible for objects to act on consciousness. In Sartre's ontology, the will is 'necessarily negativity and the power of nihilation' (Barnes, p.442 modified: EN, p.487); in that case it is inconceivable that volitions could constitute 'trous de néantisation' ('holes of nihilation', Barnes, idem) in the otherwise dense and full web of the passions and of the παθος in general. Passion and pure and simple desire are also 'néantisants'[21].

[20] He refers to the Stoics on p.485 and their attempt to deal with this problem.

[21] 'Is not passion first a project and enterprise, does it not precisely posit a state of things as intolerable and is it not constrained by this fact to take some distance back from it and to nihilate it by isolating it and by considering it by the light of an end, that is to say, a non-being? … how can we refuse autonomy to the passions to grant it to the will?' (own translation: EN, p.487)

Sartre's intention is to show that will and passions have the same freedom. The will posits itself as a reflective decision in relation to certain ends. But it does not create these ends; it is rather a way of being in relation to them. Passion can implicitly posit the same ends, e.g. the value of life in a dangerous situation.

He concludes: 'Thus liberty, being treated as equivalent to my existence, is the foundation of the ends which I will attempt to attain, whether by the will or be the efforts of the passions' (own translation: EN, p.488). This does not mean that freedom is *prior* to the voluntary or the passionate act; it is a foundation ('un fondement') strictly contemporary with the will or the passion. Nor should we oppose freedom to the will or the passion like the "moi-profond" ("deep-self") of Bergson to the 'moi superficiel'. Sartre repeats his definition of the pour-soi:

> the for-itself is wholly selfness and cannot have a deep-self, unless by that is meant certain transcendant structures of the psyche. Freedom is nothing other than the *existence* of our will or of our passions, in so far as this existence is nihilation of facticity, that is to say that of a being who is his being in the mode of having to be it. (Barnes, p.444 modified)

He continues to compare the will and the passions. His primary aim is to establish the freedom of both. At the same time he cross-refers to the ETE and repeats material from it (p.489). The common view conceives moral life as a struggle between 'une volonté-chose' ('a will-thing) and 'des passions-substances' ('passion-substances'). This conceives the will as possessing permanence and the 'en-soi' existence of a property. He describes this as a 'psychological manicheism which is absolutely insupportable'. He compares the emotional reaction to a situation with the willed, rational reaction. His first comment is that emotion is not a physiological storm. This repeats his rejection in the ETE of the James-Lange theory, which would make the body's reactions the foundation of emotion. It is a response to a situation like any other act.

'… it is a response adapted to the situation; it is a behaviour of which the meaning and the form are the object of an intention of consciousness which aims to attain a particular end by particular means' (own translation: EN, p.489).

He repeats the theory which he put forward in the ETE of extreme emotion as a response whose aim is to escape from the stress of a disturbing situation by suppressing the consciousness of the stress. He also repeats the claim about emotion as functioning magically:

'It concerns therefore magical behaviours provoking symbolic assuaging of our desires and which reveal at the same time a magical layer of the world' (own translation).

Sartre contrasts ‘la conduite volontaire et rationnelle’ (voluntary and rational behaviour) with this ‘magical’ behaviour. The former will conceive the situation technically, will reject magic and will organize a system of means, basing itself on instrumental determinism. It will uncover ‘un monde technique’ (‘a technical world’), consisting of a network of complexes of utility (‘complexe-ustensile’). What will make me choose between the magical and the technical aspect of the world? The ‘pour-soi’, in its project, must choose to be one by whom the world reveals itself as magic or rational. ‘It must, as free project of itself, give itself magical existence or rational existence’ (own translation: EN, pp.489-90). The ‘pour-soi’ is responsible for the choice. In terms of freedom there is no difference between emotions and volitions. ‘There is not, as regards freedom, any privileged psychic phenomenon. All my “ways of being” manifest it equally since they are all ways of being my own nothingness’ (own translation: EN, p.490).

Sartre’s prime purpose in this section (and chapter) is to describe the operation of freedom. In the course of this he gives his theory of the psychology of the individual and also describes his psychological methodology, comparing it with that of classical psychoanalysis, showing its differences and similarities. He will expand on this in the next chapter in his outline of existential psychoanalysis and his analysis of quality, using the example of the ‘visqueux’ (‘the slimy’).

Sartre is basically arguing that the classical theory of the sentiments, which posits a conflict between the will and the passions (p.492) is wrong. To do this he analyzes the springs of decision, i.e. an act of will, which he identifies as ‘motifs et mobiles’ (p.490). ‘Motifs’ are the generally objective reasons for an act, usually the result of deliberation; ‘mobiles’ are the subjective motivations, ‘the totality of desires, emotions and passions which push me to accomplish a certain act’ (own translation: EN, p.491).

The psychologist views the motivation[22] as the affective content of a fact of consciousness in so far as this content determines another fact of consciousness or decision (p.494). Cause or motive[23] and motivation are correlative, exactly as the non-thetic consciousness (of) self is the ontological correlative of the thetic consciousness *of* the object (p.493). This, says Sartre, is a particular case of being-in-the-world. This can be described by three terms and their interrelationship – ‘motifs, mobiles, fins’. Being is pure project towards an end (‘fin’). This means that there is a certain objective structure of the world which deserves the name of cause[24]/motive (‘motif’) in the light of this end. The ‘pour-soi’ is consciousness of this motive.

[22] ‘mobile’

[23] ‘motif’’

[24] Barnes (1969) translates ‘motif’ as cause.

But this positional consciousness of the motive is on principle non-thetic consciousness of oneself as project towards an end. In this sense it is motivation ('mobile'), that is, it experiences itself non-thetically as 'a project more or less keen, more or less passionate towards an end' (Barnes, p.449)[25] at the very moment when it constitutes itself as a consciousness revealing the organization of the world into motives ('motifs') (ibid).

He now introduces (p.495) irreflexivity/reflexivity as distinguishing characteristics of motivation ('mobile') and motive ('motif'). The willed act distinguishes itself from non-willed spontaneity in that the latter is purely unreflected consciousness of motives via the pure and simple project of the act. The structure of the willed act, on the contrary, demands the appearance of a reflexive consciousness which grasps the motivation ('mobile') as a 'quasi—objet' or which even 'intends' it as a psychic object via reflexive consciousness. In terms of intentionality, his conclusion is that there is an intention deeper than that or those provided by reflection and the will (p.496). The will is not a privileged manifestation of freedom; it is a psychic event with its own structure, which is constituted on the same plan as other psychic events and just like them is supported by an original, ontological freedom (pp.496-7).

Sartre gives an example in order to describe the theoretical and actual factors in decision-making (pp.498-501). He imagines a situation (p.498); I go for a walk with some comrades. I gradually become tired over the course of several hours. Initially I keep going and then suddenly I let myself go, throw my bag down and lie down beside it. He sets out first to give a theoretical description of how the decision is made; however he will then see if concrete reality does not show itself as more complex and, without contradicting the results of the theoretical research, will lead us 'to enrich them and make them more flexible'[26].

He starts his analysis (ibid): 'Let us first note that the tiredness in itself could not provoke my decision' (own translation: EN, p.498). He then gives a phenomenological-psychological description of the experience of fatigue leading to the decision to give up. While he is right that the initial statement (that I was too tired to continue) is not strictly accurate, it does seem to represent a form of language which expresses the experience reasonably fully. Sartre's analysis of the experience is as follows (pp.498-9):

The fatigue is the way in which I exist my body. To start with it is not the object of a positional consciousness, but it is the very facticity of my consciousness. I walk through the countryside, the surrounding world reveals itself to me, it is that which is the object of my consciousness. At the same time I have a non-positional consciousness of my body – which controls my

[25] Barnes translates 'âpre' as 'keen'. But the word also has the implication of roughness, rawness.

[26] Barnes, p.454.

relations with the world and which signifies my engagement in the world – in the form of fatigue ('sous forme de fatigue'). 'Objectively and in correlation with this non-thetic consciousness, the roads reveal themselves as interminable, the slopes as *harder,* the sun as more fierce' (own translation). But I still do not *think* my fatigue, I do not grasp it as quasi-object of my reflection. But there comes a moment when I seek to consider it. I *suffer* it*,* that is to say, a reflexive consciousness directs itself on my fatigue to live it, to give it a value and a practical relationship to myself. It is only on this plane that it will appear to me as supportable or intolerable. It will never be this in itself; it is the 'pour-soi réflexif', which in arising suffers it as intolerable. Here we come to what Sartre calls the essential question (p.499); all other things being more or less equal, how come I and my comrades suffer differently from our fatigue? You might say that 'I am a softy', whereas they are not. But 'to be a softy' is not a fact, it is just a name given to the way in which I suffer my fatigue. If I want to understand under what conditions I can suffer a fatigue as intolerable, it is not sufficient to look at so-called factual data, which show themselves as being only a choice; we must try to examine this choice itself and see if it is not explained in the perspective of a broader choice in which it would be integrated as a secondary structure. Sartre gives a lengthy description of someone who by contrast '*aime* sa fatigue' ('loves his fatigue'). For this person,

> it appears to him in some way the privileged instrument for discovering the world which surrounds him, … the feeling of effort is for him that of fatigue overcome …. Thus the fatigue of my companion is lived in a broader project of confident abandonment to nature, of passion accepted so that it exists at the maximum, and at the same time of pleasant domination and appropriation. (own translation: EN, p.500).

So it is in the context of this project that his fatigue will have meaning.

But there is another layer of project and meaning on top of this. 'For they suppose precisely a particular relationship of my companion to his body, in one respect, and to things, in another' (own translation: ibid). Of course there are as many ways of existing one's body as there are 'pour-soi', even though there are also certain invariable original structures which constitute human reality in everyone. Sartre focuses on one of the ways as an example.

> … there is … a certain type of flight in face of facticity which consists precisely in abandoning oneself to this facticity, that is to say, in sum, to take it back up in confidence and to love it, to attempt to recuperate it. This original project of recuperation is therefore a certain choice which the for-itself makes of itself in the presence of the problem of being. (own translation)

This shows itself in ‘une valorisation singulière de la facticité’ (‘a singular valorization of facticity’) and is expressed notably by the thousands of behaviours described as self-abandonment. Their condition is an initial project of recuperation of the body, that is, an attempt at a solution of the problem of the absolute (the en-soi-pour-soi) (pp.500-1), the ultimate, never to be realized project of the Sartrean pour-soi. This initial form may be limited to a profound tolerance of facticity, for example, a blissful abandonment to a thousand carnal pleasures (p.501). But it may also be the case, as with my companion, that by means of the body and in compliance with the body the pour-soi seeks to recuperate the totality of the non-conscious,

> i.e. the whole universe in so far as it is the amalgam of material things. In this case the projected synthesis of the in-itself with the for-itself will be the synthesis quasi-pantheist of the totality of the in-itself with the for-itself which recuperates it. The body here is an instrument of the synthesis; it loses itself in the fatigue … so that this in-itself exists to the maximum. And as it is the body which the for-itself exists as its own, this passion of the body coincides for the for-itelf with the project of “making exist” the in-itself. (own translation: EN, p.501)

This attitude may show itself ‘par le sentiment obscur d’une sorte de mission’ (‘by the obscure feeling of a sort of mission’).

So to understand the way in which my companion *suffers* his fatigue we have to carry out a regressive analysis which leads us to an initial project. And, this time, is the project an *a priori*[27]? Sartre answers emphatically yes; ‘de regression en régression’ we have reached ‘the original relationship which the for-itself chooses with its facticity and with the world’ (own translation: ibid). And this relationship is nothing other than the ‘être–dans-le-monde’ (‘being-in-the-world) of the ‘pour-soi, in so far as the ‘être–dans-le-monde’ is choice. We have reached the ultimate ground.[28] We know this because it is ‘selbstständig’ (‘a priori’), which he compares to the initial postulate of Euclid. The validity of this method is doubtful for three reasons:

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[27] Sartre uses the German ‘selbstständig‘ (p.501).

[28] Phyllis Sutton Morris (1976), in the analytical tradition, uses the fundamental project to rescue Sartre from the charge of favouring irrationality:

‘The body-subject creates a self, a system of conscious relations to the world, by reference to a connecting link: the ideal self or fundamental project. In this sense, Sartre may be seen as providing a new interpretation of the ancient idea that man is distinguished from things in nature by his rationality’. Emotions are not ‘unintelligible responses. Rather, emotions are part of that total organization of responses to a world which is structured in the light of our fundamental project’ (p.107).

Morris also contests the idea that the fundamental project, as conceived by Sartre, represents ‘a dominant end which excludes all others’ (p.119). She cites evidence to support this in BN (pp.437 & 461). She concludes that the fundamental project appears to function as a top-priority end which ‘sets

1) Sartre is very confident of his method, emphasizing rhetorically its apparently self-evident validity[29]. The method is in fact circular. The final 'a priori' has already been established, i.e it will be the choice of the 'pour-soi' of its 'être dans le monde'. That is why the regressive method of analysis works. Indeed the method will always work because the ontological framework is already assumed.

2) The danger with such a method is that it tends to be reductionist. We regress to one foundational explanation, whereas an inductive approach is likely to rely on a variety of experiences and interpretations, which will provide some protection against reductionism.

3) How do we know if we have regressed far enough? If the 'projet' is chosen, why do we choose one project rather than another?[30]

I, on the other hand, he continues, distrust my body. My fatigue is 'un phénomène importun' that I want to get rid of, escape (p.502). It incarnates my body 'et ma contingence brute au milieu du monde' ('and my raw contingency in the middle of the world'), whereas my project is to preserve my body and my presence in the world by means of the looks of the other.[31]

Much of the rest of this section is methodological. As in the later section on 'La psychanalyse existentielle', he begins by emphasizing the underdevelopment of this method of analysis, while summarizing and valorizing its scope and efficacy.

> We do not hide how much the method of this analysis falls short … it involves unwrapping the meanings implied by an act – by *every* act – and passing from there to the richer and deeper meanings until we come to the meaning which implies no other meaning and refers only to itself. (own translation: EN, p.502)

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the stage for working out other purposes' (ibid). All of the other ends are connected and unified through this project.

This does not answer two major questions about the idea of the fundamental project: 1) how do we verify its existence and 2) even if we do accept its existence, how do we find out what it is?

[29] 'What appears evident … is that the way in which my companion *suffers* his fatigue demands necessarily to be understood a regressive analysis.' 'Certainly no interpretation can be attempted', 'it would implicitly suppose the adoption of this postulate' (own translation: EN, p.501).

[30] A further objection to the idea of the initial project, in terms of Sartre's ontology, is the question of whether it does not mitigate the fundamental freedom which Sartre postulates.

[31] Sartre appears not to deal with or consider issues here arising in respect of 'les regards de l'autre'. There could, for example, be an issue of shame here. One suffers and keeps going, one gives up. The question of the 'value' of actions seems to arise and to be dependent on 'le regard de l'autre', even if internalized. Sartre's confidence that he has reached the *a priori* of my action seems much less well-founded. Another aspect of the example is that the concept of abandonment could be applied to both behaviours in reponse to the fatigue (giving up *and* self-abandonment), whereas Sartre only applies it in relation to my companion (see p.500).

There is in fact a spontaneous understanding of 'Cette dialectique remontante' ('This dialectic in reverse') both as it applies to ourselves and others – 'A gesture refers to a "Weltanschauung" and we *feel* it' (own translation). The only school (of psychology) which uses the same *method* is the Freudian (ibid). For Freud, as for us, an act cannot stand on its own; it refers immediately 'à des structures plus profondes'. Like us, he refuses what Sartre calls, 'un déterminisme psychique horizontal', i.e. the interpretation of an action by the previous moment. The act is *symbolic*, it expresses ('traduire') a deeper desire, which itself can only be interpreted following an initial determination of the libido of the subject. But by this Freud sets up 'un déterminisme vertical', which starts from the subject's past. Affectivity is at the origin of the act in the form of psychophysiological tendencies. But this affectivity is originally a *tabula rasa* in each of us; external circumstances, the *history* of the subject will decide if a certain tendency will be fixed on a certain object. Of course, the symbolic act expresses an underlying, *contemporaneous* desire (p.503), but this desire manifests a deeper complex, which preexists its symbolic manifestation and has been constituted by the past. So the future dimension does not exist for psychoanalysis[32]; human reality is interpreted uniquely by a regression to the past from the present. At the same time the fundamental structures of the subject, which are signified by her actions, are not signified *for her,* but for an objective witness who uses discursive methods to explain their meanings. According to Freud, 'No preontological understanding of the meaning of his acts is granted to the subject' (own translation, EN p.503).

So we should accept the psychoanalytic method, in the sense that we look for the meaning of an action, however insignificant, not as the simple effect of the 'previous psychic state' in a linear determinism, 'but it (the action) is integrated … as a secondary structure in global structures, and in the end in the totality that I am' (own translation: EN, p.503). But our method is applied in the opposite direction to Freud's. Instead of understanding the phenomenon under consideration by reference to the past, we conceive of the act of comprehension as a return from the future to the present. He again stresses the distinction between my fatigue and the way in which I suffer it (pp.503-4).

To illustrate the difference between the direction of the psychoanalytic method and the existentialist, he gives an existentialist interpretation of the inferiority complex (p.504). The

[32] Is it reasonable to say that psychoanalysis has no future dimension? Firstly as a therapy its very purpose gives it a future dimension. Secondly, even if it is just regarded or used as a psychological theory, the very metaphor which Sartre uses of 'un déterminisme vertical' suggests an 'upwards' determined continuation coterminous with the existence of the individual psyche. Either the therapy is valid and successful, in which case there will be development and change, or the future will continue to be determined by the past.

Adlerian sees this complex as ‘une formation antérieure’. For the existentialist, on the other hand:

> … the inferiority complex … is a project of my own for-itself in the world in the presence of the other … it is always transcendence, … a way of choosing myself. This inferiority against which I struggle and yet which I know, I *chose* it right from the start; no doubt it is signified by my different “behaviours of failure”, but precisely it is nothing other than the organized totality of my behaviours of failure, as projected plan, as general framework of my being and each behaviour of failure is itself transcendence since each time I overtake the real towards my possibilities: … Thus the inferiority complex is a free and global project of myself, as inferior in front of the other, it is the way in which I choose to assume my being-for-the-other, … (own translation: EN, p.504)

We (existentialists) agree with the psychoanalysts that every human reaction is, *a priori*, comprehensible. But we disagree with them in their attempt to explain the reaction being considered by a previous reaction, which reintroduces the causal mechanism. Rather every action is comprehensible ‘comme projet de soi-même vers un possible’; in the first place it is comprehensible in that it offers a rational purpose which we can grasp straightaway, e.g. I put my bag on the ground – so that I can have a moment’s rest. Then it is comprehensible in that the possibility which it projects refers to other possibilities until we arrive at the ultimate possibility which I am.

Sartre’s overriding concern here is to define what he calls on p.506, ‘l’acte fondamental de liberté’ and to disprove the determinism which he accuses psychoanalysis of introducing by its emphasis on the causation of the past. But is psychoanalysis as far apart from Sartre’s existential psychology as he makes out? As I said in the footnote on the previous page, his assertion that psychoanalysis has no future dimension is dubious. The very basis of psychoanalysis implies that there may be ‘some room for manoeuvre’ and that there may be choice. Secondly is his existential description of ‘la totalité organisée de mes conduites d’échec, comme plan projeté, …’ so different from the idea of an inferiority complex? ‘I chose this inferiority from the start’ (‘l’origine’), he says (p.504). What is the origin, if not the circumstances which tended to create the complex, when I first made the choice?

Towards the end of the section, Sartre returns to this example (pp.516ff.). This is in the context of showing the relationship between the *will* and *le projet originel* and indeed the inefficacy of the will to modify, create, or alter the course of *le projet (*p.521*).* One implication of this, brought out explicitly by Sartre in this passage, is the primacy of the unreflected and the spontaneous over the reflexive. The will operates reflectively; it can make decisions which are in opposition

to the fundamental ends which the pour-soi has chosen, but it cannot fundamentally modify that project.

'Unreflective consciousness, being spontaneous project of itself towards its possibilities, can never deceive itself about itself … The reflective attitude, on the contrary, brings a thousand possibilities of error, …' (own translation: EN, p.516). For it aims to constitute 'de véritables objets psychiques' ('real psychic objects'), which are merely probable and may even be false. Thus I may use my will through reflection to reform my weakness (e.g. my feelings of inferiority) but this will only serve to displace the weakness. Another will grow in its place, which will express in its own way 'the all-inclusive end which I am pursuing' (own translation: ibid).

This 'choice of total ends', he continues, although it is totally free, is not necessarily or even frequently operated in joy. Rather it can be operated in resignation or malaise, in flight or in 'mauvaise foi' (pp.516-7) ('bad faith'). Sartre vividly describes the paradox and 'mauvaise foi' more or less inherent in the operation of the inferiority complex (pp.517-521). Lurking behind this analysis but not addressed in such detail is the question - why on earth would a subject *choose* the suffering described as the consequence and very content of failure? He addressed the ontology of the choice of inferiority earlier (see EN, p.504 considered on p.96 above). The essence of Sartre's view is that we are free to choose at every moment. We carry out the regressive analysis, which is his recommended method (see p.93f. above), and establish the fundamental project/choice of the pour soi, which in this example is inferiority. But have we regressed far enough in this analysis? The fact that we can choose one project or another does not exclude consideration of the availability of choices and the propensity to choose one available project rather than another. Adler, in this case, (and Freud in others), at least examines these issues. Sartre may disagree with the determinism of their interpretations but cannot reject the validity and usefulness of their method. Effectively Sartre's 'explanation' of choice and project regresses to his ontological schema of pour-soi, en-soi, être-pour-autrui and the world. But the operation of the schema begs the question of why it operates as it does in a particular case; successfully or not, Adler and Freud do attempt to answer this question.

In terms of the structure of behaviour and consciousness, Sartre makes four main points here (pp.518-9):

'Mauvaise foi' is integral to the inferiority complex. It is operated by the will.

'… it' (the will) 'flies from the recognition of the real ends chosen by spontaneous consciousness … it constitutes false psychic objects as *motives*' (own translation). The will decides to compensate or mask our inferiority.

He does not accept the fundamental recognition of inferiority as unconscious. It is so far from being unconscious that it even constitutes 'la mauvaise foi' of the will. 'Based on this, we do not establish between the two planes under consideration the difference between the unconscious and the conscious, but that which separates the unreflexive and fundamental consciousness from the reflective consciousness which is dependent on it' (own translation: EN, p.518).

He believes that the concept of 'mauvaise foi' should replace the concepts of the censor, repression and the unconscious, which Adler uses.

Sartre's conception is that, far from there being a dichotomy between conscious and unconscious (as in Freud and Adler's conceptions of behaviour and the mind) or between our 'fundamental project' and the 'mauvaise foi', which attempts to mask and compensate for our weakness, as described in his own psychology, there is a fundamental unity to consciousness (ibid). In relation to this example, he describes this as 'the profound unity of our fundamental project which is to choose ourselves as inferior' (own translation). He describes this unity in more detail:

> The unity of consciousness, as it reveals itself to the *cogito,* is too deep for us to accept this split into two planes without it being taken back by a deeper synthetic intention which brings one plane back to the other and unifies them … not only is the inferiority complex recognized, but this recognition is a *choice*; not only does the will seek to mask this inferiority by unstable and weak affirmations, but a deeper intention goes through it which *chooses* precisely the weakness and instability of these affirmations, with the intention of making more palpable this inferiority which we pretend to flee from … (own translation: EN, pp.518-9)

'La psychanalyse existentielle'

Sartre examines this in Chapter II of the fourth part. He begins by stating his ontological view:

'… human reality… is defined by the ends which it pursues' (own translation, EN, p.602).

He begins the section with a lengthy criticism of traditional descriptive and what he terms 'psychological' explanations of these ends. First he puts us on our guard against considering human desires as little psychic entities inhabiting consciousness and ignoring its structure of transcendence (p.602). Secondly he warns us against the kind of psychologizing which we all recognize, which analyzes character as a combination of typical and abstract desires but stops

there and inquires no further into the concrete genesis of these desires in the specific individual (pp.603-8). Rather, he claims:

> It involves on the contrary uncovering, under the partial and incomplete aspects of the subject, the true amalgamation which can only be the totality of his impetus towards being, his original relationship to himself, to the world and to the other, in the unity of *internal* relations and of a fundamental project. (own translation: EN, p.608)

So, instead of defining the individual personality as the sum of a set of general maxims, we will reveal it in its full richness 'dans le projet initial qui la constitue' ('in the initial project which constitutes it').

Now Sartre explains his idea of the 'meaning' of every action, of the totality of our behaviour, including the affective.

> … in every inclination, in every tendency, (the person) expresses himself in his entirety, even though under a different angle, … we have to discover in each tendency, in each behaviour of the subject, a meaning which transcends them. Such and such a jealousy, *dated* and singular, in which the subject historializes himself in relation to a certain woman, signifies, for whoever knows how to read it, the global relationship to the world by which the subject constitutes himself as a self. (own translation: EN, p.609)

The *empirical* attitude, i.e. the jealousy, is in itself the expression of the 'choice of an intelligible character'. But, he continues, it does not just signify the choice, it *is itself* the choice (ibid). We are not talking here about something going on in the unconscious or something noumenal which is then expressed in an observable action. It does not even have *ontological* precedence over the empirical choice; it is what must always come out of the empirical choice 'as its *beyond* and the infinity of its transcendance' (own translation). My concrete 'project', as totality of my being, expresses my original choice in particular circumstances. It requires a special method to bring out this fundamental meaning, which is nothing other than the individual secret of its (presumably the project's) being-in-the-world. This rather requires a *comparison* of the diverse empirical tendencies of a subject and not just a simple summation or recomposition (as in a descriptive psychological account).

He first unequivocally rejects the Hedeggerian criterion of a project as authentic or inauthentic, based on the attitude of the subject to his own death (pp.609-10). He dislikes the moral implication of the terminology (p.610) and he believes that our fundamental projects must be based on the primacy of the project of *living*, i.e. on an original choice of our being. There is a project more fundamental than the Heideggerian. The original project of a pour-soi *can only aim at its being*; in fact the project is not distinguished from the being of the pour-soi. 'The for-

itself is a being whose being is in question in its being in the form of its project of being' (own translation). The possible and value belong to the being of the pour-soi as follows:

The pour-soi is *lack of being*.

The possible belongs to the pour-soi as *that which is lacking to it*.

Value haunts the pour-soi as the totality of being *which is lacking*.

Between project of being, the possible, value and on the other hand *being,* there is no difference[33]. Man is fundamentally *desire of being*. He describes the connection between this ontological account and affective behaviour:

> … every empirical tendency is in a relationship of expression and of symbolic assuagement, as conscious tendencies, in Freud, in respect to complexes and the original libido. Besides it is not at all a case of desire of being existing *first* to then be expressed by desires *a posteriori;* but there is nothing outside the symbolic expression which is found in concrete desires. There is not first *one* desire of being and then a thousand particular feelings, but the desire to be exists and manifests itself only in and by jealousy, greed, the love of art, cowardice courage, the thousand contingent and empirical expressions which cause human reality only ever to appear to us as *manifested* by *such and such a man,* by a particular person. (own translation: EN, pp.610-11)[34]

Sartre continues by describing how 'désir d'être' in fact equates to 'désir d'être-en-soi', and also how this is compatible with freedom and its ability to choose its own possibilities (pp.611-3). He then moves on to the question of method: how can the fundamental 'désir d'être' of an individual person be discovered and defined? We can establish the basis by a phenomenological ontology but we cannot define *a priori* and ontologically what appears in all the unforeseeability of a free act (p.613). It is not sufficient simply to list behaviours and inclinations, we have to be able to decipher them, to know how to interrogate them. This can only be done following the rules of a specific method. It is this which we call existential psychoanalysis (p.614).

[33] See also section below (pp.106ff.) for Sartre's examination of quality as revelatory of being.

[34] Morris (2008) gives, as an example of a 'fundamental project', Sartre's commitment to being a writer (p.152), expressed in his autobiographical work, *Les Mots*. This is questionable for two reasons: firstly, although it is clearly an empirically observable manifestation of Sartre's fundamental project, does it get to the heart of that project even within the terms of Sartre's ontological psychology? Secondly, Sartre's commitment to writing is a very simple solution to the definition of the fundamental project. Even if it was a valid example, it is unlikely to be so straightforward in most cases (Morris does acknowledge this (ibid)). Among other things, Sartre was exceptionally privileged to be able to pursue his aim.

He starts with the principle of this method:

> The *principle* of this psychoanalysis is that man is a totality and not a collection: that, as a consequence, he expresses himself in his entirety in the most insignificant and the most superficial of his behaviours – in other words, that there is not a preference, a tic, a human act which is not revelatory (own translation: EN, p.614)

We can summarize the method according to Sartre as follows:

Purpose. 'The end purpose of psychoanalysis is to *decode* the empirical behaviours of man …'. This means 'fix them conceptually' (own translation).

Starting point: *'l'expérience'*.

Foundation (*'point d'appui'):* preontological and fundamental understanding which man has of the human person. Sartre's view is that every human being possesses *a priori* the *meaning* of the revelatory value of gestures and words and is capable of deciphering them, at least if he is guided by 'a helping hand'[35]. The truth here is not something encountered by chance, the uncovering of something completely unknown. 'It belongs *a priori* to human understanding and the essential work is hermeneutic, that is to say, a decoding, a fixing and a conceptualization' (own translation: EN, p.614).

Method: comparative. Each instance of human behaviour symbolizes the fundamental choice which we seek to uncover and it is by comparing these behaviours that we will bring to light what each expresses in a different way. The first 'sketch' of this method is provided by the psychoanalysis of Freud and his disciples.

Sartre then compares at length classic psychoanalysis and existential psychoanalysis (pp.615-620). He begins by examining how the latter is inspired by the former and their common approaches and then moves on to their differences. Both consider that all the objective manifestations of the 'psychic life' symbolize the fundamental and global structures of the individual person (p.615). Both, according to Sartre, consider that there are no initial givens – inherited inclinations, character, etc. Existential psychoanalysis recognizes nothing *before* the 'surgissement originel' ('original arising') of human freedom; original psychoanalysis[36] 'posits that the first affectivity of the individual is an unused piece of wax *before* his story' (own translation). This in fact seems potentially quite a big difference.

[35] Translation of 'par la main', Barnes, p.569.

[36] Sartre describes classic psychoanalysis as 'empirique' to distinguish it from the existential form, although the latter appears to be just as empirical, i.e. the importance of *situation,* the accent on the individual person.

Existential psychoanalysis therefore posits a complete 'blank slate', whereas empirical psychoanalysis assumes a kind of basic affectivity. The latter poses an immediate problem; does this mean that we all start with the same affective make-up, all at the same intensity for example?

Sartre continues with the comparison of empirical and existential psychoanalysis (EN, p.615). Both approaches consider the human being in his historialization and seek to reveal the meaning and direction of this history. Both consider the person in the world and that it is essential to take into account *situation* in revealing his being.

Classic psychoanalysis looks for the *complex*, existential psychoanalysis for '*le choix originel'*. Both the complex and this choice are prelogical; the latter, according to Sartre, 'bring together into a prelogical synthesis the totality of the existing' and is 'the centre of reference of an infinity of polyvalent meanings' (own translation: ibid).

Neither method believes that 'subjective' self-examination is the best approach (p.616). Both seek a strictly objective method, using data from reflection and external observation ('les témoignages d'autrui', 'the testimonies of the other'). 'Empirical' psychoanalysis starts from the postulate of the existence of an unconscious psychic dimension, which escapes in principle the intuition of the subject. Existential psychoanalysis on the other hand rejects the postulate of the unconscious: for it the psychic is coextensive with consciousness. But this does not mean that the 'projet fondamental' is *known* by the subject. In fact the two approaches are similar in this respect. He explains at length on p.616 that even reflection cannot isolate the 'projet'. Yes, there is a 'compréhension préontologique' of it, but self reflection does not have the tools or necessary techniques to fix the project conceptually. We are not talking here about the 'unsolved enigma' of the Freudians; in any case self-reflection is itself part of the project. It will simply provide raw material for the psychoanalyst. Here the bases of the two methods coincide; the complex and the project will both be grasped *from the point of view of the other,* even if the analyst and the analysand are one and the same (p.617). What can be grasped by these methods is 'l'être pour l'autre'. But they do not give access to 'the project as it is for itself, the complex in its own being. This project-for-itself can only be *enjoyed'* (own translation). On the other hand knowledge and understanding by the subject can help to enlighten self-reflection and that can then become an 'enjoyment' which will be, in a somewhat strange expression and concept, 'quasi-savoir' (ibid, 'quasi-knowledge'). What seems to be lacking in Sartre's formulation is an explanation of the purpose or purposes of psychoanalysis, whichever theory is adopted[37]. Freud and Binswanger were both therapeutic practitioners and

[37] Morris, K J (2008) and Gardner, S (2009) have different but overlapping takes on Sartre and therapy. Morris (2008) likens his philosophical method to Wittgenstein's (p.xii). Sartre is aiming to change the

certainly in classic psychoanalysis the 'quasi- savoir' of the subject plays an important role in the therapeutic outcome.

In the next paragraph (pp.617-8), Sartre spells out the fundamental difference between 'empirical' psychoanalysis and the existential variant. The result of the latter will be to define the fundamental 'choice' of the subject, which will always be individual and unique. Particular behaviour does not express or exemplify this choice; right from the start the choice is itself 'made concrete'[38]. The choice is nothing other than *the being* of each human reality. 'Empirical' analysis on the other hand always posits either the libido (Freud) or will to power (presumably a reference to individual psychology, founded by Adler) as the ultimate, irreducible psychobiological foundations of human existence, common to all men. Existential analysis will only admit them as representing the particular choices of certain individuals.

Sartre then details some specific ways in which the approaches differ (pp.618-9). Their impact on psychoanalytical method merely reflects the difference in their psychological and ontological theories. Existential psychoanalysis does not assume that the environment acts mechanically on the subject. 'From the start, the milieu conceived as situation refers back to the choices made by the for-itself, just as the for-itself refers back to the milieu through its being in the world' (own translation: EN, p.618). In fact, unlike the other methods, existential analysis does not accept any theory of mechanical causation (e.g. the Freudian theory of the energy of the libido). Nor does it accept any general interpretation of symbolization, as

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way we live, by ridding us of bad faith, prejudices and illusions. Phenomenology identifies a number of wide-ranging and pernicious intellectual prejudices which distort the description of familiar phenomena (p.42). Among others, Morris mentions 'the prejudice in favour of knowing over living' and 'the prejudice in favour of knowledge over the emotions' (pp.48 & 50). One consequence of these prejudices is the impoverishment of perceptual experience (pp.50f.). Morris suggests that 'Sartrean' and, more widely, phenomenological 'therapy' can help philosophers and psychologists to overcome their misdescription of lived experience (pp.51f). It may also help to combat these prejudices, which, she contends, are inherent in western technology oriented, science-worshipping society (p.56).

Gardner (2009) also describes 'philosophical therapy' as a Sartrean aim. However he links this to the deficiencies in commonsense psychology, highlighted in TE and followed up in BN. Philosophical misconceptions are 'of a piece' with these. Sartre's intention is to give a true articulation of human existence, which will lead to a revision of our fundamental orientations. Philosophy cannot abolish the deficiency in human life – lack is a fundamental phenomenon of life – but it can help us distinguish between 'metaphysically necessary' deficiencies and remediable forms of deficiency (pp.27-8).

Gardner explains the non-therapeutic nature of existential psychoanalysis ontologically. Sartre's conception may, in principle, allow the human subject to be made finally intelligible, but it provides a basis for biographical study, not therapeutic practice. In existential psychoanalysis, even when self-applied, the subject is apprehended '*from the point of view of the Other'*, thus as an '*object'* having 'objective existence rather than existence-for-itself (BN, p.571), and so not in the mode of freedom, as would be required for a modification of the subject's projects' (Gardner (2009) p.190).

[38] 'la concrétion absolue', p.617. '… the first point that needs to be understood about the existentialist concept of choice is that it is not an extra inner act but rather "a certain kind of *doing"'* (Olafson, 1967, p.163, quoted in Morris, P.S.,1976).

practised in Freudian theory. Each case has to be viewed on an individual basis. The choice can always be revoked by the subject. Existential psychoanalysis must be entirely supple; the method used for one subject cannot be used for another or even for the same subject at a later time (p.619).

Sartre then comes to the nub of the difference, not between their basic methods, but between their psychological theories (pp.619-20).

> … Precisely because the aim of the inquiry is to uncover a *choice*, not a *state*, this enquiry will have to remind itself on every occasion that its object is not a given buried in the shadows of the unconscious, but a free and conscious determination – which is not even an inhabitant of consciousness, but rather is totally identified with this consciousness itself. (own translation: EN, p.619)

For Sartre, 'empirical' psychoanalysis never gets to the heart of the matter, the fundamental choice of the subject. Its theoretical basis in the unconscious simply makes it impossible. If the complex is really unconscious, that is, the sign is separated from the signified by a barrier, how could the subject recognize it (the complex)? If we say that the subject consciously recognizes the image proffered, how could he compare it to his true problem since it is out of reach and he never has knowledge of it? In the framework of empirical psychoanalysis, the best which can be achieved is that the subject accepts the explanation as a *probable* hypothesis; and, if he *believes* in the probability of the hypothesis, is this simple belief which dwells in the limits of consciousness sufficient to break down the barriers which block the unconscious drives?

But the fact is that the subject of psychoanalysis of whatever method can achieve enlightenment – 'he touches, he sees what he is' (own translation: EN, p.620). Sartre's argument is that this proves that the subject has never ceased to be conscious of 'his deep-seated tendencies'. '… the psychoanalytic interpretation does not make him *assume consciousness* of what he is: it makes him *assume knowledge* of it' (own translation: EN, p.620)[39].

[39] Sartre's approach is to show that classic Freudian psychoanalysis does not make logical sense as a theory because it cannot explain how knowledge of the unconscious can arise (p.619). But this seems to underestimate classical psychoanalysis, which does show ways in which unconscious tendencies infiltrate conscious existence (e.g. *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life)*. Thus the pathology itself, though its signs may be apparently unrelated and/or deceptive, can be interpreted as the breaking through of the unconscious into consciousness. Again, whether classed as pathological or 'normal', affective experience, e.g. depressive feelings, unexplained euphoria, etc., unaccompanied by insight or understanding, can be interpreted in the same way.

In the last paragraph of the section (p.620), Sartre summarizes what existential psychoanalysis *would be.* His view is that it does not yet exist; it has not yet found its Freud. At best, he says, hinting at his own future biographical writings, it is foreshadowed in some biographies. There are three criteria for the success of this analysis:

i. The number of facts which its hypothesis enables us to explain and unify.

ii. 'the evident intuition of the irreducibility of the end reached' (own translation: p.620).

iii. Where possible, the decisive testimony of the subject.

He concludes, 'But it is of little importance to us, here, that it (this psychoanalysis) exists: the important thing for us is that it be possible' (own translation). What does he mean by this? To find the answer, we need to look at the first paragraph of the following section, 'Faire et avoir: la possession' ('To do and to have: possession'). Sartre's line of thought is as follows: ontology provides the principles relating to behaviour and desire from which existential psychoanalysis begins and with which it works. Classical psychology considers that its task is accomplished when it has established its understanding of the individual as the combination of his empirical desires (p.602f). Existential ontology on the other hand reveals the structures of the concrete desires (p.621). Each desire is not one of a patchwork of desires but expresses the totality of human reality (ibid). Then he makes a very strong criticism of traditional psychology; 'Instances of empirical and partial knowledge are, in this area, without meaning' (own translation). The final discoveries of the ontology are the first principles of the psychoanalysis. From then on it is necessary to have another method as the object is different. I take this to mean that both 'procedures', the ontology and the psychoanalysis, are required to understand and describe human reality. Ontology provides us with the principles of being, psychoanalysis enables us to examine the being of individuals. The sentence at the end of the previous section where he casts doubt on the existence of the second discipline indicates its lack of development. What ontology has to address, says Sartre, is the nature of desire, as desire is the being of human reality, and it is the ontological structure of desire which he analyzes in this next section.

At the end of the section, he returns to existential psychoanalysis. Ontology has taught us that, 'Every for itself is free choice; … all my acts, all my projects, translate this choice and reflect it in a thousand and one ways, for there is an infinity of ways of being and of ways of having' (own translation: EN, p.645). 'Existential psychoanalysis has the aim of recovering, via these empirical and concrete projects, the original way which everyone has of choosing his being' (own translation). And this 'manière d'être' is 'la qualité', especially the material quality. Colour, taste, tactility translate symbolically a particular way that being has of giving itself and we react

with desire or disgust. The task of existential psychoanalysis is to reveal the *ontological meaning* of these qualities. This is not just a question of identifying tastes and aversions, rather the choice of the aspect of being revealed through and by those tastes and aversions (p.646). Sartre proposes to sketch this out in the following chapter as a basis for further research. Here in foregrounding quality, taste (desire) and aversion (disgust), he gives affect a major role in his ontology of fundamental choice.

'De la qualité comme révélatrice de l'être' (pp.646-662) ('Of quality as revelatory of being')

He begins by comparing his proposed psychoanalysis with that of Bachelard, who attempted 'a psychoanalysis of *things'* (own translation: EN, p.646). Although he speaks warmly of Bachelard, he rejects his approach on three main grounds. Firstly he concentrates on things themselves without reference to the subject and his 'choix de l'être' ('choice of being') in relation to the appearance of things in the world. Secondly Bachelard gives a major role to the imagination, which Sartre rejects in his definition of perception and psychoanalysis as the explanation of the meanings attaching *in reality* to things in the world (pp.646-8). Thirdly he criticizes Bachelard on the same grounds as the other psychoanalytic schools (pp.648-9). Every psychoanalysis, according to Sartre, must have its *a priori* principles. It must know what it is looking for, otherwise how could it find it? It cannot establish itself the object of its research (p.648). In fact he describes that as a vicious circle. But I have argued that Sartre's (hypothetical) psychoanalysis itself creates a vicious circle. It will find what it is already looking for. He clearly sees psychoanalysis as a method for uncovering psychic reality, which is necessarily individual, in accordance with a rigorously established ontology (p.649). It cannot be used inductively to establish an ontology itself either on an individual basis or proceeding from individual cases generally[40].

Sartre criticizes Freudian psychoanalysis for being based on a 'simple postulat', 'la libido freudienne'; Adlerian individual psychology on 'a generalization without method of empirical

[40] It seems entirely conceivable that it could be used in this way; the conditions would indeed have to be extremely rigorous, to exclude as far as possible the prejudice of pre-established ontological views. Indeed, Sartre comes close to claiming as much in the previous paragraph:

'… one will discover, by a rigorously objective psychoanalysis other potentialities … which remain entirely transcendant, even while they correspond to a yet more fundamental choice of human reality, a choice of *being*' (own translation: EN, p.648).

data', namely 'will to power' (own translation); and Bachelard for using a mishmash of principles derived from his predecessors, which he hopes the results will clarify[41]

The real difference between Sartre's and the other psychoanalytic theories is not methodological but, as he himself goes on to describe (p.649), ontological. They do not seek to describe human reality as the fundamental choice of being as his does. Sexual symbolism may be important but it is secondary to 'des structures présexuelles'.

What ontology can teach psychoanalysis is first of all the *true* origin of the meanings of things and their *true* relation to human reality, 'The existential symbolism of things' (own translation). Sartre's conception is that being resides in the qualities of things:

'… its quality' (i.e. the quality of *this*, the object in situation) '… is nothing other than its being. The yellow of the lemon, …, is not a subjective mode for the apprehension of the lemon; it *is the lemon*. Every quality of being is entirely being' (own translation: EN, p.649). The importance of this for emotion and affectivity is in the major role that they play in the experience of quality. He continues (ibid), 'we insist on the inseparability, in the quality itself, of the project and of facticity' (own translation). For there to be quality there has to be mediation by the pour-soi. 'In every apprehension of quality, there is … a metaphysical effort to escape from our condition, … and to penetrate right to the pure in-itself' (own translation: EN, p.650). A new structure of the 'il y a' ('there is') is constituted, 'la couche significative' (translated as 'the meaningful level' by Barnes, p.604), which reveals itself in the absolute unity of one and the same fundamental project. This is what we call the metaphysical content of every intuitive revelation of being and this is precisely what we should attain and unveil by psychoanalysis.

Sartre then embarks on his famous ontological/psychological analysis of one particular 'qualité', 'le visqueux', the slimy (pp.650-662). He begins with a clear statement of his transcendental view of consciousness as it applies to emotion:

> … we have shown … the error that there would be, … in believing that we "project" our affective dispositions *onto* the object, to throw light on it, or to colour it…. A feeling is in no way an internal disposition, but an objectifying and transcendant relationship, which causes itself to be known by its object what it is. (own translation: EN, p.650)

[41] Freud would surely argue that the libido is more than 'un simple postulat', rather the product of an empirical, scientific approach, supported by behavioural and other evidence. Similarly the grounds of Sartre's criticism of Adler seem far-fetched. What does he mean by saying that his idea is a generalization 'sans méthode'? Is not 'generalization from empirical data' a method? Is not Sartre's structure of 'pour-soi, en-soi' precisely such a generalization.

‘Slimy’ has a double meaning; it has a physical meaning and also a metaphorical meaning as a moral quality. Sartre rejects the common idea of the primacy of the physical meaning and the moral quality as simply an application of the physical quality (p.653). As an objective quality it represents for us a new *nature* which is neither material and physical nor psychic, but ‘which transcends the opposition of the psychic and of the physical in discovering itself to us as the ontological expression of the entire world’ (own translation). So the apprehension of the ‘slimy’ creates a particular way for the en-soi of the world to give itself. As long as we are in contact with the ‘visqueux’, everything happens as if sliminess was the meaning of the whole world. He then explores the nature of the ‘visqueux’ (pp.653-7). To summarize, the ‘slimy’ is an en-soi by which the pour-soi feels threatened, so that it is afraid of it. Possession of the solid object ‘elevates it right up to the dignity of the in-itself’ (own translation: EN, p.655). It affirms the primacy of the pour-soi in the synthetic being, ‘En-soi-Pour-soi’. The slimy object on the other hand I cannot let go of when I want; there seems to be a danger of the ‘pour-soi’ being absorbed by the ‘en-soi’:

> The horror of the slimy … It is the fear … of a particular type of being, which has no more existence than the *in-itself-for-itself* and which is only *represented* by the slimy. An *ideal*[42] being which I condemn with all my strength and which haunts me as *value* haunts me in my being: an *ideal* being in which the in-itself not founded has priority over the for-itself and which we will name an *antivalue*. (own translation: EN, p.657)

So sliminess suddenly changes the project of appropriation into a project of flight from danger. Sartre describes its discovery not as empirical but as intuitive (ibid). What has appeared is the *meaning* (‘sens’) of the slimy, resulting from ‘the preontological understanding of the in-itself and the for-itself’ (own translation). The slimy does not symbolize any particular psychic behaviour, *a priori*: it manifests a certain relationship of being with itself. Hence it becomes an ontological scheme, beyond the distinction of psychic and non-psychic, for interpreting the meaning of all existing things of a certain category (p.658). Unusually, Sartre here gives an account of the genesis and development of the quality and meaning of ‘le visqueux’ in the child, and by analogy of all qualities.

> The first experience which the child can undergo of the slimy enriches him or her therefore psychologically and morally: … What we are saying about the slimy is the same for all the objects which surround the child: the simple revelation of their material extends his or her horizon right to the extreme limits of being and bestows on him or her

[42] Own italics in ‘*ideal*’.

a collection of *keys* in order to decipher the being of all human facts. (own translation: ibid)

This does not mean that he knows from the start the "uglinesses", the "beauties" or the "characters" of existence. 'Simply, he or she is in possession of all the *meanings of being,* of which uglinesses and beauties, psychic traits, sexual relations, etc., will only ever be particular examples' (own translation). He will spend the rest of his life explaining the prepsychic and presexual modes of being which the physical qualities and objects of the world reveal to him. 'Il n'y a pas d'enfant « innocent »' (EN, p.658).

Merleau-Ponty's view of the structure and symbolism of objects is similar to Sartre's. Cataldi (1993) examines Merleau-Ponty's view and quotes the following passage from PP:

> Between our emotions, desires and bodily attitudes, there is not only a contingent connection or even an analogical relationship: if I say that in disappointment I am downcast, it is not only because it is accompanied by gestures expressing prostration in virtue of the laws governing nervous mechanisms, or because I discover between the objects of my desire and my desire itself the same relationship as existing between an object placed high above me and my gesture toward it. The movement upwards as a direction in physical space, and that of my desire toward its objective are mutually symbolical, because they both express the same essential structure of our being, being situated in relation to an environment, … (Smith, p.284: PP, p.329)

Cataldi's particular focus is space[43]. As she points out, some understanding of space, some sensing of distance is implicit in our understanding of emotional experience, e.g the closeness of love, or the forces of repulsion and separation in hatred (Cataldi, p.45). However she does also explore the crossover between touch (tactility) and the feeling of emotion, in a way that is reminiscent of the tactile nature of the 'visqueux' analysis in BN, even if it lacks the ontological dimension:

> If we do allow for "cross overs" between emotional and tactile perception and remember that what is unique about touch is that "in contact, things 'outside' us are felt inside us – inside our bodies", then we may be more apt to notice that we do not even *say,* when we are feeling apprehension, that "all we feel" is our own spastic stomach. We say instead that we are feeling "butterflies" fluttering inside ... it. The feeling that is felt is a distinguishably embodied ("butterflied") and kinaesthetically styled ("fluttering") expression of an emotion, apprehension. (p.130)

[43] See Introduction, pp.16f.

She also examines textural aspects of what she calls 'affective space' (pp.132ff.).

Sartre concludes the section and chapter by defining psychology (in this case, existential psychoanalysis) can use this analysis of qualities (EN, pp.660-662). On the one hand we can use it to grasp the very general projects of human reality. But what really interests the psychoanalyst is to determine the (free) project of the specific individual on the basis of the specific relation which unites him to the different symbols of being. All qualities have their general ontological significance; by my preferences and aversions for them based on this significance, I determine myself in relation to them. If the slimy is the symbol of a being where the pour-soi is imbibed by the en-soi, what am I who, when I encounter others, love the slimy (p.661)? 'To what fundamental project of myself am I referred if I want to explain this love of a sticky and louche in-itself?' (own translation). *Tastes* are not irreducible; if we know how to interrogate them, they reveal to us the fundamental projects of the individual. This, concludes Sartre, is where ontology hands over to existential psychoanalysis.

> Ontology abandons us here: it has simply permitted us to determine the ultimate ends of human reality, its fundamental possibilities and the value which haunts it. Every human reality is at the same time a direct project to transform its own for-itself into in-itself-for-itself and a project of appropriation of the world as totality of being-in-itself, in the form of a fundamental quality. All human reality is a passion, …. (own translation, assisted by Barnes, p.615: EN, p.662)

Each human reality is a passion in that it aims in vain to lose itself in order to found being and to constitute at the same time the 'en-soi', which escapes contingence in being its own foundation.[44]

Summary

Of the six works, which I have examined, *L'être et le néant* is the least straightforward to use in developing a phenomenological account of emotion and affectivity. Even though the works by Merleau-Ponty suffer from the significant drawback that they engage in only a very limited way directly with the topic, it is possible to identify fairly easily the positive contribution which

[44] Sartre uses this description of human reality as a passion when he refers to the doomed aspiration of the pour-soi to become en-soi. What exactly is he referring to by 'passion'? I presume that it implies the intensity of commitment to this fundamental project of the en-soi. Here (p.662) he neatly compares and contrasts it with the passion of Christ, who lost himself as God ('en-soi') so that man could be reborn ('réalité-humaine', 'pour-soi').

can be derived from them. If we summarize the other five works, TE uses basic emotions to illustrate the operation of consciousness; ETE, although flawed in important respects, addresses the topic directly; IMG, surprisingly, briefly provides, alongside its main focus, the most satisfactory account of the phenomenology of affectivity of all the works considered here. Of the Merleau-Ponty material, SC provides an account of the general structure of human behaviour and of the dialectical relationship between the components of existence, which can be applied to affectivity and emotion; PP also covers the structure of existence, and provides a detailed phenomenological method, together with some specific relevant material. EN similarly contains fertile relevant material, e.g. on the role of the body, and the importance of value and quality in existence. But here Sartre's primary purpose is ontological. This makes EN more problematic methodologically in the context of a primarily phenomenological account. Secondly Sartre's ontology is underpinned by metaphysical ideas, which colour his psychological descriptions, whereas Merleau-Ponty's ontology is restricted and more consistent with a detached account of psychology[45]. I will first summarise what I see as problematic in Sartre's account in the context of a phenomenological account of affectivity and emotion and then the principal areas where I see his contributions as useful.

The 'projet originel' and the unified totality of the individual

Sartre's description of 'le motif, le mobile et la fin' (EN, p.493) as the three terms of the structure of consciousness expresses the universality of intentionality. The idea of 'la fin' as the general objective of an intentional act seems to me unexceptionable. However his example of 'a walk in the country' (pp.498-504) leads eventually to an end, which is described as a 'projet originel' or 'initial' (pp.500-1), to ascertain which requires a regressive analysis, until we reach 'the original type of nihilation by which the for-itself has to be its own nothingness' (Barnes, p.457: ibid). I have already described the methodological and metaphysical problems with this (see pp.93f. above). It assumes that there is such a 'projet initial', waiting to be uncovered. I am not saying that there is *not* a 'projet initial'; just that Sartre's method is designed to uncover that in which he already believes. His idea of a 'projet originel' seems to be a reductionist answer to the problem of the meaning of existence, which puts a limit on the very freedom which he posits.

[45] This is not to say that any activity is or can be entirely free of a metaphysical perspective.

It seems to me that the concept of the 'fundamental project' follows from another frequently expressed idea of Sartre's, that the individual can be defined and exists as a unified totality. Take, for example, the principle which underlies his method of existential psychoanalysis:

> The *principle* of this psychoanalysis is that man is a totality and not a collection: that, as a consequence, he expresses himself in his entirety in the most insignificant and the most superficial of his behaviours – in other words, that there is not a preference, a tic, a human act which is not revelatory. (own translation: EN, p.614)

This idea appears also in ETE, the idea that one act expresses the whole:

'… emotion signifies *in its own way* the whole of consciousness, or, if we place ourselves on the existential plane, of human reality' (Mairet, pp.27-28 modified: ETE, p.26).

There are similar passages quoted above (see p.99) elsewhere in the section on 'La psychanalyse existentielle (EN 608 & 9). On p.621 he expressly cross-references this idea to ETE.

'As we have shown elsewhere …knowledge of man has to be global; instances of empirical and partial knowledge are, in this area, without meaning' (own translation: EN, p.621).

He relates this concept of unity to the 'projet fondamental': '… this layer reveals itself in the absolute unity of a same fundamental project' (own translation: EN, p.650).

Sartre also brings up the idea of the unity of consciousness in a more concrete example in his analysis of the inferiority complex (p.504, pp.516-521). The unreflected and the spontaneous have primacy over the reflexive, but the two levels are fundamentally united (pp.518-9). Reflection may make decisions which are opposed to the basic project of the pour-soi, but these are in bad faith. Thus, in the case of the inferiority complex, I may use my will through reflection to reform my feelings of inferiority but this will only serve to displace the weakness. Another will grow in its place, which will express in its own way 'the total end which I am pursuing' (own translation: EN, p.516). I may also, for example, affirm my superiority to mask my true feelings but these affirmations will be betrayed by their very instability and weakness.

'The unity of consciousness, … is too deep for us to accept this split into two planes without it being taken back by a deeper synthetic intention which brings one plane back to the other and unifies them' (own translation: EN, pp.518-9).

There are two concepts here, totality and unity. The idea of unity in the inferiority complex example seems coherent, namely that there is a fundamental unity between the irreflexive feelings of inferiority and the bad faith of their reflexive compensation. But it is a big step to infer that the individual's being is a unified totality. There may be a fundamental project, but I

am not clear how it could be identified and I cannot see that Sartre has put forward a valid method to do so. His method is circular in just the way for which he criticizes the classic psychoanalysts. If we restrict the ontology to a conception of the movement of existence, we can still use Sartre's analysis of the body and original affectivity, and his accounts of value and quality as constituting and revealing the meaning of objects in the world. Thus his analysis of the 'visqueux' can reveal the creation of meaning but not necessarily tied to the subject's hypothetical fundamental project.

Behaviour

We will see in the two subsequent chapters that Merleau-Ponty places a particular emphasis on the behavioural approach to perception and feeling. There is one passage where Sartre commends the principle of a behavioural approach in similar terms to Merleau-Ponty. This is in the context of his analysis of the ontology of freedom. At the end of this he gives a summary of the results (p.521). The first two conclusions relate to the centrality of behaviour. The first can be summarized by his formulation, 'to be reduces itself to to do' (own translation).

Secondly, he rejects the existence of psychic 'givens' which can be empirically established in human psychology, while commending the empirical consideration of behaviour:

> Thus we do not find any given in human reality, in the sense in which temperament, character, the passions, the principles of reason would be attributes acquired or innate, existing in the manner of things. Empirical consideration of human being by itself shows it as an organized unity of conducts or "behaviours". To be ambitious, cowardly or irascible, is simply to conduct oneself in such and such a manner, in such and such a circumstance. (own translation)

The behaviourists were right to believe that the only positive psychological investigation possible had to be that of behaviours in rigourously defined situations. This applies to perceptive just as much as emotional behaviour. Being for man is action[46] (ibid).

The empirical method

In respect of the method of his existential psychoanalysis, Sartre again commends the analysis of empirical behaviour; it requires the comparison of the diverse empirical tendencies of the subject to ascertain the totality of being of the individual (p.609). The empirical attitude

[46] '… être pour elle' (la réalité-humaine), 'c'est agir et cesser d'agir, c'est cesser d'être' (ibid) ; '… being for (human reality) is to act and to cease acting is to cease to be' (own translation)..

is itself the transcendental choice. His method has to work with empirical behaviours, in order to decode them and 'les fixer conceptuellement' (p.614). We have to compare these behaviours to bring to light what they express. Although he describes 'classic' psychoanalysis as 'empirical' to distinguish it from his existential variety, his also proposes an empirical method.

Sartre analyzes how the body is lived. To do this he follows what he calls 'the order of being', i.e. beginning with the body as 'être-pour-soi' (344). Facticity is the major feature of the body in this. It is through the usability of objects in the world that we become aware of our body (365). It is 'a necessary condition of my action … factual condition of all possible action on the world' (Barnes, p.327 modified), 'this ungraspable given' (own translation).

To describe the non-reflexive consciousness of the body, he strikingly uses 'exister' as a transitive verb: 'elle' (la conscience) '*existe son corps*' (369) ('consciousness *exists its body'*).

'Consciousness (of the) body … is non-thetic consciousness of the way in which it (consciousness) *is affected.* Consciousness of the body merges with original affectivity' (own translation, EN, p.370).

This is *not* the affectivity 'revealed to us by introspection', which is already '*constituted* affectivity; it is consciousness *of the* world (Barnes, p.330 modified).

It is difficult to study original affectivity separately because it rarely appears without being overtaken by a transcendant project of the 'pour-soi' towards the world (371). So he fixes on physical pain as the best example to use to study the structures of bodily consciousness. The particular example which he takes is that of the eyes hurting when I am reading. His view is that this pain is completely without intentionality. He describes it as follows: 'the pain is *precisely the eyes* in as much as consciousness "exists them"' (own translation: EN, p.372). 'La douleur pure' is a 'simple vécu', which is what it is; but the consciousness of pain is a 'projet' toward a later consciousness, which will be free of pain. This does not make the pain a psychic object, it is 'un projet non-thétique du pour-soi'.

Next he analyzes a situation where I have a pain *not* 'caused' by the activity, e.g. a pain in my finger while I am reading (p.373). When I am absorbed in reading, the pain is neither absent nor unconscious, but part of the background. As a contingency of consciousness, the body never ceases to be existed in its totality.

He moves on to analyse the reflexive consciousness of pain (pp.375-6). This turns the pain into 'un objet psychique'. This is transcendent and passive, it has cohesion and temporality. These are the 'états', which he described in TE (see Chapter 1). For reflective consciousness, the body also becomes a psychic object. The psychic body is endured as the contingence of each affective state, of actions and qualities. Not that the psyche is united with a body, but:

…beneath its melodic organization, the body is its substance and its perpetual condition of possibility. … ; it is it which is at the base of the metaphorical mechanism and chemistry which we use to class and explain the events of the psyche; … it is it … which motivates and in some degree, justifies psychological theories like that of the unconscious, etc. (own translation: EN, p.378)

He also analyzes 'le corps-pour-autrui'. The 'psychic object', e.g. the anger of the other, is entirely handed over to perception, and is inconceivable outside of bodily structures and, very importantly, their situation. The body (with its manifestations) is the 'psychic object' *par excellence.* Perception of such objects is of a different type and structure to that of inanimate objects, because of their nature as 'transcendance-transcendée'. It is not necessary to resort to learned habit or reasoning by analogy to explain how we understand expressive behaviour. The body of the other, like the inanimate object, is given to us immediately as what the other *is* (387-8).

The concept, 'le corps-pour-autrui', becomes important – and tricky - for consciousness because that is how we are perceived by others. Our body is not only the point of view that we are but also a point of view on which points of view are taken which we will never be able to take (p.392). Sartre ascribes negative emotions such as shyness and fear of the other to this alienation (393-4). In reflection we try to get round this alienation by using language to describe our own 'corps-pour-autrui', thus achieving a knowledge of our bodies and ourselves as 'quasi-objects' (394-5).

<u>Motivation – the will and the passions</u>

Sartre puts forward a theory of the will and the passions fundamentally at odds with the classical theory of the sentiments and conflict between the will and the passions (p.492). To do this he analyzes the springs of decision, i.e. an act of will, which he identifies as 'motifs et mobiles' (p.490). 'Motifs' are the generally objective reasons for an act, usually the result of deliberation; 'mobiles' are the subjective motivations, 'the totality of desires, emotions and passions which push me to accomplish a certain act' (own translation: EN, p.491).

The psychologist views the 'mobile' as the affective content of a fact of consciousness in so far as this content determines another fact of consciousness or decision (p.494). Sartre agrees that irreflexivity is the distinguishing characteristic of the 'mobile', while the 'motif' is reflexive. However, the former is a non-willed spontaneity, a purely unreflected consciousness of motives via the pure and simple project of the act. The structure of the willed act, on the contrary, demands the appearance of a reflexive consciousness which grasps the motivation ('mobile') as a 'quasi-objet' or which even 'intends' it as a psychic object via reflexive consciousness. In terms of intentionality, his conclusion is that there is an intention deeper than that or those provided by reflection and the will (p.496). The will is not a privileged manifestation of freedom; it is a psychic event with its own structure, which is constituted on the same plan as other psychic events and just like them is supported by an original, ontological freedom (pp.496-7). The positional consciousness of the motive, which is the will, is on principle non-thetic consciousness of oneself as project towards an end. In this sense consciousness is motivation ('mobile'), that is, it experiences itself non-thetically as a 'a project more or less keen, more or less passionate towards an end' (Barnes, p.449).

Qualities, value, and meaning

In terms of structure, we do not project our affective dispositions onto the object; 'A feeling is in no way an internal disposition, but an objectifying and transcendant relationship, which causes itself to be known by its object what it is' (own translation: EN, p.650).

The quality has a double meaning, a physical meaning and also a metaphorical meaning as a moral quality, which Sartre surprisingly claims has primacy over the physical meaning (p.653), in contrast to the standard view of the moral quality as simply an application of the physical. As an objective quality it represents for us a new *nature* 'which transcends the opposition of the psychic and of the physical in discovering itself to us as the ontological expression of the entire world' (ditto: ibid), a particular way for the en-soi of the world to give itself. Here structure and meaning come together. 'Valeur' comes into being as a specific object in reflection or given immediately with the object of intuition (p.131f). Sartre looks at the 'manière d'être' ('way of being') of objects (pp.645-6), within his attempt to describe the operation of 'libre choix' ('free choice'). 'Manière d'être' is 'qualité'. The perception, the appreciation of 'qualité', like 'valeur', generally consists of and depends on a related affect. As with 'valeur', the being of the object in Sartre's ontology cannot be separated from the being of the individual. He describes the subject's reaction to 'qualité' as follows:

> … there is an infinity of ways of being and of ways of having…. In the object we aim at its *being* via its way of being, or quality. And the quality – in particular the material quality, fluidity of water, density of rock, etc. – being the way of being – does nothing other than present being in a certain way. Qualities are not at all for us irreducible givens: they symbolically translate in our eyes a certain way that being has of giving itself and we react with disgust or desire, …. (own translation: EN, p.645)

In Sartre's view this symbolic interpretation is a bedrock of the fundamental 'projet' of the individual. Apprehension of 'qualité' has to take place within the 'projet' (pp.649-650). The 'qualité' produces 'la couche significative' (meaning) within the unity of the fundamental project (p.650). The particular quality represents the 'teneur métaphysique' ('metaphysical content').

Even if we remain sceptical about the idea of the 'fundamental project', we can still find his description and analysis of being useful and valid. So his analysis of 'le visqueux' (pp.650-662) can be read *not* as the diagnosis of a *fundamental* relationship to being but an account of how one quality among others has physical meaning and also metaphorical moral meanings.

Also useful is his definition of a general project of being. Our fundamental projects must be based on the primacy of the project of *being* (p.610). 'The for-itself … is a being whose being is in question in its being in the form of its project of being' (own translation). The pour-soi is *lack of being;* The possible belongs to the pour-soi as *that which is lacking to it,* while value haunts the pour-soi as the totality of being *which is lacking* (ibid). Man is fundamentally *desire of being.*

Again his description of the apprehension of the quality of objects and their 'symbolisme existentiel' (p.649) is useful. It is unexceptionable to claim that for there to be quality there has to be mediation by the pour-soi (p.650) or that quality, perceived intuitively, may constitute a new structure of being with a metaphysical meaning, which he calls 'la couche significative' (ibid).

<u>The description and analysis of affective experience</u>

This is a feature of all four of Sartre's works considered here. In EN, for example, he analyses different situations where I experience pain while reading, and then when I stop reading (pp.371-378), using the example in order to define the structures of bodily consciousness (p.371. See below). In the chapter, 'Être et faire: la liberté', he uses the example of the

experience of fatigue caused by a walk in the country and differing decisions in reponse to it to show how motivation involving the will and the passions functions (pp.498-502)[47].

His analysis of the 'visqueux' (pp.650-662) exemplifies the ways that being gives itself in qualities, which generate symbolic meanings.

Psychoanalysis – Sartre's existential psychoanalysis and criticisms of classic psychoanalysis

These topics have already been alluded to in the section above summarizing Sartre's theory of 'le projet original' and the unified totality of the individual. I deal in more detail with these in the section on psychoanalysis in the concluding chapter, in which the treatment of psychoanalysis across all the texts analysed is examined.

[47] See Chapter 6, 'A Walk in the Country', for a comparison of Sartre's treatment of this situation and our experience of it, to Merleau-Ponty's in PP.

CHAPTER 4 LA STRUCTURE DU COMPORTEMENT

Introduction

The Structure of Behaviour, which appeared in 1942, was Merleau-Ponty's first published work. It represented the first thesis of the two required at the time to achieve a doctorate, to be followed in 1945 by *Phenomenology of Perception*. In the Introduction he specifies that the purpose of the work is to understand the relationship between consciousness and human nature. The analysis of the notion of behaviour can help to clarify this 'rapport' because in itself it is neutral in regard to the distinction between the psychic and the physiological. In behaviourism consciousness functions not as a psychic reality but as structure. So his overall intention is to use this structure to examine the relationship between human nature and consciousness.

We will *not* find in this work a specific treatment or discussion of affectivity and emotion, other than the occasional reference. Merleau-Ponty acknowledges this omission himself[1]. On the other hand we can use it to provide a basis to examine the structure and meaning of emotion as a category of behaviour.

In the first chapter, he criticizes the scientific analysis and explanation of behaviour as founded on simple reflexive acts and then, in the second, the orthodox scientific account of more complex behaviours. Chapter III is of most interest to us; here he explores the notion of behaviour as 'une forme', which operates in three fields ('champs'), each with their own structure, the physical, the vital and the human or mental. He explores the relations between the three. The relevance of this for our topic is not only in the general account of behaviour but, more particularly, in the description of how we might conceive and explain the reflexive, physiological and psychological elements of the experience of emotion and affect, and the relationship between them. Towards the end of this chapter, he raises a philosophical problem with which the rest of the work is concerned. Essentially he poses the question of whether his detached, quasi-scientific account of consciousness as a form of behaviour is compatible with the standpoint of critical idealism and unconditional reflection. In the course of this, he

[1] 'We have not completely described the structure of the body proper, which also includes an affective perspective, the importance of which is evident' (Fisher, p.214: SC, p.231).

describes the development of the phenomenological approach and explores the importance of embodiment and perceptive consciousness (which he will examine in detail in *PP*).

Purpose

Merleau-Ponty begins the Introduction with a simple statement of his aim: 'Our goal is to understand the relations of consciousness and nature: organic, psychological or even social' (Fisher, p.3: SC, p.1). He then proceeds to a brief account of the explanations of these 'rapports' by critical philosophy, compared with those of physics, biology and psychology. He summarizes this:

> Thus, ..., there exist side by side a philosophy, on the one hand, which makes of every nature an objective unity constituted vis-à-vis consciousness and, on the other, sciences which treat the organism and consciousness as two orders of reality and, in their reciprocal relation, as "effects" and as "causes". (Fisher, p.4: SC, p.2)

He then explains why he thinks the notion of behaviour can be used to clarify the relationship of consciousness to human nature.

Behaviour and behaviourism

As we have said, in the Introduction Merleau-Ponty states that he has decided to use the analysis of the notion of behaviour to understand the relationship between consciousness and human nature (p.2). In behaviourism, consciousness is not viewed as a 'réalité psychique' or a 'cause' (p.3) but as a structure. However, he rejects the classic behaviourist approach developed by J B Watson and the North American school. In the main text (pp.2-3), he criticizes the latter for reducing behaviour to a collection of conditioned reflexes. In footnote (2), on the same pages, he gives another reading of Watson. While he approves of the move away from reliance on introspective experience in behaviourist psychology, he identifies two significant points: firstly, he suggests that Watson identifies behaviour with existence; secondly, he suggests that it therefore calls for a dialectical approach rather than mechanical or causal.[2]

[2] 'In reaction against the shadows of psychological intimacy, behaviourism for the most part seeks recourse only in a physiological or even a physical explanation, …. In our opinion … when Watson

In the first chapter, Merleau-Ponty criticizes the 'scientific' analysis and explanation of behaviour as founded on simple reflexive acts. Although he does not address the topic directly, this can be applied to emotional reactions, whether conscious 'feeling', the physiological events associated with emotion, or physical actions provoked by emotions. He does however refer explicitly to the latter on p.46. He gives 'la définition classique' of reflexive reactions, namely 'reactions ... constant for a given excitant …' as 'comparable … to the monotonous reactions of flight in human pathology' (Fisher, p.44: SC, p.45f.), the 'fight or flee' reflex, so often cited as the source of the physiological symptoms of fear and aggression. Merleau-Ponty rejects this conception of constant reactions as anomalous (p.46). He describes it as applicable in two situations: either 'a neutralisation of dangerous excitants, ... a "catastrophic" reaction which appears in "borderline situations"' (ibid) (quoting Goldstein); or as the product of the experimental situation which we use to study the reaction (p.47). 'the variation of the response in the presence of analogous stimuli is related to the meaning of the situations in which they appear' (Fisher, p.45: ibid). This is the constant theme of the first chapter, that even the simplest behaviours cannot be reduced to mechanical reactions, but depend on and are guided by the situation and intentions of the organism. Merleau-Ponty takes the notion of 'form' from Gestalt psychology to represent the vital processes which are more than the sum of their isolated parts (p.49).

In the conclusion to Chapter II (pp.135-8), Merleau-Ponty pulls together the criticisms of the orthodox scientific accounts of simple and more complex behaviours which are set out in the first two chapters. There is a traditional distinction between mechanical reactions which occur in objective space and time, which belong to 'l'ordre de l'en soi', and higher order reactions, which depend rather on the sense of the situation (see above) and therefore presuppose 'une "vue" de cette situation, une prospection', and belong to 'l'ordre du pour soi'. (pp.135-6). Both of these can be easily explained by the human intellect, the first by physics, i.e. the chain of cause and effect; the second by reflection, which can always find an intention. These two explanations can serve for individual instances of behaviour, but neither accounts for behaviour in so far as it has a structure. Merleau-Ponty rejects the idea of behaviour as belonging to 'l'ordre de l'en soi' or 'du pour soi'; rather he defines it as 'the projection outside the organism of a *possibility* which is inside it' (own translation: SC, p.136). He rejects the idea

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spoke of behaviour he had in mind what others have called *existence*; but the new notion could receive its philosophical status only if causal or mechanical thinking were abandoned for dialectical thinking'. (Fisher, p.226: SC, footnote, p.3)

that behaviour is the product of consciousness; that, he says, is anthropomorphic. Animal behaviour does not show consciousness but 'a certain way of treating the world, of "being in the world" or "of "existing"' (own translation: SC, p.136). Its intentional object is 'being-for-the-animal, ... a certain milieu characteristic of the species' (own translation). He then moves on to consider how we perceive behaviour and its structure. He repeats that it is 'ni chose ni conscience' ('neither thing nor consciousness'), which makes it 'opaque pour l'intelligence' (p.138). The *cogito* teaches us that the very conception of behaviour and behaviourism presupposes consciousness and 'l'existence pour soi'. So behaviour is thought, but not 'en soi'. Merleau-Ponty defines it as 'a form', not a thing, nor an idea, nor the envelope of a pure consciousness (ibid). This notion avoids the alternatives of a pure materialism or a pure subjectivism.

Structure, dialectic and meaning

In Chapter III, he explores this notion of behaviour as 'une forme'. He identifies it as operating in three fields ('champs', p.141); the physical field, where reactions actually take place; the physiological field (equivalent to 'l'ordre vital' of the title of the chapter), which overlays all physical reactions – this determines the effective behaviour of the organism, the aptitude which it has to respond to situations by different reactions; and finally the mental field, symbolic behaviour of which generally man alone is capable (pp.130-133).

'L'ordre physique' and 'l'ordre vital'

The form of the physical is an individual (p.148). Merleau-Ponty examines the physical properties of behaviour (pp.157-160), but concludes that the laws of classical physics do not determine the behaviour of an organism.

> Each organism thus has, in the presence of a given environment, its optimal conditions of activity, its own way of achieving equilibrium, and the interior determinants of this equilibrium are not given by a plurality of vectors, but by a general attitude towards the world …. Organic structures are understood only by a norm, by a certain type of transitive action which characterizes the individual …. He measures himself the action of things on him and delimits himself his milieu … (own translation assisted by Fisher, p.148: SC, p.161)

Merleau-Ponty makes explicit reference to affectivity in a summary which he gives based on a passage in *The Organism*[3] by the German neurologist, Kurt Goldstein.

> … there exists, for each individual, a general structure of behaviour which is expressed by certain constants of conduct, of sensible and motor thresholds, of affectivity, of temperature, of respiration, of the pulse, of blood pressure … in such a way that it is impossible to find in this combination causes and effects, each particular phenomenon expressing equally what one could call "the essence" of the individual. (own translation: SC, p.160)

He uses the word 'dialectique' to describe the relations between the organism and its 'milieu'. This dialectic produces new relationships, which are incomprehensible when the organism is reduced to the image which anatomy and the physical sciences give of it (p.161). Its reactions cannot be classified according to the mechanisms by which they occur, but 'selon leur signification vitale' (ibid) ('according to their vital significance'). In a footnote on p.162 he gives as an example 'le système sexuel'. Sexual reactions are not autonomous; sex cannot be separated from the nervous system, nor one subordinated to the other. 'Normal sexual life is integrated in the totality of behaviour' (own translation). This topic is expanded and dealt with in detail in PP in the chapter on the body as sexual being.

But what is behind this, what causes the organism to behave in the way it does? Merleau-Ponty spends several pages arguing against the hypothesis of an immanent vitalism. His particular target here is the 'élan vital' of Bergson (pp.164-168). For him the idea of signification is central to understanding the life of the organism (p.168). What does this refer to? The operation of the laws of physics in living organisms leaves an unexplained residue which is 'accessible to another type of coordination: coordination by *meaning'* (own translation: SC, p.169). There is clearly an overlap with the idea of intentionality here. The unity of organisms is 'une *unité de signification'* (ibid) ('a unity of signification').

In the following pages (pp.169-173), Merleau-Ponty examines what this means, how we can perceive and have knowledge of it, how this knowledge differs from knowledge of the laws of

[3] German title, *Der Aufbau des Organismus* (1934). Goldstein developed a holistic theory of the organism based on Gestalt theory which influenced not only existential philosophers, but also psychologists and psychotherapists. He developed his theory while working in and running a neurological clinic, dealing with cases of traumatic brain injuries following World War 1. There is an obvious affinity between his work and Merleau-Ponty's interest in and use of pathological examples.

physics and chemistry. First he stresses the importance of considering the organism as a totality:

'… the real organism, …, is the concrete totality of the organism perceived, vehicle of all the correlations which analysis discovers there and not decomposable into them' (own translation: SC, p.169).

We must look to biology and psychology to recognize the structures which cannot be reduced to laws. He introduces the term 'corps phénoménal' to describe what is being examined here. But the 'signification vitale' (ibid) does not come from the projection of an observer's own feelings based on the analogy of his own experience. '… the child understands the joyful meaning of the smile long before having seen his own smile, and that of threatening or melancholic expressions which he has never formed and to which his own experience cannot therefore furnish any content' (own translation). Here he uses child psychology to show that objective perception is not primary[4].

'it is therefore necessary that the gestures and attitudes of the phenomenal body have their own structure, an immanent signification, that it be from the beginning a centre of actions which radiate over a "milieu", …' (own translation: SC, p.170). He goes on to describe as 'certain nuclei of signification, certain animal essences', 'immanent to the phenomenal organism' (adapted from Fisher, p.157), the act of walking towards an objective, of taking hold of, of eating a prey, of jumping or going round an obstacle, which go beyond the elementary reactions of the reflexes, and thus constitute an *a priori* of biology.

Merleau-Ponty makes it clear that this does not mean that what he calls 'la perception commune' has a complete grasp of these structures (p.170). What it does show is that the causal explanations of classic psychology are invalid. But scientific observation can correct and add to 'la perception commune'. Here he cross-refers in a footnote ((3) on p.170) to a description by the comparative psychologist, Buytendijk, of his method of investigation. He quotes from Buytendijk, 'a "phenomenological investigation of the movements of expression" which "isolates a phenomenon, reduces it to its irreducible residue, contemplates its essential characteristics by means of an immediate intuition" (own translation) and comments that phenomenology is used here 'in the very broad sense of description of structures' (own translation). Merleau-Ponty gives the example of how the rich and confused notion of male

[4] See his later examination of 'la perception commençante' and 'la perception enfantine' (SC, pp.179-180). See p.128 below.

and female which 'common knowledge' holds is enhanced by a knowledge of causal correlations, for example the influence of endocrinal operations (pp.170-1). He concludes the paragraph with a summary of this 'phenomenological biology':

> … to understand these biological entities is not to note a series of empirical coincidences, is not even to establish a list of mechanical correlations; it is to tie together the totality of the known facts by their signification, to discover in all a characteristic rhythm, a general attitude towards certain categories of objects, perhaps even towards all things. (own translation: SC, p.171)

In the related footnote he points out that scholars and scientists do this all the time, even if they do not acknowledge it. When they recognize that an animal is tired, they do not need a physico-chemical analysis to be aware of 'la norme du comportement'.

After again criticizing the vitalist argument (pp.171-2), he moves on to flesh out his definition of the organism. It is

> a unity of signification, a phenomenon in the Kantian sense. It is given in perception … The totality is not an *appearance,* it is a *phenomenon ….* Vital acts *have* a meaning, they are not defined, even in science, as a sum of processes exterior to each other, but as the temporal and spatial deployment of certain ideal unities. (own translation: SC, p.172)

Merleau-Ponty gives a quote from Uexküll: 'every organism is a melody which sings itself' (own translation). Our external experience is of a multiplicity of structures and significant assemblages. Then he defines these external 'things' as they are 'in themselves'. Some of them, which belong to the world of physics, find the sufficient expression of their interior world in mathematical laws (p.173); the others, 'which we call the living, offer the particularity of having a behaviour, … their actions are not understandable as functions of the physical environment … on the contrary the parts of the world to which they react are defined for them by an interior norm' (own translation). Merleau-Ponty then defines what this norm is. It is not 'un devoir être qui *ferait* l'être' ('a should be which *would make* it be', or perhaps '*would make* being'), nor an overall purpose. '… it is the simple establishment of a privileged attitude, statistically more frequent, which gives to behaviour a unity …' (own translation: ibid). Contingency can never be ultimately eliminated from the existence of the inorganic or the organic. He concludes the section on the 'ordre vital':

> … the ideal structure of a behaviour allows us to connect back the present state of an organism to a previous state taken as given, to see in it the progressive realization of an essence already readable in the latter, without ever being able to arrive at the limit nor make the idea into a cause of existence. (own translation)[5]

I take 'l'idée' to refer back to 'la structure idéale'.

'L'ordre humain'

Merleau-Ponty moves on in the next section to consider the human order and its distinctive features. He begins by giving a summary of the previous two sections (pp.174-5).

A major point is the importance of dialectical, as distinct from mechanical relationships (p.174). Thus relations between the physical or organic individual and his surroundings ('entourage') are not mechanical, i.e. determined effects of a necessary and sufficient cause, but dialectical. The reaction of the organism to physical stimuli depends on their 'signification vitale' rather than on their material properties:

> Thus between the variables on which effectively depend behaviour and this particular behaviour there appears a relationship of meaning, an intrinsic relationship. One cannot assign a moment when the world acts on the organism, since the very effect of this "action" expresses the interior law of the organism. (own translation: ibid)

The 'milieu' and the 'aptitude' are effectively the two poles of behaviour and participate in the same structure. Biology refuses the conception of behaviours as objects in themselves existing *in* the nervous system or *in* the body. It recognises that they have a meaning and depend on the 'signification vitale' of their respective situations. It sees in them an incarnated dialectic which radiates out on the immanent milieu[6]. The object of biology is unthinkable 'without the unities of signification which a consciousness finds there and sees being deployed'

[5] This passage represents a counterpoint to Sartre's concept of the original project – see the Summary to Chapter 3. It suggests a structure for the more limited ontology of 'the movement of existence'.

[6] By 'immanent milieu', I take it that he refers to nature, the immanent conditions of life, e.g. the physical world, the body.

(own translation: SC, p.175). It is this unity of signification which distinguishes a gesture from a sum of movements.

If we move on and think about the human order, what we see first is the production of new structures. Consciousness from the point of view of the external observer is at first only the projection into the world of a new 'milieu' and humanity a new species of animal (ibid). 'In particular perception must in its turn be inserted in a dialectic of actions and of reaction' (own translation). He draws on Husserl to describe the distinctiveness of human behaviour:

> While a physical system finds equilibrium in regards to the given forces of the surroundings and the animal organism prepares itself a stable environment corresponding to the monotonous *a prioris* of need and instinct, human labour inaugurates a third dialectic, since it projects between man and physico-chemical stimuli "objects of use" … - clothing, the table, the garden, - "cultural objects"[7] … - which constitute the special milieu of man and cause new cycles of behaviour to emerge. (own translation: SC, p.175).

He continues by defining what he sees as the grounds of human originality:

'Just as it appeared impossible to us to reduce the couple vital situation – instinctive reaction to the couple stimulus – reflex, in the same way the originality of the couple situation perceived – work must no doubt be recognised' (own translation: SC, pp.175-6).

He explains that he uses the Hegelian term, 'travail', work, where most psychologists would use action, to denote the totality of activities by which man transforms physical and living nature. From this point Merleau-Ponty mainly focuses on the relationship between human perception and human action.

He moves on to reject in some detail (pp.176-179) Bergson's theory of perception. For Bergson, he says, human action is just another way of achieving instinctive aims, i.e. it is another aspect of 'l'ordre vital'. On the one hand there are a mosaic of preconscious sensations, from which the attention chooses, on the other impersonal forces (like the instincts) which transform them (pp.178-9). Essentially Merleau-Ponty sees human perception and action, even 'primitive', as having a relatively autonomous existence. '… there are melodic unities, significant combinations lived in an undivided way as poles of action and kernels of knowledge' (own translation: SC, p.179). He frequently uses melody and music as an image

[7] Including language.

to express the relatively independent existence of the whole, which has a meaning which goes beyond the sum and analysis of its parts[8]. I find the use of the word 'connaissance' somewhat unexpected here. He has been commenting on the relationship between perception and action; he introduces 'connaissance' as though we will take the step from 'perception' to 'connaissance' as given. He concludes the paragraph by returning to perception:

'Perception is a moment of the living dialectic of a concrete subject, participates in his total structure, and, correlatively, it has as its primitive object, not the "unorganized solid" but the actions of other human subjects' (own translation: ibid). The primacy of the perception of 'autrui' ('the other') is returned to several times in the rest of the section.

Merleau-Ponty moves on to examine the structure of consciousness[9]. He starts by looking at 'la vie primitive de la conscience' (p.180) ('the primitive life of consciousness), which he formulates in two other ways, 'La perception commençante' (pp.179-180) ('nascent perception') and 'la perception enfantine' (p.180) ('infantile perception'). His thesis is that 'la perception d'autrui' comes before the perception of objects or their qualities. 'Nascent perception has the double character of targeting human intentions rather than natural objects or pure qualities … and of grasping them as realities experienced rather than as true objects' (own translation: SC, pp.179-180). He continues, 'It is a known fact … that infantile perception attaches itself first to faces and gestures, in particular to those of the mother' (own translation). A child, just like an adult, can perceive a smile (and even a feeling behind the smile) without consciously or unconsciously being aware of the qualities of the face.

'Human signification is given before the alleged sensible signs. A face is a centre of human expression, the transparent envelope of the attitudes and desires of the other, …. From that it follows that it seems impossible to treat as a thing a face or a body even when it is dead' (own translation: SC, p.181).

Merleau-Ponty primarily uses the infantile example to explore the nature of perception but it also has a profound implication for the perception and experience of affectivity. The 'perception commençante' is concentrated on possibly the most intense *affective* relationship

[8] e.g. See quote from Uexküll on p.172 (see p.125 above), and p.188, 'une mélodie orientée', referring to the intentionality of movements.

[9] As with the mention of knowledge discussed above, the move to consciousness does not seem entirely clear. It is as though at this point he takes for granted a paradigm of 'l'ordre humain', where there is a connection or inter-relationship between perception, consciousness and knowledge. At this stage he has not established the relationship of perception to consciousness, nor why this is specific to humans.

which the child will experience throughout her or his life. Even though it may also be a function of the desire and need for nourishment and physical safety, the affective element is central[10].

Merleau-Ponty somewhat tentatively ('On pourrait être tenté de dire', p.181) ('One could be tempted to say') proposes another component of 'la perception commençante', the useful objects created by man. Even in adults, he says, they remain a focal point of perception. Here he moves onto two distinctive features of 'l'ordre humain', tools and language. He ascribes to language a central role 'dans la constitution du monde perçu' (p.182) ('in the constitution of the perceived world'). We do not have objects perceived which are then designated by words; rather the meaning of a word is determined by a child based on the 'contextes logiques' in which it is used:

'It is not because two objects resemble each other that they are designated by the same word, it is on the contrary because they are designated by the same word and are thus part of a same verbal and affective category, that they are perceived as resembling each other' (own translation: SC, p.182).

Words themselves he classifies as 'objets d'usage' ('useful objects'); nature, he again tentatively suggests ('peut-être', p.182)[11], is initially only perceived as the necessary background for the principal substance of 'la perception commençante', namely 'la représentation d'un drame humain'. Merleau-Ponty again brings in the gestalt notion of 'forme' to describe primitive perception. It does not grasp individual objects but lives them as realities. He gives the excellent example of the football pitch, which usually exists in the mind of the player and the spectator not as an object or objects but as the 'milieu', 'le fond' ('the background') of actions, which are their focus (pp.182-3). The pitch is present 'as the immanent term of his practical intentions' (Fisher, p.168: SC, p.183). Towards the end of the example he gives a definition of consciousness:

'It would not be sufficient to say that consciousness inhabits this environment. It is nothing other at this moment than the dialectic of the environment and action' (own translation: ibid).

[10] 'la perception commençante' described here seems as much part of 'l'ordre vital' as 'humain'. After all we commonly see in other species affectionate and protective mother-child relationships, motivated by the need for nourishment and safety.

[11] Presumably his tentativeness springs from the lack of certain knowledge in this area of child development.

This bridges to the next section, in which Merleau-Ponty examines in detail the structure of human consciousness. He rejects the idea of the purely empirical development of consciousness (pp. 183-4). Rather there is a predisposition in the child towards speech – 'If language did not encounter in the infant who hears someone speak, some predisposition to the act of speech, it would remain for him for a long time a phenomenon of sound among others, …' (own translation: SC, p.184). On the other hand he rejects the idea of the innateness of fundamental structures of behaviour as absurd. That, he says, would be to transfer what empiricism says comes from the outside to the inside, to 'une expérience interne' (ibid). Finally he turns to the findings of child psychology, precisely describing the difficulty of explaining the development and structure of consciousness (p.186).

> … infant psychology precisely proposes the enigma of a linguistic consciousness and of a consciousness of the other more or less pure, prior to that of sonic or visual phenomena, …. Speech, the other, cannot therefore derive their meaning from a systematic interpretation of sonic phenomena …. They are undecomposable structures and in this sense *a priori*s. (own translation)

Consciousness does not only consist of representations, judgements and thoughts (pp.186-7).

> Acts of thought would not be alone in having a meaning, in containing the prescience of what they are seeking; there would be a sort of blind recognition of the object desired by desire and of benefit by the will. It is by this means that the other can be given to the infant as the pole of his desires and his fears …., - that confused sensory combinations can nevertheless be very precisely identified as points of support for certain human intentions. … Consciousness is rather a network of significant intentions, sometimes clear to themselves, sometimes on the contrary lived rather than known. (own translation: SC, p.187)

Human action, he argues (p.188), is not just another solution of the problems which instinct resolves, a more ingenious means of achieving the same goals as animals. Even if all actions, human and animal, have as a function adaptation to life, the word 'life' does not have the same meaning for all species[12]. He continues to give illustrations of distinctive human attributes, again stressing the importance of language as a means of freeing man from the constraints of

[12] '… the conditions of life are defined by the particular essence of the species' (own translation: SC, p.188).

his environment – 'the speech act in the end expresses that he ceases to belong immediately to the environment, elevates it to the condition of spectacle and takes possession of it mentally by knowledge properly so called' (own translation assisted by Fisher, p.174: ibid).

For Merleau-Ponty, animal activity is limited (p.190). He continues with further examples of what he calls 'la dialectique humaine' (pp.189-191). 'These acts of the human dialectic', he concludes,

> all reveal the same essence: the capacity to orient oneself in relation to the possible, to the mediate, and not in relation to a limited environment, …. The human dialectic is ambiguous: it manifests itself first through the social or cultural structures which it causes to appear and in which it imprisons itself. (own translation, assisted by Fisher, p.175: SC, p.190)

But implicitly at the same time man can both reject and go beyond these structures.

It seems debatable both in general and in some of the specific instances which he describes whether his distinction of human and animal behaviour is not overstated and whether he understates the role of 'l'ordre vital'. We can see this in his criticism of Bergson's application of the concept of 'action vitale' to the human domain (see pp.139 and 143 above). Affectivity seems to be an area where there is less distinction between humans and animals and where 'l'ordre vital', e.g. physical reaction and instinct, often play the predominant role and the specifically human aspect is less prominent. This is not to say that there is not a human dimension to the 'milieu' and the expression of this affectivity. I think Merleau-Ponty would say that 'l'ordre vital' is of course operative in the human world but integrated, inter-reacting with the 'special' structures of that world[13]. Thus, for example, when he says that 'the word "life" does not have the same meaning in animality and in humanity' (own translation: SC, p.188) and goes on to refer to 'pudeur' ('modesty') (in respect to nudity and clothing), we could be said to see a 'new' emotion in the human order. But it may still have elements of the other orders, for example, the physiological aspects, e.g. blushing, feelings of fear and their associated vascular reactions; moreover, as he says on the same page, 'all actions allow an adaptation to life' (own translation), and, contested as the origin of 'social' emotions may be,

[13] See p.135 below for his explanation of the integration of the somatic and the psychological in man (SC, pp.195-6).

they do seem to lie ultimately in some advantage or 'need' of the species.

Another puzzling aspect is why he specifies some structures as part of the 'human order' and *not* 'vital'. He clearly distinguishes the 'human' and the 'animal', which implies that animals do not go beyond the dialectic of the 'vital order'. He only considers perception in the 'human order'. This again begins with his criticism of Bergson's theory of perception (see p.127 above). In the course of this, he defines animal perception, cross-referring in a footnote to a Bergson text:

> It has been clearly shown that animal perception is only sensible to certain concrete combinations of stimuli for which instinct itself prescribes the form and a lived abstraction has been well posited which leaves purely and simply outside the sensory field of the animal what does not correspond to the structure of his instinct. (own translation: SC, p.178)

This implies that animal perception is within 'l'ordre vital', part of the dialectic of need and instinct. Human perception on the other hand is part of the dialectic of the human subject (p.179). Merleau-Ponty lays great stress on the supposition that the primary ('primitif', p.179) object of human perception is the actions of other human subjects. The perception of the other comes before that of objects or their qualities. The coexistence of this perception with emotion is obvious in the child (and indeed in the adult). My query is whether it is right to identify this as 'human'. Merleau-Ponty identifies language and the other ('autrui') as *a priori* structures of human behaviour. Language is, as far as we know, a uniquely human attribute, although it is easy to see its origins in other forms of expressive gesture. But is he right to highlight the consciousness of the other in the human infant, as distinct from animals? Is not the centrality of the significant other, especially the mother, with its associated affectivity, present in the lives of many animals, especially other mammals?

Psychoanalysis

In the following section (pp.191-198), he sets out to show how the relationship between the human and the vital order is to be conceived. So far, he has described the advent of human action and perception and shown that they are *not* reducible to 'la dialectique vitale de l'organisme et de son milieu', even one modified by the contributions of sociological causality (p.191). But, he says, it is not enough to oppose a *description* to these reductive explanations;

their abuse of causality must be revealed, while at the same time he must give a positive account of how the relevant physiological and sociological dependencies should be conceived. He decides to use the example of Freudianism to examine and specify the relationship 'of the purely human dialectic with the vital dialectic' (own translation: SC, p.191). To justify his choice of example, he repeats the finding of child psychology, which he has already emphasized twice (see pp.124 and 128 above): 'As nascent perception is, much more than a cognitive and disinterested operation, an emotional contact of the infant with the centres of interest of his environment, …' (own translation: SC, p.191). It is not entirely clear why this justifies the choice of Freudianism, unless it is that Freudianism is precisely based on 'la perception enfantine'.

He starts by examining Freud's theory of the interpretation of dreams[14]. Merleau-Ponty does not question the erotic infrastructure or the role of censorship as posited by Freud (p.191). One might have thought that the latter did distinguish 'la dialectique proprement humaine' from 'la dialectique vitale', because he rejected purely physiological theories of dreams ('l'ordre vital') in favour of 'the explanation in the individual life of the dreamer and in its immanent logic' (own translation: ibid). Freud's theory is that the latent content of the dream, its real meaning, produces the manifest content through the generation of psychic energy by the conflict between the unconscious and a counter-acting censorship (pp.191-2). Merleau-Ponty questions whether the psychological mechanisms which Freud describes require the system of causal notions which he expounded, 'which transforms the discoveries of psychoanalysis into a metaphysical theory of human existence' (own translation: SC, p.192). He prefers a different interpretation of development:

> … it is easy to see that causal thought is not indispensable here and that one can speak another language. It would be necessary to consider development, not as the fixation of a given force on also given objects outside itself, but as a structuring … progressive and discontinuous of behaviour. (own translation: ibid)

He describes psychological development with 'structuration normale':

'Normal structuring is that which profoundly reorganizes behaviour, in such a way that infantile attitudes no longer have a place nor meaning in the new attitude; it would end up in a behaviour

[14] It is interesting and somewhat surprising that Merleau-Ponty is apparently not working from Freud's original writings. The footnotes and bibliography refer to a work by Politzer.

which is perfectly integrated of which each moment would be internally connected to the whole' (own translation assisted by Fisher, p.177).

Freud's causal explanation of behaviour is based on subjects whose behavioural development is deficient (p.194). His work is not a tableau of human existence, but 'un tableau d'anomalies', however frequent. For Merleau-Ponty, drawing on Goldstein, infantile attitudes no longer have a place or meaning in the normal structuring of behaviour (p.192). A complex and repression arise because of a situation in the past which the subject could not control and was anguished by, and therefore did not develop the appropriate structure of behaviour. When similar situations arise, he is 'stuck' in the same reaction. The Freudian unconscious, the complex and repression merely represent deficiencies in the individual's organisation and structuring of behaviour.

He uses the example of sublimation to illustrate this. In Freud's pathology, sublimation is a 'diversion of unemployed biological forces' (own translation: SC, p.194). For Merleau-Ponty, where sublimation and transfer have succeeded, the vital energies have been integrated into a new totality and have been 'supprimées comme forces biologiques'. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish cases where Freudian mechanisms operate and others where they are transcended. He concludes with a description of the successful sublimation, contrasted with Freud's:

> Others in the end, capable of incorporating into existence, in unifying it, what in the former was only an ideological pretext, *would be* truly men. In regard to them, the causal explanations of Freud … would only account for the most outward aspects of a real love, just as, according to Freud himself, the physiological explanations do not exhaust the contents of a dream. Spritual acts would have their own meaning and their internal laws. (own translation: SC, p.195)[15]

[15] The objection which the Freudian might make here is to question whether even in 'l'amour vrai' the so-called mechanisms are ever fully transcended. He would argue that even in mature or spiritual love, the experience of maternal or quasi-maternal protective love plays a major role in the learning and development of affection. He would go further and argue that the stereotypical childhood complexes, even if masked, continue to operate and influence behaviour throughout life, and that there are pathological features in everyday life.

Another theory of therapeutic origin and application, heavily influenced and inspired by Freud, as most such theories, which challenges Merleau-Ponty's view, is the personality theory of Transactional Analysis. In this theory every human being exhibits three types of ego states – Parent, Adult and Child. The Parent state is borrowed from his or her own parents when he or she was a child, the Adult and Child states are self-explanatory. The Child state is with the individual all his life and is the most valuable part of his personality. This sort of theory, as could be argued about Freudianism, does not *exclude* a

‘L’ordre humain’ (continued)

In the following paragraph (pp.195-6), Merleau-Ponty picks up on the last sentence in the quote above to explore how ‘le spirituel’, ‘l’esprit’, functions, its relationship to the other ‘orders’, and more generally the structuring of human behaviour. We have to remember that ‘l’esprit’ is by no means equivalent to the English ‘spirit’. ‘Esprit’ refers especially to the intelligence; indeed that seems an appropriate translation here, as in French philosophical writing generally. So in this paragraph Merleau-Ponty distinguishes ‘le spirituel’ from ‘le psychique’, although as he goes on to explain they are not distinct in action. To present his view schematically, ‘l’ordre humain’ has two subdivisions, ‘le psychique’ and ‘le spirituel’, with the latter described as ‘supérieur’ to the former (p.195), meaning functionally superior (higher up the scale). Merleau-Ponty’s main point here is that the orders which he has identified do not have isolated, separate existences (pp.195-6). Each order fully integrates the order ‘below’ and gives its actions a new signification. The distinction between the psychological and the somatic is useful in pathology but does not help us to understand the normal man, in whom they are integrated. Then again we have to distinguish man from animals. He gives the example of ‘la vie sexuelle’; sexuality in animals is periodic and monotonous, in humans it is continuous and varied. So in the human order biological behaviour is reorganised ‘dans des ensembles nouveaux’ (‘in new combinations’) with a new significance (p.195). ‘… the body in the normal subject … is not distinct from the psychological’ (own translation, assisted by Fisher, p.181: SC, p.196). The same sort of things can be said about ‘l’esprit’. It is integrated with the vital and the psychic, so that, for example, ‘The alteration of higher functions reaches as far as the so-called instinctive structures’ (Fisher, p.181: ibid). He again gives the example of the effect of cognitive difficulties on sexual performance. He concludes:

> … if the alleged instincts of man do not exist *apart* from the mental dialectic, correlatively this dialectic is not conceivable outside of the concrete situations in which it is embodied.

‘structuration progressive … qui réorganize la conduite en profondeur’ (SC, p.192); indeed the theory has been designed to help achieve that; but it does not suppress ‘les attitudes enfantines’ (ibid). (Summary based on Berne, E. (1974) *What Do You Say After You Say Hello?,* London: Corgi Books, pp, 30-31).

> One does not act with mind alone. Either mind is nothing, or it constitutes a real and not an ideal transformation of man. (Fisher, p.181: ibid)

It is a new form of unity, not of being.

In the very last paragraph of Chapter III, which deals with the orders and their relationship, Merleau-Ponty summarises again the three dialectics which he has explored (p.199). Assisted by the notion of structure or form, he has rejected mechanism and finalism. '… the "physical", the "vital", the "psychic" did not represent three powers of being, but three dialectics' (own translation, assisted by Fisher, p.184). He repeats the double, paradoxical aspect of this analysis, which "founded" each 'higher' order on the 'lower', while accepting its autonomy[16].

But, he says, this double rapport remains obscure, so we must compare our results to the 'solutions classiques' and in particular critical idealism. So he proposes to examine consciousness, which he does at length in the final chapter. He returns to the aim which he stated in the first sentence of the work (see p.120 above), the understanding of the relationship between consciousness and nature. Merleau-Ponty has developed an account of the structure of behaviour in order to examine this relationship, on the basis that consciousness is 'un type particulier de comportement' (p.199) ('a particular type of behaviour'). But the account can be applied to all other psychic phenomena, for example, for our purposes, emotion and affectivity. Merleau-Ponty on the other hand comes up against a particular problem in applying a behavioural approach to consciousness (ibid).

> We were considering, when we set out, consciousness as a region of being and as a particular type of behaviour. In the course of analysis, it is found to be supposed everywhere as the place of ideas and everywhere connected as integration of existence. What therefore is the relationship between consciousness as universal milieu and consciousness rooted in the subordinate dialectics? Does the point of view of the "outside spectator" have to be abandoned as illegitimate in the interests of an unconditional reflection? (own translation, assisted by Fisher, p.184)

The point of view of the 'spectateur étranger' refers back to the 'perception extérieure' of the previous paragraph, in which he commended the perspectives both of experiment and the verifiable accounts of introspection (see section on Methodology below). He questions

[16] '… chacun d'eux, n'étant pas une nouvelle substance, devrait être conçu comme une reprise et une « nouvelle structuration » du précédent' (p.199); 'each of them, not being a new substance, should be conceived as a taking up and a "new structuring" of the previous one' (own translation).

whether the objective approach is valid or whether consciousness can only be examined by ‘réflexion inconditionnée’.

Methodology – psychology, perception and phenomenology

Psychology

Towards the end of Chapter III, he briefly compares his theory to the various schools of psychology (pp.196-8). He first mentions ‘psychology as science of the facts of consciousness’ (own translation), by which I presume he refers to psychology based on introspection; then, by contrast, ‘the psychology without consciousness of Watson’ (own translation), meaning behaviourism. He then contrasts the latter with a modification, ‘Purposive behaviourism’, put forward by Tolman, which introduces intentionality into animal and human behaviour. Merleau-Ponty objects to this because it still relies on cause and effect, stimuli and responses (p.197). It replaces ‘une réalité matérielle’ with ‘une réalité psychique’ and does not see that when behaviour is taken ‘in its “unity” and in its human meaning’ (own translation) we are not concerned with a material or psychic reality but ‘un ensemble significatif’, a structure which does not belong wholly either to the external world or the inner life.

Then he attempts to reconcile, as it were, the introspective and behaviourist approaches (pp.197-8), arguing that there can be objective descriptions of behaviour, combining an ‘external' objective approach and introspection, claiming that he has himself attempted this (p.198). First he describes an experimental method, such as used in animal psychology (pp.197-8), concluding ‘There is an objective analysis and definition of perception, of intelligence, of emotion as structures of behaviour. … The psychic thus understood can be grasped from the outside’ (own translation). What is most striking here is his description and defence of introspection as a ‘a procedure of the acquisition of knowledge homogeneous with external observation’ (own translation). His conclusion here is very positive; he commends both the experimental and the introspective method as practical approaches to the structures and meaning of behaviour. He acknowledges the shortcomings of introspection as a means of access to ‘l’expérience vécue’ (‘lived experience’) (p.198), because it is always screened by language. These are of a different type to the shortcomings of the experimental method but not of a notably different degree. Even the reports and conclusions of introspection need to

be tested and verified in action; it is not enough to rely on the report of a vague impression. He concludes by commending both approaches.

Historic theories of perception

Merleau-Ponty's examines the problem of the relationship between objective perception and transcendental consciousness and their validity, which was posed at the end of Chapter III (see above), in the final chapter, Chapter IV 'The relations of the soul and the body and the problem of perceptive consciousness' (own translation). He begins this by reviewing various philosophical theories of perception, foreshadowing and sometimes repeating ideas which he deals with at greater length in *Phenomenology of Perception*. In SC he deals with them in an ascending order of philosophical sophistication (pp.200-217). He begins with the perception of 'la conscience naïve' (pp.200-4). Much of the material in his account here of 'la perception vécue' is strongly reminiscent of PP, for example the description of perspective and subjectivity (pp.201-2) and the criticism of empiricism and intellectualism (p.202). Similarly his account of the experience of the body by 'la conscience naïve' (pp.203-4) is the forerunner of a major theme of the later work. The body is not yet taken as a physiological reality; the unity of man has not yet been broken; there is no causal relationship between soul and body; 'Our intentions find in movements their natural clothing and express themselves in them as the thing does … in its perspective aspects' (own translation: SC, p.203). Man lives in a universe of experience, in direct contact with beings, things and his own body. The ego, source of his intentions, the body which effects them, the beings and things to which his attentions are addressed are not confused; they are three sectors 'd'un champ unique' (p.204) ('of a single field').[17]

He next examines realism (pp.204-7) and then purely scientific (physiological and psychological) explanations of perception (pp.207-10). These seek to explain perception as the result of the combination of various mechanical actions or as a function of certain physical variables (p.208). However these do not sufficiently account for the 'champ phénoménal' (207-8, passim). Any attempt to explain 'le spectacle effectif du monde' by a pure realism, 'as a real

[17] There is an interesting reference to magic and the miraculous in this passage, in which Merleau-Ponty contradicts Sartre's frequent use of magic to describe and explain lived psychic experiences, especially in ETE (pp.101-3,108, 115). Merleau-Ponty mentions the possibility of a magical connection but rejects it on the grounds that the subject does not believe that it requires a miracle for his mental states to lead to action on or knowledge of external things; he lives in 'un commerce direct avec les êtres, les choses et son propre corps', as part of 'la dialectique vécue'. See p.51f. for the full quotation.

operation of the thing on the body and on the perceiving subject' (own translation) does not work. 'L'objet phénoménal' has two layers; that of the perspective in which it is seen and that of the 'thing' which is seen. This ideal presentation ('référence'), the ambiguity which this represents[18] can be described or understood, but not explained by a psycho-physiological law (p.210).

Next he deals with Cartesianism (pp.210-213). He quotes Descartes to explain the originality of the latter's approach to perception.

'… the radical originality of Cartesianism is to situate itself within perception itself, not to analyze vision and touch as functions of our body, but "only the thought of seeing and touching" (Fisher, p.195: SC, p.210).

Where Descartes falls short, Merleau-Ponty says (pp.211-13), is in not satisfactorily integrating knowledge of truth and the experience of reality, intellection and sensation.

> Thus the universe of consciousness revealed by the *cogito* and in the unity of which even perception itself seemed to be necessarily enclosed was only a universe of thought in the restricted sense: it accounts for the thought of seeing, but the fact of vision and the ensemble of existential knowledges remain outside of it. (Fisher, p.197: SC, p.212)

But it is by integrating the two, so that the body and things are defined as unchallengeable objects of a consciousness, that the problems of realism can be solved and the alternatives of realism and scepticism can be overcome (p.213).

This leads into consideration of how critical philosophy seeks to achieve this integration (pp.213-217).

In critical philosophy, 'ordinary' perception becomes 'an incipient science, a first organization of experience which is completed only by scientific coordination' (Fisher, p.201). This leads to a very different take on 'la conscience naïve' and immediate experience from that of the start of the chapter (see above). He quotes Brunschvig: '"The universe of immediate experience … is a superficial and damaged world, …"' (own translation). For critical philosophy the dialectic of the epistemological subject and the scientific object is presupposed by and is the completed form of all consciousness (SC, p.217).

[18] The ambiguity that we have only partial, perspective views of things, but have no difficulty in believing in their full existence.

The dialectic of the orders, gestalt and phenomenology

Merleau-Ponty begins the following and final section of the work by asking whether his analyses lead to this conclusion also. He accepts that they at least lead to 'the transcendental attitude, that is, to a philosophy which treats all conceivable reality as an object of consciousness' (Fisher, p.201: SC, p.217). He then summarizes (pp.217-8) his earlier conclusions, stressing again the integration of the three orders as 'plans de signification' and that the interrelationships between them and between the living being and his environment are not those of separate realities but 'dialectical relations in which the effect of each partial action is determined by its signification for the whole' (Fisher, p.202: SC, p.218). On this view the problem of the relationship between mind and body seems to disappear (p.218f.), since we can no longer distinguish between them as if they were separate substances.

Perception cannot be explained by purely physical or physiological phenomena (pp.220-221). 'Le champ phénoménal' operates in accordance with its own articulations (p.221). Science has not been able to explain behaviour (including perception) as if it was something enclosed inside the brain; it can only understand it as a dialectic of phenomenal objects and actions. He reinforces this (pp.221-2) with the example of the hallucination. A bodily event may provoke the hallucination but it is not the cause of 'l'image hallucinatoire'. The sum of events in the nervous system can only be the condition of its existence. 'The somatic substratum is the point of passage, the point of support of a dialectic' (own translation: SC: p.222), in which perception opens itself 'onto a network of original significations' (own translation: SC: p.222).

So, says Merleau-Ponty (p.222), our first conclusion from the preceding chapters is that we are led to the transcendental position. But this conclusion is only nominally the same as that of crtically inspired philosophy. The two related concepts which he picks out as distinctive in his account are the Gestalt and structure.

> What is profound in the notion of "Gestalt" from which we started is not the idea of signification, but that of *structure*, the joining of an idea and an existence which are indiscernable, the contingent arrangement by which materials begin to have meaning in our presence, intelligibility in the nascent state. (Fisher, pp.206f.: SC, p.223)

Perception

In the curse of the final chapter, Merleau-Ponty makes a move which is highly significant for his later work. The consciousness for which the Gestalt exists is not intellectual consciousness but perceptive experience. It is perceptive consciousness which we must interrogate to find 'un éclaircissement définitif' ('a definitive clarification'). But for the moment we will restrict ourselves to examining how the status of the object, the relationship of form and matter, mind and body, the individuality and plurality of consciousness are 'founded' in it (pp.227-8). This he proceeds to do in the remaining pages of SC*,* while he will examine perceptive experience in depth in his next work.

In the last paragraph of the chapter and the work, Merleau-Ponty summarises the philosophical difficulty which his account of perception produces (pp.240-1). On the one hand the structures identified appear to be capable of intellectual analysis; on the other hand the contingency, the flux, 'des perspectives vécues' limits our access to their meaning. He foresees that the critical solution may no longer work. 'We would have to redefine transcendental philosophy in such a way as to integrate with it the very phenomenon of the real' (own translation).

Summary

We will not find a specific treatment or discussion of affectivity and emotion in SC, other than the occasional reference. On the other hand, we can hope to use its account of the structure and development of behaviour to provide a basis for an examination of their structure and meaning.

Behaviour and meaning

Merleau-Ponty's approach to behaviour, as he makes clear, is not to be confused with Watsonian behaviourism, which relies on reflex and causal relationships to explain behaviour. He constantly rejects the idea of mechanical relationships based on cause and effect (see below). Two concepts are central to his approach; gestalt and dialectic. Gestalt refers to the idea that physical and psychological reactions cannot be treated in isolation from the situation and intentions of the organism taken as a whole. His use of dialectic again represents a rejection of simple, essentially linear relationships of cause and effect. He uses it to refer to

productive interrelationships in which two or more 'fields' interact, resulting in a revised form of behaviour.

One advantage of approaching action as behaviour is that the 'meaning' of the action is implicit in the concept of behaviour with its purposeful nature. We see in Merleau-Ponty's text that structure and meaning are not dealt with as separate topics but are inextricably linked, indeed integrated. Thus, for example, on p.169, he describes the unity of organisms as 'une *unité de signification'*.

Criticism of empiricism, defence of the empirical method

The first three chapters of SC represent an extended rejection of the causal explanations of orthodox science. Merleau-Ponty proposes 'la pensée dialectique' and the operation of 'gestalt' as alternatives to 'cause and effect' (SC, footnote p.3, p.49 and p.161). There is a dialectical relationship between the organism and its 'milieu', which produces new relationships. The reactions of the organism cannot be classified according to the mechanisms by which they occur, but 'selon leur signification vitale' (p.161)[19]. These 'noyaux de signification' ('these nuclei of signification') of the phenomenal body constitute an *a priori* of biology (p.170). But this does not mean that science and causal explanations do not contribute to the understanding of the structure of meanings inherent in the organism (pp.170-173). Thus he quotes from Buytendijk and Uexküll to reinforce his stress on meaning.

Towards the end of Chapter III, he argues that there can be objective descriptions of behaviour. He himself has used just such an external, objective approach. At the same time this does not rule out an introspective approach. Though it has shortcomings and should not be favoured as the only or privileged means of accessing 'faits psychiques', it is one of the possible perspectives on the structure and immanent meaning of behaviour (p.198).

[19] 'according to their vital signification' (own translation).

The structure of existence

He describes human behaviour as operating in three wholly integrated fields, which he denominates as 'l'ordre physique', 'l'ordre vital' and 'l'ordre humain'. The latter refers to the unique role of consciousness in human behaviour and the symbolic behaviour of which generally man alone is capable. Though he does not exclude a role for science in clarifying the structures of the body, Merleau-Ponty's focus is on what he describes as 'le corps phénoménal', of which the gestures and movements have their own structure and meaning in their action on and inter-reaction with the environment ('milieu').

The place of emotion and affectivity

The integration of 'l'ordre physique' and 'l'ordre vital' provides a framework for the connection between the physiological and the mental, in the context of emotion and affect, which has so exercised philosophers, physiologists, psychologists and neuroscientists, viz. the James-Lange theory of the physical basis of emotion, which is still under discussion after 130 years.

At the same time Merleau-Ponty rejects Bergson's emphasis on the primacy of the vital, and makes a distinction between humans and animals. He emphasizes the species-specific features in the human environment, which justify a degree of integration of the human order with the physical/vital orders in the description of human emotion. He draws on Husserl to distinguish 'l'organisme animal' from 'le travail humain'. The animal constructs a stable milieu for itself corresponding to the monotonous *a prioris* of need and instinct. Man on the other hand produces new structures, objects which can be used, which range from tools and clothing to cultural objects, such as language.

The psychoanalytic theory of the mind versus structure

Merleau-Ponty compares his own theory to Freudian psychoanalysis (pp.191-5). Both the theory which he has put forward of the human dialectic and psychoanalysis start from the 'perception enfantine'. As he says, this is '… much more than a cognitive and disinterested operation, an emotional contact of the infant with the centres of interest of his environment, …' (own translation: SC, p.191). He fundamentally disagrees with the Freudian use of underlying causal explanations, based on the concept of psychic energy and its inhibition. His view is that child (and adult) development consists of the progressive structuring of behaviour

and that psychological pathology represents deficiencies in the development of these structures, not unconscious censorship and repression.

Before concluding, he looks at a problem to which he will return in the Cogito chapter of the *Phénoménologie*, the problem of how and why consciousness falls into error and creates false meanings. His explanation of imperfect dialectical relationships and partial structures contradicts Freud's of misdirected psychic energy. He also excludes the Freudian idea of the unconscious. His view is that psychic events have an *immanent* signification consisting of their effective structure. This has to be distinguished from their ideal signification, which can be true or false.

CHAPTER 5 PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIE DE LA PERCEPTION

In *Phénoménologie de la Perception* Merleau-Ponty continues the move which he made towards the end of SC[20]. This is to focus on basic perception and perceptive experience. We cannot therefore look here to find a global account of affectivity and emotion, such as we find in Book II of Hume's *Treatise*, in Descartes' *Les Passions de l'Âme* or Sartre's *Esquisse*. However, there are chapters and passages where he focuses on particular topics in emotion and affectivity. We can look for material relevant to our topic in three areas:

1) The examination of the scope and methodology of phenomenological enquiry, especially in the 'Avant-propos' and Introduction, and the emphasis on the centrality of the domain of the 'l'irréfléchi' therein.
2) Material relating to the structure and meaning of affectivity and emotion in existence drawn from passages in Part I on the Body, dealing with the relationship between body and soul, the structure of this relationship and their fusion, and from descriptions of valorization in perception of the world and objects (including intersubjective others), in the chapters on 'Le Sentir' and 'La Liberté'.
3) The chapters and passages which expressly deal with topics in affectivity and emotion, i.e. the chapters on the body as sexual being, the body as expression and speech and the section in the Cogito chapter on feelings. I have commented on each of these separately. I shall then consider their contribution to our main themes in the conclusion to the chapter.

Methodology – phenomenology, science and psychology

Avant-propos

Merleau-Ponty begins the work with the question, 'What is phenomenology?' (p.I) which he attempts to answer in his preface. Where do emotion and feeling fit in the definitions which he

[20] See above, p.141.

gives here? They are just one psychological phenomenon (or set of psychological phenomena) included in the 'irréfléchi' which 'réflexion' reflects on (p.IV). 'Reflection' is 'like a change in the structure of consciousness' (own translation). But reflection has to recognize that there is something which it cannot change, 'the world which is given to the subject because the subject is given to himself' (own translation). He emphasizes twice the descriptive function of phenomenology as defined by Husserl:

> It is a matter of describing, not of explaining or analyzing. Husserl's first directive to phenomenology, in its early stages, to be a "descriptive psychology", or to return to the "things themselves", is from the start a foreswearing of science. … The whole universe of science is built upon the world as directly experienced and … we must begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the second-order expression. (Smith, p.xi: PP, pp.II-III)

Then:

> The real has to be described, not constructed or formed. Which means that I cannot put perception into the same category as the syntheses represented by judgements, acts or predications. My field of perception is constantly filled with a play of colours, noises and fleeting tactile sensations which … I … immediately place in the world, without ever confusing them with my daydreams. (Smith, p.xi: PP, pp.IV-V)

If the reality of my perception was based only on the coherence of "representations", it would always be hesitant and conjectural.

Merleau-Ponty's characteristic emphasis here is on perception but the 'irréfléchi' which is affect is implicitly subject to the same epistemic and existential conditions[21].

Introduction

He returns to the nature of phenomenology in Chapter IV of the Introduction, 'Le Champ Phénoménal'. Intellectualism and empiricism both fail to capture 'l'expérience directe' (pp.65-6). Merleau-Ponty sets out to situate this in relation to science, psychology and philosophy. The trouble with science is that it reduces experience to the level of 'la nature physique' and

[21] For a fuller consideration of the methodological aspects of the Preface to PP, see the Introduction to the Thesis.

turns the living body into a thing without interior (p.67). The affective and practical positionings of the living subject in face of the world are thus reabsorbed into a psychophysiological mechanism. Every evaluation, however complex the situation, becomes the result of a simple reaction of pleasure or pain; action is entirely put down to the nervous mechanism (p.68). Sense experience is thus detached from affectivity and motility and becomes totally explicable by physiology.

> The living body thus transformed ceased to be my body, the visible expression of a concrete Ego, to become an object among all the others. Correlatively the body of the other could not appear to me as the envelope of another Ego. … We therefore no longer had a constellation of selves coexisting in a world. (own translation: ibid)

Everything becomes part of *l'en soi*; the only real *pour soi* is the thought of the scientist who perceives this system.

This philosophy, 'the ideal of knowledge fixed by the thing perceived' (own translation), falls apart in front of us (p.69). Firstly, physics itself recognised the limits of its determinations and the pure concepts by which it had operated. Secondly 'the organism … opposes to physico-chemical analysis … the difficulty in principle of a signifying being' (own translation). Here in a footnote he cross-refers to SC*;* these two points effectively summarise the significant conclusions of that work. But he goes beyond them in the paragraph on page 69, and directly criticizes the ideas of positive and rational philosophy. In particular he squarely places the development and tradition of rationalism in a historical perspective. He has two targets here, which he links; philosophy inspired by classical science which believes that it has direct access to the object and rationalism, founded on that, which believes that reason can govern life and solve the problems of life and the world. It seems worthwhile to quote the conclusion of the paragraph more or less in full, as it summarizes the method and position, not only of Merleau-Ponty's approach to perception, but of existential phenomenology as a whole.

> … classical science is a perception which forgets its origins and believes itself complete. The first philosophical act would therefore be to return to the lived world which is prior to the objective world, …, to restore to things their concrete physiognomy, to organisms their individual ways of dealing with the world, and to subjectivity its inherence in history. Our task will be, moreover, to rediscover phenomena, the layer of living experience through which other people and things are first given to us, the system "Self-others-things" as it comes into being; to reawaken perception and foil its trick of allowing us to

> forget it as a fact and as perception in the interests of the object which it presents to us and of the rational tradition to which it gives rise. (mainly Smith, p.66: PP, p.69)[22]

He then moves on to criticise the idea that 'le champ phénoménal' is only accessible to individual introspection or Bergsonian intuition (pp.69-70). If access to it is only through interiority, defined by impression, then there are two overwhelming difficulties; firstly interiority escapes in principle any attempt at expression. Communication of these intuitions is reduced to 'a sort of incantation destined to induce in others experiences analogous to those of the philosopher' (own translation: PP, p.70). Secondly the subject is unable to account for what she/he sees in the moment, because it would be necessary to think it, that is, to fix and deform it. 'The immediate was therefore a lonely, blind and mute life' (Smith, pp.66f.). Merleau-Ponty then gives a positive account of the method of phenomenology and its approach to perception (pp.70-71).

'Le retour au phénoménal' (p.70) ('the return to the phenomenal') transforms the notion of 'l'immédiat':

'… henceforth the immediate is no longer the impression, the object which is one with the subject, but the meaning, the structure, the spontaneous arrangement of parts'. In particular, 'the mental life of others becomes an immediate object, a whole charged with immanent meaning' (Smith, p.67: ibid).

This does not rule out the use of introspection; my own 'psychisme' can be approached in exactly the same way as that of 'autrui'[23]. So in the rest of the work he can use indifferently the internal experience of his own perception and the external experience of 'sujets percevants' (footnote (1), ibid). But the 'retour au phénoménal' is not so straightforward epistemologically (p.71), as the essence of consciousness is to forget its own phenomenal experience in order to constitute objects. 'Nothing is more difficult than to know exactly *what we see*' (own translation). There is 'a dialectic whereby perception hides itself from itself'

[22] Dorfman (2009) expresses how radical reflection is different from an intellectualist or a Cartesian reflection. 'Whereas the latter conceives itself as all-powerful, as capable of constituting the world on its own, radical reflection recognises … what lies beneath it, that is, the enormous carnal zone which is characterised by Merleau-Ponty as 'pre-objective or 'unreflective':' (p.140).

[23] '… l'introspection, ramenée à ce qu'elle a de positif, consiste elle aussi à expliciter le sens immanent d'une conduite' (PP, p.71); '… introspection, when brought down to its positive content, consists equally in making the immanent meaning of any behaviour explicit' (Smith, p.67).

(Smith, p.67). But phenomenal experience can always be *accessed* by consciousness, as it is always the basis of objective consciousness, whether naïve or scientific.

Thus phenomenology bridges the gap between science and 'le vécu' – 'Experience of phenomena … is … the bringing to light of the prescientific life of consciousness which alone endows scientific operations with meaning …. It is not an irrational conversion, but an intentional analysis' (Smith, p.68: ibid). Presumably the accusation of irrationality is imagined as coming from science because 'la vie préscientifique' must by definition be without reason (see p.147f. above). But Merleau-Ponty makes a science-like claim for phenomenology; it is an 'analyse', 'une analyse intentionnelle', bringing to light intentionality as the factor which science has left out.

Phenomenological psychology must also, he says, be distinguished from introspective psychology (pp.71-2). The latter explores consciousness as just another sector of being and takes for granted 'the absolute existence of the world around it' (own translation: PP, p.72). The phenomenological psychologist, by contrast, who thematises his reflection with the *Gestalt,* inevitably sees that the spatial and qualitative values of what is perceived are determined by perception. Consciousness cannot be analysed without taking us beyond the postulates of common sense. 'A psychology is always led to the problem of the constitution of the world' (own translation: PP, p.73).

Methodology (continued) – reflexion and the transcendental position

The problem with psychological reflexion (and much philosophical as well) is that 'le champ phénoménal' becomes 'le champ transcendantal' (p.73). There becomes only one real subject, 'l'Ego méditant' ('the thinking Ego'). Through it, I can take entire possession of my experience and realise 'l'adéquation du réfléchissant au réfléchi' ('the equating of the reflecting to the reflected'). But the reason and order which we apply to nature never lose their facticity (p.74). Reflexion is always creative and participative in facticity:

> If then we want reflection to maintain, in the object on which it bears, its descriptive characteristics, and thoroughly to understand that object, we must not consider it as a mere return to universal reason and see it as anticipated in unreflective experience, we

> must regard it as a creative operation which itself participates in the facticity of that (the unreflective) experience. (Smith, p.71: PP, p.74)

Reflexion only ever has a partial view and a limited capability. '… the thinking Ego can never abolish its inherence in an individual subject, which knows all things in a particular perspective' (Smith, p.71: ibid).

> Reflection cannot be thorough-going, or bring a complete elucidation of its object, if it does not arrive at awareness of itself as well as of its results. We must …reflect on this reflection, understand the natural situation which it is conscious of succeeding … The core of philosophy is no longer an autonomous transcendental subjectivity, to be found everywhere and nowhere: it lies in the perpetual beginning of reflection, at the point where an individual life begins to reflect on itself. Reflection is truly reflection only if it is not carried outside itself, only if it knows itself as reflection-on-an-unreflective-experience, and consequently as a change in structure of our existence. (Smith, p.72: PP, pp.75-6)

He concludes the chapter (pp.76-77) with a fundamental statement and defence of his method. In so doing he emphasises the interweaving of psychology and philosophy. Can thought, reflexion ever totally cease to be inductive to the point of possessing the whole texture of an experience? A truly transcendental, radical philosophy considers itself as a problem, and recognises that the presumption of reason is the fundamental problem of philosophy. We have to start with psychology in order to follow methodically the steps leading from 'l'attitude naturelle' to the transcendental position. We have to explore 'le champ phénoménal' in order to become acquainted with the subject of phenomena by means of psychological descriptions. If not, we will miss the real problem of the constitution of the transcendental dimension. But psychology alone is not enough.

> In order to revive perceptual experience buried under its own results, it would not have been enough to present descriptions of them which might possibly not have been understood, we had to establish by philosophical references and anticipations the point of view from which they might appear true. …. Experience anticipates a philosophy and philosophy is merely an elucidated experience. (Smith, p.73: PP, p.77)

So, he concludes, let us begin our examination of the 'le champ phénoménal' with the psychologist, until the latter's self-criticism leads us to an understanding of the phenomenon

of the phenomenon and thus decisively turns ‘le champ phénoménal’ into ‘champ transcendantal’.

Structure and meaning

‘Le Corps’

As mentioned above, on p.145, two chapters in this section of the *Phénoménologie* deal explicitly with topics relevant to affectivity, Chapter V, ‘Le Corps comme Être Sexué’ and Chapter VI, ‘Le Corps comme Expression et la Parole’. These are discussed separately below. A further relevant topic is dealt with in Chapter I, ‘Le corps comme objet et la physiologie mécaniste’. Here Merleau-Ponty explores the idea of existence having two forms, the personal and the impersonal or the general. This binary structure, variously formulated, is a constant theme in the psychology and physiology of existence in this work. The impersonal is roughly the organic aspect, equating to the physical and vital orders examined in SC. This form of the impersonal can help to formulate and explain the physical aspect of affectivity and its spontaneity, outside our conscious control.

Merleau-Ponty introduces this in the course of the examination of the phenomenon of the phantom limb. He likens this to the experience and effect of psychological repression (pp.98ff). The subject engages on a certain trajectory and encounters an obstacle. He can neither overcome the obstacle nor give up his aim, so he remains blocked and expends his energy indefinitely in continuing to try to pursue this aim, consciously or unconsciously.

> One present among all presents thus acquires an exceptional value; it displaces the others and deprives them of their value as authentic presents …. Impersonal time continues its course but personal time is arrested …. I forgo my constant power of providing myself with “worlds” in the interest of one of them, and for that very reason this privileged world loses its substance and eventually becomes no more than *a certain dread*. (Smith, p.96: PP, p.98-9)

For Merleau-Ponty repression, the psychic complex are examples of the universal phenomenon of ‘l’avènement de l’impersonnel’ (p.99) (‘the advent of the impersonal’). Around our personal existence appears ‘a margin of *almost* impersonal existence’ (Smith, p.96); around the particular human world which each of us has made for himself there is ‘a world in general’, ‘our condition of incarnated beings’, ‘my organism, as prepersonal adhesion to the

general form of the world, as anonymous and general existence' (own translation: ibid), which plays, beneath my personal life, the role of an innate complex. On the face of it he here gives a different account of the relationship between the organic and the distinctively human from that in SC. He does not mention the dialectical relationship between them, which is such a prominent feature of the earlier account[24]. He also begins to reflect on the importance of time as a condition of existence. But we must bear in mind that here he is examining lived experience, not primarily explaining the biological and cultural framework, as in the earlier work. In contradiction to the identification which I have suggested above between affectivity and the anonymous, he makes it clear (p.100) that a particular emotion ('un deuil', and its associated 'peine') is part of the personal existence. On the other hand, the physical component in affectivity, the common view of it as a more 'primitive' mental activity suggests that it draws on the autonomous prepersonal. Merleau-Ponty goes on to say that these affective episodes (or presumably other mental acts), which fill life in the present, are in fact intermittent and that they never fully transcend the prepersonal, autonomous and anonymous life of the body (pp.100-101). And this, he thinks, is how we can understand 'la fusion de l'âme et du corps' ('the fusion of the soul and the body'). He also brings in time as the third element which determines the nature of existence:

'The fusion of soul and body in the act, the sublimation of biological into personal existence, and of the natural into the cultural world is made both possible and precarious by the temporal structure of our experience' (Smith, p.97: PP, p.100).

And the experience of time he particularly associates with the body ('… the ambiguity of being-in-the-world is translated by that of the body, and this is understood through that of time' (Smith, p.98: PP, p.101)). In summary he writes: in consciousness we are in the present; we have an illusion of transcending the past and the future and even the body, but there are situations where we do not transcend the body (for example, illness and death) and the experience of our body reminds us that we cannot transcend the past. Indeed in the experience of our body we experience the elements of time.

[24] On the other hand, the passage quoted on p.152 below, including 'la sublimation de l'existence biologique en existence personnelle, du monde naturel en monde culturel', suggests a conception of the relationship between the levels of existence reminiscent of that in the earlier work.

Could the change of emphasis in PP to a binary structure be motivated by the influence of existential psychology in this later work? To incorporate the freedom of choice required by existentialism, he has to distinguish 'le Moi naturel' from 'mon être propre, celui dont je suis responsable et dont je décide' (p.250).

He also suggests another potential element in the 'illusion' of the phantom limb (pp.101-2). He first compares it to the complex, the repression of the neurotic; it is 'a former present which cannot decide to recede into the past' (Smith, p.99). This could be the effect of emotion, which, according to the Sartrean theory in ETE, expressly referenced here, is a way out when the subject cannot face up to a situation.

'Rather than admit failure or retrace one's steps, the subject, caught in this existential dilemma, breaks in pieces the objective world which stands in his way and seeks symbolic satisfaction in magic acts' (Smith p.99: PP, p.102)[25].

In fact he has now given *three* explanations for the phenomenon of the phantom limb – reflex (physiological), memory and emotion. He suggests that the three can coexist:

'It is not that an ideal causality here superimposes itself on a physiological one, it is that an existential attitude motivates another and that memory, emotion and phantom limb are equivalents in the context of being in the world' (Smith, p.99: ibid).

Finally, in this chapter, he summarizes and repeats the integration of the physical and the psychic which he explored in SC (pp.103-5):

> What allows us to link to each other the "physiological" and the "psychological", is the fact that, when reintegrated into existence, they are no longer distinguishable respectively as the order of the *in-itself*, and that of the *for-itself*, and that they are both directed towards an intentional pole or towards a world. (Smith, p.101: PP, p.103)

He alludes to the instinctual component in emotion: '… by an imperceptible twist an organic process issues into human behaviour, an instinctive act changes direction and becomes a sentiment' (Smith, pp.101f.: PP, p.104).

He concludes by rejecting the Cartesian idea of the soul as subject and the body as object. 'The union of soul and body is not an amalgamation between two mutually external terms, subject and object. It is enacted at every instant in the movement of existence' (Smith, p.102: PP, p.105).

In the following chapter, 'L'Expérience du Corps et la Psychologie Classique', he examines the experience of the body and its implications for classical psychology. For the latter the body

[25] Here Merleau-Ponty repeats Sartre's theory of emotion from the ETE, in accordance with which the subject seeks to escape a difficulty by 'actes magiques'.

was always something of a problem, as it wanted to treat it as an object but had to deal with the fact that it is an object of a unique nature. One approach to this (p.109f) was to distinguish the body from external objects by defining the body as 'un objet affectif', contrasted with external objects which are 'seulement représentées' ('only represented'). So, to say 'my foot hurts' has a special meaning, which says more than just 'my foot is the cause of my pain' with 'my pain' as a feeling unrelated to its site. Thus, it was recognized that the body is experienced in a different way to 'the objects of external impressions'[26] and that perhaps even they 'do no more than standout against the affective background which in the first place throws consciousness outside itself' (Smith, p.107: PP, p.110).

Sense experience, behaviour and the qualities of objects

In Chapter 1 of Part 2, 'Le Sentir'[27], Merleau-Ponty looks at sensation and how the qualities of objects in the world affect us. He again stresses the centrality of behaviour. Sensation is neither a state or a quality nor the consciousness of a state or a quality. Each of the so-called qualities is inserted in a certain behaviour (pp.241-2). He draws on the findings of empirical psychology to demonstrate this, namely experiments with brain-damaged patients and their reactions to particular colours. These show that each colour always acts with the same tendency, with the result that a defined motor value can be attributed to it.

'Sensations, "sensible qualities" are then far from being reducible to a certain indescribable state or *quale*; they present themselves with a motor physiognomy, and are enveloped in a living significance' (Smith, p.243: PP, pp.242-3).

He considers the effect of various colours (pp.243-5). Green, for example, is commonly seen as a 'restful' colour, red tends to signify effort or violence (p.245). But we are not talking about two distinct events, the sensation of red, for example, and the appropriate motor reactions. Merleau-Ponty suggests that there is a 'blue' attitude adopted by my body, even without the objective spectacle of blue, and that as part of that I obtain 'une quasi-présence du bleu' (ibid). He returns to the red example:

> …we must be understood as meaning that red, by its texture as followed and adhered to by our gaze, is already the amplification of our motor being. The subject of sensation

[26] Translation by Smith, p.107, of 'des objets du sens externe'.

[27] 'Sense experience' (Smith).

> is neither a thinker who takes note of a quality, nor an inert setting which is affected or changed by it, it is a power which is born into, and simultaneously with, a certain existential environment, or is synchronized with it. (Smith, p.245)

Further on, he fleshes out his frequently expressed intuition that perception and sense experience (and by implication affective experience) have a mode of existence different from that experienced by conscious subjectivity. As often he describes this as general or anonymous:

> Every perception takes place in an atmosphere of generality and is presented to us anonymously … My perception, even when seen from the inside, expresses a given situation: I can see blue because I am *sensitive* to colours, whereas personal acts create a situation … So, if I wanted to render precisely the perceptual experience, I ought to say that *one* perceives in me, and not that I perceive. Every sensation carries within it the germ of a dream or depersonalization … this activity takes place on the periphery of my being. I am no more aware of being the true subject of my sensation than of my birth or my death. (Smith, p.250: PP, p.249)

He continues (PP, p.250) by describing sensation as being on the margin of my personal life and my own actions, which emerge from 'a life of given consciousness …, the life of my eyes, hands and ears, which are so many natural selves' (Smith, p.251). But, says Merleau-Ponty, sensation does not concern 'mon être propre', but

> another self which has already sided with the world, which is already open to certain of its aspects and synchronized with them. Between my sensation and myself there stands always the thickness of a *primal acquisition* which prevents my experience from being clear for itself. I experience the sensation as a modality of general existence, one already destined for a physical world and which runs through me without me being the cause of it. (Smith, p.251 modified: ibid)

When he comes to justify his description of sensation as 'anonyme' (pp.250-1), this apparently hinges on the idea that it is prepersonal (p.251). He repeats the phenomenological insight that perception and sensation are always partial, that the object and being have a depth beyond immediate perception. Every sensation belongs to a certain field ('*champ*'), which means that, in the case of vision, for example, I have access to a system of beings, namely visible beings, which are at the disposition of my regard by virtue of a sort of primordial contract and a gift of nature, without any effort on my part (pp.250-1). What is unclear here is why this makes

sensation anonymous. The basis of Merleau-Ponty's view is illustrated by his treatment of the 'moi'. He appears to split it: there is my 'sensational' self, which is not my 'être propre' ('my own being', which indeed he describes as 'un autre moi' on p.250); then there is 'my own being, the one for which I am responsible and for which I make decisions' (Smith, p.251), whereas 'The person who sees and the one who touches is not exactly myself' (Smith, p.251). He makes the distinction again at the end of the paragraph on p.251:

'… I am able by connaturality to discover a meaning in certain aspects of being without having myself endowed them with it through any constituting operation' (Smith, p.252 modified).

So, there is a distinction between a 'natural' moi, the moi of sensation, and a 'constituant' moi. A Sartrean existentialist would no doubt argue that the 'constituant' self is free or has the capability to be free, whereas the 'natural' self does not.

These selves may define different experiences, with the 'natural' moi representing something more general, but on what basis can we say that the 'constituant' self is more personal and more representative of 'l'être propre'? Merleau-Ponty's view is apparently that the being of the sensational self is general, pre-existent to our personalised identity, 'anonymous' as he calls it. Our own, our personal being is the 'constituant moi', for whom we have responsibility and who makes decisions.

In the following two paragraphs (pp.251-260), he establishes, by way of a critique of Kantian transcendentalism, the importance of the senses and their distinction from intellection, and their diversity (p.255).

But he als goes on to examine situations which show the unity of sensations and to show that there is 'un monde intersensoriel' (p.261). These situations contain a clear and powerful affective component and show the structure of our affective response to qualities in the world. The senses communicate. He gives the example of music, which is not in visual space, but can undermine that space, invest it and displace it (p.260). The two spaces (the audible and the visual) are united at the very moment that they oppose each other. The other instance which he describes is where I 'lose myself' in vision:

'I … project myself wholly into my eyes, and abandon myself to the blue of the sky, soon I am unaware that I am gazing and, just as I strive to make myself sight and nothing but sight, the sky stops being a "visual perception", to become my world of the moment' (Smith, p.262: ibid).

Natural perception is the product of our whole body; to examine the separate operation of one sense requires a very particular analytical attitude (p.261). In fact, he concludes (p.265) that synaesthesia is the rule, not an isolated phenomenon. Sounds modify colours and vice versa (pp.263-4). One cannot define vision by a visual quale, nor sound by an auditory one. Vision, says the scientist, can only give us colour, light, form and movement (p.265). But what about transparency or "muddy" colours[28]? 'In reality, each colour, in its inmost depths, is nothing but the inner structure of the thing overtly revealed' (Smith, p.266: ibid). He extends this across the senses:

> The senses intercommunicate by opening on to the structure of the thing. One sees the rigidity and brittleness of glass, and when, with a tinkling sound, it breaks, this sound is conveyed by the visible glass. One sees the the springiness of steel, the ductility of red-hot steel, the hardness of a plane blade, the softness of shavings. The form of objects is not their geometrical shape: it stands in a certain relation to their specific nature, and speaks to all our senses as well as sight. (Smith, pp.266f.)

The data given by the different senses are each a way of modulating the object, by way of their 'noyau significatif' (p.266) ('significant core').

He then attempts to analyse the nature of this signification, of the synthesis effected in perception (pp.266-72). This, he concludes, is effected not by the 'sujet épistémologique' but by the 'corps phénoménal' (p.269). So, whereas science would look for the explanation in the objective body, we look for it in the phenomenal body. The body projects around itself a certain "milieu"; its parts are dynamically acquainted with each other; its receptors are so arranged as to make possible, through their synergy, the perception of the object (ibid, and Smith p.270). This perception does not take place in the transparency of consciousness, it takes as given all the latent knowledge which my body has of itself. Relying on the prelogical unity of the bodily schema, the perceptive synthesis no more possesses the secret of the object than it does of its own body. The perceived object always offers itself as transcendant; the synthesis appears to be carried out in the object itself, in the world, and not in the metaphysical entity of the thinking subject. This is the distinction between the perceptive synthesis and the intellectual (p.269).

The different senses communicate in perception just as the two eyes collaborate in vision:

[28] Smith's translation of 'les couleurs « troubles »'.

> The sight of sounds or the hearing of colours come about in the same way as the unity of the gaze through the two eyes: in so far as my body is, not a collection of adjacent organs, but a synergic system, all the functions of which are exercised and linked together in the general action of being in the world, in so far as it is the congealed face of existence. … sight or hearing is not the mere possession of an opaque *quale,* but the experience of a modality of existence, the synchronization of my body with it … (Smith, p.272: PP, p.270)

The body is a system of 'transpositions intersensorielles' (p.271). The senses translate each other without any need of an interpreter, they understand each other without having to pass via the idea. My body is the site or rather the very reality of the phenomenon of expression, in it the visual and auditory experience, for example, are pregnant each with the other; their expressive value founds 'l'unité antéprédicative du monde perçu' and, through that, verbal expression and intellectual meaning (pp.271-2). My body is the common texture of all objects and, at least as regards 'le monde perçu' the general instrument of my 'understanding'.[29]

Merleau-Ponty then moves on to apply this to one of his favourite themes, speech and language (pp.272-4). It is the body moreover that gives a meaning not only to natural objects but also to cultural objects like words. He describes the immediate reactions of subjects to words describing qualities. They generate a sort of 'halo significatif' around them (p.272).

'Before being the indication of a concept, it is first of all an event which grips my body, and this grip circumscribes the area of significance to which it has reference' (Smith, pp.273f. modified: ibid).

In these instances, the word is indistinguishable from the attitude which it induces, and it is only when its presence is prolonged that it is seen as an external image and its meaning as the subject of thought. Words have a physiognomy because we have in regard to them a certain behaviour which appears instantly as soon as they are given (ibid). This does not mean that we reduce the signification of the word (or phrase), or the perceived object, to a sum of "bodily sensations", but 'we are saying that the body, in so far as it has "behaviour patterns",

[29] This does not address feeling from the inner, introspective perspective, which may be different from the 'sujet épistémologique'. Merleau-Ponty would consider that this is covered by the 'Cogito' chapter. There he contends that the certainty which I have of my thoughts derives from their 'existence effective' (p.438). 'My love, my hatred, my will are not certain as simple thoughts of loving, hating or willing. On the contrary all the certainty of these thoughts come from the' (related) 'acts, which I am sure of because I *do* them. All interior perception is inadequate because I am not an object that one can perceive, because I make my reality and only become myself in the act' (ibid, Smith, p.445).

is that strange object which uses its own parts as a general system of symbols for the world, and through which we can consequently "be at home in" that world, "understand" it and find significance in it' (Smith, p.275: PP, p.274).

Freedom and the 'valorisation' of the world

In Part III, Chapter III, Merleau-Ponty considers the operation, conditions and limitations of freedom and free-will. It is in what he describes as the 'valorisation' of objects, the world and others (pp 501-3) that his account here suggests the domain of affectivity. This appears in his discussion of the conditions of freedom. He suggests that there is a common or even universal 'valorisation', which supports the idea that it can be scientifically studied and that it has 'laws' (p.503). Behind my actual projects, decisions, choices, lies a general relationship to the world, a natural self rooted in the world and the body, which continually evaluates the world in absolute terms. It is worth quoting what he says at length, both to understand the structure of our relationship to the world which he describes and to exemplify the operation of this structure:

> We must … distinguish between my express intentions, for example the plan I now make to climb those mountains, and general intentions which evaluate the potentialities of my environment. Whether or not I have decided to climb them, these mountains appear high to me, because they exceed my body's power to take them in its stride, and, …, I cannot so contrive it that they are small for me. Underlying myself as a thinking subject, …, there is, therefore, as it were a natural self which does not budge from its terrestrial situation and which constantly adumbrates absolute valuations. … my projects as a thinking being are clearly modelled on the latter; if I elect to see things from the pont of view of Sirius, it is still to my terrestrial experience that I must have recourse in order to do so; … In so far as I have hands, feet, a body, I sustain around me intentions which are not dependent upon my decisions[30] and which affect my surroundings in a way which I do not choose. (Smith, p.511: PP, p.502)

These intentions are general in two senses; firstly they constitute a system which includes all possible objects; hence it is the same system which makes the perceived qualities of the tall

[30] 'décisoires' – 'dependent upon my decisions' (Smith, p.511). *Le Grand Robert* defines 'décisoire' as 'qui résulte d'une libre décision de l'esprit'.

and straight mountain and the small and bent tree. Secondly, they are general in that they can be found in all the psychophysical subjects who are organised like me. 'Hence, as Gestalt psychology has shown, there are for me privileged forms, as they are for all other men, and which can give rise to a psychological science and rigorous laws' (Smith, p.511 modified: PP, pp.502-3).

He posits 'une valorisation spontanée', which is always present in us in our contact with the world (p.503). He gives the example of sight, 'the look', but it applies equally to the other modes of perception. It is at work even when we deliberately analyze and disaggregate a form. Again it is worth quoting at length to illustrate his view of our place in and relationship to the world.

> Without them, we would not have a world, that is, a collection of things which emerge from formlessness by presenting themselves to our body as "to be touched", "to be taken", "to be crossed", we should never be aware of adjusting ourselves to things and reaching them where they are, beyond us, … we should not be in the world, ourselves implicated in the spectacle and … intermingled with things, we would only have the representation of a universe. … the self … runs ahead of itself in relation to things in order to confer upon them the form of things. (Smith, p.512 modified)

He concludes the paragraph by describing how this forms the background and basis for the exercise of freedom:

'There is an autochthonous significance of the world which is constituted in the dealings which our incarnate existence has with it, and which provides the ground of every deliberate *Sinngebung*'[31] (Smith, p.512 modified, and see below: ibid).

So he is here defining a freedom with constraints, namely the world and our relationship to it, but which we do not live as a constraint.

In the next paragraph (pp.503-5), he takes this analysis to a deeper, existential level. Again I suggest that this can be applied to the workings of 'levels' of affectivity, from the basic affectivity of the 'valorisations spontanées', described above, to the influence of mental states described here. Although his major concern here is the examination of freedom and its conditions, this affective angle becomes explicit with his consideration of the influence of pain and fatigue. So far, he says, he has been considering 'la perception extérieure', which he

[31] 'Sinngebung décisoire': perhaps 'chosen creation of meaning'.

describes as ‘une fonction impersonnelle et en somme abstraite’[32] (p.503). However, there is something analogous in *all* valorisations (pp.503-4). He considers the example of pain and fatigue; they always have a meaning, they express my attitude to the world. One man cannot stand pain and fatigue and gives up his journey; another carries on, he loves being outside, feeling the sun on his back; he loves feeling himself ‘au milieu des choses’. The former doesn’t like fatigue, he doesn’t seek being in nature – ‘I have chosen differently my manner of being in the world’ (Smith, p.513: PP, p.504). We have to recognize that there is a sort of sedimentation in our life. We privilege a certain attitude towards the world, when it has been often repeated. In principle, our habitual being in the world is so fragile that ‘le geste de la liberté’ can effortlessly and instantaneously explode the complexes which we have nourished for years. However, after having constructed our life on a complex of inferiority continually repeated over twenty years, ‘it is not very probable that we would change’ (own translation: ibid). It is easy to see what a summary rationalism might object: there are no degrees of possibility; either there is no longer a free act, or there still is, and liberty is an absolute. Probability has no real existence, it is not ‘un ingrédient du monde’ (p.505).

He rejects this and gives a clear statement of his view of the relationship between freedom and situation (ibid). ‘Generality and probability are not fictions, but phenomena, and we must therefore find a phenomenological basis for statistical thought. It belongs necessarily to a being which is fixed, situated and invested in the world’ (Smith, pp.513f. modified). What does he mean by saying that probability is a phenomenon? In an intellectual context we often think of it as a part of scientific thinking, a method of prediction. A simplistic belief in freedom of choice would reject probability as irrelevant. In its schema, the answer is yes or no. Merleau-Ponty’s point is that the operation and application of probability is part of experience.

> “It is improbable” that I should at this moment destroy an inferiority complex in which I have been content to live for twenty years. That means that I have committed myself to inferiority, that I have made it my abode, that this past, if it is not a fatality, has at least a specific weight and is not a set of events over there, at a distance from me, but the atmosphere of my present. (Smith, p.514 modified: PP, p.505)

[32] To call external perception impersonal is consistent with other passages, where he divides actions between the bodily, the natural i.e. impersonal and anonymous, and the personal. On the other hand in what sense is external perception abstract? It could be that external perception is an abstract idea, i.e. the isolation of the phenomenon is abstracted from actual experience, but that does not seem to fit the context.

He concludes with a summary of the limitations of freedom, although he does not himself express them as limitations in any way, they are only limitations for the believer in absolute freedom of choice. 'Our freedom does not destroy our situation, but is geared upon it' ('s'engréne sur elle', a vivid image ; it suggests the teeth of the gears intermeshing); 'our situation, in so far as we are alive, is open, which implies at the same time that it calls upon privileged modes of resolution and that it is by itself without the power to procure any one of them' (own translation). So, we cannot get away from our past and our habitual way of relating to the world, but at the same time, he asserts, there is always a margin of choice, our decisions and behaviour in a situation are never inevitable, it always calls for a choice to be made.

As part of her examination of emotional depth and alterations in identity, Cataldi (1993) borrows from a discussion by Dewey in his 1887 *Psychology* of the 'deepening' of emotional feelings, which suggests how sedimentation might work:

> Take, for example, the "deepened" anger of the "angry young man". He is not (necessarily or constantly) *feeling* angry. The angry young man *is* angry. He is identified with his anger. It has become a person-ality trait…Another … interpretation of this deep emotion … might be to say that' the anger 'has become, through time and exercise, so "in"-grained that it is no longer an emotional disposition but a *pre*-disposition. (Cataldi, pp.152-3)

Hence:

> We construe his angry orientation as "stemming", …, more from him' and 'as having less and less to do with his actual surroundings… Moreover, this emotional predisposition "affects" his perceptual stance …His predisposed anger provides the background for the way he will tend to view the world and his role or place within it. (Cataldi, pp.152-3)

This suggests another way of describing how sedimentation works.[33]

[33] It also recalls the 'state of emotion', described by Sartre, notably in TE. Could it also describe how Sartre's idea of the project could work? This 'anger' could be seen as the *choice* of the young man in his relation to being.

‘Le corps comme être sexué’

The structure of affectivity and sexuality

Merleau-Ponty begins this chapter by setting out an ambitious aim. Our overall project, he states, is to explore ‘the primordial function whereby we make exist for ourselves, we take a hold upon, space, the object or the instrument’ (Smith, p.178 modified) and to describe the body as the setting (‘lieu’) of this appropriation (PP, p.180). So far, we have looked at space and the perceived object. By this means however we have only explored existence ‘en soi’, the natural world which exists beyond its existence for me (‘… a nature which does not need to be perceived to exist’ (own translation)). But if we want to explore ‘the genesis of being for us’ we need to consider ‘the sector of our experience which visibly only has meaning and reality for us, that is to say, our affective milieu. Let us look to see how an object or a being cause themselves to exist for us by way of desire or love and we will better understand … how objects and beings can exist in general’ (own translation: ibid).[34]

He begins the next paragraph by giving what he describes as the ‘ordinary’ conception of affectivity:

‘Ordinarily, affectivity is conceived as a mosaic of affective states, pleasures and pains, closed on themselves, mutually incomprehensible, and can only be explained by our corporal organization’ (own translation, assisted by Smith, p.178: PP, p.180).

In man however it is modified by intelligence. Through our representations the natural stimuli of pleasure and pain are displaced onto other circumstances. Second or third order values are set up without any apparent relationship to *natural* pleasure or pain. The subject is defined by his capacity for representation; affectivity is not recognized as an original mode of consciousness (p.181). Merleau-Ponty rejects this account. If either of the above conceptions was true, any loss of sexual capacity should be reduced either to the loss of certain representations or a weakening of libido. As in other chapters, he then cites a study of a

[34] The claim that ‘notre milieu affectif’ plays a central role in our grasp of being is unexceptionable. It is less clear why desire and love have any greater role than other affective states in enabling us to understand how objects and beings can exist. On the other hand, desire and love are good examples in the context of Merleau-Ponty’s accent on the body.

pathological case[35]. He describes the subject as suffering from an 'inertie sexuelle'. He eventually concludes that neither reflex nor representation are at the origin of normal sexuality (PP, p.182). Rather there is a 'a vital zone in which the sexual possibilities of the patient are elaborated' (Smith, p.180). This relies on the structure of perception or of erotic experience[36]. This is what has been degraded in Schn.. In a normal person a body is not perceived like any other object: 'the visible body is subtended by a sexual schema, …, emphasizing the erogenous areas, outlining a sexual physiognomy, and eliciting the gestures of the masculine body which is itself integrated into this affective totality' (Smith, p.180). For Schn. however the female body has no particular attraction – 'Perception has lost its erotic structure, both spatially and temporally' (Smith, p.181); in space because he is not aroused either by touch or sight, in time because he cannot envisage the sex act in its duration, its phases or its climax. '… the sick person has ceased to address to the world about him this mute and permanent question which normal sexuality constitutes' (own translation)[37]. Merleau-Ponty sees a different kind of perception and intentionality in 'la perception érotique'. There is no representation involved, 'it happens in the world and not in consciousness' (own translation: PP, p.183). '… desire understands blindly in tying one body to another body' (own translation). Sexuality, long thought as typical of bodily function, is not a peripheral automatism but an intentionality 'which follows the general movement of existence and loses its force with it'[38]. Schn.'s inability to handle a sexual situation is part of his general inability to function normally in affective situations. For him, 'le monde est affectivement neutre'. He can no longer operate on a spontaneous or intuitive plane, only on an abstract one (p.183). Sexuality is another process which depends on 'un arc intentionnel', which 'gives way in the sick person'[39], while giving 'l'expérience' (du normal) 'son degré de vitalité et de fécondité'.

Sexuality is fundamental to existence and tied up with all aspects of behaviour:

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[35] The famous Schn. or Schneider.

[36] '… the normal extension of sexuality must rest on the internal powers of the organic subject. There must be an Eros or a Libido which animates an original world' (Smith, p.180 modified: PP, p.182).

[37] This is a male oriented description of sexuality, as Merleau-Ponty openly implies.

[38] p.183, own translation.

[39] 'sick person' is my translation of 'le malade', contrasted with 'le normal'. Two ideas seem to be covered by 'le malade'. One is Schn. and people like him, the other is people who are <u>not</u> 'normal'. Certainly Schn. and people like him are included in the 'not *normal*', but are the 'not *normal*' necessarily 'malade'? Moreover is the 'malade' always 'not *normal*'? Merleau-Ponty uses Schn. as the type of the 'malade'. 'Handicapped' is perhaps a better translation or maybe fits the type better but then again what is being said does not apply to all the handicapped.

‘Sexuality is not therefore an autonomous cycle. It is tied internally to the whole knowing and acting being, these three sectors of behaviour’ (perception, motility, and representation) ‘manifest one single typical structure, they are in a relationship of reciprocal expression’ (own translation: PP, p.184).

Psychoanalysis

Here we join the findings ‘les plus durables’ of psychoanalysis. Merleau-Ponty by no means, as we shall see, accepts the Freudian reduction of life to sexuality. Psychoanalysis ends up not by explaining man in terms of her or his sexual infrastructure but uncovering in functions which were believed to be ‘purely bodily’ a dialectical movement and reintegrating sexuality into human being (p.184). Psychoanalysis neither excludes the description of psychological motives nor is opposed to the phenomenological method. Indeed, it has unwittingly contributed to its development by affirming that every human act has a “meaning” (« sens ») and by seeking in all cases to understand the act rather than attaching it to mechanical conditions. According to Freud himself, the sexual is not purely biological, instinctive and genital (p.185). Rather, ‘… in his sexuality is projected his manner of being towards the world’ (Smith, p.183). Merleau-Ponty’s objection to psychoanalysis is not that it insists on the sexual infrastructure of life; it is that it ‘“inflates” the notion of sexuality to the point of integrating into it the whole of existence’[40]. The whole of life cannot be reduced to ‘la vie sexuelle’, nor can sexuality be completely subsumed in existence, ‘as if it was only an epiphenomenon’ (own translation: PP, p.186). Although sexuality, according to psychoanalysis, has a privileged role in existence and psychic life, this is not always the case. A vigorous sexuality can co-exist with a spiritually impoverished hold on existence[41]; on the other hand sexual impoverishment may co-exist with aspiration and success (pp.185-6). However sexual troubles are not just a sign of the fundamental drama of existence, but a ‘signe privilégié’ (p.186). He poses the question of why this is (ibid). So in this way he is aligning himself with psychoanalysis in his analysis of the importance of sexuality, although, as we shall see, his explanation is not the same. He does not give an answer until several pages later (pp.194-5). But he examines the question in detail and in so doing addresses the fundamental question of the structure of existence and the relationship of body and mind.

[40] p.184, own translation.

[41] Indeed, it may be the expression of that impoverishment (own comment).

The binary structure – 'l'existence biologique' and 'l'existence personnelle'

He begins (p.186) by recalling gestalt theory ('la théorie de la forme'), according to which sense data never depend only on the sense organs but come already configured into an existential form. He gives an explanation of the structure of 'living' which we have already come across in the discussion of the phantom limb (see pp.151f. above). In a memorable phrase, he writes, '… l'existence biologique est embrayée[42] sur l'existence humaine' (p.186). This does not mean that 'to live (biologically)' is not 'une opération primordiale' which makes it possible to live a particular world. This primordial level of bodily and sensory functions have an 'existence donnée et anonyme' ('given and anonymous existence'). '… l'existence personnelle' takes them over, uses them and manifests itself in them (p.186), in an act of everyday transcendence[43], '… the carnal life… and psychology are in a relation of reciprocal *expression* … the corporal event always has a psychological *signification'* (own translation). But this does not mean that the body 'is the transparent envelope of the mind' (own translation). We are not returning to spiritualism (Cartesianism). We need to make precise the notions of 'expression' and 'signification' which belong to the world of language and constituted thought (p.187).

Existential psychoanalysis

In this chapter Merleau-Ponty makes clear his view of the relationship between body and mind, which involves rejecting the Cartesian view. He refers to existential psychoanalysis and moves on to study a case described by Binswanger, in which a girl, forbidden to see her lover, was afflicted with aphonia. A strictly Freudian interpretation would ascribe this to a problem in the oral phase of sexual development (p.187). The existential point of view is that speech is the vehicle of relations with the other. The hysterical aphonia therefore represents a refusal of coexistence. Her inability to swallow represents her refusal of life and her inability to 'swallow' the prohibition. But Merleau-Ponty reconciles the Freudian with the existential. He speculates that she may have a particular sensitivity in the throat and mouth area, linked to the history of her libido and the oral phase (p.188). But, behind the sexual significance of her symptoms,

[42] Translated by Smith as 'synchronized with' (p.185). It implies that one cannot move without the other. 'embrayage' is a word for 'clutch'.

[43] The word is not used here.

lies their more general significance for the fundamental dimensions of her existence, the past and the future, her subjectivity and intersubjectivity. The hysteria is not just a symptom of an inner malaise[44]. The illness as sign cannot be distinguished from its signification. If I forget something (through repression), it is not chance. It belongs to a certain area of my life which I refuse, because it has a certain signification. He continues with the existential analysis of repression, which, as he acknowledges, draws on classical psychoanalysis.[45] Resistance presupposes an intentional relationship with the memory which we resist, but it does not reject it by name. Aphonia is not willed nor chosen (p.189). This could be called 'mauvaise foi' (p.190) ('bad faith'). But he distinguishes between 'une hypocrisie psychologique' and 'une hypocrisie métaphysique'. By the first he means self-aware hypocrisy. The second, he says expressly, operates on a level '*plus bas* que la volonté' (*lower down* than the will'). In the same way the cure is not just a matter of cognition, just coming to an understanding of the trouble. It requires 'un rapport personnel' with the therapist involving 'confiance' and 'amitié' ('trust and friendship'). 'The symptom like the cure does not work itself out on the level of objective or thetic consciousness, but underneath' (own translation: PP, pp.190-1).

He then uses a quite complicated double comparison (p.191). He compares the situation of aphonia to sleep. In trying to go to sleep we are conscious and exercise our will. We take various steps but will and consciousness stop there. We imitate 'real' sleep in order to summon it. He compares the 'act' of falling asleep with the initiates miming scenes from the life of Dionysus in order to call up the god. 'The god is there when (they) no longer distinguish themselves from the role which they are playing, when their body and their mind cease to oppose their "opacité particulière" to it' (the role, or it could be the god). In the same way there is a moment when sleep 'comes', we become what we were pretending to be. We are now only in the world 'par la vigilance anonyme des sens' ('by the anonymous vigilance of the senses'). It is by the latter in fact that we are woken up. In the same way the hysteric who has cut himself off from co-existence can still perceive the exterior of another. In this sense the sleeper is never completely asleep, the hysteric is never completely cut off from the intersubjective world. 'Falling asleep, waking up, illness, health are not modalities of consciousness or of the will', they have to come out of existence. 'Aphonia does not only represent a refusal to speak, …', it is 'this refusal of others …, torn from the transitive nature

[44] 'The invalid does not mime with her body a drama which happens "in her consciousness". … she does not translate to the outside "an internal state"' (own translation: PP, p.188).

[45] 'comme le montre la psychanalyse', p.188. 'comme la psychanalyse aussi le montre à merveille', p.189; 'as psychoanalysis shows', as psychoanalysis also shows amazingly well' (own translation).

of “inner phenomena”, generalised, consummated, transformed into *de facto* situations.’[46] The existential disturbance has to be actualised in the transitive phenomena of an existing body and mind.

The body and meaning

A major purpose of the chapter on sexuality is to show and exemplify the role of the body in intentional existence.

‘The role of the body is to make this metamorphosis certain.’ (turning a transient phenomenon into an actual situation). ‘It transforms ideas into things, …. If the body can symbolize existence, it is that it realizes it and that it is its actuality’ (own translation: PP, pp.191-2). I read this to mean that the body is more than a symbol, it fulfils and realizes existence[47]. He returns to the example of the sick girl; her whole movement of existence has become blocked in a physical symptom, in ‘cette vie anonyme’ which underlies ‘ma vie personnelle’ (p.192). But, just as it can close itself to the world, my body is also that which opens me to the world and puts me in situation. I never become completely ‘une chose dans le monde’. At every instant an intention springs up from me, at every instant I am ‘exercized by an active nothingness’ (own translation: PP, p.193). On the other hand bodily existence which runs through me without my complicity is only the outline (‘l’esquisse’) of a genuine presence in the world. ‘If therefore we say that the body at every moment expresses existence, it is in the sense in which speech expresses thought’ (own translation). But he is not talking about conventional expression, ‘chit-chat’ or ‘idle talk’ (to borrow Heidegger’s phrase), but real communication.

> … we must indeed, …, recognize a primordial operation of signification in which the expressed does not exist apart from the expression and in which the signs themselves bring about their meaning outside. It is in this way that the body expresses the whole of existence, not that it is an external accompaniment of them, but because it (existence) is realized in it (the body). This incarnated meaning is the central phenomenon, of which body and mind, sign and signification are abstract moments. (own translation: PP, p.193)

So here he has clarified what he meant by ‘significance’ and ‘expression’ which he earlier applied to the relation of mind and body (p.187). In this case you cannot separate expression

[46] Smith, p.190.

[47] The « pas existentiel », which he quotes from Binswanger (p.191).

from what is expressed nor the sign from its meaning. ‘Neither the body nor existence can pass as the original of human being, since each presupposes the other and the body is generalized existence … and existence is a perpetual incarnation’ (own translation: PP, p.194).

Sexuality as a privileged sign

But this does not mean that sexuality is *only* a manifestation or symptom of an existential drama. We cannot reduce sexuality to existence any more than we can reduce existence to the body or sexuality. Rather existence is ‘le milieu équivoque’ of the communication of its different facets. Shame, desire and love have a metaphysical significance, which is incomprehensible if we treat man as a machine governed by natural laws and instincts. He first examines ‘la pudeur’ to exemplify this (p.194). Man does not usually reveal his body; when he does it is sometimes with a sense of modesty (‘pudeur’) and sometimes with the intention of fascinating the other (‘impudeur’, ‘shamelessness, immodesty’). In ‘pudeur’ he or she feels that ‘the alien gaze … is stealing it’ (the body) ‘from him’ (Smith, p.193), i.e turns her in to the slave of the other; in ‘impudeur’, the exhibition of his body will deliver the other to him without defence, i.e. turns the other into a slave. Thus ‘pudeur’/ ‘impudeur’ belong to the Hegelian dialectic of master and slave in the relationship between me and the other (ibid). They express the dialectic of the plurality of consciousnesses and have a metaphysical significance (p.195). This is the same with sexual desire. The importance which we attach to the body, the contradictions of love tie in with a more general drama relating to the metaphysical structure of the body, ‘at the same time object for the other and subject for me’ (own translation: ibid). Sex is like a model, given to everyone and always accessible, of the human condition in its most general moments of autonomy and dependence – hence the role of sexuality as a privileged sign of the fundamental drama of existence (see p.186). The dialectic is the tension between one existence and another which denies it but without which it cannot sustain itself; the metaphysical (defined as ‘the emergence of something beyond nature’ (Smith, p.194 modified)) begins with the opening to an “other” (p.195), which includes the development of sexuality.

Neither 'contenu manifeste' nor 'contenu latent'

Merleau-Ponty rejects the 'cut and dried' views of both 'philosophies of consciousness' and 'psychologies of the unconscious' (p.196)[48].

> There are here two errors to avoid: one is to not recognize in existence other content than its manifest content, spread out in distinct representations, as philosophies of consciousness do; the other is to duplicate this manifest content with latent content, as psychologies of the unconscious do. Sexuality is neither transcended in human life nor figured in its centre by unconscious representations. *It is constantly present as an atmosphere*. (own translation: PP, p.196, my italics)

In accordance with this, he rejects the idea of images (as in dreams) with a latent content – 'Sexuality diffuses itself in images which retain from it … only a certain affective physionomy' (own translation). It is the same in 'that individual fog through which we perceive the world' (own translation). In there are confused forms, privileged relationships, which, without evoking sexuality specifically, we know very well relate to it. From the genital area of the body sexuality send out its rays 'like a smell or a sound'. He describes this as another example of 'the general function of silent transposition' (own translation) exercised by the body. Sexuality, without being the object of an explicit act of consciousness, can motivate the most important forms of my experience (p.197). We cannot look for the explanation of the form of existence in the form of sexuality. There is an osmosis between the two, so that it is impossible to distinguish between the sexual and other motivation of a given decision or action.

The movement of existence

The chapter proper ends with a general picture of the structure of existence, as exemplified by the role of sexuality and incorporating it (pp.197-9). Existence is undetermined in itself, in so far as it is the very operation by which that which has no meaning achieves meaning.[49]

[48] By the psychologies of the unconscious he refers chiefly to Freud and his disciples; by philosophies of consciousness to, for example, Descartes, Kant and inevitably Sartre and his rejection of the unconscious.

[49] 'Existence is undetermined in itself, because of its fundamental structure, in that it is the very operation by which that which did not have meaning assumes meaning, that which only had a sexual meaning takes on a more general signification, chance becomes reason, in so far as it is the taking up of a factual situation. We will call transcendence this movement by which existence takes up for its purposes and transforms a factual situation' (own translation, PP, p.197).

Human existence cannot be defined by an essence, rather it is a movement by which 'les faits sont assumés' (p.198) ('the facts are assumed'). We must think of the hands, the feet, the head, the sexual apparatus not as contingent, not as 'fragments of matter' but in their living function.

> … all the "functions" in man, from sexuality to motility to intelligence, are strictly united, it is impossible to distinguish in the total being of man a bodily organization, which would be treated as a contingent fact, and other attributes necessarily belonging to his make-up. All is necessity in man, … (own translation, assisted by Smith, p.197: PP, p.198)

On the other hand, 'Tout est contingence dans l'homme' (pp.198-9) in the sense that existence is not a 'given' but must be constantly remade via the hazards of the objective body. Everything that we are we are on the basis of a facticity which we make our own and which we ceaselessly transform by a sort of *escape* which is never an unconditional freedom (p.199).

Finally he returns to sexuality and the body. There is no explanation of sexuality which reduces it to anything other than itself, for it was already something other than itself and, we might say, our whole being.

> Sexuality, it is said, is dramatic *because* we engage in it our whole personal life. But indeed why do we do this? Why is our body the mirror of our being for us, except because it is a *natural self,* a current of given existence, in such a way that we never know if the forces which carry us along belong to this existence or are ours – or rather that they are never entirely either those of this existence or ours. (own translation)

This time, in contrast to other formulations in PP (see pp.152.and 155 above) he does not qualify the natural self as anonymous (p.199).

In the lengthy footnote which ends the chapter (pp.199-202), he sketches an existential analysis of historical materialism, to parallel the conception of psychoanalysis which he has just given. We cannot reject either based on reductionist interpretations of them. Just as our whole life breathes in a sexual atmosphere, without us being able to identify a single content of consciousness as 'purely sexual' or not at all sexual, so the economic and social drama provides to each consciousness a certain background ('fond'), which it will decipher in its own way (p.201). Conversely (p.202), just as it is impossible to reduce the life of society to one factor, so it is impossible to reduce the life of the individual to the bodily functions or to our knowledge of it. On the other hand 'in each case one of the orders of signification can be

considered as dominant, one gesture as ‘sexual’, another as ‘amorous’, another as ‘warlike’. …’

‘Le corps comme expression et la parole’

Communication

This chapter deals with the subject of gesture, emotional expression and communication in its linguistic and non-linguistic aspects. Speech and language are major interests of Merleau-Ponty throughout his philosophical writings[50], and he returns to the topic later in PP in the Cogito chapter.

He details his view of the communication and comprehension of gestures in general and then of the linguistic gesture in particular (pp.214-220). He does not see the communication of the gesture as requiring a double action by the recipient (seeing it, followed by a mental process of analysis): ‘… I do not perceive anger or threat as a psychic fact hidden behind the gesture, I read anger in the gesture, the gesture *does not make me think* of anger, it is anger itself’ (p.214). Sartre uses more or less the same formulation[51]. Merleau-Ponty acknowledges that something other than perception of a physical quality is going on here. There is an action [‘acte’] by the spectator, but he rejects the idea that this is ‘une operation de connaissance’ (p.215) (‘a cognitive operation’, Smith, p.215). He tries to convey how communication takes place by a series of metaphors:

> The communication or the comprehension of gestures comes about through the *reciprocity* of my intentions and the gestures of others, of my gestures and the intentions *readable* in the conduct of others. It is as if the intention of the other person *inhabited* my body or as if my intentions *inhabited* his. … Communication is achieved when my conduct finds in this *path* its own. There is confirmation of the other by me and of me by the other. (based on Smith, p.215 modified: PP, pp.215-6, all italics mine)

[50] See e.g. *La Prose du Monde* (1969), and Chapters I and II in *Signes* (1960).

[51] ‘… these frowns, this redness, etc., these furtive looks which seem at the same time fearful and threatening do not *express* anger, they *are* anger’ (own translation: EN, p.378).

Again Sartre and Merleau-Ponty are in agreement here on the status and role of the body (EN 387f. See p.84f. above).

He gives 'les gestes sexuels' as an excellent example of spontaneous, unlearned behaviour (p.216). He sums up: 'It is through my body that I understand other people, just as it is through my body that I perceive "things". The meaning of a gesture … is not behind it, it is intermingled with the structure of the world outlined by the gesture, and which I take up on my own account' (Smith, p.216: PP, pp.216-7).

The linguistic gesture

Merleau-Ponty next moves on to describe the cultural role and context of the linguistic gesture (pp.216-220). He begins by comparing the linguistic gesture to the physical expressive gesture and describes their common nature and the differences between them. The origin of physical gestures can easily and largely be explained as universal[52]. He starts with the assertion, 'The linguistic gesture, like all the rest, delineates its own meaning' (p.216). This may seem surprising; (physical) gestures have 'une signification immanente', because the intentional object, the sensible world, is given to the spectator by natural perception at the same time as the gesture. The linguistic gesture on the other hand is directed at a mental 'world', which everyone may not possess in advance and has a tailored function, i.e. not natural, tailored to communicate. But culture, not nature, provides the immanence of the linguistic gesture – 'Available meanings, …, establish between speaking subjects a common world to which speech … refers as the gesture does to the sensible world. … I seize it' (the meaning) 'in an undivided act which is as short as a cry' (Smith, pp.216f.: PP, p.217).

How is this cultural 'world' set up? It is relatively easy to see the common ground between the smile and joy, for example, but there are many different languages, using varied and complex forms. The use of particular words for particular meanings appears arbitrary (p.217). But Merleau-Ponty puts forward the theory that the origin is relatively simple. A language now contains multiple layers of borrowings from others, imitations of itself, and even rationalization by grammarians (ibid); but originally it was a probably very limited way of expressing the emotional essence of objects and the world. The origin was therefore <u>not</u> arbitrary. Now we usually only have 'le sens conceptuel' and 'terminal' of words; but if we look at poetry and the

[52] Although cultural differences make even this arguable. See the following page.

poetic use of language, we encounter ‘le sens émotionnel’, ‘le sens gestuel’. ‘We would then find that the words, vowels and phonemes are so many ways of *singing*’ (my italics) ‘the world, and that they are destined to represent objects, …, because they extract, and literally express, their emotional essence’ (Smith, p.217: PP, p.218). Each language, he believes, has its own essence; they are not so many arbitrary conventions to express the same thought (p.218), but different ways ‘for the human body to celebrate the world and finally to live it’ (own translation: PP, p.218). Note that Merleau-Ponty again here identifies ‘le geste linguistique’ as a property of the body in the world.

He repeats his view that we must ‘seek the first attempts at language in the emotional gesticulation whereby man superimposes on the given world the world according to man’ (Smith, p.219: PP, p.219). But this does not mean that there is a layer of natural signs which exist or existed before the artificial signs of developed language. Emotion as a variation of our being in the world is contingent in regard to the mechanical dispositions contained in our body, and displays the same power to shape and actualise stimuli and situations which is most fully developed in language. There is no such thing, he says, as ‘natural signs’. Neither physical gestures expressing emotions nor the emotions themselves are the same across all cultures.

> It is not sufficient that two conscious subjects have the same organs and the same nervous system for the same emotions to produce in both of them the same signs, What matters is the way in which they make use of their bodies, it is the simultaneous patterning of their body and world in emotion. (own translation, assisted by Smith, p.219)

He uses this theme to state his fundamental view of the relationship between human behaviour and culture and the body.

> The psychophysiological equipment leaves a great variety of possibilities open, and there is no more here than in the realm of instinct a human nature given once and for all. The use which a man will make of his body is transcendent in relation to this body as a purely biological entity. …Everything is both manufactured and natural in man, …., in the sense that there is not a word, not a form of behaviour which does not owe something to purely biological being – and which at the same time does not escape the simplicity of animal life, and cause forms of vital behaviour to deviate from their pre-ordained direction. … Behaviour creates meanings which are transcendent in relation to the anatomical apparatus, and yet immanent to the behaviour as such, since it communicates itself and is understood. It is impossible to draw up an inventory of this

> irrational potentiality which creates meanings and which communicates them. Speech is merely one particular case. (Smith, p.220 modified: PP, pp.120-1)

The Cogito

The possibility of error and illusion in the consciousness of our own feelings

Merleau-Ponty returns specifically to the topic of affectivity in the Cogito chapter. He begins by examining the functioning of perception and thought in consciousness. He defines his objective here:

> We have recognized definitively that our relations with things cannot be external relations, nor our consciousness of ourselves the simple notation of psychological events. We perceive a world only if, before being established facts, this world and this perception are our own thoughts. It remains to understand exactly the way the world comes to belong to the subject and the subject to him or herself, this *cogitatio* which makes possible experience, our grasp on things and on our "states of consciousness". (own translation, assisted by Smith, p.435: PP, pp.428-9)

First he considers 'notre prise sur les choses', perception. He criticizes Descartes for the distinction which he makes between sensation, which he says, taken in itself is always true, and the transcendent interpretation given by the judgement, which introduces error (p.431). In Merleau-Ponty's view there is no transcendent interpretation which does not spring up from the very configuration of phenomena. The consciousness which I have of seeing is the actual effecting of vision. Vision is an action, which is prepared inwardly only by 'my primordial opening upon a field of transcendence' (Smith, p.438), 'une extase'. He concludes:

> What I discover … by the *Cogito,* is not the inherence of all phenomena to "private states of consciousness", … the belonging of all phenomena to a constituting consciousness, …, - it is the profound movement of transcendence which is my very being, the simultaneous contact with my being and with the being of the world. (own translation, assisted by Smith, p.438: PP, p.432)

He then moves on to the distinction, or possible distinction, between perception and the consciousness of « faits psychiques » ('psychological facts'). The perceptive 'synthesis' must always be incomplete; there is always a risk of error; in perception the distinction between appearance and reality is always present. On the other hand, in « faits psychiques »

consciousness seems to be in full control. For love and volition, for example, may be mistaken in their objects but not about themselves as feelings: … it seems impossible that they' (love and the will) 'deceive us about themselves' (PP, p.432). 'A love or a will which is not conscious of itself would be a love which does not love, a will that does not wish, as an unconscious thought would be a thought which does not think. … A feeling, considered in itself, would always be true, from the moment that it is felt (own translation: PP, p. 433).

He rejects this. First he asserts, 'First of all it is clear that we can distinguish in ourselves "true" feelings and "false" feelings' (own translation). Just as in perception, there are degrees of reality in our feelings just as there are in perception. '… there are degrees of reality in us just as outside us there are "reflections", "phantoms" and "things". Beside true love, there is a false or illusory love' (own translation). The latter does not refer to misinterpreted love or 'amour de mauvaise foi' which is not love at all (ibid). In this illusory love, it is not that the *feeling* was illusory. The beloved was for a time 'the mediator of my relations with the world' (own translation); but, when I discover that I was suffering from an illusion, I find something other than love. I only loved some qualities and not 'the singular way of existing which is the person himself' (own translation: PP, p.434). He does not seem to be talking about the *emotion* of love here. The love he is questioning is more like a judgement on the beloved or the subject's relationship with the beloved. There are no doubt emotions involved but they do not *constitute* the illusion.

He interrupts the love example to give another. I undergo a mystical experience in puberty. It could either be an incident in puberty or the first sign of a religious vocation. But that is to give it its meaning with hindsight and take away its meaning at the time. Merleau-Ponty is convinced that there must ('doit') be something in the experience itself, which distinguishes the vocation from the incident. In the former case, 'the mystical attitude inserts itself in my fundamental relationship with the world and with the other' (own translation: ibid); in the latter it is 'in the interior of the subject an impersonal behaviour without any internal necessity' (own translation). In the same way, real love involves the whole of the personality, whereas 'false' love concerns only one part of the personality, one of its roles. Real love ends when I change or when the beloved has changed; a false love reveals itself as false when I return to myself.

He now goes back to the example of the hysteric. The hysteric:

> does not *feign* pain, sadness or anger, yet his fits of "pain", etc. are distinguishable from "real" pain etc., because he is not wholly given over to them; at the centre of himself,

there remains a zone of calm. The illusory or imaginary feelings are indeed lived, but … with the periphery of ourselves. (own translation, assisted by Smith, p.441: PP, p.435)

He poses the fundamental question here: 'how can the hysteric not feel what he feels and feel what he does not feel' (own translation). But, drawing on material from Scheler, he widens the question far beyond just hysterics. Children and many adults are dominated by "valeurs de situation" ('values of situation'), which hide from them their actual feelings. He quotes from Scheler: '"We do indeed feel the feeling itself, but in an inauthentic way. It is like the shadow of an authentic feeling". Our natural attitude is … to live according to the sentimental categories of the environment' (own translation: PP, p. 435). He cites the example of a romantic young girl who fantasizes about being in love. She lives these feelings but will realize their falseness with hindsight. He uses a term from Sartre in *L'Imaginaire* - '… the young girl "loses her reality" in them' (false feelings) 'like the actor in his role' (own translation, assisted by Smith, p.442). He then makes the central claim of this passage: 'Thus we do not posses ourselves in each moment in our complete reality and we are entitled to speak of an internal perception, of a private sense, of an "analyzer" between us and ourselves, who, at each moment goes more or less far in knowledge of our life and our being' (own translation: PP, pp.435-6). He rejects firmly the idea of the unconscious as the repository for any shortfall in our knowledge. He asserts that reflexion can access our inner life: '"My life", my "whole being", those are not constructions which can be contested, but phenomena which give themselves with evidence to reflection' (own translation: PP, p.436).

Behaviour and the primacy of existence over consciousness

What provides this evidence? It is what we *do.* There is a pattern of behaviour and emotion which I understand with hindsight means that I am in love. '… I find the traces of an organization, of a synthesis which *was in the course of being formed'* (own translation: ibid). Here he summarizes the existentialist view of the structure of consciousness and the ego and contrasts and compares it with the Freudian view. 'The idea of a consciousness which would be transparent for itself and of which the existence would be reduced to the consciousness which it has of existing is not so different from the notion of the unconscious'[53]. Both consist of a retrospective illusion that there is within me a kind of tangible, explicit object made up of

[53] My translation of p.436.

everything which I will be able in the future to learn about myself. He then describes the actual experience of unarticulated love:

> The love which followed its dialectic through me and which I have just discovered is not, from the beginning, a thing hidden in an unconscious, nor an object in front of my consciousness, it is the movement by which I turned myself towards someone, the transformation of my thoughts and my behaviour, …, it was from one end to the other lived, - it was not known. (own translation: ibid)

He then compares the lover to the dreamer (pp.436-7). He refers back to and draws on the earlier chapter on sexuality. Broadly he is saying that love functions like sexuality in dreams. Sexuality is the general atmosphere of the dream, but this does not mean that the dream is thematised as sexual. Sexuality is only one of the ways in which we relate to the world. A fire in a dream only becomes a symbol of sexual drive when we are awake. 'The sexual significance of a dream is not unconscious nor "conscious", because the dream does not "signify", like waking life, in relating one order of facts to another, and we would be equally mistaken in making sexuality chrystalize in "unconscious representations" as in placing in the depths of the dreamer a consciousness which calls it' (sexuality) 'by its name' (own translation: PP, p.437). In the same way, for the lover who lives it, love does not have a name. It is not a defined object ('une chose'), it is not the love which books and newspapers talk about, because it is 'the way in which he' (the lover) 'establishes his relations with the world, it is an existential signification' (own translation). It is not that it exists deep inside the lover as an unconscious representation or tendency; he is like the criminal who does not see his crime because he is in a world which is relatively closed, in situation. 'If we are in situation, we are circumscribed, we cannot be transparent for ourselves, and so our contact with ourselves has to only take place in equivocation (own translation: ibid).

In the next paragraph (pp.437-439), he discusses the potential problems which this poses for the idea of the cogito. He initially questions whether what he has said does not lead to an overwhelming scepticism. Can we ever be certain that a feeling is 'authentic'? 'We said that there are imaginary feelings in which we are sufficiently committed for them to be lived, but not sufficiently committed for them to be authentic. But are there absolute commitments?' (own translation: PP, p.437). He continues:

> Unless we have defined reality by appearance in consciousness, have we not cut the connections between us and ourselves and reduced consciousness to the condition of

> simple appearance of an ungraspable reality? Are we not faced with the alternative of absolute consciousness or unending doubt? (own translation, PP, p.438)

The way round this is to see that existence is not a mental state but an 'acte ou un faire', which by definition is 'le passage violent de ce que j'ai à ce que je vise, de ce que je suis à ce que j'ai l'intention de être'. He rejects the Cartesian formulation of the cogito and reframes it. It is not *because* I think that I am that I am certain of existing; on the contrary the certainty which I have of my thoughts derives from their 'existence effective'[54] (p.438). 'My love, my hatred, my will are not certain as simple thoughts of loving, hating or willing. On the contrary all the certainty of these thoughts come from the' (related) 'acts, which I am sure of because I *do* them. All interior perception is inadequate because I am not an object that one can perceive, because I make my reality and only become myself in the act' (ibid, own translation).

The most interesting feature of the conclusion to this passage is the parallel which he describes between internal and external perception, as well as between the original, pre-reflective knowledge of things and the world and our prereflective certainty of our feelings and thoughts (p.439). He does this by examining the proposition, "I doubt" (p.438). The classic refutation of this is to argue that you can never be certain of doubting, if every certainty is the subject of doubt. Merleau-Ponty on the other hand argues that doubt is always an action with an intentional object:

> To doubt is always to doubt something, even if one "doubts everything". I am certain of doubting because I accept such and such a thing, or even everything and my own existence precisely as doubtful. It is in my relationship with "things" that I know myself, internal perception comes afterwards, and would not be possible if I had not made contact with my doubt in living it right into its object. (own translation: PP, p.439)

Internal perception is just the same as external – it is a synthesis which is never complete, yet which affirms itself. If I want to verify the reality of my doubt, I will never finish, because it will be necessary to question the thought, then the thought of the thought, ad infinitum. 'The certainty comes from the doubt itself as act and not from these thoughts, as the certainty of the thing and of the world precedes the thetic knowledge of their properties' (own translation). I cannot reconstruct the object, and yet there are perceived objects; I can never coincide with my life which is always in flight, and yet there are internal perceptions. There are acts in which

[54] 'effective', translated as 'genuine' by Smith, p.445, but surely it alludes to their existence in action, in doing.

I gather myself together in order to overtake myself and this makes me capable of illusion and truth as regards myself. He concludes the paragraph by asserting implicitly the primacy of existence over consciousness. It is not the 'I think' which contains the 'I am', it is not my existence which is reduced to the consciousness which I have of it; conversely it is the 'I think' which is reintegrated in the transcendent movement of the 'I am' and consciousness which is reintegrated in existence[55].

Summary

Merleau-Ponty gives a full account in the Preface and Introduction of the nature, advantages and difficulties of the phenomenological approach. The traditional disciplines, physical science and psychology, and traditional philosophical approaches, intellectualism and empiricism, fail to capture, describe and explain direct experience. He draws on Husserl's injunction to phenomenology to begin with a descriptive psychology, to return 'aux choses mêmes' and to 'le monde vécu'. Phenomenology can bridge the gap between science and 'le vécu' by bringing to light 'la vie préscientifique de la conscience' (p.71).

Behaviour and meaning

The stress on behaviour follows that in SC. For example, in the chapter, 'Le Sentir', he states that sensation is neither a state nor a quality nor the consciousness of a state or a quality. Each of the so-called qualities is inserted in a certain behaviour (pp.241-2). He draws on the findings of empirical psychology, in experiments on the reaction of brain-damaged patients to particular colours, to demonstrate this. These experiments show that each colour always acts with the same tendency, with the result that one can attribute to it a defined motor value.

[55] Merleau-Ponty fundamentally contradicts the Cartesian Cogito here, even though he tries to reconcile his own view with Descartes'. When he says, '… il y a des actes dans lesquels je me rassemble pour me dépasser. Le Cogito est la reconnaissance de ce fait fondamental' (p.439, '… there are acts in which I bring myself together to go beyond myself. The Cogito is the recognition of this fundamental fact', own translation), it makes sense to see self-consciousness as a privileged instance of this. He has shown that 'Je pense' is **a** transcendent act in existence of a particular nature, not that existence is conditional on it.

Mazis raises another issue about Cartesian doubt. Descartes seeks to free himself from emotion to arrive at the foundation of his thought. But his 'radical doubt' does involve emotion, a distrust and suspicion of the world and its emotional entanglements. Mazis uses this distrust to highlight his own plea for a trust in the world and e-motion (Mazis (1994) pp.131-2).

Again in the Cogito chapter, he stresses the primacy of existence over self-consciousness. Love is not a defined object (‘une chose’). It is defined not by belief or consciousness but as part of ‘the manner in which he establishes his relations with the world, it is an existential signification’ (own translation). Similarly, doubt is often thought of as a proposition, which can be refuted by logic. In Merleau-Ponty’s view, doubt is always an action with an intentional object.

The behavioural approach also has epistemological advantages. We can mitigate the difficulties and uncertainties of relying totally on introspective accounts of feelings[56]. It promises an empirical basis, from which induction can be carried out, which avoids to a significant extent the ideal intangibility of metaphysics or ontology. This shows the advantage for phenomenological psychology of the existential approach.

Further criticism of empiricism alongside approval of empirical methods

In the Introduction Merleau-Ponty makes a blistering attack on empiricism. For example, he describes ‘les constructions empiristes’ as hiding from us, not only the cultural or human world, but also the natural world, by treating it as just a sum of stimuli and qualities (p.33). Indeed he concludes by describing empiricism as ‘the system the least capable of giving the complete picture of revealed experience’ (own translation). Then, on p.65, he accuses it of forgetting ‘le fonds existentiel’ (‘the existential background’) of perception. Sensation is not the perception of an isolated quality, it invests that quality with ‘une valeur vitale’ (‘a vital value’).

But, as he shows, especially in the Preface, the difference between empiricism and phenomenology is not primarily one of method; it is a difference in subject matter. As he states on p.II, phenomenology is primarily descriptive, a return to ‘les choses mêmes’, to actual experience, precisely the empirical. He rejects Husserl’s belief in the possibility of a fully transcendental reduction (PP VI-VII). While he accepts the need for the eidetic reduction to grasp the nature of existence, we must start with our experience of the world (X-XI). His attack is on classical empiricism, in which sense experience is detached from affectivity and motility and becomes totally explicable by physiology (p.68). But its failure is not one of method; it is to gloss over and take an erroneous view of foundational experience. He acknowledges this

[56] ‘les ténèbres de l’intimité psychologique’ (SC p.3, footnote) (‘the shadows of psychological intimacy’, Fisher, p.226). Merleau-Ponty commends both approaches at SC, pp 197-8. See Chapter 4 above.

at the very end of the Introduction, when, like Sartre in ETE, he affirms that we must start our phenomenological inquiry with psychological description (pp.76-7).

An example of his use of experimental psychology (described by him as 'psychologie inductive' (p.241)) is his description of the findings from experiments on brain-damaged patients and of their reactions to different colours (pp.241-246). He uses this to show that each sensation has a defined motor value and 'une signification vitale'.

The structure of existence

He describes existence as having two forms, the personal and the impersonal or general. The impersonal is roughly the organic; it is identified with the body ('notre condition d'êtres incarnés', p.99); around our own self-created worlds is 'un monde en général' with its own time, which continues to flow, whatever value we place on our personal pasts, presents and futures. Clearly this is a recasting of the progressive and integrated 'orders' of *La Structure*, which help us to understand the dual organic/ psychic nature of affectivity and emotion. On the other hand he does not specifically mention the dialectical relationship between them which was stressed in the earlier work. Rather here he stresses the integration of the two forms in *existence.* As regards specific references to affectivity, he makes it clear (p.100) that particular emotions ('un deuil', grief, and its associated 'peine', pain) are part of the personal existence. On the other hand, he says (ibid), these affective episodes, which fill life in the present, are intermittent and never fully transcend the prepersonal, autonomous and anonymous life of the body. He sums up the integration of the organic and the psychic: '… via an imperceptible turn an organic process issues into human behaviour, an instinctive act changes direction and becomes a feeling' (own translation, assisted by Smith, pp.101ff: PP, p.104).

This concept of the binary structure of existence is described repeatedly in the work[57]. On p.249, in the course of his description of sense experience, he applies it to perception. Every perception, he says, takes place in an atmosphere of 'généralité', and gives itself to us as anonymous. Every sensation includes a germ of 'dépersonnalisation'. It goes on at the periphery of my being. My personal life emerges from 'une vie de conscience donnée', which is given by my sense organs, so many 'Moi naturels'.

[57] See, for example, PP, pp.186, 191-194, 199-202, 220-1, 249-251, 269, 502-3.

Qualities, value and meaning

Merleau-Ponty considers how qualities of objects in the world affect us. A central feature of his account is that 'qualités sensibles' cannot be reduced to 'a certain indescribable[58] state or *quale*'. They each have a defined and inherent motor value, expressed in a real or virtual motor reaction of the body. They have a 'a motor physiognomy, and are enveloped in a living significance' (Smith, p.243: PP, p.243). Thus, he again stresses the centrality of behaviour (and purpose) in the structure of experience.

In the Freedom chapter, he introduces the concept of a 'valorisation spontanée', which is always present in our contact with the world. The qualities which are valorised (e.g. large and small, wet and dry) apply to all the objects in the world and are perceived by the other subjects like me. These represent a 'native[59]' meaning of the world which is constituted in the commerce of our incarnated existence with it (p.503). On the other hand there are also valorisations based on privileged attitudes to the world, e.g. one man likes being out in the sun, another shuns it, leading to individual behaviour (pp.504-5). Over time these become what we would describe as character traits or complexes, part of our situation in the world, but, in the existentialist view, always subject to choice.

Sexuality and psychoanalysis

Merleau-Ponty's treatment of sexuality is important for our topic. He states at the beginning of the chapter on the body in its sexual being that he has decided to use desire or love to examine our affective experience. Sexuality is a particularly stark example, as he points out (PP, pp.186,199), of the integration of body and mind. We engage therein our whole personal life and it represents, it *is* 'notre être entier' (p.199).

Sexuality has more significance than as a purely physical manifestation. It is a privileged sign of the fundamental drama of existence, the opening to the other and the tension between self and other (p.195). Shame, desire and love have a metaphysical significance for man, which goes beyond physicality and instinct.

At first sight, Merleau-Ponty's view of sexuality is purely physical. He does not believe that representation is involved. It consists of the perception of another's body and our relationship

[58] Smith's translation of 'indicibles' (Smith, p.243).

[59] 'autochthone'.

with that body. However, it is not just a physical reflex. He uses a pathological example to show that it is part of the general movement of existence (p.184).

He acknowledges the contribution of psychoanalysis in uncovering in functions which were believed to be 'purely bodily' a dialectical movement and reintegrating sexuality into human being (ibid). In his sexuality, man projects his way of being in regard to the world. Psychoanalysis recognises that every human act has a meaning, which cannot be purely attached to mechanical conditions. On the other hand, it has inflated sexuality to the point of integrating the *whole* of existence into it, which he objects to as a reduction. He makes a further criticism of psychoanalysis for its belief in the unconscious (p.196). On the other hand he accepts that there is more to existence than the 'contenu manifeste' of consciousness. Sexuality is neither transcended nor expressed in unconscious representations. He evokes the dramatic image of sexuality continuously present as an atmosphere (ibid). We do not have to look for it in an explicit act of consciousness but it is always present as a motivation.

At the end of the chapter on sexuality, Merleau-Ponty gives a general picture of the structure of existence, stressing the importance of meaning, the dialectics of body and existence, exemplified in sexuality, and necessity and contingence. Man is defined by his experience, 'by his own way of forming the world' (PP, p.198). '…it' (existence) 'is the movement by which facts are taken up' (ibid), 'Everything that we are, we are on the basis of a factual situation … which we transform endlessly' (PP, p.199: all own translation).

Emotional expression

Merleau-Ponty views communication as a single action. He rejects the idea of representation followed by mental analysis. Comprehension of the emotional meaning of a gesture is not a two stage process, the gesture and then the deciphering of the emotion behind it. '… I read anger in the gesture, the gesture *does not make me think* of anger, it is anger itself' (PP, p.215: own translation). Speech is just another instance of this, another use of our body to convey meaning. Speech and language, cultural symbols generally, are extensions of physical gestures; 'le geste linguistique' is just as much a property of the body in the world (p.218); different languages represent different ways that the body has developed to express the meanings of human subjects (pp.220-1).

He links expression, meaning and behaviour:

‘Behaviour creates meanings which are transcendent in relation to the anatomical apparatus, and yet immanent to the behaviour as such, since it communicates itself and is understood’ (PP, p.221: Smith, p.220).

‘True’ feelings

The treatment of affectivity and emotion in the Cogito chapter does not deal with their *structure* but with the truth or falseness of our consciousness of them. Although the perceptive synthesis is always incomplete and there is always a risk of error, the act of perception itself is beyond question. In the same way, if we have a feeling, love or volition for example, how can this be false?[60] Merleau-Ponty is determined to show that ‘sentiments vrais’ and ‘sentiments faux’ can be distinguished. He suggests various ways. For example, I may not have loved the whole person, just some of his or her qualities (p.434), a youthful passion did not involve the whole of my being (ibid); my feelings may be superficial, influenced by convention (p.435). He believes that the authenticity or inauthenticity of these emotions *can* be judged by reflection. Again he also stresses the importance of behaviour – the evidence comes from what we do (p.436). We are not necessarily transparent to ourselves. He gives the further example of doubt, to show how action and behaviour, not thetic knowledge, define existence. So Merleau-Ponty resolves the problem of the truth of feeling by citing the evidence of action and behaviour.

[60] In examining the distinction between perception and the consciousness of « faits psychiques », he brings up the problem of ‘états’, which runs through Sartre’s works examined here, from TE, through ETE to EN. Merleau-Ponty is equally critical of them as potentially illusory and sources of bad faith, but introduces criteria by which they can become transparent.

CHAPTER 6 OVERALL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Summary

I have summarized below the principal points brought out in the commentaries in the previous chapters. The points have been referenced to the primary text concerned.

I have largely structured the summary on the basis of the major themes identified in the Introduction (see p. 23f.). I also deal with two topics, where there is significant overlap between the two authors. The first is a situation of decision and evaluation, which they both examine in different but not wholly dissimilar ways (pp. 196ff.). The second is the topic of psychoanalysis (pp. 199ff.). Five of the six works examined here engage critically with Freudian and other psychoanalysis, while two describe alternative approaches. Both authors are ambiguous about classic psychoanalysis; though they reject most of its significant psychological principles, they appreciate its methodology and its objective of uncovering meaning.

Behaviour

The study and description of behaviour is integral to the phenomenological analysis of emotion and affectivity (and other mental acts) (SC). Interior perception is inadequate because consciousness and our feelings are not objects that one can necessarily perceive. Nor does the fact that we are not necessarily fully conscious of our feelings imply that they exist in the unconscious.[1] They are not 'objects' but ways in which we relate to the world, which have an existential meaning, We make our reality and only become ourselves in the act (PP,EN).

Merleau-Ponty explains his choice of behaviour as the subject of analysis in the Introduction to SC. He rejects classic behaviourism, which views behaviour as a collection of conditioned reflexes (SC, p.3). This does not work in respect of either simple behavioural reactions or the psychology of higher level behaviour. His aim is to explore consciousness and, in his view, by using behaviour, he can introduce consciousness, not as a psychic reality or a causal factor, but as a structure with its own role in behaviour (ibid). Behaviourism correctly defined itself as concerned with the relationship between the individual and his/her milieu but continued to look for causal or mechanical factors to explain behaviour. In Merleau-Ponty's view, 'la pensée

[1] See the section on Psychoanalysis below.

dialectique' ('dialectical thought') is a better approach to 'the vision of man as a debate and perpetual "discussion" with a physical and … social world' (SC, p.3, footnote: own translation).

Sartre commends the behavioural approach in his analysis of the ontology of freedom in Part 4 of EN. The formulation 'to be reduces itself to to do' (own translation, EN, p.521) and his definition of human being as 'an organized unity of conducts or "behaviours"' (own translation, ibid) are consistent with Merleau-Ponty's commendations of the behavioural approach. Generally the behavioural approach figures more as description than on a theoretical level in Sartre. There are vivid descriptions of emotional behaviour, used to analyse or exemplify, in all of his works considered here. Thus, in TE, he uses the example of pity (p.39f) to criticise those who hypothesise a further layer of thought or feeling behind the feeling. In ETE, he gives a lengthy analysis of the act of writing to describe 'le plan irréfléchi' (pp.73-76). Later he describes a catalogue of various emotions, passive and active fear, passive and active depression and joy, and their function, as he believes, of magically changing the world (pp.83-92).

In IMG, he gives a lengthy description of the difference between love in response to the real, i.e. the loved one present, and in response to the imaginary, the absent loved one (pp.276-280).

In EN, he analyses different situations where I experience pain while reading, and then when I stop reading (pp.371-8). He uses the example in order to define the structures of bodily consciousness (p.371). In the chapter, 'Être et faire: la liberté', he uses the example of the experience of fatigue caused by a walk in the country and differing decisions in reponse to it to show how motivation involving the will and the passions functions (pp.498-502). I have examined this in more detail in comparison to Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the same situation in the section, 'A Walk in the Country'.

There is also the analysis of the 'visqueux' (pp.650-662) ('the slimy'), which he uses to exemplify the ways that being gives itself in qualities, which generate symbolic meanings.

Thus, both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty stress the importance of behaviour in the study of consciousness and psychological analysis. Their existentialist viewpoint with its emphasis on being in action makes them well-placed to construct a behavioural psychology.

Structure

1. Existence and experience

This is dealt with systematically by Merleau-Ponty, especially in SC. The latter includes some specific references to emotion and affectivity[2], which are useful for our overall objectives, but there is no systematic application of these features to the domain of affectivity, as Merleau-Ponty explicitly acknowledges (SC p.231).

The principal features of Merleau-Ponty's view of the structure of existence and experience are taken from SC. I will summarize these, identifying those which are common to SC and PP.

We should take the 'gestalt' view of human and animal organisms, i.e. we cannot understand their structure and behaviour simply by examining their parts in isolation from the whole. They possess qualities and act in ways which transcend the sum of their constituent elements. The idea of signification is central to understanding the life of organisms (SC & PP).

The description and integration of the physical, vital and human 'orders' in organic and human life enable us to understand the development and nature of affectivity and its physiological, psychological and cultural components. We can understand the integration of the 'orders' by examining the dialectical relationships between them (SC)

'La conscience naïve' experiences existence as a unity. Beings, things and the body are experienced as three sectors of a single field. Body and soul are integrated. The body is not a separate physiological reality; it is the perspective of all mental operations and behaviour. Phenomenology seeks to recover this unity of experience. Its concern is the lived experience of the body, in contrast to science which views the body as a mechanism. The body is part of the permanent structure of my being, the effective condition for all possible action in relation to the world (SC & PP).

Although Sartre's focus is the conscious experience of the body, his view of the existential significance of the body is consistent with this. He defines the experience of the existence of the body as a non-thetic consciousness, incorporating the non-thetic affective tonality of existence (EN).

[2] See SC, pp.179-187 and p.191.

Although SC and PP deal with different but related topics, the latter does offer its own consistent account of the structure of existence and experience, which is similar but is cast differently from the theory of the integrated orders in the former.

The structure of existence in PP is consistently shown as binary, consisting of the personal and an impersonal, more general realm of existence, often described as anonymous, and identified with the physical and the organic. It has its own time which flows continuously 'beneath' the events and time of conscious experience (PP, p.99). In SC, on the other hand, he stresses the dialectical relationship between the orders; the physical and the mental aspects of an individual of any species are fully integrated in their behaviour. The bodily is necessarily integrated in the individual organism[3]. He quotes Uexküll, using an image which he repeats elsewhere: 'Every organism is a melody which sings itself' (SC, p.172: own translation)[4]. However he acknowledges that the integration can always break down, for example, in sickness, fear or other extreme emotion, or in the process of dying (pp.226-7).

His treatment of the body in PP similarly emphasizes the integration of psychology and physiology. In Part 1 he criticizes in detail the scientific approach to the body, which treats it as a purely physiological or psychological object. He wants to formulate an approach to psychology which takes into account the living experience of the body and its role in the meaning of existence. His characteristic way into this is via the examination of the phenomenon of the phantom limb (pp.90ff.). To understand this, we have to examine the body not as a scientific object but in its existential role. He describes '… The fusion of the soul and the body in the act, the sublimation of biological existence in personal existence, of the natural world in the cultural world …' (own translation: PP, p.100). The body is not an object to be studied like other objects (p.111). Scientists and classical psychologists instead of looking for a new definition of being, turned the experience of the body into the 'representation' of the body, so that it was not a 'phénomène' but 'un fait psychique' (p.111). But the correct definition of the body is as the vehicle of being in the world (see footnote, p.163). We have to cease distinguishing the body as 'mécanisme en soi' and consciousness as 'être pour soi' (ibid). The centrality of the body reappears in the chapter on Freedom. Behind my actual projects, decisions, choices, lies a general relationship to the world, a natural self rooted in the world

[3] '… la forme physique est un individu' (SC, p.148).

[4] As he expressly states (SC, p.223), this is the gestalt position.

and the body, which continually evaluates the world in absolute terms (see PP pp.502-3 and 'A Walk in the Country', below).

So it seems to me that the two works are effectively consistent. There is however a marked difference in emphasis in the description of the structure of existence. In SC he emphasizes the integration of the 'orders' from a 'gestalt' perspective; in PP he accepts integration, but distinguishes between an impersonal and a personal realm of existence, between 'un moi naturel' and 'mes projets d'être pensant' (PP, p.502).

Sartre, on the other hand, shows little interest in physiology, which absorbs so much of Merleau-Ponty's attention. But he does describe at length the conscious experience of the body in Chapter II of the third part of EN, including in relation to emotion and affectivity. He also describes the phenomenology of the body specifically in relation to emotion in ETE[5].

In the section in EN entitled 'Le corps comme être-pour-soi: La facticité' (EN pp.342-400). 'le corps' stands for, *is* the facticity of human existence. It is that through which, in which there is existence and behaviour. It *is* the physiological and psychological system and structure of existence. This is consistent with Merleau-Ponty's definition of the body, referred to above, in the footnote to p.163 of PP:

> … consciousness is defined … as being in the world, … as to the body, it is defined not as an object among all objects, but as the vehicle of being in the world … It remains to understand by what magical operation the representation of a movement precisely sparks off in the body the same movement. The problem is only resolved if we cease to distinguish the body as mechanism in itself and consciousness as being for itself. (own translation).

2. Affectivity and Emotion

The specific phenomenological characteristics of the structure of emotion and affectivity mainly, but not exclusively, come from Sartre.

[5] See p.56 above.

All perception is accompanied by an affective reaction (IMG). Intentionality is omnipresent (ETE & IMG). Emotion and affectivity are aspects of the 'irréfléchi'. They are spontaneous (TE & ETE) but captive of themselves, in the sense that they are not free to deny themselves on the unreflective plane. Unreflective behaviour is not unconscious behaviour. Unreflective consciousness has 'non-thetic' consciousness of itself (EN & ETE). The affective reaction is a transcendent form of consciousness which 'grasps' the qualities of objects and the world (TE, ETE & IMG). Emotion is akin to belief in its implicit confidence that it has an authentic grasp on the world (ETE). It is one of the two ways for consciousness "to-be-in-the-world". The other way relates to the world as a complex of utensils, which we can use to change or modify our world. In emotion there is nothing between the world and consciousness (ETE). Reflection treats emotion as a structure of consciousness, which has meaning and is usually motivated by an object (TE & ETE).[6]

Although the meaning of affects and emotion must be sought in the mind, they are accompanied by inherent physiological phenomena. These coexist with emotional behaviour in a total synthesis. They are integrated (see previous section). In the eyes of the other, the physiological changes experienced represent the lived belief in the authenticity of the conscious experience (ETE & IMG).

Sexuality is a privileged example for the examination of our affective life and indeed our life in general. Not only does it show in clear detail the integration of body and mind; we engage our whole personal life in our sexuality and project into it our whole being (PP).

[6] As shown in this paragraph, Sartre makes constant references to consciousness in his account of the phenomenological characteristics of emotion and affectivity. This is consistent with his rejection of the existence of the unconscious (see the section below on Psychoanalysis). Both writers look for and propose solutions to phenomena which 'classical' psychoanalysis views as products of and evidence for the existence of the unconscious, in particular repression and irrational emotional reactions. Both develop various solutions to explain the apparently hidden aspects of emotional life; Sartre, that they are simply unperceived meanings (TE), that behaviour can be conscious of itself 'non-thetically', that there exists an underlying original project and that meaning is obscured by 'mauvaise foi' (EN); Merleau-Ponty, that they reflect difficulties or deficiencies in the structuring of consciousness and behaviour (SC & PP).

In the context of my objective to develop a coherent account of the phenomenology of emotion, the case against 'classical' psychoanalysis and the operation of the unconscious is not so clear-cut that I would rule out using theoretical and phenomenological material from psychoanalytic sources, for example in the project which I outline at the end of the thesis to describe and analyse in detail a specific affective experience,.

Emotion (like language) is a variation of our being in the world which reflects the usage which subjects make of their body (PP). Affective communication does not require a cognitive operation. Communication of gestures is achieved by the repricocity of intentions and gestures between self and other(s) (EN & PP).

Value and Meaning

The topics of the perception and experience of value and qualities, the omnipresence of meaning and the connection between them are dealt with by both writers. The affective structure of objects consists of qualities which generate meaning for the perceiving/ experiencing agent. Merleau-Ponty analyses the 'signification vitale' of all sensations. Sartre emphasizes the metaphorical meanings which arise from physical qualities.

a) Merleau-Ponty

La Structure du comportement

Merleau-Ponty's focus on behaviour implicitly and explicitly leads to a concentration on the 'meaning' of action (see pp.186f. for a discussion on the epistemological advantages of this focus). His constant theme in the description of its structure is that behaviour, however simple, always depends on and is guided by the situation and intentions of the human or animal organism. The reactions of the organism cannot be classified according to the mechanisms by which they occur, but 'selon leur signification vitale' ('according to their vital signification') in the dialectic between it and its 'milieu' (SC, p.161). When he comes to look at 'l'ordre humain', he describes how the 'signification', the meaning of actions, gestures and expressions, is given to the human other before the signs themselves (pp.181). He considers consciousness on p.187; clearly thoughts, using language, have a meaning; but consciousness is rather a network of meaningful intentionality, sometimes clear to itself, sometimes *lived* rather than known:

'… there would be a sort of blind recognition of the object desired by the desire and of the good by the will. This is the means by which a person can be given to a child as the pole of his desires and fears …' (Fisher, p.172). If the phrase, 'reconnaissance aveugle' suggests the existence of an unconscious, he addresses this later in his examination of 'mistaken' consciousness. He quotes Sartre's definition of the unconscious as only 'une signification

inaperçue' (p.237) (an unperceived signification). Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of this confirms points made elsewhere; the centrality of the analysis of behaviour, the link between, the identity of structure and meaning, and the priority of structure over *apparent* meaning (SC pp.237-8 and p.144 above).

Phénoménologie de la perception

In contrast to scientific thinking which detaches sense experience from affectivity and motility and explains it purely by physiology (p.68), in Merleau-Ponty's account:

'Sensations, "sensible qualities" … present themselves with a motor physiognomy, and are enveloped in a living significance' (Smith, p.243: PP, pp.242-3).

To illustrate this, he analyses the affective meanings of different colours (pp.243-5) and the forms of objects (p.266). These meanings are perceived, felt through and by the body, 'le corps phénoménal' (see below). This applies to language and cultural objects, just as much as physical and natural objects (p.272). He expands his analysis of the valorisation of objects and the world in his discussion of freedom (pp.501-4). In my perception of and reaction to the world there are 'general intentions which valorize my surroundings virtually' (own translation: PP, p.502). They are general in that they include all possible objects and that they are shared by my fellow subjects. 'une valorisation spontanée' is always present in us in our contact with the world, in which objects propose themselves to our body « à toucher », « à prendre », « à franchir » (p.503)[7]. These valorizations always have a meaning, they express my attitude to the world. If the valorization is constantly repeated, the attitude may become a privileged characteristic of our attitude to the world (p.504).

In the chapter on sexuality, Merleau-Ponty compares existential with Freudian psychoanalysis, rejecting the latter's use of symbolization to express and understand meaning. He summarizes his view of meaning and its expression as follows:

> … we must indeed, …, recognize a primordial operation of signification in which the expressed does not exist separately from the expression and in which the signs themselves produce outside their meaning. It is in this way that the body expresses the whole of existence, not that it is its external accompaniment, but because it is realized in it. This

[7] "to touch", "to take", "to cross" (ditto).

incarnated meaning is the central phenomenon of which body and mind, sign and signification are abstract moments. (own translation: PP, p.193)

Sartre

L'Esquisse

Sartre stresses the importance of the meaning of emotion in the Introduction. 'To the phenomenologist, …, every human fact is of its essence significant. If you deprive it of its significance you rob it of its nature as a human fact. The task of the phenomenologist will therefore be to study the significance of emotion' (Mairet, p.27 modified: ETE, pp.24-5).

The role of meaning is also stressed in the discussion of methodology in the Introduction. Since the full anthropology which is phenomenology's ultimate goal has not yet been completed, phenomenological psychology will focus, not on the collection of *facts,* as practised by experimental and introspective psychology, but on the interrogation of psychic phenomena in so far as they are 'significations' (p.28).

The *signification* of emotion and the centrality of *meaning* in his view of the structure of consciousness is further examined in the context of his review of psychoanalysis. In view of the ubiquity of discussion of psychoanalysis in the works examined, I refer to this in a separate section below (pp.199-204).

L'Imaginaire

Sartre examines the affective meaning of objects in the chapter entitled 'L'Affectivité' (see above). In fact he identifies structure and meaning. Qualities 'consitute the meaning of the object, … they are its affective structure' (own translation: IMG, p.139).

He quotes approvingly from D H Lawrence, who 'excels in suggesting … those imprecise ('sourdes') affective structures which constitute their deepest reality' (Webber, p.69f. modified: ibid). In the example which he gives from Lawrence, the representative 'retains a kind of primacy'[8], followed by 'an affective consciousness which comes to confer on them a new signification' (own translation: ibid). But affect does not have to be tied to a representation (pp.139-141). For example, one emotion can be provoked by another; a feeling may be

[8] Webber, p.70.

awakened by a representation but it may not be directed at it; 'une conscience de savoir' ('a consciousness of knowledge') can at the same time be a 'conscience affective' (p.143). The latter can give the former, which may be 'savoir vide' ('empty knowledge'), in the image for example, 'opacité' (p.144) ('substance').

L'Être et le Néant

Sartre's account here of the meaning of the 'qualités' of objects in the world is broadly consistent with Merleau-Ponty's description of the 'signification vitale' of 'les qualités sensibles' (see above). The perception, the appreciation of 'qualité', like 'valeur', generally consists of and depends on a related affect. Sartre especially explores the relationship between the physical meaning of 'qualités' and their metaphorical (i.e. metaphysical and moral) meaning. They generate, they *are* the value which is lacking to the pour-soi. I have summarized Sartre's account of value, quality and meaning in EN, in Chapter 3, pp.116f.

I have also examined issues of meaning in both thinkers in the sections below on the specific example of a country walk and fatigue, which is examined by them both, and on psychoanalysis. They agree that objects in the world have qualities which are valued in common by human subjects, while at the same time they make individual decisions based on differing ways of being in the world. For Sartre, in EN, these are ultimately based on an individual 'original project'. Merleau-Ponty views them as more restricted in respect of choice and freedom by environmental and historic factors. Both commend the method of classic psychoanalysis for uncovering meaning but strongly disagree with the bases of its psychology.

A walk in the country

i) **All objects in the world have qualities which are valued in the same way by all human subjects.**

ii) **At the same time, we make individual decisions based on our individual ways of being in the world.**

In the course of the chapter on freedom in EN, Sartre gives an example of a decision to show how motivation involving the will and the passions functions. He begins: 'I set off on an excursion with some comrades' (own translation: EN, p.498). Eventually I become so tired that I give way and collapse at the side of the road. My companions do not; although tired, they keep going. He then analyses both decisions (pp.498-502).

Merleau-Ponty uses the same example in his chapter on freedom (PP, p.504). Again he analyses why my decision to give up is different from my companion's. Although both passages are within the framework of examinations of the possibility and operation of freedom, they also show how each thinker envisages the individual's valorization of the world and hence his/her affective relationship to it.

Sartre's description of the initial fatigue (EN, p.498) repeats the analysis of affectivity in the chapter on the body (see p.221 above). The fatigue is the way in which I exist my body but it is not initially the object of a positional consciousness. Rather the object of my consciousness is the surrounding world, in this case the countryside. Initially I do not *think* my fatigue as a quasi-object of my reflection. But there comes a moment when I seek to consider it. I *suffer* it, that is to say, a reflexive consciousness directs itself on my fatigue to live it, to give it a value and a practical relationship to myself. It is only on this plane that it will appear to me as supportable or intolerable. It will never be this in itself; it is the 'pour-soi réflexif', which in arising suffers it as intolerable (p.499). All other things being more or less equal, how come I and my comrades suffer differently from our fatigue? If I want to understand under what conditions I can suffer a fatigue as intolerable, it is not sufficient to look at so-called factual data, which show themselves as being only a choice; we must try to examine this choice and see if it is not integrated as a secondary structure in the perspective of a broader choice. In fact, he first examines the alternative case of one of my companions who *loves* his fatigue (pp.499-501). He gives a longer and more substantial account of this than he does of the 'giving up' response.

Sartre identifies *three* layers of meaning. On the immediate level, for the lover of fatigue, tramping through the countryside is a way of discovering the world. For him the feeling of effort means that he has conquered fatigue. '… his effort, …, gives itself as a way of taking possession of the mountain, of suffering it right to the end and of being its conqueror' (own translation: EN, p.500). The second level is 'un projet plus vaste' of a trusting abandonment to nature, of passion consented to so that it exists at its maximum and at the same time of a gentle domination and appropriation. The third level is 'le projet originel' (ibid) and 'initial'

(p.501). This is defined in various ways. It is the particular relationship of my companion to his body and to objects (p.500). Some original structures are invariable and constitute human reality in everyone[9]. In this case, however, the 'pour-soi' chooses to abandon itself to its facticity, hoping to recuperate the 'en-soi' of the material universe. This is the original relation which the pour-soi chooses with its facticity (the body), and with the world (p.501). It represents the choice which the pour-soi makes of itself in the presence of the 'problème de l'être' (p.500).

I on the other hand suffer my fatigue differently. My manner of 'existing my body' is different; I distrust my body and am equally suspicious of the 'en-soi'. My fatigue is 'un phénomène importun' that I want to get rid of, escape (p.502). My project is to preserve my body and my presence in the world by means of the looks of the other. This is my 'projet originel', my choice of 'être-dans-le-monde', in contrast to my companion, whose project led him to embrace his fatigue. This provides an example of the different method of psychoanalysis which Sartre is proposing (EN, p.502 and see below).

Merleau-Ponty's account begins in similar terms to Sartre's, as he acknowledges (PP, p.504). He has been describing the way in which behind my actual projects, decisions, choices, lies a general relationship to the world, a natural self rooted in the world and the body, which continually evaluates the world in absolute terms (PP 502-3)[10].

Then he moves on to consider the 'grounds' of decision, when we react differently to the same situation (pp.503-4). Pain and fatigue can never be considered as causes which 'act' on my freedom. They do not come from outside, 'they always have a meaning, they express my attitude in regard to the world' (own translation: PP, p.504). My companion, on the other hand, carries on, he loves being outside, feeling the sun on his back; he loves feeling himself 'au milieu des choses'[11]. I, however, don't like fatigue, I don't seek being in nature – 'I have chosen otherwise my way of being in the world' (own translation: ibid).

Merleau-Ponty then addresses the question of how free we are to change. We have to recognize that there is a sort of sedimentation in our life. We privilege a certain attitude towards the world, when it has been often repeated. He cites two possible situations. If my habitual

[9] See Merleau-Ponty's description of 'intentions générales' below (see following page).

[10] See Chapter 5 above, pp.159f. for detailed citations.

[11] See p.504 for the particularly vivid enumeration of 'my companion's' feelings.

being in the world is fragile and the complexes which I have nourished for years are fairly anodine, 'le geste de la liberté' can effortlessly and instantaneously explode them. However, after having constructed our life on a complex of inferiority continually repeated over twenty years, 'it is very unlikely that we would change' (own translation: ibid). The reference to an inferiority complex is surely deliberate, using the same example as Sartre (EN, p.504 & pp.516ff.).

A summary rationalism might object to this: there are no degrees of possibility; either there is no longer a free act, or there still is, and liberty is an absolute. Probability has no real existence, it is not 'un ingrédient du monde' (p.505). Merleau-Ponty rejects this simple view; the operation and application of probability is part of experience.

> "It is improbable" that I should at this moment destroy an inferiority complex in which I have been content to live for twenty years. That means that I have committed myself to inferiority, that I have made it my abode, that this past, if it is not a fatality, has at least a specific weight and is not a set of events over there, at a distance from me, but the atmosphere of my present. (Smith, p.514 modified: ibid)

The simple alternatives, either the free act is possible or it is not, either the event comes from me or is imposed by the outside, does not apply to our relations with the world and our past. 'Our freedom does not destroy our situation, but is geared upon it; our situation, in so far as we are alive, is open, which implies at the same time that it calls upon privileged modes of resolution and that it is by itself without the power to procure any one of them' (own translation: ibid).

It seems to me that, although the language is different. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty agree on the fundamental *meaning* of the behaviours described. Sartre talks about the original relation which the pour-soi chooses with its facticity and the world, Merleau-Ponty about the choice of 'ma manière d'être au monde'. The difference seems to come in the emphasis which the latter gives to the influence of the past – our privileging of an attitude to the world when it has been often repeated – and the resulting restriction on our freedom. This brings Merleau-Ponty closer to a psychoanalytic view of the influence of the past and the difficulty of change.

Psychoanalysis

It is striking that of the six primary texts examined in this thesis, five engage in more or less depth with Freudian (and in two cases other schools') psychoanalysis. The exception is *L'Imaginaire*, where there is one brief reference to Freud and one to psychoanalysis (Webber, pp.97 and 168). Why did our authors feel obliged to engage in this way, what differences and possible progression in their treatment are revealed, and what contribution does this make to our topic? Of course, a straightfoward reason for their engagement is the contemporary importance of psychanalysis as an approach to psychology, and particularly the affective life, which meant that they felt obliged to address the differences from their own approach and its influence thereon. However, I suggest that psychoanalysis presented a particular challenge to phenomenology and the life and world view of both these philosophers, which they felt they needed to counter and reconcile to their own views.

Sartre does not explicitly refer to psychoanalysis in TE; however he does refer to the unconscious. It is easy to summarize his view of it – he rejects its existence. This is expressed most clearly and forcefully in the Conclusion (TE, pp.78-9). There is nothing before or behind spontaneous consciousness[12] (p.79). The unconscious is an illusion, to which man resorts to explain 'the way in which the *me* is ... surpassed by consciousness' (Brown, p.47: ibid). Certain psychologists could not accept the idea of a spontaneity producing itself; they therefore imagined that the spontaneities of consciousness "came out of" the unconscious where they already existed.

In ETE (pp.57-67) Sartre devotes a section to the examination of the psychoanalytic theory of the emotions. Here, although he fundamentally rejects the existence of the unconscious for the same reason as in TE, he agrees with psychoanalysis as to the centrality of meaning. His disagreement is over the role of consciousness. Psychoanalysis is based on the theory that conscious states have a significance other than themselves; conscious thoughts and feelings are interpreted as caused by and as symbols of unconscious drives; consciousness is 'un phénomène secondaire et passif' (p.63), with 'real' meaning in the unconscious. For Sartre, in ETE, meaning, even if not perfectly explicit, is an aspect of the very structure of consciousness

[12] '… transcendental consciousness determines itself to exist at every instant, without us being able to conceive of anything *before it* …. Every instant of our conscious lives reveals to us a creation *ex nihilo*. (Brown, p.46: TE, p.79).

– ‘Consciousness, …, is itself the *fact,* the *signification* and what is *signified’* (Mairet, p.53 modified: ETE, p.64). The psychoanalytic view is fundamentally incompatible with the Cartesian cogito, in accordance with which consciousness is the essence of existence.

He reinforces his rejection of the unconscious in his lengthy description of writing as an example of action ‘sur le plan irréfléchi’ (pp.73 – 78 & p.39 above). He makes it clear that unreflective behaviour is not unconscious behaviour. He is describing an action on the unreflective, spontaneous level (‘For example, at this moment, I write but I do not have consciousness of writing’ (p.73), ‘there is not a need to be conscious of oneself acting to act’ (own translations: ETE, p.77)); but this does not make it *unconscious* behaviour; rather he defines it as behaviour conscious of itself *non-thetically* (p.77).

In EN, Sartre engages in detail with psychoanalysis, both Freudian and Adlerian. He acknowledges his methodological debt to them in formulating his own theory of psychoanalysis. He is also now much closer to the psychoanalytic view of psychic structure, that an action may have a deeper meaning than the apparent one (p.502). On the other hand, he still disagrees with the basis and nature of the meanings proposed by classical psychoanalysis and its method for uncovering them. Sartre proposes his own psychoanalytic method, ‘la psychanalyse existentielle’.

He considers this question of method after describing his theory of the ‘projet initial’ and the method of regressive analysis which uncovers it (pp.498-502). The only school (of psychology) which uses the same *method* is the Freudian (p.502). For Freud, as for the existential psychoanalyst, an act cannot stand on its own; it refers immediately ‘à des structures plus profondes’. Again, Freud also refuses what Sartre calls, ‘un déterminisme psychique horizontal’, i.e. the interpretation of an action by the previous moment, as cause and effect. The act is *symbolic*. Sartre identifies two fundamental differences between his analysis and Freud’s; psychoanalysis posits a vertical determinism from the past to the present, by which the complex constituted by the past of the subject produces its symbolic manifestation in the present. Existential analysis on the other hand understands the present by the future, by the choices of the ‘pour-soi’ in the world, its ‘projet’ (pp.502-4). Secondly in psychoanalysis the fundamental structures of the subject are only accessible to an objective observer, the analyst, who can then understand and explain the meaning of her actions. In the existentialist view, on the other hand, every action is a choice and is comprehensible as a ‘project of oneself towards a possibility’ (own translation: EN, p.504). We should restrict ourselves to taking inspiration from the *method*, in the sense that we should look for the meaning of an action, however

insignificant, not as the simple effect of the 'état psychique antérieur' in a linear determinism, 'but because it (the action) is integrated … as a secondary structure in global structures, and ultimately in the totality which I am' (own translation: EN, p.503).

Sartre continues by giving an existentialist analysis of the inferiority complex, pointing out the fundamental differences from the Adlerian analysis (p.504 and pp.516-9). For him the end point of the regressive analysis, 'Mon projet ultime et initial' (p.507), is the choice of being, which he contends is free. He attributes to 'mauvaise foi' the role which classical psychoanalysis ascribes to unconscious mechanisms (p.518). In the case of the inferiority complex, the will, the 'réfléchi' is an inherent source of 'mauvaise foi' (ibid). But this is not only applicable to the inferiority and other complexes, which could be seen as pathological or maladaptive. The reflexive is *inherently* a mechanism of 'mauvaise foi' in *any* circumstances as it tends to generate inauthentic psychic entities. Sartre makes clear the ontological priority and superior authenticity of the 'irréfléchi' over the 'réfléchi'. 'The unreflective consciousness, being a spontaneous projection of oneself, towards its possibilities, can never deceive itself about itself … The reflective attitude, on the contrary, brings along a thousand possibilities of mistakes, …' (own translation: EN, p.516). For it aims to constitute 'de véritables objets psychiques', which are merely probable and may even be false (ibid).

Sartre continues and develops his examination of the 'projet' and the method of psychoanalysis in the section, 'La psychanalyse existentielle' (pp.602-620). He believes that there is a 'transcendant signification of each concrete and empirical choice' (own translation: EN, p.609) and he refers to the 'individual secret of the subject's being in the world' (Barnes, p.564). Every action and the totality of our behaviour, including the affective, have a 'meaning'.

> … in every inclination, in every tendency, (the person) expresses himself in his entirety, even though under a different angle, … we have to dicover in each tendency, in each behaviour of the subject, a meaning which transcends them. Such and such a jealousy, *dated* and singular, in which the subject historializes himself in relation to a certain woman, signifies, for whoever knows how to read it, the global relationship to the world by which the subject constitutes himself as a self. (own translation: ibid)

Because of the 'secret' nature of the individual's being in the world, we require a special method to define it, i.e. existential psychoanalysis. In the course of his comparison of classic and existential psychoanalysis (pp.615-620), Sartre refers to the Freudian view of original affectivity and its role, describing it as 'virgin wax *before* its history' (own translation: EN,

p.615). In the view of existential psychoanalysis on the other hand there is not even a 'cire vierge'; it recognises nothing before the original upsurge of human freedom. However they do agree in considering the human being in his historialization and seeking to reveal the meaning and direction of this history. Both consider the person in the world and that it is essential to take into account *situation* in revealing his being.

Classic psychoanalysis looks for the *complex*, existential psychoanalysis for '*le choix originel'* ('the original choice'). Both are prelogical; both, according to Sartre, 'bring together into a prelogical synthesis the totality of the existing' and are 'the centre of reference of an infinity of polyvalent meanings' (own translation: ibid). Both theories seem reductive, Sartre's to the 'projet', Freud's to infantile sexuality. On the other hand, there *are* features of existential psychoanalysis which differ from classical psychoanalysis and apparently avoid *its* reductionism. Existential psychoanalysis does not assume that the environment acts mechanically on the subject. 'From the start, the milieu conceived as situation refers back to the choices made by the for-itself, just as the for-itself refers back to the milieu through its being in the world' (own translation: EN, p.618). Existential analysis does not accept any theory of mechanical causation (e.g. the Freudian theory of the energy of the libido). Nor does it accept any general interpretation of symbolization, as practised in Freudian theory[13]. Each case has to be viewed on an individual basis.

Again Merleau-Ponty, in both his works which we examine, writes lengthy critiques of Freudian psychoanalysis. This critique in SC plays a particularly important role, as he decides to use Freudianism to show a) the weakness of causal explanations of human development and behaviour and b), by contrast with the theory of Freudian psychoanalysis, to present positively his theory of the relationships between the human and the purely vital dialectic (p.191). He rejects Freud's theory of psychological mechanisms caused by the activation (and frustration) of psychic energy. Merleau-Ponty's theory is that both normal and defective development are explained by the success or otherwise of the structuration of behaviour (p.192). Freud's theory is based on the exceptions of pathological cases and does not account for normal development (p.194). It also generates a metaphysical theory of human existence on the dubious basis of his causal explanation (p.192).

[13] i.e. as sexual in origin.

Merleau-Ponty returns to the critique of Freudianism towards the end of the last chapter and his review of theories of perception (pp.237-8). Here he considers how consciousness can fall into error, given that we have excluded Freud's causal explanation based on the metaphor of psychic energy and his conception of the unconscious. This summarizes how Merleau-Ponty attempts to counter the challenge of psychoanalysis and its account of the malfunction of consciousness, while remaining within a philosophy of consciousness. He has replaced Freud's metaphor of psychic energy with metaphors of structure; if the complex is not something outside consciousness, then the explanation for it and its continuing effect must lie within consciousness. He quotes Sartre's denial of the unconscious in TE: 'What is called unconscious, it has been said, is only an unperceived signification' (own translation: SC, p.237). Even if we are not aware of it, 'the true signification of our life is no less its effective law' (own translation). Psychic events have an immanent signification and an effective structure, which must be distinguished from their ideal signification, which can be true or false (pp.237-8).

PP has the most positive view of Freudian psychoanalysis of the five works discussed here, expressed in the chapter, 'Le corps comme être sexué'. Not only does Merleau-Ponty acknowledge its contribution to psychology and its reintegration of the body into the philosophy of meaning; while refusing to accept the reductionism of Freud, he also explores the uniquely important role of sexuality in existence, physical, emotional and social, enabling us to understand the origin of the reduction. A marked difference between Merleau-Ponty and Sartre is the former's drawing on the existential psychoanalysis developed by Binswanger in the case study on pp.187-191. There is no indication in EN that Sartre was aware of Binswanger's work. He expounds his own method of existential psychoanalysis, based on his ontological theory. There are significant differences between the two approaches, as expounded. Binswanger's objective, like Freud's and Freud's disciples, e.g. Adler (to whom Sartre refers) and Jung, the most prominent, is primarily therapeutic. Sartre never refers to any therapeutic objective. He even casts doubt on whether existential psychoanalysis, as he conceives it, yet exists (p.620). However, we do know that it existed in the form practised by Binswanger, as recounted by Merleau-Ponty. Sartre's theory is very reminiscent of Binswanger's, when he describes its objective: '… it must reduce individual behaviours to the fundamental relations, … *of being* which are expressed in these behaviours' (own translation: EN, ibid). This finds its echo, when Merleau-Ponty describes the analysis of the young girl in the case study: 'Thus we discover, in faint outline, what the symptoms signify more generally in respect of the past and the future, of the self and the other, that is to say, in respect to the fundamental dimensions of existence'

(own translation, assisted by Smith, p.186: PP, p.188). What is absent in Merleau-Ponty/ Binswanger's analysis are Sartre's notions of *choice* and *the original project*. As I have explained above[14], these form an overall theory with serious logical and epistemological problems. The Binswanger approach (most of the method of which Sartre's is entirely consistent with) seems the more coherent overall. We notice again the importance of the empirical *and* intuitive analysis of *behaviour,* as distinct from introspection and a metaphysical interpretation of some inner or unconscious life, which both accounts emphasize.

Overall, it seems to me that all the works examined here which deal explicitly with classic psychoanalysis (i.e. excluding IMG), although none of them accept its psychological principles, show its methodological influence. What psychoanalysis offers is a hermeneutic method to uncover meaning, which, in Freudian psychoanalysis, is founded on infantile sexuality, in Adlerian psychology, on feelings of inferiority, and in existential psychoanalysis, on the movement of existence. The question of whether and how this meaning can be known by the subject herself and even the analyst is answered differently by the proponents of each approach. Freud, Adler and Binswanger, whose theory Merleau-Ponty describes, approach this uncovering as a therapeutic issue; Sartre does not, apparently, but acknowledges his debt to the method.

Conclusion

The overall objective of my project was to investigate whether the early work of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty could be used to create a phenomenological account of emotion, and if so what the major concepts of this account would be. To answer these questions, I consider how the research objectives, set out in the Introduction, have been addressed and with what success, by examining the overall contribution of our two philosophers to the principles detailed above. Finally I summarize the major concepts in the phenomenology of emotion which they put forward and outline a direction in which the project of a phenomenological account of emotion and affectivity could be developed.

[14] See Chapter 3, Summary.

Sartre deals explicitly with the affective life in all four of his works considered here. The phenomenological characteristics of affectivity and emotion summarized on pp.191-2 are largely based on these. The ETE*,* however, in which he addresses the topic directly, although it covers many of the basics, is unsatisfactory in two important aspects. Firstly, the work focuses and bases its theory of emotion on a limited range of emotional experience, namely quite extreme emotion and, in particular, situations of extreme fear (see p.40ff.). Secondly, as I have discussed in the Summary to Chapter 1, he puts forward a theory of the magical function of emotion, which is repeated in EN. I have set out my objections to this on pp.49-52.

EN deals in depth with aspects of the affective life, which I have examined and incorporated above. Apart from basic intentionality, these include the role of the body, the apprehension of the qualities of objects, the role of the passions in motivation and the expression of 'character', and the fundamental structure and meaning of the individual's being. Although the main theme of the work is ontological, the phenomenological aspects listed above stand on their own, whatever view is taken of the existence of the 'project' and 'original choice' (see pp.111-113 for my discussion of these).

L'Imaginaire, although it is not explicitly focused on the experience of emotion and emotional behaviour, contains the most coherent account of the phenomenology of emotion and affectivity of all the works considered here.

Merleau-Ponty, self-confessedly, concerns himself little with the affective aspect of our relationship to the world In SC (SC 231). In this work, his major contribution is his description of the structure of existence and consciousness, which details the integration of the physical, mental and cultural. This explains not only the physiological aspects of emotions but also the groundedness of existence in the lived experience of the body. This continues in PP. Although his main focus in the later work is perception, he does examine sexuality as a privileged area of our affective life. He also explores the way that we valorise objects in the world and how they have universal qualities, while at the same time we make individual decisions based on our individual ways of being.

All the works examined here, by both authors, describe and stress the role of behaviour in developing a phenomenological psychology. This is articulated most clearly in Merleau-Ponty, from the Introduction to SC, through its first three chapters, through the frequent behavioural examples in PP, to the Cogito chapter. There he employs the criterion of behaviour to assess

the authenticity of love and characterizes doubt as behaviour before reflection turns it into a concept. Here we see the close relationship between behaviour and existentialism, in its concern with the 'movement of existence'[15].

The emphasis on and use of behaviour also has epistemological advantages. As long as we do not fall into the trap of full blown *behaviourism,* as described by Merleau-Ponty in the Introduction to SC (pp.2-3), we can use an empirical approach, involving induction, to contribute to our examination of consciousness, without relying totally on introspection, with the concomitant self-deceptions of consciousness, the necessarily uncertain and tentative interpretation of the unconscious, or metaphysics. At the same time, in characteristic Merleau-Pontian style, we must temper our reliance on induction by remembering the fragility and perspectival partiality of our own perception and judgement.

Summary

Emotions and affects are conscious experiences, forms of unreflective, spontaneous experience, which have ontological and temporal priority over the reflective.

They only become objects in reflection. They are ways in which we relate to the world. The best way in which we can approach and describe them is as behaviour with an existential meaning. Introspection, the reflective examination and description of internal feelings, may be inadequate as reflection may fail to capture the original spontaneous and unreflected meaning of the affective experience.

Both writers stress and analyse in depth the perception and consciousness of the qualities of objects. These are important sources for our affective reactions and our affective relationship to the world.

The integration of the physical, the vital and the human enables us to understand the physiological, psychological and cultural components of affectivity and the emotions. The dialectical relationship between these components enables us to explain the notable physiological changes associated with affective experience. A related and equivalent way of seeing this, explored by both thinkers, is the exploration of the body as an aspect of the

[15] i.e. not defining existentialism in the Sartrean sense, with the full Sartrean ontology.

permanent structure of our being, the effective condition for all possible action in relation to the world. Through the body we experience the non-thetic affective tonality of existence.

Classic psychoanalysis is consistent with this, in its integration of the body, especially through the central role of sexuality, into psychology and philosophy. Existential psychoanalysis, whether of the Sartrean variety or in the therapeutic method devised by Binswanger, rejects central hypotheses of classic psychoanalysis, the unconscious, the complex and universal symbolic meanings. On the other hand, existential and classical psychoanalysis are consistent in identifying the meaning of actions in the individual's global structure of being. Merleau-Ponty focuses in particular on the importance of the fundamental structures of the individual's relationship to existence and traces pathology to a breakdown in these structures.

The question remains as to whether the two writers provide satisfactory descriptions and analyses of affective experience. Apart from the *Esquisse*, neither in the works considered has emotion and affectivity as their main subject. Merleau-Ponty, as I have pointed out earlier, apart from the topics mentioned above, is self-confessedly not focused on the affective aspect of experience. In relation to Sartre, some analysis and description in ETE are useful, although I have pointed out elsewhere he restricts the scope of this by concentrating on 'difficult' situations and emotional responses to them. He also relies on the idiosyncratic theory of emotional consciousness as a response aimed at magically changing these situations[16]. On the other hand in TE he analyses irreflexive and reflexive emotional experience; in ETE he briefly describes various emotions, active and passive fear and sadness, 'les émotions fines et faibles', and horror and disgust; in IMG he particularly analyses the affective content of images and the contrasts with affectivity in response to the real; in EN he analyses in detail irreflexive experience in the context of his ontology. Sartre's great contribution here from TE onwards is his deep and intense engagement with such experience.

Nevertheless what could be said to be lacking here even in Sartre in the context of my project is the detailed description of *feeling* a particular emotion or affect.

I have briefly outlined a potential approach to this below.

[16] This also appears in EN.

Coda: The phenomenology of doubt

This in fact is where this project began. My initial intention, arising from an interest in scepticism and doubt as philosophical ideas and approaches, was to use the results from my readings of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre to develop a phenomenological account of doubt, paying particular attention to the affective and emotional experience involved. Indeed in ETE Sartre alludes to the need for more detailed studies in a footnote to the Conclusion (ETE, p.121)[17].

Interestingly both Merleau-Ponty and Mazis allude to doubt, and in particular the *lived* experience of doubt as prior to the philosophical idea and its foundation. Merleau-Ponty discusses doubt in the Cogito chapter (PP, pp.438-9). He strongly refutes the idea of the primacy of intellectual doubt or doubt as a principle. We first have to *live* doubt in finding something doubtful (p.439). 'It is in my relationship with "things" that I know myself, internal perception comes afterwards … the certainty of the thing and of the world precedes the thetic knowledge of their properties' (own translation). Sartre makes the same point in ETE[18]. Mazis, like Merleau-Ponty but in a different way, develops a critique of Descartes (Mazis, pp.131-3). Descartes sought to free himself from e-motion in order to arrive at the foundation of rational thought, the method of radical doubt. In Mazis' eyes, however, Descartes' whole method involved suspicion and distrust, a movement of "shrinking back" from the world. Although he condemns the passions, he is still involved emotionally with the world, 'one of the most powerfully emotionally swayed thinkers: compelled by the power of distrust, …' (Mazis, p.133).

It was this affective aspect of doubt which I would be interested in exploring, not only the affective experience of doubt but also the affective origin of the concept of doubt. There is also the question of the affective *consequences* of the concept of doubt. Sceptical doubt may be conceived in gloom, depression and pessimism. It may also produce these feelings. On the other hand, it may be seen and felt as liberating, for example in the ancient conception of scepticism. Again, fideism originates in doubt, yet overcomes this to generate positive beliefs.

In terms of the principles formulated in Chapter 6 for a phenomenological account, areas to be explored would be:

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[17] 'We would wish … that our suggestions permit the undertaking of complete monographs dealing with joy, sadness, etc. We have only provided here schematic directions of such monographs' (own translation: ETE,p.121, footnote).

[18] '… doubt, of its very nature, can be nothing but the constitution of an existential quality of the object: the *doubtful* …' (Mairet, p.80; ETE, p.102)

1. The description and analysis of the experience of doubt. Merleau-Ponty makes it clear in both works discussed that, although he promotes the investigation of 'le champ phénoménal' via behaviour, he does not rule out the evidence of introspection, the personal description of experience. For this one has to look more to the approach of someone like Mazis[19] and his use of literary sources. Autobiographical accounts, including those of philosophers such as Descartes, Hume and Kierkegaard, and other accounts of the experience of religious doubt could also be explored.
2. Behaviours associated with doubt.
3. The doubtful as a quality of the world.
4. The structure of doubt in terms of the orders of existence formulated by Merleau-Ponty in SC. There are the physiological components of doubt, the gestural aspect, e.g. frowning, posture, tension, examined by Merleau-Ponty in the material on the expressive body and by Sartre in his discussion of the body-for-the-other. There is also useful material in Darwin (2009). At the same time, there is the experience of cardio-vascular aspects, which are less visible to the other. In the human order doubt becomes a reflective concept and ultimately a philosophical idea, but with affective content and affective consequences. In the vital sphere, we would have to look, I imagine, at everyday doubt. What is its function? With what 'primary' emotions is it associated? Uncertainty and fear? Loneliness?

To sum up, my aim would be to explore the affective content, present here even in association with a sophisticated philosophical idea. The premise is that the unreflected both lies behind and largely founds the reflective concept; at the same time the concept has consequences for the unreflective life. Doubt is one way of perceiving and living the world.

[19] See Introduction, pp.17ff.

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