The Prison Crime-Terror Nexus

In the wake of a series of terrorist attacks in Europe over the past two decades, it has become evident that individuals responsible for these acts often have a history of imprisonment. During their imprisonment, they forged critical relationships, acquired skills, and built strategic alliances essential for executing their crimes. Notably, illicit activities have been instrumental in facilitating the financial and logistical aspects of impactful acts of terrorism. This was evident in incidents such as the November 2015 Paris attack and the March 2016 Brussels attack, in which criminal syndicates contributed to recruitment efforts and, in some cases, provided operational support for the execution of these heinous acts. Research conducted in various parts of the world has suggested that prisons can serve as breeding grounds for criminal education and radicalisation, and the United Kingdom is no exception. This pivotal study seeks to research the crime-terror nexus within the prison environment. At a time when a substantial number of resourceful criminals coexist with ideologically motivated offenders in custody, it is imperative to conduct research to clarify what factors influence the prison crime-terror nexus.

Drawing on data collected through semi-structured interviews with professionals and frontline practitioners, as well as textual data from questionnaires and letters from prisoners, this study concludes with five central arguments. (1) The Prison Crime-Terror Nexus (PCTN) is contextual and individualistic in nature. (2) PCTN interactions are driven by necessity and opportunity. (3) The crime-terror nexus is absent in some prisons, but some exhibit ‘black hole’ characteristics—where corruption, violence, and instability create fertile ground for its emergence. (4) A two-axis matrix integrating prison security categorisation with 'black hole' characteristics offers a structured method to assess environments most conducive to the PCTN. (5) The ‘intelligence capability gap’ framework identifies systemic, operational, and conceptual barriers, such as definitional ambiguities and misaligned priorities, which hinder the detection and understanding of the PCTN. Without a precise recognition of the crime-terror nexus, even the most adept intelligence professionals may struggle to recognise its existence. In light of these findings, this research provides a data-driven definition of the PCTN. It also presents a series of recommendations aimed at guiding future strategies and interventions designed to mitigate the risks associated with the PCTN in England and Wales.