Constructing the Discontinuous: Gaston Bachelard’s Philosophy of Time

This thesis examines Gaston Bachelard’s philosophy of time as an original contribution to twentieth-century thought, rooted in epistemological considerations and shaped by the developments of early twentieth-century physics. It argues that Bachelard’s distinctive approach is founded on a rationality derived from mathematics and applied to temporal experience. Unlike contemporaries such as Bergson and Husserl, who begin with phenomenological description, Bachelard proceeds from scientific rationality and its epistemological implications. For him, science does not merely describe the world but actively constitutes new avenues of rationalistic inquiry. In the case of time, this entails abandoning substantivism in favor of a form of relationism. Time is not a substance but a system of relations between events, conditioned by both physical theories and psychological experience. This thesis situates Bachelard’s writings on time within the broader framework of his epistemological project, offering an alternative interpretation that distances him from figures traditionally associated with phenomenology and from phenomenological readings of his philosophy of time. It also underscores his epistemological divergence from Bergson. In this light, Bachelard’s philosophy of time is examined in relation to his principal scientific influences, most notably Einstein and Heisenberg.

Bachelard’s relational conception of time carries two major implications. First, metaphysically, time is disclosed through the relational structures posited by scientific theories such as relativity and quantum mechanics, where temporal order depends on frames of reference. Second, phenomenologically, time is experienced as discontinuous yet rendered intelligible through processes of reflection and construction. Duration, therefore, is not an ontological given but a constructed synthesis. To account for this synthesis, Bachelard develops rhythmanalysis, a psychological model for making sense of temporal experience. Rhythmanalysis explains how individuals establish continuity across discontinuous instants, thereby making time meaningful for consciousness without reverting to Bergson’s concept of durée. In this respect, Bachelard’s philosophy of time stands apart from both phenomenological accounts of lived duration and analytic attempts at systematic temporal models. Ultimately, this thesis contends that Bachelard’s philosophy of time is inseparable from his epistemological project. By linking mathematical rationality to temporal experience, Bachelard offers a reconceptualization of time that is discontinuous, relational, and constructive.