Secondary Spectrum Allocation Framework via Concurrent Auctions for 5G and Beyond Networks

Due to the dramatic increase of spectrum demand, efficient usage of the limited spectrum resources has become a crucial issue for the next-generation wireless networks. Auction-based spectrum trading, utilization and pricing have many promising features and have proven to be a fair and consistent way of secondary spectrum trading and management. In this paper, we present a mathematical approach to the future spectrum market where multiple buyers (secondary network operator, SNO) compete to gain spectrum resources through a number of auctions from multiple sellers (primary network operator, PNO). Through static and dynamic auctions, the secondary network operators borrow underutilized licensed spectrum resources from primary operators either through predefined contracts or through instantaneous contracts. Our main focus is on the optimal choice of the secondary operator, contiguous spectrum resource to maintain the quality and utilization history based fair allocation of the spectrum resources through auctions controlled by the third party spectrum regulators (SR), which has not been addressed previously. We first develop a matching problem to identify the most suitable auctions for secondary operators. A price-based optimal number of auctions and a utility-based ranking of the optimal auctions to be bid by the secondary operators are proposed, where the secondary operator maximizes the net utility surplus (NUS). The win or lose, pricing and allocation of spectrum resources are determined by a proposed Vickery-type mechanism. Finally, we provide simulation results to evaluate the performance of the proposed auction mechanism.