The concept of action in Maurice Blondel’s philosophy, with particular reference to the 1893 and 1936 versions of L’Action

This thesis studies the way in which the meaning of ‘action’ develops across Maurice Blondel’s oeuvre. As for method: we allocate to a ‘selection’ category passages in which ‘action’ means action in general; to a ‘construction’ category passages that can be easily rewritten so that ‘action’ means action in general; and to an ‘extension’ category passages in which the meaning of ‘action’ can be extended to action in general. By this means we conclude that in the 1893 thesis ‘action’ means human action, and that in later writings the meaning broadens to action in general. We also conclude that Blondel could have understood ‘action’ as action in general throughout if he had wished to, and that he had reasons not to do so. Further conclusions relate to an evolution from philosophy with theological implications to theology understood philosophically; to a connection between that evolution and the evolution of the meaning of the ‘action’; and to the concept of ‘pure Act’. Finally, we ask to what extent Blondel understood reality ‘actologically’, that is, with Action rather than Being as the fundamental concept, and with reality understood as action in changing patterns.